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ELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND HERESY IN THE MIDDLE AGES

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND HERESY IN THE MIDDLE AGES

BY THE REV.

F. W. BUSSELL, D.D. (Oxon.)

Perpetual Curate of Brushford, Devon
Rector of Northolt, Middlesex
Fellow and sometime Vice-Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford
Bampton Lecturer, 1905



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TO THE PRINCIPAL AND FELLOWS
OF BRASENOSE COLLEGE
A SMALL TOKEN OF GRATITUDE
AT THE CLOSE OF THIRTY HAPPY
YEARS OF SERVICE IN THEIR MIDST

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Religious Thought and Heresy in the Middle Ages

INTRODUCTION

PART I

General Scope of the Work

THIS work is intended to throw light upon the motives and developments of religion in its social aspects during the Middle Age. This period begins with the rise of religion to secular power in the Papacy and in Islam; it ends in the West with the disappearance of the Medieval Empire, the Church's rival, and all its representative ideals. It is one of the most fertile and inconsistent ages in the history of religion: everywhere in West and East alike it gathers up and remoulds the past into new forms. At every point we are obliged to retrace our steps far backwards to arrive at the primitive source and origin of later phenomena.

It is not pretended that the descent or affiliation of beliefs in East and West is clearly proved; all that is clear is that from the earliest times there has been current the same limited number of solutions for the cosmic and religious problem, so that a knowledge of the past can only be obtained by a patient study of the whole.

One excuse for gathering at first sight unwieldy and disparate material may be pleaded: it is only within the last few years that the special studies of experts in oriental matters has been freely placed at the disposal of amateurs or general students. Only recently has it become possible to appreciate the true meaning e.g. of buddhism, or to codify the new views on the most primitive

creeds of Hindustan, and the earliest character of our kinsmen, its invaders.

Yet without this help it would be hopeless to estimate the influences at work in our period upon the world's religions. In studying the evolution of hindu thought, perhaps closely connected with the remarkable developments of Islam under the Caliphate, in tracing the blends of Chaldeism and greek peripatetic philosophy with Christian, parsi, or arabian ideas—the chief aim before the writer has of course been the illustration of western movements within or just outside the Catholic Church. Light is thrown upon that notable decay of Idealism in Europe which follows the overthrow of Emperor and Pope as effective forces. The writer's standpoint will be already familiar to readers of the *Bampton Lectures* for *1905*.[1] The importance of such figures as Frederic II and Philip the Fair is due to their heralding of the purely secular aims and powers of the modern State. Again, the savage repression of heresy as a contagion inimical to the whole social life can only be explained and (to a certain extent) justified when all the circumstances are understood. The break up of the attempted *Monism* of the medieval Church-State divided human life into the competitive nations, and hostile departments in which we find it to-day. Henceforth *unity* can be achieved not by a harmony or reconcilement of the parts—as Scholastic and the Holy Roman Empire hoped—but by a resolute denial of them, by refusal to recognize this region of the diverse and particular: that is, by a return to the very ancient Absolutism of India. It cannot be doubted that the cultured and enlightened class gained in the following ages a very substantial measure of freedom and of toleration, owing to the decay of moral conviction and of religious belief. But it will be seen how slowly this has been won and how little the average individual, who is neither cultured nor enlightened, has gained in the process.

It cannot be said that the present study warrants any very bright hopes for the immediate future of mankind; but it will serve to illustrate some permanent phases and tendencies of the human mind, some fundamental hopes and beliefs which no perfectly organized secular State can satisfy or abolish.

[1] He is permitted to refer to a very thoughtful survey and sympathetic appreciation of his ideas by the Reverend John Lendrum, M.A., of Elgin (*Interpreter*, July 1915).

It will be impossible to escape blame in the matter and arrangement of a work claiming to cover so wide a survey. There will be grave difference of opinion as to the relative importance of passages in *large* and *small* type: some parts will be deemed wholly superfluous or out of place by strict critics, and in others a certain repetition of material (which to the writer seems unavoidable) will be held up to rebuke. The aim has been to make each section complete in itself. The whole book is but part of a comprehensive study of *Human Thought and Ideals* from the dawn of history—a work only rendered possible to a synthetizing philosopher by the patient labour and research which has been displayed by recent specialists. That completeness or accuracy in such a synoptic attempt is beyond the reach of any one student must not deter the human mind from making it. Philosophy, often merely barren and *à priori*, must be wedded to the new wealth of material opened by historic inquiry before it can serve the purpose of a wider circle than that of a few mystics or quietists. The restoration of western ideals after the present war will indeed depend mainly upon native instincts, feelings and convictions. But a truer knowledge of the past will help us to avoid the foolish complacence, shallow optimism, narrow prejudice, or culpable blindness which, in spite of its achievement in many departments of life, will for ever be considered the true marks of the nineteenth century.

PART II

The Church in the Middle Ages and the Influences at work during 600–1300 A.D.

Assured Conviction of the Church.—Authority in the Middle Ages must always suggest the Church: strictly speaking her rival, the State, did not possess or use authority, either as policy firmly conceived and inflexibly carried out, or as coercive power able to enforce its rules over a wide area without respect of person or privilege. Only the Church knew its own mind, and had made out a definite system or program of living for its subjects, which comprised both this world and the next, and met and satisfied (as was believed) every human need and aspiration. In exercising this social power churchmen were assured and unhesitating, fully convinced that they had a divine mission to the world and represented in their tutelage the best and final form of earthly polity. In other classes of society, shut out from each other by exclusive franchises, faulty intercourse and above all, by mutual ignorance, there was no assurance and no conviction.

Elsewhere uncertainty and improvisation.—Kings had no

theory of their rights except what from time to time the Church taught them. The exquisite and formal symmetry of the feudal system was a legal or artistic fiction, which only arose when the substance had passed away: the laws of chivalry were only codified when there were no more knights. The town-centres had no exact plan of municipal politics; merchants schemed and made leagues from day to day: it was use and necessity and circumstance, not human foresight, that crystallized their institutions. Only the Church was sure of itself and frankly believed that it held within its grasp all mysteries and the key to every secret of life. This is true both in East and West; we must not forget Byzantium when we speak of the Middle Age. In both a sacrosanct power, a mixed *sacerdotium* and *regnum*, represented and sustained the final form of Christ's kingdom, so far as this could be realized upon earth.

First great event: rise of Islam.—Now the first great event in our period is the rise of Islam. Fear of this menace was the great lever in politics, East and West, during the greater part of it: we need no further witness that the old self-conscious spirit, defensive yet bold, has passed away for ever when Pius II preaches a last crusade to unheeding ears, when Alexander VI and Francis I make covenants with the Great Turk.

Results of Crusades—disintegrating.—Much earlier than this, the result of the Crusades (rapidly becoming secular movements of worldly greed and ambition) and the incoming of arab philosophy, suggested to the lay world that the danger was not after all so terrible and that the two creeds and cultures had more in common than was supposed. Against this easy tolerance the Church protested with all her might.

Attacks on Christian Orthodoxy: (1) Iconoclasm.—In the East, orthodoxy was attacked by the Iconoclasts (*717–842*; with some intervals) who had doubtless borrowed much as thinkers from the muslim, against whom they fought as emperors.

(2) Paulicians.—Half a century before Leo III the Syrian, that peculiar movement of heresy emerged into the light which we know under the names of paulician, bogomile, catharist and finally albigensian. This was only externally linked with the muslim attack on eastern Christendom; for in doctrine it had little in common. But it arose because the monopoly of the orthodox church had been challenged, and an opening was given

to sectarian malcontents to express their feelings and possibly regain their liberty. The paulician heresy is a lengthy and unfinished chapter in byzantine history; its remnants were not merely discovered in cent. xii by Alexius Comnenus, but survive to the present hour; the rapid advance of Islam in Bosnia and Albania owed much to the sympathy and adherence of the sect.

(3) **Albigenses: The chief foes of Christendom in the west.**—The movement, passing westwards and settling where Islam had been expelled or at least humbled by Charles Martel, became the chief foe of that organized churchly society of which Rome was the centre and stronghold. If we are tracing, not the restless and opportunist movements of barons or traders fighting for their own hand, but the striving of independent thought, we cannot deny that the suppression of heresy and the extirpation of a wholly alien element in the populace seemed to be the chief need of the church—even if we hesitate to admit that it was the chief duty.

Panic of the Church as the only State with convictions and a policy.—The fact remains plain to be seen (whatever our verdict) that the Church was terribly afraid of the new spirit and shrank in the end from no cruelty that it might be rid of it for ever. In cent. xi it was already conscious of the enemy within the gate before it went forth to attack Islam in its own house. Persecution began early in that century and in the first stages marked a new departure in *civil* policy rather than in *ecclesiastical*: the pious king Robert was 'consenting unto the death' of the canons of Orleans, and at first it was feared that the clergy would be supine in the repression of heresy. As time went on and the brilliant society of Southern France, while openly scoffing at heresy, became more and more heretical, the Church became thoroughly alarmed. It was not the petulance of resentful dogmatists that kindled the fires but the genuine fear that an anti-social poison was penetrating mankind, that the future of Christendom was at stake and the faith itself in jeopardy. Although this panic changed its object later, it was the same feeling that prompted the savage pursuit of witches in the most enlightened and humane countries down to the year *1700*. Only in the very last years of cent. xii was a radical attempt made by Innocent III to stamp out heresy; after the Albigenses were suppressed as a 'political'

party the Inquisition still continued the task of uprooting any sporadic growth of 'free thought.' In Spain, the chief zone of danger from the earliest times, the Holy Office has not to-day been abolished for a full century. In Russia and Latin America it is still possible to find traces of the old intolerance which sprang from fear and was in the main a popular movement, only headed by Authority lest worse things befall if hostile feelings were left to uncontrolled mob-law.

Just at the same time (*1200*) there entered the last and most insidious phase of eastern thought, in the commentators and translators (both Arab and Jew) who brought in an heretical philosophy through Spain from the extreme East: 'Averroism' (as it was somewhat unfairly called) forms a long episode in our period, perhaps only of late years reduced to its proper perspective and true proportions. The new learning stirred the mental powers to recover *an earlier and now lost truth*, sometimes moving the mind to science, sometimes to strange apocalyptic vision; now to a conviction that a fresh outpouring of the Spirit was impending, now to pantheistic denial of all explicit revelation or positive religion, now to a defiant sectarian communism, now to the wild self-torture of ascetic individualism. Whatever the form, all were animated by a genuine hostility to the powers that were and to the established Church-state, within which nations, no less than individuals, were growing up to self-consciousness and a demand for free expansion.

Aristotle first as foe then ally: harmony of *Reason* and *Faith*.—The Church, on the defensive, after an early ban placed upon Aristotle, was thankful to recognize a useful ally in him on closer acquaintance: he was pronounced to be our Saviour's *praecursor in naturalibus* and under his guidance dogma was finally elaborated into a complete system of rational thought. For Albert and Aquinas are rather *apologists* than *dogmatic* formalists of set purpose: their aim is to show (for how brief a space!) the complete accord of the *faith* and *reason*, of acceptance on *belief* and conviction by *argument*, which had been already challenged by the Double Truth.

Apostasy and Collapse of the Empire.—Meantime in the political world the empire, for long the partner, but sometimes the reformer, of the spiritual power, had suddenly apostatized in Frederic II. From the East again had come that belief in

many incarnations of the divine which, foisting itself on the barren and wholly uncongenial ground of Islam, had contrived to beget strange heresies, sects and development in Irak and Egypt and at last took possession of the unbalanced brain of that King of Sicily, who, by a strange irony, was also Roman Emperor.

Sternness of Church justified.—Of his sympathy with muslim in creed and politics there was no doubt whatever; nor of his hatred of the papacy. We may regret the atrocities of the albigensian Crusade but we can justify and explain the sternness of the chief agents. So in the sad disaster of the welf and wibelline quarrel we must recognize that the fears and hostility of the popes were well grounded: was heresy to be rooted out in Provence only to be permanently enthroned with Cæsar? Meantime, to complete the tragic drama of the Middle Ages, the pope only triumphed over his rival and became for a brief moment the sole leader of Europe, to succumb to the rising forces of nationalism, and to vanish as an effective factor until the humbler and more spiritual days of the great Counter-Reformation.

Divisions of the work: The movements of 'Free Thought' leading to bondage.—It will be our task to trace the mission and influence of oriental thought from the earliest days of Hindustan, through Persia to the west, down to the heresy which reached its zenith about *1200*; next the rise of arab philosophy (so-called) in Islam, and its effects on western thought; the independent growth of antinomian or ascetic doctrines on the fringe of the churches: and lastly the new system of government and politics which appeared first in Frederic II the herald and pioneer of the modern absolutist and secular State. All these are movements of 'free thought'—by no means in the sense of a desire to attain individual freedom for life and conduct, but as protests against a visible system which prescribed a single and (as it was held) erroneous view of the universe and man's place within it.

Heresy represents pre-Christian ideas.—For the heretics were an off-shoot of a pre-Christian theory of the world, with which had been embodied certain early and imperfect Christian ideas: they demanded a freedom and tolerance for this view which would in the end have destroyed all civil and religious supremacy in the Church-state. The new philosophy again, in part mystic and in part naturalistic, displaced man from the position of

central exclusiveness given by the Christian scheme of redemption. Henceforth the mark of the irreconcilable party was to believe the universe 'uncreated and eternal,' the human unit a passing and accidental phase of a single Being. Here again was a claim put forward to hold tenets which, however destructive of the social and religious framework no less than of individual hopes and worth, might certainly bear the collective name 'free-thought.' In the last and most conspicuous sphere, that of the State, a violent revolution occurred, in the rejection of a moral and ecumenical power or arbiter, in the recognition of the new secular claim of localism and nationality, ruled with coercive and summary force by a king who resented any papal counsels or intervention. Here, once more, there is little (as we know to-day) that makes for freedom in any ordinary or accepted meaning: the impersonal State and its absolute ruler may be technically free but the individual subject is not. In place of the intermittent violence of the medieval mesne-lord he was subject henceforth to the hourly control and dictation of the state official.

Protest of Nominalism and Individualism in Renaissance.—Finally then we have to notice one last phase, which inaugurates a conflict which is raging as fiercely in our own age as in any other. The Renaissance and the 'humanism' it brought with it really demanded, what the other movements had not pursued, personal freedom of thought and action, liberty for the subject to enfranchise himself from servitude to the great objectives—church, state, gild, corporation, dogma, tradition, morality—and to lead his own life. This is the first movement of Individualism, which produces then and in all subsequent time the conflict of the two ultimate and irreconcilable sovereignties—of the State and of the Individual. An inquiry then into the causes and demands of this consciously atomic tendency must complete any survey of the struggle of free-thought against Authority:—because in it alone does any element appear of that which we understand to-day by the term *Liberty*. Thus keeping the title Authority for the system, policy and control of Rome we shall find, after the first onslaught of Islam, definitely hostile forces or *momenta* in the defiance or challenge thrown down:—to the Christian religion itself, the last effort of a pagan and pre-Christian world-theory allied with many Christians resentful of church abuses: to the *dogmatic* exposition of the Faith on the part of a

small circle of philosophers, uniting elements from the first group with peripatetic and later platonic teaching : against clericalism or churchly and papal supervision on the part of the modern nation-state and its secularizing rulers—in effect, a claim to restrict morality and submission to the private life of citizens and subjects and to set the state-organism free from moral restraint : lastly (the only case in which the unit becomes prominent and is seen fighting for his own hand) the movement towards individual liberty of choice in the ideals and theories of life against the (supposed) exclusiveness of the churchly ideal. First, it will be needful to describe clearly the sources both of orthodoxy and of heretical theories and to inquire carefully into the earliest movements in India, the last results both of patristic learning and of independent greek thought,—the religious schemes of redemption that met and blended with it in Syria and Chaldea.

DIVISION A

Hindustan and the Religions of Further Asia

PART I

Aryan and Dravidian Creeds in India

CHAPTER A. THE TWO RACIAL FACTORS

Section I. The Aryans

Study of hindu thought: a needful part of our inquiry.—We cannot to-day exclude the forms of Indian thought and religion from any survey that claims to be inclusive. To comprehend th ese phases, slowly revealing to the reverent and careful study of the west, does not imply dogmatism about origins, influence, indebtedness. There is no reason, for example, to seek for actual connection between the names and persons and teachings of Buddha, Confucius and Pythagoras in that movement of the years *550–500* which must be called the Great Awakening of the human intellect. But a parallel treatment of these kindred tendencies can hardly be avoided ;—in any case one will be found to illustrate the other and to exhibit, by the strange points of contact or contrast, if not the actual borrowing of a disciple, at least the fundamental unity of our human mind. To omit mention of eastern thought in this epoch (*600–1300*) is both unwise and unfair, for even if the origins be independent and isolated, we must allow in a later period for a large margin of actual intercourse and unconscious influence. If the chief age of medieval thought was awakened to life by Arabs and Albigenses (*1200–1300*), the beliefs of these schools, flourishing on the extreme borders of the west, have their roots deeply

but obscurely planted in the further east. Averroes implies not merely the whole circuit of greek thought but a steady persian influence and a certain element from Hindustan. If Mani stands behind the whole anti-Christian movement (culminating, ignorant of its strange parentage, in our Reformation) behind Mani again lies the entire evolution of indian asceticism, —though it may not be easy to show how far the great heresiarch was consciously indebted to this. It is certainly possible to trace from India (known through Alexander) a stimulus to hellenic quietism, though this is by no means the chief formative influence: just as Plotinus is a true Greek completing the work of Plato, Aristotle and the subjective schools, but at the same time stands within the area of genuine eastern influence and finds in its teaching, not the origin, but the ratification, of his prejudices. Thus once again our own religion is quite independent in its doctrinal system of any purely mechanical impression from without, but it is not an accident (nor a mark of servitude) that these dogmas are cast in the forms set by greek thought and meet and satisfy aspirations sent up by the reflective eastern mind from the very dawn of history. It is not therefore in any assertive spirit that we begin to survey the religious feeling of mankind in the Dark Ages on the indian continent —a land whose forms of thought and belief have impressed by far the greater part of our race from the earliest times.

Novelty and difficulty of the synoptic 'Problem.'—It is only of late years that such a survey is in any degree possible. We are not even now fully acquainted with the material for an exhaustive study or a final judgment. But it is not too much to say that within these first years of this century new light has been thrown, not only on the material but on the interpretation, of every historic problem. In the matter of Comparative Religion, the result is perhaps the most striking. But the task of the earliest systematizers is all the more difficult. The complexity of special work in the rapidly multiplying sub-departments of knowledge places a synoptic inquiry beyond the power of any single student, and any such venture must seem an impertinence. In this attempt at harmony every general statement ought to leave behind it such a full knowledge of the particulars as is unattainable. The older commonplaces and truisms must receive careful scrutiny

and be accepted with reserve and on trial. The calm assurance of the western mind in relation to life's problems and aims—an attitude, however, largely assumed to hide our growing doubts and anxieties—must certainly be profoundly modified in the course of the present war. To contrast and compare other standards in a humble spirit must in any case be one outcome at least ; and for some time to come there will be either a suspension of impartial scholarship or at least such a rift between its chief professors and representatives as must gravely hinder further unification. Thus, though the present seems a fitting moment for trying to adjust the particulars of specialized study, such an effort must of course be merely tentative and provisional. It will be no shame to have failed, but rather not to have attempted —in a time when to lie fallow and become sterile is criminal alike in student and in man of action.

Doubtful points in Aryan History.—Most of the nations of Europe are related in some obscure way to the so-called 'Aryans' of India and Persia, if only through their common tongue. But the first home and later diffusion of the 'aryan race' are still under dispute: and the proportion of Hindus who are genuine kinsmen to western peoples, classical or modern, is very doubtful. Few historical subjects are more obscure. It is again very uncertain what culture and faith the settlers in Punjab (*c. 1800–1500* at the earliest) and Ganges-valley (*1500–1000*) brought with them. Critics tend to discredit their superiority to the native races, chiefly in S. India ; who, for long remaining aloof and untouched by their influence, produced when the time came their own literature and religious forms, and to-day preserve both in popular rites and educated belief a genuine independence thinly veiled under recognition of the brahman caste. We know now that the aim of this caste has been everywhere and at all times the same ; to preserve continuity and avoid sudden rupture, to smooth over violent opposition and effect compromise, to acknowledge and admit every indigenous form of worship (subject to its own general control) and to arrange quite irreconcilable standards of life and creed in a formally perfect series or hierarchy. In any case we must carefully analyze what we can discover of Aryan and Dravidian origins and (so far as is possible) refer to each its due share in the final blend.

Original home and religion ?—The original equipment of the

aryan mind seems very inferior and it will be our first task to inquire how far its claims can be justified. Since Gruppe, we have been taught to mistrust the loftiness of aryan religious sense, though we may be reluctant to agree that they were 'devoid of religion' and borrowed all that they exhibit from Asia or from Egypt! Their domestic purity has been assailed as well: they were free neither from Shamanism nor *Sati*: it seems proved (in the opinion of many credible authors) that the *lingam*-cult, formerly referred to the 'low and sensuous Dravidian native', was in truth introduced by the northern immigrant. One thing is certainly clear: the early immigrants were at no higher stage in culture and thought than Homer's Acheans or their later kinsfolk the Norsemen,—whose inroad created modern Europe, just as the two former conquests (or perhaps infiltrations) created India and Greece and Italy. Such a chivalrous society of nobles and their dependants has in any age its specific virtues, but among them religious coherence and depth of thought are not conspicuous. If the marvellous later development is really due to aryan thought, it is under the strong influence of climate and native ideas: just as 'greek philosophy' is a blend and most certainly not the peculiar product of a conquering tribe from the north. In both countries the nucleus must have been supplied by the deep brooding spirit of the long-settled original inmates, *Dravidian* or *Ægean*,—just as our prominent *norman* scholastics may have promoted, but assuredly did not originate, medieval philosophy.

Extent of influx and influence doubtful.—If we have reason to doubt the extent of both the influx and influence of Aryans in India, it has been reserved for a native, Iyengar,[1] to deny their arrival altogether: 'between *2000* and *1000* there was no 'appreciable racial drift, but a foreign tongue and culture were 'somehow adopted by tribes later taking the name *aryan* to 'distinguish their race from other natives and neighbours.' This may be an extreme statement but it is a natural reaction against a most unfair emphasis. The exact proportion of culture given and received by either factor will never be known; but it will not again be forgotten that the peninsulas of the world—

[1] *Journ. Roy. As. Soc.* 1912—a conclusion which Risley, the famous author of the *Census Report* 1901, seems also inclined to accept.

India, Greece, Italy—must contain the most mixed peoples and on this account the most complex and perhaps most perfect civilizations. A theory has even been started that the buddhist movement is not aryan at all, but comes from a burman-malay source of the furthest east, wholly at variance in its extreme quietism and world-surrender with the instincts of aryan *Ksatriyas* (even allowing for some centuries of an enervating climate in Ganges-valley).

Low stage of primitive culture : the two cults, *souls* and *spirits*.—The incoming aryan tribes, if assumed at all, were at a low stage of culture, not much superior to that of the indigens whom they dispossessed in the north. Certain primitive features common to all users of aryan dialects may be distinguished in them. They had (like most people) two quite separate worships — of *souls* and of *spirits*. The cult of the Fathers (*pitara*), hopelessly irreconcilable either with their nature-cult or speculation, still holds its own to-day,—the religion of a continuous family line, in which the several members fit in as links in a chain having but little personal import and no further duty beyond handing on the torch of life. Fustel de Coulanges is here completely justified, often as he has been assailed, for his stress on patriarchal institutions and the domestic cult of the hearth. The whole social and religious life of India from earliest times has depended on a cult of ancestors, which makes celibacy inconceivable or a heinous sin, and regards the unit as one in an undying series or unbroken chain. The extreme individualism of the later subjective reaction cannot be harmonized by any logical experiment, and therefore, as in the case of castes, the different schools are merely superimposed. There still survives in parts of White Russia that combined reverence and fear of the departed which is probably common to the whole aryan family : disrespect and neglect bring all sorts of evil, family quarrels, loss of crops and cattle, even the falling of the hills on guilty survivors. When ancestors are begged to intercede with a supreme being, we have clearly a later compromise with an imported religion (in the stricter sense) : at first (as in every savage tribe) they are independent powers, world-rulers with effective control over their descendants' fortunes. To-day Indians ask the *pitara* for children. These souls are invited at set times to return to the world they have left, but when they have partaken of good cheer and

kindly welcome they are again urged to depart. (So Indians, Letts, and classical Greeks, cf. Harrison's *Prolegomena*). The family ghosts are a peevish crew, sensitive to slight, and apt to take offence on trivial pretext, ἥρωες δυσόργητοι κ. χαλεποὶ τοῖς ἐμπελάζουσι. The truculent ghost Achilles demanding human victims and revived from a shadow-life by gory draughts is the true type. In all funeral customs fear and respect, affection and dislike seem almost equally blended.

Survival of the Dead: (*a*) in the tomb; (*b*) in some distant paradise.—Meantime religious belief as to the future lot of the dead has altered: at first the dead man lives on in the tomb, surrounded by objects needful in this life and so presumably in the next, carefully protected from damage to his bodily envelope or at least to his osseous structure. To the same stratum of eschatology belong the cairn or dolmen-tombs of the megalithic builders all over the world, from the west and north of Europe through Africa and Palestine to India, Corea and Japan: not other were the earliest beliefs of Egypt, in providing the god-king with an indestructible body and an eternal abode. Nearly everywhere (as in the Roman forum) burial and burning are found together, but burning is the later usage and implies a new theory of the Soul. There are signs in Early Bronze Age of a decay of this primitive faith in ancestors living near descendants in their cemetery and taking heed of their fortunes from a short distance. The neolithic peoples *inter*; only after an interval and in the Bronze Age do they *cremate* their dead. The horror felt by the different tribes (in Herodotus' well-known story) for each others' funeral customs accurately reflects the gulf between the two stages of thought. The aim is no longer to protect the material frame, to confine it to the sepulchre that it may not become vampire, and to offer respectful homage on set occasions —but to purify and set free from all earthly contagion that principle which must be called spiritual. As long as the body lasts, the poor soul is tied to it, and instead of being preserved this material vehicle must be destroyed: gifts once lowered into the tomb are now burnt with it, or at least broken, to ensure a passage to the other world.[1] New homes and paradises are dis-

[1] It may here be said once and for all that the attempt to exonerate the aryan family from *Sati* has failed; it is a practice common all the

covered for the soul thus set free,—often in the west, according to a myth (no doubt solar) found in nearly every savage race. The tribal cemetery no longer confines the ancestor ; he has gone on a much longer journey from home : the ground which is truly holy is remote, not near at hand.

Remote Homes for dead according to desert.—It is easy to trace here the effect of migration and conquest. Kingly families are descended from the Sun and their representatives return like Pharaoh to the heaven which has only lent them to earth for a season. Breasted (writing on the Osiriac Cult) and others have well traced the *moralizing* and democratizing process which transformed this eschatology :[1] the heaven of divine favouritism, or by right of birth, becomes less exclusive ; it is opened to all and is gained by goodness : in like manner the small Hades or tartarus of a few ' paradigmatic ' criminals is prepared for the purging and punishment of all sinners of whatever rank. The Way of the Fathers is the simplest and most ancient scheme in Hindustan, and the next life is a family reunion (just as the continuance of the family on earth may be due to a return of ancestors in a new birth). To their tribal god the Gets of Herodotus send at intervals envoys, and willing victims immolated on spears—like Frazer's ' divine victims ' all over the world. This home lies beyond the earthly surface, in sun or moon : but it can never wholly replace the original abode of the dead in or under the earth, where they are planted as seed ' in sure and certain hope ' : an idea which also provides us with one link or point of transition to the second form of aryan worship, the cult of *nature* and the propitiation of spirits.

Second religion : *Animism* ; early *science* rather than *religion*.—Animism is here used for the cult of *nature* not of *ancestors*, of *spirits* not of *souls*, of the unknown and incalculable rather than of the known tradition and the tribal custom. I am aware that much reverence for the dead arises from fear of

world over from which they are by no means exempt ; it is found among Scyths, Mongols, Thracians, Slavs, Teutons, and Letts. But it seems true that the Vedic Indian had abandoned it. Garbe and Risley (*Cens. Rep.* 1901) believe it was never quite extinct but reappeared with savage emphasis soon after the time of Buddha, or about the age of Panini (450–400).

[1] *Devel. of. Rel. and Thought in Anc. Egypt.* London : Hodder & Stoughton, 1912.

their new power and changed characters when disembodied: we still to-day read blood-curdling romances of those who become vampires in the next life against their will and can only be saved from themselves by a horrible ritual. But on the whole the aim of true ancestral worship is to preserve the family and maintain the tribal usage. With the world of Nature it is different: man is face to face with the untrustworthy and capricious, though he may seek to represent it as having will and desires like his own. It would however be a very great mistake to suppose that Animism deals at first with fully matured personalities, conceived by analogy with ourselves and hiding behind phenomena which nevertheless they are able to escape and transcend, as a man his instrument or vehicle. This is the later stage of self-conscious hellenic rationalizing with its strong humanist bias and its romantic delight in clear-cut characters. But it is not the key of all mythology and has often led inquirers astray. Animism is early *science* rather than primitive *religion*: it leads on to *theurgy* not to *theology*. It recognizes in things a Something forceful and fatal, an impersonal impulse which can be controlled, diverted or counteracted. It is a spiritual force or a *spirit*, but it is not a *soul* which can be addressed in the confident fashion in which we couch appeals to an ancient forefather of the tribe. Nor is its worship one of custom or normal usage; it is not the elders who can hold intercourse with it; a special faculty, personal or inherited by a family set apart, marks off the *shaman* who can interpret nature. I am aware that *shamans* often claim to communicate with offended ancestors; and that on the other hand the ritual of the vegetation-god is recurrent, customary and mostly familiar. But on the whole the distinction drawn holds good; that very different rites, methods and mediaries are found employed in these two chief branches of ancient religion. These vague potencies behind phenomena are certainly not conceived as persons, as the term Animism perhaps unhappily suggests, nor (at least at first) as resembling man in character or as sympathetic with human interests. The 'departmental gods' (solemnly reckoned up by Varro and Censorin, laughed at by St. Augustin) are not individuals, for ever engrossed in a never finished task or else summoned into momentary being by the need (or imagination) of the worshipper. The three male teutonic gods (so Kaufmann)

by the side of Great Mother Freya (Tacitus' *Nerthus* or *Herthus*) are not men or persons, but actually *wind, thunder, sky*. For aryan 'animism' the first stage is not far from *fetish worship*, in which quite irrelevantly and without explanation or warning a certain natural object is found to contain accumulated force—e.g. the *Svayambhu* stones of later hindu thought. By degrees the motley congeries of *spiritual* objects were united under fewer forces and at last under a single one; just as Ionia explained the manifold as phases in the transmutation of the one eternal Substance. The mark of all primitive aryan thought is that Sky itself and the Shining Ones form the nucleus; that fire (the earthly element most akin to heaven) should among Indo-aryans, Persians, and later Romans provide the earliest embodiment or symbol of the divine principle.

Not *personal* at first: in the tribe *personality* emerges late: from *fatalism* to *freedom*.—That physical forces and heavenly bodies were not first conceived as *personal* seems certain; the hymns to Agni are addressed to an elemental potency not to an anthropomorphic deity. As with pelasgic, thracian, celtiberian *numina*, these forces are anonymous. Personality is not understood or emphasized until 'history and political aggregation produces *personages*' within man's actual experience, as Schrader of Breslau very well says. When kings, nobles, and champions in war, or leaders in successful migration, stand out of the ranks, the hitherto impersonal *numina* are invested with the same striking qualities. First man separates himself as superior from the *world of nature*, then from his old friends and rivals, the *animals*, lastly (in kingship and nobility) from his own *kin*. He begins to demand behind phenomena a reflex of himself; and this humanist movement marks his awakening to full self-consciousness. Fate is no longer something that works irresistibly, careless of man, but something against which it is good to struggle, which at times it is possible to divert or even thwart. It has been noticed that the last aryan family to enter the arena of history, the russian Slav, is also absorbed in fatalism, has few national heroes and has been obliged to depend for political cohesion on the rule of foreigners. It is the Heroic Age, that is the age of 'norse' pirates and freebooters, which teaches the supremacy of man as end and ideal both over nature and his fellow and crushes the old *democracy* of settled communities by

the new *chivalry* of migration. There is no doubt that the primitive aryan was deeply impregnated with this slavonic fatalism and sense of dependence, which only wore off by degrees when he found himself the master of alien slaves or clients. It returned once again under the stress of a depressing climate to teach him a new theology. His gods are all secondary and derived; there is never a real Creator. In homeric Greece Zeus himself is subject to destiny, *karma* is stronger than divine will and refuses to spare Sarpedon when his appointed hour is come. It is likely that *δαίμων* has nothing to do with wisdom or cunning (*δαήμων*) but is derived from *δαίομαι*, the lot *distributed* to each, dwelling with him and working itself out in his life; sometimes in Greece the *κῆρ*, like the Egyptian *Ka*, is one of man's souls, passed on from father to son,—like the inherited taint of tragedy.[1] That man should rise above his tribe, above nature, above the character of deities his ancestors bequeathed him, is the beginning of freedom, the initial step towards winning a spiritual liberty. The soul is filled and fired by heroic deeds; thus the Eastern Slavs, clinging longest to family tradition and equality, remaining latest near their original home, are still the most pagan and fatalist division of aryan-speaking peoples. Such as they are, the early invaders of Hindustan must have been. Caste, progress in culture, militarism, sacerdotal claims, and theology at once independent and sceptical—these arose from the success of conquering raids and gave hindu thought that peculiar tendency to an arrogant individualism which soon united with pantheism.[2]

Is anthropomorphic element in creed a *loan*?—It is even held that the *personal* or anthropomorphic element in an aryan creed must be a loan and that the roman religion has most faithfully preserved these vague potencies working in national objects, impalpable and intangible. Oldenberg suggests that the Light Gods or Shining Ones (*Mitra*, *Varuna*, and *Aditya*) were borrowed

[1] The Norse *fylgja*, something analogous to Persian *fravashi*: there is besides the *mother's* dower, which no doubt helped on the Cult of the Mothers (cf. Goethe's *Faust*), and met and blended with dravidian beliefs in norse myth (not to mention greek and latin) the Norns are quite independent of Wodan until he is transformed into a sovereign Deity under foreign influences.

[2] In a modified and peculiar sense as the sequel will show.

from Sumerians or Semites. It seems possible to some that the Persians learnt to sacrifice to a personal god from Arabs or Assyrians; that the Greeks derived from the east the personal characters of their deities.[1] The Roman never seriously admitted the vivid individuals of the greek pantheon except for a state-cult which every one felt to be unreal; the real *numina* were mysterious powers, rarefied if potent abstractions and in no sense human. Lastly the Teutons, as we know from Tacitus, did not liken their deities to any human shape or confine them in temples; grove-and tree worship was the earliest religious phase and they only learnt in two centuries of contact with a hellenized Rome to put names to deities and regard them as persons. Prayer to a person is long subsequent to magic constraint of inherent forces.[2] *Agni* in vedic hymns is after all only the element of flame; Homer's Zeus (though by that time represented as a superman) is really a natural power (*νεφεληγερέτης*) upon whom epithets from human relations sit clumsily (*μητιέτης*, *ξένιος*): only by degrees (as Westermarck) were natural powers brought into contact with mankind as 'guardians of morality.' Apollo is at first 'he of the cattle-pen', Hermes 'he of the cairn' (Usener, Schrader) It was in the *cult of the dead*, not in the *worship of natural forces*, that they found a basis for conduct; the *καθεστῶτα νόμιμα* are under the protection of ancestral souls jealously watching over the institutions of the tribe. In the Veda, inferior gods seem to prefer *animal* rather than *human* shape; there is no distinct barrier between these two branches or stages of organic life. Certainly in Greece, deities were zoomorphic (as Artemis, she-bear, Juno the ox-eyed *βοῶπις*, so E. Meyer and Harrison). In teutonic myth, we have *snake, wolf, bear, goat* as vehicles of the divine *Donar* (thunder) and other gods; Frey's boar is well known in two passages of Tacitus (*Germ.* § 45, *formas aprorum gestant* and *Hist.* iv 22,

[1] Any ægean debt of this sort is very unpopular to-day, and Foucart is almost treated as obsolete because he still insists on tracing greek mysteries to Egypt: it was rather the Heroic Age of Homer that converted *nature*-powers into *human* personalities.

[2] That is, in any religious evolution of which we can trace the record: the belief in a primitive monotheism (from which later creeds are perversions) is by no means extinct, and is certainly not rejected as a *possible* hypothesis by the present writer.

ferarum imagines). In India an early personation was Father-Sky, accounted (as in China) the male or positive principle and wedded to the feminine and receptive earth. Scyths and Bithynians call Zeus παπαῖος or παππῶος: in the myth of Zeus and Semele, there is certainly the story of the soil's infecundation, not through rain but by the lightning, and *zmelja* in thracian dialect is the *ground*. Humanism did not create, either in Greece or in India, an orderly divine world guided by a single sovereign. The gods are forces independent of each other with an accidental or provisional immortality: they live by the *Soma*-draught or the welcome offerings of worshippers: in norse legend they have to recover their waning strength by eating Iduna's apples:—if man needs them they assuredly need man. Where we have the notion of a single universe obeying fixed laws, the aryan mind is indebted to a foreign influence (so Oldenberg and Schrader of Breslau): *rta* and *asa* are not ideas native to their mind.

Magic and priestly specialism: *Spirit* cult needs an expert. —We must now find a place for magic and a specialized priesthood, of which there are germs even in the earliest vedic times. Once again we notice the sharp distinction between the cults of *souls* and of *spirits*: to Family-worship no stranger is admitted (though the slave can be); but in Nature-worship anyone who knows the constraining gesture or formula is welcome. Like the typical *ruler* in history, the favourite priest is often a foreigner. If domestic customs are in the hands of the elders and, as in german royal houses to-day, remain separate from the law of the land, there rises a new code, man's relation to the unseen powers of nature, to which only experts can guide him: hence 'justice' falls into the hands of a specialized class like the druids. It is likely that the roman bridge-builders (*pontifices*) were a class whose special knowledge enabled them to strengthen the pontoons by charms and sacrifices. Magic as we have said precedes, in any given history, the appeal for favour to a personal God. Early rites are acts, not of pious *worship* but of rudimentary *science*. Primitive man oscillates between too lofty and too humble a view of nature: either its forms are immeasurably superior or he can control them by the slightest effort; he lights a fire to help the sun to rise.

Use and conception of sacrifice: (1) food for the dead; (2)

banquet to strengthen a divine friend ; (3) or magical rite.—When the gods become personal, they are still inferior or at least dependent upon man's bounty ; he spreads out his gifts and frankly invites them to come to share his banquet. Early sacrifice has no elaborate theory behind it : it is too natural to need any such, and hospitality to a friend or powerful neighbour requires no argument to justify it. There is no need even of the formula *do ut des* : this belongs to the logical refinement of religious instinct which we have found to-day so full of pitfalls. It seems certain that at first food was offered only to the dead ; a man did not give it to the non-human potencies of nature until they were conceived as *personal* and like himself. Magic, though it merely sees and uses natural forces for its own end, neither justifying nor vilifying nature, is yet apt to conceive and deal with it as in the main *unfriendly*. When the god was more like a man, he might be a friend, and he was invited to share in food (which only later became a sacrifice) as a welcome guest. Later reflection saw in food offered to gods their necessary sustenance : the worshipper wants to make his chosen helper strong in his service. It is curious to trace how this rite of sacrifice becomes once more a magic power, and not an offering to a personal being who can be a friend. Among sacrifices there are victims for expiation and atonement, human sacrifices which (as seems certain to-day) are as common among the aryan as in other families of mankind.

Contrast of family priest and *Shaman* (from latter come all aryan priesthoods).—For *magic* and for *sacrifice*, the services of special experts are needed. For household worship and family prayers the head of the group is the proper officiant ; but for the unknown region outside, with man's precarious relations to it, certain gifted persons or classes must act as mediators. The *brahman*, a neuter word like the latin *flamen*,[1] stands for such a mediary, who slowly acquired the sole and exclusive right of corresponding with the unseen and eternal, at least, of supervising and directing all such methods.[2] Among the letto-

[1] With which it is very likely connected, so Schrader suggests against Walde's denial of any etymological tie : other possibly kindred forms will be noted later.

[2] The *brahman* is not strictly himself a priest or sacrificant, but a director of sacrifice.

pruss tribes, the last remnants of aryan heathenism, lived the *Waidlers*,[1] hereditary families who knew the right way to appease the gods, and handed down jealously the proper rites and forms to their children, as roman patricians the secret knowledge of the kalendar and the *dies nefasti*: the miraculous gift akin to second-sight, died out when the family itself became extinct (Prætorius). This special endowment, handed down in certain classes was a special feature, so far as we can judge, in the development of all aryan priesthoods. Those sacred classes [2] tend to become *local* as well as *hereditary* and lead on to the holy city with its temple and sacred enclosure, protected mart or fair—the religious origin of urban nuclei being clear, e.g. from the early history of Sumer and Accad. A great power was lodged in this priestly lineage; they could break up the temple or oracle, carry elsewhere the divine influence and their own special powers of mediation. Hence the fear of offending the priesthood; the gods, we read in *Aitareya Brahmana* 'do not eat the gifts of a king who has no *purohita*.' The rise of every hierocracy may be traced to the exceptional powers of one man gifted with (we may say) second sight or some natural capacity for explaining and controlling abnormal phenomena: the faculty is supposed to descend in his line and is jealously preserved. The Druids, the Brahmans, and the priests of Egypt and Israel (under one aspect) had no other origin: their prototype is always the *Shaman* or medicine-man.

Section II. (A) The Dravidians of the North

The Dravidian Aborigines: their Shamanistic Animism.—The term *dravidian* like *aryan* denotes only a distinction of speech, but it corresponds in the main to a clear physical difference. A process of mutual assimilation has been going on from earliest times; the aryan type becoming accentuated in

[1] It is possible that the word is connected with Sanscrit. *Vidya vedas*, latin *vates*, *wizard*, *dru-vid*, even our Old English *waits*, minstrels who like Plato's Orphic priests go round to houses and offer up a hymn in return for food or largess.

[2] Hindu *vasisthas*, *visvamitras* etc., so the *eumolpids*, *cinyrads*, *hesychids* and other hellenic families: the divine or priest-king retained his sacred duties, when robbed of civil power, because he understood the necessary formula.

the north, where tribes are slowly but surely hinduized, the hill tribes being everywhere the last to succumb. Yet there is a dravidian element even in the aryan speech of the north, as it is still a strong factor in the population.[1] The indigenous Dravidians were certainly not savages; no doubt there were then as now forest-folk at a very low level of culture, as modern Gonds or Mundas, nomads of the type of Bediyas and Sansiyas to-day. Some kingdoms had forts, treasures and well defined political powers; nearly all had cattle and tilled the ground. If they had no word for soul they certainly equipped the dead with articles to be of use in the life to come. Probably (so Crooke of the Bengal C.S.)[2] in material culture as well as religious beliefs and practice they were not very far below the standard of the mass of Aryans: some writers go further and believe them superior. They are the *dasya* or *krsna trac* (black skin) which excited the wrath and contempt of the invaders. They had no words for *priest, idol, soul, sin* (Caldwell) though 'God' is *ko* and his temple, *ko-il*. Their less advanced tribes are said to-day to recognize, but not to worship, a supreme being, and their real religious interest is the control or appeasement of natural forces. Wilson (*Sirsa Settlement* Report 1883) thought that the average hindu peasant of the Punjab (where however the

[1] 60 millions use dravidian dialects (Tamil *c.* 18, Telegu *c.* 21, Kanarese 11, Malayalam 6): the speech is mostly confined to India south of the Vindhya, but is even found on the banks of the Ganges; the Kui (a hill-tribe) are 'an isolated island in the sea of aryan speech' (Sten Konow of Christiania). Beluchistan contains the Brahui with a decaying dravidian dialect, but they are now Iranian in race and physique; no doubt sprung from southern settlers who like Hungarians with us have lost early features and become merged in a superior race. The Dravidians of India are so far as we judge, aboriginal, and their tongue has no kindred (unless we detect a link with Australian). J. D. Anderson believes the race to be akin to the african negro; language as yet without known connexion with any scythian or mongolian tongue. Racially, it has no obvious affinity with N. Indian. Thurston cannot decide if it is autochthonous or immigrant. Their literature is indebted to aryan models, though it goes back to an early date. Bishop Caldwell's *Compar. Grammar* (London 1856, 1875) is still a work of authority and his surmises on their primitive culture derived from their vocabulary are still of value. Cf. Grierson's *Linguistic Survey of India*, Calc. 1906; Sten Konow's article on Munda and dravidian languages.

[2] To whose untiring energy and vast learning in matters indian every student of religion is deeply indebted.

dravidian element is least certain) recognizes one Supreme Being, who knows all things, punishes guilt and provides heaven and hell for those who deserve them; his general social standard and instincts to good are much the same as among normal Europeans, but are of course limited to the narrow tribal environment. But this 'rational deism' is a very late stage in human religion, so far as actual history can trace it. This attitude must be the result of muslim or Christian influence and is quite at variance with other data. Early religion is very rarely individualistic; and must in such tribes consist largely of unreflecting observance of custom, tradition and caste rules. Fagan seems much nearer to the truth in laying stress rather on their placation of demons, whether *ghosts* or *spirits*, than on any belief in a Supreme God.[1] They are thus closely united with the chief 'religion' of central and E. Asia—*Shamanism* with its hypnotic trance and the devil-dance which controls or eludes the evil spirits. There seems little doubt that this was their earliest belief and practice; the *animism* of the dravidian hill-tribes to-day seeks (without any attempt to define accurately) to appease whatever hostile or dangerous influence may lurk in natural objects. These potencies or *numina* are not conceived as *personal* (Risley) but as *elemental* forces; here once again religion is rather dawning natural science than any sense of gratitude or devout surrender.[2] Here also there is a conflict or at least a rivalry, between the cults of *souls* and of *spirits*, just as amongst the men of aryan speech. For religious rites like a marriage or a funeral the proper celebrant is a member of the family, sometimes the elders or senior members, sometimes

[1] Traces of this indifferent monotheism are found all over the world, and in almost no mythology is the earliest parent of the gods still the actual sovereign; the older line (as in Uranus and Cronus) has either been forcibly ejected (*functus officio*) or, as in Plato (following a very primitive savage belief revived by the gnostics), the chief God *delegates* the entire work of Creation to subalterns or only *permits* it. Hence (as said above) it is possible that a single deity is recognized much more widely than actual religious rites would prove, offered as they are to purely local dæmonic *forces* or to ancestral *souls*.

[2] In Assam and among the Santals, there is a benevolent Supreme Being somewhere in the background: but the dreaded and effective deities are the much nearer spirits of evil, appeased in Assam by the charms and ritual of regular hereditary priests.

the sister's son [1] as among the Haris and Doms to-day at the offering ten days after the funeral, or among the Bhuiyars and Kols.

Specialized Shaman clans.—But the specialized 'levitical' clans for nature-worship are selected and valued precisely because they are in no way connected by blood. It is certain that the Aryans preserved the natives who knew the ways and could calculate the temper of the local spirits. It is often noticed (Baden Powell, *Ind. Vill. Comm.*) that the recognized priest for some momentous rite or offering is generally an alien or a member of a despised class.[2] In Chota Nagpur the *baiga* is found in nearly every village; he must be a man of non-aryan lineage and looks; he is chosen preferably from the more remote tribes; it is felt that the less he is contaminated with hinduism the more power he will retain over the ancient spirits of the district.[3] He is the 'keeper of custom' and must be able, like the bailiff of an English Manor, to point out each family's rightful tenure or plot of ground, in disputes on rent or landmarks he is the recognized arbiter. Among the Gonds each village has a medicine-man who knows the *mantra* of service against tigers, drought, cholera—matters which have nothing to do with ancestors. The Mundas select from the earliest settlers one who knows the 'demonic' ways: he is sometimes chosen by the tribal vote (*chota*), sometimes he enjoys the place by right of heritage, sometimes by personal choice and miracle, sometimes (certainly among the Oraons)

[1] The Arakhs of the Unit. Prov. also employ him if they cannot procure a brahman—a curious sign of transition; they are not yet completely hinduized and still retain the infallible sign of the *matriarchy* or (not to use a possibly misleading term) the *matrilinear* system. It need not be said that this method of reckoning children and kinship by no means implies polyandry, early promiscuity, or a low standard of morals; though no doubt these (on the whole) abnormal conditions are to be now and again discovered among such 'distaff' or *matrilinear* tribes.

[2] In W. Bengal the *mauliks*, as representing the 'oldest inhabitants' are often sent for in trouble, in preference to the local priests: but further instances are not needed, it being one of the essential features of hindu religion: are not certain rajahs crowned and legalized by a savage from the hills, with whom at other times they would have no intercourse?

[3] Here we have a trace of the common belief that culture destroys certain primitive gifts of savage peoples and their powers of understanding the unseen. It is not a little singular that the favorite and most successful *government* or *priesthood* in human history is invariably a foreign one.

by the selection of innocent children who stop before a certain house, sometimes (as among Malers) by the direct urgency of the spirit who calls him away into the desert to commune alone with the unseen world. Such a one, like the Nazarite, does not cut his hair : he must be invested by the headman of the tribe, and at the bullock sacrifice must drink the blood. Among the Kandhs self-election to this onerous post is the most usual method ; the future *shaman* or priest (*janni*) becomes drowsy, and absent-minded, his soul being away in the spirit-world ; he qualifies for his sacred calling by being as unlike normal men as possible, his spiritual powers depending on this.[1] In the highest grade of this singular hierarchy, the Great Janni must live a life of horrible squalor. While other lesser ranks are allowed to marry and may drink (but not eat) with other men, he exists in a condition of nameless filth, may wash only with his own spittle, must remain immured in his noisome hut unless (at the spirit call) he wanders forth to get drunk on palm juice, and is regaled at sacrifices with the choice morsel no other man would touch, grilled skin and feet of buffalo, heads of fowls and half the headskin and one ear of a deer.

Among these animistic hill-tribesmen of N. India, it is curious to note that the belief in Metempsychosis is either now extinct or has never existed. This statement is not easy to accept. Metempsychosis is far more a savage ' prejudice ' than a reasoned belief, and most students hold that the later aryan doctrine is at least strongly indebted to native influence ; that the keen sense of vivid and valued personality, clearly suitable to an heroic or homeric age, was blunted under such influence : each life of itself became a single link in a chain, and the real individual was the continuous (or recurrent) being, the sum of all the several lives or the vague impersonal unity running through the series. The return of an ancestor as a newborn infant is commonly believed not merely in Asia but among the Australians, who

[1] So amongst many N. American tribes and some N. Asiatic, a boy of refined or feminine type acts like a girl and is transferred into the sex ; his very abnormality being a guarantee of his weird and miraculous power. We can thus easily understand the terror which the name, the heresy, and the (supposed) peculiar vices of the Bulgarians excited in the medieval mind,—also the savage penalties still found in the codes for homosexual offences.

(it is said) know no other method of generation but demonic possession of women by an ancestral ghost desiring to come back to active life. It is very much later that we find, as in Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato and the most typical hindu thinkers, this natural and instinctive belief called into alliance with morality, to explain and justify man's lot. But of this more must be said hereafter.

Cult of canonized saints or angry dead : *Lingam* and *Sakti*.— The Dravidian of N. India fears the angry dead and tries (as we saw) to appease the only half-impersonated nature-powers. He readily accepts the hero-cult of some dead brahman or muslim saint ; we can see here (as students tell us) new gods in the making. A certain Diwan or prime minister of a native State (Charkar) was killed by bandits or thugs in 1768 ; from the forest he ran headless to his proper burying-ground and has ever since received honours. Such instances are common and a violent death (as elsewhere in religious history) is no bar but rather a recommendation for apotheosis. There are souls who take up a posthumous abode in trees or in animals ; the *personal* and *human* thus winning over the *natural* and converting it to its own uses. Early fetichism is of course nature-worship in its most primitive stage ; stones are supposed to be the abode not of disembodied ghosts, but of vague or electric potencies, which can be discharged or held in reserve by one who knows their secret. So cairns and pillars have been honoured and the images or natural objects called *svayambhu*,[1] existing of their own accord, highly charged with divine *mana*, pervaded by a spiritual energy which awaits the clever manipulator. The διίπετες ἄγαλμα in various classical shrines will occur to the reader (e.g. Emesa) ; the Black Stone of Mecca which even Mahomet dared not deconsecrate ; and the constant references of Pausanias to herms and very un-hellenic ξόανα, the unhewn nameless stones of the popular cults. It is now held by many critics that the *lingam*-cult is not in origin *dravidian* but *aryan* and indeed due to hellenic influence in large measure.[2] Such a cult was not openly practised until the close of the Epic Period ; i.e. after *200* A.D. with the rise of Siva-worship. Others (as Fergusson) believe it to be modelled

[1] e.g. of mysterious light issuing from a hill, in *Vansavali* or History of Nepal 78 (ed. Daniel Wright, Cambridge 1877).

[2] The bull *Nandi* seems to come certainly from Dionysus.

on buddhist shrine or *dagoba* and to have had no genesiac meaning till much later times. The Dravidians would naturally worship *Sakti* or female energies rather than the male power in creation ; some have said (as Oppert) that there is no evidence of any native cult of the *lingam*, that no indigenous tribe is given to phallic worship. In any case it seems clear that as practised to-day it is not in the least indecent or suggestive : the erotic side of hindu religion comes in from quite another quarter.

(B) Dravidians of the South

In South strong Native Element persists : evolution to pure form of Theism.—The above remarks refer mainly to the scattered animistic hill-tribes of N. India, where the dravidian element has never had a fair chance of free development. In the South matters are quite different. The Vindhya barrier enabled them to retain language, faith, and perhaps literature intact : in the latter we may surely find some traces of pre-aryan times.[1] The South stood quite aloof and isolated in the first millennium of the aryan inroads. Panini *c. 450–400* B.C. merely notes the existence of the *Andhras* dynasts ; his commentator (perhaps 150 years later) names the *Pandya* and *Chola* kingdoms. Only under Asoka (*250* B.C.) is a sudden knowledge of these regions shown ; his edicts and his script seem to be recognized in dravidian lands, and his kinsman Mahendra becomes an evangelist to Ceylon, the outpost of dravidian culture. Even when brahman missioners came to convert the south and racial blending went on apace, the native substratum was never overwhelmed. The indigenous people can show an evolution in religion as remarkable and as spontaneous as can aryan priests and *ksatriyas* of the North. The whole gamut of religious feeling is displayed in their beliefs and practice, from vague animism and gloomy superstition to a living faith and love towards a personal God—than which no other region of the pagan world can show a purer or more ardent form. The dravidian genius, says Frazer, has advanced to literary and religious concepts worthy to stand side by side with the most exalted of human achievements.[2] It is now time to turn to the aryan development in the

[1] As in Rome this literature is something quite artificial and unpopular : the forms of the *tamil* and *telegu* vehicles are so archaic that natives cannot understand them without special training.

[2] But if the temper and impulse are native the terms are borrowed—

north, long anterior to any genuine movements in religious belief of the South.

Section III. Brahman and Brahmanism

Magic and Naturalism submerges Aryan Humanism : *Science* overpowers *religion*.—It seems clear that after the early vedic mixture of semi-personal, semi-elemental theology, there was a gradual recovery of the latter so that the humanistic tendency was completely submerged.[1] We have seen the traces of magical science or theurgy amongst the Aryans, and the usage of *brahman* only extends and confirms the theory. It does not mean *prayer to a personal deity*, but a *compelling charm* or *hymn* which is effective, like a chemical or algebraic formula when properly applied, *ex opere operato*. Here once again we have *science* rather than *religion* ; and the mind or disposition of the agent who sets this tremendous force in movement, is indifferent.[2] In the heroic and personal age, gods, priests and *rsis* are regarded as authors and revealers of these ' runes of power.' The electric current or resistless energy begins to act when the hymn is recited and the sacred *soma*-juice pressed—a mystical power is evoked from *latent* to *active* form by certain rites and words. Unifying reflection converts it into the force which lies behind nature and the gods in virtue of which all things have their being and efficacy. It is of course impersonal, a *unity* from which the *multiple* rises only to sink into it again. But before this profounder philosophizing, it had already been identified with the *sacrifice* over which the *brahman* class presided.[3]

bhakti is sanscrit, and the original impulse may come from Jainism, just as the later development (700–900 A.D.) can hardly be claimed as exempt from Christian influences, as will be seen.

[1] The system of *avatars* and divine births belong to the exoteric faith and is a mere compromise or concession made to the weaker brethren.

[2] We have noted the supposed connection with an identical neuter-form in latin, *flamen* : others connect it with irish *bricht*, magic spell, icel. and norweg. *bragr*—scarcely far-fetched, when we remember the *asiatic* origin (even in myth) of all the chief doctrines of norse religion : may not the norse or gothic *gudia* be identical with the *khojas*, the priestly caste who usurped power under the later Jengizid Dynasties, claiming descent from Abubekr and Omar ? (cf. Schefer and Sir H. Howorth, cited in *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, ed. Elias & Ross, London 1875).

[3] Not that he actually sacrificed ; but his presence alone ensured its due efficacy.

Brahmans, a caste knowing runes and ritual of now magical sacrifice.—When the ritual of the sacrifice became more complex a supervisor was needed to direct the various ministrants: that this official had much in common with the ancient *shaman* seems clear from his position—he stood by the southern fire, the region of demons.[1] In the *Brahmanas* (*800–500*) there is a distinctly non-vedic element and many novel deities, and divine revelation is made solely for the purpose of disclosing the method and ritual of the sacrifice: this is now ceasing to be a frank offer of hospitality or a means of strengthening and gratifying the divine beings that they may be staunch and powerful in their worshippers' service. It is now purely external magic; there is no mention of devotion, pious intention, or moral duties. The route elsewhere followed is here exactly reversed; whatever personal element the Veda shows is now suppressed. The aim is a direct scientific effect as of an experiment in a laboratory. The gods invoked are only accessories and instruments to help in completing (as it were) the electric circuit. He who knows the magic sacrifice is master of the world; did not the gods (or God) create the world by means of sacrifice? It was by magic that they had in the first instance secured the prize of godhead; 'by this art' (*hac arte Pollux* etc.) that they won their rank. Later, when the personal and inward receive more attention, this divinity is said to be the result of ascetic practice (*tapas*). In this pre-moral Age of Magic, the sacrifice is (with Haug), 'a kind of machinery, 'a sort of great chain,' binding earth to the divine throne; or it is a staircase by which to ascend to heaven. 'The ideal sacrifice' it has been said is 'reality set in motion' for the service of man: its efficacy always exists but it is ever and again called forth anew, this invisible latent power which binds the whole world in fetters of adamant. When unrolled it extends right up from the sacrificial flames into heaven itself, acting as bridge or ladder down which spirits come at man's behest and man himself rises above his own earthly lot (cf. Manoah and the Angel in *Judges*). Every piece must exactly tally and be rightly fitted into the whole; or else the effect is nullified.[2] If the forms are vitiated as in

[1] The *atharvaveda* is consecrated to him and without doubt includes a large non-aryan and foreign admixture.

[2] The American Indian kills the man who gets out of step in the sacred dance; and the punctilious *εὐφημεῖτε*, *bona verba quæso*, *favete linguis* of the classical peoples will readily occur.

the case of the foolhardy necromancer, the gain becomes instead mischief and ruin. For this complex ceremonial then, the brahman is recognized as chief director and supervisor, to whom it falls to heal and atone for any unwitting error or neglect.

Wizard exalted above the demons he compels.—Thus he usurps the place and dignity of the gods who are degraded to be his servitors. Already in the *Rig* [1] Indra is derided, and distinct traces of careless scepticism are found, the gods being denied by some as boldly as by certain hellenic sophists; these priests are less concerned to exalt a god in the worshippers' eyes than to display the momentous scientific efficacy of the sacrifice duly performed and their own good offices in securing it. As a fact neither in the primitive nor in any subsequent age did the gods as such represent the eternal, the highest or the best. When subjective rationalism entered (with Jains and Buddhists) it took no trouble to exorcize or eject the gods, but left them to the enjoyment of those transient and illusory heavens which the wise man scorned.

Spiritual **protest against** *mechanical* **and selfish cultus.**—Against this selfish and mechanical cultus, the *Aranyaka* and *Upanisads* were the natural protest and reaction. The movement might be compared to the mystics of the Middle Ages, to St. Bernard, the Victorines, Thomas à Kempis or the teutonic preachers of cent. xiv who led forwards to the Reformation. It is characteristic of hindu theology that it is continuous and will admit no breaks in its history: it would rather offend every canon of logic than confess a regret for the past, a breach, or a new departure. The brahmans, however bitterly opposed, have been able in the end to absorb the rival element and include it as an essential 'moment' in their own system. It was the aim of an anti-clerical party to discover something more real than the mystical Sacrifice itself (in which gods and men and things alike seem to have vanished). There are three stages in this rebellion, *autotheism* (often miscalled pantheism), *ascetic practice*, *rational morality*. Each of these is a deliberate defiance of brahman ideals and rules. It will be well at this point to recapitulate the early history of the migration and its result, that the right of the new elements to emerge and win recognition may be the more clearly seen.

[1] *Rig.* IV 24, X 119, II 12, VIII 100.

Section IV. Retrospect on Early Indian History *1500–500* B.C.

The Midland Sacerdotal.—In the long period of migration (*1500–1000*) down to the probable date of collection for the vedic hymns, the Aryans were engaged in tribal feuds. When they had advanced to the Ganges, the Midland (*madhyadesa*) and the region round the present capital, Delhi, remained the central nucleus under the *Kurus*. It was here that sanscrit developed, the sacred hymns were compiled, the brahmanic supremacy was confirmed. Many hymns show features of northern scenery and landscape and are certainly earlier than *1000* : but this district was, if not the actual cradle, at least the publishing centre, of this oldest religious literature (Grierson). The later priestly reflection falsified history to avoid any appearance either of abrupt change, of alien influence,[1] or of internecine disputes. Up to *650*, just a century before Gautama's birth, writing was not generally known and hymns were handed down orally in priestly families who possessed in them a valuable monopoly.[2] Asoka's inscriptions

[1] A difficult yet insistent problem : some writers attribute (*a*) to Babylonian influence the cult of Nana (*b*) to Persian, the emphasis on a solar cult and the Shining Ones of heaven, (but rather to be held a common heritage of the patriarchal sky-worshipping Aryans in contrast to the *matrilinear* votaries of a Cthonian Mother-Goddess), (*c*) Egypt : Flinders Petrie seems to find traces of a hindu colony at Memphis, with seated figures of the aryan punjab type, and believes that here is witness to contact between E. and W. during the age of Asoka (250 B.C.) ' of whose missions we have hitherto lacked proof ' ; it is obvious however that this testimony does not plainly refer to our more primitive times. The persistent traditions of the Land of Punt, of early maritime adventure in the Persian Gulf and of the chaldean culture-hero Ea (or Oannes) from overseas, are really better witness ; they make one pause before a dogmatic denial of foreign incentives to indian development. The influence of greek art and religious thought is later and unquestioned ; but by the time of such prevailing influence from Bactria, hindu religion, or rather theosophy had put forth all its most significant traits.

[2] Hindu alphabets show a semitic origin (some time subsequent to 800) and undoubtedly lend some support to the hypothesis of a still earlier connexion by marine trade-routes, cf. A. H. Macdonell in Bühler *Ind. Ary. Philol.* 1897, where also he ruthlessly dismisses the old identifications *Varuna* οὐρανὸς, *Manu* Minos, *gandharva* centaur, *sarameya* ἑρμείας, *Sarvara* Cerberus, etc.—while retaining Mitra = persian Mithra, Soma = haoma, hotar = zaotar, Yama = Yima :—so too *deva* as connected with iranian *dia*, lettish *diewas* norse *tivar*.

are the earliest known, and the most primitive remains of sacred building are due, not to brahmans, but to jains and buddhists. For these early ages there is then, we are bound to confess, but little positive witness.

Phase A. Vedic and Dravidian Animism (*impersonal*) *; theurgy* **precedes** *theosophy*.—The *first* phase we may call *Vedic Animism*, in which we can really discover but a higher form of fetichism ; anything capable of exerting influence is adored and no effort is made to define what the potency behind phenomena is in itself. No doubt certain hymns show conviction of a *personal* relation to a *personal* god, but this is an exception and the tendency is soon suppressed by other currents peculiar to hindu development. What myths of a personal character there are, present (like all savage rudiments) very objectionable features, and there is little trace of reverence, piety or genuine devotion. We have shown that (as in other aryan branches) the magical element is by no means wanting ; *theurgy* has a long start of any attempt at *theosophy*, and these *shamanic* or fetish elements, common to the invaders and their foes, very soon blended. For the savage mind it is enough to know that power is there, accessible and convertible to human use by those who approach it properly. To this *mana* [1] is referred all effects in nature which are plainly beyond human power.[2] The idea (such is the witness of Risley) at the root of the jungle-folks' religion is *power* ; he seeks to direct and propitiate a shifting number of unknown forces making rather for evil than for good ; he does not wish to get closer to them or define them more precisely ; he does not stop to ask if they are associated with spirits or ancestral ghosts : later they are divided into active and passive powers, and the good are nearly always placed in the latter class.[3]

[1] A convenient name for the indwelling *numen*, borrowed from Melanesia (Codrington) ; it corresponds to algonquin *manitu* and iroquois *orenda*.

[2] Which it must be remembered is very widely believed to be the sole cause of death.

[3] I must repeat that there is nothing unlikely *à priori* in a pre-vedic 'Monotheism,' if it is any comfort to the orthodox to discover such a belief here and in China at the very dawn of historic development. It is possible to conceive (as Andrew Lang inclines) the various vedic deities as but different forms, powers, or theophanies of a single Being. But history only shows us peoples with whom this unifying belief must have decayed long before they enter its purview. It is perhaps needless here to repeat that

Cheerful outlook of early Vedic Age : gives place to *Pessimism* (Hesiod and the Sophists).—Now this first period of *animism* (sometimes coming very near to personal worship) is marked like the homeric age in Greece by cheerfulness, an easy and independent attitude to divine beings and a belief that the gods are guiding their chosen favourites to victory.[1] The 'Norseman' with his love of fighting for its own sake, his birserker rapture, his eager anticipation of the delights of possessing a land which it costs his people so dear to win, is a type found in all three descents of a blonde conquering race on an ancient culture already effete.[2] But it is only in the process of attaining a desired object that real pleasure—always a 'genesis'—can be found. In place of *joie de vivre* and readiness to die fighting we have *ennui*, disillusion and a restless leisure. The world is only comprehensible or tolerable when there is something to be won, another effort to be made, a final peak to climb. By witness of Homer's pages—the records of a heroic age which acts and does not reflect—the Hellenes acquired a most unmerited name for optimism, contentment and the even poise of a mind in complete harmony with nature and itself.[3] The leading note is cheerfulness only in a heroic age when there is little thinking and the poor and oppressed are perforce silent. The Punjab gives way to the Midland as the arena, fraternal strife succeeds to victories over foreigners, and

the cult of souls and of spirits (=natural *numina*) are not successive or exclusive ; but running parallel and distinct, found side by side from the earliest times : cf. Clodd. *Fortn. Rev.* June 1907. It is important to reserve the useful (but provisional) term *animism* for the worship addressed to the as yet unknown and undefined powers of *nature*, though it is unfortunate that it so powerfully suggests disembodied *souls* and an assimilation of external events to impulses of human will.

[1] Rhys Davids speaking of Metempsychosis says truly that there is a helplessness about this creed in direct and striking contrast with the 'childlike fulness of hope and the strong desire for life revealed in the 'Vedas.'

[2] We may say *four*, if we choose to separate the Normans proper (*c.* 900 A.D.) from their cousins the Teutons five centuries earlier.

[3] This curious fallacy is even to-day repeated again and again as an acknowledged axiom even by writers of the acumen of Pringle Pattison : it finds a parallel in the imperfect vindication of democracy as an ideal for all time, because it existed at Athens under personal influence for perhaps half a century in a genuine form. Of such 'prejudices' our mind divests itself with great reluctance : it would be interesting to know how much error in religion, politics, philosophy takes its rise from these two fallacies.

the depressing climate of the Ganges valley begins to affect both thought and will. This vedic age may be placed in *1200–800*.

Phase B. The Brahmanas *800–500* B.C.—The second phase, of the brahmanas (*800–500*), is marked by loss of spirit and energy, by pessimistic legalism, and by a degraded view of the divine beings. A new horror is felt at the thought of ' becoming again and again the food of death ' when metempsychosis took the place of personal immortality and a happy home with Yama and the forefathers. There were in this period two tendencies ; the *priestly* class were devoted to the elaboration of the cultus, the *military* to the task of explaining the destiny and the nature of the soul. There seems to be a growing agreement among scholars (i) that the belief in transmigration arose from native contact, although some authors of repute reject this theory ; (ii) that the speculative thought of the Hindus is not a priestly creation but rather a reaction against mechanical sacerdotalism.

See further note on p. 508.

CHAPTER B. THE NEW MILITARY MOVEMENT IN THOUGHT

Section V. Novel Theories (Autotheism, *Sankhya, Yoga*)

Anti-clerical reactions of the Outland and Warrior Caste.—After this brief historic interlude we take up once more the development of the anti-clerical reaction. The warrior-class seem to have given a new meaning to the purely magical and external word *brahman*, because they had not yet lost the sense of the value of the inward and personal. It is not a little curious that such a protestant movement against a magical 'catholicism' should employ this word *brahman* to support its main thesis. The Outland protested against the Midland where the priests were establishing their supremacy: the *Ksatriya* class on east and south and west showed a keen interest in speculative theology, and later history (though edited by brahmans) could not eject references to learned and pious kings of whom the priests did not disdain to become the disciples.[1] It is held by some (e.g. Deussen and Grierson) that the revival of personal theism is owed to the same military influence; a cult not unconnected with the old solar worship and therefore, like Mitraism in the armies of Imperial Rome, highly suited to the soldier's temperament—indeed marking a survival of the joyous days of heroic combat when death was not dreaded but gave the only sure passport to paradise. Perhaps every *military* race or *militant* creed has a firm hold upon a happy personal life hereafter: at the same moment life is held cheap and of value, death a good: it is the commonest article of savage belief that only the heroes who fall in battle or meet violent death gain the highest immortality.

Autotheism: identity of Self and God.—But without doubt

[1] Kapila (though perhaps mythical) founder of the *Sankhya*, was of *Rajah* stock; Mahavira, like Gautama his contemporary, was a *ksatriya*. These only gave a peculiar turn and perhaps a novel direction to the doctrines already anonymously spread in the *Aran.* and *Upan.*

the chief military doctrine reflects a somewhat different spirit. *Brahman* is conceived as the *ens generalissimum* (not an active or fighting partizan) ; supreme cause of all physical and psychic potencies, and yet best expressed by their negation. The highest *without* is identical with the highest *within*, the 'Inward Controller' (the stoic ἡγεμονικὸν) and this simple axiom expresses the whole cycle of doctrine, *Brahman=Atman*, God=the *Self*. We have called this autotheism. It is not precisely *solipsism*, and most certainly it should not be called *pantheism*. The Absolute has nothing in common with the vedic gods. It is not even conceived as their parent : like everything else, they are the product of its dreaming. Though it transcends all being and every predicate, it is very near us, being our own self : through our minds the Absolute looks forth with myriad eyes (which are yet the same) upon a world of mirage which He (or it) has produced by somnambulism. There is much delight in the discovery of this secret ; the *upanisads* are not steeped in melancholy, and like the *Bhagavad Gita* [1] show a glad appreciation of the nearness of the divine. Here we only briefly introduce the system which finds its end and completion in the *vedanta :* it demands a fulness of treatment which would at this point only interrupt the account.

The 'Way of Works' : *tapas* and ascetism, an intensified Shamanism.—Side by side with this new *ksatriya* teaching on the identity of God and the Self must have arisen a novel theory of *works*, which was to modify profoundly the hieratic and mechanical cultus, and to set up an ideal of personal holiness wholly irreconcilable with brahmanic teaching. There existed then two methods of attaining salvation : (1) the way of works, of the external cultus, *Karma-marga*, and (2) the path of knowledge *jnana-marga*. The one corresponds to the stage of πίστις or obedience to churchly rules and guidance in Clement of Alexandria, the other to the stage of γνῶσις where the believer appropriates and realizes in himself the previously external dogma.[2] Now the way of works took suddenly a new personal turning. There had probably always been in India a class of

[1] Later, but certainly pre-Christian in its original form.

[2] The later *bhakti-marga* is the name of the great *dravidian* revival of personal theism following a military movement ; the three stages find a parallel (not to be too closely pressed), in the triple doctrine of St. James, St. John and St. Paul.

men who desired to attain assurance of salvation by personal effort, and not by priestly rite or vicarious mediation. In the ordinary sacrificial cult, the worshipper was in the position of a rich man, unable or unwilling to dance, who paid nautch-dancers to perform in his stead. Such passivity and mechanical externalism did not satisfy those who felt religion to be a matter for the inward self. Asceticism (*tapas*) taught that a man could neglect or override ordinances and punctilious rites and conquer himself alone. This *Yoga* method was nothing but an *intensified Shamanism*;—there the *shaman* himself chose his lot and the means to attain communion with the divine (or rather personal release from passion and the flesh). Reverence for such ascetics is a common feature in all early religions. The medicine-man only wins and retains his place by suffering, just as the N. American boy is tortured and tested before he is admitted as a man and a full tribal member.[1] In Rig V. x. 136 we read of *munis* who (quite in the manner of the self-taught wizard) boast of magical powers won by ascetic practice: in the later *Brahmanas* we hear of the *Sramanas*, mentioned in conjunction with the *brahmans* but as already their rivals.

The Gods jealous of this personal holiness.—Very early it was supposed that this over-holiness in man was intensely distasteful to the gods, who would, like Indra, send *apsaras* to tempt the too persistent 'Saint Antony' from the path of continence and mortification. Penance led to the development of magical powers which challenged a *divine* (and a *priestly*) monopoly. The orthodox hierarchy could only by a patent anomaly include in the stages of a holy life one which transcended all need of works in the ritual sense. An anchorite could wrest boons from the gods by virtue, and become their equal and even superior. It was now held that the *rsis*, or saints of old, rose to their dignity not by *sacrifice* but by *penance*. During the years of transition and ferment (from Gautama to the close of the Epic age) the ideal had completely changed; the third stage of the *asramas* or the life in the forests disappeared, and the fourth or ascetic took its place. This new ideal then of holiness won by personal effort supplanted the sacrificial order and set

[1] The parallel to this is the *conversion* after spiritual conflict demanded in the strictest Methodism before full Church membership is granted.

a certain class of men entirely free from sacerdotal control.[1]

The 'atheistic' *Sankhya* (only in a very modified sense).—There is still another primitive movement of thought which has exerted and still exerts the deepest influence in Hindustan, the *Sankhya* of the perhaps fabulous Kapila, said to be the founder of an atheist system, as Patanjali of the *Yoga* just named.[2] Here it may be said once for all that neither the Sankhya nor the jain or buddhist systems deny the gods any more than did Epicurus.[3] Nor did they deny heaven and hell; they only professed to show 'a more excellent way.' But there is no Creator or Supreme Deity; only an Absolute from which (in a fashion never explained) various souls arise to return thither again. Hindu gods, as Jacobi and many others clearly show, are not gods in our sense; rather Plutarch's dæmons who live a very long time but are not immortal in their own right: in India they live thirty-two or thirty-three *sagavopamos* or oceans of years but not for ever. So even amongst the jains (whose main object is to exalt a perfect *human* nature at the expense of the *divine*) prayers are offered to the *jinas* or sanctified human saints but actually rewarded by the gods; for the canonized mortals have passed into perfect peace and cannot be disturbed to listen to us. Buddhism probably led in India, as elsewhere, rather to a multiplying than to a denial of various heavens and hells; in each of which, for a time only, a soul growing nearer the great Deliverance might find respite or purgation. With this preface, which answers our wonder that the Sankhya should ever have been included among orthodox sects in philosophy, let us examine the chief tenets of this remarkable system.

[1] Of Yoga there are two kinds, *hatha*, aiming at magical powers, *raja*, at spiritual perfection and purity; *dhyana* (concentration) is the best method for the latter purpose by which a man gets to know the structure of the Universe and the nature of God (Böhn).

[2] Patanjali is called founder of the Yoga by Garbe, but he is no more original in his doctrine than Mahavira or Confucius, or Gautama himself. He lived some time after the Sankhya had become widely known and while introducing a personal deity into his own system really adopted their physical tenets and strove to make them in this manner acceptable to the orthodox.

[3] Or his latin editor, Lucretius, whose address to the great Mother-Goddess is, until Apuleius, the sole genuinely emotional and devotional passage in roman literature.

Sankhya **dualism : the end, return of soul to its own true life.** —It is an *unresolved dualism* (*dvaita*) between *mind* and *matter* : between these two self-subsisting entities a bond or the semblance of a bond has arisen which must be untied. There is no explanation either of their origin or of their nexus : the whole philosophy has but one aim, to set the soul free from its entanglement. This thought-system must have arisen not long before the appearance of the orphic psychology in the west—an independent witness to the ' home-sickness ' of the human soul for some true native land.[1] The end is freedom through knowledge that the nexus is unreal, and is the return of the soul to its own true life *αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν* as Plato would say. What this state was no hindu thinker could ever explain, and hence the continual dilemma, does this or that sect teach or deny immortality ?

First theoretic basis of *Pessimism* **(so-called) : sole aim deliverance : the Universe** *moral*.—It was the ascetic system of Yoga and the philosophic dualism of Sankhya which first provided a theoretic basis for pessimism—an attitude of which there is little trace in the *Upanisads*. The whole future thought of Hindustan is centred henceforth on the single problem of *release*. It is now taken for granted that this must be a man's personal work on his own behalf ; ' no man may deliver his brother ' nor make agreement unto God for him, for it cost more to redeem ' his own soul, so that he must let that alone for ever.' And nothing but knowledge can give deliverance ; even ascetic practice only prepares the way, and in some systems (as buddhism) is rejected as an indispensable propædeutic. Salvation is a state of wisdom in which man, after recognizing the unerring law of the universe and acquiescing in it, rises altogether above it by his own strength of will. Now there are two axioms of science, or rather one in two forms, which the primitive mind seems from the first to have accepted ; *nothing without a cause*, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Hence the idea of creation is always strange and unfamiliar—just as ionian thought starts with the given universe which shifts, contracting or expanding, according to

[1] Garbe, Jacobi and Deussen are all convinced that the Sankhya system has a primitive and historic character (in spite of the doubts about the person of Kapila) and is certainly anterior as a system to buddhism which resembles a restatement of the doctrine, but from different points of view and with some reserves.

fixed rules. For human practice this becomes the survival of old energy in some new form, the reaping of that which is sown, the exact recompense of desert. The profound thought behind this sense of inexpiability, the futility of penance and sacrifice, is the belief that *the Universe in itself is moral.* The rationalist schools about the year *500* while they seem at first sight to reject 'humanism'—the conviction that behind phenomena a counterpart is found to our human will and character—nevertheless only bring it back in an intenser form. Mahavira and Gautama really leave nothing in the world but the constant operation of moral cause and effect. In such a system there is no place for a creator or need for any Supreme Being. Fichte (in one phase of his theosophy) would have thoroughly approved: God was the moral order of the world and no one ought to ask for any other deity. It is clear then, fluid as we may suppose the theology (or rather theodicy) of India to be, that every school believes the problem of desert and retribution to be finally settled and to have left no doubts behind. A man is in every system just what he has made himself, and will be hereafter what he is making himself now. Against this extreme pelagianism the religion of personal theism ranged itself in the *Bhagavad Gita.*

Section VI. Theism (*c.* 500 B.C.)

Stage 1: Personal theism of Krsna—possibly a coeval of Zoroaster.—It is believed by some [1] that the *ksatriya* class tended towards *monotheism*; though their theology is chiefly concerned with another form of belief. We have noticed that a *solar cult* is suitable for the military mind: we can find a parallel for it in later *mitraism.* This worship of light is the common heritage of the indo-iranian stock and marks off the southern branch from the cthonian religions of the dravidian natives. Some two centuries before *400* B.C. Krsna Vasudeva [2] became its religious pioneer. He taught those features of theism which, familiar enough to the western world, indeed the presupposition of any religious feeling whatever amongst us, have never been accepted by hindu theosophy. God is a single Being, simple, supreme,

[1] e.g. Grierson of the Bengal C.S., Garbe and Professor Bhandarkar.

[2] A real historic character—as many students accept to-day, a pupil of Ghora Angirasa after whose teaching he 'never thirsted again.'

adorable ; infinite, eternal and good : man's salvation, highest bliss or final aim is not immersion in a neuter substance but personal immortality in his presence. If we cannot trace any active perso-magian influence in this revival, we can at least say that one instinct of the aryan mind found expression in India as it had earlier in Zoroaster's preaching.[1] It was a reaction against the exclusively physical conception of godhead, and the pure fatalism which seems to follow. Krsna, later deified by his devoted followers, found no welcome for his doctrines among the priestly class ; he therefore turned to the ' atheistic ' systems of *sankhya* and *yoga*. Neither school was directly concerned with normal ethics or with personal religion ; the *yoga* was certainly the more interested in moral conduct, though it saw nothing ultimate or satisfying in the restless and imperfect life of common morality. The *yoga* paid a price for an alliance which gave it a popular form ; *it accepted God*. A refined shamanism was brought to admit a personal deity of good will towards men ; it changed its object from concentration upon self to devotion towards a deity distinct from the worshipper.[2]

Alliance—(1) **with** *yoga*, (2) **with** *brahmanism*.—In the *second* stage this theistic belief was reconciled with brahmanic doctrine and accepted (though with reluctance) as orthodox.[3] Brahmanism found in Gautama's movement a serious foe and as the price of alliance accepted the Adorable as identical with the ancient vedic sun-god Visnu.[4] It is certain that during the Epic Period

[1] It may be noted that although most writers agree to refer Zoroaster's date to *c.* 1000 B.C., some students have assigned a much later era, about a century before that of Buddha.

[2] The nebulous Deity adopted by the yoga bears some resemblance to Leibnitz' Supreme Monad, a ' constitutional ' sovereign, guide and persuader of other souls, not the absolute power or rather substance of Spinoza ; he is a particular soul, not the universal Creator and parent of all, exalted over all the others only in virtue of his superior knowledge ; the yoga call him *Purusa*—soul, or *Narayana* the Primal Male—a curious point of contact with later gnostical thought and with the Cabbala based upon it.

[3] For this early phase of the Midland hierocracy Hopkins suggests the useful term *Brahmaism* as the ' unsystematic teaching of the earlier ' *Upan.*' before the formal development into the Vedanta.

[4] In *Mahabh.* God Himself the Adorable is said to teach Narada, who in turn imparted the doctrine to the Sun. In *Bhagavata* theology the saved soul passes through the sun (cf. the curious coincidence of Plutarch's

(*200* B.C.–*200* A.D. or even later) the brahmans altered their policy of haughty exclusiveness for one of almost eager comprehension. They discovered and accepted the legends of *ksatriya* 'doctors'; [1] believed that Janaka became a brahman and that warriors could by merit change their class; *Manu* is said to be a warrior and in the (very late) redaction of his *Law* it is allowed that in certain cases a brahman may go to learn of a *ksatriya*: [2] thus they even admitted that their chief hero Parasu-Rama, a brahman incarnate for the sole purpose of destroying the military order, was in the end defeated.[3] In effect, at this moment the hieratic caste began that policy of inclusion from which it has never since deviated: we can witness to-day the success of such overtures. Local and native gods, even though abhorrent to the highest aryan sentiment, are made welcome and discovered to be embodiments of Siva, declared to be rajputs or brahmans. Aboriginal customs are not touched but are somehow included and 'within two generations' (it is said) 'these natives will become staunch adherents of brahmanism though still in the 'stage of fetich cult.'

Section VII (A). The Bhagavad-Gita and Military Theism

The Treaty of Peace between priests and warriors; or the Bhagavad-Gita: its irreconcilable strata.—The Bhagavad-Gita

surmises in *Facies in Orbe Lunæ* with common hindu belief, Deussen); Nimbarka an early reformer is said to be an incarnation of the Sun; Rama-chandra was of *solar* (as Krsna of *lunar*) descent.

[1] Among theologians of the royal or military class we may name Janaka king of Mithila prominent in debate with brahman divines; the *Ksatriya* Ajatasatru of Kasi taught the brahman Gargya; Jaivali lived among the Panchalas to E. and S. of the orthodox Midland and confuted or instructed the brahmans; among his pupils was Gautama *non-buddha* (cf. *Chandog. Upan.* wherein V iii 7 he claims that his religious system is the peculiar property of the military class); in W. Punjab, a region clearly not remote from persian influence, a brahman consulted by earnest seekers after truth, sends them on to a *ksatriya* king, Asvapati. All this witness to an independent (if not superior) theology, the brahmans allowed to remain in their editions of the *Upanisads*. But they had no love for their teachers as the Epics clearly show; in *Satap. Br.* vii 4 4 bad arguments are scornfully compared to 'the words of a warrior.'

[2] In *Mahabh*, *Satap. Br.* and *Visnu Prasna*.

[3] That Rama-chandra was a *Ksatriya* incarnate is slurred over in the *Ramayana* but without success i. 75.

marks this new alliance ; it is a compromise and a treaty of peace. The noble ethical sentiment comes from the solar (' mitraic ') cult of the soldier-class; the now deified Vasudeva is fully identified with Visnu, and Krsna, the personal name of the prophet, is an incarnation. There is then a union of *pantheism* and *theism* which in the frankest manner seems rather to parade than disguise its anomalies. It is well to inquire more closely into the origin and fortunes of this remarkable writing. In it Krsna is represented in three different guises, each a stage in an ascending scale of theology ; a human hero on the way to be recognized as semi-divine ; a phenomenal form of Visnu ; lastly identified with Brahman the All-Soul. Garbe, in this theory agreeing with Grierson, says : ' he was probably a leader of a warrior ' and shepherd tribe of non-brahmanic race ' (he is certainly the Dark or Black One) and lived long ' before Buddha, becoming ' the eponymous hero of the race and the founder of an ethical ' religion independent of the vedic ceremonies. . . . The brah- ' mans claimed this important manifestation of the divine and ' made it an incarnation of Visnu . . . his adherents, called ' *Bhagavatas* were thus merged in brahmanism '. The *Gita* was the text-book of the sect, but in its present form it is much modified and interpolated. A personal deity reveals himself as a hero and asks for love and devotion ; then, manifested as superhuman, he promises admittance to his heavenly abode after death. He calls himself Creator and ruler of a real world (not of a mirage). Yet side by side with this is introduced the conception of a neuter impersonal Absolute, in which it is the supreme end of man to be merged : phenomena are *maya* and cosmic illusion. It is not said, be it noted, as in the later Vedanta that the theistic attitude is for the less enlightened, an exoteric cult to those who cannot dispense with a personal object. But the two irreconcilable beliefs are calmly juxtaposed, receiving alternate emphasis, as if there was no essential difference ' either ' in contents or in value ' (Garbe). We cannot doubt which is the earlier element—the *theistic*. The whole character of the poem in design and execution, as well as the historical data, point to this conclusion.[1] It is the ' brahmaistic '

[1] As against several eminent scholars, e.g. Holtzmann, *Mahabh*, 1893, who believes *pantheism* original, the *theistic* element only an adaptation of the Visnu-Krsna cult.

recension which admits the neuter Absolute; the true basis is the theology of sankhya-yoga dualistic creeds which can admit a personal god, but not a higher term to embrace the two hostile antitheta.

(1) **God transcendent and from time to time incarnate as man.**—God is transcendent, that is, distinct from the world and from souls; He deposits in matter a germ which evolves of itself (xix 3, 4): a trace of the spontaneous matter or *prakriti* of the Sankhya. He is father of all creatures; matter is the womb. He superintends the origin, development and catastrophe of the world. He determines the deeds of his creatures, making the figures revolve as in a puppet-show (xviii 61). All his actions are for the sake of His universe; and as this interest is wholly unself-ish He is never entangled in the flux of the world-process, as souls are (in sankhya and in orphic platonism). He loves those who know and seek Him and delivers them from all sin and evil; He takes human form from time to time to support the right. *B. Gita* iv 5–8: 'Many births have passed of men and of thee, 'Arjuna; all these I know, but thou, O slayer of foes, knowest 'them not. I, unborn, and soul eternal, Lord of all creatures, 'taking upon me mine own nature, I arise by mine own power. 'For whensoever righteousness decays and there is a rising up of 'evil, then myself do I create, for the protecting of the good and 'the overthrow of evil-doers: for the setting up of righteousness 'do I arise from age to age.' It is very hard to believe that there is no connexion between this theory and the Incarnation of the Clementine (Christian) and the Shiite (muslim) doctrine.[1]

(2) **Matter:** (3) **the Passive Soul—all three eternal.**—Primitive Matter is not created by God, but coexists from eternity, subject (like platonic ὕλη in Timæus) to incessant change. It evolves from chaos the present universe and returns again to it, like the primal homogeneous substance of the Ionians, of Spencer and the now perhaps obsolete Nebulist School. These world-periods are from the sankhya. The soul is also eternal[2] and is enchained by the *gunas*, but in itself is immutable and dwells in body quite inactive and uninterested.[3] It neither acts nor inspires acts (v

[1] The *B.G.* has been carefully tr. by Kashinath Trimbak Teland (1840–1893) into English verse and prose.

[2] Thus there are three eternals.

[3] Of ψυχὴ as a pure spectator or unwilling guest in the body there are curious traces in Homer and Pindar.

13) and remains as in Valentine and other Gnostics quite unaffected by the emotions of the body: this, being a mere occasional vesture, may be put off without regret. All this is pure sankhya philosophy with a religious turn added at the price of logic and consistency.[1] Entering into union with matter with a mission (here it differs from Sankhya teaching) its chief duty is so to behave under this trial that it can return quickly to its source, when the recall is sounded.

(4) **Methods of Deliverance: Works and Knowledge or faith.**—There are two ways of release; by moral conduct and good acts (πρᾶξις) or by withdrawal from action and true knowledge (θεωρία). The military original puts the *moralist* tendency in the foreground (iii 8, v 2, xviii 7). But the superior value of speculation is too ingrained in the hindu mind to be safely dislodged in any system bidding for popular favour.[2] At times *quietism* is praised *above action* (vi 3) with the same neglect of consistency that we find in the theology, as it oscillates between a personal god and the Absolute. Without regard to moral conduct, knowledge can save from rebirth; that is, the redeeming knowledge of the Sankhya which discriminates soul from body, showing that the former has no concern in the doings of its garment of flesh (xiii 23, xiv 19).[3] But as a rule this self-knowledge is only a preparation for the higher knowledge of God. The second path by good acts, is repeatedly enjoined as the true way to salvation.[4] But good acts must expect no fruit, and only win their reward when no reward is looked for: they must be done for duty's sake alone, or rather because of love towards God. 'Do what is right and leave the rest to God, never troubling about the effect or success of your works.' This is the lesson of such passages as iv 22, 23; ix 27, 28; xviii 12, 17.

(5) **Express rejection of Pharisaic Ritualism.**—Legalism or

[1] Soul is sometimes held to be a *part of God* not an independent substance xv 7, xvi 18, xvii 6.

[2] India shows that the people (in a wide sense) prefer the hermit and ascetic to the active priest or philanthropist; interest in others is really a sign that the spiritual nature is not yet perfect and has not attained its goal; cf. Kipling's well known story of Sir Purun Dass.

[3] This, as Garbe reminds us, is 'an isolated recognition of the pure Sankhya ideal.'

[4] Deussen urges the unethical character of Sankhya and the very remarkable and almost unique emphasis of *B.G.* on moral conduct.

ritual morality is expressly condemned in the strongest terms : abandon all sacred rites (xviii 66). The vedic promises are scorned (ii 42–45) as dealing only with this material world and transient bliss in some secondary heaven (ix 20, 21), indifference to vedic prescriptions is indispensable (ii 52, 53) for salvation—a state or attitude of the soul which outward acts are powerless either to create or to impair. Thus the *karma-marga* or efficacy of works is rejected ; so are all brahman rites which minister to earthly desires and personal greed. Also man's freedom to act and to carve out his destiny seems throughout taken for granted ; it is left to him whether he will rise, to the highest bliss in the service of God : nothing is said of fatal predestination. The hindrances to his true self-development are (as in most other systems) selfish passion and desire (iii 27, 43)—man's chief and domestic enemy—and the ignorance which finds vent in unbelief and wrong standards of life. To kill earthly desires a moderate *ascesis* is recommended ; *yoga*, even if it does not lead to the truest state of the soul, will bring rebirth in a better condition and so ultimately the goal will be within reach (ii 40, vi 41).

(6) **Stress on a blissful and personal immortality.**—This happy state of the released is of course not absorption in a neuter Absolute but conscious bliss [1] in God's presence : the problem of conscious survival without material organs of life does not enter their purview. This doctrine of immortality is a pillar of theistic belief without which theism or belief in any personal god or providence would be inconceivable or at least wholly superfluous. It is most certainly as ancient as the earliest *ksatriya* revival under Vasudeva, attributed by some to a date much anterior to that of Buddha. The Sankhya-yoga (of which jain and buddhist systems are but modifications) lays no stress upon conscious survival. Even in this poem, side by side with these almost Christian expressions are found the complement of pantheistic theology in a doctrine of absorption of the single soul into the World-Soul. This pantheizing stratum can never be clearly marked off from the original and theistic. This

[1] As in almost every *religious* immortality all over the world : the goal of the Sankhya-yoga is perhaps unconscious—certainly in any usual sense ; but, as in buddhism, it is foolish to conclude summarily that this implies a positive extinction of being—about which the hindu is very properly discreetly silent.

latter cannot be much later than *200–100* B.C. in the view of the latest scholars: and the brahmanic may be placed in *100–200* A.D. It must be left open to question whether Christian influence can be traced in the age of this 'orthodox' recension: it is certain that it is not to be found in the first form of Bhagavat doctrine which arose spontaneously out of the 'rich storehouse' of hindu thought (Garbe). It is a joyful anthem in praise of devotion to God—pauline faith.

(7) **Faith of itself (without caste or works) ensures this salvation.**—It is therefore a message free to all mankind; it knows no caste distinctions. Like modern nonconformity the appeal is made without respect to birth, race or former conduct and deserts. *Bhakti* ensures *mukti* (deliverance from the birth-cycle) not only in the *vaisya* or third aryan class, but in women and in *sudras*, the fourth or dravidian caste ix 30 32. Believing evil-doers if converted on a death-bed and directing their whole thought to God, will carry this temperament of faith and love as a passport into the next world (viii 6, 9, 10, 13). In sum the *Gita* is the best expression of the Bhagavata School founded by Vasudeva, itself a strong movement against mechanical vedic brahmanism, an almost pure Sankhya-yoga philosophy coupled with strong personal theism and immortality. It is with all its startling and unresolved anomalies an attempted concordat between two incompatible systems.

(B) The Bhagavat Church as modified by alien influences

Negative influence of Brahman Theology: worship of *Avatars*.—Yielding to the overtures of brahmanism, the Bhagavat theology became negative, and the warm personal object of faith gave way to an abstraction. We come across the deity expressed by an interrogative 'Who?' of which neither being nor not-being can be predicated. Yet again, in evident reaction, in other places God is represented as having substance and form, as revealed to the saints in the body. Thus the original Adorable being removed into inaccessible darkness (as in later *apophatic* western theology) all genuine cultus is directed to the incarnations, which supplied the need of a personal and intelligible object of devotion. In special favour were the two final *ksatriya* embodiments of the divine Rama-chandra and Krsna—even

the Buddha was sometimes so regarded.[1] Incarnations, at first ten in number were increased to twenty-four, that every religious sect and every temper of the human mind might be able to find an appropriate object of faith. Tulasi-dasa, a renowned poet of the movement (*c. 1580*) sums up the position 'Why try to gaze on Him Who is invisible? Pray to Rama and all (the divine) is at once seen.'

Influence of Dravidian Sakti worship; syncretism resulting in *complete medley*.—But two new influences, beside frigid and abstract brahmanism, appear to have reached and modified this faith: the *dravidian* cult of female power or *sakti*, united in Lakshmi, God's consort, one with him and yet distinct; and the Christian doctrine of the Holy Ghost.[2] Thus there arose a sort of trinity, the Adorable, his successive incarnations on earth, and his single *Sakti* (or collective feminine potencies). The other hindu gods were reduced to Visnu's deputies: Brahma is a lower being created by him, Rudra like Satan is made to fight against him, and when he acknowledges his defeat and inferior place God said:—'He who knoweth me knoweth thee also, and who followeth thee, followeth me'.[3] Thus even Siva is accepted (towards the close of the Epic period) as a form of the Highest, while other gods are reduced to mere satellites. Attempts to reconcile or find a place for all needs of thought went on apace, until as in the *Bhagavad Gita*, the hindu Scripture becomes in Grierson's terms, 'a medley of unrelated and mutually contradictory conceptions.' All this anomaly the pious, uncritical and unifying mind of India accepted without demur—each reading into the text what he chose or actually finding it there. So each of the three-fold 'practices' *karma, jnana, bhakti*, found a welcome in the system: a man might purify himself by religious rite or concentrate his mind on the divine qualities, or (last and highest stage) might see and experience nothing but God Himself in the warmth of his own faith and love. We

[1] Other zoomorphic or totemistic *avatars* of Visnu were *fish, tortoise, boar, lion*—before *man* and *dwarf*.

[2] Believed by the Nestorians and quite possibly by still earlier arrivals from the persian church to be female, and by some identified with the Blessed Virgin Mary. Cf. note on Elkesai, p. 428.

[3] Another later and reflective legend represents Siva as *wrath* born out of his forehead—somewhat in Böhme's spirit: Hegel (*Phl. Rel.*) appears much interested in this instance of hindu speculation.

may here leave the Bhagavata, down to the time of the monistic reactions of Sankara (*c. 800* A.D.).

Section VIII. Analogous movements towards Theism in Dravidian India

Influences on S. Dravidian Development : (1) *Bhagavat*, (2) Christian, (3) Jain. The Tamil Classics.—We have already spoken of the fervent religious emotion and fine literary powers which arose among the southern natives of India. If we remember the date of these devotional writings we shall certainly recognize two influences—the Bhagavat creed and the Christian settlers.[1] During early Christian centuries there was regular intercourse held between Pandya and Chera kingdoms and the Empire of Rome : it is hard to believe that there was not also an interchange of ideas, and it is certainly possible that from *100–500* A.D. two systems, northern rationalism and personal theism from the far west, may have competed for victory among the races of southern India. In these early centuries Dr. Pope saw everywhere an extension to the South of *Bhagavad* doctrine—Siva only being substituted for Visnu : in the Siva tract *Agamanta* we have the familiar simile for the two theories of divine grace (*austinian* and *semi-pelagian* or a modified Synergism), the cat taking the kitten in her mouth to a place of safety, whilst the young of the monkey lay hold of the mother's tail. But the date of the *Agamanta* is by no means certain. In the former hypothesis the fervent love of the believer is the only possible return he can make and transcends every kind of outward religious observance. The dravidian tongues have no word for *faith*, and the sanscrit *bhakti* (which must have come in from the north) is first found in tamil some time after *700* A.D. But the first transforming influence was neither 'orthodox' from the Midland, nor Christian from overseas, but *jain*. Writings in tamil are found after the year *750* [2] and flourish in the following centuries under jain influence. If there are vestiges of a northern influence in the surviving instances, a desire to oppose brahman ideas and create a popular religious series can certainly be traced.

[1] Cf. Grierson's very moderate and convincing *Modern Hinduism and Debt to Nestorians*. Jl. Roy. Asiatic Soc.

[2] The date of a document granting terms to a hebrew settlement at Cochin ; so Dr. Burnell. Some claim a much earlier date, 385 A.D.

The augustan age of tamil letters is found under jain supremacy in the Pandya kingdom *c. 850* to *1200*—just the period covered by the present survey. A certain antipathy to the north is found: 'many southroners have entered the way of salvation' (*svargam*), while many in the north have lived in vain.' The *Naladiyar* is perhaps the earliest composition, an ethical poem on the objects of existence: next comes the famous *Kural* by Tiruvalluvan, in 1330 stanzas dealing with virtue, riches and enjoyment. These gnomic couplets, somewhat in the style of Theognis, were accepted at the tamil academy as good guidance for the laymen or *audientes* (as we might call them) of the *jain* brotherhood; 800 of their professed anchorites are said to have met at the Madura court to discuss practical ethics. These monks also issued 400 quatrains serving as a 'book of wisdom' for daily use, teaching the usual lessons of northern pessimism, weariness of life, soul lost in round of rebirth, evil deeds and joyful release. A very interesting parallel may be found in the neoplatonic Hymns of Synesius Bishop of the Cyrenaica and coeval with Augustin (*c. 422* A.D.): but in the East the similar evolution is quite independent. As opposed to any notion of 'compelling grace' it is throughout clearly asserted that every man's future depends on his own deeds.[1] But there was also a much earlier period of jain influence; the denial of God and the Soul was in vogue in cultured circles between *25–220* A.D. and the great revolt of the Dravidians against the rationalism from the north was marked by the revival of Sivaism. This took place between *400–600* at least anterior to the visit of Huen Tsang the chinese pilgrim. It seems clear that in the earlier centuries of our era, jain, buddhist and polytheist had lived together in peace and no doubt the sceptical views were confined to refined circles.

Sivaite Revival: reaction of theistic Piety against Nihilism.—In the third great tamil classic, jains and sivaites attack buddhists; and Tsang seems to represent many *viharas* of the latter as in ruins. During that period (*400–600* A.D.) southern India became the land of belief in a benevolent First Cause who, of his grace, created the world that souls might work out their *karma* and

[1] It must be noted that although the dates of tamil works are given as *c.* 850–1200 acc. to Reinhold Rost, there are some authors who prefer an *earlier* age, as Frazer who writes on 'South Dravidians' in *Enc. Rel. Eth.*

escape the ' haunting terror of endless hells '. Perhaps just after the visit of Tsang or *c. 650* A.D., Sambandhar, a renowned sage and saint, began to write devotional hymns to be sung in Siva's temples : he looked on the overthrow of jains and buddhists as the great aim of his life and in every anthem the tenth verse is an attack on their tenets.[1] Even he seems to have found a prototype in Nakkirar Devar, a still earlier hymnodist (before *600*). Others continued the work in the ninth century, e.g. Vachakar who ousted the heretics and set up a Siva-temple at Chola. Collections of the hymns were often made by compilers ; a ninth (*c. 1050*), tenth and eleventh are found.[2] In the doubtful atmosphere of this earlier age we can at least be certain that a literature of personal devotion grew up some time later than *400* A.D. and had a life of intermittent activity never wholly interrupted down to the present day. Both jain and buddhist negations failed to make a lasting impression. In *907* [3] a temple of Siva was covered with gold at Chidambaram, and nearly fifty years later a Chola king marked a success by building a temple at Tanjore, in *955* A.D., at incredible cost. Vachakar opposed to the Humeian doctrine of personal instability and denial of soul or *ego*, the need of a constant and personal element which perceives : ' if knowledge appears and disappears in a moment of ' time what is it that survives all flux ? ' He asks what use is it to debate as to revealed truth if understanding (which demands a persistent centre of consciousness) has long since passed away before the interlocutor had stopped speaking ? The buddhist is represented as inquiring ' since thou sayest that we from the ' north possess neither god nor salvation, tell me then what is thine ? '

Later influences after the Expulsion of the Nihilists : Sankara's Compromise.—The hymns of devotion (very likely under Christian influence) may have turned the popular mind away from jain and buddhist tenets ; some have held that it was owing

[1] He is said to have induced (like Elijah and the prophets of Baal) the Pandyan king of Madura to put 8000 jains to death.

[2] A later development in cent. xvi–xvii does not here concern us ; e.g. the psalms of the ' David ' of Sivaism, Jayumanavar, were written *c.* 1650 ; the ' sacred sports ' of Siva (=ways of manifesting his *Sakti*) were gathered together in the latter century.

[3] When Rost believes the jains supreme in the Pandya kingdom.

to them that the two latter sects became extinct by the year *900*.[1] But other powers were at work. Kumarila Bhatta preached a crusade against the heretics (*c. 750*) and the famous monist Sankara of Malabar gave them a death blow and laid the basis of philosophic Sivaism. Dravidian India could never have accepted the genuine esoteric teaching of this philosopher, any more than the religious consciousness of England could be satisfied with Mr. Bradley's Absolutism. The 'realism' of *personal* worship and a *personal* God was required by these non-brahmanic races. Sankara allowed them a cultus of all Siva's manifestations, as being forms of the All-Spirit. He founded monasteries to compete with the still remaining buddhist *viharas* and the present *guru* or abbot of the southern convents is thirty-third in unbroken descent for over 1000 years. A somewhat later influence seemed to have arrived (within our period) from Kashmir; the exposition of practical Sivaite theology by Mey-kandar Devar (*c. 1225*) represents the system taught them about *1000* by Abhinava Gupta.[2] An inscription dating perhaps from *c. 1200* (so Thurston *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras: *1909*) says that Siva specially created a man to stop the hostile observances of jains and buddhists; an incarnation of the bull Nandi took place in a brahman called Basava, who procured the slaughter of the usurping jains.[3]

[1] A date very difficult to reconcile with Rost's chronology and Augustan Age of tamil letters given above.

[2] Cf. Dr. Burnett, *Jl. Roy. Asiatic Soc.*, July, 1910; he traces both to the *Svetasvatara Upan.* There is some doubt however if this formulated doctrine came from S. to N. or the reverse way; certainly the *Svet.* was familiar in both regions *c.* 500 A.D. when Sivaite devotion put forth its earliest shoots; and we know that sanscrit was used in the S. for literary purposes.

[3] Basava, brahman from the Belgaum district (cent. xi or xii) set up a reaction against Sankara's sacerdotal Monism and founded or rather reformed a sect of phallophorous sivaites (*lingayats*) which has spread all over S. India and to-day (*Cens. Rep.* 1901) numbers 1½ millions, including most of the officiant priests at Siva's shrines. They still show a certain hostility to brahman claims, yet in accordance with an irresistible tendency may be expected to find their way back to the ancient fold (see Eggeling of Edinburgh). Basava early in life renounced his caste and went to reside at Kalyana, capital of the Chalukya realm, and at a very early date seat of a Christian bishopric. Here as in the case of Ramanuja we cannot exclude a direct influence of western doctrine.

CHAPTER C. THEISM AND ITS ANTAGONISTS

Section IX Sivaite Theology

Part A. Its barbarous origins

Doubtful position of Siva : a composite figure.—It may never be decided amongst scholars whether Rudra-Siva is a deity of the aryan invaders or of the natives ; whether his almost invariable emblem, the *linga*, is aryan, dravidian, hellenic or even hunnic in origin.[1] With the reflective syncretism that produced the *trimurti* and later forms of hindu belief and worship we have little concern : it is just here, in the dearth of spontaneous forms and in the predominance of calculating thought, that philosophical interest wanes. But Siva is connected with a genuine religious feeling as well as with priestly systematizing and must claim our notice as a pioneer preparing the way for the revival of devotion. Sir Charles Lyall very rightly sees in him the earliest and universal impression of Nature upon man —' one of endless and pitiless change '. Under his patronage as *bhutesvara*, ' lord of the dead ', was placed the demonolatry of the non-aryan tribes. His emblem may well suggest a rude *patriarchal* society as opposed to a perhaps more gentle and refined *matriarchal* stage [2] ; the powers of the sky as confronting those of mother-earth and the children of her womb. There can be no doubt however that the extension of *lingam*-symbolism is due to the Aryans and also that there is no sort of obscene or even erotic connotations with a cult of the most austere kind (so H. H. Wilson and most subsequent students). Since Siva is the typical ascete, the Great Yogi, it might even be supposed

[1] Siva, invariably represented *white*, is said to appear at beginning of present age as *Sveta* the White for the benefit of *brahmans* ; Visnu always depicted in dark-blue colour has Krsna (black) as subordinate form ; it is hard not to see here *racial* features.

[2] The gentleness is however contradicted by the frequent ferocity of sacrifices to the Mother-Goddess, e.g. Hinglaj.

(this is the suggestion of Fergusson) that this symbol is not genesiac but represents a buddhist tope—a sign of renunciation, not of life. Yet, as in the case of Dionysus, the choruses of the *Bacchæ* (as Murray and others well show) display both the wild revelry of bacchantic mountaineers with all their gory rites and the pure contemplative calm of nature-mysticism. There are sudden transitions to wild cruelty and destructiveness. But this patronage of the ascetic type was late: for the Yogi is a product of aboriginal shamanism and of the godless Sankhya. There can be no doubt that it was a democratic protest against caste and ritual: for it was a way of salvation open to all and attained by personal effort without 'works of the law'; in the *Mahabh.* psychical concentrations and magic formulæ begin to supersede sacrifice. We learn from Megasthenes (*300* B.C.) not merely the prevalence of ascetics and gymnosophists as an essential feature of hindu life but also the branding of their cattle by the Sibæ of the Punjab with the trident. Siva's image with the bull Nandi (? a greek loan) is found on the coins of the Kusan Kadphises II (?*90–100* A.D.). King Vasudeva (*185–226*) is known to have been a patron of Siva and it is believed that between *200-300* A.D. the cult was firmly established throughout the Continent.

Yet adopted in S. India as chief *brahman* deity.—In Southern India the cult of Siva was the oldest form of brahmanism; its first teacher, Lakulisa, is said to have preached there *c. 50* A.D., just when the Gospel was penetrating the Gentile west and China was opening her gates to buddhism. The spread of this worship was the work of mission-priests. Kumarila the Mimansist (*c. 750* A.D.) is said to have taught that creation is a divine act not a fatal necessity, and to have enjoined a persecution of jains and buddhists. His pupil was the great Sankara, whose special work as a Vedantine will occupy the next section.[1] The sole object of the scriptures to this 'inspired genius' (as Frazer calls him), was to reveal the delusive appearance of that which sense represents as real, to pierce beyond reality itself to the point where God and matter are identical. But

[1] W. Crooke, and perhaps Frazer *Lit. Hist. Ind.* seem to give Sankara's date as 737–769 instead of the usual 788–820; but we adhere with other recognized authorities to the latter.

although Sankara no doubt accepted Siva as a traditional object of exoteric worship, he could not be said to popularize the cult. This was reserved for Basava: a brahman (cf. p. 55), whose *Ekantadaramayya* [1] attacks brahman supremacy and professes to receive from Siva's own priests (*jangama*) the eight-fold sacrament.[2]

Feminine cult closely allied with Sivaism: Sakti or Female Energy.—Closely connected with Siva is the worship of *Sakti*, female energy, which may have been introduced in the age of the Puranas (the earliest of which may have dated from the close of the Epic Period or *c. 350* A.D.). The wives of the gods are here taken as their *creative* or rather *material* powers. They correspond to the vedantine *Maya*, or cosmic illusion, or to the plastic matter *Prakriti* of the dualist Sankhya. These mythical relations as consort and spouse show the mystical union of the two eternal principles for the production of the world-spirit and matter, *yang* and *yin* or heaven and earth in China, the active and passive (or receptive) elements in the Porch. Such a worship is chiefly offered to Siva's wife; and we are thus driven again to raise the question of this god's nationality and origin. It is in S. India among a non-aryan folk that traces of *matriarchy* still survive (Nairs etc.) and it is certain that in India as in Europe a rough distinction between the natives (dravidian or ægean) and the immigrants was found in the *patriarchal* system of the latter.[3]

Primitive cult of the Earth-mother or Mother-goddess.—The most primitive [4] monotheism was worship of the Earth-Mother, which comes only with settled life and husbandry and is a mark of the importance of women in fixing a home and maintaining sedentary pursuits while the men are absent in foray or hunt. We cannot however deny all traces of female-worship among the aryans.[5] Even in the *Rig* we have the mystical union of Dyaus (that is, Zeus) and Prithivi, but this cult is quite differ-

[1] Re-written in present form *c.* 1180.

[2] This sect does not cremate its dead or observe caste-rules or pilgrimages; at present they tend to revert to orthodox brahmanism though there still remain traces of the old animosity (cf. note on Basava in previous section).

[3] As well as in the sky or light-worship to which the aborigines were also strangers.

[4] In stages of historic development; I do not say earliest in time.

[5] Or (if preferred) those hindu tribes who received a dialect and social culture from aryan sources.

ent from that of the Dravidians.[1] This rested on the belief that Earth exhausted by her motherhood must be renewed and invigorated after harvest.[2] This is the source of the patting of the soil or (as on greek vases) violently striking of the earth's surface with mallets : it is to arouse a dormant power to new activities.[3] Secondly, Earth must at intervals be refreshed with human gore as the stream of life ; thirdly, she must be married at the proper season to her consort. There is a cult of a Divine pair (as in the Nearer East, from earliest times) in the whole range of dravidian myth and ritual ; e.g. in Bengal ' Old Man and Old Woman ' in sacred village tree, among Kharwars, *Chandob* and *Chanda*, or *Darkar* and *Dakin*,—in Behar, *Chordeva* and *Chordevi :* the goddess of small pox Sitala has a husband Ghantakarana (Bengal) ; and in Rajputana *Gauri* the yellow lady of the barley has for spouse *Siva Svara*, a deity of phallic origin. So the monkey-god *Hanuman* is her husband. There are curious nuptial rites in Chota Nagpur ; an oblong stone covered like that at Hinglaj with red ochre is flung into a chasm dressed in wedding garments. It is clear that both in myth and earlier rite, marriage with a divinity was soon expiated (and consummated by death : the bridegroom is married and then slain like *Dulka Deo* a god of vegetation—a story tells how he violated the *tabu* and disappeared. In Baroda the Mother is represented by a huge boulder from a fallen hill-top, before which are offered clay images of men, clearly (as the wicker figures in Rome) substitutes for real human victims : in Baroda too a human victim or scapegoat is merely slapped and chased away by the children, to be once more brought back by them into human society. Among forest tribes in the Central Hills the Mother lives in a cairn of stones and the native priest or *baiga* offers

[1] The correct rendering of the famous Rig X. 129, suggests the severance or bifurcation into two halves of an original *neutrum* : ' The One breathed ' breathless by his own inherent power (*svadha*) ; beyond him was nothing ' whatever : by heat was generated that one living germ enclosed in the ' void ; then first came upon it *desire* which was the first seed of the mind ; ' fertilizing forces there were (*svadha*) below, *prayati* above ' : a dualism which places *will* in the upper region and *kama* or desire in the lower.

[2] Cf. Grainger *Worship of Romans*, 1895.

[3] Kols of Chota Nagpur kneel and pat earth; among the Oraons harvest-dance ends with a resounding smack analogous to many hellenic, or rather pre-hellenic, rites.

flowers and a goat in sacrifice : adult women do not share in this but have a ritual and feast of their own, showing perhaps a double aspect of this worship, cthonian and terrible, creative and beneficent. The Mother-goddess is held to assume any form she likes, even the shape of a tiger ; also she is identified with snakes as dwelling in dark holes and as guardian of hidden treasure. In S. India there is an image of a serpent in her shrine. Sometimes her head, also as on greek vases, is seen just emerging from the soil. The dravidian cult of a female principle, cruel and kindly by turns, is beyond dispute the most important element which hinduism has received. Though accepted as orthodox this worship is most akin to the primitive Animism which for both races formed the under-current of all religious belief.[1] We find such a cult in the Caves of Karli blended to the present day with buddhist ritual, with which at the outset it could have nothing in common. Her cult is common in Western India [2] where it may well have given or received influence from the earliest days.[3]

Wide and various patronage of Rudra-Siva and his Spouse.— Rudra, father of the *Maruts* or storm-gods, like Wodan the wild hunter, malign, slayer of men and cattle, became the god most favourably accepted in S. India. He appears to be a complex, or rather abstraction, of the various evil spirits or hobgoblins or mountain-sprites : as in the later greek attempt to unify all such influence under a Pan living behind nature objects. So Megasthenes (*300* B.C.) tells us he is worshipped on the mounts, but Heracles (Krsna) on the plains. If not dravidian in origin, this figure of Rudra-Siva soon blends with congenial native ideas : he is lord of ghosts (*bhutas*) and *bhutesvara :* here shamanic devil-cult prepared the way. He is also lord of *ascetics* (*yogisvara*) ; represented as Death no less than as vanquisher of Death, with his garland of skulls, his seat on a corpse. He is thus the first regular and recognized ruler of the demoniac forces. In early times he is called *Satasudrija* and lord of robbers : Siva is a euphemism, ' the Gracious ' and his double or paradoxical attitude he never loses ; he creates but only to reduce again his

[1] Cf. the strange cholera-goddess *Devi* who is supposed to be actually incarnate in the patient.

[2] Every Rajput clan in Kathiawar has its *Mata*.

[3] I need not again refer to Hinglaj.

work to ashes. His wife, Kali, for whom we have seen the way preparing, is scarcely inferior in power to her spouse and is like him a fusion of several notions.[1] Like Siva she is 'Lady of the Hills' and patroness of female bacchants; she is thought by some to be the primitive tutelar goddess of lofty mountain-chains, Parvati of the Himalayas and Vindhyas. As Durga, 'not to 'be approached,' she is the object of a sanguinary cult.[2] *Kali* (black) and *Karali* are names derived from two of the seven tongues of Agni's flame.[3] It is however possible that this is merely the female partner of *Kala*, God of Time who produces and devours all things: the *Kali-puja* is celebrated on the darkest night of the month following the autumnal equinox; it represents her as a naked black woman (certainly of dravidian type) four-armed, wearing skull-garlands round head and neck, dancing on Kala's breast with open mouth and protruding tongue. She is also called *devi* 'goddess' in a very special sense, *jagan-mata* world-mother. In connexion with Sakta cult, the *tantric* theology has devised a system of female figures as attendants on Kali—arrayed in groups as the great Sciences (*Mahavidyas*), the Mothers eight or nine in number (*Mataras*) sometimes called the great Mothers (*Mahanatatas*) who are consorts of the chief gods, the eight Mistresses, and lastly witches and ogresses (*yoginis*, *dakinis*, *sakinis*). In this priestly refinement of a very early and untutored belief, each god has his own special *sakti* or feminine energy as a complement which enables him to perform his cosmic function and to come into relation with the lower world.

Passage of terrible Mother-goddess into 'Motherland'. The hindu novelist Chatterji (*1838–1891*) wrote the well-known patriotic hymn *Bande Mataram* which Grierson claims as an invocation of Kali, the great Mother-goddess—the idea of a motherland or national State with claims upon its children (accepted by Cotton) being wholly alien to hindu ideas. J. D. Anderson suggests that it marks a blend of western thought with

[1] In part a cannibal deity, e.g. the Cumoris are said to snare and eat little children, and with her are associated the Dread Mothers (*Mataras*).

[2] Weber believes this title equals *Nirrti*, a vedic goddess of evil.

[3] There seems no doubt that we can assign the evolution of Visnu and Siva to a *popular* movement lasting through the Epic Period (*c.* 200 B.C.–200 A.D.) and preceding the Age of the Puranas (from 350 A.D.); their cult is attested by coins and inscriptions of the early Christian centuries.

eastern ;—side by side with black Kali, who is the Mother that *was*, is set up by the mystical insurgents of the novel, a white marble statue of the Mother that *shall be*, the land of Bengal or Kali purified,—the poem addressing both idols. Though the motive of the author was harmless, he keeps alive the notion of Durga bearing ten weapons, and the hymn was used to inspire the rebels against the british *raj*. It is most certain that to the average hindu it both suggests the terrible world-mother and is the trumpet-note of sedition. A parallel, interesting from more than one point of view, is found in the aryan propaganda in Asia Minor under the persian Great Kings : whether to gain a people strong in *matriarchal* tradition and cult of the Mother-Goddess or because the native faith reacted on the aryan, is uncertain, but aramaic inscriptions are found in Cappadocia where Bel the indigenous God recognizes *din Mazdayasnish*—mazdeism personified as a female—as sister and wife (Lidzbarski, *Ephem. Semit. Epigr.* 1 59). A similar syncretism is found in the cult of Anaitis, Mitra the youthful sun god taking the place of the young favourite familiar in all female worships of the Nearer East.

NOTE

Barbarous Dravidian Survivals

I cannot here do more than refer to the able article of J. H. Powell, *Folk-Lore* June 1914 on ' Hook-Swinging in India.' Here we observe a rite almost confined to dravidian India which has probably taken the place of *human* sacrifice ; and it is always offered to a *goddess*—Siva being quite a later hindu patron introduced by brahmanic syncretism upon a wholly aboriginal cult of the Earth-Goddess (who is summoned, aroused or propitiated by slapping the soil before the hooks are attached to the votary's back 152, 195, 196). The real patroness is Durga (who safeguards the rite and prevents accidents to the rotating victim) ; Kali (goddess of cholera and plague), Manasa (of snakes and scorpions) and Bhadu (of children) are other tutelary Mothers. Dubois (*c.* 1800), E. Thurston (at Chennapatna in Mysore), and Dr. M. Phillips (in *Evol. of Hinduism*) say that the *chidi-mari* is self-torture offered to Mariamma ' one of the most ' evil minded and bloodthirsty of all the deities of India '. Anantha Iyer on *Cochin Tribes* etc., gives Kali as patroness of kite-swinging and boat-swinging, both rites in fulfilment of a vow performed by Nairs, kammalans, and kuruppans : it symbolizes the fight of Kali with demon Darika, the goddess leaping on his back and drinking his blood (at Travancore she is called Bhadra Kali). In the Belgaum district the goddess is Yellama, at whose shrine 175 persons were ' swung ', or rather rotated, in 1834. It seems clear that it is a dravidian and aboriginal usage, scorned by the

brahmans unless for purposes of their own they consent to become its patrons ; it is a substitute for human sacrifice, a practice lasting far later among Dravidians than among Aryans. Upon Siva (whom Powell accepts as hindu), was fathered a practice doubtless in vogue 'long prior to the 'time at which he became recognized member of the village pantheon.' There is no mention in hindu scriptures or even in *Tantras*. It is a humane modification of the Kandhs' *meriah* (or willing human victim who by appeasing the fertility-goddess on behalf of the little community earns blessedness hereafter and renown ; Frazer, *Spirits of Corn* I 245). In it some blood (essential for a fertilizing rite) is shed, but not fatally. The rotation marks a survival of the common practice of leading round the altar and displaying a victim to all points of compass (Cf. Salamis, temple of Diomede, Frazer *Adonis* I 145) ; to this usage perhaps belongs the encircling of the walls of Jericho. May the processions of buddhists round *tope*, containing holy men's relics, be a peaceable form of a horrid rite ? The last civilized change is seen when the ' victim ' is not hooked but slung on ropes and so made to rotate or revolve on a pivot or in a wheeled car (so the name *charak-puja*) round a shrine. This note is added for the proof it gives of a sanguinary aboriginal cult of the earth-goddess and the *subsequent* intrusion of a male god into the ritual.

The cult of girls is certainly derived from an indigenous worship of the earth-goddess, in her less terrible theophanies ; while it degenerated into the orgies of left-hand *Saktas* (on whom see H. H. Wilson) it certainly originated in a very pure and austere fashion. In the Deccan (W. Crooke : *Dasahra in Folk-Lore*, March 1915), at the autumn festival to the Mother-Goddess, offerings are given to young girls on each successive day. In Bengal, after the Goddess has been roused from slumber, and magical life imparted to her by invocations and anointing both idols, the day closes with devotion to a young *brahman* maiden. At Bastar (Central Province) though the brahmans patronize the native cult it is none of their making, and a chief part is played in the *Dasahra*, by a Mahar girl of seven or eight years who impersonates the goddess of fertility until puberty, living in strict continence ; after offerings of fruit to the dread Goddess Chamunda on the ninth day, nine unmarried girls are worshipped and fed, as embodiments of the goddess. Only a short time ago, two unwedded maidens at Kapurthala were announced as divine incarnations and for some time were held in the greatest respect ; but, no good result accruing, the cult fell into abeyance (*Census Report.* Punjab 1901). In the early days of the present war, in September 1914, it was given out at Meerut that a Bengali girl-saint was coming from Calcutta to conquer a two-headed dragon appearing there ; great crowds assembled, but the amazon St. George did not come forward.

It seems quite certain that the primitive Thugs were also of southern (and dravidian) origin and made the early custom of human sacrifice a business and a source of gain ; they were staunch worshippers of Kali (Devi or Durga). In the north they are first heard of amongst the muslim in *1290*. Firoz Shah did not imitate Hulagu's righteous vengeance on the Assassins some thirty years earlier, but sent them in detachments from Delhi in a body, about 1000 in number, to live freely, but apart

from mankind, at Lakhnanti. It is possible that the Assassins may have had before them this earlier model of murder, as a fine art and a religious rite. It cannot be doubted that the indigenous stratum, holding human blood to be necessary for the welfare of the land and appeasement of demons, took these secret means of satisfying Kali's thirst after the practice had been condemned both by hindu feeling and muslim authority.

Part B. Sivaite Theology: its lofty development

Sivaite Doctrine of God and his creative purpose.—Yet from these very primitive beliefs and barbarous origins was evolved a pure theism. Sivaite theology, of which no new modification has since arisen, had its chief forms fixed at an early date. There is one Supreme God, all other divinities being only highest or perfected souls dependent on him (as the demons in Plato's *Timæus*) and doing his will. He is himself without form and all representations are purely symbolic such as *lingam* and *lingi*. God and his energy *Sakti* are inseparable: by it he comes into relation with the world, creating, sustaining and at last destroying to create anew. God is pure thought (*sit*) and bliss (*ananda*) as in Aristotle's doctrine; these are *parasaktis*, supreme qualities or energies: from them are developed those of *will*, *action*, *wisdom* by which he is brought into relation with the world.[1] Creation is both an eternal necessity and an act of grace, for souls (as above in the *Bhagavad Gita*) need a cosmos wherein to work out their *karma*. They are eternal (as in Sankhya) and do not vary in number. It is only in a world like ours that they can rid themselves of impurity, eat the now matured fruitage of their former works and attain release (*mukti*): the deeds of *karma* need a forcing-ground to ripen them before they can be consumed; the doer become in turn the sufferer. Only when their account is exactly balanced is final union attained and the redeemed soul has no longer any use for a 'scene of probation'. But at the end of every æon a fresh universe is needed for the multitude of souls whose accounts do not tally. We have then as regulative ideas of the average dravidian mind, all the familiar tenets of theism: a personal deity, a real universe and immortal souls, to whom he gives award of deeds and in the end saves

[1] Of course this is merely the commonplace of all reflective theology and is the same in every system, however widely divided in space or time: it is the essential outcome of any speculative division between God as He is *in Himself* and God *in His relation* to His creatures.

from migration by means of the useful purgatory of this world.[1] Pure *Maya* exists, like the souls, coeternal with God and supplies the necessary material for their discipline. This trinity of coëternals we have already seen in the northern systems : it is of course borrowed direct from the Sankhya dualism which becomes a triad when a directing deity is accepted from outside. There is besides an impure *maya* (? the residue of immature or not yet assimilated *karma*) with inherent *malas* or impurities. The *mula prakriti* or actual material is not eternal and the Sankhya is reproved for supposing that it can of itself evolve a cosmos (hylozoism) ; its source is the *Maya* and it is perishable as an earthen vessel.

Soteriology or Soul's Deliverance.—The Soul is from all time enclosed in a fine subtle body or envelope, persisting in its company through all its migrations : it is from eternity associated with the *malas* of ignorance and with the impure matter which contains them.[2] The triple bond of the soul can only be destroyed by Siva's grace, by the *parasakti* of pure knowledge : we must rouse this grace (*arul*) of God, ere we can gain full understanding of our essential oneness with him. The states of souls are threefold : (*a*) human or divine and demonic ; (*b*) those which await new birth ; (*c*) those who are set free from *deed* and *maya* or illusion and have no need of rebirth, but await full union with Siva.[3] In this life the receptivity of knowledge and of divine grace must be aroused by a personal teacher or *guru*, standing to his pupil as a divine and infallible mentor. The disciple must listen to him, abstract his mind from objects of sense and repeat the mystic names ; he may acquire magic and

[1] A careful comparison with Origenism, a system certainly complete before 250 A.D., will make it not unlikely that the two theories had points of contact and intimacy.

[2] Thus all the elements of our world (including souls, not perfect at the outset and then somehow fallen, but vicious from the start) coëxist from the very beginning : no new factors or elements are introduced ; and so, unlike the orphic (?) or Christian theory, there is no *history* in the strict sense, only a ceaseless process which here and there has an ending for certain rare and happy souls. And this is the true doctrine of buddhism also.

[3] There are two curious points which are not quite clear ; God's *arul* (grace) is to be stirred that it may appear as an *obscuring* energy, and the souls in the highest condition are said to be *ignorant* still ; cf. Nallaswami Pillai *Sivaite Religion*, Madras 1909.

supernatural power.[1] At last the soul released has conscious immortality, and sharing the bliss and wisdom of Siva is not absorbed into His essence but leads a blissful life in his presence.

Section X. The Reforms and Compromises of Sankara the Monist (*800* A.D.)

Autotheistic Reaction (in its esoteric philosophy) : Sankara's uncertain position.—Mention has already been made of the revival of brahman (or ksatriya ?) monism under Sankara (*c. 800* A.D.) and his compromise with the popular cults of southern and dravidian India. In him (as Deussen has very minutely pointed out) hindu philosophy reaches its limit, its final and systematic form —the *Vedanta*. Hitherto we have followed rather the religion and exoteric piety of the east and have traced its spiritual affinity to western standards. It will now be needful to examine at greater length the esoteric philosophy which ran counter to the theistic tendency, whenever this showed signs of independent culture and reflection ; though it was quite prepared, as is shown in modern hinduism under thin brahmanic veneer, to give a welcome to the lowest forms of native superstition. Sankara was born *c. 788* at Kaladi in Malabar, and a brahman of the Nambudri class. Though he died at the age of thirty-two (*820* ; in the Himalayas) he completed an immense work which had a wide influence on the current and later life of India. He was looked on as an incarnation of Siva for his wisdom and strictness of life.[2] He aimed at restoring brahmanic purity, and succeeded on the esoteric side. Himself a votary of Siva he desired to recall the doctrine of Brahma, coupled with the joint worship of the *trimurti*. His school took its name *Smartas* from *smriti* (tradition), the author professing only to revive the old faiths. Without doubt he occupied a somewhat insincere position ; for the people at large he posed as a champion against the heretical and atheist sects of northern rationalism, yet in truth he was almost as hostile as they to the theistic principles of the *Bhagavata*. His real doctrine, apart from polemics, was

[1] This concession to the ineradicable passion of the hindu mind is made by even the very loftiest systems of thought.

[2] His works take the form of comments on the *Upanisads*, the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and the Vedanta Sutras : perhaps the latest appreciation of his position is *Sri Sankaracharya* by Aiyar and Tattvabaushan, Madras, 1902.

a strict monistic theory; but his influence in the south led to a modelling of a hindu cult comprehensive and 'national' (if the term can be admitted) at a moment when Buddhism was rapidly losing ground: whereas in the north he reduced an indefinite Brahmaism to order and set for all later time the true standard of orthodox theo-philosophy.

Sankara's unique tenet: that of Parmenides.—The disputes and successes of this itinerant apostle of the Upanisads are told by his own disciple Anandagiri (*Sankara-dig-vijaya*, 'S. world-conquest') and in another work of the same name by the more famous Madhva. Sankara interprets the aphorisms [1] ascribed to Badarayana, and he again is said to be identical with Vyasa, fabulous arranger of the Vedas and supposed founder of the Vedanta. Sankara has in truth but a single doctrine to preach —that the *phenomenal world is illusion and in itself unreal.* His attitude is that of Zeno and Parmenides: he does not refuse to recognize the world altogether, but gives it a value for convention and ignorance only (*vyavaharika*): it has no true or transcendental existence (*paramarthika*). Therefore there are two kinds of knowledge, esoteric and exoteric, just as in the eleatic poem the way of truth and the way of error or opinion stand contrasted and yet must in a sense be held together. The personal creator and separate soul are beliefs which must be conceded to the average man, to the mind sunk in illusion and ignorance. No moral aim or purpose must be attributed to the Absolute Spirit, and the mirage or phantasmagoria can only arise from sheer sportiveness (*lila*). These points, with the unvarying *brahman* = *atman* or 'god is the self,' constitute the whole of Sankara's *advaita* teaching. As this is the chief movement in thought as distinct from theology, within the limits of our period, we must inquire by what stages this final form of hindu philosophy was reached.

[1] These *Sutras* are translated in our English edition of *Sacred Books of East* by G. Thibaut, and by the unwearying though prolix German student, P. Deussen, Leipzig 1887; he had then already published his *System of Vedanta* 1883 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1906. Deussen's works are translated into English (*The Phil. of the Upan.* tr. Geden T. & T. Clarke Edinb. 1908, being the second volume of the indian division of his *General Hist. Phil.* and *S. of Ved.* (as above) by C. Johnston, Bengal C.S. Open Court Publ. Chicago 1912. These two valuable but diffuse writings very much overlap one another.)

Section XI. Final form of Autotheism or the Vedanta System

Vedic Periods : A Old, B New, and C Post-Vedic.—After the previous survey it will be easier to understand the following summary of aryan history and development : (A) the Old Vedic Age and hymns of the *Rig* composed perhaps from *1500–1000* B.C. within the border of India (Punjab) but no doubt preserving poems composed *2000–1500*, (B) The Neo-Vedic *1000–500*, marked by the gradual conquest of the western region until the whole northern plain bounded by Himalaya. Ganges and Vindhya M. was occupied—to this period belong the three later Vedas (*Yajur, Sama, Atharva*) [1] and also the *Brahmanas* and *Upanisads*. (C) The Post-Vedic Age in which appear the heretical tendencies, and personal rationalism which elevates man above the gods and does not (as the *upanisads* of the second period) regard absorption in the Absolute as the goal (*either* as a fact already realized here and now by those who can understand, *or* as an ideal infinitely remote and painfully to be won, but nevertheless always in sight.)

The Gods not genuinely connected with religion or morality.—It is clear that from the first a sceptical and disintegrating tendency was active and that a very imperfect connexion was made between the *natural* and *moral* agency of the early Vedic gods. Where they are conceived as genuinely personal, they are supreme egoists and an increasing sense of ethical requirement led to a separation of the province of conduct from any real divine jurisdiction. Not that their magical power was denied, but their worshippers were supposed to be greedy of gain (in this world or hereafter) and purely selfish and calculating in offering the sacrifice. *Rig* x 117 [2] recommends benevolence without placing it under the patronage of the gods. In ii 12 ' this terrible god ' Indra whose being men doubt ' asking where is he ? nay whom ' they deny, saying he is not—he will destroy his foes like children's toys ' : ix 112 suggests that Indra is quite selfish, and is (x 119) much given to intoxication with Soma, like his own priests as

[1] It is to be noted that even this latest (and to some non-canonic) Veda bears in its name witness to the prehistoric identity of the indo-iranian family.

[2] As Deussen notes *Outline Ind. Phil.* Curtius, Berlin 1907.

they gambol around like frogs (vii 103) : in x 82 the Vedic minstrels are ridiculed as wrapped in a fog of unmeaning verbiage and as travelling about to make gain (like Plato's Orphic priests and Cybele's mendicant fraternity in later times).

Beginnings of Monism (in reaction) : the Atman or God within.—But already speculators had guessed at the unity lying behind : *Rig* i 164 refers to the ' One Being of which the hymns speak under divine names : x 129 (the most famous of all) represents, after Hesiod's fashion, the birth of Love from primal chaos or being which is identical with non-being : x 121 finds a name for this new yet aboriginal deity, *Prajapati*. Now this, it is to be noted, is ingenious reflexion and priestly refinement : this new God is the great wizard who by rite and charm, and above all by penance (*tapas*), created the world, or rather transmutes himself into it, falling to pieces like the norse giant Hrymir, and intermittently restored by those who know the magic ritual of sacrifice. The effort to find the underlying Unity was carried a step further (as we saw) by this later emphasis on rite : *brahman* or power of prayer, it is this which compels *Prajapati*, and it is self or *Atman*, all that remains when the perishable notself is taken away and man reaches the depths of his being. These two terms (which are one thing) form the sole subject of the *upanisads* and the Yajnavalkya chapters of *Brihad-aranyaka Upan.* are the oldest of all : our *Atman* is the only real, is itself unknowable, and cannot be *object*, since it is eternal *subject* of knowledge. This is idealism which has not yet raised the problem of Solipsism. The *Atman*, once existing alone, thought ' I will ' be manifold and make the worlds issue forth ' ; and having created them *he entered his creation as its soul.* In theistic systems God creates souls ; here he multiplies himself in the playfulness of divine power and becomes all and *many* by illusion or glamour, yet remaining all the time *one*. Within the same being, man, live the true and the illusory Self (*Svetasv. Up.*) ; the true as one bird on a tree which only quietly looks on, while the other bird as the false self, is busily eating the fruit of works.[1] Therefore

[1] Here is the doctrine common to all mysticism and often leading to a dangerous *adiaphorism ;* the true soul is quite passive (ἀπαθὴς) in the body and cannot be soiled by sin ; so Aristotle's νοῦς is really the veritable man and yet is not interested in or qualified by any of the changes of his ethical character or the deeds of his life.

the Highest is already within us ; and we have no need of prayer or magic to bring Him nearer. Salvation (if only we knew it) is already realized and assured ; it wants no superfluous complement of futile works, nor postulate of any further transcendental deity.

Autotheism : man is everything and God superfluous : the saving knowledge.—This insistence on the immediate deity of self is very curious : hindu thought in its pure subjective idealism is just the very reverse of all *pantheism*, whether of *thought*, of *will* (as in the hebrew or muslim theology) or of *matter*. So far from God being everything and man nothing or contemptible, man is everything and God is superfluous.[1] A keen sense of immortality, in contrast with the neglect or indifference of the Semites, is ' from oldest times a patrimony of the indo-germanic ' race.' The complete surrender of this assurance of personal value by the Rationalists arose not from any scorn of the personal but from a ' fear of dying again and again.' Their aim was to win a lasting state of bliss instead of a brief sojourn in Indra's heaven, soon to be followed by another fall to earth.[2] Hence, though strictly inadmissible in a theory of an unchanging selfhood (subject only to a mere illusion of change and the manifold), Metempsychosis is adopted seriously[3] and not merely moralized but made the basis of all hindu morality (such as it is) down to the present hour. Even *Yajnavalkhya* the idealist for whom nothing exists but the abiding divine self, can say of the vain struggle of the world of illusion and the prospect after death :— ' What they spoke of was *work* and what they praised was the *deed* ; verily a man becomes holy by good works and wicked by evil.' Migration is just as real as the empirical world for the stage of exoteric knowledge ; but from a higher point of view both pass away or are seen to be but mirage. Saving knowledge is to know the self to be one with the Highest ; he fears nothing for there is nothing beyond himself to fear, and will injure nothing because everything is himself. Those who still wish to retain theism and a humble attitude of devotion speak of this knowledge

[1] Hence ' atheist ' Sankhya is admitted as an orthodox system because it leaves the self and denies God ; but jain and buddhist are excluded as denying both.

[2] This repeated death and rebirth is called *punarmrityu*.

[3] No doubt a loan from the earlier races.

as the gift of God's grace; the pure autotheist however knows there is no reality and no higher being, beyond his own thought.

Upanisads contain every germ of later developments (except their pessimism).—The chief developments, or 'orthodox' systems, are (as we have already seen) *Sankhya, Yoga, Vedanta;* these (it must be remembered) are not new or original but legitimate deductions from the *Upanisads,*—each laying an exclusive stress on one particular aspect of a body of doctrines not yet fused in a homogeneous system. Deussen (as against undue praise of buddhism) is quite right: 'the only systems of value for 'metaphysics are *Sankhya* and *Vedanta* and even these are not 'to be considered original creations of the reflecting mind: for 'the common basis of both—still more of *buddhism* and *jainism*—'is to be found in the *Upanisads,* those ideas which by a kind of 'degeneration, have developed into Sankhya on one side and 'buddhism on the other'.[1] Buddhism is but a clear, popular and unmetaphysical way of stating for the benefit of mankind the *Upanisad* truths set forth by *Yajnavalkhya.* As to the much debated point of its psychology, Deussen very justly remarks: 'If buddhism in its opposition to brahmanic belief goes so far 'as to deny soul, *the denial is only apparent* since it maintains 'the theory of transmigration effected by karma . . . this must 'in each case have an *individual bearer* and this is what *Upanisads* 'call *atman* and buddhism inconsistently denies.' It is this purely apparent *denial of self* or self-denial which has led the uncritical west into a flood of irrelevant sentiment about the great disinterested religion of the east: it should of course be plain that buddhism is a purely subjective and indeed eudæmonistic system and very rarely ventures forth beyond the confines of the self at all: its somewhat inert but not insincere benevolence is of course a natural and logical corollary from its value of self, not an impulse of active altruism. It must be noted that, while the *Upanisads* are still joyous and optimistic in tone, *Sankhya* and its derivative buddhism start from *pain* and seek, to end it by negation; whereas true philosophy is not in the main practical but issues from an eager curiosity for know-

[1] I venture to alter the order of the last two schools; elsewhere Deussen (with, I believe, all important critics to-day) insists on the priority of Sankhya and the entire indebtedness of Gautama to earlier systems—for all but his own wonderful personality.

ledge : ' it is a symptom of decadence both in Greece and India ' when it begins to be considered as a remedy for the pains of life ' (Deussen). The *Sankhya* (with its sense of pain and its self-pity) is founded on *dualistic realism* for purposes of subjective satisfaction. *Matter* is real and the *soul* is real and the two being coeternal are inexplicably linked and entangled. The sole aim is *negative*, to be released from the actual.

Sankara's aim ; to correct the self-pity and realism of Sankhya. —The work of Sankara then is to sound a recall to primitive truth, corrupted and disfigured by the self-pitying pessimism which appeared in the ' degenerate ' Sankhya.[1] Against this independence of matter or empiric realism he raised his voice. He is an eastern Luther reviving the pure word. At the same time he is no fanatic or sectarian : he desires only to unify. So, as in the grades of life or *asramas*, he admits three forms of thought, an exoteric theology, an esoteric, and an idealist philosophy (which strictly speaking excludes both the others). It is his rendering of the Vedanta which to-day lives in the heart and mind of every thoughtful Hindu.[2] God and the self are—rather *is*—inaccessible to human thought. The *Atman* can only be expressed by *neti neti*[3] or by the wise Bahva's obstinate silence when questioned upon its nature. This *ding-an-sich*, as Kant has shown, is inconceivable under the categories of our intellect which only operates with the forms of *space*, *time*, *causality*. ' We ' are for ever excluded from a knowledge of the spaceless, timeless, ' godless reality '. Yet all the time we have it in fact, full and wholly, within us : when we leave the mirage of the external world and return to the secret depths of our own nature, we come

[1] And to a less extent in Gautama's system ; but it must not be forgotten that the chief doctrine of buddhism is after all *optimistic* (as will presently appear).

[2] Deussen who is entirely in sympathy with Sankara *advaita* tells us that of 100 Vedantines seventy-five follow Sankara : of the remaining 25 per cent. 15 adhere to Ramanuja and 5 apiece to Madhva and Vallabha—all of whom recede from his psychical *monism* to some form of *dualism*—at least recognizing, no doubt under Christian, jewish, or muslim influence, the distinction of God and the soul. ' The fact ' he says ' may be a great ' source of comfort for poor India in so many misfortunes, for the eternal ' interests are higher than those of time.'

[3] ' Not thus, not thus ' ; cf. Royce's use of this negation, *World and Individual* 170 (Macmillan 1900).

to God—not (as in Sankhya) by objective and scientific knowledge, but by absorption into self (*arubhava*) ; man in this act knows himself as sum and totality of all being. There is no external world at all ; it is illusion which vanishes as we come near, like the terror of a serpent which is found to be only a piece of rope.

Phenomena are but mirage : the soul's true life : parallel in Taoism.—When we die we awaken from a heavy dream and stand in the presence of reality, or rather find it to be within our self. Thus in this and every other hindu Way of Deliverance, the true state of the self is really *positive*, though from our earthly point of view we have to express it as pure negation. Every true mystic very rightly declines to discuss the state of the redeemed soul when it has found its goal. He knows that it is incommunicable to any user of the terms of understanding. It is enough for him that it is a felt experience which, once gained, must be eternal. About *600* B.C. in China [1] an attempt was made to define soul in its native home and true state : life reaches earth from some dazzling and remote centre in space, distant beyond the range of human conception. This centre (says H. A. Giles) appears to be ' a home of eternal principles ', ' the abode of a First Cause ', somewhat analogous to Plato's *Plain of Truth* or Ideal World. Here pure and spotless beings drink of the spiritual and feed on force, and likeness exists without form (?). To get back to that primeval state should be the aim of all men ; and this we can attain only by a process of purifying mind and body, to be prolonged through all conditions of existence until perfection is reached. When soul and body are fitted for the great change, there comes what men call death ; the pure being closes his eyes to awake forthwith in his original glory from the sleep which mortals call life.[2] The True Real (which we are in virtue of our inmost core) is timeless, spaceless and unchanging ; outside of this, all is *maya* or mirage.[3] But *Sankara* does not deny that our ' godly nature ' is obscured and concealed, any more than he denies the *appearance* of a visible universe. We are here in

[1] Or possibly under Chuang Tzu somewhat later *c.* 330–260 B.C.

[2] Deussen who is a dogmatist in metaphysics, believes that Kant and Schopenhauer finally proved the doctrine which Plato (from Parmenides) and the Vedanta only surmised ; the two worlds of *being* and *non-being* ; cf. his *Elements of Metaphysics*, tr. C. M. Duff, London, 1894.

[3] Cf. Suzuki's *Hist. Chin. Philos.*, Probsthain 1914.

sin and misery ; why, we cannot know and it is impious to ask : of this alone we can be certain—we know a way out, and that is enough. The knowledge that 'I am God' does not produce salvation, but is already salvation.

Section XII. Later Development of semi-Theism in Indian Sects

Rapid spread of Theism after the Mahommedan Inroads : Mystical devotion.—After Sankara the next striking figure in theology is Ramanuja (*1017–1090*) born near Madras, who suffered persecution from the sivaite king of the Chola, Rajendrath II (*1070–1118*) [1] for his persistent advocacy of Visnu. Following in this the early *bhagavata* movement, he retained also their faith in a *personal god* and a *real* [2] *soul*. This theistic creed rapidly spread over India from the south : Ramanandra (between *1300–1400*), also from the same district of Madras, completed its success and hinduism began to revive all over the continent.[3] Among supporters of the cult of Visnu must be named his sivaite coeval Madhva (*1331–1390*) [4] who became a fierce foe of *advaita* and all doctrines which confuse or identify God and the soul. Reverting to the realism of common sense he held that matter was real and eternal and that salvation was attained through *bhakti* directed to Visnu's son Vayu. In this conflict between aryan *monism* and dravidian *dualism* the latter wins the day : it seems certain that other foreign influences cooperated to secure this result. The cult of Visnu as related to sivaism is roughly as *humanism* to *nature-worship ;* but the former admits *theriolatry* (either aryan or dravidian in origin) : a generalized conception of a divine potency lies behind the animal forms and finds occasional expression. Sayce believes that in Babylon god was at first theriomorphic and only later represented in human guise, the animals then becoming mere satellites like Mars'

[1] It will be seen that the century covered by these two persons corresponds to the age of Cathar persecution in the west and the attack on the paulician sect in the Balkans by Alexius Comnenus (1081–1118).

[2] i.e. not a 'transient theophany', to be presently absorbed into the Deity.

[3] The curious homogeneity of thought (at least the easy passage of universal propagandist movements over an area politically disunited) reminds one of the *philosophic* Germany of cent. xviii.

[4] Grierson seems to give him as a contemp. of Ramanuja in cent. xi.

picus, or a very momentary vehicle. Visnu is (as in Lyall's *Asiatic Studies*) clearly the *human* preserver in the ever-increasing flux and change ; while Siva's *natural* vicissitudes are governed by fate and are quite indifferent to our special welfare, Visnu constantly revisits the earth, when demand arises, either as man or as animal. Two other notable apostles were Vidyapati and Chaitanya (cent. xv) in the north, chiefly in Behar and Bengal. A division, analogous to the position of Pelagius and S. Austin, now arose ; the *northern* school admitting the presence of male and female energies in God and laying stress on the need of human cooperation, on the concomitance of the human will in the scheme of salvation,—the *southern* holding that the divine grace and fiat of election were irresistible.[1] In a devout work (*c. 1213*) the *Artha Panchala* Loka says that in religion ' faith ' becomes rapturous and intense ; effort is merged in craving ' and self-assertion give place to self-surrender ; the heart is ' poured into the intellect or rather intellect becomes fused ' with heart.' [2]

Principal tenets of the Theistic Church : theology, creation, psychology.—It must be remembered that Sankara in bringing back the Vedantine doctrine of the Midland was forced to attack the Bhagavata with vigour. This sect (in the main theistic) were now divided ; some remained faithful to the old alliance with brahman orthodoxy,[3] others finally broke with it and returned to the ancient *Sankhya-yoga* doctrine. The dispute (according to Grierson) culminated in the two representatives Ramanuja and Madhva—both, as we saw, natives of southern India. The generally accepted tenets of the Bhagavata Church may be thus stated : ' God exists from eternity and creates ' everything from *prakriti*—which, at first represented as *nothing* ' or as an emission from the divine, afterwards becomes a dualistic

[1] They are thus divided like the sivaites by the simile of the mother-ape and young, and the cat and kittens, the latter exerting no will or influence upon their own movements.

[2] Cf. Govinda in *Jl. Roy. Asiatic Soc.* July 1910, and his *Lives of the Arvars*, Mysore 1902, where he describes these devout mystics in true *Sufi* style as drunk or drowned or maddened with love towards God ; we compare also Schleiermacher's (quite unwarranted) eulogy of Spinoza's piety, in the term ' god-intoxicated man '.

[3] To which must be referred the ' *pantheistic* ' interpolations of the *Bhagavad Gita*.

'*matter* already coexisting. From him issue souls (*jiva*), to be 'henceforth indestructible and separate entities. He creates 'the lesser gods Brahma and Siva, who may receive reverence, 'but are not entitled to worship'—a refinement analogous to the δουλεία and λατρεία of the Greek Church. 'It is to them however that he leaves the burden and care of world-ruling' (as the Demiurge in *Timæus*): 'but when occasion arises, of 'his infinite grace (*prasada*) Visnu becomes incarnate and saves 'the earth from the rising tide of evil and his faithful elect from 'trouble.[1] Of these avatars one is yet to come, the highest 'in the past incarnations being those of Ramachandra and Krsna. 'In creating, God first produces *prakriti* from himself and emits 'the separate conscious souls, considered as parts or *amsa* of 'him. He himself passes from the phase of unrelated Absolute 'into that of conditioned Spirit. These two in partnership pro-'duce *manas* (equivalent to the Sankhya *buddhi*): after several 'stages the grosser elements are formed and a personal deity, 'Brahma, who fashions the world.' The soul if it desires to be saved must be a *unitarian monotheist;* if it acts from desire for reward or the sake of fruit (*phala*) there will be recompense and after this is worked out a return to the weary round of rebirth. If acts are pure, disinterested (*niskama*), and dedicated to God, he accepts them and confers his eternal nature on their fruits. The deity enters into the soul and confers the gift of *bhakti* which really brings assured salvation in its train. There are four classes: (1) *buddha*, tied to earth and its joys; (2) *mumuksu*, awakened sinners who wish to be good; (3) *bhakta*, the pure in heart already on the path of salvation; (4) *mukta*, released souls enjoying a conscious immortality at the feet of God. The soul at death passes into the sun where the subtle body is burnt up; and, in the reverse order of the creative process, passes into *aniruddha, pradyumna* and a further stage, finally into the presence of God himself. In spite of some traces of pantheistic absorption, the tenet is consistently maintained throughout that the saved will enjoy a conscious and separate life.

The Four Great Doctors and their sects.—*Ramanuja, Madhva, Nimbarka* (or Nimbaditya), *Visnusvamin* formed sects within this revived hinduism which hardly attained to the dignity of

[1] From the very earliest *bhagavad* writings, the doctrine of God's free grace (*prasada*) has an important place.

schismatic bodies. Their differences are really trifling, depending on the precise attitude to Sankara's *Vedanta* : none are opposed to the mother-church though particular teachers lay stress on special tenets. The first of these teachers seems to revert to the old ' brahmaism ' of the Midland (Hopkins) and rejects the vedantine refinements of Sankara. He is only in a qualified sense *non-dualist ;* for God is *personal* and possessed of all good positive qualities, though he embraces all things within himself and emits alike from his essence both *soul* and *matter*, to be henceforth separate and discernible : he pervades the universe as its ' inward regulator ' (*antaryamin*, stoic ἡγεμονεῦον).[1] The *second* teacher, Madhva, reverts to Sankhya-yoga dualism and objects to Ramanuja's doctrine as disguised buddhism. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion of a strong jewish, Christian or muslim influence—perhaps traces of all three can be found in him. He lays stress on the five eternal distinctions ; between *God*, the *soul* and *matter*, and again between these two latter ; between one soul and another, and one material particle and another. He prefers to call the Supreme God, Visnu. The monistic followers of *Advaita* detest this dualizing sect and consign them in a body to the fiercest torments of Hell (in the *Pasanda-chapetika*). The sect of Nimbarka the third doctor is said to be the oldest of all [2] and its scripture to date from the end of century xi (say *1080*) ; if this is so, there is strong evidence that this religion was from the first a protest against *monism*. He preaches a distinct *duality* or rather *trinity—God, soul* and *matter* being quite distinct but intimately connected as the coils with a snake or as waves with the water : God is unknowable but his nature can be interpreted and understood so far as visible creation reveals it. The actual facts or mythologies of the divine *avatars* or periodic incarnations are of small value, so long as we do not fail to

[1] This branch (really the mother-church) is strong in S. India, but is not popular in the north ; its food-restrictions are severe ; some of its members prefer the feminine cult of *Laksmi*, but worship is often directed to divine incarnations, chiefly that of Ramachandra.

[2] The present *mahaut* of the chief convent near Mathura claims direct descent from him, and he is placed in cent. v by some ; a date plainly too remote. He is perhaps an earlier coeval of Ramanuja (Eggeling) and his pupil Jayadeva may be identical with the mathematician Bhaskara who wrote *c.* 1150 A.D.

see God's love shining behind them.[1] The *fourth* school, without doubt the latest, also hails from the south about a century after our period closes (*c. 1425*) : it is again a monistic restatement of non-duality. Of God's three qualities (*sat, chit, ananda*) soul has *bliss* suppressed, matter *consciousness of bliss*, leaving only *essence :* the released soul regains this blessedness and becomes in nature identical with the Adorable—but, it must be supposed, enjoys a separate life without absorption. Visnusvamin's followers, unlike the other three sects, encourage marriage for their ' clergy ' and it is they who accept the cult of Rada and the youthful Krsna (as *Bala Gopala*) : the *Vaishnavas* of Bengal profess much the same doctrine and, together with a small section of Nimbarka's adherents, carry erotic and mystical devotion to somewhat doubtful lengths.

Inclusive tendencies in Religion : culminate in Kabir.— History shows a progressive desire to extend the boundaries of the Church in an inclusive sense : even Ramanuja taught that in theory and in the sight of God castes were equal, but he chose his leaders only from pure brahmans. Ramanandra threw open church-membership to all men and released them from every shackle of ordinance and ritual : among his ' twelve apostles ' (an obvious imitation) were found a muslim, a barber and a worker in leather. The last point in inclusiveness was reached by Kabir (*1440–1518*), perhaps a true muslim by birth, who mixed hindu doctrine with islamic *Sufism* and Christian beliefs.[2] True to the strict unitarianism of his early training, he neglected the divine embodiments (such as Ramachandra) and directed prayer to the Adorable in person.

We have already outstripped the true limits of our period but we never pass beyond tendencies already seen to be working within it. Later hindu development has been due in great

[1] Of this branch there are but few surviving adherents mostly in N. and N.W. India (Rajputana) : the greater part adore Krsna.

[2] Many passages in Kabir's writing are little more than a paraphrase of St. John ; he was almost certainly a disciple of Ramanandra and thus a *vaishnava* or visnuite ; he was an important pioneer in N. India and first tried to unite Hindus and Muslim ; from him Nanak Shah borrowed his composite and eclectic faith. Malcolm (1810), though H. H. Wilson contests this, described his tenets as a blend with Sufism and orthodox islam ; with the former view Westcott of Lucknow in a work published at Cawnpore agrees (*Kabir and Kabir Panthis, c.* 1907–8).

measure to external circumstances ; for instance the reforms of Charan-Das (*1703–1782*) date from Aurungzeb's persecution when men turned to ascetic pietism for the comfort which brahmanic exercises and ordinances could not give. His views are much like the sikh doctrine of Nanak, both betraying a rational syncretism which considers outward observances superfluous, directs a worship of the heart to a single deity and holds that salvation is won by faith and an unceasing repetition of the divine name.

High position granted to the Spiritual Director : Humanism and the ' Name '.—The *guru* or spiritual adviser [1] becomes almost superhuman in these systems ; he is the true mediator who ' with one arm rescues the soul from sin, with the other presents ' it saved before the Throne.' In one sense the *guru* is more powerful than God, for he can protect his disciples from God's wrath. The believer must know that the *guru* and Hari are one : he is god incarnate and has complete power (over family and estate etc.). Here is found a trace of the tendency to divert cultus from an inaccessible deity to a visible embodiment—a relic of early magic and shamanism which, with the lamaism of Mongolia and Tibet, elevates certain men above the gods, just as savage magic in early times made man feel superior to nature (Hegel *Phil. Rel.*). Now the creed of the ' Word of Power ' (*an-had*) [2] held by Kabir Charan Das and found also in the sikh scriptures, adds one further class to the Ways of Salvation—*Sabda-marga*. The conception seems affiliated with the jewish and Christian *Logos* (so R. Burn) and with parsism :—for *an-had* is expressed as *limitless time and space*, the unceasing music, the Eternal Son who abides even in the heart of self as the indwelling spirit. It has (like *om*) no letters, no articulate sound : it is in itself the Supreme Deity and he who muses on it and repeats it unceasingly becomes God : ' measureless glory he ' puts on and hears the Limitless speaking ; error flies, earthly ' desires are all killed, good and evil actions lose their fruit.'

[1] As among Catholics the choice of a *guru* or spiritual director must be made by these *Kabir Panthis* with great care, but once chosen the confessor is to be implicitly obeyed, for his voice is that of God. The *Vallabhacharis* offer body and soul to this *gosain*. If in the *Sabda-marga* the word is sometimes mystical, as divine inspiration, it is often merely the concrete advice or command of the director.

[2] A half-arabic, half-indian compound.

Charan Das is quite explicit ; ' meditation on the name of Rama destroys all sin, even the worst.' In all these systems the Supreme is *personal*, and the creed though certainly mystical does not teach the absorption of the soul, but a blissful eternity in God's presence.

Resulting Tendency to Solifidian Indifferentism.—It was to this *solifidian indifferentism* that Kabir's teaching led : there was no caste, no need for ascetic practices, alms or fasting : salvation was won neither by good *works* nor by *knowledge*, but by ardent *faith* (bhakti) alone. The cult of many gods—here speaks a follower of Zoroaster—is wrong : *Maya* [1] created them and they are the cause of all sin in us. His followers of to-day believe in heaven and hell, enjoyed or suffered in the intervals between rebirth. Kabir [2] himself is curiously represented as denying a distinct and real *heaven* or *hell* ; they are but symbolic names for states of bliss or misery in this world.[3] If so, this sceptical secularism is wholly out of keeping with the *vaishnava* tenets and with hindu thought in general, but singularly resembles the views attributed to the innermost circle of the

[1] A peculiar use of *Maya* may be noted in these cognate systems which may or may not show a gnostical or manichean impress ; the First Cause through the operation of *Maya* created the universe, and by means of it appears at periodic intervals in mortal form, the common tenet of the muslim Shiites and much more primitive Incarnationists. But the modern believer, under foreign influence more *personalist* than his forefathers, uses *Maya* for the inferior demiurge which creates the world with all its faults, either in subordination to God or in ignorance of him or in defiance. For Tulasi-Dasa the great poet of this later theistic religion (*c.* 1580), *Maya* seems to occupy a place like that of Satan in the *Book of Job*. As to God's incarnation, Nanak taught (like the Hindus) twenty-four embodiments, and among the Kabirs these twenty-four different phases of the divine are utilized as the several patrons of the various vocations (*nistha*) which the faithful may pursue. Nanak and his nine successors are regarded by the Sikhs as only one person, as in the Clementine writings, the light of the first *guru's* soul being transmitted in turn to each—a clear reproduction of the shiite deification of Ali.

[2] Kabir refers to his spiritual parents Jaideo and Nama (first marathi poets *c.* 1250) ; he is said to have died 1449 after spending most of his life at Benares ; the author of the *Padmawat* shows (*c.* 1550) how intimate were relations between K. and the early Sikhs—the modern sect (cf. the great work of Macauliffe in six volumes, Oxford to 1909) of 2½ millions in Punjab are without any doubt his spiritual descendants.

[3] Cf., besides Westcott (*lib. cit.*), Bhandarkar's work on the *Religion of Visnu and Siva* (Strassburg, 1913).

Assassins. It is moreover clear that Kabir believed in the divine origin of the soul and its ultimate happiness with God : life is God's gift and must not be taken away. His followers resemble Quakers and lead harmless lives ; but it cannot be denied that the extreme emphasis on *bhakti* and a purely spiritual cult, the rejection of any official priesthood, might in certain cases lead to the moral indifferentism which, both in east and west, excited such terrible reprisals from a suspicious or pharisaic society.

Note A.—Ramanuja's doctrine was specially directed against *lingam*-worship, dissociated though it was from any sensuous practice or belief. It was certainly a protest of *humanism* against a *nature*-worship which both in exoteric or esoteric form seems to submerge man as an agent in a power not himself ; for in spite of Sankara's professed *autotheism* the effect on the average mind is pantheistic. Strict sivaites cannot approve of *Incarnationism* which is the belief which really enlists the sympathies and evokes the religious feeling of average man. The brahmans hold it derogatory to the divine changelessness and have perhaps only been induced to adopt Visnu's *avatars* to counteract buddhism with its attractive doctrine of human merit. The austere Siva (as Julius Eggeling justly remarks) never made effective appeal to the warrior-caste or to the hearts and feelings of the common people. Ramanuja aimed of set purpose at contradicting the special tenets of the great Vedantine, whose mendicants were forbidden to touch fire and lived on alms like the early buddhist friars. He enjoined the use of fire and would not allow his disciples to eat food prepared by strangers. Hence as in some very primitive tribes the meal is a punctilious and religious rite, reserved for privacy after a ritual bath, and consumed only in certain prescribed garments. Madhvacharya (born at Kanara, 1199) was less intolerant of *lingam*-worship and aimed to reconcile the cults of Visnu and Siva ; but he is a constant opposer of *monism* and asserts the soul's distinct being, here and hereafter.

Note B.—Pharisaism or barbaric food-*tabus* were set aside by Ramananda ; he was as a novice suspected of laxity in these complex regulations and on disobeying the order to dine alone he left his convent and set up a schism in Benares. His choice of apostles proves that he accounted the rules of caste as futile. His teaching was of a popular kind and he might be reckoned among the earliest democratic levellers in India. The writings of the sect are composed in the popular tongue. Tulasi-dasa's version of the sanscrit *Ramayana* has wielded immense influence on the hindu mind. His pupil Kabir was Nanak's master and thus each stage shows a further step in an eclectic and liberal tendency towards the creation of an inclusive creed.

APPENDIX A

The Sankhya : a further inquiry into its origin from *upanisad* doctrine

Realism creeps back into pure Spiritualism : Creationism.—Accepting *idealism* (solipsist autotheism) as the primitive form of *Ksatriya* theory, we may note with interest its gradual blending with, or corruption by, other and more familiar thought-forms. Yajnavalkhya taught that *atman* was real, to know it was to know all, there is no change and no manifold, nature is a pure fantasy or illusion. *Realism* crept back in a doctrine more nearly akin to *pantheism* which allowed a certain truth to the visible world but still identified this with the *atman* : that which is infinitely small *within* us is the infinitely great *outside*. But this identity (the core and substance of *Upan.* doctrine) gave way before the necessity for (empirical) thought to conceive of this identity in causal relation : *atman* as *cause* or creator, world as *effect* and creature. Just in the same way Anaxagoras (in spite of his expressed dislike of ' splitting things asunder ' as with an axe ') had finally severed *thought* and *things*—which before had been unified or alleged as one in Parmenides. The old cosmogonies of the *Rig* were revived and altered to suit the new theory : after *Atman* has created the universe it enters into its various parts as soul or animating principle.[1] This is not yet *theism*, which only appears when a class-distinction is drawn between *atman* as creator and *atman* as soul or souls,—when God is something out and beyond the aggregate of animating centres, when he is believed to send them forth as his messengers to do his service. This is the stage reached in *Svetasvatara*—where as on a palimpsest the other shades of theory are to be recognized.[2]

God becomes superfluous.—But this recognition of the real being of *particular* souls was fatal to the *universal*. At first contrasted with their creator they soon became independent : they existed coeval and apart. Instead of a cosmogonic activity, one single function remained for a Supreme Being ; to provide a sphere in which souls might work out their destiny, ' to fashion forth material nature as *the arena of recompense* ' for the deeds done by autonomous souls ' (Deussen). If by the hypothesis of spontaneous evolution Nature could be charged with the duty instead, God would become superfluous : He would not be needed either as original creator or as moral judge and allotter of retribution. We are

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[1] For this stage Deussen invents the convenient, if ugly, term *cosmogonism* (*Upan.* Pt. ii. ' Cosmology ' ix § 3).

[2] Deussen well says : ' It is characteristic of this work that, side by ' side with its proper and peculiar theism, all the preliminary steps are ' retained.'

left then with the two primitive elements of the *atheistic Sankhya* (1) a number of souls (*purusa*) burdened with a heritage of deeds and working out their fruits from birth, and (2) matter or *prakriti* always evolving to provide a stage for this unending drama or tragedy.

Sankhya : Realism and Dualism : Salvation, to recognize separateness.—The rise of Sankhya is, by the confession of most modern students, one of the obscurest problems in hindu philosophy. But the general lines of its parentage are not doubtful : it is the extreme form of that realism which arose to contest the *ksatriya* idealism and insisted on attributing true and independent being both to *nature* and to the *souls*. *Prakriti* and *purusa* are distinct and coëternal essences ; there is a dualism here as complete as in the cartesian system. No effort is made to show their 'ultimate identity in a higher sphere' (to use hegelian language) or to postulate a common origin. The *purusa* in themselves are mere *knowing subjects* and as a whole would be entirely identical and 'indiscernible' if they were not differentiated by their empirical characters, by the separate parts of *prakriti* with which they believe themselves connected (though as will be seen this is very subtle and rarefied matter). Thus, as with many of the Schoolmen, the *principium individuationis* is matter. The soul as a *simplex substantia* has in itself no real qualities, and the more properties or predicates it loses, the more real it is and the closer to its true intrinsic nature : hence *mysticism*, which is on one side at least, scorn of the particular and a desire to return to the universal. Souls, in a sense a single being but nevertheless existing from the very outset in plurality, are disengaged from, yet connected with, matter or nature, *prakriti*, as *subject* from and with its *object*. Knowledge of this secret—that it is entirely separate and distinct from *prakriti*—is the soul's true salvation. As in other systems the recognition of identity is the saving knowledge, so here it is the recognition of complete severance or a fundamental *dualism*. 'The world is none of my business and its sufferings even in so 'near a part as my own body are quite alien from myself.' *Prakriti* when its sufferings cease to be reflected in *purusa* also gains redemption. The latter must cease to illuminate the illusory griefs of the former. Indeed in a paradox deliverance or redemption affects the *prakriti* alone—for nothing ever happens or can happen to *purusa ;* and it is its unfortunate yoke-fellow that 'is fettered, a wanderer and at length ransomed' when by the detachment of *purusa* it ceases to be conscious of pain.[1] In this practical and redemptive school the process and release concern the *individual* alone. Each several soul for itself must attain knowledge ; for each, as the light dawns upon it, is the process repeated.

Nature : its aim and evolution.—*Prakriti* is even represented as having a conscious aim in unfolding itself before the souls—like a dancing troupe before a rajah in his palace. This is done, not to claim kinship with the

[1] Cf. *Rom.* viii 22, 'the whole creation groaneth and travaileth 'in pain together'—the 'manifestation of the sons of God' takes the place of knowledge and distinctness (in hindu thought) or of mystical suicide (for individual or race) in modern pessimism.

psychical factor but to urge it to repudiate connexion and break away from it. With the usual serious mystification of hindu pseudo-science the stages of *prakriti* in evolution are traced with care: first *Buddhi* (consciousness), then from it *Ahamkara* (the fashioner of 'ego'), from this again (in a twofold emanation) *manas* and the ten organs of knowledge and act (*indriyas*), and the five subtle (*tanmatras*) and five gross elements (*bhutas*). These eighteen first products of *prakriti* form the 'subtle body' (the avestan and manichean 'tunic', the gnostic *αἰθέριον ὄχημα* or vehicle) which accompanies soul in all its manifold wanderings. In a somewhat ambiguous place come the three *gunas* or factors, *sattvam* (radiant or intellectual) *finjas* (active or emotional) *tamas* (dark or inert); to the different admixture of these are due the fifty different states of the *Lingam*, collective name for the eighteen products. All this solemn trifling and arbitrary classification is a suggestive feature in hindu thought, and may be entirely omitted (as in buddhism) without any detriment to the doctrinal core. Plainly it is not a mark of extreme care or subtle discrimination; it marks simply the need of numbered divisions or classes and analysis —for oral teaching; and it has little value beyond that of a *memoria technica*.

This dualism marks a relapse of philosophy: which becomes purely medicinal.—If true philosophy is always a monism, as is often asserted, then a distinct dualism must mark a lapse, 'the wane of the unifying or 'philosophic spirit' which finds itself at home everywhere in the world,[1] in the true hegelian fashion.

The postulate of two eternal and coexisting reals meeting in infinite space and time is a very serious demand on intelligence and creates more problems than it can solve. In this arbitrary dualism nothing can be said about origin or relation, no one can explain how they came to cooperate so well for a common end—the strong but blind man and the lame with good eyes, who seemingly need each other and cannot dispense with mutual good services. How is it that this accidental union forms a world, the disentanglement of which is so wearisome and lengthy a process? It will be noted that Soul is no longer an animating principle or platonic source of activity, but an unwelcome and reluctant guest or rather prisoner. The creative faculties were transferred from God to matter and He became (as we saw) superfluous. As to the plurality of souls we recommend a comparison with the system of McTaggart, to whom the Absolute is most certain plural, active and developing, instead of a dead unity in which all particulars are lost.[2] This Dualism can be traced back to *Brihad*, i 4 where deeds and souls are the only two factors: 'this only,

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[1] Or must pretend to.

[2] This is of course a reaction of *british nominalism* which, as in politics or ethics, holds strongly to the value of particulars above their aggregate or sum, or collective group-name—against a revived *pantheism* which like Saturn devours all its children. When Deussen asks: 'a plurality 'of knowing subjects! What philosophic mind can admit this thought?' he is already answered; indeed, he answers himself.

food and *eater*, is this entire universe.' The *Maitr.* vi 10 gives earliest notice of the Sankhya system and interprets these two terms food and eater as *prakriti* and *purusa* : the direct contrast set up in this chapter—a realistic dualism—is quite at variance with usual *upanisad* teaching. In the desire to reach the notion of soul as *simple substance*, the Sankhya actually traces *intelligence* to the evolution of matter—*buddhi* or *mahan*. As in *Rig* ix 121 the first-born comes forth from the waters, so here mind, sustainer of phenomena, issues from the *prakriti* and in turn from it all the elements of individuality and selfhood emerge. The *Gunas* likewise are present in *prakriti*. In deliverance it is the spirit (*purusa*) that rids itself of a gross world of matter which for it no longer exists : as of the two birds one is onlooker, the saved and disinterested ; of the two rams (*Svetas.* iv 5) : ' the one leaps on the red and white and blackish she-goat ' (the three *gunas*) whilst the other ram abandons her to his " late companion ",' and becomes a passive spectator.[1] Saving knowledge is not to recognize the world as pure illusion, glamour, phantasmagoria—but to see that soul's *union* with it is unreal. But, it must be asked, how can mere knowledge effectively sever an actually existing union ? [2] What is interesting in the Sankhya is its practical and pessimistic character, which assimilates it, with the jain and buddhist doctrines, to the subjective and self-pitying schools of Greece after Alexander. The speculative element is nearly extinct, that serene temper of mind which makes its home and finds itself welcome everywhere in the object, because the *real* is the *rational*. But for the Sankhya, philosophy is nothing but the search for a remedy for suffering : it is wholly practical and medicinal. ' Philo- ' sophy, at first based on pure desire for knowledge and having no aim ' beyond truth ' has now become mere means to an end, the personal desire to escape a purposeless suffering.

APPENDIX B

Parentage and Asceticism : the Conflict of Ideals

A. Parentage (1) a religious duty in ancestor cult : (2) means of shifting guilt.—The ancestor-cult of *souls* which has nothing to do with belief in gods or *spirits* survives in India to the present time, curiously

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[1] It is not to be doubted that the verse refers to and expresses well the chief thought of Sankhya : elsewhere these three elements are called, *heat*, *water* and *food* (!) : in western thought they might be said to find their counterpart in *joy* or φιλία, *pain* or νεῖκος, *indifference* or ἀπάθεια. In the passage cited there is a kinship to Hartmann's simile of the evil satyr *Will* leaping on the maiden nymph *Idea* and producing our universe, the bastard child which ought never to have been born.

[2] Deussen traces the gradual emergence of the cloud of pessimism from the still genial atmosphere of the earlier *Upan.* : it is but the size of a ' man's hand ' in these, but it occupies increasing space in *Kathaka* ; and still more in *Maitr.* i (speech of Brihadratha).

incompatible with other theories, of aims in this world and recompense in the hereafter. Immortality in the company of Yama and the forefathers is something quite different from admission to a divine heaven by sacrifice and the god's favour : it is of course wholly irreconcilable with migration in the strict sense and with an ultimate absorption in *brahm*. In the *Rig* ix 113 there is an attempt to unite the *pitrayana* with the *devayanas* in Yama's paradise, the *fathers* in realms of light inexhaustible are represented as dwelling with the *gods* and are with them invoked to draw near and partake of the sacrifice. In *Rig* viii 48 the marvels of the universe are ascribed (quite in the fashion of some savage cosmogonies) to the fathers as well as to the gods ; they helped them to adorn the sky with stars (x 68) and to bring forth the sun (x 107) The ancestors therefore seem to stand on a level with the divine beings, and all later degrees of blessedness and separate heavens are as yet absent. The *Rig* knows nothing of migration. Other difficulties arise when a private and ascetic morality takes the place of normal tribal duty ; the supreme duty of parentage for the tribal welfare and due worship of the fathers is still recognized.[1] To beget children is a religious duty, enjoined (e.g. *Taitt.* i 9) side by side with scripture study and teaching ; the pupil dismissed from his lessons is charged by his master (11) to ' take care that the thread of his ' race be not broken '. Parenthood is even oddly spoken of as a means of transferring guilt ; ' he who in life continues rightly to spin the thread of ' lineage in begetting transfers his guilt to the fathers.' [2] Having left behind his child as a vicarious sufferer he continues his life in the world of men (*Brihad.* i 5) and is admitted to the fathers' realm to consummate his good deeds. (*Aitar.* ii 4) ; ' if aught has been perversely committed ' by him his son will expiate it all ' (*Brih.* l.c.).[3] With a very confident belief in eugenics and control of offspring (*Brih.* vi 4), the master imparts advice to his retiring pupil how to beget a son or daughter of a certain disposition.

B. Ascetic celibacy, Shamanistic : conflict of *tribal* and *individual* interest.—Entirely at variance with this rule of life is the ascetic tendency which disparages the family ties, the rank and duties of *grihastha* in the *asramas*. In the same *Upan.* (*Brih.* iii 5) it is said of brahmans who have known *atman* that they hold aloof from the desire for offspring or estate or worldly honours, and wander around as mendicants. In iv 4, we read

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[1] Attention must be drawn to the extraordinary, indeed unique, traducianist passage in *Aitareya* ii 2 ; an idea utterly abhorrent to the hindu mind and its theories and not to be reconciled with any doctrine of *deeds* or *migration* : the child is merely the man's self seeking a new home.

[2] *Mahanarayana* lxiii 8 which according to Deussen belongs to the second or metrical group, subsequent to *Mundaka* and *Svetas*.

[3] A doctrine curiously like that set forth in Dion Chrysostom's *Charidemus*, where men of rebel Titan blood (the true orphic doctrine) are here imprisoned and punished by angry gods until they have left behind one or more new victims to suffer in their stead : I have elsewhere noted the traces in Dion of a possible acquaintance (A.D. 100) with things indian.

'This our forefathers knew when they ceased to desire children and said, 'What need have we of offspring, we whose soul is this universe?' In the later *Mahan.* (lxii 7, lxiii 8 sq) continence is exalted above parentage; in *Prasna* i. 13 the world of brahman is open only to those who mortify themselves, in whom true chastity is fixed firmly. The ascetic ideal (with its self-centred individualism) strikes right across the tribal or social duty and the tradition of family. In its origin it is without doubt *shamanist;* the *shaman* or *janni* has to be as unlike other men as possible and is accepted by the tribe as a medicine-man just because he is so. He is something abnormal and eccentric and therefore is supposed to be able to reach and propitiate the abnormal in the invisible world. He who knows *atman* is exalted above the threefold *asramas* (scholar, householder, forest-anchorite) *Svetas.* vi 21: he has found that which the ascetic only seeks (*Maitr.* 1 2)—complete release from individuality (*Brihad.* iii 5, iv 22). Therefore is he *Sannyasin,* one who casts all from him, a homeless vagrant (*parivraj*), a mendicant (*bhiksu*). This *Shaman-sannyasin* really rejects the whole brahmanic mode of life or rather orderly system of successive life-standards. In his utter disregard of the external he protests against all ritual observance and merit thus sought. He is already a dead man, must not live with his wife and need offer nothing to his ancestors. After one last concluding sacrifice to the gods, he renounces it for ever; he lays aside the sacred thread and lock of hair that mark his caste and family. He bids a final farewell to his son who may not shed tears. He is allowed but the simplest equipment; which one passage (*Kanthasruti* 5) rejects altogether, leaving the saint in a naked and helpless state. He may beg food from all former castes, their distinctions having ceased to be valid for him. In *Paratmanamsa* 4 it is said 'For him exist no longer 'vedic scriptures, or meditation or worship, no visible or invisible, joined 'or disjoined, I and thou and the world . . . the motions of every im-'pulse have been stilled, he abides only in knowledge, firmly founded 'on the *atman.*' Some texts even permit the day of release to be hastened, as in the *endura* of the albigenses (*Kanth.* 4, *Jabala* 5). Then may he 'enter on the great pilgrimage by abstaining from food, throwing himself 'into fire or water, or choosing a hero's death—or he may repair to a 'hermitage for the aged.'

C. Triumph of the Unsocial Ideal: Quietism and World Surrender.—It is therefore quite clear that the finally victorious ideal is *anti-tribal, anti-vedic, anti-brahmanic.* It is indeed in the oldest *upanisads* that opposition is most marked; the famous simile of the 'house dogs of the gods' occurs in *Brihad.* 1 4. 'He who worships another god (than the 'self or *atman*) saying *It is one and I am another* is not wise but resembles 'a house dog . . . and each man is a useful housedog to the gods. If 'one dog is stolen (by those who teach *atman*) it is disagreeable for the 'owner, how much more so if many? Therefore it is not pleasing to the 'gods that men should know this doctrine!' As with the Greeks 'the 'divine character is full of envy', and Prometheus is a better friend to man than Zeus: the hindu gods do not want man to become too holy—they send beauteous Apsaras to tempt him—or too wise; or they would

lose all their offerings. These *Ksatriya* writings are wholly opposed to the sacrificial cult of the Vedas. Only later did brahmans admit and modify a doctrine which was too strong to be ousted. 'In brahmanism 'itself was ripening a world-concept which though *outwardly* bound up with 'it was *inwardly* opposed to it in its very basis' (Deussen, *Ved. Systm.* Introd.). So while religious worship and secular knowledge are purely egoistic and utilitarian, either for this world or the next, *atman-consciousness* leaves the whole sphere of desire (*kama*) behind, annuls all differences of position in outer life between brahmans, warriors and the rest; and lifts us to the knowledge that soul is not in the least entangled in the cycle of rebirth (*samsara*). 'This truth' says Sankara plainly, 'is not implied 'in the injunction of the work of sacrifice but is rather in contradiction 'of it. The Canon of Ordinances . . . does not rise above the province 'of ignorance.' This conviction cannot again be made the basis of any strenuous action or moral appeal: what concern has such a soul with a world of illusion and misleading 'severalty'? Quite rightly does Deussen call our notice to the illogical exhortation in *Bhagavad Gita* to manly acts—where this military and theistic phase is allowed to remain unmodified side by side with mystical autotheism: 'only painfully and 'artificially has this writing the skill to derive from these premisses a 'demand for heroic action' which in quietism has no place or relevance. 'When the knowledge of *atman* has been gained every act, and therefore 'also every moral act, has been deprived of meaning.' Hence the true and salient doctrine of the *upanisads* is not merely hostile to vedic tradition and brahmin supremacy but cannot be reconciled either with common social duties or with the belief in migration, another illusion like the myth of a realistic world and an autonomous soul. This is at most a fable, suitable for those who are like Kant unable to transcend a frigid moralistic standpoint, and therefore find immortality in approximation to a goal ever receding and in the end unattainable. The unceasing return of soul is realized not in the future and in other regions, but here already and in the present moment; but this *here* is everywhere and this *present* is eternal. This immediacy of salvation is altogether out of keeping with the careful brahmanic hierarchy of castes and grades of life, the various duties and proficiencies. The doctrine is plainly aimed, like all mystical teaching, against pharisaism and mediation. But it overthrows not merely formal church ordinances but some of the chief foundations of human fellowship.

APPENDIX C

'Autotheism' or Spiritual Pantheism

Consistent Autotheism cannot be maintained—nor consistent doctrine of God as Unique Cause.—'This entire universe,' says Deussen, 'with its 'relations of time and space, its manifold, its dependence on apprehending 'mind, rests solely on *illusion*; in truth there is One Being alone, eternal, 'exalted above space and time, above change and the multiple, self-

'revealing in all the forms of nature, and by me myself who am also one 'and undivided,—discovered and realized within as my very self, the '*atman*.' This is of course the language not of a proud and pelagian *autotheism* but of a religious and augustinian *pantheism*. Deussen seems to approve of Christian humility (*Romans* vii 18): only by God can good be wrought in us (*Philipp.* ii 13). He notices that the Church has found it difficult to rest satisfied with this denial of man's cooperation; 'because 'behind the sole operative power which makes God the source of all 'good she saw standing (like some fearsome apparition) the grim mon-'strosity of Predestination.' Yet the Christian conception 'God as sole 'Agent' has to be connected with the jewish realism which sets God and man over against each other as two mutually exclusive substances. Every effect in the universe is wrought by the Atman (*Kaush.* iii 8): It is he who causes the man to do good works 'whom he will lead on high from 'these worlds; and the man, whom he will lead downwards, to do evil.' The *Kena Upanisad* says that the gods do their task only by virtue of the power which Atman confers on them; and *Brihad.* iii 8, 9, expands this notion of universal energy in a passage of wonderful poetic beauty. He compares the Pauline suggestion, identifying (?) God with the ἄνθρωπος πνευματικὸς (1 *Cor.* xv 47) and Kant's explication of the *Categoric Imperative*, as the real man (*ding-an-sich*) laying down the law to the *phenomenal* apparition of his true self. In any case Deussen here represents the vedantine doctrine and the Christo-mystical as substantially the same. Certainly Aristotle's νοῦς ἕκαστος and Averroes' later edition of the doctrine stand in relation to it. It is therefore interesting to note that *autotheism* cannot remain a consistent doctrine; it always falls over from its proud height of self-sufficiency into a mystical self-surrender in which a deity from outside (as it were), absorbs the soul. Professors Murray and Bury call this very logical issue of subjectivity a 'failure of nerve' when it occurs in the platonism of the later roman empire (M: *Four Stages*). But this tendency to objectify is to be observed everywhere: if man's self is the whole of reality or if this can be found within the precincts of his soul, he will certainly set up this self as a new object of worship and rejoice in yielding to it, as if before an extraneous authority. The Vedanta certainly preaches 'that God, sole author of good in us, is not 'as in the Old Testament a Being contrasted and distinct, but rather our 'own metaphysical *Ego*, our divine self, persisting in untarnished purity 'through all the aberrations of human nature, eternal and blessed: and 'this without impairing his absolute antagonism to the depraved self of 'experience (*jiva*).' So Deussen. This is quite lucid as a theory; God is man's self when the imperfect, lower, phenomenal appendages of selfhood (the gnostical περιαρτήματα) are cleared away. In experience, of course, it is hard to realize this true underlying self or to sever into its proper antitheses. Hence mysticism, in east or west, will oscillate between the extreme poles of audacious self-assurance and complete self-abasement.

Subjective Self becomes God—as *objective* Power outside: pure Autotheism arises within the Warrior Caste.—The Atman e.g. is conceived of

(*Kath.* ii 23 and *Mund.* iii 2) as a divine person, and revelation is not subjective insight, but an act of grace which suddenly enlightens the soul : ' only by the man he chooses is the Atman understood, to him alone he ' discloses his essence '. The *Svetasvatara Up.* is the high-water mark of this theistic and personal side, with its genuine prayers for illumination to Savitar, Rudra, and Brahma(n) ii 1–5, iii 1–6, iv 1. King Asvapati (*Chand.* vii) convicts the brahmans who come to him to learn, of entanglement in the error of regarding *atman* as an object of worship existing outside themselves,—a new divinity. Only provisionally then is *Brihad.* i 4 to be taken, where the vedic gods are said to lose the cult henceforth to be offered to Atman alone : ' He who worships another deity saying ' *He is one and I am another*—such a man is not wise.' In the last resort indeed *autolatry* (worship of the atman) is inconceivable. Autotheism then seems not to be a brahman doctrine at all in origin, and to have been but slowly accepted by the priestly caste. The name *brahman* no doubt suggests a priestly origin for Idealism but it is more than likely that it developed elsewhere, that its first adherents were to be found in the military caste. Deussen *Phil. Upan.* i 1 is surely correct on this score : these leading ideas—sole reality of *Atman*, its identification with soul, its evolution in the world—although they may have started with brahmans like Yajnavalkhya ' met with acceptance rather in *ksatriya* circles than among ' priests engrossed in professional ritual.' The priestly redactors of canonic scripture allow the following passages to stand against their own claims : *Chandog.* v 11–24, *Brihad.* iii and its counterpart *Kaush.* iv expressly declare that the doctrine ' Brahman *Atman* ' is possessed by the king and not by the brahman. In *Chand.* i 8, 9 vii 11, 3 War-God tells Narada that vedic lore is quite inadequate ; ' all that you have studied is merely ' name.' In *Chandog.* v 3–10 = *Brihad.* v 2 and *Kaush.* i (very much modified) Transmigration is represented as the secret of *Ksatriya* supremacy : king Jaivali instructs brahman Aruni : ' Because to the present hour ' this doctrine has never circulated amongst the *priests*, therefore in all the ' worlds the government has remained in the hands of the *warrior* caste.' The Atman-doctrine has not developed from any allegory or symbolism of priestly ritual ; only later were the rite and the sacrifice adjusted by the brahmans to meet it. Such was the conservative piety of the schools that they attempted to retain the heirlooms of ancient thought and practice, while converting them into vehicles of higher truth.

APPENDIX D

The Vedas supplanted and disparaged : indifferentism in *morals* as well as *ritual*

The ' mystical doctrines ' so far as they are to be found in the Vedas are expressly said not to enlighten man on the most serious issues. In *Brihad.* iv 1, 2 Janaka cannot say what is the soul's destiny after death, though he has studied the vedas and listened to the hidden lore. In *Chandog.* vii 1 Narada tells the War God that though learned in the

scripture he is not learned in the Atman : so he prays to be led over to the further shore that lies beyond sorrow, since he has heard that he who knows atman has vanquished all pain. In iv 4, 21 of the same *Upanisad* ' book-knowledge gives rise only to words without end ' ; *Kathaka* ii 23 ' not by learning is the *atman* attained,' not by genius or book-lore ; *Mundaka* i reckons the four Vedas as inferior knowledge through which the Imperishable Being cannot be known. This attitude of contempt, even of opposition, is by degrees modified and the title, *Vedanta* or ' End of the Vedas ' is acknowledged without demur. Yet the archaic scriptures are really subservient and their text is allegorized. The life-stages (*asramas*) are depreciated in *Chandog.* ii 23 : All these social or religious duties being rightly performed ' carry as their recompense the divine ' worlds ' that is, the rewards of heaven, ' but he alone who abides stead- ' fast in *brahman* wins true immortality.' It is in the older *upanisads* that we find traces of serious hostility to the entire ritual system of the priests. Works and the sacrifice are either openly mocked (*Brihad.* i 4) or allowed only as conducting to the lower heaven of the moon and the ' Way of the Fathers ' which after a decent interval of respite, must be followed by a new birth (*Brih.* i 5, *Chand.* v 10). Of such it is said (*Mundaka* i 2) ' regarding sacrifice and deeds as the highest good, they know ' no better and are befooled.' Sometimes by allegory a new and more spiritual meaning is given to the sacrifice ; the ritual ceremonies acquire a cosmic significance or are related to the *atman*. In *Taittarya* ii 5, the value is clearly given : ' He presents knowledge as his sacrifice, knowledge ' as his works '.

Change of attitude owing to heretical attacks.—The polemic against knowledge (book-lore) and study of Scripture reaches its height in a verse interpolated in *Brihad.* iv 4 : ' In darkness dense they move, who bow ' the knee to *ignorance* but in still denser gloom those who rest satisfied with *knowledge.*' So *Kena* iii : ' only he who knows it not, knows it ; ' who knows it, knows it not ; by the wise is it unknown but by the ignor- ' ant it is known '—which suggests several parallels in the New Testament. For the essence of things must remain for ever unknown in such a system so far as its nature is concerned. To attempt to make it object of knowledge must fail, for we have to impose upon it categories and definitions only valid in the empirical world of *time, space, causality.*

Only the later *upanisads* are more friendly to the official cultus. We are therefore permitted to suppose that this represents a reaction of all moderate men, after seeing the undue lengths to which the Sankhya and buddhist rationalism (its outcome) were prepared to go (cf. polemic against heretics in *Maitrayaniya* vii 8–10). So too the value of *tapas* or ascetic penance is restored in *Maitr.* i, 2 no doubt because Gautama altogether rejected it : ' without being an ascetic a man cannot reach ' knowledge of the *atman* or bring works to fruition.' This is a plain retracement of steps, an irenicon agreed upon by the orthodox (whether priests or warriors) in face of a common danger from godless humanism.

APPENDIX E

Pessimism : How far is the name justified ?

Deussen with his mystical pietism and 'other-worldliness' heartily approves of hindu pessimism : 'it is essential to the deeper religious 'consciousness to regard earthly life not as an end-in-itself but merely 'as a road by which we must travel to our true destination.' Both hindu systems (he believes), the Gospel, and 'not least the philosophy of 'Schopenhauer, representing Christianity in its purest form, agree in 'teaching that *deliverance* from our present lot is the highest aim of 'endeavour.' Yet so much has the word *pessimism* suffered from the misuse of the sensational School 'in its childish play upon it' that he almost shrinks from employing it. 'This attitude to life is only so far 'justified as it is a presumption of the Doctrine of Release and Redemption 'from this wicked world' (1 John v 19). He believes it in the modified sense to underlie *upanisad* teaching which certainly does not lack a joyful anticipation of a better life. Union with God is the only cure of sorrow, for *ato'nyad artam*,—'whatever is distinct from Him, must be full of 'suffering' (*Brihad.* repeatedly). The true life which breaks upon us when we wake from life's brief and restless nightmare is not a negation —for is it not the supreme reality ?—yet again cannot be expressed in any positive terms of earth. Just as the mystics call God the Nothing (though He be all in all), or as Socrates fixed upon dreamless and unconscious slumber as the truest state of human happiness.[1] In *Brihad.* iv 19–33 : 'That is man's real form, wherein desire is quenched—and he is 'himself his own desire, separate from desire and distress,—wherein father 'is no longer father, mother no longer mother, worlds no longer worlds, 'gods no longer gods : then is he to be unaffected by good or evil and has 'subdued all the griefs of his heart.' Then when all contrasts have blended and disappeared and he is pure subject without object, it is said : 'This is his supreme goal and happiness . . . by a tiny portion only of 'this bliss all other creatures live.' Brahman then is *bliss* or *ananda*, a term at first used in an erotic sense ; to discover him in ourself we strip off husk after husk of not-self ; and the core is then found,—when 'love 'is his head, joy his right side, gladness his left, bliss his trunk, Brahma his under part and base.' (*Taittiriya* ii, an early *upanisad* of the first group) 'What this well-fashioned one is, that is the Essence ; and when 'a man receives it then is he full of bliss ; and if this bliss were not in the 'void' whence the world is born 'who could breathe, who could live ? 'for it is he who creates bliss. When a man finds peace and refuge in 'that invisible and fathomless One, then has he attained to peace.' It is clear then that a pessimistic outlook on the world is tempered by the belief that behind appearance is reality as bliss, and that it can be had

[1] *Apol.* 40 *νὺξ ἐν ᾗ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μηδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν* a genuinely socratic (not platonic) trace of orphic mysticism (on which Burnett, *Greek Philosophy*, Macmillan 1914, has written so convincingly).

for the asking and without painful effort. Pessimism then, or discontent with the actual world and our own empirical self, is part of all true religion ; but this outlook can only be justified if a positive solace is offered. It is no final bar to this doctrine that the state of the released baffles all description. As in Christianity (though, in a very different sense) the end is bliss, 'love, joy, peace.'

APPENDIX F

Atman and the Problem of Divine Transcendence

Unreconciled Strata in the Upanisads : three doctrines in juxtaposition.—In *Kaushit. Up.* iii 8, there only appears to be a *theistic* doctrine, for in the end it is but man's own self and not a force from outside that determines him to evil and to good : 'He (the *atman*) is not exalted by good works or 'by evil degraded ; he it is who inspires to do good the man whom he would 'lead on high . . . he is the guardian and ruler of the universe, lord of 'worlds—and he is my soul (*atman*) : that (doctrine) ought man to know.' In *Rig* x 90 all beings are 'but a fourth part of the *purusa* while three 'parts are immortal in heaven.' We find here a clearer conception of God's transcendence : as in Spinoza's doctrine that thought and extension are but two of the infinite attributes of God and do not sum up the possibilities of the divine nature. Thus Brahman is transmuted into the world or enters it 'from without' as animating principle without forfeiting his own true nature or essential perfections : he is not exhausted by this alliance with phenomena ; 'the inmost self of all beings remains pure from 'the sufferings of the external worlds' (*Kath.* v 11). Yet is he as a whole (*totus et integer*) present in me,—a paradox like that of the eucharistic hymn

> 'Yet the hearts of children hold what worlds cannot,
> 'And the God of wonders loves the lowly spot.'

It is impossible to define the dogma of autotheism with any precision. Even in the *Svetasvatara*, on the whole the most *theistic* of all *upanisads* in tone, there are vestiges both of *pantheism* and of pure *idealism*. Everywhere there are traces of a blending or confusion of these three theories and nowhere is the slightest attempt made to reconcile them. As each vedic god was in turn accounted supreme, just so long as the worshippers addressed him and the hymn lasted, so each theory is by turns given the preference and the same treatise will contain an unharmonized medley of all three strata. It is possible (as Deussen seems to suggest) that idealism or (as we prefer to term it) *autotheism* is primitive 'all except the *atman* is unreal' : then would come *pantheism* which identifies the whole universe with it. These views taken over from the earlier *upanisads* are found still continuing side by side with a growing tendency towards *theism*, of which we found constant traces in the *Bhagavat* doctrine of the warrior or regal class. So we get unresolved problems and discrepancies which (strangely enough)

seem never to have troubled the hindu mind. In *Svetas.* iv 10, the world is *maya* caused by a supreme god, but with the reality of the universe, the reality of God also vanishes, and nothing survives but the self or *atman* within us. In i 6 of the same, distinction of God and souls, as drover and swans, is called illusory; yet the removal of these illusions is said to be an act of the Divine grace (as elsewhere). In truly theistic spirit, the task of ripening works and allotting their fruit to souls is said to be the chief function of *Iswara* (lord, κύριος). But this *deus ex machinâ* (as hindu philosophy accounts him) is merely an exoteric fallacy: law resistlessly and unremittingly works for requital. Just as in Kant the systems of pure rationalism needed such a deity to redress the balance and restore the lost harmony of *virtue* and *happiness*: Fichte his pupil saw no need in one stage of his development for a personal deity and was satisfied with the non-personal 'moral order of the universe.' The *Svetas. Up.* so often referred to is without doubt an outcome of the same movement that produced the theistic form of the *Bhagavad Gita*: it celebrates Rudra (Siva) as the Primal Being and source of all wisdom, the original *purusa*, 'him who created the god Brahman and imparted the Vedas to him': this then is a product of that sivaite monotheism of which we have already treated. It is to this pregnant writing that we owe the new and fruitful thought of the world-periods of creation and dissolution: 'Rudra-Śiva 'dwells in the creatures, and at the end of the æon burning with fury he 'as Lord dashes to pieces all created things' (iii 2): through the interval regulating their aims 'until finally the whole is lost in him who is the 'beginning' (iv 1). A much later *Upanisad* (*Maitr.* vi 17) thus amplifies this doctrine, quite in the style of Dio Chrysostom who seems to know something of hindu writings: 'It is he who, when the universe is dis-'solved, alone remains on the watch, a sentinel; and he it is who again 'from the depths of space wakens the pure spirits to a new life' (cf. also *Atharvaciras* iv and vi.)

That God is something more than the (solipsist) individual consciousness, or the collective sum of all such, was no doubt acknowledged by the hindu theosophist in spite of constant phrases of the *totus et integer* type. To the idealist the entire objective world is possible only as sustained by a knowing subject (so Berkeley or Rashdall). This *universal* subject is manifested in all *individual* subjects but 'is by no means identical 'with them' (Deussen) or, as we might say, exhausted in their manifestation. For they pass away, but the universe continues to exist without them: hence an eternal knowing subject (*hiranyagarbha*) must for ever exist by whom it is sustained. Thus *the primitive idealism constantly tends to pass into theism, and the self-deified atman into an objective deity*: but there is no doubt that the former is the original thought and is found breaking out again and again in vivid contrast to the doctrinal strata of subsequent times.

APPENDIX G

Soul-migration

Is this doctrine due to the influence of savage belief ?—There is great variety of opinion on the origin of this theory of *soul-migration*. It is plainly not merely an independent discovery in many separate parts of the world, but is also an almost unfailing mark of the savage ' science ' which cannot conceive of *creation from nothing*, of any *indefinite multiplication*, or of any *further addition to the sum of things already in being*. This is proved by the consistent and logical theory of the return of ancestors in new births found e.g. among australian natives who are more than suspected of racial affinities with the Dravidians of India. Hartland (*Primitive Paternity* London 1909) adduces proof to convince us that neither in India nor in the pythagorean schools of Italy is migration a dogma of esoteric philosophy : it is rather the development of a savage belief in transformation (cf. also Bertholet *Transmig.*, etc., London 1909). The doctrine of Metempsychosis is not found in Vedas, where a personal survival is taught similar to that which Zoroaster introduced into parsism. The belief was accepted in the much later *brahmana* period (800-500 B.C.) : cf. *Satapatha Brahmana* x 4, ' those who do not perform the rites with due knowledge ' are born again after death and repeatedly become the food of death ' —a passage which may well have helped the revulsion against ritual and the discovery of an independent path to happiness either in *Bhagavata* theism or the ethical eudæmonism of Gautama. Many critics (Rhys Davids, Macdonell, Gough, Oppert), believe it a loan from non-aryan tribes adapted to the service of the new personal morality. It is found to-day e.g. among the Kacharis of Assam, and in N. India the great mass of hindus, whatever their peculiar cultus, believe that wrong-doing displeases *Paramesvara*, or Supreme Deity, and that every act must be atoned for or rewarded, either in this or in some future life.[1] As we have seen, if the law works with unerring certainty a divine judge becomes superfluous, and no divine atonement or forgiveness for sin once done can be accepted. When Gautama took over the belief from his age he merely read *character* or resultant of acts in place of soul.

Deussen denies : its purely moral basis.—Deussen however (*Gen. Hist. Philos.* part ii) pronounces against this loan theory : he regards it of course not as esoteric Vedanta teaching but as a *myth*, a valuable substitute for a truth, to most men inconceivable. It has no connexion with savage beliefs in *transmutation*—when the *pitri* adopt the form of birds, or even creep into the roots of plants, or the soul of a mother enters the body of a jackal to warn her son, or the dead man passes into an insect hovering near his burial place ; ' these ' he says ' have nothing to do with belief

[1] On the other hand Wilson's testimony (*Sirsa Settl. Rep.* 1883) must be kept in mind ; the ordinary hindu peasant of the Punjab has no belief in transmigration, accepting a supreme (and solar) God, *Suraj Narayan*, who knows all and rewards and punishes.

'in *transmigration*'. The mistake arises as in the case of Herodotus, who gave a wrong account of the egyptian superstition that a dead man can assume any form at pleasure (on which cf. Breasted op. cit.). These ideas everywhere existing do 'not imply the belief we speak of and have 'never given rise to it—least of all in Hindustan. . . . The theory rests 'on the conviction of due recompense awarded to good and evil works 'this retribution, at first conceived as *future*' (as in iranian eschatology 'was only later transferred into the present life from an imaginary 'hereafter.'

In sum, it is not a development of *wehr-wolf* notions, but an attempted *theodicy*, or rather *cosmodicy*. Its traces begin in the *brahmanas*, though there is no definite mention before the *upanisads*. The Vedas teach an indiscriminate felicity for the pious. The *brahmanas* begin to differentiate their lots according to exact merit (e.g. *Satap.* xii 9, 'whatever 'food a man eats here by the very same is he eaten again in the hereafter. The *Vision of Bhrigu* xi 6—a parallel to the *Vision of Er*—shows the torments of the bad and the gaoler's reply: 'Thus did they in yonder 'world, thus do we to them in this.' In *Taittar. Br.* it is clear that the 'world of the fathers' is still as in *Rig* the highest destiny for the departed soul, by degrees becoming a 'world of the gods', when worship of non-human divine beings pushed aside the primitive cult of ancestors. It is also clear that the real dread is directed towards 'renewed death' (iii 11, and *Kaushit. Br.* xxv, *Satap. Br.* ii 3, x 1, x 5, xi 4): this phrase becomes 'a stereotyped formula and is sometimes used even where it 'seems to give no meaning.' But it is certain that this recurrent death, *punarmritya*, is not yet transmigration, but a dying and rising again in the other world: transfer it to the present and we have the definite doctrine for the first time. 'This takes place' (says Deussen) 'first in the *Upanisads* and the reasons that led to this step will not evade us. The chief text is one but is found in two recensions (*Chand. Up.* v 3 seq. *Brihad.* vi 2): it teaches a double retribution, by reward and punishment in the other world and by rebirth in this. Deussen is convinced that the *Yajnavalkhya* passage in the latter recension is the basis and earliest form of this *Upanisad* doctrine:—where speaking of that which survives death 'the two men went aside and what they said was *work* and what 'they commanded was *work*.' Thus the doctrine makes its first appearance as a great mystery. *Yajna* is still more explicit in *Brihad.* iv 4 'in pro- 'portion as a man consists now of this or that—just as he acts, as he behaves, 'so will he be reborn.' He cites the verse 'He who has arrived at the final goal of the deeds he has here committed returns again from yonder world back to this world of work.' It is of interest to compare Vergil's popular view: return is due no doubt partly to a strange desire for earth and partnership with the body, *in corpora velle reverti*, but in part to the controlling function or supervising duty of soul. After stains are washed out and a thousand years' respite allowed, God gives the draught of oblivion and sends the soul back to take care of earthly matters (cf. *Pseudo-Asclepius* among Appuleius' works and his genuine *Dogm. Plat.* 'curare terrena'). *Yajna* seems to recognize no other hereafter than a rebirth on earth,

which, as in lamaism and among the jains, follows at once after death. Later, the most ancient element is seen to reassert itself and we have a two-fold retribution both in the hereafter and in a renewed life here. The recompense or penalty is doubled in the chief text (*Chand.* v 3 = *Brih.* v 2 cf. also *Kaushit.* i) where the king Jaivali instructs Aruni, and says that this knowledge has never been in the possession of the *priesthood.* In *Kaush.* i, we may note how expressly migration into animals is taught. 'Whether in this world he be *worm, bird, fly, fish, lion, noxious vermin,* 'tiger, or *man*—whatever he was formerly, in this or that rank is he reborn, 'each according to his *works* or according to his *knowledge.*' It extends also into the world of the gods (*Brih.* iv 4) and at the other end of the scale into the plant world. In *Kath.* v we have :—

'The one enters his mother's womb
'embodying himself in physical form ;
'into a plant another moves :
'Each according to his *deeds* or *knowledge.*'

Thus the origin of the *samsara* or migration theory is not (in this hypothesis) to be traced to primitive superstition or belief in a return of the dead in other and animal forms to revisit its former home. It is due to a moral cause ; it rises from an empirical survey of mankind, an observation of men's different destinies and characters in this life. 'In truth by 'good works does a man become good, by evil evil.'—an extension of the aristotelian canon of conduct into a transcendental doctrine (*Brihad.* iii 2 ; iv 4). That it leads into a confusion of thought or a distinct injustice when a man is made to pay the same debt over twice, is due to the blending of diverse dogmas, of which but one can be held at a given time with any logical consistency. As to this the hindu mind with all its love of symmetry and formal classification is singularly careless and incoherent.

DIVISION A

Hindustan and the Religions of Further Asia

PART II

The Great Heresies or Rational Humanism

INTRODUCTION : JAIN AND BUDDHIST INDIVIDUALISM

Awakening of Individualistic Thought : The Aryan supremacy. —According to West (*Sacred Books of the East* xlviii) the most probable age of Zoroaster is *660–583* B.C., or about a century earlier than Buddha, Confucius, Pythagoras. It was from the year *800* that the most remarkable effort of hebrew prophecy takes its start. This period then, ending with the perso-aryan supremacy in the nearer East (Cyrus *c. 539*, but still more important Darius *c. 500*) or with the greco-aryan dominion in Europe after Salamis and Thermopylæ [1] is without doubt the productive and original age of human reflection. The keynote is *individualism* and *egoism*. In China alone does thought undertake the task of vindicating the social and conventional against selfish and personal aims. Everywhere else the democratic [2] stage is seen in process of dissolution. The contact of divers races and the break-up of tribal aggregates promoted those *individualistic* tendencies which betoken our human maturity. The unit was deserted by the support of tribal custom ; in many cases the tribe itself existed no longer. Confucius' depression of the unit, except as member or representative of a family or gild,

[1] After which the history of the western aryans is unbroken down to the present conflict of nations.

[2] I use this word in its only justifiable meaning, the stage of small independent communities of equals, bound together by kinship and a common religion ; every other form of society is artificial, created either by force or contract.

marks the reaction of a conservative socialist against a personal and subjective philosophy of life. The theory of *Tao* is said to have originated before Laotze or Laocius (*c. 600–520*) but its character is well known to be unsocial and anti-political. Like buddhism therefore, this subjective quietism has often been favoured by energetic rulers both in China and Japan ; because, if it deprecates governmental activity, still less does it approve of the subject's interference in matters which in no way concern his true happiness or intrinsic nature. The *individualism* of orphic psychology in the west dealt a severe blow at the traditional view of human survival—that of a ghost living in or near the family cemetery and partaking in the feasts and fortunes of the descendants. ' Realism ', a fundamental conviction of the rudimentary mind, insisted that the *family* was real, not the *single member*, and that the divine custom of the tribe must override individual will and crush out any defiant idiosyncrasy. But the orphic school taught man that he had nothing to do with this accidental nursery in which his soul found itself : he was not a link in the continuous family chain but a wholly independent being. What he was he owed to himself, not to his environment or to his ancestors. The soul was a demon of heavenly lineage, expiating past offences.[1] Now it is quite possible that this curious belief was also held by the Taoists in slightly different form.[2] It certainly brought in a measure of contempt for the inherited, for the social and the actual ; it opened up dazzling visions of unknown forms of existence and it lent support to personal vanity and fostered the love of adventure and the marvellous. It was the parent of the more sober *nominalism* and exerted great influence even on the anarchic rationalist who disputed its chief premise—that the soul was an immortal entity. Its detachment of the unit from his natural group led him into novel enterprises and created volunteer associations for his behoof. In Germany, for example, when the clan was broken up by conquest or decay the *comitatus*, artificial and personal, succeeds as the

[1] The whole discussion in Rohde's *Psychologie* is scholarly and interesting ; but he occupies a very old-fashioned standpoint, and solemnly takes the Greeks to task for believing in a *personal* and not a *tribe-ghost* immortality.

[2] See the earlier passage (Div. A. pt. i) on the original home of soul and its return thither in the taoist school (p. 73).

social unit and gave rise to all our western kingdoms and their feudal[1] sense of duty and loyalty.

Individualism in Hindustan: arose in a knightly caste: becomes shamanistic.—In Hindustan there lay behind this individualism the strong chivalrous sense of personal honour which marks a knightly caste.[2] With jains and buddhists this impulse to act so strongly displayed in the epics, had passed into a desire for repose, for deliverance from act and deed. Neither sect was in any sense an original movement of the age to which both Mahavira and Gautama belonged. The former deprecated, like Confucius, any claim to set up a novel doctrine: he is the restorer of old paths, the prophet of a system which constantly needs restatement. There is really nothing original in the Buddha's teaching except the following points:—there is no soul,[3] ascetic practice is useless for the attainment of bliss, the final end or supreme happiness of man can be won in this life and by his own effort, and if once gained cannot be forfeited. Far less formal than jain teaching, buddhism owes all its influence (1) to the striking personality of the founder, (2) to the answer it gives to the problem of rebirth or rather renewed death. Indian thought is not entirely a polar antithesis to the common instinct of mankind, who somehow agree in finding (though for very diverse reasons) life pleasant and on the whole of value. The hindu loved concrete things and the present existence; he worshipped his gods (then as now) to get earthly blessings. What he feared was *death*; and he was constantly told that all happiness in a heaven must come to an end and be followed by another birth and another death. *Buddhism* promised an eternal state, no less than the Upanisads to the

[1] Which is even now not yet extinct; I do not refer to the connexion with land but to the *voluntary* tie with mutual obligations which takes the place of *natural* duties and the coercive demands of the (so-called) *national* State.

[2] It is perhaps needless to look further afield for the source of western chivalry than the teutonic individualism already named; but it is fair to say that many students trace this salient medieval virtue to the contact with arabian culture in the Crusades; and it is certainly possible that the spirit of the *Bhag. Gita* had already penetrated the combatants of Islam.

[3] But the force of this radical denial is lost by his constant emphasis on the well-being, moral development and final bliss of the *ego* which he says does not exist.

knower of *atman ;* and gave release not so much from an existence evil and wretched in itself, as from the troubles and demands of social life.[1] From one point of view it corrects the pessimism of Sankhya and the trance-like unworldliness of Yoga. Buddha's ideal is, to our western mind, somewhat lazy and tropical, perhaps in its simple rules and aims not worth the trouble of laying down in such pedantic formulas : but, allowing for its slothfulness, it is eminently sane and normal. It is rationalist because it rejects the notion of divine or human aids, or any vicarious offering. Its sole practical maxim (and it does not touch metaphysics except with reluctance) is ' help thyself, none else can ' : in this it does not stand very far from the *Upanisad* teaching of salvation by knowledge—which cannot be imparted from outside and is called only by a metaphor the gift of God's grace. Premising then that Mahavira and Gautama only restate the ideal of the highest life which India (aryan and dravidian alike), had always held sacred—let us examine both systems.

Jain and Buddhist : priority of the former system : both monastic and celibate.—Both are *monastic* [2]—the end is not for all but for the elect only : if they are *pelagian* in the terms of Christian sects they show also a distinctly *montanist* element. Like the medieval heresies they divide their church into the ' professed ' and lay element, the fully enrolled and the novices, the *perfecti* and *audientes*. Strictly, there can be but one rank ; the lay factor is a concession needful in a system where the monks are also mendicants and must live of a gospel which forbids them to work. In doctrine it is probable that, like Sankhya and Yoga, the jain is a pure dualist ; souls being intelligent monads whose actual differences are caused by *prakriti* or matter—the indefinable potency which can become anything. Jainism in particular is founded on a ' crude and primitive Animism ' (Jacobi).[3] It is at least as old as buddhism, and cannot be called an offshoot.[4]

[1] Who choose better sites for convents ? admire natural beauty more ? put aside any futile desire or tiresome human tie more carefully ? lead an existence of unruffled calm with greater success than buddhist monks ?

[2] An unfortunate but necessary word.

[3] Although buddhism denied the permanent and continuous subject in its heraclitan flux, no real emphasis was put on this divergence ; hindu writers constantly confuse the two schools.

[4] In buddhist canon Vardhamma Mahavira is called *Nataputta* and

Mahavira,[1] the coeval of Buddha, was not the founder ; he reached omniscience (*kevala*) by penance (*tapas*) and by following a recognized discipline and a religious method long handed down. Tradition is silent as to his reasons for becoming a monk ; there are no picturesque legends of meditation under the sacred bo-tree, of a ' sudden conversion ' or instantaneous intuition of truth, of a great public impression made by first sermons and early teaching. He is not noted for imparting any specially profound or novel truth. He was held to be the *tirthankara*, prophet or pioneer of that age, and Parsva (his predecessor) was said to have lived 250 years before (say *750* B.C.).[2] An endless series of *tirthankaras* revealed at due intervals the Eternal Gospel of redemption. Of those known in later ages twenty-four were counted from Roaba to Vardhamma all of *Ksatriya* stock and (with two exceptions) belonging to the Iksvaku family.[3] In death they attain the changeless and blissful *nirvana* and are then set free from all care or directorate of the world. But they are held to be *devas* and have statues and temples ; oldest shrines and *prakriti* writings belong to *c. 1–200* B.C. No rules for this cult of deified men are given but though strictly illogical it began at an early date ; only a few protests were made against this androlatry though some teachers altogether condemn it. Scriptures seem to have been redacted into canonic form in the middle of cent. v (*c. 454* A.D.) or as some aver in *614* (about the time of Huen Tsang's visit) : before this they were handed down orally.

his disciples *Nigantha* ; Gautama seems to have outlived his rival who died as early as 490 at Pava, after enduring twelve years of mortifying ascesis and all the hardships of the mendicant friar ; for thirteen months he wore no clothes, setting the example to the ' sky-clad ' division of his sect, the Digambaras, whom the muslim conquerors compelled to adopt a decent costume.

[1] Born (so Hoërnle) at Kollaga, or at Kundagrama (Jacobi), a suburb of Vaisali, 27 miles N. of Patna or the capital later called by the greeks *Palibothra*.

[2] The disciples of the old master and the new united into one body (*Uttara-Sutra* xxiii) ; it seems likely that Mahavira joined the School of Parsva (? the persian or parsi) and became its chief representative and reformer.

[3] Some were called by *animal* names (bull, elephant, horse, ape, heron) : most are styled *golden*, but nos. 6 and 12 are *red*, 9 *white*, 19 and 23 *blue*, 20 and 22 *black* ; this last, named Aristanemi, (be it noted) was Krsna's cousin.

CHAPTER A. DOCTRINES OF THE 'ATHEISTIC' SCHOOLS

Section I. Jain Metaphysics

Being—plural and changeable.—The tendency to regard Being or the Real as something fixed, permanent and motionless, has nearly always had its counterpart in the belief that the ultimate plurality of 'reals' is ever changing and evolving. With Bergson to-day, the early jain thinkers held that being is not persistent or unalterable: all the accidents and qualities of substance originate and perish; matter, like the clay, may continue for ever but it can assume any shape or quality; the jar-form is born and dies even if the clay survives.[1] Now *brahman* speculation was concerned with transcendental being, conceived as one and unchanging; *jain* on the other hand, with being as given in normal experience. They laid stress on the indefiniteness of being, since it can only be defined by two excluding negatives *neither—nor*; the only positive statement about it should be *syat*, it may be. It is not so simple as the Vedanta suggests, but of very complex nature. When you have made an affirmation you find it has to be almost immediately withdrawn; all positive denotations are partial and one-sided, disappearing when you regard a thing from some other point of view. Therefore the jains seem very inconsistent and scholastic in demanding unwarrantably a precise statement what the thing under discussion *is*—in substance, place, time and rank of beings.[2] Thus we must

[1] Two recent works on Jainism may be named. Jacobi's paper on *Metaph. and Eth. of J.* Oxford Congress Hist. Rell. 1908 and Herbert Warren's *J. in Western Garb* Madras 1912 in which he suggests that such a system 'solves great problems of life'. See also Margaret Stevenson *Note on Modern J.* Oxford 1910; Jhayeri *First Principles of J. Philos.* London, 1910; an earlier work is that of J. G. Bühler *On Indian Sect of J.* ed. Burgess, London 1904.

[2] This result is not a little strange; the fluid condition of particulars as shown e.g. in Hegel's *Logic* and Wallace's suggestive *Introduction* seems to preclude any sort of precise definition as waste of time; but the pedantic

carefully discern the *living* and the *lifeless*, and again divide this latter class into space (*akasa*) and two subtle invisible fluids (?) *dharma* and *adharma* (one producing motion the other rest) which through contact cause sin and merit. Matter comes in the fourth place (*pudgala*), eternal and atomic, an indefinite something that can become any and everything.

Animism : doctrine of souls as spiritual Monads : soul-colonies or clusters as reservoirs of life.—From the four elements are formed bodies of souls in the lowest state of development : jainism is clearly (in this aspect) only a survival of primitive Animism. For floating through the universe in countless numbers are souls (*jiva*), substantial and eternal monads, not of any definite size but each contracting or expanding according to the measure of its bodily envelope. Agreeably to the entire course of hindu thought, their character is that of *subjects* : they are *intelligences* which may be obscured [1] but can never be wholly destroyed or de-rationalized. To these souls, when embodied in their corporal setting, is due the greatest deference and respect. Subtle and scholastic in the extreme is the discrimination of their classes : the four *elements* themselves are ensouled and both *plants* and *animals* are psychical ; some of the former being animated by a single soul, others forming a sort of leibnizian hierarchy or corporate republic, an aggregate of embodied souls. The universe is literally full of these invisible colonies of plant-lives (*nigoda*), consisting of an infinite number of clustered souls with a corporate system of breathing and feeding in common. These act as a reservoir for the replacement of souls that attain *nirvana*,—so small is the number of the latter that a very tiny fraction of one unseen zoophyte colony could effect this. The cosmic process has gone on and will go on for ever : *samsara* has no beginning and no end. Other ranks of being are *animals*, (in the more usual sense), *men*, *gods*, *denizens of hell*. Our mundane souls are filled with subtle matter as a bag with sand : it pours into the soul from without and is detained as it enters by the *passions* like a viscous substance. When digested by the soul it is transmuted into eight kinds of *karma* and forms a

side of hindu thought, with its curious passion for formal classifying and its half mystical numeralism, must not be overlooked—nor again, dwelt upon too seriously.

[1] It nearly always is so, save in the case of the elect or illuminated.

subtle envelope clinging persistently to the soul-nucleus, thus determining the several lots of individuals in their future lives. When this mischievous matter is discharged in a steady and uninterrupted issue by the ascetic soul, the *karma* is cleared away : soul being relieved from its weight flies aloft in a straight line to the summit of the universe, there to dwell in the blessed choir of souls redeemed from *samsara*.

Soul's immersion in matter or final release.—But for the more part, soul, as fast as it discharges this malignant humour, is certain to introduce it again ; and thus is forced to continue its mortal and changeful lot. This subtle body is probably the outcome (as Jacobi thinks) of very primitive ideas on *magic*—pre-religious and vaguely scientific or materialist ; joined with a strong vein of *animism* and fetish-cult it gave rise to a system of ideas which the jains only reduced to a semi-rational order. The only true cause of re-embodiment is the presence in soul of this viscous *karma*, a substance to which the passions have allowed entry and attached themselves. Its clear native faculties—knowledge (*jnana*), intuition (*darsana*), and highest bliss—are dulled, obscured and overwhelmed. These eight kinds of *karma*-matter produce the various mundane forms : each has its predestined time in which it must be worked off, or eaten, as the *Upanisads* would say. It is possible—and this is the preaching of a practical redemption—to elude this attachment of *karma*, to neutralize it and (as a fire is covered with ashes) hinder the evil germ from taking effect : only the holy men and sages can annihilate it altogether (*ksapita*). Between successive lives only a few moments' interval or respite is allowed—the dogma thus setting itself (as in lamaism) against either brahman or buddhist theories. Liberated souls will not again be embodied ; they dwell in a state of absolute purity : [1] this state of everlasting salvation is called *nirvana, nirvritti, mukti*.[2]

[1] This doctrine was being taught at the same moment by Tao in China and by the Orphists in Greece ; the *Digambara* sect being certainly as old as 600–500 B.C. (Rhys Davids).

[2] Jains and buddhists show a perfect passion for a very unmeaning 'numeralism' which must however be excused by the needs of oral instruction and *memoria technica ;* e.g. the former hold that man may possess five distinct bodies (a certain proof of the survival of primitive savage belief), and that man's soul has five kinds of knowledge—a sort of hindu equivalent of Plato's 'divided line' (*Rep.*) ; cognition (*mati*) testi-

Section II. Jain Ethics

Ethical materialism : to keep the pores closed : the monkish rules.—The object of all ethical practice is to prevent the admission of this unholy *karma*-substance, to close up the pores by which it can find an entry through the joints of the ' harness '. All acts produce *karma* and entail renewed life on earth. Therefore the monastic and celibate life is imperative for one who desires to accumulate no more dregs : *apathy* and *penance* are its natural features. Neither in jain nor in buddhist ' apathy ' is there anything original : the ideal of Sir Purun Dass K.C.B. is an inheritance from the very earliest days of hindu history and finds its prototype as much in dravidian, as with the aryan *shamans*. For all sects the end is the same—*moksa* or deliverance from repeated deaths that so the soul may regain its own proper and eternal nature.[1] Release is won by right *faith*, right *conduct*, right *knowledge*—three jewels which are not produced in the soul or added to it from without but are exposed in their intrinsic beauty by removing the dirt accumulated on their surface. To the four obvious ethical precepts—*do not kill, lie, steal, commit adultery*—they added the vow of the Mendicant Friars in Europe ; ' *own no property* and have no concern in world matters.' These rules (including endless and complex methods of preventing murder, even insecticide) were strictly binding on the professed monks of the order and were in many respects wholly beyond the power of the lay members who still lived in the world. But monk and layman alike forbore to eat by night, or to consume roots, honey, or spirits. One meritorious discipline of the ' unprofessed ' rank was to provide the monks with necessaries : thus the layman without wholesale surrender of secular life, its aims and duties, could partake in the spiritual graces of the holy quietism which his care and devotions alone rendered possible.

The Lay-Brethren—their duties : rules for *lay* and *clerical* suicide.—From the first the lay brotherhood, like the Tertiaries of St. Francis, was recognized as an integral part of the Order ;

mony (*sruta*) = no doubt, faith in revelation, supernatural knowledge (*anadhi*), thought-reading (*manaparyaya*), omniscience (*kevala*).

[1] This is in effect buddhist doctrine also, but it is of course obscured by his firm denial of *soul* or *self*, due to his detestation of animism (so Hoërnle) —but for all practical purposes it stands outside and detached from his ethical system and has no influence on its teaching.

whereas buddhism tended to exclude them in the stricter sense and confined their duties and connexion to friendship and patronage. The lay brethren amongst the jains seemed to have possessed at once well defined privileges and correlative tasks. Often the layman was a novice preparing to take the full vows. Buddhism, far more indifferent to the welfare of the lay element on the fringe, has therefore suffered changes which have wholly altered its complexion, its aims and its doctrines : whereas to-day after more than *2500* years jainism can be recognized and studied almost in its primitive form. We may pass by the formal pedantry of the seven heads of discipline, the minute rules for saving life, the twelve reflections, the twenty-two troubles to be borne cheerfully. *Tapas*, or penance and ascetic exercise, is a most important side of jain morality and (like medieval mysticism) is overladen with scholastic rules and divisions. Fasting is reduced to a real art: besides diminishing the amount of food and rejecting whatever is attractive, a monk will train himself to eat only every second, third or fourth day. From the jains perhaps came the *endura* of the western heretics in our period. Sometimes suicide was permitted, if not actually enjoined. The Order condemned some of the rash and violent forms of self-murder, prevalent from an early time among hindus : yet they lay down rules for an orderly suicide to form the graceful close of a regular monastic career. Sometimes it is allowed (as by the stoics) in case of emergency and special circumstances.[1] If a monk falls sick he abstains from all food (*itvara*), and if this starvation ends his days it is felt to be no matter for regret. Special facilities for the *endura* seem to have been granted to a layman, passing through eleven standards (*pratima* or sanscr. *padima*) and in the end refusing all sustenance and devoting himself to penances which sometimes bring the desired result of death within a month. But for a monk salvation and release can only be obtained by a long process lasting twelve years. On permission of his *guru* [2] he devotes himself for this space to the serious task of overcoming

[1] e.g. mortal disease or inability through ill-health to fulfil the *tapas* ; three canonical books of the jains give the rules which must guide this religious *felo-de-se*.

[2] It is possible that this devotion to the spiritual guide or father-confessor, so common in hindu sects, may be in jainism a later feature with which its general doctrine of *self-help* and *self-sufficingness* is at variance.

all worldly feeling, warding off meantime a too hasty demise : but when this period is expired he is free to starve himself to death.[1] It is held that the attainment of *nirvana*, as described above, can only follow this twelve years period of mortification ; but it is also believed that no one in this present Age (*avasarpani*) has reached *kevala*,—the last perfected sage being Jambusvamin, Mahavira's own disciple (*c. 450* B.C.). Besides this negative method there is the *positive* discipline of *concentration* (*dhyana*), when the mind resolutely shuts out every object but one.[2] In the still higher art of *Contemplation* there are four stages, and at the end a sudden explosion may dissipate the accumulated *karma*-matter (*samud-ghata*) and release the soul for its ascent to the pure region of bliss. There are however as a rule fourteen stages (*gunasthana*) of orderly progress upwards to perfection, leading from ignorance to that genuine knowledge which is purity and redemption. Relapse to the lower carnal life may follow eleven of these stages, but in the twelfth the holy man is secure ; his holiness is now beyond human loss, '*inamissible*'. In the thirteenth, the man still belongs to this present cosmic order and may survive a long time, still retaining certain acts of body, mind and speech : but when vital activities cease he enters on his path to heaven (*moksa*).

Outfit and daily duties : expansion of the sect.—The outfit of the modern monk is confined (as in every hindu ascetic sect) to the barest necessaries ; but peculiar to the jains is the broom to sweep insects from the path and the respirator to cover the mouth against their intrusion. Intended from the first to be vagrants (like their imitators or perhaps schismatics, the buddhist *bhiksus* or beggars) they were compelled in the rains and monsoons to seek asylum in convents (*Upasraya*) just as the *bhiksus* in their *viharas*.[3] After three hours sleep the daily round com-

[1] Scholastic partition, beloved by jains and all other hindus, distinguishes three different means of securing release by death ; one with eleven syllables, the second with six, the third with seven (*padapopagamana*) ; in the two latter all movement of the limbs is forbidden.

[2] This meditation is officially limited to the space of forty-eight minutes : it is believed that the surprisingly exact details of the fantastic cosmography of the jains are derived from such trances.

[3] In the same way the original solitary anchorite of Egypt became the member of a busy and well ordered 'monastic' community : it is unfortunate that the term commonly used should suggest that solitude

prises the duties of self-inquiry, penitence and meditation. In the afternoon clothes are inspected to remove any lurking insect and food is begged for the single meal of the day. Laymen are 'called upon to hear sermons', and a most conspicuous habit is a temple-worship directed towards the *tirthankaras*, more correctly *tirthakaras* or saints. As observed elsewhere it is not believed that these deified souls hear prayers or are any more attentive to earthly matters than Epicurus' gods: but the *devas*, subordinate (like all hindu deities) to the perfected Sage, reward our piety towards their superiors, by intercepting and granting our petitions. Jainism has its records and an inscription at Mathura, of some date between *50–200* A.D. We read of thirty-three patriarchs up to the time of writing since Mahavira, and must note a great expansion in the school in N. and N.W. India under and after the sixth of this pontifical line. The two divisions of the sect *digambaras* and *svetambaras* have distinct and separate successions of popes agreeing only in the first, Jambhu (or Jambusvamin). Taking the period covered to (say) *150* A.D. from the death of Vardhamma the Conqueror, to be roughly *650* years, we may place the increase of the sect (and perhaps the historical conversion of the king of Gujarat by Hemachandra) about *350* B.C. or just prior to Alexander's invasion: the jain ascetics seem certainly to be mentioned by the greeks who coined the word 'gymnosophists' for them.

Section III. General Survey of Jainism

Survival of a very Archaic Animism.—It has been possible to treat the modern aspects of jainism as giving a sure clue to its primitive features. It is also believed that the theoretic and doctrinal side as taught to-day is original. The abstruse but thoroughly materialist theory of *karma* is not a later development grafted on to an early animistic creed, in which the chief rule was to spare life wherever found. It is found in the very oldest parts of the canonic books and is presupposed by technical terms which are without doubt primitive.[1] These terms the jains

and isolation of the holy man against which the *cenobite* movement was one of continuous protest.

[1] E.g. *Karma* as subtle matter flowing in (*asrava*), the inlets or pores stopped to prevent such influx (*samvara*), digestion or assimilation of the noxious substance (*nirjara*) :—the first two are significantly enough borrowed

understand in the literal and physical sense, and are as frankly material in their conception as were the manichees: but these material terms are as old as our earliest evidence for the sect. The doctrines must have quickly followed the publication of the Sankhya philosophy of which they are certainly a modified form. Both are *godless* (in the strict western sense) and *dualistic*: both claim to find salvation in separating two discrete substances which ought never to have been blended. If with Jacobi and Rhys Davids we put Parsva's date as a historic figure in *760* B.C., jainism may well have been not an imitator but a pioneer in the great animistic movement which spread over east and west in the centuries *800–400* B.C., to reach its culminating point in Plato. Yet Rhys Davids holds it to be the '*last* representative' on the indian continent of the school of thought which grew out of the religious speculation of *600–400* B.C. He rightly says that it has almost escaped notice by the side of its stupendous rival, and that, being less opposed to brahmanic doctrine, it continued to exist after buddhism was extinct on indian soil.[1]

Animism refined to meet the new needs of Individualism.—As we have often remarked, this doctrine was the outcome of an *individualism* which followed the break-up of tribal relations and a certain cessation of that struggle of life, in which after all its chief joy consists. The pirate and conqueror is always an optimist, be he achæan, norseman or indo-aryan. The greek *joie-de-vivre* is only keenly felt in the homeric age and does not long survive the peaceful settlements of the new conquests. The same *ennui* of a military caste, 'out of work' and left to an unwelcome leisure, produced the *ksatriya upanisads* and the systems of the mythical Kapila and Parsva or the historic Gautama,—produced also in later times and in a different climate the holy wars of western Europe, the Crusades. In India egoism found outlet, not in deeds of valour and chivalry—the *Bhagavad Gita* has never produced a caste of *samurai*—but in a search after a perfection which should leave behind both the gods and the rest of mankind.

by buddhism, though formally the school denies both factors in this dualism.

[1] The *digambaras* he believes as old as 600–500 B.C. It is curious that the rich and beautiful jain temples, so striking a feature in their system, cannot be dated earlier than 600–700 A.D. or more than a thousand years later.

There is nothing *social* or *religious* in indian philosophy : *Solipsism*, rather practical than theoretic, is the final outcome in all the sects. Both among jains and buddhists man as self-regarding sage is substituted for divine beings as object of homage ; and this cult is far more sincere than the reverence paid to the *devas*, more than half-mythical, whose existence was doubted and derided even in early vedic times. In essentials the two rationalist systems agree exactly with Lucretius' position : they make no objection to the gods' existence provided they do not interfere. They display in common a curious wavering between pessimism and a half-admiring outlook on the cosmic process ; also a whole-hearted devotion to the heroic soul who first pierced the veil of error and brought to wretched men truth and enlightenment.

Points of Contact with Buddhism.—It is of course possible to say that in most important and essential respects jain teaching is the exact reverse of buddhism ; that the two orders are not merely independent but directly opposed on points of doctrine. Jains are thoroughgoing *animists*, with tenets analogous to the modern theory [1] that cells and atoms are all in a modified sense *alive* ; while buddhism denies the soul (in them) altogether. A more distinct point of difference can be found in the practical sphere, where the one school recommends, the other rejects, penance (*tapas*) for the holy life. Again Mahavira (like the Sankhya) is more concerned with metaphysics, to which he makes ethics subordinate : to Gautama the former study is futile and the whole of life should be given to self-culture. Mahavira was an instance of the ordinary type of hindu mind ; in nothing does he transcend the subtle methods and procedure of his kindred ; he does not produce a system so much as illustrate a tradition. Apart from his teaching he has no individual character. But Gautama is a genius.

Section IV. Buddhism : its teachings and motive-force

Tokens of a Decadent Age and Society : exhaustion of aim.—Few will be prepared to dispute Deussen's dictum that a practical philosophy is secondary and derivative, that it marks a deca-

[1] Which can be traced back to Bruno and to Leibnitz.

dence or deterioration.[1] Strictly speaking *ethical philosophy* is an impossible union. For thought is born of curiosity and wonder; it is wholly disinterested and recognizes in its purest phase only general laws and species, not particular happenings or persons. When it is occupied solely with its own wretchedness, it loses its serene outlook and universal competence: it is often but the outcome of temperament and subjectivity, which forces its metaphysics into harmony, not with reason, but with the dictates of an unreasoning emotion. Wherever *personal* ethics makes its appearance, the Heroic Age is over and the 'Epigones' alone survive to remind us what noble spirits once lived.[2] It is so with the phenician and semitic inroad of Zeno and Chrysippus into hellenic thought; it is so with the systems of self-pity which arose in India about *500* B.C.[3] The *Sankhya* and jainism are both practical, although it is quite true that Mahavira is more of a scholastic than a preacher or a zealot.

The Mystic and Evangelist: inward peace.—But Gautama is not a philosopher, except by incident and against his will: he is rather a mystic and a preacher. Having found the way to peace himself, by a method which he believed the current sects could not supply, he wished others to share his happiness. What this supreme bliss was neither he nor any other mystic could explain; nor was explanation required by a hindu audience. The paradox that the man who never spoke except about the soul's health denied its very existence, did not chill nor puzzle his hearers, did not brand his school with sheer illogicality. Its metaphysics and ethics were held apart: the former (dealt with by him with no little reluctance) very few took the trouble to understand. The latter were perfectly plain and obvious to a hindu of any earlier sect: life, or rather a series of repeated deaths, was an error, a matter of pain and illusion, and release was within one's own power. Neither his paradox nor his wearisome scholastic divisions prevented his hearers from believing that he had solved the problem, had attained the highest ideal and happiness accessible to man, and had pointed out the path to others. It

[1] Or a 'failure of nerve,' cf. Murray's preface to his *Four Stages of Greek Religion*.

[2] Because rudimentary and unreflecting: cf. the *Tao-teh-king*.

[3] It is to be observed in Socrates also; indeed, wherever greek thought is *practical* it is certain to be what we call broadly pessimistic.

is remarkable indeed that his personal magnetism prevented the utter failure of an otherwise crude and colourless Nihilism. It is of course needless to say that the later world-religion bears only the faintest resemblance to the original dogma and seems to do its utmost to contradict his primitive teaching at every point. The formal denier of soul won his marvellous success in the remoter east because he came to men with infallible tidings on the soul's destiny : and the denier of ' godhead ' (in the western usage) is himself a supreme object of worship on the part of nearly one-third of our race.

Buddha's life and date.—Gautama Siddartha was a princely member of an aristocratic republic of the sakya (or sacæ) tribe. He lived between *568–488* B.C., being eighty years old at his death, which occurred *218* years before Asoka's accession in *270* B.C.[1] He was very proud of his aryan descent, and uses it as an *epitheton constans*, 'noble,' for his very teaching (*ariya*). He is thus an ' aryan ' in the same sense as was Cyrus, and more particularly Darius, his great contemporaries. But he abandoned the princely life and sought to gain peace by penance (*tapas*). But, finding this method unfruitful and ignoble, and enlightened under a bo-tree in the true wisdom, he devoted the rest of his life and his strangely winning personality to help others to the same deliverance.

His metaphysic, of secondary import.—It is therefore chiefly as a ' winner of souls ' that he engages our attention. Modern research seems to establish that his metaphysic is accidental and due only to the needs of a polemic which he felt constrained to offer to the false notions then prevalent. But we must begin by seeing how much he *rejected* and how much *retained* of these current theories. He retained the popular and universal belief in *Soul-migration* and (with some reserve) the use of meditation leading to rapture, trance and ecstasy.[2] He *rejected* the Veda,

[1] This is not the place for a purely antiquarian debate on chronology or a full catena of authors and theories : S. Buddhism (Ceylon, Burma, Siam) gives 623–543 because of its faulty date for Asoka's reign. But even the above (approved by Rhys Davids and others) is merely provisional, cf. Rhys Davids *Ancient Coins and Measures of Ceylon*, London 1877 : for nearly forty years he has maintained much the same views.

[2] Though, as against any excessive regard for hypnotic and shamanistic mysticism, its use is not indispensable to gain the end, and it is heresy of the worst type to employ no other means.

the use of ritual, sacrifice and magic formula, all violent ascetic practices, the superstitions of vulgar animism no less than the more complex soul-theory of the jains, the theistic speculations to be found in certain early *upanisads*. As against permanent *soul*, the inactive entity, or non-agent of Sankhya and the Vedantines, he denied that there was any changeless substance within which passes along the line of lives suffering for acts which cannot in any strict sense be its own.

'Impermanence of Compounds.'—It may be said that his single metaphysical doctrine (when he was forced to think of one at all) was '*all compounds are impermanent*', and he quickly followed it up by the ethical reflection, '*all compounds are unhappy*'. It must again and again be repeated that he never makes his full meaning clear; to tie him down to precision or logical system is absurd. He simply refuses, with Confucius, to concern himself with the problems of the hereafter, while man has so conspicuously failed to order his present life so as to secure happiness. Confucius is a social reformer, a tribalist, a conventionalist; Gautama is a monk, a recluse, a mystic; and his teaching is not only *unsocial* but from one point of view a danger to society. Thus while his whole practical interest is centred upon the *inner self*, which is man's only true reality, he has in his *theory* to deny its existence altogether because he hated the prevalent animism. The two dogmas, *impermanence* and *no-soul*, are therefore his only theory; and this speculation is due to misleading views which kept men distraught and closed for them the 'open road' to happiness. After all, he appealed to the patent facts of life when he taught that the composite must suffer now and must be resolved into its elements hereafter.

Denies the Inactive Soul on Moral grounds.—There is no *being*, only *becoming*, as with Heraclitus. Behind the *samsara* there is no single changeless individual (as in Vedanta), no multitude of unchanging and inactive selves (as in Sankhya). From the prominence given in scriptures and in such writings as the Conversion of Milinda the greco-bactrian, we can see that this dogma of no-soul held a chief place and was always being brought forward. It must be remembered that soul was in the orthodox sects a *non-agent*, and it was Gautama's wish to bring back a moral earnestness, which, while largely disqualifying him

for the title of philosopher,[1] renders him immune from any criticism directed at a systematic teaching. This he could not have pretended to impart. Finding it suited to his temperament (in some degree a reaction from a military and princely upbringing) he taught a tender and feminine morality as the only sure means of gaining a durable peace of mind ; love, joy, sympathy, gladness : he urged men to kill wrong desires and foster good impulses.[2] This gladness and serenity is a state to be attained here in this life : a doctrine, which later was to be for countless myriads a passport to a happy immortality, is in its original scope purely *secularist*.[3]

State of the saved — a tested experience of Bliss.—For this state the sole guarantee was the satisfaction felt in attaining it : no logic or philosophy was needed to convince a man who had once tasted its happiness. Hence there is no complex metaphysic, as in Sankhya or jainism : the only test is feeling. The ethical doctrine is then the *purest subjective eudæmonism* which regards the inner state or disposition of the subject (if we may use the term) to be the only thing of value. In effect it cannot be distinguished from the Vedanta : it denies of course the *atman* and its godhead in theory, but like that school it arrests the moment of blissful consciousness, withdraws it from the secular whirlpool and makes it the sole and abiding reality in the world of change and flux. It is idle (and needless) to deny a general pessimism in the outlook upon life. Like all other schools it recognizes the evil of all particular existence ; because it is a shifting and impermanent compound, therefore it must always be full of pain. But this pain is man's own fault ; he has it in his power to avoid it and to heal himself.[4] Against the ' ignoble and profitless ' paganism or ascetic self-torture he sets the noble **aryan path—the Middle Way.**

[1] Whose principal motto should be *surtout point de zèle*.

[2] Rhys Davids justly exposes the fallacy that B. wished to exterminate *all* desires ; far from pursuing stoic *apathy* he has a sermon ' On Right Aspirations ' : he is no more unemotional than St. Francis, who is the only obvious western saint fitted for this comparison.

[3] Like the greek subjective schools after Aristotle.

[4] Without granting the ' exuberant optimism ' in which Rhys Davids finds the keynote of the system.

CHAPTER B. AIMS OF THE NEW IRRELIGIOUS HUMANISM

Section V.. The Monk's Gladness as World-Goal

The Monk's Blessedness justifies the World-Process.—If then the aim of both philosophy and religion is to rescue a foothold from the world's inconsequent flux and find the One in Manifold, the Buddha certainly did not deny it. But he gave to this true being, out and beyond the flux, a very peculiar meaning.[1] The only genuine reality was the gladness of the mendicant friar, the *Arhat*, who has reached perfection. As with some modern absolutists true being cannot be *knowledge* alone or *feeling* alone. Still less can it be conceived as soulless matter ; it is rather an *experience*, a state of consciousness in which the chief factor is bliss.[2] There is not a doubt that the Master felt the world-process to be justified—here is *cosmodicy* if not *theodicy*—if it could produce as its perfect bloom one or two specimens of this joyful holiness in each æon, like a rarely-blossoming cactus. Therefore the amended outlook cannot be called pessimistic, since the ideal state can be won by man's own efforts. Emancipation is a *habit of mind* attainable now and not the last vague stage in a series of rebirths. Nirvana is the dying out of tormenting passion and bears no reference to the extinction of the soul : he inveighs equally against his two dangerous foes, *immortalists* and *annihilationists* or thanatists, and will not commit himself at all in the matter of survival. Like Confucius (as we saw) he is indignant at man's futile pretensions to solve the secrets of the hereafter when he does not know how to use his present life and its opportunities aright. I am strongly of opinion that, while he properly confined himself within the limits of experience, he could not have written and spoken of *nirvana* as he did, if it was not in some sense unlike everything else, *fixed* and

[1] The best analogue being of course the vedantine *atman*, as said above.

[2] With Bradley felt at a *single* centre, with McTaggart at *many* centres.

eternal. But he avoided of set purpose any dogmatic statement. If he regarded the utter cessation of consciousness as the end and goal of existence, it is absurd to deny the appositeness of the term *pessimism*; and to talk of his 'exuberant optimism' is defiance of common sense and ordinary language. The Gospel tells us in no uncertain terms that the 'world is evil' or 'lieth under the Evil One'; but it is not pessimistic because it shows us 'better things to come', for which the present distress and discipline is a necessary prelude and noviciate. If Gautama really held that death in its strictest sense was better than life, he could never have built up a school. After all, his doctrines were *positive* and popular; they appealed to no test or argument but that of conscious experience: *man is wretched, but by his own fault; release is possible and can be won by his own exertions.* The gladness and peace of the perfected *arhat* was his message; his face shone like Moses' countenance when he came down from the Mount, as an earnest and guarantee that the message was true and worth having. The Buddha felt that he was happy—a state no one can prove or analyse or explain to another: other men saw that he was happy and believed that he could show them the way to become so. He taught them the tender 'feminine' virtues of love, joy, peace, relieved them of every social duty or worldly interest, and forbade them to marry.

Doctrine and Problems of Karma (*kamma*).—With this curiously simple, if not childish, way of salvation was juxtaposed—it cannot be called combined or blended—the doctrine of *Karma.*[1] It is agreed by all scholars that he accepted *transmigration.* Yet, as he also denied *soul,* he could not have held that any abiding or continuous entity passed through the several stages towards perfection or learnt by suffering and discipline in a series of lives where true happiness must be sought. If there is no soul, no single subject, there can be no justice, no requital, no education,[2] in any conceivable sense. Hence the whole doctrine of Karma (so far as any can be discovered) is an unresolved

[1] Of this the veteran buddhist scholar Rhys Davids, says in 1911: 'The history of the Indian doctrine of *Karma* has yet to be written' (cf. his Hibbert Lectures 73–120, Dahlke's *Aufsätze* etc., Berlin 1906, also the erudite article of de la Vallée Poussin in Hastings' *Enc. Rel. Eth.*).

[2] As Lotze shows against Lessing's obvious but somewhat mischievous poetic fancy of the '*Education of the Human Race.*'

puzzle.[1] The popular belief was then and is to-day that a man's present lot was due to acts in a former life and that he was now engaged in preparing his future destiny. Buddha said there was *no man, no agent at all, behind these acts* ; and therefore no one to taste requital (*bhoktar*) or suffer penalty. But the sum of these acts formed a sort of nucleus for a fresh life ; and this aggregate produced within itself a consciousness, to suffer or enjoy the fruit of acts for which it could not be held accountable. Sometimes *karma* was this sum of acts, sometimes an isolated action which determined the lot in another life, sometimes the death-bed aspirations,[2] sometimes the thought most dwelt upon during life or the mental disposition resulting therefrom. It seems as if these impersonal cravings hovering in the air when released from our expiring consciousness had power to create a new entity, to expiate our sinful thoughts or enjoy the rewards due to their merit. Rhys Davids' idea is not to be entertained, that Plato (*Phædo* 69) agreed with Buddha as to 'the influence exerted 'upon one life by a desire felt in the previous life!' It is certainly true that it is there connected with a belief in transmigration ; but Plato did not stultify himself by denying every bond between one life and another, and his views upon the soul were diametrically opposed to Gautama's *no-soul* hypothesis. There was for him as for Origen, a permanent subject, led by stages to a final perfection ; Buddha denied any such thing, though he was obliged to found upon it his whole moral appeal (apart from his sheer eudæmonism). Between the two successive entities there is no bridge ;[3] no consciousness or memory passes over into the fresh life : only the *grasping*, *cleaving*, *craving*, that exists at death and at once creates a new body.[4]

[1] Over which it is idle to waste time, when Gautama himself made not the least attempt to elucidate it.

[2] To which hindu thought attached very great weight.

[3] He rejected of course the brahmanic theory of the soul emerging at death through an aperture or orifice in the skull : see Deussen's elaborate account of the stages of the soul's ascent both in his *Upan.* and in his *Ved. Syst.*

[4] It is unnecessary to add with Rhys Davids 'How this takes place is nowhere explained' : when there is so much in Buddha's person and influence to challenge attention, it is a mistake to treat seriously those antinomies which he either left in reserve and mystery of set intent or perhaps (with a failing congenital to the hindu mind) was unable to recognize as *antitheta.*

Theory inconsistent but application clear: 'everything matters'.—But in whatever hopeless and illogical plight he left the theory, the practical application was never for a moment in dispute. His first and last words are 'work out your own salvation'. As against dependence on ritual acts or divine grace, or 'instantaneous conversion' to knowledge, he preaches the 'gospel of works' (*Karma-marga*). Everything that is done 'matters': there is no inactive soul-substance passing unaffected and untaught by experience through a series of lives—a doctrine often leading to that complete moral *indifferentism* which passed westwards and alarmed both muslim and Christian society. It is quite certain that Buddha's teaching had a wide and indeed a wholesome influence—first within the narrow group of celibate adepts and next in the larger circle of buddhist laymen.[1]

The Certainty of Requital or Recompense.—Apart from the supreme ideal of placid quietism, it is not too much to say that the whole *ethical* influence of buddhism depends on its doctrine of exact personal *requital.* It is this doctrine of certain recompense either here or hereafter, which is the postulate of every religious system and the sole rational basis of ethics. Not of course of the ethics of instinct (e.g. desire to save life at risk or cost of one's own) or of *convention* and *custom* (honesty or patriotism to some group or collective term). But all moral inquiry which passes beyond these primitive standpoints and becomes rational must give a reason for its claims to the individual consciousness. Ultimately, that is, the moral sanction is bound to be explained in terms of *self-interest.* If the unit is not satisfied that the world and its rulers are concerned in his righteousness and welfare, or believes that they have quite other ends in view, he is perfectly free to think out another scheme of conduct without attention to 'other-regarding duties.' At least, justified

[1] A circle of 'tertiaries' or lay-brethren none too willingly admitted (see above). Gautama did not wish at first to admit nuns. It is obvious that Asoka, like Constantine, contaminated the early 'zealot' element by the wholesale admission of nominal and conventional members; the purity of a montanist 'church of the elect' gave way before a loose and unexacting national and established church with shallow doctrine and lax practice. It was in this period that (as Rhys Davids very justly says) 'the old ideal of life, the *arhat's* salvation, in this life and in this world 'only, to be won by self-culture and self-mastery—was forgotten—or con-'demned.'

or not, this has been the course always taken by ethical reformers who have (as our Lord, or Gautama, or Kant) invariably raised the *individual* above the demands of the social group or church and vindicated his independent life. If you have to prove to the average man that 'honesty is the best policy',[1] you must be able to show that the right will win in the end, that it can both protect and punish, and that in the final victory its servants who have borne the brunt of the battle will bear a share.[2] Popular buddhism could at once appeal to the test of experience and the *arhat* who attained knowledge was happy—by visible tokens. Striving mankind made themselves wretched because they strove for things of no value; disease or pain or success was meted out by inexorable justice to each man according to his former acts. In sum, it is certain that the felt happiness of the *arhat* proved Buddha's teaching to the elect; and to the vulgar, later admitted at the cost of some corruption and softening of dogma, the familiar cosmodicy of *Karma* seemed upheld by a system offering an additional prospect of relief and release for all.

Section VI. 'Welt-anschauung': The Cosmic Order as moral and rational

World-order purposive: mechanism subserves an end.—In its general world-concept buddhism assumes, not as a working hypothesis but as an obvious fact, that the cosmic order is *rational* and *moral*, that within its boundaries *mechanism* is in the service of *teleology*. From the scientific 'reign of law' we are apt to-day to draw very different conclusions. Morality never deals quite happily with the normal, it is always more at home with the exceptions: if nature is 'so careful of the type' it is because the single life with which morality alone deals is of no value. Neither science's 'nature' nor the Absolute of idealism

[1] We must suppose them for the moment indifferent to the (perhaps) higher appeal of the 'beauty of holiness'.

[2] This is the strong argument in parsism and in Christianity: it is blurred in judaism because the unit is the *nation* and not the *individual*, who had not yet found self-consciousness. Medieval 'realism' (with its attendant sacrifice of the suffering unit to an unintelligible cause) will surely not be tolerated by the modern mind, although sentimentalists have promised us the contrary; but they seem to know nothing of what is passing in the mind of the 'people' or of the logical outcome of our political teaching and our natural science.

can in any accepted sense be termed ethical. But to Gautama's mind there was always present a vision of universal and eternal Law which brought to every individual a precise requital, the exact harvest of his seed—a purposive world-order which while carrying out *cosmic* justice did not stifle *personal* hopes. Unless this point is appreciated buddhism must be misunderstood. It is no system of tearful self-pitying surrender to a Whole which it can neither withstand nor understand ; it is a joyous and wilful decision to seize and enjoy the best : self-abnegation (except of that false self which hinders our attainment of happiness) never enters the purview of the School for a moment. The 'everlasting arms' are impersonal no doubt ; but one may rest in them with absolute assurance. The Law of Nature is then the Moral Law also, and the two do not hopelessly challenge each other, as in our western thought : the outer order corresponds exactly with the inner voice, *κατὰ φύσιν=κατὰ λόγον*, the *real* is the *rational*. Thus it is possible to embrace the whole system in the one word *dhamma*—a secret but eternal rule like *tao* or λόγος which man only discovers and does not himself promulgate. Buddha only claimed to restate this truth ; like the deists of later date, he did but republish the everlasting religion.

Dharma **as eternal law of right : ethics=ætiology.**—Everything [1] in his system is comprised under this one word *dhamma*, as *order, law, right, good, justice, standard, norm* ; it is akin to a root meaning to *maintain, establish* and therefore not unlike *θεὸς, θεσμὸς, θέμις* from *θέ-σις*. It is the recognized guiding rule. It can be used for the creed or doctrinal system embodying the law of the universe. A pupil can ask a teacher 'What is 'your *system* (*dhamma*) by which you train your disciples to 'get comfort and support for the higher life ?' But it is first a real and *objective* standard which is always valid, a rule of justice always working whether men know it or not. It is not an imaginary or mythical world-picture, or a pious and unrealized ideal, or a distant hope at the end of the ages. As accepted and understood by the human consciousness it became a *subjective* vision : there being no vivid contrast (as in the west) between *within* and *without*. To know the external order was to obey it and be happy : the stoics formulated the same theory, but in their

[1] I may here quote from a historical work in preparation on *Human Standards and Ideals* (from 'everything' to 'harmony' on p. 122).

practical dualism never really believed it. Buddha does not invent the law, but like many a holy teacher in time past, he rediscovers it for the good of mankind. It gives to all beings a natural and at the same time moral guidance. It is not weak like our moral law in the west, always somehow a matter of the hereafter, and unable to operate unless men are willing to accept and recognize its sovereignty. It needs no judge to apply it to individual cases, no further penalties or recompense beyond its own. No childish question 'who put it there?' need be asked or answered. No purposive consciousness called it into being for an end. . . . Knowledge of the law, is knowledge of the steps of a process: the noble or aryan discipline is a thorough acquaintance with things 'by way of causes' (in the *Samyutta*). Just before death Gautama says '*for fifty and one years I traversed the wide realm of system and of law, seeking after the good; outside of this can no victory be won.*' Thus *ætiology* or search after causal order is search after the (human) good; because of the initial axiom that '*nature* and *man* are in harmony.' We may compare Kant with his dualism and lingering trace of that scottish puritanism which surrendered the present order to the direct control of the devil and his witches: 'How it may be with dwellers on other planets we know not; perhaps in these each unit may fully attain its appointed design in life. With us it is otherwise, only the species can hope for it.' I do not know if such a thought, pregnant with the grossest injustice, can console any sane man for individual failure. I only point out here that Buddha did not seek to comfort his disciples by any such childish 'realism'—a 'realism' which tries to heal our own conscious pain or disillusion, by hopes for the mass, by promise of ultimate millenniums, or by pointing out how good for some impersonal and unconscious abstraction is our daily and irremediable routine of suffering.

Morality based upon Denial of the Gods: The Perfect Type.—Instead then of a search for God, or true and eternal Being, he preferred to trace causes; his system (so far as he has one) is an *ætiology*. A *primus motor* has given place to a *perpetuum mobile*; there is *no being* but *becoming*; no *absolute* except the *relative*; no rule but the paradox, *permanent impermanence*. The only incontestable *fact* is the reality of evil and suffering; the only encouraging *hope*, that it lies in our own power to end it. So far is denial of theism from overthrowing the basis of ethics,

that the exile of the gods or of God is really a prelude to a more earnest morality. Law and exact justice take the place of heavenly caprice and favoritism. Knowledge of eternal law does not bring a despairing sense of man's littleness; rather a grateful feeling that properly obeyed it leads the way to his highest blessedness. Nature itself is teleologic: she is always striving to produce a perfect man, the highest type, the perfect *arhat*. Ordinary 'means of grace' and solace Gautama rejected: 'Would a river bank on the further side come across to greet 'you on this by man's invoking, praying, hoping, praising? 'Would such practices ensure union after death with Brahman? 'Such a condition can in no wise be.' As a substitute for these vain hopes, he finds ample security in the cosmic order for belief in right action and its due and certain recompense. In five ways, each of increasing interest for man, is *cause* and *effect* shown in nature [1] (1) in *act* and *result*, (2) in the ranks of inorganic life, (3) in plants' growth, (4) in the orderly sequence of man's conscious states [2], (5) in Nature's untiring effort to produce her highest type (*dhammaniyama*). So there is still room for a spiritual teleology; or rather we might ask is anything else left?

Section VII. (A) Buddhist philosophy of History

Birth and Development of Worlds and of Society.—Besides a theory of *nature*, Buddha taught also a philosophy of *history*. Life on this planet was represented, partly in the scientific manner of Democritus, partly with the imaginative irony of Plato. In the *Genesis Discourse* among the Dialogues (iii 27)[3] he pictures earth as passing away and yet again evolving out of gloom and moisture: reborn from other spheres, self-luminous beings descend and at last taste earth and are embodied [4]; sun and stars arise, seasons begin their course; vegetation appears

[1] The (dynamic) *œtiology* which takes the place of Plato's (static) *dialectic* as the sovereign-science.

[2] In spite of the fact that for him, as for Hume, there exists nothing central or continuous to hold them together!

[3] I admit that this theory does not appear amongst the earliest writings, —perhaps not until the editorial or scholastic period of Buddha-ghosa (450 A.D.) but I think it is clearly implicit in the primitive teaching.

[4] The continuous legend of archaic days is that to taste food in hell was to become a prisoner: it is found in the most primitive chaldean sources.

and rice grows of itself 'for the service of man'; sex separates mankind into two hostile camps and great tumult ensues; households and families come into being and private ownership is the unfailing source of disquiet, misery and injustice. At last for his personal gifts a ruler is chosen and the rest agree to obey him as umpire; whether as *tilling*, *ruling* or *fighting*, (that is, protecting) man set up for himself a certain professional norm or standard according to which each class is judged. From either of the four classes [1] a man may go forth to lead a homeless life as recluse: this order too has a special norm or standard. 'If any member of the four classes control himself in thought, 'word and deed, obeying the seven commandments, he can 'extinguish evil completely in this life. Any one becoming a '*bhiksu* and attaining this rank of *arhat*, has put off moral taint 'and laid down the burden, has won salvation, broken the fetters 'of becoming, found freedom through knowledge made perfect: '—he is said to be chief and foremost in virtue of a *norm*, and 'a norm is what men call highest (ideal) both in this world and the 'next.'

Difference of Standards and Ideals: *Arhat* the Highest.—There is here no monotonous or hopeless prospect; no dead level. Each rank has its fitting duties and standard, and at the apex of human society is found, not the book-writing brahman but the begging friar. In the very last stage there arises a type of absolute perfection to delight and instruct mankind, *bodhisat*—who is to become *buddha* the world-saviour in his very last embodiment. There is then (it would seem) a world-process evolving towards a perfect type open to every man who tries to reach it, *la fine fleur*, ἄωτος; which however rarely attained is justification enough for all the painful development. When the tree has given off a certain number of these secular blossoms it dies. The cosmic order thus subserves man's imperious demand for happiness and self-realization. And so to the buddhist (whose ethics are wholly *empirical*) *karma* is in a sense the correlative of *dharma* (or *dhamma*): man is and will be as he has behaved; he makes himself and is his own creation. His true essence (here we part

[1] This recognition of caste betokens a later date; it is clear that in Gautama's own life the caste-system and its rigid divisions were very far from gaining general recognition or approval.

from the pure *intellectualism* dear to the hindu) lies not in a mysterious entity, *soul*, but in *character*—not in the changeless and inactive, but in that which develops from moment to moment and is big with presage and promise for the future. He rather defines than extinguishes the notion of personality : it is for him no hard ultimate core, a *ding-an-sich* left when every quality and attribute is stripped off. In *karma*, all past acts and experience are wrought up as material into the existing self ; and this again is always pregnant with a new life. The future heir of my ' doing ' may not be myself but merely a resultant ; but so far as I have true reality he is my genuine self. Aristotle may say νοῦς ἕκαστος ' the mind is the man,' but in effect it is just this part in us which is not *individual* but *universal*, not *personal* but *impersonal*, not *human* but *Divine*.

Survival of *Character*, not of *Spirit* or Soul : nevertheless, final Jettison of Morality.—Buddha willingly let this somewhat empty function, of apprehending general truths, evaporate : what survives is *character*, the resultant of the deed done. Soul must not claim immunity from the law of growth, change and causality. Nagasena replies to King Menander of Bactria, asking if the same mind and body were reborn : ' Nay, my Lord, ' but by this mind and body there is doing of deeds good and ill, ' and by the deeds another body and mind are brought to birth '. *Life* ends but its *living* goes on. *Character*, like matter and force, is indestructible. As in the old family chain of ancestors and descendants, how can a man be indifferent to his acts and hopeless about his future who knows himself as a necessary link in an everlasting series ? This doctrine may seem to us westerns very much like nihilism ; but to the sincere buddhist the future being will, in a very real sense, be himself. But action is not the highest thing, nor is this unending coil the last word in the great system of becoming. Morality is a very good raft to take us to the further side of the river—Virgil's *ripæ ulterioris amore*.[1] But when we have traversed the stream we need not burden our shoulders with it any longer (*Majjhima Nikaya*). ' Just so my ' brethren, must you put away *moral* no less than *unmoral* rules.' Goodness is a means not an end ; the only possible end that can be conceived is *enjoyment*, or blessedness in a final perfection. When ordinary man thought of *nirvana* there was nothing chilling

[1] In a very different and truly western sense.

or despondent in the notion: it was 'no death-knell but a "presentiment of bliss' (Mrs. Rhys Davids). Here again the western mind is at a loss to understand the fascination of that which seems to us to lack all content. Yet for nearly two centuries the motive force behind all movements in Europe has been a concept no less vague and indefinite—*freedom*.

(B) Conception of Nirvana (or Nibbana)

Various uses: '*health*' as well as a 'State of perfect Bliss.'—There can be no doubt that *Nirvana* stands for the final stage in evolution, goal both of the world-process and of the individual: it is extinction of pain and evil—calmness, insight, enlightenment. It is used for a conscious state of wellbeing.[1] Magandiya the eremite strokes his limbs (*Samyutta*) saying 'I am well and ail 'in no respect; this is health, this *nibbana*.' In a more spiritual sense, its attainment is a *timeless rapture* not of this world: the nun Mitta says, 'I am satisfied; I do not need a heaven of gods; 'I have rid me by self-discipline of the pain and desire of the 'heart'. It was not a doctrine of the hereafter at all. As to this Buddha [2] is discreetly silent: it was not a matter necessary to salvation, or having any direct bearing on the holy and blessed life so fully attainable here. The only dogmas were 'This is '*pain* (dukkha), this the cause of its *arising*, this of its *ceasing*: and 'this the *path* that leads to its ceasing.' Quest into the timeless and unknowable was quite useless for holy living and happy dying. True to his 'Middle Way', the noble aryan compromise, Gautama reproved alike those who dogmatized about the soul's *extinction* or *eternity*.

Nirvana: Not an immediate goal for all.—We have made this goal more than ever incomprehensible to our western mind by supposing it to be the *immediate aim* of all true buddhists. It is of course nothing of the sort; for most men seeking perfection it is clearly a very distant goal. Most believers in the Norm die with visions and hopes of future bliss not unlike our own. *Buddhism is, of all religions, the one in which belief in a future life exerts the strongest influence*: life is really lived with an abiding sense of its eternal and momentous value. It is certain that for the

[1] Perhaps with Carlyle we should say, when we are so well that we are not conscious of being so.

[2] With Confucius and Aurelius or any pious pantheist like Spinoza.

bulk of believing buddhists the world to come is far more real than to the average Christian. Buddha is a recluse and a celibate but he is not strictly a *quietist*: the sum of his practical doctrine (as we saw) is *everything matters*. In the end, the gladness of the *arhat* who has found salvation is the goal of a cyclic evolution which by slow and painful steps produces the best. The cosmos is concerned in creating at the last this perfect type of superman.

Ideal of Buddhist Superman contrasted with Aristotle's and Nietzsche's.—When we compare eastern with our modern ideals we must feel ashamed of our shallowness and childish brutality. Nietzsche is like a refined and delicate boy who makes up his mind (too big for his body) to be a highwayman or a pirate when he grows up: yet he would have detested the present teutonic type, necessary outcome and hero of the modern State-system. Buddha knew far more of his own and of normal human nature. Aristotle had seen in Nature an organic tendency towards the best and truest type; he arranged a graduated scale or hierarchy of being; he represented every throe of parturition in vegetable or animal world as an attempt to bring forth a man-child who might become the recipient and vehicle of eternal truth. In this and the buddhist system man is the end 'to which creation moves'; whereas in most others he is a fatherless orphan, 'groping proto-'plasm' (as Spencer in his old age dreaded to find) which has somehow worked its way upwards into the horror of self-consciousness. Once more, the buddhist *arhat* is no solitary recluse; although there is to our western mind little active and interfering social propaganda in the genuine system, although it distinctly refuses to recognize marriage as compatible with the highest life, —a saved man is a missioner to others and his life is not wholly self-centred. There is in him no forced and pretentious altruism (more than half a desire to domineer or make experiments); but a simple affection and genuine pity, for men who cannot yet see their own good. The sage reaches *nirvana* not to escape from the world of his fellows, but to show them by a living example —he cannot do more—that the holy life is also the blessed life. In a sense, for him exist the four castes which prepare the way for his coming. For him nature works with its eternal law; for him too the lay community, each member at his several post and duty, seeks to advance and improve, finding in his serene

gladness both the justification for their own lowly toil, and the guarantee of all spiritual truth. Whatever western ideals (outside the Christian Churches) are still living to-day, must owe their cogency and vitality to some shadowy resemblance to these essential features of buddhism.

NOTE I.

In attempting to form a conclusive estimate of a system offering the strongest resistance to any such effort, we shall do well to remember, 1. That Gautama had exhausted and found futile the three methods of relief which his age had to offer, (α) metaphysics of the intellect; (β) mere contemplation or trance; (γ) ascetic practice: he turned from these to a more practical and universal way from which no applicant was turned back; but he could never forget his training in all three, or shake off their influences; in a changed form metaphysic, trance, and penance creep back again—just as the notions of deity and saviour were not exiled for long from an avowed system of self-help.

2. The mental atmosphere of the leisured class in Hindustan was a curious compound; (1) *animatism* or the animation of all natural objects—the primitive creed of both races, now termed *animism*—on this the similar school of the Jains was built; (2) out of this had emerged *polytheism*, or the worship of the greater potencies in Nature, of the conscious and personal spirit lying behind an entire group of kindred phenomena; (3) the further refinement or belief that after all even these apparently conflicting forces were but the activities of a single primitive being, *monism* or pantheism; (4) the persistent protest of the soul to this last theory, and its escape to the hypothesis of *dualism* between souls and matter (Sankhya).

3. His active apostolate and desire to found not so much a religion as an Order; 'Go forth (*Mahavagga* i 11) wandering everywhere in com-'passion for the world, for gods and for men; preach the doctrine; pro-'claim a life of perfect restraint, chastity and celibacy': rightly then Waddell (the great revealer of the mind of Tibet) says 'Buddhism is not a 'popular religion at all but essentially a monastic brotherhood which 'advocates celibacy for every one' (s.v. 'Celibacy' *Enc. Rel. Eth.*). So Sir George Scott: 'Buddhism can hardly be called a religion. In its concrete 'form' (he is writing of Burma) 'it is rather a sort of philosophy practised 'by a monastic organization like that of the dominican or franciscan 'Orders.'

4. As to *Nirvana* it is absolutely certain that it did *not* imply the extinction of soul: why should Gautama follow the hunter or warrior at the banquet ('twice he slew the slain')? It was a purified state to be attained in this life by extinguishing the fires of passion—sensuality, ill-will, ignorance (*Samyutta* iv 251, 261). The proof of its attainment was the actual happiness and peace experienced in the 'soul': 'a mental state of 'exaltation, bliss, insight, altruism.' Rhys Davids *Early Bm.* London 1908.

5. Oldenberg well reminds us that the practical teaching is the segment of a circle into which the true disciple of Buddha is forbidden to

penetrate further: the centre is always concealed. Hence the later rise of the Great Vehicle which permitted (1) help and grace from a deity when self-help proved of no use; (2) ecstatic communion with God in place of meditation on nothingness; (3) the belief that so partaking of God's nature the individual man becomes immortal and divine—the aim in all other religious systems.

NOTE II

Is Gautama's Doctrine Original?

Only as a 'way of life' founded on the three axioms—self-help, value of actions, impermanence. This is still hotly debated: Rhys Davids (*Amer. Lec. on Bm.* 1896) and Oldenberg (*Buddha*, 1906, edit. 5. 65–71) maintain the merit of novelty; others, as Pischel, believing it to be 'wholly dependent on Kapila and Patanjali'. Mrs. R. Davids (*Bm.* N.Y. and London 1912) asserts, with all the zeal of a fervent disciple, that 'the criticism which would rob the teaching of originality is slenderly 'based and that will one day be held to be a positive contribution to the 'history of philosophy'. To Pischel, buddhism, like Christianity, seems rather a 'vehicle for culture' than a culture itself. But it may safely be said that few will join him in the following: 'While as a *religion* it 'gains by modern research ever in value, as a *philosophy* it sinks ever 'deeper'. What is buddhism as a religion? it must be asked, and, apart from its borrowings and later perversions or accretions, there is no answer forthcoming. While admiring the partial defence of its apologists, the cool critic is bound to recognize that Buddha, like Confucius, disclaimed the idea of new doctrines and had not received the training necessary for initiating any novel view in philosophy. His aim was purely practical: dialectics and metaphysics, so far as he admitted them at all, were only subsidiary to the great compassionate purpose. It is idle to deny that Kapila's views embodied in the later compilation *Akarika* do contain the doctrine nearest to his own and there can be no doubt that he used them when his moral and practical teaching needed a rationalized basis; it was the one most ready to hand; it dispensed with a Supreme Lord and needed in his eyes only one correction—his theory of 'no-soul' in which he is the forerunner of Hume. Thus he carried negation to the furthest practical extreme and denied the stability of the one entity hitherto allowed by all parties to exist in any true sense. By this means he avoided the dogma of Absorption into an Absolute, which for the individualist who wishes each man to 'work out his own salvation' is peculiarly abhorrent. He substitutes a *cosmodicy* for a *theodicy*, it is true; but Mrs. Rhys Davids must be reminded that a theodicy in any strict sense cannot be found in indian thought at any stage. He believes in *cause* and *effect*, and the importance of acts; and, as soon as he speaks of the *moral* consequences and human demand for deliverance (here and hereafter), he forgets or puts on one side the doctrine of *ajiva* or 'no-soul' which is after all his chief philosophical tenet. This is at once the one original contribution to a development already far on the nihilistic path before his time; and the one point on which his 'creed' has exerted not the slightest influence

on average mankind. The success of the system (except upon a handful of abstract philosophers) is due to the belief that he is a true guide and saviour for the (permanent) Soul; and it is as a teacher and guarantor of immortality that he entered the great eastern kingdoms of Asia, where his influence flourishes to this hour for the same reason.

Section VIII. Hinduism or the Brahman Recovery and Compromise

Gradual Reactions of Brahmanism: Laws of Manu.—The Brahmans offered no determined resistance to the rationalist or religious schools which taught salvation apart from the traditional 'works of the law'. The jain and buddhist systems arose into light and flourished in those outer districts beyond the influence of the Midland and its priesthood. For some time the three schools existed side by side in comparative harmony. The priesthood was neither organized for attack nor as yet completely assured of a predominant place in the scheme of caste.[1] The sects lived together without undue quarrelling: official favour was bestowed impartially. There is little trace of oppression at the hand of a triumphant party.[2] The religions of India are blends and compromises, not single or homogeneous products or creations of a single intellect or period: to-day the jains employ Brahman priests, some preferring the cult of hindu gods, even of the female principle (*sakti*) at Bombay; buddhism in Nepal is more than half hinduized and strongly sivaite; Ceylon shows the same combination;[3] in the latter burmese dynasties the syncretism is apparent; in Baroda jains and the followers of Visnu freely intermarry;—in fine, lines of distinct cleavage can be traced only with great difficulty. The actual decay of buddhism set in about *600–700*, and its final disappearance was due rather to the muslim inroads from *950* or *1000* onwards than to any native attack. But the prevalence and menace of non-ritual philosophies no doubt forced the priesthood into that strange alliance with the submerged dravidian consciousness, to which

[1] Rhys Davids (e.g.) is clear that Gautama lived in an age *anterior* to any set or fixed system and to any recognized priestly supremacy.

[2] So V. A. Smith in his *Early History* and all recent authors, both with regard to pre- and post-Christian centuries.

[3] Cf. A. Lillie's very suggestive but often prejudiced and mistaken volume on the influence of indian on Christian development.

allusion has so often been made. The epoch of the Puranas [1] shows this new alliance which has produced the system called hinduism. The last monument of early and orthodox brahmanism is Manu's treatise,[2] in its present form certainly a redaction later than the century before and after Christ. Here an attempt is made to resist innovation by reticence; the gods are purely vedic; the teaching is for aryans alone; there is no mention of the later *purana* deities or of the *trimurti*, the *sakti*; the saving faith (*bhakti*) of the Krsna system is ignored; *Prajapati* is still the greatest god (albeit a priestly and artificial abstraction); Brahma is named but only a single allusion is made to Visnu and Siva, images and temple worship are spoken of with contempt; transmigration is clearly stated though nothing is said about buddhism [3]; the heavens are only steps upwards to union with brahma and the hells have become purgatories; stress is laid on the virtues of *yoga* and concentration.[4] In this Epic period, though sacrifice has its place, when marvellous power is exerted it is chiefly due to this *yoga* or personal self-discipline or sometimes to the use of magical formula.[5]

The Brahmans win Dynastic Support and regain Influence.—After the astonishing success of a pacific imperialism and a single State-religion (under Asoka *270–220* B.C.) a brahmanic reaction took place on the extinction of the Maurya supremacy which did

[1] Now believed to extend as far back as 500 A.D. not as H. H. Wilson believed to 1045; these writings represent even older material which was edited afresh 320–500 and no doubt interpolated to suit altered conditions.

[2] Burnett 'composed under the Chalukya king Pulakesi *c.* 500 A.D.' or, as others, 550–608; this is 'unconvincing' (Eggeling): in any case it is by no means a work of primitive authority and in its present text and arrangement subsequent even to the above dates.

[3] Just as pagan writers down to the times of Ammianus and Libanius seem to ignore Christianity of set purpose, even when it had become the State-religion.

[4] Perhaps the date of the chief stratum may be *c.* A.D. 100. Many verses from 'Mahabharata' are cited and we seem to be reading a *tendenzschrift* gathering up the dogmas of tradition at a time when they were being assailed by other influences.

[5] *Mantra*, in themselves potent and mystical, are now used by priest and warrior alike, serving every purpose of a purely secularist religion, and superseding the theurgic sacrifice of the *brahmana* epoch; cf. Hopkins *Religions of India*, London 1896.

not last quite a century and a half (*321–184*). The *asvamedha*[1] or horse-sacrifice came again into vogue, though there is no proof that buddhism, till lately official, suffered actual persecution. The *Kanva* dynasty were brahmanic and used priests as ministers of government. After the *Andhra* India was a prey to invaders from the north, *Saka* or Scyths, *Pahlava* or Parthians ; the famous dynasty of Kaniska and Kadphises continuing until *226* A.D., giving way about the same time that their kinsmen (?) on the persian throne yielded to the native sassanids. All these rapidly accepted their environment. Kaniska's part in organizing a novel form of buddhism is well known ; he and Huviska formally became hindus ; and the last of the line, Vasudeva, employed on his coinage sivaite emblems. A revival of brahmanic power and the sanscrit tongue can thus be marked after *80* A.D.[2] Both were fostered by the *Satraps* in cent. iii (*200–300*) and still more promoted by the *Gupta* house in cent. iv, the successor of Chandragupta II (*326–375*) celebrating the *asvamedha* in token of his warm support of orthodox brahmanism. The dynasty though quite tolerant of jains and buddhists was itself under the guidance of the older priesthood. About *500* the *hunnish* tribes burst in, to be accepted or adopted by the pliant brahmans as *ksatriyas* : early legends were re-written to suit the theory of a primitive kinship.[3] Under the *Chalukya* king in Deccan, Pulakesi I (*505–608*) we note some early traces of buddhist decadence ; he was himself advised by brahmans and performed many hindu rites including the horse-sacrifice. In cent. vii it is even said that Sasanka in Bengal persecuted the buddhists, but king Harsa (*606–645*) his coeval,[4] beginning as a brahmanic hindu ended by favouring the sect. It is to this period and the following centuries that the great cave-temples

[1] This famous offering and rite, its aim being wealth and world-sovereignty, lasted three years, had a gross and bestial symbolism in which the queen was obliged to take part (a form of ἱερὸς γάμος), and was regarded as an emblem of *Viraj*, the primeval universe.

[2] We read of the horse-sacrifice again in the case of Pushya-mitra whose date is somewhat uncertain.

[3] There is said to have been admixture even with the brahman caste—another argument for doubting the closeness of our affinity to the *present* races of Hindustan.

[4] Also contemporary of Mahomet and Heraclius the east-roman emperor.

are referred,[1] in which it is clear that the new allies, brahmans and hindus, imitated the work of jains and buddhists.

Brahmanic influence in the fabulous Land of the South.—In S. India, not known in the ' aryan ' north till *350* B.C. or more than a century after Gautama, and still a fabulous region during the epic period—brahmanic influence was but slightly felt before *700* A.D.[2] In any case brahmanism developed on quite different lines in the South. It was only in *700* and following years that this reaction was complete and the caste-system fully worked out under brahman supremacy. The priests develop the new theology of the *Puranas* (e.g. Ganesa and Hanuman) and adopt cults and beliefs from races hitherto outside the civilized pale. Perhaps from the now dwindling buddhism was borrowed the word *dharma* to imply the established *order, usage, institution, prescription* or *custom, duty, rule* which implied a method of life and social observance binding on members of a given community. When duly complied with and performed by the unit, this objective standard would become subjective and personal as *virtue, merit, moral worth.* Like the so-called materializing of the spiritual content of religion in western Christendom, this system implied a concession to new races and a compromise with their practices. The now completed caste-system is framed in the interests of the new converts ; each section of whom was allowed to retain its usages and cult, on condition that a general supremacy and right of supervision should be allowed to the priesthood, everywhere energetic and zealous in mission work. Summing up the period of religious conflict to the time of Sankara we may say that the two systems existed side by side [3] for more than 1000 years—*250* B.C.–*800* A.D.

Buddhism steadily loses ground and at last disappears.—We have proof of the continuous existence of brahmanism after Alexander's invasion (*327* B.C.). After the time of Asoka (*c.* *250* B.C.) witness is borne to its survival by legends, inscriptions,

[1] Cf. J. Fergusson's (1808–1886) great work *Hist. Ind. and E. Architecture*, 1876.

[2] So Burnell : Bhandarkar writing in 1912 is also inclined to later dates and disputes any earlier influence of aryan missioners from the north. *Ind. Antiq.* xli.

[3] With the same varying fortunes as we observe in chinese history, in the case of buddhism, *tao* and the confucian ethics.

sanscrit texts, and dramatic stage-plays. Fa-hien (*399–413* A.D.) journeying from Afghanistan down the entire Ganges valley found brahman priests held in no less honour than the buddhist mendicant friars. Huen Tsang, in his journeys somewhat later (*629–645*) found both methods in eager competition, but the older faith was now beginning to reassert supremacy. Towards the Punjab frontier, the temples of Siva and his terrible queen showed the influence of the newly-allied powers. Yet buddhist kings still predominated in the north-west, and there were many convents for the friars and 'swarms of heretics' devoted to the popular cults. The triumph became complete in the next few centuries and brahmanism (including very much that was non-aryan and indigenous) became the ruling religion. But the downfall of its rival was due to natural causes.[1] In century xi only outlying States like Kashmir and Orissa still adhered to the rationalist creed. Hinduism—the alliance of brahman tutelage and the barbarous cults of the natives—supplanted it everywhere else on indian soil.

[1] At Peshawar in Tsang's time *c.* 640 A.D. though the populace were faithful to buddhism the great monastery built by Kaniska stood silent and empty, deserted by its once thronging students.

CHAPTER C. GODLESS THEORIES IN HINDUSTAN

SECTION I. DENIAL OF A SUPREME LORD

However great the speculative activity of the hindus, however complex their metaphysics, we may safely say that they never emerged in theology from that *impersonalism* which marks alike the earliest and latest efforts of human thought. If in the development of many historic creeds, *magic* clearly precedes anything that can be called *religion* in our modern sense, this is preëminently true of India. Except in the *bhakti-marga* movement, the inhabitants of the peninsula (whether aryan or dravidian) have remained to this day at the level of magic. In vedic times the gods were natural powers not persons; and in no subsequent time was *animism* a compliment to the superior beings. Behind the phantom deities was the world-order or unknowable substrate; which produced them as it produced men and animals and the whole mirage of the universe, and in the end would again reabsorb them. Like Plutarch's demons they were long lived but not eternal—certainly did not exist in their own right. The great humanist heresies never aimed at overthrowing their cultus or denying their existence: they only held that the saint or sage was far above them and that they had no supreme master or sovereign—except the unknowable world-order. The pantheon remained, under brahman and buddhist alike, an incoherent republic, never united under a single monarch. We cannot then strictly speak of *atheism* in the sense of a denial of spiritual beings. We must in this section exclude the *materialism* which sometimes obtrudes itself in quite a western form. For the whole tendency of hindu thought is towards an *idealism* which refuses to recognize the actual and the manifold. It is this attitude which allows to all seemingly separate and independent beings—whether gods or men—only a precarious and phenomenal life. In this spirit the vedic people could pour ridicule on Indra (*Rig* iv 24, x 119), sometimes even deny that he existed (ii 12, viii 100). The gods lived on as trans-

ient creatures (Garbe) in the systems of 'Sankhya', of Mahavira and Buddha. They were rather angels or demons than 'gods' in the western sense which is always tending to unique exclusiveness. But there is no *isvara*, only *samsara*: no Supreme Lord or providence, only a wheel of life. The sankhya aphorisms urge that the existence of such a deity cannot be proved: ed. Ballantyne, i 92–95 (p. 112 sq.), v 2–12 (313–321), 126 (416), vi 64 (456). *Matter* holds in itself an inherent force which can explain its development, and on the other side *souls* or living beings entail the consequences of their acts—and neither for creation nor for moral providence is a Lord required. 'Scriptural 'texts which mention the Lord either glorify the liberated soul of 'the saint, or pay [ironical] homage to the recognized deities' of the hindu pantheon (pp. 115, 116). 'Fruit is not brought to 'maturity here because the world is governed by a Lord' or moral judge 'for this is accomplished by works' that is merit and demerit (313). A commentator (315) suggests that the opponent accept Lord in the sankhya sense: 'if there be a lord' [as a necessary counterpart or correlate]. 'Whilst there exists a universe, 'let yours, like ours, be merely a technical term for that Soul 'which emerged at the beginning of creation,—since an *eternal* 'lordship there cannot be because of the [fatal] antinomy between 'mundaneness and the possession of unobstructed will.' 'The Lord' once again (Aph. 6) 'could not be world-ruler without *selfishness* 'or without *passion*; for it is passion only that determines all 'activity; or without fettering to His task.' In a spirit very strange to us, it is maintained that this is the orthodox teaching of Scripture (Aph. 12, p. 321). 'Scripture' says the paraphrast 'asserts exclusively that the world is product of *Nature*, not that 'it has *soul* for its cause . . . for' (note on Aph. 13) 'Soul has 'no association with anything whatever.' In v. 126 the great hellenic thesis and the maxim of modern Idealism is entirely rejected: 'Eternity does not belong to *knowledge* [or mind] as 'those allege who desire to establish the existence of a Lord': 'just as we infer' adds the paraphrast 'from the example of 'ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire is not eternal.' So lastly vi 64, 'the effectuation of works is dependent on the agent's self-'consciousness, not dependent on a Lord, as the *vaiseshikas* 'idly feign; because there is no proof that such exists'. Aph. 65 (457) 'it is *desert* which sets *Nature* energizing.' A commentator

in cent. xii A.D., coeval with Averroes in the west, labours to prove that a purposeful Creator is quite inconceivable : neither *egoism* nor *benevolence* (the two great motives) could account for a proceeding so senseless : 'a god whose wishes were 'all fulfilled can have no personal interest whatever in creating 'the world . . . neither can he have undertaken the task from 'kindness, since before the act of creation souls' [represented as already existing] 'suffered no pain. . . . Further a deity 'actuated by kindness would create only joyful creatures. . . . 'But it will be said that the difference in condition' pleasant and painful 'results from the difference of desert for which 'individuals receive a reward from God. We reply, Such a 'direction on the part of a conscious Highest Being is superfluous, 'for the effectiveness of work' in entailing good and evil consequences to the doer 'fully explains itself without any such inter-'vention. . . . The operation of unintelligent matter which 'Sankhya assumes has no *egoistic* purpose behind it nor is *kindness* 'its motive.' So far Vachaspatimisra.

While Patanjali, founder of Yoga, introduced into sankhya teaching the hostile tenet of personal theism, the jain and buddhist schools accepted this ruling-out of Creator or providence. The jains deny any Supreme God (cf. *Slokavartika* § 16, Calcutta 1907), but admit numberless deities and grades in spiritual life. But none are eternal and their merit can be exhausted, as in the case of men. Gods are *embodied* souls but they have not reached the height of perfection, attained only by the *released* soul which flies aloft to the apex of the universe and breaks off all connexion with the mundane life and its interests. The jain saints or 'conquerors' do not take over the tiresome functions of direction and providence. The faithful, although they know that these victorious souls cannot hear them, pay them worship in their splendid temples and address actual prayer to them : but the gods, as deputies or ministers of these secluded mikados, intercept the pious entreaties and send an answer. To meditate on the perfection of those who have 'overcome the world' is a purifying spiritual exercise, quite apart from any hope that our invocation is audible to them. It is easy to see how far the conception of *heavenly* perfection has impressed the definitions of *secular* kingship in the eastern world.

As to the buddhists, Poussin well remarks that although they

maintain (with the Sankhya) that the Lord is superfluous they tend to personify the effect of works (*karma*): 'If I were to hide my 'sin from every man, I could not hide it from the Law' (*dharma* of which *karma* is the result in each individual case). Retribution operates then automatically in virtue of a cosmic energy unhappily indestructible, save for a very few who attain release by quietism. Where impersonal Law is working so unfailingly, there is no need of a personal being to reckon up the balance in the 'book of debts'. At a very early date it was taught that Brahma (like the later Ialdabaoth of the gnostics) thought in his pride, at the beginning of a world-age, that he was sole Lord and Creator and Ancient of Days (Rhys Davids, *Dial. of the Buddha*, London 1899). He attributed to the force of his thought the arising of a phenomenal world: 'A moment ago I thought, would that they 'might come! and behold, on my mental aspiration the beings 'came forth into life.' The lesser gods reverence Brahma (*l. c.* 280 on *Kevaddasutta*) who does not like to confess his ignorance before them, but he in turn is infinitely below Buddha who enlightens him as to his modest place and limited destiny.

Section II. Materialism

There are traces of pure materialism even in pre-buddhist India (Gogerly's *Ceyl. Buddh.* Colombo 1908). In the *Review of the Systems* by Madhvacharya—written at the close of our period (+*1331*), the author arranges them in an ascending scale of orthodoxy, putting materialism as the first and worst. Indeed, before the beginning, Haribhadra (+*531*) wrote to the same effect showing how little genuine development took place after the great pre-Christian movements (ed. Suali, Calcutta 1905). But it may be doubted if there was ever a definite school or system. It is said that there are three classes of the Deniers (*nastikas*); the *charvakas* (called after an ogre in the *Mahabharata*); the *Lokayatas* or 'mundane', whose adherents according to Rhys Davids explain the origin of the physical world; the disciples of *Brhaspati*, the divine chaplain and teacher of (sceptical) wisdom.

In the time of Buddha there lived an ascetic Ajita (in all three *Nikayas, Digha, Samyutta, Majjhima*: cf. Rhys Davids' *Dial.* i. 73) who held that there is neither fruit nor result of good and evil deeds; no alms nor sacrifice; no father nor mother; no world

either now or hereafter ; no recluses nor brahmans : a man is built up of the four elements, and at death like returns to like, the five senses and the mind vanish into the ether. ' This talk of gifts ' he said ' is a doctrine of fools : it is mere idle talk and ' an empty lie when men say there is profit in them. When the ' body is dissolved, fools and wise alike are cut off and become ' nothing ; after death they are not.' Purana Kassapa, another contemporary (*Digha Nik.* i 52) uses the same materialism to deny moral *responsibility* ; so Makkhali from the same standpoint rejected the idea of *freedom.* ' There is no such thing as human ' strength or energy ; beings are bent this way and that by their ' destiny, that is, their peculiar nature.' In the *Mahabh.* we find a very similar belief ; *daiva* (fate) is almighty and the soul's energy is very weak (*purusakara*). It is easy then to see that Buddha led a moral reaction against this predestinarian quietism, when he taught that the supposed external *daiva* is nothing but the sum of our former deeds, and that man is the master of his fate and must blame no one else for his lot. His school (not without an illogical earnestness) express abhorrence for Ajita's ' denial of remuneration ', though his doctrine of dissolution, so near to their own, left them quite unmoved. In this heresy consists the greatest error (*mithyadrsti*), which destroys the roots of good and thrusts men into every kind of sin—like the doctrine of Reprobation in certain Christian sects. They saw that it was purely an accident of temperament that Ajita led an ascetic life ; others starting from the same premises held to a pure epicurean eudæmonism—as Haribhadra (1000 years later) described : ' As long as we live we should live happily, enjoying ' all the pleasures of sense ; how can the body reappear when it ' has been reduced to ashes ? ' Hence ' there is nothing in man ' except what is visible to the senses ' . . . ' the sole means ' of knowledge is their direct evidence ' both induction and appeal to authority being expressly rejected. Thought arises in the body ' from a special mingling of elements, as the intoxi- ' cating force arises in fermented grain or the juice in the sugar ' cane '—a doctrine quite analogous to the tenets of the french enlightenment (cent. xviii) and of Moleschott and Büchner (cent. xix) This led in the last resort to a repudiation of causality, like that of Hume : ' Things are not produced by causes ; they are what they are because they are so ' (*svabhava*), in

virtue of their own (uncaused) nature. After this pure nihilism is the only refuge.

Patanjali (*Mahabhasya* vii 3) seems to speak of regular text-books of materialism, which he refers to Brhaspati as mythical author. Madhvacharya, more than 1500 years later, begins his compendium with a regret that in his day most men followed the materialism of the *charvakas*. It is difficult to accept this very pessimistic statement in idealist India, where *acosmism* has been a far more usual attitude of mind than *atheism*. But it is well to remember it in estimating the effect of reflective nihilism (in the garb of religion and devoutness) upon the still ethical character of the semitic muslim and upon the spread of antinomian heresy westwards. The *lokayata* school are said to reject induction and accept only the impression of the moment —cf. Aristippus' *μονόχρονος ἡδονή*. With the dissolution of body, soul and its faculties pass into nothingness. Any form of life beyond this mundane sphere is dismissed with a gibe; hell is only earthly pain. There is most certainly a Supreme Being (cf. the confession of Maarri in the division on Islam), for the visible world affords tangible proof of his existence. *Karma* is a doctrine founded on baseless inference and need not trouble us. The essential nature of things is the (impersonal) cause or ground whence issue all phenomena singly. To gratify sense is the only conceivable good: it is quite easy for the prudent to avoid the pain which is so often blended with the greatest pleasures. 'If 'you want to enjoy fish you must beware of the bones; and you 'cannot get rice without husks.' Scripture is the idle prating of knaves, and its doctrines are mutually destructive. Brahman ritual is a fraud, and the only aim of sacrifices is to provide the priests with an easy livelihood. 'If an animal slain at the *soma* 'offering rises up into heaven, why does not a man rather slay his 'own father instead?' (Hillebrandt 'Materialists and Sceptics', *Alt. Indien* etc. Breslau 1899; to the same year (London) belongs also the still useful *Six Systems Ind. Phil.* by Max Muller). De la Vallée Poussin and Bendall (*Athenæum* June 30, 1900) agree that Rhys Davids is wrong in his statement: 'Of the real existence 'of a school calling itself *Lokayata* there is no trace.' 'There may be' says H. H. Wilson (*Essays* ii 87, Trübner 1862) 'a few '*charvakas* in India but their opinions are unavowed': he classes them with buddhists and jains on which sects his know-

ledge was very imperfect. But vol. i. 22 he speaks of them as *Sunya Vadi* (asserters of the unreality and void of the universe) ' advocates of materialism and atheism who have existed from ' a very remote period and still exist as we shall hereafter see.' Of the Sunya Vadi sect in modern times he gives a most interesting account (vol. i 359). Under the patronage of the Raja of Hatras (in the days of Lord Hastings' viceroyalty) Bakhtovar, a religious mendicant, wrote a poem, *Sunisar*, on the essence of emptiness : ' Whatever I look upon is vacuity : belief in God or ' denial—all is false, *maya* and *brahm* alike. The globe itself, ' Brahma's egg, the seven *dvipas* and nine *khandas*, heaven and ' earth, sun and moon, the divine trinity, master and pupil, unit ' and species, temple and god, ritual and muttering of prayer— ' all is emptiness. Let each one muse upon himself, be worshipper ' and worship ' in that inner shrine : ' let him not disclose his ' self-communion to another nor talk of distinction between this ' and that. Look to thyself and not to another ; for in thyself ' that other will be found. Whatever thou seest is but thyself, ' and father and mother do not exist ; thou art infant and old ' man, wise and fool, male and female. It is thou which art ' drowned in river, art passing across the bridge ; thou which art ' slayer and slain, killer and eater, monarch and subject. Thou ' art ascetic and man of pleasure, the strong man and the sick. . . . ' All that thou beholdest in thyself—bubbles, surf, billows are ' all nothing but water. . . . I know neither virtue nor vice : ' many have been the princes of the earth ; nothing did they ' bring or carry away. Take what the world offers thee in the ' few days of life ; enjoy thy share and allot some to others : ' let men speak good words of thee. . . . Have no hope in the ' dead ; trust to him that is living . . . of all that have died has ' any one returned to bring tidings of the rest ? A rent garment ' cannot be spun anew, a broken pot cannot be pieced together. ' With heaven or hell a living man hath naught to do ; but when ' the body is dust, how can we distinguish the jackass and the ' dead saint ? Of four elements is the world composed and ' beside them is nothing else ; this is Brahma, this a pismire. ' Hindu and muslim are two leaves from one tree ; one calls his ' teacher *mulla*, the other *pandit* : they are two pitchers of one ' clay ; one performs *namaz*, the other *puja*. Where is the ' difference ? I know of none. . . . Therefore avoid all wrang-

'ling and strife and adhere to the truth, the doctrine of Dayaram 'the Raja. I fear not to disclose the truth; a subject and 'a king to me are all one . . . a palace or thicket to me are the 'same; what I may with ease obtain, that will I desire. The 'error of *mine* and *thine* have I cast away from me. I know nothing 'of loss or gain. When a man can meet with a preceptor to teach 'him truth, this outweighs the errors of a million births. Such a 'teacher is now in the world; such a teacher is Dayaram.' This nihilism, leading up to a very worldly flattery of an absolute ruler, is to be noticed; for it is the principle which took visible form in the Assassin community, when hindu thought penetrated into the 'political adventure' of Islam.

APPENDIX H

Indian History

PART I. NORTHERN DYNASTIES

Hindu Dynasties after Alexander

A. Maurya (round Patna in N. India and Ganges Valley). *Chandragupta* I. *321–296* B.C. (Megasth. speaks *300* of 118 indian kingdoms and of 'Sandrocottus the Prasian' exerting suzerainty over many vassals) *Bindusara* (*296–269* ?) *Asoka* (grandson) *264–228* (but Schmidt *269–232*), patron of buddhism, allied with Antiochus Theos of Syria (*256*). A period of hellenic influence follows in astronomy and art (especially sculpture), the purest specimens being found in Punjab and Gandhara (N.W. frontier province): the greek princes in Bactria (such as Menander 'Milinda') were interested in buddhism, which took its models in statuary from the greek. Heliodorus, a soldier and follower of king Antalcidas (*c. 170* B.C.), professed himself a follower of the *Bhagavata* or theistic faith and a worshipper of Visnu (acc. to inscr. found near Bhilsa, Central India 1909, the year of the discovery of the Peshawar *stupa* with Kaniska's inscr. and perhaps containing genuine relics of Gautama's bones). The influence of greek art lasted on to cent. xii; it is traced even in the architecture of the temple at Kanarak (in Orissa).

B. Sunga founded by *Pushyamitra* (others say, by Brihadratha) a rebel general of the last Maurya (*184* B.C.): marks beginning of a decided brahman reaction (others, as E. Schmidt, give *178–66*).

C. Kanva: *72–27* B.C.

D. Andhra: *27* B.C.–*236* A.D. (but it had existed since *224* B.C. in compar. independence after Asoka's death). Meantime on N.W. (Malwa, Gujarat, Kathiawar) inroads begin from *100* B.C. of pastoral nomads Saka and Parthians together with *Yavanas*, or dispossessed greco-bactrians, all driven south by the Yue-chi. The rulers of these tribes took the name

E. Satrap from the persian, and their successors maintained power

at the end of the Andhra Dynasty till *c. 350* A.D. being overthrown by Chandragupta II.

F. YUE-CHI (or KUSAN) themselves attacked from the N. by ancestors of Huns press downwards from steppes of Khiva and Khotan, and, united under *Kadphises I* (*45–85* A.D.), form the kusan kingdom in Cabul valley (others give *25* B.C.) sweeping away the hellenic and parthian remnants there (E) : his successors complete conquest from Indus-delta to Benares on W. and open up commerce and trade-routes with Rome, *Kadphises II* announcing his conquest of the N.W. to Emperor Trajan (*c. 99–100* A.D. ; acc. to Dion Chrysostom). *Kaniska* (date in the kusan series uncertain ; acc. to V. Smith succeeded *120* A.D. Fleet and Otto Franke of Berlin *58* B.C. Schmidt gives date of anointing *78* A.D.—Smith's reckoning is to be preferred) conquered Kashmir, Kashgar, Yarkand and ruled from Peshawar. During this supremacy of the KUSAN House religion assumed a more and more syncretist form. This dynasty (as is well known) supplanted in the Punjab a ruling family of *parthian* origin—which Gondophares (mythical correspondent of St. Thomas but a real historic figure) represented in *50* A.D. At Minnagar (on Indus delta) a great trading centre, turbulent *parthian* princes ruled and expelled each other (*Periplus Mar. Erythr.*). This foreign occupation may perhaps be traced back to the conquests of Mithradates I (V. A. Smith's monograph on these parth-indian families *120* B.C.–*100* A.D. *Zeits. d. deutsch. Morgenl. Gesellsch.* p. 60, 1906). The KUSANS extinguished it some time after their conquest of Bactria *50* A.D.) and the *Periplus 70* A.D. fixes them in the Indus valley. Kaniska (for whose reign Eduard Meyer gives *123–153* A.D.), who had adopted *buddhism*, uses an alphabet borrowed from the *greek*, and on his coins places the titles of *zoroastrian* deities (Cf. Aurel Stein *Babyl. and Orient. Rec.* i. 1887) *Mitra Mah* (moon), *Athro* (fire, cf. *Atharvan*), *Orthragno*, and *Nana*—one of whose shrines has been found within the limits of this kingdom at Hinglaj. Thus about *120* A.D. mazdeism and buddhism were welded in a single State-religion. If polytheism reacted on the ' godless humanism ' of Buddha, it is also probable that the warmer theism of the persian sun-god reacted upon hindu theology.

G. GUPTA : *Chandragupta II* (*320–365* or *326–375*) : line overwhelmed by the organized brigandage of the White Huns (*470*) which came to an end with the overthrow by Turks of their central power on Oxus River (*565* also date of Justinian's death at Byzantium). The hunnish, turkish and avar forces menace the Roman Empire about this time until the rise of Islam which fixes a semitic barrier against the Mongols for several centuries. A minor dynasty, the *Valabhi*, was founded by a GUPTA vassal Sanapati Bhatarka (*495*) against the invaders ; it reigned in Gujarat (veering from buddhism to brahmanism and again to jainism, the dogmas of which sect were definitely reduced to order at the Council of Valabhi). Another GUPTA vassal Yasodharma (also in *530*) defeated the White Huns. The Huns on indian soil remain hinduized and included amongst *rajput* clans, as an important element in possession of the N.W.

H. THONESAR : *Harsa 600–648*, coeval of Tsang the chinese traveller and Heraclius the roman emperor, rules over N.W., Malwa, Gujarat, and

the Ganges valley (with Nepal and the greater part of Bengal) and was repulsed from Deccan by

I. CHALUKYA: King *Pulakesi II* (whose dynasty had been founded by Pulakesi T. *c. 550* Burnell and Schmidt who gives date as *500* and the name Jayasimha); this house was superseded in *750* by

K. RASTRAKUTAS: the great Ellora temples were built under this family by *Krsna I c. 760*; it lasted till *973* and the eve of the muslim inroads.

I. CHALUKYAS (*restored*): *Taila Deva II* overthrows K. the dynasty lasts for 2½ centuries; a chief hero is *Vikramanha 1076–1126*. Some CHALUKYA nobles maintained an even later dynasty but, together with the Hoysala, were overthrown by Malek Kafur some time after *1310*, Ramachandra being the last autonomous sovereign in Deccan.

PART II. NATIVE DYNASTIES IN THE SOUTH

Of the three primitive kingdoms of myth and legend, *Pandya* held the extreme south of the peninsula, *Chola* north and east, *Chera* the west (including Malabar); they are known in Asoka's time who mentions 'Cherala', but there is no authentic history till close upon the time of the muslim inroads cent. x A.D. In the *Mahabh.* Arjuna is said to reach (as in the tale of Odysseus and Nausicaa) the Maidens' Baths at Cape Comorin; Rama meets eremites everywhere; Agastya is the type of divine champion of aryo-brahman race who combats the evil *asuras*; he is said to bring culture to the dravidian realms and is called the *Muni* of the Tamils—clearly a myth of aryan vanity; he arrived, it was said, at the court of the PANDYAN king *Kulaseka*. The starting-point and earliest centre of this civilization was Korkay, called by the Greeks, with a happy suggestion of another familiar land of wealth and mystery, *Colchi*,—facing Ceylon. The malabar coast was specially settled (so it was maintained) by the brahmans who secured recognition as masters of the country by divine right and Rama's (that is, Visnu's) famous hurling of the battleaxe from Gokama to Cape Comorin; he presented the land thus conquered to the priestly caste and the computation of time in malabar chronology starts from *1176* B.C. when the axe was thrown. While it is true that the brahman on the west coast enjoys great deference and a higher status than on the east, it is hard to attach any value to the letter of these myths —certainly none must be given to the chronology.

The subjects of PANDYA and CHERA certainly traded with the Roman Empire in the early centuries of our era, but the first P. king to whom a date can be given is *Rajasimha* (*920* A.D.) and there are no records until cent. xii. CHOLA is named by the sanscrit grammarian Katyayana *c.* 350 B.C. and Asoka a century later calls it independent; but its dynastic history does not begin until more than a thousand years later. Its greatest king was *Rajaraja* (*985–1012*) who conquered the whole of S. India and annexed Ceylon: after Vikrama *1120* A.D. the CHOLA power declined and here also the deathblow to native rule was dealt by Malek Kafur (see Part i).

The PAHLAVAS (?Parthians) came from the north and became a ruling

and tribute-taking people (from *c. 150* A.D.) along the malabar and coromandel coast, like the Mahrattas in later times. When Hsuan visited Kauchi, their federal capital, he measured it as nearly 6 miles round. They were at perpetual feud with the Deccan dynasties, viz. I. and K. (above Part i), but their power was only destroyed by *Rajaraja c. 1000* A.D. The present ruler of Pudukottai claims descent from a royal house of these *Pahlavas*.

The muslim invasion gave without doubt a stimulus to religious development by its destruction of national hopes and security of life, and by its disarrangement of the formal rules of caste (the due performance of which had taken the place of personal religion with the vast bulk of the dravidian converts). But there is no need to continue the account of this alien dominion which could but exercise a negative and depressing influence. Nor is it proposed to follow the process by which the original philosophic buddhism was contaminated with various forms of Central Asiatic *Shamanism* or blended with the cultus of dravidian and aryan gods.

APPENDIX I

Infusion of Mongol and Semitic element

RACE : It is quite impossible to accept views such as (e.g.) Schmidt expresses in Helmholt's History on the predominance of a pure aryan race in the north ; (it has been noted that other competent authors have denied any ' caucasic ' migrations on a large scale or that the mid-asiatic or mongol element has disappeared from these regions.) ' As far as the ' Mongol princes are concerned almost every trace of their existence has ' vanished ', although a ' strong infusion of mongol blood ' is allowed by him to have entered from the N. and N.E. (see above Part i. on the origin of some rajput families). It has actually been suggested that Siva-worship was introduced by the Huns from the N. and Central Asia *c. 500* A.D. *Bombay Gazette* ix, *1901* and Crooke denies our right to attribute this special brahman divinity to the dravidian aborigines—an assumption very often made.

But for our purpose more important is the *semitic* influx : ' from an ' early period trade relations were maintained between the east and malabar ' coasts and the westerly continent ' (Schmidt). (Cf. semitic type of countenance found there.) Jews, fugitives or merchants are said also to form a factor : Jews of Cochin are descendants of exile colonists after *70* A.D. The jewish colony at Bombay lasted on in affluence and power, until the times of muslim bigotry. It is remarked that the semitic cast of features bears strong resemblance to the earliest assyrian kings and renders more than ever likely the early relations and intercourse which we note in connexion with Hinglaj and ' Nana '. Nor can we accept Schmidt's statement that the ' conversion of the south to brahmanism took place ' between *1000* and *500* B.C.' ! It is on the contrary probable that the very transient suzerainty of Asoka was the earliest religious influence from the north, except from wandering ascetic brahmans.

DIVISION A

Hindustan and the Religions of Further Asia

PART III

Obligations and Influence of Hindu Theosophy

I. FOREIGN CONTACT

CHAPTER A. POSSIBLE FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON HINDU CULTURE

Section I. Babylon, Persia, Greece

Babylonian influence : the cult of Nana of Erech.—Whether the eastern mind and its products exerted active influence on the west after Christ will always be matter for dispute. Harnack (*Miss. and Expans.* eng. tr. i 28) while doubting if it can be proved whether India had any share in the blending of religions and (if this be granted at all) unwilling to decide to what extent, adds : ' Some connexion with India however does seem probable.' Pfleiderer allows some forms at least of gnostical doctrine and metaphysic to be traced back to India, e.g. the basilidian system in Hippolytus *Refut. Hær.* vii 22.[1] As to the most primitive sources of contact we have elsewhere spoken of a possible *chaldean* influence, and of this we may take the cult of Nana, Mother-goddess of Erech, as typical. Here it is possible that a fusion took place, perhaps in the second millennium B.C. The hegemony

[1] So F. Kennedy *Jl. Roy. Asi. Soc.* 1902. A. S. Peake believes it safest at present to suspend our judgment : the μὴ ὢν θεὸς of the Basilidians (according to Hippolytus) he takes, not as a buddhistic loan, but merely as Scotus Erigena or his predecessor Bar Sudaili might interpret it ; there is a god who wills and deposits a seed ; emanation is rejected for *creatio ex nihilo* ; no spider spins the world out of itself—thus marking the sysem off from normal ' emanatist ' *gnosis*, there being no evil principle and the Archon receiving reverent obedience. On the other hand Bousset (*Hauptprob. d. Gnosis* 329) says that no system shows the doctrine more clearly ! and that elsewhere in the various systems emphasis is laid upon the fate of one particular Æon, ' the idea of *emanation* ' not being relevant for the true understanding of *gnosis* '.

of Babylon (in a culture spreading both eastwards and westwards) must have began prior to *1500* B.C. and the aryan advance-guard could not be wholly immune from this influence : the rulers must have controlled trade-routes through Persia, Bactria and Turkestan. There are traces in Baluchistan of irrigation-systems, typically chaldean [1], which bear witness to a fertile period in antiquity during which intercourse by land would be easy and normal. Certainly by *800–600* B.C. there was maritime traffic between Babel and the *non-aryan* west and south of India ; and as is well known a semitic script is the beginning of all hindu writing and reached India perhaps *750* B.C. by sea (Bühler, Kennedy, Robertson Smith, Sayce etc). In the *Brahmanas* during this period before *500* B.C. there seem to be echoes of chaldean myth—demons pile up a fire-altar to reach heaven, but Indra pulls out a brick and lets them fall, to become crawling spiders or the hell-hounds of Yima-Yama.[2] At Hinglaj too in Baluchistan there is a famous shrine of the Mother-goddess, under the name of *Nana* Devi, identified by muslim pilgrims with Mahommed's grandmother Bibi Nana. This curious syncretism may well go back to very early days. Here is the furthest westerly point of hinduism.[3] We may find in it a survival of the worship of *Nana*, lady of the temple of E-anna and mistress of the city Uruk or Erech. Scholars now admit that this influence may underlie the *female* worship both of Aryans and Dravidians : ' the view ' says Crooke, ' is not unreasonable that the babylonian culture of the Amana Period (*1450* B.C.) may also have passed eastwards.' *Nana* (Innanna or Nina) is of course to be identified with Ishtar (Astarte, Atergatis) the goddess of nature and death ; who continues to be a dominant personality even when she

[1] Sir Thomas Holdich, however, attributes most of these works to much later and *arabian* irrigators.

[2] The doctrine of the Flood, however, seems curiously enough to reach aryan India later through *dravidian* mediation and not through the *persian* land-route.

[3] The best account is still Goldsmid's (1861) : it is the cult of the Mother-goddess in her most terrible form with gory sacrifice, once certainly human ; now a stone is smeared with vermilion. Of the goddess herself there is no image (the absence of which always betokens a primitive worship) ; the votary creeps through a narrow opening in the rock on all fours and cannot pass if he is impure : the custodians receive an annual revenue of some £40 from visitors to this remote sanctuary.

becomes in later *patriarchal* times the consort of a male God.[1]

. **Persian Affinity and Darius' Suzerainty : Solar-cult and architecture.** From Persia and the common affinities of the indo-iranian stock must have come the light-[2] and sky-worship which marks off the early aryan invaders both from the natives and their own later descendants. Obvious resemblances of name and ritual are familiar and need not here be detailed.[3] At the close of the *Brahmana* Age (*c. 500* B.C.) in the very height of the humanistic reaction in the Outland, a large part of India to the west was held under pers-iranian suzerains. Somewhat later Alexander and the bactrian soldiers of fortune brought in a hellenic influence,[4] but also a further iranian sun-worship : we know by inscriptions like that of Heliodorus (*c. 170-150* B.C.) the guardsman of Antalcidas already mentioned, and by dionysiac symbols for Siva,[5] that the influence was reciprocal. The House of Kathiawar and other rajput families claim ties with the later Sassanids—itself a reaction (*c. 224* A.D.) of pure aryanism, against mongol dominion. It is possible too that the late blossoming of hindu architecture was affected by iranian models (e.g. the *gardu*, winged vehicle of Visnu). Albiruni's statement, then, can hardly be borne out : ' Hindus believe that no other country, nation, ' kingship, religion, science—can be like or on a level with their

[1] As *Nano* she appears on the coinage of the Kusan king *Huviska c. 150* A.D. (see prev. sect.).

[2] Contrast of two kingdoms of Light and Darkness (expressed in proverbs) in Upanisad ; *Brihad.* i. 3, *Chandog.* iii. 17 suggests a *parsi* influence : Mani 250 A.D. hopelessly materialized the valuable suggestion.

[3] Haug e.g. shows the exact identity of the *agnistoma* rite with that prevailing in Iran. Risley, *Census Report* 1901 suggests that the four castes are from Persia—that the social system which in Hindustan took many centuries to complete and establish, was primitive in Iran.

[4] The extent of which it is hard to estimate.

[5] Miss Gladys Davis (*Asiatic Dionysos*, London 1914) very ingeniously adduces proof for the oriental origin of the wine-god, in accordance with the constant hellenic legends of Nysa and the indian campaigns of Bacchus, celebrated by the late epic-writer, Nonnus. W. Crooke however (with most students) ' is satisfied to accept a thraco-phrygian origin ; the difficul-' ties of direct intercourse (*700–600* B.C.) being considerable—not to speak ' of earlier ages ' (Review in *Folk-Lore*). Miss Davis lays emphasis on the Asianism of ancient Greece and seems to refer the undoubted analogies of hellenic and hindu thought to direct borrowing on the part of the former. The book is very suggestive ; Dionysos is for her no other than the vedic Soma.

' own.' Even the national or rather universal religion,[1] buddhism, is by no means a native product in its effective influence.

Section II. Christianity in Central Asia and Hindustan

Contact with Christianity through Chaldean Church.—Edessa, capital of the buffer-state Osroene, sent out missioners to Armenia and Parthia early in the Christian period and before the end of its own autonomy under Antoninus ' Caracalla ' (*216* A.D.). They took with them oriental thought and a syriac vernacular. Thaddeus, the Apostle,[2] is said to have preached in Assyria and left his disciple Pakida as Bishop of Adiabene, while another, Mari, went to the see of Seleucia. Though the Magians opposed its propaganda, the Gospel spread rapidly. After the national reaction under the sassanids this preaching was no longer permitted : no distinct effort was made to kill Christians, or create martyrs (as in the case of *Mani*), but it was made a penal offence to proselytize. When Constantine had become a convert, every believer in Christ became a political suspect in Persia.[3] This suspicion led Sapor II to persecute (*338*) and Shimun or Simeon (successor of Papa) was martyred in company with 100 priests ; in forty years the victims numbered sixteen thousand. Theodosius II (*410*) secured a measure of toleration, and the forty sees existing in that year soon became sixty-four,—at *Merv, Herat, Seistan* and other places. But these cruel attacks did not destroy a national spirit ; a strong claim for independence from clerical or imperial Rome was a cardinal tenet of the persian Christians. Disputes on Christology only reached the east in *480* ; and from the outset the sympathies of the church were *dyophysite*. Under

[1] Which alone of the indo-european family they have been able to create.

[2] The preaching of SS. Thomas and Bartholomew rests on no authentic foundation. In 52 A.D. the former is said to have reached Kodangalur in the State of Cochin (on malabar coast) and preached there : Pantænus of Alexandria, Clement's master, did not succeed in his indian mission, but no doubt brought back some vague data about buddhism which the latter seems to turn to account. The jewish settlement in Cochin professes to hold grants dating from cent. iv, 378 A.D. Long before Sankara's *neovedantism*, syro-christians were firmly fixed in this district (Burnell).

[3] Papa, the militant bishop of Ctesiphon, was still ruling his see, towards the close of a long reign, at the time of the Nicene Council ; but no mention is made of his attendance.

the vigorous Bar-Soma of Nisibis, this autonomy hardened into actual severance from communion with the west: like Paul of Samosata, reputed founder of the paulician sect, he was a secular official as well, being Warden of the Marches under the tolerant sassanid king Perozes. He founded a college for bishops at Nisibis, which lasted 1000 years, and prevailed on the church for a time to sanction the marriage of all ranks of the clergy; it is not unlikely that he wished to reassure the State that Christianity was neither *buddhist*, nor *manichean*—both of which systems were a menace to the social order as conceived in Persia and regulated by zoroastrian doctrine. But in *484* Acacius resumed relations with western Christendom; he was received at Byzantium and a non-nestorian confession of faith was drawn up. In the curious episode of Mazdakism [1] we have an analogue to much later heresy and persecution in the west and an explanation of much that puzzles or revolts us in cent. xiii and the Albigensian Crusade. Cabad, as a medieval king might do, hated both feudal nobles and magian priests. He listened readily to the communism of Mazdak (son of Bamdad) who in demanding a more equitable division of wives and riches was quite willing to use an autocratic monarch as a tool. The king adopted this doctrine and sought to break the power of the magnates and prelates,—for which futile attempt he was punished by an exile of three years (*496–499*). Yet it was only towards the close of his long life and after his restoration that he recognized in the sect a dangerous menace to society, and allowed his heir Chosroes to attack them; only in *529* was the prime mover Mazdak hanged. Thus about the same moment the roman consulate was abolished, the hellenic schools closed, and the modern age ushered in by the demand for social reform on *communistic* lines; or rather the first stern repressive measure was taken against dangerous social tendencies disguised in the garb of religious reform. In *518* the Patriarch Mar-Aba I[2] made peace with the greek church and Justin I, founded schools, went round to

[1] Which formed, or was thought to form, the basis of all later anti-social anarchism and ethical indifference in those regions. Mazdak, a socialist of the school of the later Chinese reformer Wah-gan-shih, was supported by Cabades the king, and the whole history reminds us now of Peter the Great, now of Jan 'King of Munster' and his Anabaptists.

[2] Others give his date as 536–562.

administer justice, revived monastic life, and established rules as well for degrees of affinity in marriage as for election to the chief see. He shows the curious anomaly and compromise which marked the status of Christians under the Sassanids. As a convert from the parsism of the Established Church, he was legally liable to death ; Chosroes only imprisoned him for a time during which he ruled the faithful from his dungeon. The synod of *544* forbade bishops and the patriarch to marry and accepted the Nicene creed, with Theodore of Mopsuestia as the chief biblical exegete ; another in *577* pronounced against the Massalians. Here once again we have a link with the west : these sectaries are the greek Euchites and forerunners of the balkan Bogomils whose tenets pierced to the west in cent. x and xi as Catharism. Though these were peaceful and harmless quietists they were regarded with no less distrust than the anarchical communists. There is not a doubt that the royal favour so constantly shown to the perso-Christian church was due to political motives ; the church was a social organism which did not reject marriage (except in the case of its highest officials) and was ready to condemn solifidian indifferentism. The church besides comprised a large number of busy traders and thrifty husbandmen ; its members occupied an industrial position not unlike that of the Jews in any State of east-Europe to-day. It counted few adherents among the turbulent feudal class and their retainers. We may contrast this worldly activity with such principles as were held by Aphraates of Edessa who tried to make celibacy a condition of baptism. It was reported that Chosroes I died a Christian ; Hormisdas IV and Chosroes II greatly favoured the nestorian sect and the latter even forced the whole church to accept their doctrine. Nor was the church estranged as yet from the west : the very pious emperor Maurice welcomed Patriarch Tshu-yahb to communion on his visit to the byzantine capital : it was only later that the church realized with surprise and dismay that their great doctor, Theodore, had been condemned throughout the greek empire. The *monophysite* party nearly captured the patriarchical See *570* and Chosroes actually sat in judgment upon the disputes of Christian theology. From this date two *natures* and a *single person* in our Saviour were recognized : at the same moment the title Mother of God was accepted for the Blessed Virgin, and for the sect itself, the sobriquet (hitherto

unwelcome) of *nestorian*.[1] At the conclusion of Heraclius' Persian Wars [2] the church was in communion with the greeks and Tshu-Yahb II was admitted as orthodox, *c. 628*. Only by degrees did the stricter nestorian party separate from the rest : a schism complete perhaps by *640*. The first to proclaim himself openly a heretic and nestorian was Babæus in *500*, when the primacy of Seleucia was fixed and all clergy commanded to marry one wife. Nisibis continued to be a nursery for the higher clergy and a seat of learning, where nature was studied as well as divinity and hellenic thought, where versions were made from the greek and the way prepared for arabian philosophy by translations from Galen, Hippocrates and Aristotle.

Nestorian Missions to India and Eastern Asia.—When both eastern empires crumbled to pieces before the sudden attack of Islam, this heterodox party seemed to have acquired a monopoly of strength and vigour. From the conquest of Persia by the muslim must be dated its marvellous and romantic record of mission-work in the far east ; but it began this wonderful career of medieval triumph in avowed schism.[3] For five centuries the nestorian church was a recognized institution within muslim ground and the chief see was moved in *762* to Bagdad. Its members filled high places at Bagdad in the official world and at the court, as secretaries, physicians, and clerks of bureaus. In *1000* Albiruni speaks of them as comprising ' the bulk of the people ' in Syria,

[1] The name Nestorian was first applied by Xenaias of Mabug (or Hierapolis) ; but the Christians of Persia called themselves the *Chaldean Church* and said that Nestorius followed them. The modern turk calls them *nazarah*, a corruption, like *feringhi* = both *Varangi* and *franci*, which suggests two sources.

[2] The disastrous effect of which I have elsewhere pointed out (*Constit. H. Rom. Emp.* 2 vols. Longmans 1912), in opening a clear path for Islam by the exhaustion of two ancient powers, which had little to gain or even secure by quarrelling :—the persian attack on the tyrant Phocas (602–610) was no national or ambitious movement but a purely personal vengeance for the murder of Maurice, benefactor and restorer of the persian king.

[3] It will not be forgotten that Ibas of Edessa supported Nestorius at Ephesus and advanced his views there after 435 A.D. ; in the same year Bar-Sumas his pupil founded a school at *Nisibis*, now become persian. The government welcomed as a political ally a sect, under the roman imperial ban and regarded with distrust by the local church. In 495 their leader assumed the title ' patriarch of the East ', at Seleucia, which became the focus of evangelizing activity.

Irak, Khorasan. Besides Armenia, Arabia and Persia (where they fixed their bishopric) they set up sees in Egypt (*732–752*) ; in Central Asia or Turkestan at Merv, Herat, Tashkend, Samarcand, Kashgar ; in China at Singanfu [1] and at Pekin ; in India [2] at Kalyana and Kranganore. They numbered at the time of the great Mongol invasion *c. 1250–1265* twenty-five provinces and seventy dioceses in Asia. The syro-Christians of St. Thomas' on the malabar coast also owe their origin to nestorian missions. Cosmas Indicopleustes, the eastern explorer under Justinian, tells us expressly that the Christians he found in Ceylon and Malabar came from Persia—no doubt as refugees. Pahlavi inscriptions at Madras [3] and at the still flourishing mission-centre of Kottayyam in Travancore attest the early presence of Christian settlers and perhaps native converts (*c. 750*).[4] In *745* a further contingent of emigrants from Bagdad was brought over to the west coast by Thomas of Kana—a few years before the removal of the head see to that abbasid metropolis ; a fresh reinforcement arrived in *822* from Persia. The malabar Church lived under its own kings as a close caste, imitating many hindu rules of food and *tabu*.

Great successes of the Nestorians in China to close of our period.—In China, after (perhaps) a first mission in *636* [5], there

[1] The famous inscription, once believed to be a forgery, is now held to be genuine. It was found in 1625 ; it commemorates ' the advance of ' the Noble Law of Tatsin ' (Rome), sets forth the chief Christian dogmas in syriac and chinese and gives the account of a mission which started from Judea under ' Olopan ' in 636—that is, at a time when Rome and Persia alike were exposed to the blows of Islam and the old empires and creeds seemed doomed.

[2] India belonged, it is said, to the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Egypt (a see established *c.* 750)—a fact surely helping to make probable a very early and continuous connexion between Alexandria, the home of world-thought, and the ' hermit ' continent.

[3] St. Thomé, though this name only dates from the arrival of western adventurers in modern times.

[4] Their tenets appear to have been *patripassian*, all three Persons being identified with the Divine Sufferer upon the cross : ' In punishment ' by the Cross was the suffering of this One (effected),—He Who is true ' Christ and God alone and Guide ever pure '.

[5] In 639 Siladitiya king of Kanauj, a patron of the theistic *Bhagavata*, received at his court nestorian-Christian envoys headed by Alopen, clearly the same personage as we meet with in China as Olopan : what syriac word this conceals I do not know (Cf. Takakusu *I-TSing*, xxviii) ; ? *rabban*.

were fresh migrants into Shensi province in *699* and *813*.[1] Indeed in *800* Theodore of Edessa (still their spiritual metropolis) allowed (in his *Canon*) the remote chiefs of China and India to send reports at intervals of six years. We know that the confucian and reforming Emperor Wu-Tsung ordered 300 *foreign* priests to return to the secular life that the customs of China might be uniform—these were a class apart from the buddhist monks whom he pursued (with much greater harshness) as a standing menace to an industrious community. In cent. ix the arab traveller Ibn Wahhab discussed the Bible with the reigning Emperor. In the next century Christian evangelists introduced the Gospel and built churches in Tartary proper (or Mongolia) : the Kareth tribe was converted wholesale and the chief took the name at baptism of *Malek Juchana* or King John—whence the popular medieval legend, not wholly unfounded, of a pope-king in the wilds of Asia. A MS. of the same period (*c. 850–1000*) in sogdianese, an indo-iranian tongue, proves that the New Testament had been circulated in the north-east of Asia. The activity of the nestorian missioners, in a word, covered the whole continent and Marco Polo (*c. 1274*) bears witness to their unbroken series of see-towns along the trade-routes from Bagdad to Pekin. They do not seem to have suffered from Timur's persecution, and as a rule the Mongols favoured them ; Hulagu in *1268* spared them while he hurried on to the extirpation of the Assassin Community. But already their star was waning and they gradually vanish as did buddhism, from causes not easy to assign or analyse. John of Monte Corvino laboured amongst them (*1292*) to induce them to accept the roman primacy ; and even in *1247* Innocent IV is found trying to persuade them to conform to latin rule. Nicolas IV and Benedict XI (*1311*) worked with some success in the same direction. The rest of their history is a record of silent absorption. The present patriarch of this dwindled sect lives in the Kurd Mountains near Lake Urumiyah, with a flock of 70,000 souls the *Assyrian Christians*, sole remnants of a once mighty organization.

Bhakti and Christian Influence on its Revival.—In India, the

[1] The first chinese patriarch was Salibazacha 714–726, and both Herat and Samarcand had metropolitans.

Christians of St. Thomas (as we saw) received a metropolitan from Persia in the person of Timothy (*778–830*) ; [1] no doubt subjection to a see in Egypt was then given up. The Church then spread rapidly. But true zeal began to dwindle when (*c. 1125*) the archbishop went to receive his pallium from Constantinople and then from Rome. Yet they are not quite engulfed and in *1884* there were ninety-seven churches following syrian rites and using a syriac liturgy.[2] It is certain that theistic tenets and a doctrine of salvation by faith were known in India some centuries before Christ : *bhakti* goes back to very ancient times. We cannot then accept Lassen and Weber's view that this is a mere reflex of Christianity. Serious study, beginning with Bhandarkar, has established [3] certain positions which are not likely to be assailed. Garbe (introd. to his *Bhag. Gita* Leipzig 1905) fixes a pre-Christian date for certain typical portions of the work. But the differences and the extension of the later phase may well be due to foreign influence :—the earlier form is a *mitraic* religion of a warrior-caste, analogous to the personal loyalty of a retainer or *samurai* and the devotion of a royalist

[1] Thus according to dates received by most students, an exact contemporary of Sankara the vedantist.

[2] For these *Malabar Christians* cf. W. R. Phillipps, *Ind. Antiq.* xxxii, 1903, an inquiry into the relations of India and the Apostle Thomas. The last nestorian bishop in Malabar, Mar-Gabriel of Azerbaijan, sent to Leyden in 1720 a syriac sketch of church-history, published by Land (*Anecd. Syr.* i 24). The second founder Thomas is said to have come out 345 from Jerusalem : it is more than likely that the Apostle's patronship only arose because he was the reputed evangelist of Persia whence the church was certainly derived for the most part. Even as late as 1490 they sent deputies, mindful of their origin, to the nestorian patriarch Simeon who gave them bishops (Assemani *Biblioth Orient.* iii, 1). When a great movement took place after 1653 ' away from Rome ' and the goanese tyranny, the Jacobite patriarch of Antioch sent out (1665) an envoy. Thus they have long ceased to be in any sense nestorian and attempts such as Mar Gabriel's (1730) to reclaim them to the old dogmatic allegiance came to no issue. Apart from cent. xviii authors, La Croze (the Hague 1724) de Menezes (Rome 1745) and Paulinus (do. 1794), almost the only modern work relating to them is by G. Milne-Rae, *The Syr. Ch. in Ind.* Edinburgh and London 1892 : W. Germann has collected a useful mass of ill-digested material in *Die Kirche der Thomaschristen* (Gütersloh 1877).

[3] In works published at Bombay 1887, at Vienna 1888, at Cawnpore 1913.

(*Bhag. Gita* iv, 1, 2)—a worship suitable to a section of society only, kings and nobles, a cult of the rich and not of the poor. Nor could the alliance with brahmanism and theories of absorption afford the smallest solace to the average man with whose personal hopes and conceptions it had nothing in common. For at least five centuries after our era it was buddhism and sivaism that catered for the needs of the humble. Bhagavatism numbered fewer and fewer adherents: Sankara names its cardinal tenet (faith) but once and dismisses it with scorn; after him it disappeared though the feeble light was still kept burning in S. India. Within fifty years of Ramanand's appearance it became the leading religion of India, for, like the Gospel, it directs its chief appeal to the despised and disinherited classes and to a very primitive democratic instinct. There is (as Grierson suggests) as complete a difference between its earlier and later phases as between Plato and St. Paul. By cent. xv, as the literature shows, the ideal of salvation by *knowledge* has given way: *faith* belongs to the sphere of emotion and will. Nobles and great ladies were seen to give up their rank and comforts to become wandering devotees, not of mere ascetic practice but of trance and rapturous visions. Christian influence can here be no more denied than muslim. Jews and Christians had settled in a stream of colonies along a continental coast which had never been closed to western trade since *800* B.C. The first six centuries of our era are marked by a free and regular intercourse; towards the close of it there were several bishoprics (e.g. at Kalyana) besides the colonies at Madras.

Direct Influence of the Gospel upon Epic text: the Christ-child.—For the earlier doctrine as found in *Bhagavad Gita* such an influence is clearly impossible; but from certain passages of later date in *Mahabharata*, we have clear proof both of a knowledge and an appreciation of western faith. Three saints go to visit the white continent where men have fair complexions and are endowed with a *bhakti* not possessed by Hindus: if this was written about *300* A.D. it is the earliest reference that we find to *Christians* as opposed to *Yavanas* or hellenes. Rama washing the feet of Brahmans in the older version becomes Rama washing the disciples' feet; and the story of a *faithful* follower walking on the sea is introduced without doubt in imitation of St. Peter's attempt. Indeed much in this poem

suggests acquaintance with St. John.[1] Krsna, as God incarnate, is described as 'the Ancient One, eternal and uncreate, only 'begotten Son of God, born of a Virgin, very part of God . . . 'guardian of the flock, deity without sin, lord of the world, who 'consented to death to fulfil the words of the Seers'. In cent. vi (about the time of Cosmas' visit) child-worship (cf. the italian *bambino*) was an innovation, since hitherto cult was paid to the God as warrior or as teacher: now—as if to a youthful Apollo—to the deity as manifested in adolescent pastoral life. The Mother (*devaki*) hitherto hardly mentioned becomes a prominent figure and (like Kwan-yin under his *female* form in China) is represented as holding the Holy Child in her arms. His birth coincides with a massacre of the Innocents and in his history the miracles of our Gospel recur—a cripple is healed, a widow's son restored to life, ointment poured over the Saviour by a devout worshipper. The orthodox liturgy of Krsna's birth-feast puts the loan from Christian sources beyond all doubt; an earlier form is actually altered of set purpose to suit our Gospel-narrative in St. Matthew and St. Luke.[2] In Mathura the reformer Vallabha found child-cult already very prevalent and applied it to the uses of his own *krsna-bhakti*. Hopkins puts his conclusion strongly: 'so decided is the alteration, so direct the 'connexion between later hinduism and the early centuries of 'Christianity that it is no expression of extravagant fancy but 'sober historic account that in all likelihood hindus of the cult of 'Madonna and child have unwittingly been worshipping the 'Christ-child for fully 1000 years.'

Reciprocal influence in the time of Ramanuja: his debt to Christianity.—By the time of Ramanuja the Christians of St. Thomas had become hinduized to a certain extent, while retaining some essential rites and beliefs:[3] they had given up baptism, but kept the Lord's supper and did not refuse to join in a curiously mixed cult with their hindu neighbours at the ancient shrines. With this contaminated Christian doctrine and practice Rama-

[1] The parallels have been carefully collected by Hopkins *India Old and New*.

[2] Kennedy *Jl. Roy. Asiat. Soc.* 1907 has shown cause to believe that these adaptations of the Gospel-story were brought into the Ganges region by Gujar immigrants from N.W. India.

[3] *Paganized* is perhaps too strong a term.

nuja was most certainly acquainted and he seems to have gladly adapted it to his own purposes. It would be strange if two theories of *adoring love*, at the outset independent, should not have coalesced ; and, if a hindu environment impressed the Christian settlers, they would assuredly exert some influence in their turn. Ramanuja was born and reared in the vicinity of a Christian settlement.[1] In his early years he was a Vedantist[2] of Sankara's *non-dualist* school ; converted to theism he began to oppose the pride of the autotheists and thought out for himself a qualified *monism*. Persecuted by the orthodox he fled from the south, and to this Hegira is to be attributed the extension of the doctrine over northern India. The driving force of this system (*sri-sampradaya*) was without doubt faith in a personal God, in a responsible and separate life of the soul, in Ramachandra as an actual embodiment of the divine, who after this human life still retains in heaven the same personality and all his sympathies with suffering mankind. It cannot be mere chance that he instituted a kind of sacramental meal, wherein the ' worthy ' or higher grade first received the eucharist and the whole company then joined in an *agape*, the consecrated elements being reserved for the sick.[3]

Debt of Hindu Theism to the West.—It need not be supposed that these syro-christian exiles were the sole channels of influence, their settlements the only points of contact : there had been free intercourse by sea with the west for more than a thousand years, which the *Yavanas* improved and the Roman secured. Asoka sent missioners to Alexandria to preach his world-religion, the therapeuts were surely not ignorant of their eastern congeners (even if their rise was certainly independent). Pantænus may have reached the Punjab (*150* A.D.) and left some impress behind of a visit which history pronounces futile. Again, the new term *isvara* used both by Sankara and Ramanuja is an exact equival-

[1] It is important to avoid confusion between St. Thomé, a modern district near Madras, dating from cent. xvi and the better known and far earlier colonies on the W. coast ; to-day, in the whole province of Madras, native Christians form *one quarter* of the population.

[2] About the same time two Christian bishops of Mathura and Kalyana are said to have been converts from Vedantism.

[3] This is curiously like catharist methods in the west during cent. xi–xiii.

ent of κύριος and may well be due to a knowledge of the LXX; the reverence for the *guru* or *gosain* finds its parallel in early Christian days, the *Didache* calling the teacher the Lord; the value attached to the mystic name of God suggests a western source; there are the same disputes on the relative merits of *faith* and *works*, on *irresistible* or *coöperating* grace, on the part played by human endeavour in securing salvation.[1] The very conception of sin underwent a remarkable change; before Ramanuja it was regarded as in Old Testament, in the light of an infringement of rules laid down in text-books, but later, in the practical sense of anything not done in faith. Sin is sin, not because a rule is violated but because such acts are incompatible with loving trust in God: as in the west, Sandilya can assert: 'Even good works not done in faith partake of a sinful 'character'. We may well accept then Grierson's summary that, though singly inconclusive, these points of agreement have a strong and final cumulative effect. It is therefore certain that (as has long been clear in buddhism) hinduism in its later and most impressive form is under important obligations to Christianity. It was from the south that the new and inspiring impetus of *bhakti* came [2] and on this district muslim unitarian belief and sufic mysticism could have had very little effect. When the southern movement swept with irresistible force and welcome solace over the foe-ridden land, it no doubt met and blended with similar doctrines of the divine fatherhood and love and man's bounden duty in his service. But the chief foreign influence which gave new life to a theism already old and decadent was the Gospel.[3]

[1] When the conduct of cat and ape with regard to their young is contrasted.

[2] Sir Charles Lyall (*Enc. Brit.*) amongst others notes that Ramanand is under Christian influence; but he also believes that the Gospel has impressed Kabir's teaching *indirectly* through pietistic sufism from Persia which seems to owe much to Eastern Christianity. That under Akbar (1556–1605) catholic influence gave a new turn to Kabir's maxims and ritual, he dismisses as unlikely.

[3] [Here should follow the Nestorian Chronology from p. 325.]

CHAPTER B. THE ARYANS AND THE RELATIONS OF INDIA AND THE WEST

Section I. Hellenic Religion

Aryans from Asia : Soma-Dionysus.—The dispersion of Aryan stock from an *asiatic* centre (e.g. the Caspian shores) not a *central-european* (*2000–1000* B.C.) is defended by competent critics with increasing urgency. Compare H. R. Hall's *Discov. in Crete* in *Proceedings Soc. Bibl. Archæ.* Dec. 1909 and Meyer's last edition of his *Hist. of Antiq.* 1909, as against Hogarth *Ionia and the East*, Oxford 1908, and R. Burrows, *Discov. in Crete*, London 1908. It is now held by many that from the confines of the Caspian Sea [1] the Aryans spread eastwards to Hindustan and westwards into Phrygia which is *par excellence* the chief home of the bacchic cult to which the *Soma*-draught bears undoubted resemblance (as in Gladys Davis : *Asiatic Dionysos*, Bell, London 1914). The cult was carried from Zagros Mountain westwards into Asia Minor by sea to Thrace (which could never have been its original centre), into Thessaly and Boeotia ; also to Crete and the Morea. Premising that this theory takes no account of the solid wedge of semitic peoples intervening between Persia and Phrygia we may notice certain points in the argument : (1) *βάκχος*=zend *Bagas* or sanscrit *Bhagas* ' lord ' and the *phrygian* *Ζευς βαγαῖος* is a link between *persian* and *hellenic* forms : Bactria (Eurip. *Bacch.* 3) is also connected (*zend*, bakhdhi) as the

[1] This belief that the Aryans came from Asia rather than Europe has been lately revived, but Bury and Farnell are still faithful to the latter view. Farnell (*Greece and Babylon*, Edinb. 1911) believes that Aryans poured into Greece (with Ridgway) from the N. *c.* 1500 ; at the same time that aryan deities are found worshipped among the Mitani *c.* 1450–1400. Indian deities, as we call them, are found at that time as far west as the Upper Euphrates and Cappadocia (inscr. unearthed at Boghaz-Keui 1907). There seems then to be a double invasion. Prasek (*Hist. of Medes and Pers.* Gotha 1906) calls Aryans a *balto-slavic* people with an extensive kingdom in N.E. and Central Europe at this very date 1500 ; Niederle cannot be far out in giving 2000 as the date of the division of the various aryan stocks.

scene of an early adventure of Dionysus ; (2) The Phrygians or Bryges are identical with the mythical indian tribe *Brighus*, discoverers of fire like Prometheus and predecessors of Manu (under whose instruction mankind began to eclipse this semi-divine or heroic stock). So Conway suggests that the *phrygian* γέρμη is related to *sansc.* gharma *zend* garema ; just as ' kshan ' may be taken as earlier form of χθών and as plainly connected with Semele (Zembla, Ζεμέλω) ; Langlois and Burnouf even compare this latter name with *somalata*—which must be dismissed. The phrygian stock would appear to be closely related to the *iranian* and to the aryan invaders of India. (3) Zagreus (the primitive cretan deity dispossessed by Zeus) derives his name from the Zagros range and not from the notion of Wild Hunter (as Wodan) or Hunter of Souls. (4) Salomon Reinach (*Cultes* etc., vol. ii Paris 1909) believes that the Celts, Illyrians and Thracians had some affinity and intercourse, supporting the ancient authors in this view ; Thrace and celtic or rather druidic Gaul having much in common in religious matters : Zagreus as a *horned serpent* is derived from the Celts through Thrace. (5) Sabazios, it is suggested, is from *sanscr.* sabhaj ' to adore ' and has ' manifestly an iranian appearance ' (Davis). (6) The indian origin of Soma-Dionysos was held by Langlois (*Mémoire sur Soma* Paris 1853) Maury (*Hist. Relig. Gr.* Paris 1857) and by Max Duncker the synoptic historian : out of favour for a long time it is now revived once more. (7) Eurip. (l. c.) is the first Greek to represent Dionysus as coming from India but yet (somewhat incongruously) his birthplace is Thebes : later writers give him an indian campaign but hold that he came to India from Europe. (8) Soma is a god of vegetation and of ecstatic drunkenness in the older vedic stratum (dating in complete oral and canonic form from *c. 1300–1200* B.C. according to Macdonell :[1] the means of producing bacchic frenzy or exaltation would differ in each country : Duncker may be right in believing Dionysus to be at first a *mead-god*, afterwards becoming a *wine-god* ; and Vincent Smith, India's latest scientific historian, agrees with Sir George Watt that the vine is indigenous to the lower ranges of the Himalayas[2] and was introduced thence into

[1] Cf. V. Henry *Soma et Haoma*, Paris 1906.

[2] This *Soma* grew on mountains, perhaps in the Himalayan Highlands of Kashmir (Miss Z. Ragozin *Vedic India*, p. 170, Fisher Unwin 1895).

Europe as producing a divine enjoyment and at the same time destroying sense and reason—it helps friends, while it maddens and destroys foes. Orgiastic excitement, a temporary self-oblivion, was both in East and West the very essence of the cult (Rohde, *Seelen Culte*, p. 299 Leipzig p. 1894) ; Thracians seem to have produced the ecstasy by the use of indian hemp. Thus the principle of worship would be in all cases the same but the means employed would differ : the hypnotic trance of the primitive shaman is the prototype for all.[1] (9) Very oriental are the magical effects produced on the votaries and the hypnotic juggling with the senses of the audience in the *Bacchæ* of Euripides. (10) It seems likely that with this means of approaching the divine was blended a cult of *plant-life* and the god who promoted it ; which is the primary aspect will perhaps always be disputed, perhaps the subjective side is the later : the *soma*-draught is believed to confer immortal life. (*Sama-Veda* ii 4 : ' Thee, O deathless One, the gods approach together ; by ' thine offerings they are wont to attain immortality.') The two sides might easily exist together, man's sense of divinity and a hereafter being derived from his sense of abnormal exaltation in drunkenness, his conviction of nature's cyclic recurrence from the observed series of the seasons. As to the figure of Dionysus in greek religion Dr. Farnell well says (Hastings *Enc. Rel. Eth.*) : ' It belongs indeed to personal theism, certainly in hellenic ' cult and probably in the thracian ; but he was less sharply ' defined as a concrete individual than was (for instance) Apollo ' or Athene : he was vaguer in outline, a changeful power, ' conceived more in accordance with *daimonistic*, later with ' *pantheistic* thought, incarnate in many animal shapes and operative in the life-processes of the vegetative world :—an atmosphere of Nature-magic accompanied him.'

It is clear that this hypothesis of a genuine connexion with the East is provisional, and its arguments at present tentative. We may be contented to note merely the affinities of thought and practice in the various branches of aryan stock ; and to call attention to their common belief in a power to attain communion with the divine by ecstasy or inebriation. A man becomes most like God (as in shamanism) not when he obeys a moral or ritual

[1] Kern too believes that the main feature is ' enthusiasm and ecstasy ' (Pauly-Wissowa *Encyc.* s.v. ' Dionysos,' Stuttgart 1903.)

law, but when (so far as he can) he ceases to be consciously human. (11) Ἴακχος whom Lenormant holds to be a primitive *pelasgic* God of cthonian character, confused later with a *thracian* god of vegetation, is taken as equivalent to *Yakshas*, half-divine beings who attend the hindu god of riches and in the Mathura scriptures are connected with scenes of obvious bacchic revelry. (12) Arrian (*Anab. Alex.* V i, 2) speaks of Nisa a town between the rivers Cabul and Indus in Punjab, which sent envoys to Alexander: near them was Mount *Meros*, said to be so named from the legend of Dionysus' birth from the thigh of Zeus (μηρός): but Meru is the familiar mountain of hindu fabulous cosmogony, made of gold and gems, the haunt of Gandharvas (?=centaurs)[1] and abode of the god of riches, Kuvera, already mentioned. (13) The aryan prototype or counterpart is above all things a *proselytizing* god and his cult is a world-wide propaganda. While one branch of the aryans passed from Central Asia to Hindustan (*2000–1500* B.C. at earliest), another traversed Iran and Media and spread to Asia Minor: there were two diffusions of the *soma*-cult at the same time, and the two lost sight of each other. *Soma* is represented as a divine conqueror warring, in alliance with Indra, on all who refuse his worship—quite a novel feature in ancient religion: Indra the war-god of the blond immigrants may well have been 'hellenized' as Heracles—the companion of Dionysus and his foil. Those who sell or fail to press *soma* are called accursed; the non-pressers were held to be godless barbarians (Miss Ragozin op. cit. 171). (14) Thoroughly oriental is the stress on ritual purity—a great feature in persian fire-worship (Harrison, *Themis*, 536): if *soma* often seems to blend its character with Agni (Ragozin) there may be a connexion between the latter and ἁγνὸς as well as with *ignis*: it is through this close tie with Agni that Soma becomes a Solar Deity—to whom the earthly form of the god daily ascends from the

[1] In this matter Miss Harrison has *almost* recanted (*Class. Review* Sept. 1910) 'as regards the content of the two mythologic conceptions 'G and K, they are practically identical'. In her *Prolegomena* she stoutly opposed the notion that the two words are derived from a common root (cf. 'Aryan' in Hastings' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* where this etymon is dismissed with scorn, along with many others since in favour). Miss Davis (op. cit. p. 178) labours to show they are actually the same. She suggests that *Asbolos* the centaur in *Shield of Heracles* = *Asvala*, a good sanscrit form for 'horse' or 'horseman.'

domestic or sacrificial hearth. So Dionysus becomes *Phanes* or the Sun-god in the orphic syncretism. (15) Nay more, both Soma and Bacchus are identified with the Supreme God Himself as Universal Parent—by a usage familiar in *henotheism*. The orphists certainly addressed Dionysus as Zeus (Macrobius *Sat.* i 23 and Proculus *in Tim.* iii μόνον ἀπογεννῆσαι τὰ πάντα); so in the *Sama-veda*, Soma as parent of heaven and earth, creates his own parents also! It is curious to note that to-day Soma is just a moon-god to the hindus and nothing more. Dionysus also had lunar functions and was the offspring of a moon-goddess Σελήνη: so Cicero, Ulpian, Eusebius Chær. and John the Lydian *Mens.* iv 38. (16) Soma and Dionysus are both held to be rulers of the starry firmament (Soph. *Antig.* and Aristoph. *Frogs*): the sanscrit lunar title is *nakshatra raja* King of Stars, and in hellenic worship the dappled fawn-skin was held to represent the sky: in the *Homa Yasht* (tr. by Haug) Mazda is said to bring to *Homa* the star-spangled girdle which spirits have fashioned, that is, Orion's belt. Soma as Moon-god had a cthonian character; for the Moon is abode of the blessed departed. In the hindu system of the *Seven Margas* or Orbits, atmosphere (*bhuwar loka*) is in the lowest place and above are the sun's orbit and next to that the moon's. It was because of this emphasis on the lunar paradise, that the old solar character of Soma disappears; 'Il 'n'est plus' (said Langlois more than sixty years ago) 'que le 'Régent de la Lune, maître de la Nuit et des Planétes, rois des 'brahmanes et des plantes, dépositaire de la divine ambroisie, 'gardien des Mânes et père des fluides.'

Dionysus and Cthonic cult: Savage origins.—(17) The Dionysiac festivals have all probably sprung from an original savage worship of an underworld god, who as vegetation-deity was himself dismembered and scattered to produce fertility. The hostility of the Titans is a later fable when (possibly owing to *parsi* influence) the antithesis of Evil to God was seen more distinctly: at first it is his own worshippers who turn and rend the living representative of a Bull-god: this omophagy[1] is an essential part of the rite, just as in ritual cannibalism a brave foe is eaten that the survivors may inherit his strength and courage or to-day in India a tiger's heart. All later mystical symbolism, with its deep moral lessons and promises of a blessed hereafter, is evolved

[1] Firmicus Maternus *Err. Prof. Rel.* vi. *vivum laniant dentibus taurum.*

from the old savage rites of nature-worship allegorized and made the vehicle for higher truth. This reflexion marks the moment when man, having already won for himself a fairly assured place in nature, turns from mere *corporate* vegetation-festivals of a community to *personal* religion. So men's souls are purified as grain is by winnowing fans; the idea of the λίκνον in the orphic cult (Harrison) brings a utensil of husbandry devoted to the worship of a vegetation-god, into relation with the religious life in the truest sense, with hopes of individual worshippers.

Transition from *tribal* to *personal* religion: the new sacramental Brotherhood.—The notion of earth's revival and restored fertility becomes a vehicle for the doctrine of a risen life, mystically anticipated in this by the initiate. The infant God is awakened; or the sleeping Ariadne, pregnancy of nature dormant during the winter months, is aroused to life by the divine Visitor. In probing the secrets of soul-life ingenious use was made of these early rites and practices which were forced to bear a solemn and mystic significance. So the scattering of the limbs of the dismembered god[1] is made to portray the division into the manifold of this world of a single Divine Energy; as Proculus commenting on the *Timæus* says clearly, the rending in pieces (διασπασμός) of Dionysus shows the 'advance from a unitary and indivisible 'creation to a divisible—τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀμερίστου δημιουργίας μεριστὴν προόδον—the antithesis so common in hindu and eleatic (indeed hellenic) thought of the *one* real and the *many* false, of Being and phenomena, of *brahman* and *maya*. It may well be that this 'diffusion' of the divine and its need of collection and readjustment met and explained or strengthened the peculiar soul-theory of the orphists and the doctrine of Migration. Every single element says Harrison (*Themis* 16) 'in Zagreus' 'ritual and myth can be explained, I believe, by the analogy of '*primitive rites of tribal initiation*.' The votary, in a very rude anticipation of Plato's maxim ὁμοιῶσις θεῷ, is made like (in dress or dramatic incidents) to some zoomorphic deity or it may be a totem-ancestor; and thus made like, is actually identified with the god worshipped. To this a counterpart (showing however very significant points of disagreement) is found in the early practice of *identifying* a deceased man with Osiris, as in Breasted's *Egyptian Religion* already referred to. The soma-

[1] Cf. the pigs' flesh scattered in ravines at an attic festival.

sacrifice and the ritual partaking of the draught is a closer and better parallel. Here too 'mystic sweet communion' is won; at the feast gods and worshippers are invited to share in a common banquet. Hence among Greeks the term ἰσοδαίτης implies an equal sharing in the feast which made the company one with the (as yet) impersonal nature-force and also 'members one of another.'

Egypt, not the source of Dionysiac worship; though resemblance to Osiriac very striking.—It may here be remarked in conclusion that renewed inquiry and research into these hellenic origins do not bear out the theory of a great influence from Egypt which Foucart presses upon the world of scholars, in season and out of season, with so much warmth. It seems likely to many students that after a long spell of uninterrupted persian influence on Greece [1] there was a 'nationalist' reaction of native religious ideas. (Compare Aristophanes' *Pax*, 406 seq., where Sun and Moon are said to be plotting against the gods of Greece.) But greek writers did not venture to claim these as indigenous; like Herodotus they tried to trace their religion to *semitic* Egypt rather than *aryan* Persia. Osiris is of course a vegetation-god like Dionysus who has been symbolically changed into a judge and saviour of souls, the Lord of the Hereafter. He is (Frazer's *Adonis*) the god of corn who comes to be regarded as patron of the risen life, of buried *man* as well as of buried *seed*; hence as god of the dead. That this belief is very old in Egypt is certain: Wallis Budge (*e.g. Ideas of Future Life* 56, ed. 3, Trübner 1908) even thinks it possible that it might be predynastic and pre-Menes: certainly the belief appears under the earliest Dynasties. 'He occupied the position of god and judge of 'those who had by his help risen from the dead'; Menkaura (Mycerinus) of Dyn. iv [2] is called Osiris king of South and North, Menkaura living for ever. But there is no trace of ecstasy or intoxication, no sign of war or noise; there seems to have been no sacramental eating of his symbolic body, as in the cult of soma or Dionysus; nor (*pace* Reinach) is there any trace of a story that Set or Typhon, like the Titans, devoured his rival.

[1] Which we are apt to forget or overlook in the dramatic (but by no means conclusive) setback of persian militarism.

[2] ? 3800 B.C. or with the much later scheme of dating recently in favour with the Berlin School 2800 ?

In Egypt no ecstasy, sacrament, proselytism.—In fact there is nothing in common between the two but the aspects found everywhere in all vegetation-cults. Nor is there to be seen in the osirian creed any vestige of propagandism and eager enterprise in missions. Osiris was a purely local and national deity and Egypt always hated strangers; he was never considered as a philanthropic culture-hero for the whole world. This lord of plants and irrigation, then becoming lord of the dead, became also a solar deity (dispossessing the older sun-gods of the regal house) long before the aryan avalanche on Egypt in the People of the Sea under the later Ramessids. The dionysiac cult was brought to Greece from elsewhere before this time. Egypt, according to Foucart (*Culte de D. en Attique*, ch iii[1]) was in contact with the Ægean and greek mainland *c. 1500* B.C., that is, under Dyn. xviii, which expelled the Hyksos and began for Egypt a policy of expansion and vengeance.[2] About the same time the bacchic worship seems to appear. Davis is inclined to date the 'first arrival somewhere about cent. xiii (op. cit. 6), at the time when the vedic *Rig* was compiled and transmitted orally *1300–1200* B.C. (Macdonell *Sanscr. Lit.* 12, Heinemann 1900). Farnell believes that there are reasons for thinking the god had entered Attica before the date of the Ionic Settlement in Asia Minor, some time previous to *1200* (*Cult. of Gr. States* v 85). Langlois, taking Herodotus for guide and holding that Cadmus was the introducer, places the first appearance of the cult *c. 1550*.[3] Maury however gives a later date, relying on the very secondary position of Dionysus in the homeric poems and on Herodotus' own statement that this deity is the most recent addition to the greek pantheon. Bury also gives *800–700* for the introduction of his worship into N. Greece, and thinks it only began to extend in *600–500*. Harrison agrees, as also Kern who gives *800–500* as the time of expansion. But Farnell and Foucart produce undeniable evidence of knowledge in Attica of Dionysiac

[1] Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscr. xxxvii Paris 1904.

[2] But these renewed relations, as they must surely have been, cannot interfere with proofs in Crete and elsewhere of a far earlier intercourse of Egypt with the northern isles and mainland, possibly pre-dynastic.

[3] Otto Ribbeck (*D. Cultus in Attika* Kiel 1869) gives the reign of Pandion as the date, following Apollodorus (iii 4–7), and connects it with this king's *thracian* ally Tereus.

ritual between *2000–1000*. It may be surmised then that the cult lost favour with the coming of the Achæans or of that later more terrible aryan inroad from Central Europe which wrecked cretan culture and produced the peculiar 'norsemen' society which Homer has depicted. An ancient indigenous cult then lost favour and was revived by foreign influence during *600–500* especially under the attic Pisistratids (*560–510*). If the first arrival was due to Crete, may not this revival be due (it has been asked) to persian influence, in the 'medizing' epoch of the later Tyrants.

If Dionysus not from Egypt or Thrace ? from the East.—In sum, Dionysus is not from Egypt nor (according to a new school of critics) from Thrace; but from the median Zagros through Phrygia and Crete in the first instance and in the later revival as well: are not Epimenides and Orpheus cretans? Cox in his *Mythology of the Aryan Nations* [1] mentions and seems to adopt Brown's curious assyrian etymon, *Daian-Nisi*, the 'judge of men', which will hardly be accepted to-day. Both Kern and Farnell adhere to the theory of Thracian origin, following Lobeck. K. Muller (in his *Orchomenos*) meets the objection that those tribes were barbarous: 'there were two distinct peoples of 'Thrace, the rude barbarous race in the north and the race 'which settled in central Greece and was addicted to the cult 'of Dionysus and of the Muses.' Welcker (*Greek Theology*, 1857–1862), Rapp (*D. Cultus zu Thrakien*), Kretschmer and Rohde all agree as to the *thracian* origin and name. Against this is the ignorance of bacchic worship along the west or adriatic coast of Greece N. of the Morea and E. of Corinth: except at Calydon and Pleuron which are closely in touch with the opposite shore, and in myth at Phæacia or Corcyra (whither Bacchus' nurse Macris fled for refuge). There remains then the hypothesis that he is of *perso-phrygian* descent through Crete. Against this hypothesis again (as we saw) must be set the unaryan wedge which divides the somewhat remote and isolated Phrygians from their kindred south of the Caspian sea; and the theory (which can at least show some evidence in its favour) that phrygian Troy is an outpost of central-european culture and was founded by settlers from the west and north and not from the east. The question must be left open for further inquiry but it

[1] P. 507, 1870, republ. Trübner 1903.

has been admitted here because of the new theories it suggests as to the early affinities of the two chief branches of the aryan family.

Section II. Eastern Influence upon early Greek Thought

Necessary Dualism of any *Aufklärung*—whether in East or West.—If we are asked, can eastern ideas and principles be traced in the classical thought of Greece no decisive answer must be expected. Here once again we find actual intercourse very hard to prove—and in the end we are forced back upon vague surmises based on racial affinities, a common temperament and (perhaps) a primitive association. Contact of oriental theosophy with ionic thought and the subjective psychology of orphism is to say the least doubtful; I cannot share the confidence of G. Davis (op. cit. p. 23) that both movements reproduce the *Upanisad* doctrine (from *800* B.C. down to the time of Buddha).[1] We shall never know fully either the reasons for the great awakening of human thought *c. 500* nor the connexion of its parts, their common or distinctive features. Such awakening must always show a dualistic tendency, for man when fully aroused must needs set himself in contrast and opposition to the rest of the universe, perhaps even to the world-order. He lifts himself far above the animal world of which in the Age of Fable he felt that he was a member less privileged than many others: he rises—above Nature—and above the gods—lastly, above his own carnal nature. The dualism he finds in himself he attributes to all Nature and to God Himself. Davis traces likeness to *Upanisad* doctrine in the zoroastrian *Avesta*; evil or the 'untruth' being admitted as another side of God's character, as in *maya* to *brahma*, or *non-being* to *being* in Parmenides' elcatic thought-system. But it seems clear that it is the original and not later and diluted parsism which is frankly dualist.[2] Trace is even sought in Plato's *Statesman* 273, for the *Upanisad* belief that God is not author of evil but that the Evil Principle (*maya*) exists with Him from immemorial time (perhaps as Böhme's *dark spot in God*). Again the doctrine of his *Timæus* (37) that World-Soul is composed of Same, Other and Essence is held by

[1] Deussen seems to concur.

[2] Although Martin Haug *Rel. Pars.* Trübner 1884 thinks otherwise.

some to coincide exactly with the *Upanisad* theory of the three coexisting principles *isvara*, *maya*, *brahman*. So (*ibid.*) the inconsistent blend of a 'universe without beginning in time' and 'Time as the eternal image of eternity' is said to find parallel in the *Upanisad* contradiction—*brahma* is origin of all things yet at the same time *Maya* coexists with him: this latter side (one of the cardinal doctrines of *Upanisads*) is virtually admitted, it is thought, by Plato (42 *fin*) where an Evil Principle is seen to coëxist with Good. Before this Pythagoras exhibits a dualism of Limit and Unlimited, resembling the iranian good and evil spirit of *Avesta* and the indo-aryan tenet of brahma limited by *maya*.[1] So in the pythagorist view of Unlimited as air or breath [2] of Universe (Aristotle, *Phys.* iii 4) some see a close affinity with the Atman doctrine, and Atman=Brahman. So in *Rep.* 379, Plato is in agreement with the doctrine of *Maya* as (avestan) Untruth and (hindu) Principle of Seduction, contrasted with Brahma, the principle of Good; God never changes, just as the One in *Upanisads* never changes, though it may appear to, because itself is all things. There is a verbal harmony in the steadfastness and firmness demanded in the character of the ideal Guardian, with the 'firm, immovable man' of *Bhag. Gita* (e.g. vi 7) who is ever the same in pain and in pleasure. But moral analogies and coincidences do not carry us far in tracing any real connexion: whatever the starting-point, the portrait of the ideal man is the same all the world over in every reflecting age; Zeno and Epicurus have the same ideal. More weight may perhaps be allowed to the resemblance of the Four Classes to the brahmans, warriors, *vaisyas* and *sudras*.[3]

So much for the dualism which seems to be a permanent background of all aryan thought. Heraclitus it is who urges the identity of *One* and *Many*: god is essentially the same though he appears in manifold forms and disguises, all

[1] *Brahma* (connected by some etymologists with root *brih*, grow, swell, increase) is held to correspond with Unlimited, its activity being restrained by *maya* as πέρας. But however suggestive these analogies appear, it is certain that it does not so correspond; the *good* limit applied to *evil* chaos cannot resemble *maya*, imposture and delusion: on closer inspection hindu and hellenic thought are, in their estimates of the *finite*, incommensurable.

[2] Following Anaximenes.

[3] On whom cf. Garbe *Phil. Anc. Ind.* Trübner 1879.

transient. So in the *Chandogya Upanisad*:[1]—As by one clay-clod all things made of clay may be understood—for their several shapes are but a 'hold-fast' of speech and their name in truth is only clay—of like kind is knowledge of the Supreme Being, who is One, yet in appearance diverse and at war with himself.[2]

'Greek Philosophy' not strictly Hellenic: Orphism and the Vedanta.—This is not the place to dwell on the problem of the independent origins of Greek thought: it is only on the fringe of 'barbarism' that it develops at all, although, like the Enlightenment in cent. xviii at Paris, it found a focus in Athens. With much love of novelty and eager receptivity there was, in speculation at least, no original impulse. Ionia, Italy and Macedon were the first scenes of western development, and the Greeks themselves looked on the orphic doctrines as exotic. Max Muller believes in the separate development of indian and hellenic thought: while Niebühr held that Alexandria gave the great stimulus to hindu metaphysics, a theory quite disproved by the now ascertained dates of *Upanisads* and of *Sankhya* and *Yoga*.[3] Garbe traces eleatic tenets to *Upanisads* and even thinks that Heraclitus may have borrowed from the Sankhya.[4] Those who unite East and West believe that Persia must be the medium, the 'bitter prejudice' after the great War leading the Greeks to suppress the indebtedness. Even Burnet speaks of the 'startling resemblance' of orphic doctrine to 'beliefs prevalent in India at the same time,' though he conceives actual contact to be impossible. Adam (*Relig. Teach. of Greece*, Edinburgh 1908) thinks that transcendental psychology evolved separately in East and West: 'it is not possible to assume an 'actual borrowing of indian ideas.' At all events we know through a more complete acquaintance with Egyptian beliefs

[1] Cf. Barnett *Sayings from Upan.*, Luzac 1905.

[2] It is Heraclitus who gives us the significant association, 'magi, priests 'of Bacchus and female votaries of the wine-vat': and we owe to him the *first* definite statement that Dionysus is Hades.

[3] Not to mention the newest hypothesis as to the origin of the *bhagavat* Theism.

[4] Max Muller and Deussen agree on this point that its elements are already found in the *Rig* and (with Weber) place it at an epoch of high antiquity, certainly in pre-buddhist times. Both Sankhya *dualism* and Vedantine *monism* come direct from the *Upan.*, and buddhism introduced nothing that was new except a revolt against sacerdotalism.

that the doctrine of Transmigration did not flourish on the banks of the Nile. The text of all indian teaching long before Buddha was 'release'; which is of course the chief orphic and pythagorean tenet as against the complacent secularism of the homeric 'Norsemen'. It is likely that (with Harrison: *Themis* 271) '*reincarnation* is a primitive and natural doctrine': for it is indeed the earliest savage solution for the mystery of birth. In Greece *c. 500* it seems to be a novelty, or else a revival of an ancient faith suppressed by the shallow Olympianism of the conquerors. If it came from Thrace or Crete, it is certainly hard to exclude an asiatic influence which may somehow depend on hindu teaching. Certainly such a passage as this (*Katha. Upan.*) states the chief orphic tenet with precision as well as the hindu doctrine of *moksa*; 'the wandering soul that knows this *purusa* (brahman)' is loosed from the cycle of birth and wins immor-'tality.' To the more material orphists, soul is 'child of earth and 'starry heaven' The *Upanisad* 'inward ruler' who is God, yet the truest self in each being, is Aristotle's νοῦς ἕκαστος.

Eastern Doctrines in psychology and eschatology.—Empedocles who thought himself a demon exiled from the courts of heaven [1] (φυγὰς θεόθεν κ. ἀλήτης) implies that, before such fall downwards into matter, souls dwelt with the gods or were united to the divine as yet undifferentiated from it. The coincidence of τροχὸς or κύκλος γενέσεως with the hindu *wheel of generation* or of *Brahma* has often been remarked. The value attached to ritual purity, ascetic practice and words of magical power also suggests affinity: the offerings and formulæ, as much abhorred by Plato as Tetzel's indulgences by Luther, are thoroughly indian in their desire to bind and coerce the gods under the control of the *shaman*. *Mundaka Upanisad*, while recognizing their use for those who only aspire to pass through the Seven Ascending Worlds of Recompense, warns those who desire to win brahma's heaven against their employment: 'frail barques are they in truth' for those who pass to the other shore; 'fools who rejoice 'in sacrifice as the best of means shall pass on once again to death 'and decay.' [2] The Greek was content with a ten-thousand

[1] The gnostical Pleroma whence the Æon fell who was to create the universe.

[2] Gough, *Phil. of Upan.* Trübner 1903.

year period of metempsychosis as against the abysmal infinities[1] of hindu calculation : so too Adam (in his *Religious Teachers*) is no doubt right in allowing far more concrete reality and positive bliss to the released soul than we find in India for the soul united to its parent source. It seems certain that, in eschatology for the wicked, orphism was indebted to Persia (and perhaps therefore to Babylon) : the evil soul (in *Hadokht Nask*) passes through alarms, mire and horrible stenches—Plato's orphic pictures of the *inferno* may be compared. It is impossible to overlook the fact that the *Avesta* contains the first definite theory of retribution by a blunt separation of sheep and goats, good and bad, after the experience and trial of a single life : and sets the lines on which moralizing eschatology has run ever since in the west. Pythagoras strikes a greek note by insisting on *science* and knowledge of the universe as leading to bliss, by the side of ritual purity and ascetic practice.

Plato and his Oriental Affinities.—For Plato (*Phædo* 67 and elsewhere) perfect knowledge is only possible after death, because the soul is no longer hindered and trammelled by the flesh : is this state to be compared to the *hindus'* dreamless 'slumber' when soul severed from its organs and faculties is one with the supreme knowledge? The soul (says Sandilya in *Chandogya Upan.*) is made of thought and as its thought has been in this life such shall be its nature when it departs hence. But it is needless to follow out in detail the platonic affinities with the East : his early pythagoric or orphic mood certainly yields in its emotion and intensity during the middle period to a passion for pure numbers and dialectic ; yet the *Statesman* (as we saw) revives oriental features which had come westwards through these orphic channels. In *Phædrus* the famous eulogy of soul as *prime mover* recalls *Upanisad* language : it is self, agent and actuator of all the world, of things that move and move not. The chariot-simile also can be referred to the East : also the colourless intangible Essence (247) finds a parallel in 'supreme '*purusa*, which, beyond the undeveloped principle, pervades 'all things and is without character or form'—again 'its shape 'is not seen in anything visible and no man hath seen this self

[1] E.g. Sankhya doctrine of *Pralayas* or world-catastrophes at the end of every period of 432 million years ; some however hold the *Mahayuga* to be only 4,320,000 years in length.

'with his eyes, though it is seen as heart, mind, intuition can '.reveal it.' The *Philebus* and the highest life therein disclosed, find analogy in the *Upanisad* notion that the wise who recognize the Self bid farewell to pain and pleasure, and thus becoming passionless attain life eternal :—or as in *Svetasvat.* 'The pilgrim-'soul wanders in the maze so long as it deems itself separate from 'the divine spirit actuating it from within; so soon as it is 'favoured by this deity it goes to immortality' (*Brihad. Up.* tr. by Barnett iv 3). 'Whoso shall find him, the awakened 'self that lodgeth in this darkling patched-up house, builder 'of all is he, the all he createth.' For (*Philebus* 65) truth and the pure mind are one, and he who knows himself as the highest is at once and without further effort all wisdom. The hindu depreciation of public life, their *incivisme*, finds its counterpart in Plato's *Cave* allegory in *Rep.* and the philosopher's portrait in *Theætetus*. *Mundaka* speaks with scorn of those who 'infatuate, deem re-'vealed rites and works for the public good the best and highest 'thing in life, failing to find the other thing which is better and 'higher still: when they have had their reward' for a busy and restless moral life 'in some paradise, they must return to a 'human shape or even to some lower form of life'. So the Guardian's true life (in the *Republic*) is not in the State, even when it is idealized to suit their purpose, but lies in the private world of knowledge and the self. This very simile can be compared to a passage from the *Upanisads* [1]: 'All living things are foams 'and bubbles returning to the water from whence they issue. 'All bodies and minds are like pools that reflect the sun; the 'pools dry up and vanish, the sun alone remains.' So when the Good is said by Plato to be the cause of being, yet at the same time beyond it, we find that his words only echo such thoughts as these: 'The all-permeating Self is sun in firmament, and air in 'the middle region: it is true, the infinite, beyond all bliss, super-'sensuous even beyond the supersensuous, ultimate, beyond the 'mind itself.'

A common feature, emphasis on Septenary Number; the Seven Spheres, Seven Titans.—At the close of the *Republic*, the eight concentric whorls of Er's apocalyptic vision [2] resemble the hindu

[1] Gough, l.c. 153.

[2] It is to be noted that Er is an *armenian*—a *phrygian* people who may

myth of *eight* spheres of which Brahma is centre [1] while the remaining *seven* are woven round the central and divine light which is the basis of universe.[2] We may here note further the very early belief in these *seven* heavenly paths, each guided by a special wind in hindu belief (Monier Williams) ; there are six orbits of heavenly bodies, and the *seventh* is that of the Pole Star : Plato too in *Timæus* 36, divides the circles of the other (θάτερὸν) into *seven* concentric circles. The Hindu assigns the nearest but one of these *seven* orbits, i.e. the Lunar, as the home of the happy dead, the pious ancestors or *Pitaras*. It is scarcely an accident that the orphic legend of Dionysus' death gives him *seven* Titanic murderers each with his female counterpart, who outraged the infant God and divided him into *seven* parts. These find an equivalent in Manu and his kindred who are now held to be fourteen in number but in the *Code* were originally *seven*.[3] It seems certain that in passing through Chaldea these *seven* Titans acquired an atmospheric and stellar character ; they were the robbers of the heavenly light, murderers of the heavenly child that so their own dark planet-worlds might be illuminated. Hence salvation is, as with Mani, the release of the light-particles which are here only used to subserve the evil purposes of the lower creators. In some respects Prometheus, friend of man but author of a world of pride, sadness and futile hopes, resembles Jaldabaoth who creates the world that ' ought not to have come ' into being.' [4]

Analogies suggestive but not finally conclusive.—In sum, the affinities of Eastern and Western thought *c. 500–350* B.C. are in-

well have formed the connecting link with Persia : why we go on translating it ' son of Armenius ' it is hard to say.

[1] Cf. Gough, 162, 3.

[2] A conception clearly expressed by Pythagoras ; our later chaldean and gnostical theory makes them rather superimposed planet-spheres which Soul transcends to join the divine on the extreme verge, not at the *centre* ; this agrees of course with Aristotle's *spatial* and *local* notion on the perishing and the eternal ; God *embraces* the world from the outside and it is the central nucleus that is the abode of sin and decay.

[3] The *seven* torrents of the soma-libation are compared to the seven parts into which the god was dissected.

[4] The lesser gods in Plato's *Timæus* are *creatures*, perhaps emanations from the Supreme, as in India ; where the wise attribute no real life to them and regard their worshippers as the victims of illusion.

teresting and suggestive. If actual contact and conscious borrowing cannot be strictly proved, it is at least likely that some obscure vehicles and *media* carried eastern speculation westwards; that the exotic orphism and Pythagoras' eclectic and foreign system were somehow indebted to oriental sources. More than this cannot safely be said at present; and it is enough to point out some of the more obvious resemblances of thought and phrase.

CHAPTER C. THEOLOGY FAILS TO SUPPORT MORALS: FAITH SUPPLANTS WORKS

Section I. Problems of the World as Place of Requital or Moral Arena

Esoteric Indifferentism.—It cannot be doubted that one of the deepest influences of hindu theosophy was moral indifferentism—which, propagated in the muslim world and among the 'Christian' sectaries of early and later times, produced much trouble—both for statesman and ecclesiastic. God's purposive providence was denied and His interest in the moral endeavours of mankind. The soul passed through the discipline and experience of this world quite unaffected in its highest and truest nucleus. Though a moral world-order was an axiom of nearly every hindu system, there was an esoteric teaching in which the idea of retribution for offences done was silently withdrawn. Knowledge dispensed entirely with works.

God creates only in sport and with no moral aim.—One of Sankara's chief subjects is the *aim of God in creation*; for he can at times envisage the timeless identity of thought and being as if the one were the cause and author of the other. In his *Brahmasutra* ii 1 Sankara makes this clear: brahman is *efficient* and also *material* cause, subject (*bhoktar*) and object (*bhogyam*): this is repeated from i 4, §§ 23–27). In this Being cause and effect are one: he works without tools or organs, and though transmuted into the world remains himself whole and undivided, and as a dreamer or magician makes phantasies by glamour and yet remains one and unaffected by them. Though he has many powers yet he remains simple and without difference (So iii 2, §§ 11–21). There is no doubt evil in the world, but God is neither unjust nor cruel: that creatures are unequal is due to their own conduct severally in past lives. For the soul though not author of creation bears all the guilt and pain of it. *Samsara* has no beginning (36) and strictly speaking is illusion (23). *Brahman* being self-sufficing and having no ulterior motive

creates only in sport; he is free from causality as from suffering (iii 3 §§ 35, 36); 'the Great Being which brought forth unweary-'ing in sport according to the scripture' (*Brihad.* ii 4, 10). Thus the extended world with all its names and forms is in truth non-existent; a glamour projected by a master-mage. In the *Sutras* of Badarayana we have again 'the Supreme alone and Eternal' (whose being is knowledge) like a magician, through the glamour 'of ignorance, appears as manifold.' Now as for Maimonides [1] and Spinoza, normal rules of action do not apply to the Highest, so here we must assume that God is a prince who has every desire satisfied yet undertakes some activity *without* motive purely for sport and pastime (*lila*).[2] Or again it is conceived as purely

[1] Maimonides (1135–1204) in his *Moreh Nebuchim* Pt. iii. §§ 10, 11, 13 after showing (in accordance with hindu thought) that God is *not the Creator of Evil, and that Man is cause of his own misfortunes—asserts that the Universe has no other purpose than its own existence*: 'An agent that 'acts with intention must have a certain ulterior aim in that which he 'performs. . . . It is evident and agreed that the Absolute Being is not 'in need of an agent. The question—what is the purpose thereof?—'cannot be asked about anything which is not product of an *agent*; there-'fore we cannot ask what is the purpose of God's existence. . . . The 'ultimate purpose in every species is very hard to discover, still more so 'to find the *purpose* of the Universe as a whole. . . . It seems clear that 'according to Aristotle, who assumes its eternity, there is no need to ask 'what is the *object* of its existence. Some . . . assume that it was created 'only for the sake of man's being that he might serve God—everything 'being done for his sake, even the Spheres moving for his benefit, that 'his wants may be supplied.' On examining this opinion, 'as intelligent 'men should inquire into views different from their own, we shall discover 'the errors it includes. . . . Even if the world existed for man and man 'for the service of God, the question remains, what is the end of serving 'God? He does not become more perfect if all His creatures serve Him, 'nor would He lose anything if nothing existed besides. But it may be 'said "it is good for us, it makes us perfect." Here again we might 'repeat the query, What is the *object* of our being perfect? Therefore, 'in continuing the enquiry as to Creation's purpose we at last arrive at 'the answer. *It was God's Will*, or *His Wisdom decreed it*, and this is 'the correct reply.' Israel's wise men (citing from the Liturgy of the Day of Atonement) have clearly stated that it was not a *Final Cause* that determined the being of things but only *His Will* (with S. Austin, scotists and cartesians). The points of agreement and diversity with indian theology are alike of interest.

[2] Where Deussen compares Heraclitus παῖς παίζων and elsewhere πεττεύων; we may also adduce the very ironical tone of Plato's latest thought where the gods play with men as children with toys or animal-

spontaneous, as *inbreathing* and *outbreathing*—physical movements which continue in an animal without conscious effort or external aim. A further motive (Sankara says somewhat strangely) is to be found neither by reflection nor by revelation, and we cannot ask God Himself about it. The ordering of this earthly disk seems to our poor mind a difficult task, but God in His measureless all-power finds it mere child's play or sport. Perhaps even for our sportiveness there must be some ulterior end, but this hindu scripture forbids us to imagine in the case of God: but neither again did He act without thought or by chance. Our intelligence implies 'acting for a given end' and a man prepares for no enterprise, great or trivial, unless a motive leads him on. Certainly the world (as scriptures teach) is dear to God, not for its sake but for the sake of Himself. But nothing must be admitted to impair His all-sufficingness (*paratriptatvam*). Quoting the largely theistic *Svetasvatara Up.* v 13 Sankara recognizes one power of the Highest which creates and orders the whole world. It is, like Plato's *κόσμος νοητὸς*, the original state of *names* and *forms*, not yet unfolded, Plotinus' *νοῦς ἀολλὴς*, close-packed, undifferentiated: perhaps an even better parallel is the stoic *λόγος σπερματικὸς*, for it is the state of seed-force in which the world was, prior to all manifestation. As against the independent matter of Sankhya he says: 'We assume that this 'original state of the world (*pragavastha*) was not self-subsisting 'but dependent on the Highest. . . . This seed-force as yet 'unmanifest (*avyaktam*) resting in the Highest is in its inherent 'character Ignorance (*avidya*) [1], a deep slumber which glamour 'produces, in which lie vagrant souls, not yet awakened to a 'knowledge of their veritable nature.' In this hypothesis then, creation is a mere act of sportive fancy on the part of God, and it is on the particulars that the guilt or burden of this initial thoughtlessness must rest: in them Brahman punishes himself.[2]

Yet side by side exists a doctrine of cosmic moral order.—But the conception of the world as a *moral* arena could not of

pets (*παιγνία* or *θρέμματα*). It may be noted that *lila* means a stage-play (?) with a plot, or edifying moral lesson. If the evolution of the universe is a drama, it may have a *dénouement*, but we may be certain that the use of *lila* is really intended in its primitive meaning—a purposeless whim or caprice.

[1] A curious contrast to the western *νοῦς*, *λόγος*, *σοφία*.

[2] Cf. Maimonides iii op. cit. 12.

course be kept out of sight : it is one which in spite of all its obvious difficulties constantly thrusts itself upon our attention. It is an integral part of other theistic systems ; it is the sole remaining tenet of a bare deism, which reduces God to a *deus ex machinâ* to prepare a scene for this ethical discipline and to reward those who pass the test. Low as was (and is) the current hindu conception of the gods as mere givers of benefits to profitable worshippers -or good house-dogs, it is not likely that at any time there was wanting a school which somehow connected the deities with moral conduct. It must never be forgotten in estimating the very slight hold which moral virtue seems to have upon the hindu, the almost ' savage ' indifference of the divine to human merit or proficiency, the still remaining traces in story and myth of gods' jealousy of all ' unco' guidness '—that the world as an equitable scene of moral discipline is everywhere and by all taken for granted from the outset : what a man sows that shall he also reap. This is true although we find Sankara (on *Sutras* II i) answering doubts about a divine creation, ' for then ' God would be unjust and unmerciful . . because He inflicted ' pain on good men and swallowed up all beings. . . . If He ' were creator of the world, He would as free agent have created ' good for Himself and not evil—such as birth, death, sickness, ' old age.'

Creation not the work of a free agent : the World as Penitentiary or Reformatory.—' *No one who is free to do what he wishes ' builds a prison and then enters it himself.* An absolutely pure ' God could not enter the body, or doing so (by mistake) He would ' leave it at once, remembering that He Himself had made it ' and that therefore it had no power to detain Him against His will. ' Without trouble, the soul (in which guise God entered the world) ' would put an end to it, as the magician withdraws the glamour ' which he has thrown about him. But He does not do this : ' hence the world cannot have been created by a spiritual being ' who knows what is good for himself.'—For the greek mind (as for the primitive savage) the world's existence has its purpose in itself or rather did not need to be justified ; a convenient way of stating that a solution was impossible and that our partial categories could not apply to the whole. Plato alone put forward a half mythical hypothesis of God's *benevolence* in creating (which experience shows to be a pious thought which must be

left to the realm of faith).[1] 'Christianity,' says Deussen, 'inclining to the views of the Old Testament' (which are optimistic) 'seeks to understand creation through God's love to mankind. . . . According to the hindu belief *creation rests upon a moral necessity*: souls must atone for deeds done in an earlier life, and so on with an infinite regress into the fathomless past. *The sole purpose of this huge world is to be the place of atonement.* It is the expansion of Being into *the enjoying and suffering soul* and *the fruit to be enjoyed or suffered—bhoktar* and *bhogyam*'. Deussen here (*Ved. Syst.* Part ii Cosmology xx 3 (*a*)) very clearly expresses the view midway between pure autotheism and the vulgar idea of gods as powerful but non-moral. The visible universe (as to Empedocles and the Orphists) is just a penitentiary or reformatory: only strangely enough the sole occupant of this prison-house is the judge who built it! Sankara is quite clear that God in creation (allowing this exoteric conception) does not act arbitrarily *nirapeksha*, (that is freely), but is bound by a certain regard to souls' deserts. This world is but a scene of atonement or expiation and God's function becomes merely secondary and instrumental. He resembles the servants who set out the tables for an examination: He is not Himself the examiner or rewarder of success. All virtue and vice, as all happiness and misery, depend upon previous works: by an inexorable necessity, the moral world-order. As Yajnavalkhya is represented as preaching for the first time, God does not plant these seeds with their specific dormant properties bound to emerge in the light: He is only the rain and coefficient but by no means the whole cause.[2]

Cosmic Predestination not Divine.—Thus a strict *predestination* controls the whole of life and also its close, but it can hardly be called divine: for it is a yoke we make for ourselves and God

[1] Hence the profound pessimism (after the age of Alexander) of the subjective schools—above all of the Porch—as soon as the individual became fully self-conscious, and found himself out of tune with a universal harmony which after all was only a bare postulate.

[2] Sankara says on 683 of his Commentary 'God like the rain is only the efficient cause (*nimittam*).' We may compare the obvious moral of all greek tragedy

> Νόμος τεθεῖται πᾶσι τοῖς βροτοῖς ἀεὶ
> Τὸν δρῶντα πάσχειν· οὐδὲ φευκτός ἐσθ' ἅπαξ.

only supervises the atonement . The whole of empiric reality is but a *scene of requital* (*kriya-karika-phalam*) or as we might say in greek ὃν γὰρ βλέπομεν ὁ κόσμος ἐστ' ἔργων τίσις | τῷ δρῶντι. Deussen very ingeniously says (op. cit. part iii Psychology xxviii 4) : 'The clockwork of atonement in running down always 'winds itself up again', and so the process is unending.[1] Sankara in order to vindicate God's initiative believes the *apurvam*[2] as 'non-spiritual cannot act without being moved by something 'which is spiritual.' The *fruit* cannot be explained by the mere (survival of the) *apurvam* ; 'whether God regards this or that 'action, in either case the *fruit* comes from him.' All the wearisome forms of the dilemma now recur : *if God is almighty and unique agent he is author of all the evil :* or else *there is no such thing as evil.* Some *Upanisads* (as in the oft-cited passage of *Kaushitaka* iii 8 [3]) represent God as *active cause in all activity.*

Even if at times God is represented as sole active cause.—'Even if soul,' says Sankara, 'is connected with defects like love and equipped with the apparatus for developing them—(in a strain reminiscent of *semi-pelagianism* he continues) 'God 'causes soul to act, but in so doing He has regard to the efforts 'it has made towards good or evil. . . . Having regard then to 'these endeavours, God like the rain apportions good and evil. '. . . Can this regard to the efforts of souls exist together with 'the dependence of all activity on God ? Most certainly' (he answers his own question) 'though the activity depends on 'God, it is only soul that acts (*karoti*) while God causes it to act '(*karayati*). As now in causing it to act He has regard to former 'efforts, so too in causing it formerly to act He paid regard to 'still earlier efforts ; for *samsara* is without beginning.'[4] It is certain then that Sankara gets no nearer to a convincing solution than do the less subtle divines of the west.

[1] It is now clear that what made jainism and buddhism really *optimistic* and encouraging in contrast to this doctrine of a perpetual treadmill, is the new tenet that some can win respite and at last release—even in this present world the highest ideal of man can be realized (*jivan-mukti*).

[2] Defined by Jaimini, as 'certain subtle persisting elements of the *work* preparing for its fruitage' ; thus closely resembling the migrating *karma* in buddhism.

[3] An exact parallel to 'whom He will He hardeneth.'

[4] It is clear that Sankara would have been puzzled by our legal maxim *qui facit per alium facit per se* and by the problem *creare quos sciebat peccaturos=creare peccatum.*

Section II. The Inactive Soul

Activity not Soul's true nature.—Another difficulty for any moral or purposive view of the world is created by the idea of *Soul as onlooker not agent*—which (as said elsewhere) found a parallel in certain esoteric opinions in Hellas—before Plato, reacting perhaps against socratic orphism, pronounced soul to be unique source and principle of motion in the world. 'Activity' (says Sankara: 673) 'cannot be the real nature of the soul 'because then deliverance would be impossible: it could not be 'severed from its inherent nature, any more than fire can lose 'its heat. But without release from activity, man cannot attain 'the goal; because activity is by nature painful.'[1] There is of course a distinction between *individual* soul and *Highest* soul (as between Plotinus' μερική and ὅλη) even if the separate existence of the former is pure illusion. It is (385) the limitations (*upadhi*) which distinguish them—body, sense-organs, action, *manas*, *buddhi*—clothed in which the *highest* appears as *individual soul*. On them it depends that it is enjoyer or sufferer *bhoktar* and actor *kartar*—from both of which conditions Highest is free. When a man knows (S. 1078) that soul is by nature a non-agent, future works no longer cleave or adhere to his knower of brahman, who is no more *agent*; nay, the former works performed under a false delusion of *agency* are annihilated. Such an one saith: 'That 'Brahman am I, whose nature is opposed to the nature formerly 'held true as *agent* and *enjoyer*, which in its very essence, in all 'past present and future time, is *non-agent* and *non-enjoyer*—'That *brahman* am I and therefore I never was, nor am now, nor 'ever shall be either *enjoyer* or *agent*.' The true and esoteric doctrine regards *soul* as *brahman* whole and undivided, not as a detached portion[2] of God: it is completely identical with Him

[1] Here of course he speaks of the soul's true nature in the *esoteric* sense; in 1130 we read of soul in the *exoteric*: 'So long then as soul possesses '*natural tendency to act and to enjoy*, and brahmanhood which is gained '(solely) by knowledge is not attained, there is not the faintest prospect 'of release': there is really no antinomy,—that is, beyond the discrepance always arising between vedantine *idealism* and the other doctrinal strata which must somehow he included in it or juxtaposed. It is in a sense perfectly true to say with Abelard (*sic et non*), the soul is by nature both a *non-agent* and an *agent*.

[2] Μέρος, ἀπόῤῥοια, ἀπόσπασμα as with the stoics.

(*ananya*) and the plurality of souls is illusory ; each of us is God *totus et integer* (solipsism) and thus infinite, changeless, eternal, omnipotent and omniscient etc.—together with all the other meaning or unmeaning attributes which reflexion crowds upon the deity from the very beginning of serious thought. In itself soul is without differences, without organs ; it neither acts nor enjoys, neither sins nor suffers. In essence it is pure intelligence or *cognition without object*. As such it is merely an *onlooker*, as in Pythagoras' simile of the fair or mart to explain the quietistic attitude of the sage to the tyrant of Phlius. In all cognition it is present as an inmost core or nucleus ; it looks on idly at all worldly action and its illusions, being quite impassive and not in the least concerned or interested. Highest soul is ' changeless ' onlooker at the three changing states ' (432) : it is not affected ' by commerce with body or sojourn in a world ' which is after all but a spectral illusion. ' As the magician is not affected by the ' illusion or glamour which he himself raises (because it does ' not really exist), so *Paramatman* or Highest Soul is not touched ' by the deceits of *samsara*. As the dreamer is not affected by ' the delusion of his dream . . . so this single unchanging ' witness of the three states [1] is not affected by any or either of ' them.'

Soul's Intrinsic nature cannot be affected by action.—' Its ' appearance in them is but illusion, like a rope that is seen falsely as a snake . . . Therefore Cause is not polluted by matter ' or qualities of effect, if they return into that Cause ' (S. 433). To discriminate thus between *supreme* soul and *individual* souls is a marked feature of Sankara and his school, and is unknown in the oldest *Upanisads* which delight to repeat the paradox, the *particular* is the *All*. The *paramatman* is neither active nor passive and is free from the outset ; the latter (that is, particular souls) are *active* and receptive and so become entangled in *samsara*. Yet at the same time each is in the supreme soul in full and complete measure. The *upadhis* cannot change its real intrinsic nature, any more than the pure rock-crystal is changed because it is smeared outside with pigment. Although individual soul as such is not real, the system cannot avoid treating it as if it were, discussing its organs and attributes in detail, its wanderings and final release. It is clear that the division between the two

[1] Waking, dreaming and deep dreamless slumber.

is of later origin and is due both to profounder reflexion and also to the needs of the religious interest.[1] This distinction lies behind the curious and to us unnatural hierarchy of mental states, in which the dream-state is one degree less unreal than waking. *Brihad.* iv 3 explains knowledge and agency of *atman* as apparent only; in dreams it transcends the unreal phenomenon of waking life, 'in sleep he passes beyond the world and the 'forms of death: as a fish between two banks swims without 'touching either, so *atman* between dream and waking hastens 'from one to the other, but *by nothing that he sees therein is he* '*affected*; for to this spirit nothing cleaves.' Here once again we cannot doubt that ancient shamanism with its emphasis on *trance and dream* is a working influence: compare the familiar τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν of Euripides and Heraclitus' statement that men die the gods' life or the constant reminder of the earlier socratic Plato that only by death do we enter reality and attain our true nature. The *shamans*, wrapt in self-induced hypnotic slumber, went home to the real world and brought back messages and advice to guide us in the lower realm of unsubstantial shadows. But the truest life is that in which all objects vanish—the deep sleep in which the soul knows nothing but itself.

Curious theory of Divine Agency in life-organs.—Side by side with the *denial of the soul's agency* must be named a curious theory of Sankara, founded on texts of scripture, that the life-organs can only operate so far as they are guided by the corresponding gods—an analogue in an inferior sphere of physics to the doctrine of *grace* and determinism in a higher; 'a waggon though strong 'needs oxen to move it.' This implies that the organs which encircle the soul are only a lifeless mechanism, needing to be set in motion from without. This function cannot be performed by the soul *because it is not an agent* (*kartar*) and only becomes so through these very organs or *upadhis*. Therefore the impulse of activity is referred in part to the Inner Ruler, (the greek-stoic ἡγεμονικὸν), the exoteric *brahman* himself[2]—partly to the

[1] It occurs in the oft-quoted passage of *Svetasvatara* iv 6, 7 (adapting a verse in *Rig* i 164) about the two birds 'one tasting the sweet berries, 'whilst the other without eating merely gazes downwards'.

[2] *Brihad.* iii 7; 'seeing not seen, hearing not heard, understanding 'not understood, knowing not known; outside him, there is none that

gods who (as Deussen well reminds us) 'are in other respects 'superannuated.' On these passages is based a theory of divine directorship over the organs of life (*Aitar.* i 2; *Brihad.* iii 2). But their rôle is purely subsidiary and they do not share in enjoyment or in suffering, reserved for the *individual* soul alone. At death the gods withdraw their services. No great stress need be laid on these comments of Sankara: he was pledged to recognize the full text and the entire doctrine; but his interpretation has only a mythical meaning, and neither here nor elsewhere does he explain with any clearness or consistency the problem of human agency and freedom.

'sees, hears, knows or understands: he is thy soul, thy *Inner Ruler*, 'thine immortal: what is separate from him must needs feel pain'.

CHAPTER D. ANTINOMIAN ADIAPHORY

Section I. Morality superseded by Knowledge

Soul's true end in no sense ethical : the knower of Atman dispensed from obligation.—If the true soul or self be no agent it follows that it is unconcerned inactivity, being neither stained by evil nor ennobled by good deeds. *Works* therefore are a matter of pure *indifference*. The emphasis on motive or inward disposition (apart from all external tokens or effects) must certainly lead to *antinomian* views, ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ' ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος (Euripides) : just as external works are indifferent (indeed impious) to some forms of solifidian dissent in later times. For the soul there is no gradual advance, *pedetemptim* or ' line upon ' line ' as it were, to holiness ; nor is there a process of addition or accretion of new qualities. Conversion is just the instantaneous unveiling of the true form of the soul (ψυχῆς εἶδος), overgrown and encrusted like Plato's Proteus and buried under illusion and convention. The Vedantine System may be called *non-moral* without unfairness. Sankara expressly says that the *inquiry into Duty* is superfluous for a *searcher after brahman* (28, 29). Indeed, the content and aims of the two systems are quite independent ; pursuit of duty, demanding positive observance (27), has for its end happiness in some transitory heaven and on earth a better destiny in a fresh incarnation.[1] The *search*

[1] The Hindus, it will be noted, seem quite unable to conceive of what we call unselfish or disinterested service or altruism. It is said with emphasis that no man loves anything else except for his own sake—so God only loves the world for Himself. This is not invalidated by such verses as *Bh. Gita* xiii 27.

This Highest Godhead hath His seat in every being
And liveth though they die ; who seeth Him is seeing
And He who everywhere this Highest God hath found
Will not wound self through self—

that is, do harm to others : this does not exclude heroic deeds and bloody wars and slaughter. Deussen (Part V *Moksa* xxxv § 3) very pertinently

for brahman has however for its end *deliverance* : it refers to something which has always existed in a changeless state. A truth is disclosed ; there is no process which is achieved. Unlike the other system, it issues no command, is innocent of any categoric imperative. All such imperatives even when taken from scripture are blunt, as a knife to cut a stone, when directed to the higher knowledge. Scripture (76) in urging or commanding this study of the holy texts, only desires to turn our thoughts from their natural tendency towards things without [1] and all the egoist aims bound up with them, through which the eternal goal of mankind cannot be reached. *For him who knows the brahman command or prohibition is no longer in force.* 'All 'obligation of act (77) ceases and all past actions are burnt 'up.' So again (in 1007). 'By knowledge alone is the man's 'goal to be attained ; therefore after it has been won, the works 'of the *asramas* (such as kindling the sacred fires and the like) 'are not further to be observed.' The object of worship (1077), the lower and attribute-possessing brahman (the 'just God' of Marcion) enjoins the fulfilment of various duties : but the object (or rather *subject*) of knowledge issues no command. The former (or theistic god) gives many diverse rewards; the only fruit of the latter is deliverance.

No Moral Distinctions survive : nothingness of works.—To the true soul moral distinctions do not adhere, for it is quite neutral and bears in itself no ethical qualification. Its essential nature consists rather in *knowing* than in *willing* ; and even good acts are repudiated, as but another tie to the cycle of birth and requital. In *Kaushitaka Upanisad* Indra tells Pratardana (who, allowed to choose a boon, asks the god to choose for him) that *knowledge* of him is the truest guerdon for man, 'Know me ; for this worship 'I deem to be the best gift for a man. . . . Who knoweth me, his 'place in heaven is *not diminished* by any deed, neither by theft 'nor by slaying the fruit of his body, by murder of mother or 'father. If (before this knowledge came to him) he hath done 'evil, yet the colour fadeth not from his face,' that is, he will keep his self-assurance and serenity. . . . 'He who worships

remarks 'Even the good man (according to the Law of Causality) loves 'only his *Ego* ; and yet he loves his neighbour as himself, just because 'he has recognized him as his own self.'

[1] The τὰ ἐκτὸς of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.

'me as Life Eternal, will come to full life in this world and in the 'heavenly will gain immortality.' This is a very strong statement of the nothingness of *deeds*, bad or good, when cast in the balance against *faith* in the peculiar form of knowledge of the *atman*. Sankara (1076), without specifying the sins which do not matter, asserts that, when once brahman is known, sins committed are annihilated and future transgressions cannot cling to such an one. 'He quotes *Chandog.* iv 14, 'Thy face, dear one, is shining as 'the face of one who knows brahman. . . . As the water cleaves 'not to the lotus petal, so no evil deed clings to him who under-'stands this . . . in all worlds he is radiant who knows this 'truth: when such die, whether funeral rites are performed or 'not, they enter into the path which leads in the end to brahman.' Thus for the 'saved' or perfect, neither moral commands nor ritual conditions are valid.[1] So too Sankara cites the *Isa.* ii. 'If he knoweth brahman works are of no weight. To him there 'cleaveth no stain of earthly woe'; adding 'that is, even though 'thou performest works all thy life long, yet in so far as thou 'hast knowledge, they cannot stain thee' (986). All works have but the purpose of attaining pleasure and avoiding pain; but these affections concern not true and bodiless being but only embodied being based on illusion;—therefore for him who has seen through it, all works are abolished—study of veda, sacrifice, alms, ascetic penance, fasting . . . As for the awakened (or redeemed) there exists no perception, pain, action; so for him there is no veda, or sacred canon. To him, as scripture saith, 'Then is the veda 'no veda' (*Brihad.* iv 3) 'then is the thief no thief, the murderer 'no murderer, *sandala* no *sandala*, *paulkasa* no *paulkasa*, ascetic 'no ascetic, penitent no penitent. Then is he unmoved by good, 'unmoved by evil, then hath he vanquished all torments of the 'heart.' Salvation is gained solely by knowledge of *atman* through study of *upanisads* or the vedanta: this knowledge is independent (*svatantra*) of any performance of works and in itself suffices for deliverance (973). Jaimini is reproved for holding

[1] Deussen (op. cit. Part IV *Samsara* xxxiii) does not like the distinction (to which we are so accustomed) between *ceremonial* and *ethical;* they are, he considers, really on the same level: 'in so far as these doings of 'men are in the service of egoism, the value of all human deeds lies not in 'themselves but in what they aim at; and it is in effect quite a matter of 'indifference whether this object be attained by *ritual* or by *moral* acts.'

this *knowledge* to be a mere appendix to *works*, serving only to give proof of immortality : for without this immortality there could be no proper theory of retribution. To this view Sankara rejoins (980) : this would be quite true if Vedanta had as its sole object to prove that a migrating, acting and enjoying entity survives :—certainly this would be justly subordinate to the doctrine of *works*. But it goes much farther and teaches that self is the Highest Soul, freed from all activity and all qualities of the *samsara*, remaining untouched by all evil. ' This know-' ledge does not impel to works, but rather abolishes them ' (981). Not merely the evil, but the good as well—on this our author is quite explicit (1079) : ' we reply, annihilation and ' non-cleaving apply equally to both—for good *works* also bring ' their own fruit and thereby hinder the fruit of *knowledge* : ' scripture too (citing *Brihad.* iv 4) teaches that such an one,neither ' what he hath nor hath not done, can burn.' Again in *Mundaka* ii 2, it is said indifferently of good and evil works, ' and his works ' are naught '. So they are of equal value (*tuliya*). Again where evil works alone are mentioned, good are also to be understood, because their fruit is inferior compared with that of knowledge. When *Chandog.* viii 4, says : ' this bridge day nor night can ' traverse, old age, pain, nor death—neither good nor evil works ' and from it all sins turn back ' in the words *all sins* both the good and evil works just named are included.

Their doubtful value as propædeutic.—The question will arise are they of any use as *propœdeutic* or auxiliary. Sometimes Sankara seems to think so : he quotes with approval (1008) *Brihad.* iv 4. ' Him the brahmans seek to know by study of ' sacred lore, sacrifice, alms, penance and fast '—from which (says Deussen) it may be gathered that pious works are a means to the attainment of that saving knowledge.[1] These works cease of course when knowledge is obtained, while certain obligations seem alone to survive ; ' therefore he who knows this ' final truth ' is calm, subdued, patient, resigned and collected '—just the assemblage of quite negative or passive qualities which Pyrrhonism or the Porch left in the ideal sage. The *outward* acts pass away and the need for them ; the *inward* concentration alone

[1] It is fair to say that the text might once have meant : ' we the ' *kshatriyas* know the true path, but the priests seek it wrongly by methods ' which can never bring attainment of the end '.

remains—the flawless, crystalline disposition which is devoid of all willing and every emotion. The *outward* acts—it will be noted that almsgiving is one—are but auxiliary (*sahakarin*) as setting a man free from affections (*klesa*) while he leads a life of pious works. But knowledge is subject to no prescribed rule[1]: its fruit, liberation (1018), cannot be brought about by any set means or methods. Scripture by the example of Raikva (*Chandog.* iv 1) teaches us that works are not indispensable, for he was much too poor to perform the duties of the *asramas* (life-stages), yet had he attained perfection (1024). Then (with a curious relapse, it almost seems, into ritual pharisaism) to such perhaps the grace of knowledge is sometimes vouchsafed in consequence of muttering prayers, fasts and worship of the gods or as a result of meritorious acts in an earlier life (1023): but a life in the *asramas* is to be preferred as a means to knowledge (1024). The passage on closer inspection is quite logical and consistent: it is merely the caution of the mystic who desires average man to look to the sacraments or normal means of grace, because if he despises them he may become, instead of a saint, a complete antinomian of the 'Synagogue of the Libertines.' At the very close of his work (Appendix to *Sutras* iv 1, 1082–5) he takes up the question once again: works are auxiliary to deliverance even as poison may be useful as medicine; they may further it from a distance, as it were, bringing about knowledge. At times too he follows the *Smrti* in teaching a *gradual ascent to perfection*, e.g. *Bhag. Gita* vi 45 'By many a new birth made pure he treadeth at 'length the loftiest path': though it is clearly seen that this refers only to the exoteric illusion of struggle in space and time towards a distant goal. In truth there is no time or space, no struggle, no otherness; the goal is all the time within the Self. In the true esoteric teaching there is no *unio mystica* for there has never been any real separation; and soul's true bliss-nature is not something added to it or achieved by it, but is its original character at last disclosed and cleared of encumbrance (1138). 'Just as becoming healthy is only a cessation of sickness: soul's 'own proper form is not an accidental (*ayantuka*) property but 'that which it is in its own proper nature.' Just in the same

[1] It comes in a flash, uncovenanted, like instantaneous conversion; it is outside the working of causality, as in the realm to which it introduces us.

way the *exoteric theism* (of a singularly austinian and calvinist type) is a mere concession to weaker brethren—when e.g. God's grace or election and predestination are named, *Kathaka* ii 23. 'Not by instruction can He be attained | nor yet by understanding 'or the word : | whom He elects, by him will He be gained. | To him 'reveals Himself the Eternal Lord'.| Cf. *Kena* iv. 11 (compared by Deussen to St. Matthew xi 25 and Sankara's own words 682) 'From Highest Soul, the onlooker dwelling in all being, Lord '(*isvara*) Who in Spirit's cause, by His *permission* comes the 'samsara . . . . but by His *Grace* is caused knowledge and through 'it deliverance and release.' So 786 'Through God as cause, 'binding and loosing of soul are brought to pass. . . . Ignorance 'hides knowledge, but (as darkness of blind eyes) by the force 'of remedies it is shaken off in him for whom God's grace perfects 'it . . . but not *naturally* in any being whatsoever.'

Section II

State of the Emancipated Soul

Immortal Life—something real yet indefinite.—We may now in conclusion ask *in what the goal or perfection of the soul really consists*? Here we are face to face with the problem of all mysticism : can mystics make ordinary people understand what they mean? They can only do so by negation, denial, and abstraction : they can simply say *not that* or *that* (*neti, neti*) and end in singing hymns to no-thingness, which is nevertheless for them the profoundest reality. For them all our affirmations are really denials and signs of weakness ; they know by incommunicable experience the state of soul in which disappeared all these futile distinctions of *this* or *that, thine* and *mine* ; it is the deep sleep of the hindu. It is somehow conceived as a positive state of bliss won by putting off the unmeaning and illusory bonds of the lower knowledge which *discriminates*. The saving knowledge is that which *unifies*[1] : it is synthesis as opposed to analysis. It expunges all otherness and dualism. To ask about immortality in such a connexion is absurd : although the life

[1] Deussen Part V *Moksa* xxxviii puts it in true platonic fashion. 'All 'that is changeable leads back at last to an Unchanging ; to discover 'and learn to know this, is the whole problem of metaphysics'—to discover and enjoy this, is the entire aim of religion (we might add).

lived by the soul at this stage cannot be conveyed in human language to human thought, it is felt to be not merely the highest state of the *particular* soul but the eternal and blessed condition of All Soul. The visible body and our worldly environment are no barriers to this assurance : they can simply be *thought away* (when ignorance is removed) and lo ! there is nothing there. To ask if a being which has at length found its true nature, fatherland and citizenship, can still be said to exist, is an insult. It is quite true that in *exoteric realism* immortality of the individual soul is difficult to conceive. For in Idealism, the original and daring form of hindu metaphysics, the self is not as in common mysticism *absorbed into the All*[1] but rather absorbs by its own act *the All into Self*. Here Deussen very wisely remarks : ' from this point of view (Part III xxii § 4) the doctrine of Immor tality is superfluous : for it *tells us only what is self-evident.*' But if nature and its dicta are real we learn unmistakably that the concrete *ego* with its character must arise and pass away.[2] In the former case we take the All into ourselves and enjoy not only fulness of life for ever but fulness of bliss. For mysticism is only pessimistic about the present world of variety ; it is optimistic in the extreme about the ' next '—which is to be had for the asking here and now ; this is its principal tenet and the sole cause of its success. It demands and wins nothing less than divinity and everlasting life. Sometimes it seems to be humble and disinterested in surrendering the self to God, but it is not either in any accepted sense. Hindu philosophy is less unselfish and less humble than any known form ; for it deifies the self, it does not give it up to an objective deity. Only in this sense can it be said to be unselfish, that it winnows away the husks of the false self—of the egoism which makes us anxious and careful about many things when all the time heaven and God are

[1] I do not forget *Mundaka* ii i, but it is just the sort of pantheistic expression which does *not* represent hindu thought :

> ' Just as the sparks from out the glowing flame
> ' in thousand forms all flashing skywards mount
> ' All creatures from the changeless One emerge
> ' and thus, dear friend, return unto their fount.'

[2] This is merely a statement in passing of the unfriendly attitude of Realism to any definite doctrine of personal survival—not an assertion that the two are of necessity irreconcilable.

within us. This is what mystics in the west mean when they speak of *God-consciousness*, of the new birth of Christ in each soul as the consummation of the true self. This is what Aristotle (perhaps more mystic in the end than Plato) sought to convey when he calls the true self *νοῦς* by a paradox which he scorned to explain. This is the thought that haunted the medieval mind, orthodox and heretic alike—*the true nature or self of every being was God*. If this is true those who become conscious of this background and support of their life are already eternal,—not in a trivial personal way, but as possessing the true Self of the universe. Here once again mysticism is not self-abnegation but rather autotheism and autolatry.

Disparagement of all Active Duties and Social Interests.—This attitude must lead everywhere and anywhere to a disparagement of active duties and moral works. The moral character is after all not the soul's real product, nor does it find its true activity in an ethical life. It is never the man's true self, only an appendage which is separable and in itself worthless. In buddhism this appendage takes to itself a life and potency of its own : the true redeemed self of the *arhat* is elsewhere, quite indifferent and in bliss. Only in the exoteric Vedanta is there demanded an indestructible ethical part, which survives and is not absorbed in brahman. If his works were really the man himself (*Brihad.* iii 2) the doctrine of requital would be sincere and fundamental, and not a concession to the weak. Certainly Gautama made the result of works completely independent of the *agent*—though he seemed to preach the most exact recompense and no doubt believed that he was proving to all men the extreme value of the ethical life. But this impersonal ghost that we release to work mischief in a future life is not our self and really does not in the least concern us. It was only the very practical and non-metaphysical tendency in buddhism which has preserved (with praiseworthy want of logic) an emphasis on human act and deed down to the present day. The *vedantists do not make this emphasis, and their conception of knowledge* (as in the West, of *faith*) *really overrides and transcends all moral obligation*. There can be no stages in Godhead ; when once you have recognized yourself as divine, you need no further effort to maintain a position which does not depend upon *Causality*, or upon painful striving in *time* and *space*. The ironical attitude to works (delineated above),

the almost total silence as to ethical and social obligations [1] must convince us that this nihilism is very dangerous teaching for the vulgar. It seems now perfectly clear that *antinomian indifferentism* or *adiaphory* had its roots firmly fixed in Hindustan and was propagated thence into the muslim and Christian world. We shall presently trace the effect of this teaching on the social life and politics of the Middle Age.

APPENDIX K

Vedantine Attitude to Gods: Eternal Realm of (Platonic) Forms or Archetypes

Divine Beings as Nature Spirits.—The old vedic gods are not denied by the vedantines any more than by a greek monist or by Epicurus himself. They still personify physical forces and our commentator Sankara (in cent. ix) rejects the theory which dissolves them into mere natural powers; 'it is not fitting (op. cit. 307) to ascribe to the sun's disk individuality '(with heart, spirit, and the like), since it is obvious that, like earth,' the heavenly bodies are without spirit.[2] 'This holds good also for Agni and the others.' He thinks (309) 'we are compelled to assume spiritual 'beings, corresponding to the elements and gifted with ruling power . . . 'they can either remain as the self (*atman*) of their department, as light, 'or else take this or that form'—did not Indra become a ram for theft, and Aditya visit Kunti as man? 'Even if the natural elements, as light 'in the sun, are devoid of spirit, still they must have divine beings as their 'spiritual overseers—to judge by the part allotted them in *mantras* and '*brahmanas*.' In 313 he says: 'We must believe that men of old, as 'reward of eminent merit, held visible converse with gods and *rsis*. Nor 'may we reject out of hand, by dogmatic denial, that Yoga confers as 'its guerdon mastery of nature, ability to become small as an atom, to 'become light, realize every wish, possess creative power and penetrate 'all things, being free from the laws of embodied being.' It is thus plain that he neither denied the personal deities nor the attainment by the adept of magical powers, such as the East still claims for its *shamans* or *mahatmas* (cf. his work on the *Sutras* iv 4 §§ 15, 16).

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[1] Almsgiving (with, after all, a wholly interested aim) is the only 'other-regarding' act even mentioned in Vedanta and the commentators, outside the very ambiguous appeals of the *Bhagavad Gita*—a product, in part at least, of chivalry.

[2] Sankara (like Anaxagoras) is here much in advance of the arabian platonists, both in Irak and Spain, in his denial of the *motrices animæ* in the spheres and in the heavenly bodies. It was only in cent. xvii (just eight hundred years later) that this term disappeared from western astronomy, if not wholly (cf. Fechner) from western thought. But the passage following in S. seems to withdraw or modify such very mature rationalism.

The Paradigmatic World of Names and Forms.—He allows that, in a certain sense, *brahman* has an eternal object though his true concept is *subject-object*. Even before creation such an object existed : ' The Names ' and Forms (96), neither to be defined as *beings* nor as the opposite or ' *non-beings*, not evolved but rather striving towards evolution ' (*avyakrite*), which hovered before the Creator's mind before creation. We may compare Plato's *Timæus*, where the eternal forms are most certainly *external* to the mind of Demiurge and independent of Him. For the gods are transient and create transitory things ; but the words of the Veda are eternal and uncreate.[1] We come here very close to Plato's Doctrine of Forms.[2] ' *Cow* ' in the Veda refers to no concrete *individual*, or particular animal, but to the *species*, the eternal object and correlate of the word cow (*cabda-artha*) : so Indra is not the name of a given person but an eternal and general term for one who occupies that position in any of the successive world-ages (287). We must distinguish between *individuals* (*vyakti*), passing instances or manifestations, and the type, the *forms* or *species* (akriti). These are all stored up in the Veda ' everlasting repository ' of all wisdom and knowledge ' (Deussen), analogous to Plato's ' in- ' telligible world ' or Philo's ' paradigmatic ', to the powers or δυνάμεις summed up in the Logos. Are they, like perfect works of art in a gallery of statues, entirely aloof, motionless, and apart from their poor and transient copies ? No, they are not the εἴδη or forms of Plato's earlier manner, models without movement or influence upon the world of matter. They come nearer to the later platonic doctrine of *Sophist* 247 [3] as *efficient powers* or λόγοι σπερματικοὶ, not mere *exemplars* ; from them the world at the close of each æon once more springs into new life. Sankara says very clearly (303) ; ' This world in truth disappears but in ' such fashion that the powers remain and these are the root from whence ' it issues anew : otherwise we should have *effect* without cause.'[4] So, ' though by periodic catastrophe the course of the world is ever and again ' interrupted, there must exist in the *samsara*, itself devoid of beginning, a ' *necessary* and fatal determination for the cosmic series newly developing,

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[1] It seems certain that the debates and quarrels over the Coran, (whether it be create or uncreate and coeternal with God), which deluged Bagdad in blood, had their roots in this primitive hindu belief : it may have found its way into the Irak dominions under the abbasid caliphs or have been introduced at an even earlier date.

[2] A term which must replace the very misleading expression ' Ideal- ' theory ', or ' Doctrine of Ideas ' (cf. Burnet's *Greek Philos.* Macmillan 1914).

[3] Whose genuineness has been vainly contested by opponents of the notion of *development* in Plato's thought from an early standpoint of socratic orphism.

[4] Of course he uses here terms of *causality*, κατ' οἰκονομίαν or by concession to the weakness of the understanding which insists on tracing the causal nexus : in the true world of thought there is no *causality* any more than there is *space* or *time*.

'—for earth and groups of living things, gods, animals and men, for the 'different conditions of caste or stages of life (*asramas*), for duties and 'rewards. . . . In all the successive world-periods the cosmic process 'is alike, and at each new creation the distinctions of the same Names 'and Forms are present in the mind of the creators.' Here again there is a platonic analogue, the demiurge who himself only fashions after pre-existing models and entrusts most of the work to deputies, demons and inferior created gods to whom he gives provisional immortality. These *hiranyagarbha isvarah* are the real world-potencies or gnostical and buddhist κοσμοκράτορες who do not disappear at the close of each world-order but pass the time in sleep—the peaceful interval between the pure *homogeneous* nebula and its evolution into the *heterogeneous*. When the fated moment arrives they awake again from their enchanted trance and help the Isvara (300, 301, 303).

Veda, as Eternal Model and Law of Guidance for Creators.—The world of the Veda thus forms an eternal rule of guidance for the Creator, and recalls the Names and Forms he '*remembers*' from potential to actual life, in shaping the universe afresh (297). The constancy of the world-forms, both divine and inferior, depends on the eternal Veda (298). The world of scripture existed then 'before ever the world began'. They are the necessary presupposition of an orderly and methodical creation, corresponding to Anaxagoras' νοῦς and Plato's νοητά. It need scarcely be repeated here that this whole tendency to world-evolution in Names and Forms arises again because of the *need of recompense*, 'the reward of works to the doer' *kriya-karaka-phala* (273, 291, 447, 987) and not strictly from any moral or purposive impulse within the sphere of the divine.

APPENDIX L

'The Twofold Truth'

Among the phenomena of *western* thought in the later part of our chosen period, the theory of the Double Truth is one of the most interesting: 'a thing may be true in philosophy and false in religion' and of course *vice versâ*. A great deal of misplaced if righteous indignation has been wasted on this immoral irony or cowardly hypocrisy, also much contempt has been levelled against such a futile and illogical paradox. But the Double Truth is none of these: it is not merely the most natural, but the most ultimate, form of human consciousness. With advancing knowledge the world breaks up or rather multiplies itself, into a number of spheres juxtaposed but not in any strict sense co-related—each having its own rules, axioms, formulas and method of procedure, provisional working hypotheses, valid within its own department but no further.[1] The familiar opposition between oratory and laboratory will occur; the same man may be perfectly sincere, like Newton or Romanes, in both; but at different times, and with a different part of his nature. The attempt

[1] See Merz *Hist. Europ. Thought in xix Cent.* Edinb. and Lond. 1904.

to fuse or blend a *moral* with a *scientific* statement of the universe is an admitted failure ; let any one read Huxley's *Lay Sermons* and Romanes' *Lecture*, Häckel's *Riddle of the Universe* and Mallock's lucid and admirable writings on the paradox of religion. Here I do not aim at any wide exposition of this compromise which is inevitable unless we are wholly to sacrifice one half of life to the other. I only wish to show some slight evidence that this distinction marks hindu theosophy as well as our own medieval thought and the modern hegelianism (which regards philosophy as something higher and truer than religion without allowing it to supersede faith and worship altogether).

The two-world theory of Parmenides and Plato enables one to pierce to the essence of the world of thought without *denying* [1] the world of *particulars*. They deny that the latter is in the truest sense real, but from the standpoint of experience they can regard it as if it were. Here then at least the *Upanisads* cannot be charged with want of logic : there is no contradiction when on occasion they regard the universe of separate and changing things as actually existing ; a complex to be reckoned with. This *realistic* attitude is of course *avidya*, ignorance, in which all men began and most men abide to the end of life,—on which all practical living in nature and society must be based. Sometimes (*Brihad.* ii 1, *Chandog.* vi 1, *Mund.* i 1) it is said that, with *atman*—knowledge, everything is known—implying that empirical science (the western pride) is quite trivial and that there is beside the *atman* no plural universe at all. Yet this world was still something existing, it lay before their eyes : even if sheer illusion, they had to take account of it and come to terms. Thus *pantheism* came in—strictly a gross perversion of the original *idealism* : brahman becomes the *reality of reality* (*Brihad.* ii 1 '*satyasya satyam*') and that which is real in the universe is brahman alone (so *Chand.* iii 14 ; *sarvam khahi idam brahma*).[2] Like Parmenides, these anonymous writers do not shrink from tracing the rise of a manifold world from the Sole Existing Spirit in a realistic fashion (*Chand.* vi 1) ; but it is repeatedly asserted that these apparent changes are 'a mere name, dependent on words.' Concession must be made to the normal empirical consciousness, which cannot work except by means of *time, space, causality*. The *Atman* (which is also God) is concealed by this empirical reality (*Brihad.* i 6) : in him everything that seems to be changing is fixed like wheel-spokes in a nave (ii 5) ; only *as it were* and by figure of speech does he move or plan (iv 3) ; only *as it were* does 'another' exist, Plato's θἀτερὸν, or is there a duality (ii 4). *Mandukya*

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[1] Or disparaging ; Burnet (op. cit.) has done good service in showing Plato's gradual abandonment of the pure socratic dualism, and his irenicon with sense, the body, and cosmic development (in his latest and maturest period).

[2] There is always a broad distinction between the *unique* brahman and the *manifold* of his (or its) apparition : 'No thinker' says Deussen 'before Kant was able to rise to the conception that this entire unfolding 'in space and time was a merely *subjective* phenomenon.' *Up. Syst.* Pt. I. v § 2.

vii describes *Atman* as 'effacing the entire expanse of the universe, 'tranquil, full of bliss, free from duality': *Isa.* i denies (with the eleatic school) plurality, change, movement, and demands of us: 'Sink the 'universe in God.' But this earliest and fundamental tenet of *Upanisad acosmism* has clearly to be somehow combined with such a recognition of a changing manifold as common sense and experience demand. Therefore the identity of universe and *Atman* is already taught by Yajnavalkhya who (as Deussen well says l.c. IV xvii § 4) 'is as little able as Parmenides to 'avoid placing himself again temporarily at the empirical standpoint.' The later Vedantines accept this and allow for the provisional reality of soul-migration and local movements between heaven and earth—which in the truest philosophy cannot by any means be literally accepted (cf. Hegel's relation of *vorstellung* to *begriff*).

APPENDIX M

Sankara's use of Upanisads

Sankara in his great work on *Brahmasutras* (1155 pp. in *Biblioth. Ind.*) uses eleven *Upanisads* in the following order of frequency: (1) *Chandogya* 810 citations: 2 *Brihadaranyaka* 567: (3) *Taittiriya* 142: (4) *Mundaka* 129: (5) *Kathaka* 103: (6) *Kaushitaki* 88: thus from 6 *Ups.* he derives 1840 of the total number of 2060 passages cited: the small remaining number 220 are divided between *Svetasvatara* (53), *Agnirahasya* (40), *Prasna* (39), *Jabala* (13), *Narayaniya* (9), *Isa* (8), *Painji* (6), *Kena* (5). Deussen seems clear that the references (*Ved. Syst.* Introd. i) to P. Ag. J. Nar. are only incidental—thus in effect limiting his use to eleven (cf. also paragraph on *Badarayana* and *Sankara* in his *Upan. Philos.* (vol. ii of his *General Hist. of Ph.*) It is clear that for him the *Chand.* plays the leading rôle, is the Upanisad *par excellence*; it is preferred, with its 628 pages to the *Brihad.* with close on 1100: the proportion of quoted passages shows therefore quite a one-sided preference. Where both have the same passage in slightly differing forms, the *Chand.* version is preferred; and where a *upanisad* is cited without name, the *Chand.* is always intended.

APPENDIX N

Return of the Blessed Soul to Life as Missioner

In iii 3, 32 Sankara discusses if a new body is possible in the case of one finally released (913). The *Itihasas* and *Puranas* tell how some knowers of brahma have come back to embodiment,—as Vasistha, Bhrigu, Daksha, Narada, and others. Do we then infer that the holy knowledge sometimes sets free, sometimes does not? No, if these returned to bodily life it was *in fulfilment of a mission* (*adhikara*), to promote the veda for the world's good. The Sun 'having fulfilled his duty these 1000 æons at 'length neither rises nor sets but enjoys absoluteness "standing alone 'in the centre" as scripture saith (*Chandog* iii 11)—as knowers of brahma

'enjoy the same (when the fruit of each has been exhausted). We must 'assume that these glorious ones, also entrusted by the Most Glorious 'with this or that mission, continued (in life) their work not yet dis- 'appearing so long as their mission lasted, and were only dispensed there- 'from when it was complete.' The transformed *evangelist* doctrine of the *Mahayana* is familiar to every oriental student; where pure subjective eudæmonism is the sole concern of primitive buddhism the later school wishes on the Christian pattern to form and organize a church, to preach the gospel and to save souls. So in China Kwan-yin is held as a compassionate deity, because she would not enter *nibbana* but remained among men. It is hard not to recognize in all this a Christian influence (quite possible even in Sankara's day) which could reinforce the humane doctrine of *avatarism* long connected with Visnu's name.

DIVISION A

Hindustan and the Religions of Further Asia

PART IV

Medieval Development of Buddhism in and beyond Hindustan

I. IN INDIA AND CHINA

CHAPTER A (*a*). *MAHAYANA* OR GREAT VEHICLE AND DECLINE OF BUDDHISM IN INDIA TO *1000* A.D.

Rise of Buddhism in desire for Personal Deliverance : pure Individualism.—The practical philosophy of Gautama is no longer known in the place of its birth ; though it is still dominant in adjacent Nepal together with a strong admixture of hinduism. Dividing into two distinct currents, it passed south and north,—into Ceylon, Burma and Siam in the one case, into Tibet, Mongolia, China and Japan in the other. We propose to follow the fortunes of the School in these latter regions and to trace by what steps the doctrine of deliverance penetrated into China and by what native influences it was confronted and in the end profoundly modified. As this section is detached from the historical and dogmatic account of primitive buddhism, a short summary of the initial phases will not be out of place.—Within 1000 years of the aryan advent into India, a peculiar temper had been formed in the conquering race, partly by climatic effects, partly by contact with native rites and belief. This took form in a desire for *spiritual freedom*, a search for salvation, a wholesale surrender of earthly things. Hermits and mendicants left their homes, severed their social ties and gave up their dependence on the ministry of the brahman class. There was a violent reaction against formal ritualism, against a *doctrine of works*, whether hieratic or moral. Nearly all men took for granted that ' fatal doing ' could not lead to the goal of bliss and perfection ; whether as sacrifice to divine beings, gifts to priests, or social work for fellow-men. Solitary ascetics and

forest-dwellers, the greek ὑλόβιοι, were, quite early, conspicuous figures; and although in this age of Gautama and Mahavira (cent. vi B.C.) groups of disciples gathered round a master who could show the way, their primitive note of *pure individualism* was never lost.

Conflict between Ideals of Mystic and Missioner : Doctrine of No-Soul.—While the jains of Mahavira's School still survive as a sect in Hindustan, their doctrines have never penetrated beyond its frontiers; but Buddhism became a world-religion, the first of its kind. Gautama's followers were organized as a *cœnobitic brotherhood*, though without any central authority exerting coercive force. From the earliest moment they were marked by a passionate zeal for *propaganda*, which harmonized oddly with the individualist doctrine which they were carrying to mankind. The Buddha's own life betrays a singular conflict between *mystic* and *missioner*; his sympathy and pity for the lost and straying finally decided him towards the latter ideal. Stripped of its scholastic and mnemonic subtleties there is (as we have seen) little that is novel or recondite in his teaching; metaphysics he abhorred (as did Confucius, his contemporary). Retirement on the inner personal life, self-help, self-mastery and self-deliverance sum up his practical teaching. His one original dogma, *No-soul*, was in part due to reaction against current metaphysics : from the first he is beset by the problem of caring very much about that to which he denies any continuous reality. So too with the *result of action* in another life; though it is most important that we should remember the fatal consequences of our activity on a fresh life, this new life is not ours (for there is no abiding self); and the new being that arises from our *karma* has nothing to do with us, for we have ceased to be. Such anomalies were bound to be expelled by later thought. As a practical creed buddhism owes its strength and influence precisely to this belief that personal life continued; that my present actions concern and create my own future bliss or woe. It is worthy of note that the pure *nihilists* who craved for annihilation passed in his eyes for heretics, and that even to Gautama himself the question could be put : Does the saint *continue to be* after his earthly demise? Here again, like Confucius, the master refuses a reply to an ultimate question : clearly because he could not himself give any consistent solution of a system which aimed at *satisfying* the personal spirit

by *denying* it altogether. This negative attitude cannot be a permanent resting-place for any man interested in soteriology; at least some provisional answer must be given. Buddha thought that salvation and the means to it would remain the same, whatever answer we gave to the questions; is the world infinite or finite, eternal or transient, whether there is a god above it (and not within it as the hindu deities) whether the saint can be said to exist after entering *nirvana*? Whilst the jains proposed to suppress *karma* by suppressing its cause, human *deedfulness*, that the indestructible soul might live at peace in its own true and eternal nature,—the buddha denied this separate reality of soul in theory;—and in practice made inward peace the supreme end. He found the recognized means of grace or self-discipline to be futile; *sacrifices, trances, ascetic practice.* The body must neither be indulged nor mortified; the seat of evil is not in matter but in our desires which defeat themselves and entail endless misery. Finding the path of deliverance by quietism, he surrounded himself like St. Francis with disciples, of greater and lesser ranks. For the full initiate, the usual vows of *poverty and chastity* were imposed: not, as in western Orders, that of *obedience.*

A Rule of Life in a Cœnobite Brotherhood.—Though each soul must depend for the attainment of happiness on no outside help or helper but solely on its own powers, a rule of life soon became needful. The secret of the universe and therefore of man's power to escape from it, is revealed by introspection; it is therefore a philosophy *of salvation by knowledge*, rather than by *grace, faith* or *works.* In its deifying of the pure, reasonable, unwilling will, it is a philosophy and not a religion. The spiritual life culminates in ecstasy and trance, blissful states (sometimes hypnotic and self-induced) which guarantee here and now the truth and value of the new gospel for sufferers. The tested pleasure of these experiences stood without doubt in place of much formal dialectic. As with Socrates, the magnetic attraction of Buddha's personality and his promise of Beatific Vision outweighed all the tortuous classification and the uninspiring schematism. The 'trances' of the Greek and his doctrine of *Eros* and the Forms display a curious counterpart (as well as contrast) to the Indian's teaching.[1] Even at the origin there was also

[1] Both were under the influence of the peculiar 'thracian' view of life with its profound pessimism and its desire for individual freedom. The

promised to the hindu adept superhuman or *magical powers*; which it is probable that Buddha himself deprecated or at least tried to restrain. The *ethic* of Buddha need not for a moment detain us; it is the usual and complete apotheosis of the *feminine virtues*, personal purity and regard for the feelings and wellbeing of others (not of a very active or officious kind), such as are found in all the world-weary systems.

Period of Expansion and Court-favour: doctrines and standpoint modified.—For two centuries we know but little of the Buddhist history. The converts seem to have been confined to the borderland of Nepal, where was the cradle of the school and the birthplace of the master: for Buddha was a prophet held in honour in his own country. King Asoka (*c. 260–224* B.C.) extended its doctrine over most of the peninsula. Beginning his reign as a patron of all genuine religion, he shows in his latest monuments a great increase of zeal for this special school and in its honour wished to destroy the cult of earlier gods. It is clear that already reverence was paid as to a semi-divine founder or inspired prophet, superior to the deities of popular worship.[1] Kashmir and Ceylon were evangelized in his reign; and his pacific supremacy added to the vast tract ruled by the Chandragupta or Maurya Dynasty of *Sandrocottus* which followed the sudden raid and hasty retreat of Alexander. But within these 200 years beliefs and practice had already been modified: marvellous legend, miracle and relic-worship had become integral features; an individualist philosophy of salvation had become a popular hero-cult with *mythus* and ceremonial. Under hellenic kings in Bactria further expansion in the north-west took place; under the Indo-Scyths who destroyed and succeeded them royal favour was again shown. Kaniska (whose date wavers between B.C. *58* to *120* A.D.) was as great and generous a patron as Asoka himself. While his people, the Yue-chi (Getae), belonged no doubt to the indo-european family, the rulers seem to be mongol Tartars on whom buddhism has always exerted a peculiar charm.[2]

Sakya clan are *Sacae* and Scythians, of a purer aryan race than the mixed descendants of the earliest european invaders. Both exerted a powerful and lasting effect on their own and later times, not only by their actual preachings, but by the manner of their death.

[1] Moore (*Hist. of Rel.* i 302 Clark 1914) well says: 'If he was not conceived as a god, it was not that he was *less* than a god but *more*.'

[2] We know from Herodotus that Scythians, in the main of *aryan*

Royal Patronage, the Councils and Beginnings of Schism.—It was without doubt during the Greco-Bactrian Dynasties that buddhic doctrines found their way into China: that is, they were known and held in some honour *nearly two centuries before the famous mission of Emperor Ming-ti* (in the reign of Nero *c. 68* A.D.).[1] During this interval three General Councils were held (to which a certain historic value can be attached). (1) a century after Buddha's death *c. 380* B.C. at Jalandara; (2) under King Asoka *c. 240* at Patna; (3) under King Kaniska, the zealous Tartar convert. The *first*, held at Vesali, condemned the easier habits of life and the departures from minute ritual which had crept in.[2] But it is now agreed that the divergence, and indeed schism, displayed at this Council arose from disputes on *canon* and on *dogma*, not merely on points of ceremonial. At this early date the first division between the Buddhism of the North and South is apparent. Only the Southern recognizes Asoka's Council in *240* B.C.; only the Northern acknowledges Kaniska's (between *1–120* A.D.) The first council is then of the highest importance in estimating the history of the school and the reasons for a rupture which has lasted until the present moment.

Protestants and Catholics: 'Little and Great Vehicles.'—Northern supporters of the great Council of *380* B.C. upheld what

kindred, were often governed by a militant 'Turkish' or Tartar tribe: the Arsacids of Parthia are, like the Manchus in China, a nomad tribe of horsemen raiders from central asiatic plains, settling upon the peaceful aryan husbandmen of Persia.

[1] This is however still hotly disputed by sinologues.

[2] One lax observance indicated is 'the preserving of salt in a horn vessel in case they should want it at some future time': the spirit of the objection to this is analogous to 'Take no thought for the morrow.' One is however reminded of Dr. Seydon (in Mallock's *New Republic*, Chatto 1878 p. 236). 'It has been the fault of the easterns in fact to be ever 'over-subtle and to fall into those excesses of human wisdom which are 'foolishness with God. Isaac the Armenian for instance wrote a book to 'prove his countrymen in heresy for 29 different reasons, of which the 'two most important are these—that they did not blow on baptized persons, 'and that they made their consecrated oils of rapeseed and not of olives. 'Above he adduces as a fit ground for separation from the Latins in the 'eyes of the byzantine Greeks, that the western Church did not sing 'Alleluia in Lent, and that it used in the Lord's Supper unleavened bread 'which (Nicetas Pectoratus contended in an elaborate treatise) was dead 'bread and could not therefore be supersubstantial or consubstantial to 'us'!

we might well term a *docetic heresy* as to the person of Buddha : his nature was for them transcendent, his life absolutely blameless and free from all corporeal taint, his body above all limit and ubiquitous, his knowledge immediate and intuitive. From this moment began a schism of *protestants* and *catholics* within buddhism, of the Lesser and the Greater Chariot.[1] It marks the transition from a philosophy of self-help and a ' brotherhood ' of the common life ' to an organized church-life and hierarchy, from rationalism and self-discipline to a system of external grace and *opus operatum*. The Northerns disparage the selfish and paltry aim of the individualists, who seek only to save their own soul. The self-centred mystic is condemned and in his place rises the ideal figure of the missioner who tries to deliver not merely all mankind, but all beings from their path of error. There is something higher than the self-loss in *nirvana*, which with curious logic was represented as the highest bliss—to continue to live for others, to enter again and again the ' wheel of becoming ' to guide fellow-mortals on the right path.[2] The sage's aim is to become himself a Buddha and in time a saviour of mankind : Buddha was but one of a series, and already the cult of the school was beginning to turn towards his successor Maitreya. Not to be *arhat* but *bodhisatva* is the true goal of one who loves his fellowmen : the one ' redeems his own soul,' the other ' gains the whole world.' Thus from a pure ethical discipline, Buddhism had become a school of metaphysics, which constantly posed ' ultimate problems '. It refused to acquiesce in the equilibrium of the master who declined to dogmatize and (so far as he could) placed all such questions outside the great life-interests. It had become a religious propaganda.

Metaphysical Nihilism ; the Absolute as transcending all opposing terms.—The chief names connected with **Maha-yana** with its wide cosmicsweeps and richer hopes are *Asvaghosa*, perhaps coeval with Kaniska (of the dubious date) *Nagarjuna* (the fifteenth

[1] *Hina-* and *Maha-yana* translated ' car, vehicle, development '.

[2] This is the wide Catholic—rather Cosmic—teaching of *mahayana*: the typical instance we shall find in China as Kwanyin, who like Visnu in his *avatars*, descends to teach and enlighten instead of entering *nirvana* (nibbana). The same idea is found in several gnostic sects and enjoys a brilliant exposition in the pseudo-Clementine writings. Is the thought wholly absent from the ' later manner ' and final doctrine of Plato ?

Patriarch, some time between *150–250* A.D.), and the two brothers *Asanga* and *Vasubandhu*. The second name is the most famous of all : his school (*madyamika*) are nihilists of the type of Gorgias, Zeno and Melissus. The more radical members disclaim the notion of any definite doctrine : and confine themselves to attack and refutation. Their ' principles ' are a series of negations ; *no birth, no death* ; *no persistence, no destruction* ; *no unity, no manifold* ; *no coming, no departure*. Even the dilemma, ' *to be or not to be* ' contains for them a fallacy. Truth is beyond the category of being ; it is the void, *stille wust*, a silent region where nothing is affirmed or denied. ' Truth lies not ' it is said, ' in the domain of Intelligence, for this moves in the sphere of the ' related and the illusory.' With an odd likeness to the *double system* of Parmenides, the school pays its ironical homage to the phenomenal world even in denying it : it allows that it exists *in a sense* and evolves under regular, indeed unchanging, law. *Effect* is as unreal as *cause*, and the nexus of cause and effect is as illusory as both. But (with the Sankhya of eight centuries before), so long as we are in the bondage of illusion, *cause and effect* exist for us : redemption is to know no bondage and recognize it as unreal ; when we see through the illusion, there remains —not a positive Absolute but—vacancy. From this pure nihilism the later system of Asanga was in some sense a reaction : it is now held [1] that he did not deny the outer world by admitting that thought alone is real ; but, that he restored the doctrines of the dualistic Sankhya to which both ' Nature and Souls ' are ' reals '. In general the Mahayana teaches a schellingian Absolute, which transcends both opposing terms, *knowing and being*, even *being* and *not-being*. As with the pseudo-Areopagite, Dionysius (cent. v. A.D.), we cannot say that it is,—for being is a relative term. It is called the void and *that which is, such as it is*,—that is, incomparable to anything else (*bhuta-tathata*) : our world manifests it in illusion as *finite, manifold*, and *changing*.[2]

[1] See Anesaki's article Hastings *Enc. Rel. Eth.*

[2] Here, no more than in Parmenides, or Plato (early phase), or in any modern absolutist, can we discover any real solution or necessary nexus : why should the Absolute produce a phenomenal world at all ? Why should the Infinite become incarnate (or entangled) in the Finite ? Why should the motionless and stationary ideal-forms give rise to a series of imperfect semblances on the phenomenal plane ? But with Böhme and Schelling an attempt is made to find an origin in some flaw in the Absolute :

The Absolute is of course, in this as in every kindred system, beyond and above consciousness : the *principium individuationis* is ignorance ; the Absolute cannot be a *person* nor entertain *purpose*. However, although in its true nature unconscious, it comes into a conceit of consciousness through ignorance, spontaneously and not with purpose or reason : there is then a fatal law which drives on the slumbering Absolute to the error of awakening. Whilst we remain in *ignorance*, the world and our self *are* for us ; i.e. have relative reality. But we can overcome this by *knowledge* (just as in the Sankhya, or in the Vedantine System of Sankara), when our conceit of separate personality vanishes and there remains only *that which is, what it is*.

A Supreme and Personal God is recognized below the Absolute : Docetism.—Is then the *maha-yana* (with its Absolute-doctrine not to be distinguished from any western form) devoid of any personal god ? By no means. It has besides to make a necessary transition to the demonolatry with which it is inextricably entangled. A supreme and perfect Being is postulated, with essence of *mind, will, love*. It has however a quite impersonal title *Dharmakaya, body of Law*.[1] As the one true reality it is ubiquitous in the universe ; our consciousness (as in all pantheist systems) is a fragment : ' in me as conscious and ' rational being the Dharmakaya is incorporate.'[2] But in the strictest sense the Buddhas are embodiments of this universal reason (of the Stoics) : here enters the element or motive of *love*, which is absent from indian and hellenic systems.[3] The

the phantasmagoria is due not only to our ignorance, but to an ignorance in the Absolute itself : even Sankara could find no better answer to the problem of creation than that it is God's sport or pastime (*lila*). So in Deussen's *Metaphysics*. Here we have the ' dark spot ' as pure negation in God, ' that in God which is not yet God ' ; which is to the speculative pantheist and pessimist alike the spur to the ' creation ' of a world which ought not to come into being. In Hartmann's famous simile, the coarse satyr, Will (as ignorance) seizes the maiden—Idea—and compels it to objectify itself in the child of this unholy union, the world of things.

[1] Suzuki *Outlines Mahayana Buddhism* 1907, translates this term by the somewhat too modern *system of reality*.

[2] No doubt with the double meaning, *moral* sense and faculty of appreciating *mental* categories.

[3] Without doubt Visnu and his compassionate *avatars* helped to break the cold intellectualism of hindu theories. Also Christian influence cannot possibly be excluded ; whether in the form of Mani's doctrine or nestorian

historic Buddha descended, bearing a docetic frame (as in our own gnostical sects) and being from the outset above all limitations of human nature. After he had in seeming submitted to death he continues to be Buddha, exchanging his *body of change* for his *blissful* or resurrection *body* (*nirvana*—for *sambhogakaya*).

Theistic Impulse of Buddhism : Saviour more honoured than Creator.—Buddha has therefore three existences (like the *Logos* of the Christians) undifferentiate with the Dharmakaya ; in his earthly life ; as risen and exalted (*tri-kaya*). It is clear that here God is represented as awakened by pity and love to retrieve the error into which he fell as Creator or (if preferred) the fatal effects of his unconscious dreaming as Absolute. The influence of hindu Absolutism is once more obvious. But, as we have shown, alongside of this pure abstract philosophy ending in nihilism can be traced from very early times a strong *theistic* current. In a region where the idea of creation involves a fall or a sin, the god who *saves* will be object of worship rather than the god who *calls into being*. Buddhism was expelled from India, or rather became of itself decadent, because it was really superfluous. A new theism had arisen in India : the legends of Visnu and Siva were altered to suit this novel theory of divine 'philanthropy,' and the doctrine of faith in a merciful Saviour had been given a wide welcome. Transplanted to the north and east, it took with it the *theistic* impulse, in which its real strength had always lain (though such a notion would have been warmly rejected by the orthodox). Buddha as Saviour became a gracious deity, not a philosophic exemplar and pioneer ; and Buddhism took to itself all the external cultus and means of grace already current in the lands to which it found itself exiled.

Shortcomings of Hindu Buddhism : its failure and decadence by *1000* A.D.—But if Buddhism found itself superseded [1] by

or orthodox belief. Clement of Alexandria is familiar with buddhism : it is unthinkable that buddhism (on its side) should have been wholly unaware of the western development. I am however quite ready to admit that human nature and its needs are everywhere the same ; that the process of humanizing and personifying the Divine must everywhere follow much the same lines. At the same time an entirely independent evolution of buddhism, the foolish anti-Christian theorem of a few decades back, cannot for an instant be allowed. This system, as it is known to-day, has borrowed from every likely quarter (Lloyd's *Creed of Half Japan*, 1911).

[1] As to the causes of decline Walleser has recently argued (*Der ältere*

a religious movement on traditional lines (with which the mass of Hindus would not willingly break) it failed also in the land of its birth by very distinct shortcomings of its own. The way of salvation was open only to those who effectively renounced the world and lived a cœnobitic life, no less unsocial than the seclusion of hermit (*aranyaka*) or gymnosophist. At its start it provided a simpler answer and gave an easier way of life: it did not demand austerity nor a study of the perplexing subtleties of metaphysics. But India reformed her religion so as to admit the *householder* as well as the *mendicant friar* or the *forest-recluse*. The average man was conciliated by seeing a gracious God proposed as object of his worship, who would give good things in this world and the next.[1] Before turning to our chief aim in this section, we may quickly dismiss this gradual decline of buddhism in the land of its origin.

Decline not due to active Persecution.—Success was uninterrupted in the centuries after Christ. The years *400–600* were the most flourishing epoch as visits and records of chinese pilgrims will be seen to testify. In *400* students of Maha-yana were still in a minority, with strongholds in Kashmir and the N.W., but many also in the sacred cradle of the school under the Himalayas and adjoining Nepal. By the time of Huen Tsang's pilgrimage 230 years later, this greater Vehicle was in the ascendant, and the total number of convents seems to have been largely increased. After *700* a decline set in, aided by the Arab conquest of Sind district (*711*) almost exactly synchronous with the invasion of Spain in the far west by the same conquering people. The accounts of fierce persecution by reviving orthodoxy (e.g.

Vedanta, Heidelberg 1910) that the brahman victory was won by intellect and logic; for the buddhists, forsaking their own track went off upon the side-issue, the *reality of an external world*. Its vedantine opponents held that the only Real behind the illusions of our senses is soul, in man and in the universe—a view somewhat resembling Berkeley's idealism. This is not very clear as giving a cause of its decadence: E. Hardy (*Indische Rel. Gesch.* 101) is more enlightening: 'Buddhism wasted away after 'rival sects had extracted the honey; had made their own anything for 'which use could be found.'

[1] No religion can survive as a popular system which does not make concession to this frank utilitarianism (Hebrews xi 17): man is at times capable of the greatest surrender of self but only to a cause or a potentate (in heaven or on earth) *as a rule* subserving his interests and answering both his need for guidance and his demand for (at least) final happiness.

under Sankara) are now to a great extent discounted if not altogether rejected. Indeed, it is quite clear that buddhism had settled down comfortably among hindu creeds and practices, borrowing largely from their superstitions (esp. Siva-cult). Sankara's attack on all unfaithfulness to the Vedas would not specially single out the placid and ignorant monks of 1000 well-endowed convents. Nor did the later muslim conquerors show greater bitterness against the 'heretics' than against other hindu idolatrous religions.

APPENDIX O

Sources of Indian Buddhism

The results of recent inquiry into the *texts* and *sources* of the early doctrine may here be shortly stated: (A) The existing *Pali Canon*, long retained in faithful memory and oral tradition, was not reduced to writing in its present form till about *80* B.C. It is found, preserved with scrupulous care on palm leaves (in Ceylon, Siam, Burma) and is closely akin to Asoka's inscr.: which date from between *272–235* (others *260–224*) B.C. This language is a literary version of an *aryan*, that is, indo-european dialect, *later* than Vedas and Brahmanas but *prior* to Sanscrit, which became the language of the learned soon after the Christian era. It was the language of *Magadha* and of *Kosala* (Rhys Davids) about the year *450* B.C., and in this latter kingdom the school took firmest root (witness the great primitive college of Savatthi). If with some critics we do not admit that it was vernacular at *Magadha* where Asoka ruled, it is still more clear that he adopted a canon already drawn up in Kosalese by *250*.

These three Pali *Pitakas* (Baskets of Tradition) were then quite early collected into a canon for oral transmission and held to contain the authentic words of the master. It is to be noted that the numerous works in Pali of comment and exegesis date from a much later age; e.g. Buddagosa and Dammapala wrote about the time of Fa-Hien the Chinese visitor (*c. 400* A.D.).

There are besides a few early works composed in a dialect of transition between *kosalan* pali and the later and encroaching Sanscrit. (It is to be observed that the great bulk of Buddhist works belong to China, having been translated there and preserved while the originals are lost or lurking in some Tibetan library.) Though written out at this late date—four centuries after Buddha's death—there is no reason to distrust the scripture or refer it to a debased or *cingalese* form of the doctrine: in fact, a long *oral* transmission is to those who know India an even better guarantee for faithfulness than textual impression. In the *Ceylon Chronicles*, it is read that 'the 'brethren of old handed down by word of mouth both text and comments 'of the Three Baskets: but, later, seeing how men were perishing,' that is, for lack of spiritual food 'they came together and made writing of the 'Law in books, that the holy Faith might be maintained.' The canon

bears in itself the witness of early origin ; it is without the suspicious symmetry or system which nearly always tells of a late and byzantine age when spontaneity is extinct. Its folk-lore is that of primitive N.E. and N.W. India (whence it made its way into Europe through the Norsemen) ; the similes in scenery and landscape correspond with the N. and sub-tropical part of Hindustan and are not those of a tropical island. In sum, Ceylon had been a faithful repository both of the primitive doctrine and of the canonic text. And this Pali Canon (by some termed the *Lesser Vehicle*) is acknowledged by all as the parent-stock, even by those who seek to transcend it: its true name is the *Theravada* or School of the First Apostles.

APPENDIX P

Buddha, personal or impersonal: *a prophet or the Truth?*

It is essential for the understanding of modern forms of buddhism that we inquire more closely into the doctrinal changes in its earlier phase. The schism between rationalists and *mystics* began at an early hour. To the former group belonged the orthodox *Theravadins* who kept strictly within the lines of practical morality which Gautama had traced. In opposition to this 'evangelical simplicity' the *Mahasanghikas* tried to amplify the teaching and deduced from it an idealistic philosophy in which the significance and value of the personal Buddha were lost. To the latter was applied the much-debated term *Mahayana*.[1] The three and a half centuries from Asoka to Kaniska (c. *250* B.C.–*100* A.D.) are quite dark as regards authentic tidings of the sect and form a contrast to the 2½ centuries from the death of Buddha to that of Asoka (*c. 477–225* B.C.). Many students accept Oldenberg's conclusion as to Kaniska's death in closing years of cent. i A.D. (in *Journ. Pali Text Soc.* 1912). 'The brave barbarians' (Yue-chi under Kaniska and others) 'became buddhists so far as 'they were able but they were so soaked in animistic superstitions that 'their ability was equal to the task *only* after they had brought down the 'religion to the level of their own understanding' (Rhys Davids). . . . 'From the time of Kaniska' (*c. 100–120* A.D.) 'the whole power and in-'fluence of the Imperial State was thrown on the side of the animistic 'tendencies.' The word *Hinayana* is found in Fa-hien (writing after his return to China *c. 414* A.D.) and though the term occurs perhaps six times it is by no means clear what is intended to be conveyed by it. It occurs in the *Lalita Vistara* (Mitra's ed. p. 38 Calcutta 1877) as a term of reproach—'Thought, that opening of religious light, conduces to scorn for a *mean* '*method*.' Or the passage of this much interpolated text may imply 'con-'tempt for the school of Hinayana.' I-tsing, a Chinese pilgrim 2½ centuries later, refers it to those who did not believe in the various heavens or gods which religious exuberance had invented in Tibet and China. It is certain that the problems on which the schools parted company can be traced to early times. The *Katha Vatthu* belongs to cent. iii B.C.; and it seems cer-

[1] 'Origin and date are still wrapped in obscurity'; so Anesaki.

tain that the chief doctrinal novelties there discussed refer, not to ethics or pure philosophy, but to the person of Buddha. At the time of Fa-hien's visit it seems also certain that the Schism into *hina-* and *maha-yana* was a familiar feature and that the terms were current in Hindustan proper. Huen-tsang represents the people of India as on the whole loyal to the earlier and simpler faith : *c. 630* A.D. Of 200,000 mendicants in India two-thirds belonged to the primitive schools and few had been allured by 'the resplendent deities created by *Mahayana* divines or the new ethics 'based on belief in them.' Now the germ of the future development lay in the *Mahasanghikas*, a sect which even in Huen's time was represented by the *Lokottara-vadins* in the country of Bamiyan. This sect begin to collect or invent those myths and legends (*mahavastu*) from which arose the later *docetic* theories which we must now notice.

The *Hinayana*, like the school of Epicurus, believe in a single historic Buddha ; the *Mahayana* believe in many. Faith was extended to many mythical figures and the historic personage became faint and tenuous. In their essential reality all these innumerable Buddhas were *one*,—a point of contact with the Clementine writings in the early Church and the Shiite Schism among the muslim to the present hour. In each world-period a Buddha appeared to unveil the truth ; but to his historic or phenomenal apparition little value was to be attached : his significance lay in his universal buddha-hood. In *Hinayana*, as in the extremists of nestorianism, Buddha started from the position of a man and became by his own unaided efforts a superhuman being. But mythology set to work soon after his death. The *Tusita* heaven admits a theory of his pre-existence ; the various *Jatakas* and *Nidanas* added their suggestions ; the mythic biographies (such as the already named *Lal. Vist.*) completed the transition from solid earth to a transcendental cloudland. The *Theravadins* stoutly opposed this tendency under Asoka but in vain.

Meantime, almost the same result had been reached by a perfectly legitimate deduction from the founder's own words. 'Though he was not 'a Nihilist, it was not without reason that his doctrines were charged with 'being a "nihilistic wisdom" : Vacuity was one of his most important 'tenets' (Anesaki). The buddhist was to aim at realizing this ideal of perfect vacuity even in this life. It was debated whether Buddha could be said to exist after death. As against a fugitive personality the Truth or doctrine rose into prominence. The truths (*dharmata*) are preached by him but not created : they are eternal and universal : his dignity is due to his power to realize them. All Buddhas owe their place to this discovery of the eternal *dharma*. It abides while the several *tathagatas* pass away. It is a short step to the *identification* of the true personality in each Buddha with this eternal principle. The *dharma-laksana* school, while not wholly denying the reality of Buddha's historic life, are inclined to lay greater emphasis on the transcendental side. This physical body he took on him as mere 'theophany' or condescension to common mortals. Not only is the *Lalita* marked with this doctrine but the *Saddharmapundarika* which conveyed the belief to the countless adherents of buddhism in the Far East. The systems of *Asvaghosa* and *Vasubandhu* were trinitarian and through

these favourite masters of chinese thought this dogmatic side was given the chief place.

The *Mahasanghikas* then represent the idealistic attitude as opposed to realism. Buddha preëxisted and came down to earth from the *Tusita* heaven. In his essence or personality he is identical with all his predecessors. His physical body has no limit in space and his life has infinite duration. The soul or personality was the cosmos incarnate (*dharmadhatu*); and it is all the time in immediate contact and complete union with all truth. Thus the historic figure (as in the 'mythical' school of german theology) is absorbed into a universal buddhahood in which from time to time the cosmic law embodies itself for the instruction of all beings. The physical lives of such 'theophanies' are unreal: they do not see, hear, smell, eat or sleep as men do. What they utter or act is solely for the sake of others. These speculations were current about the time that mythology appears in the *Mahavastu* or *Lalita*.

From the *Prajna* School we have texts (of uncertain date) which give this pantheistic idealism a new emphasis [1]. Discursive knowledge was discounted and mental exercise restricted to a pure contemplation, transcending all aspects of the partial and multiple and advancing to a mystic union for which the time-honoured term *yoga* was still employed. In *Anguttara N.* (i 14, 2) Gautama praises Subhuti the forest-dweller for this faculty. Under his name were written the *Prajna-paramita* in which the single theme is the emptiness and unreality of phenomena. The only reality which could not be denied was the state of mystical illumination: this is called 'most real of all realities', 'mother' of all Buddhas', 'source from which their enlightenment is derived.' All that the historic Gautama said or did in life was 'pedagogic'—like the jewish Law in relation to the Gospel—*upaya-kausalya*. All incidents and specific teaching belong to the realm of vacuity. He is only *said κατ' οἰκονομίαν* to have accumulated merit and advanced by degrees to perfection. Buddhas are infinite in number, merely 'individualized manifestations' or theophanies of the Mother *Prajna*. The *Tathagata* comes from nowhere and goes no whither. He is just space and his person has no other quality than that ultimate attribute of all things—vacuity. So (in the *Vajracchedika* in 'Sacred Books of East' xlix 140) 'They who 'saw me by form, heard me by sound . . . will not see me: a Buddha is 'to be seen from the Law (*dharmatas*), the Lords have the Law-body '(*dharma-kaya*) and the nature of the Law cannot be understood nor made 'to be understood'.

Of this doctrine *Nagarjuna* was a notable expounder.[2] He belonged to that dialectical or pure eleatic phase of thought which reaches a denial of all definite statement about anything. He denies every quality to the

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[1] One extant text was translated into chinese in cent. ii A.D., that is within a century of Mingti's recognition of buddhism: cf. Nanjio's *Catalogue* Oxford 1883 no. 5.

[2] In S. India cent. ii or iii (Anesaki): Edkins from Eitel's *Handbook*, *194* A.D.: xiv or xv patriarch; chinese title *Lung-Shu* (dragon-tree).

person of Buddha, one after the other (*Madhyamika* Sastra xxii, in Nanjio's collection no. 1179). He has no body, no mind ; yet is not non-being. Being and non-being cannot be predicated of him ; both are illusions. Yet from the empirical standpoint he could not refuse to admit a real historic person. Commenting on the *Satasahasrika* he states fairly enough the common *Hinayana* view of the one concrete figure of Gautama but afterwards tries to lift it to his own transcendental theory. Yet in the end all earthly incidents in the holy life are unreal and belong to the realm of phenomena. The *dharmakaya*, which is his true nature, fills up the whole of infinite space, is endowed with all imaginable qualities and excellences, has no limit to its activities and preaches incessantly, leading all beings to enlightenment. One of these *jatakaya* was Sakya Muni or Gautama, indeed the most conspicuous in this world age ; but there are countless others. Replying to thirty-six questions put by Kasiapa, Nagarjuna lays down the rule that ' every Buddha has both a revealed (exoteric) ' and a mystical doctrine '. The chinese doctor Kan-Hwei wen (*c. 550* A.D.) was under the influence of this negative indifferentism : he is said to have mastered the notion of ' central gazing and the three branches of (nihilistic) knowledge : *matter is naught ; mind's distress is naught ; temptations of sense are naught.* Attributed to Nagarjuna is the triple division of speculation—*empty, inventive, medial.* Early in cent. v the ' Middle Sastra ' was translated into chinese as *Chung-lun* in 500 stanzas : it is based upon the *Prajna-paramita* and gave great assistance to the rise and development of the tibetan sect of *madhyamika.* ' All methods and ' doctrines I declare to be mere vacuity : they may indeed be called *invented* ' names (*kia*) they may be said to contain the sense of the *medial* path ' (*chung*) : but in themselves they are pure emptiness (*kung*).' Hwei-wen raised his system on this principle and Chikai, following him, moulded it into the *Tientai*-kian, whence issued the *Tendai* school in Japan. There can be no reason to deny Nagarjuna a chief place in the development of *mahayana—Ta cheng* or ' great vehicle ' : the words of Csoma Körösi, in this context are still true, ' with him originated what is known in Tibet as ' *madhyamika*, the " middle way," " opposed equally to the hindu dogmatists, ' who taught either a perpetual duration or a total annihilation of the soul.' It is clear that his eleatic and eristic denial extended to all *antitheta* and led to a pure nihilism like that of Gorgias and (perhaps) later of Pyrrho (*360–270* B.C.) who may himself very well have borrowed from India. The tenets of Pyrrho—if such a term is applicable—include : ' against ' every statement the exact opposite may be urged with equal force ' (ἰσοσθένεια τῶν λόγων) ; ' no assertion then is more valid than another ' (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον as his pupil Timon tersely expressed it) ; ' the proper mental attitude is equilibrium (ἀρρεψία), suspension of judgment (ἐποχή), and silence (ἀφασία) ; ' the proper attitude to life is imperturbability ' (ἀταραξία) —all finding close parallels among these later buddhists. In the *Ekasloka-Sastra* (tr. by Edkins as far back as 1857, *Ch. B.* p. 302) Nagarjuna or *Lung-shu* concludes : ' Thus we know all acts are empty and non-per- ' manent ; and being so, they are without body (*ti*) . . . my nature (*sing*) ' is in itself without body . . . ; all kinds of action differ in name but

' are the same in meaning.' Mind as organ of consciousness is (with Hume) just as impermanent as any of the senses.

In the *Suvarna-prabha*, it is explained that Buddha's appearance in the world is only with a view to educating common mortals by a method which their feeble capacity can understand. But it is his eternal and universal life, as truth unchanging, which is really of importance. The *universal* or impersonal element thus predominates over the *particular*. So in ' Lotus of True Law ', (the favourite chinese classic which Anesaki rightly calls the ' johannine gospel of buddhism ') the whole argument seeks to identify the historic figure with the eternal Buddha who had no beginning, the λόγος uncreate. First we have his actual appearance among men as lord, father, comforter ; then is revealed his original essence existing for all eternity ; lastly, we have the assurance of his abiding presence in the world and of the mission of a counterpart to the Christian Paraclete : ' lo ! I am with you always.' In the time of Chi-kai (*531–597* A.D.) of the *Tientai* sect the disputes were revived as to which aspect should receive the greater emphasis, the *temporal* and human or the *eternal*. The original buddha-hood is the real essence—not a mere ' thatness ' but constant activities for the benefit of all beings. The derivative buddhahood is a ' trace ' (*chi*) left among men to educate them. Chi-kai insisted upon the inseparable unity of the two aspects ; but their priority has never since ceased to be matter for debate. In the japanese *Nichiren* sect to-day the problem takes this form : ' which is to be accounted the more important ? Buddha's *person* or the *truth* (*dharma*) revealed by him ? ' Not only is it clear that buddhology followed with striking exactness the lines of Christological controversy in the west down to the present hour, but it also seems probable that Christian dogma and debate had no little influence on buddhist development.—We may now pass to *Asvaghosa*, the Chinese Ma-ming, who was probably a coeval of Kaniska and therefore falling in cent. ii A.D. Learned and proud, he was only converted late in life to buddhism which at that time had entirely denied the existence of the world of phenomena. His master was a pupil of *Parsva* (who may, acc. to Anesaki, be identical with Katyayaniputra of Cabul). He worked with all a convert's energy and zeal at Patna, as preacher, poet and musician. Kaniska king of Yue-chi carried him away after his capture of the city as a valuable part of the tribute of conquered Magadha. The tibetan accounts seem hopelessly confused as to dates and appear to believe six different persons are the same Asvaghosa. Amongst works attributed to persons of this name is the *Awakening of Faith* (ed. by Suzuki, Chicago 1900) which, whether the product of the fourth patriarch or not, is for our purpose the most interesting, as containing the germ of future absolutist and *mahayana* doctrine. ' All phenomena are unreal because each is ' composite and governed by the law of cause and effect. Reality trans- ' cends ' (as in Bradley) ' every distinction and qualification. This veritable ' being as ὄντως ὄν is to be named *tathata* thatness. The aim of buddhic ' enlightenment is to realize this Absolute. It is the eternal substance of ' truth, revealed (not created) by Buddha : it is at the same time his true ' body or entity *dharma-kaya*. When it appears to us in state of bliss it

' is Buddha in enjoyment (*sambhoga*). When manifested and incarnate ' in condescension to save us personally it is the Buddha who for our sake ' has emptied himself (*nirmana*). To attain the ideal we may believe in ' *any one* of these three aspects of his personality and be saved by his grace.' (*parigraha* =grip or clutch). Whether or not this work was written as early as cent. i A.D. it is certain that we have here a concise systematized metaphysic which underlay the entire later evolution, especially in its impulse to docetism, to a disparagement of the human figure of the master, and to a trinitarian division (of which later forms betray undoubtedly Christian influence). Cf. ' Triad ' in *Journal Roy. Asi. Soc.* p. 943, 1906.

Anesaki believes we have adequate ground for fixing the date of *Asanga* and his brother Vasubandhu in cent. v.[1] The chinese pilgrim Huen Tsang states that he taught publicly and wrote in Oudh—under Vikramaditya who may be identified with Chandragupta II of the Gupta House. His books exist only in chinese versions, but a continuous tradition asserts that Huen his great admirer and evangelist brought into China his genuine works. It is to be noticed that he reverted to Sankhya dualism ; man's personality is real and so is the outer world : release consists in detaching oneself from this objective universe, and this is the true buddhic enlightenment. In a work on the practice of *yoga* ascetic he ascribes his knowledge to a revelation of Maitreya, the Buddha who is to be. His system then, though styled *Vijnata-matrata* idealism, is therefore realistic and a distinct contrast to Asvaghosa's theory. Illusion consists only in regarding our mind's objectivity in phenomena as a world independent of it : if we study the true nature of mind and its objectification we get rid of our troublesome attachment. In the end, we absorb the whole world into ourself. There are seventeen grades of attainment *bhumi* (as in the title of his ascetic work *Yogacharya Bh.*). In practice then he is not so very far removed from Asvaghosa, and he adopts the existing theory of three personalities in Buddha (*trikaya*). His system is called *dharma-laksana* or ' wisdom showing us true nature of all phenomena.' It is clear that by his day interest in the coming Buddha Maitreya had eclipsed devotion to the person of the founder, Gautama. This cultus of a not yet embodied hero yielded in its turn to the worship of Amitayus, which spread over the whole east of Asia and Japan. This philosophic system of Asanga lost its hold upon India and China to became merged in the (hardly distinguishable) Sankhya.

CHAPTER A (*b*) FORTUNES OF BUDDHISM IN CATHAY : PROTESTS OF NATIONALISM AND ENLIGHTENMENT

Progress and Persecution in China.—It seems likely that (as already stated) the doctrine had reached China long before

[1] Edkins, who, rightly as against Eitel, recognizes that these two are contemporaries and brothers states that they came from Purusa in Gandhara (N. of Punjab). It may here be mentioned that this valued author, while placing Nagarjuna's date at 194 A.D. (*Chin. Buddh.* Trübner 1893, p. 415), actually believes that his doctrine was accepted by King Kaniska's ' Fourth Council ' ' probably a little before the Christian era ' ! p. 283.

the formal acceptance of it by an emperor in our first century (*c. 68* A.D.). It had long been known in Afghanistan and Turkestan, owing to the patronage of the Indo-Scyths, and later, owing to the mercantile and religious currents passing to and fro across Asia under manichee and nestorian traders or missioners; from a large area the muslim invasion ousted it and the mongol chiefs themselves sometimes favoured the religion of the more militant prophet. Its fortunes in China and the further east we are about to narrate in some detail. From thence it spread to Corea (*c. 350*) and to Japan (*c. 550*). Midway between these two dates it was admitted in the southern form to Burma (*c. 450*) and to Siam and Tibet (*c. 650*).[1] Ming-Ti's envoys, despatched in *61* or *62* A.D., returned in six years with scriptures and teachers of a faith that must have been already known, if not officially sanctioned.[2] In *335* (the end of Constantine's reign in the West) it was made lawful for native subjects to become monks; and in the succeeding years of the century (down to the date of Hien's departure) many large convents were built; e.g. ten in the capital Lo-yang in Honan province and thirty-six in the country round. Indian scholars translated scriptures under imperial patronage (*c. 400–440*) while chinese pilgrims visited the 'Holy Land' and brought back books and relics. Then followed a short if violent period of sudden persecution. In *444–6* Wuti of the Wei Dynasty strove to extirpate it as a foreign cult; temples were burnt with their images and scriptures, monks killed, and subjects forbidden to harbour or

[1] Where it continues to flourish in a phase resembling closely the primitive rules. It has here become a recognized national church, not an order of begging friars,—a natural stage in the life of every one, not a separate and exclusive society: it borrows largely from native belief and practice or countenances them generously: it has its *devout* and its *scholastic* side, its disputes on the canon, on discipline and on dogma. But it has adhered in great measure to its first model, has kept clear of transcendental *gnosis* and nihilism in metaphysics, has eschewed magical pretence and secret cults of doubtful decency, with more scruple than the northern branch. While adhering to the *individualist* axiom it has contributed to form the gentle and docile (if not stirringly beneficent or unselfish) character of these peoples.

[2] In his dream he saw a golden image hovering over the palace; it was recognized as Buddha and the vision was at once interpreted as a solemn command from a supernatural power, which was certainly not conceived as an extinct soul.

protect the victims: in this indictment were included native soothsayers and workers of magic. The motive was perhaps anger and fear at the news of aid given to rebels at (the modern) Singanfu, as well as to an enlightened dislike of charlatans and dread of secret societies. Soon restored to favour at court, it never escaped then or since the persistent hatred of the Confucian *literati* or of the official historians.[1]

Serious blows from the Confucian Party *844*, *955* **: Buddhism unsocial and unnational.**—From the State however came but one serious reverse to the worldly prosperity of chinese buddhism in *844*, but from this it never recovered. Emperor Wu-tsung dealt the blow exactly 400 years after the earliest attack. A report from the Board of Sacrifices returned nearly 5000 convents and 40,000 smaller houses. A decree was procured dissolving these societies and restoring the accumulated wealth to secular purposes,—iron statues for implements of husbandry, precious metal to the Treasury, and bronze bells to the use of the Mint. More than a quarter of a million monks and nuns were ordered to return to a productive secular life (as in the attack of the isaurian iconoclasts on the conventual system a century before in the 'byzantine' empire). But here again buddhists were not the sole sufferers: nestorians (*ta-tsin* or Romans), magians or parsees (*muhu*) and manichees (*mo-ni*) were also put under the ban (*843* and the following years): the foreign settlers of alien cult were sent back, 3000 in number, to their own far countries in Persia and Syria. Emperor Wu-tsung was not greedy and masterful as Philip the Fair or Henry VIII: he occupied, by the influence of eunuch-chamberlains and palace intrigue, a precarious position (*841–847*) in which his personal wishes counted for little. He acted rather as the spokesman of the irreconcilable confucianists. Tireless in their animosity against an exotic superstition they seized upon the weakness of the throne to wreak a long-delayed vengeance. The arguments and wording in these official memorials against buddhism never vary, and often remind us of the similar charges levelled against the Christian Church down to Augustin's time. It is a 'foreign worship 'unheard of in the old days of our forefathers, which has brought 'domestic evils of bad citizenship and seduces men and women

[1] Ministers frequently present memorials against the foreign cult, as inimical to social duties and the traditions of government.

'from active life into sloth: it withdraws ever increasing areas 'from taxation: its devotees neither till the soil nor serve in the 'armies: it inculcates a thoroughly unfilial spirit and sons 'neither tend their parents when alive nor respect their memory 'when dead: against the pure moral teaching of Confucius it 'sets up foolish stories and misleading promises: it depraves 'the people' and from the religious, moral, and economic standpoint alike merits the most summary treatment by the State which suffers so much detriment from its propaganda.

Later Treatment by the State (to overthrow of Manchus).—The storm soon passed over; the *literati* could not carry out their designs against the 'will of the people'—always a serious hindrance to autocracy (or enlightenment) in the so-called despotisms of the East. Yet the number of religious houses (owning serfs and estates) was kept down by edict and the wealth already confiscated was not given back. In *955*, more than a century later, 3336 convents were suppressed for want of a charter or imperial warrant to authorize their existence, the number of monks and nuns now registered officially was given at 61,200 or less than a fourth of those existing a century before. It is not a little curious that (both in China and Japan) a period of buddhist supremacy is always an un-national epoch, a usurpation by an illegal power (as by the Shoguns), or a time of actual foreign conquest and dominion. The mongol rulers (*c. 1260–1360*) set the monks and convents free from these restraints and invited Tibetan priests and instructors into the country. A reaction followed, under Ming nationalism (*1368–1644*) a dynasty followed by the Manchu House which has but lately ceased to reign. Taitsu, the Ming liberator and founder of the dynasty, had been a buddhist monk; but he could not resist the now clamorous antipathies of the intelligent class upon whose help every chinese sovereign has hitherto been forced to depend. Later, ordinations were restricted to once in three years, and in *1450* to once in ten: and only a fixed number in each province or district might withdraw themselves by the tonsure from civil duties. Together with the *lamas* of Mongolia and Tibet, the monks were treated by later Mings as dangerous heretics: and in *1586* the peaceful anchorites were driven to defend their rights by a rebellion, like the militant yet buddhist abbots in Japan somewhat earlier. The Manchus after *1650* did not

bring any zealous support, as might have been expected; or were unable in the face of opinion to encourage a cultus which their forefathers had accepted with warmth. Maintaining the Ming statute-law, they still restricted the building of religious houses and the admission of neophytes.

APPENDIX Q. TRANSITION TO *Mahayana*: DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT

The *hinayana*, like the greek subjective schools, aimed at the relief of the suffering individual by teaching him the path of the *arhat*; this is contained in the *pali* canon and is the doctrine recognized in Ceylon, Burma, Siam. The *sanscrit* buddhist writings are later and have never been codified in a regular scripture; most of them represent *mahayana*, in which the immediate release of the *arhat* makes way for the new ideal of the *bodhisatva* who defers his *nirvana* for the welfare of mankind. In the *pali* canon we can trace the beginnings of a movement to deify Buddha the human teacher. In the *Digha Nikaya* we find a record of his last days ('Lecture on Complete Nirvana') where some passages depict him as man, others as demigod or magician; the latter are certainly later additions. So in *Majjhima N.* there is the same divergence; at times he is purely human, at others a wonderworker who controls nature. The date of the *Anguttara N.* is proved to be later than the two foregoing, because throughout Buddha is regarded as an all-knowing demigod, if not as actual deity. This *pali* canon, though best preserved by the wonderful memory of Ceylon, is altogether a product of N. India.

As time went on the *social* propensity of man emerged again and no doubt found a powerful stimulus in Asoka's State-church and imperial missions. It was now declared that the *theravadin* doctrine of the elders was inadequate and held out hopes only to the few who adopted the full monastic rule. The new aim was to bring salvation to all mankind; and even a *pariah* could vow himself to this philanthropic service and attain the dignity of *bodhisatva* by virtue and devotion to the Master. The 'devotion' of hindu theism (dealt with elsewhere) exerted undoubted influence and transformed a philosophy into a religion, a teacher into God. Brahman doctrine at this point entered to modify metaphysics; Buddha had denied the *ego*, but had (in effect) left reality to the world of matter, and the wheel or cycle of life which the deeds of man from the beginning of time have created. The new *mahayana* denied that anything existed—either an uncompromising nihilism, like that of Gorgias, or an idealistic nihilism, like Berkeley's, that everything exists only in consciousness. To this age belongs the *Mahavastu* (*150* B.C. with accretions down to *c. 350* A.D.). It is in mixed *sanscrit*, it contains a miraculous life of Buddha and is the textbook of a sect which holds the Buddhas to be supernatural beings.[1]

It is not yet *mahayana* and there is no resplendent mythology; but it has some kinship with the later doctrine and inculcates devotion

[1] Poussin thinks that 'it would not be difficult to eliminate from the '*Mahavastu* the passages with a *Lokottaravadin* tendency': that is, those recognizing the supernatural character of the Buddhas.

to Buddha as adequate for the attainment of *nirvana*. This work is called by Poussin 'the bridge between *hinayana* and *mahayana*.' Its *buddhology* marks a stage between the concept of Buddha as simple mortal and the notion of Buddha as eternal God, sending down semblances or illusive images of himself into our world. He is depicted as superman, feeling neither hunger nor thirst nor carnal desires. He behaves as man,only out of condescension (as in our Christian συγκατάβασις) and kindly thought for men. He is *lokottara* superior to the world; his body is *manomaya* 'mind-figment', not a corporal substance (cf. St. John i); he belongs to the class of beings called 'apparitional' (*aupapaduka*) who on death vanish completely and leave no trace behind. One chapter named 'book of the ten steps or *bhumis*' recounts the successive stages by which a man determined to become a Buddha must advance to his desired goal: it anticipates objections and cavil from a less ambitious party; 'only to those who resolutely aspire to this high destiny ought 'these stages to be disclosed; they will believe, but the rest will only 'sneer' (i. 193, ed. Senart, Paris 1882–97). Here we are very close to the later doctrine; this part of the treatise is expressly addressed to the travellers by the Great Vehicle and the selfish *arhat* is warned off the perusal. Again, there are many supernatural Buddhas; not a single historic human teacher, standing to his disciples much as Epicurus to the little band of followers whom he released from the terrors of death. But in spite of these indications of change in the landscape, we have not arrived at our journey's end, at complete *mahayana*; we find no mention of *karuna* compassion, of *Sunyata* emptiness, or of *dharani* spell: we do not see represented the mythical figures of Amitabha, Manjusri, Avalokita.[1]

The book claims to be the 'recitation' (text-book or canon) of the *Mahasanghikas*, an important sect of the Midland (*madhyadesa*). They lived in N. India (Magadha, Kosala, Videha) in the very cradle of the faith or school of Gautama, and certainly held their school to be a legitimate outcome of his teaching. Buddha called the true flavour of his doctrine the 'flavour of deliverance': his discipline is therefore *either* a path (*marga*) leading to *nirvana* and putting an end to the series of rebirths in time, or as a vehicle (*yana*) conveying those who mount it to the same goal. The *hinayana* (which the later school disparages as an inferior and ineffective scheme of salvation) asserts that release can be easily gained; it is a 'vehicle drawn by deer.' Duly practised it professes to lead *in this life* to complete enfranchisement. The *arhat* when dying may say to himself 'I have nothing more to do; I shall not be born again on earth' and he

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[1] Windisch 'Kompos. des Mahavastu' in *Sachs. Gesells. d. Wissens.* xxvii 1909; Winternitz *Hist. Ind. Liter.* Leipzig 1913; Barth's articles in *Revue Hist. Relig.* xi 1885, xlii 1900 and *Jl. des Savants*, 1899. The dialect is neither *sanscrit* nor *pali* nor any *prakrit* form, but an arbitrary medley of all. The *mahasanghika* school never fixed their language. The present form is *late*—cent. iv or v. We find curious transliterations of foreign words e.g. *horapathaka* for star-gazer, Felix, Usbek and certain references to chinese and hunnish writings.

believes himself to be entering absolute *nirvana*. This release is attainable only by those who strictly follow the monastic rules of the *bhiksu*. In this system Buddha is neither a god nor even a superhuman being ; yet he is different from all other saints who obtain release by the illumination (*bodhi*) which he first brought to men's knowledge. He discovered the truths of salvation and pointed out the true path ; for in his many past lives he had accumulated merit and knowledge by good works and by his desire to save mankind. Yet he is not to be worshipped ; nor is *bhakti* (devotional affection) a proper sentiment to entertain towards him, for it implies a living and personal god. It is good to venerate relics and *stupas* and as penance these outward practices are helpful, but they are by no means essential. To those who ' cannot receive this saying ' or undertake the monkish mendicant's discipline, the *hinayana* prescribes rules by which the less ambitious may be reborn in Brahma's heaven.

The *Mahayana* describes the virtues and training of one who, not content to be Gautama's disciple, wishes to become Buddha himself in the fullest sense. It also implies the (philosophic) knowledge of vacuity or emptiness and the (religious) department of devotion. The Great Vehicle tends to deny altogether that *nirvana* can be reached by the old method and extends the career of one thirsting for salvation to many centuries of apprenticeship, while he is learning the duties of a *bodhisattva*. Not monks alone but married laymen living in the world can take the great vow to become future Buddhas. The only way to Salvation is to become a Buddha and this demands a long career in a series of lives. Buddha's promise of the guerdon of *arhat*ship is a compassionate fiction ; he showed men a goal seemingly close at hand that they might not faint by the way on their long journey : he was a wise caravan-leader. But after death they are reborn—much to their surprise and disappointment—in a heavenly paradise of Amitabha and there make the new vow. The chinese texts (de Groot, Amsterdam 1893) reduce *hinayana* to mere observance of monastic rules : they hold that it conducts only to very inferior paradises ; it is a vehicle that leads to the gods not to real salvation. The vow to become Buddha creates in a man obligation to keep it and grace to perform its duties. He must keep all the perfect virtues (*paramitas*) ; he must be taught how to practise them. He cannot avoid offences ; so he must be told how to confess them and obtain pardon. The cold ' protestant ' memorial-services round *stupas* or *dagobas* are no longer adequate to stir devoutness and win aid from the higher powers : therefore a liturgy and fixed rules of worship are needed. The Buddhas are great gods who sit on heavenly thrones encircled by saints and send down ' semblance bodies ' (docetism) to save mankind. Some men may occupy themselves with pure devotion to these deities, apart from any vow to imitate their heroic achievement and from any speculation about their nature. There exists then a Great Vehicle which is purely *devotional* ; and the sole concern of those who use it is to be reborn in the paradise of Amitabha, by the god's grace and the help of holy saints like Avalokita. In these volumes there is practically no reference to *nirvana*. The supreme virtue and vehicle is *bhakti* of the type found in hindu theism ; it is manifested in orthodox

acts of worship (such as even *hinayana* enjoined) in litanies, invocations, acts of penance, formulæ—certain in course of time to become magical and theurgic. It is held that virtue, together with pious reading of scripture and repetition of holy names, can efface sin : this is not consonant with the tenets of the early school. It was certainly a current perversion into pure formalism against which Santideva protested (*Siksasa*, see Poussin's *Introd. à la pratique des futurs B.*, Paris 1907) : 'The adept of 'mahayana will never give his pupils the vain hope of acquiring purity by 'simply reading the book and reciting the liturgy, while at the same time 'he abandons the rules of (moral) conduct.' To this popular side of the Great Vehicle corrupt hinduism easily attached itself ; indeed a separate method of salvation was invented by perverse ingenuity, the *mantra-* or *tantra*-yana. This is *vedantine* in its doctrine and purely pagan and sivaite in its myth and practice.[1] Its goal is that of our later western heretics and is based on pantheism : every being is held to be a Buddha in his inmost nature (cf. Sudaili, extreme realism, David of Dinant and the amalricans) ; every being can realize this buried divinity in him at little trouble by spells (*sadhana*) and mystical theurgy, often of a very peculiar and immoral kind. These *sadhanas* are magical incantations by means of which a worshipper brings a deity into his presence and identifies himself with it—process by no means difficult, since every one is in essence nothing but deity though this universal being is in him particularized and degraded.

We now turn from the *religion* to the *philosophy* of the new school, to its (vedantine) doctrine of emptiness—of which brief mention has already been made. This is of course entirely distinct from the *practical* teaching, whether for the future Buddha who has taken the great vow to save mankind or for the layman who by ritual devotion or by spell seeks to win a place in the western paradise. The *mahayana*, examining the traditions and tenets of the old philosophic school, objects to the incompleteness of the denial of soul or *ego* : 'Soul as a complex of passing and shifting 'elements (*skandhas*) with no real being of its own.' No doubt approaching the problem of being from the adopted standpoint of vedantine idealism, the new teachers were amazed with the reality still allowed to the outer world but refused summarily to thought and consciousness. Hence a resolute attack on the universe or *samsara*, which is no longer permitted to enjoy a higher dignity than the soul. To the denial of *ego* (perhaps admitted with reluctance) they add that the *skandhas* themselves do not

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[1] I may here again refer to that odd and unscientific but very suggestive book Arthur Lillie's *India in Primitive Christianity*, Trübner 1909 : the passages on Siva and the unhappy alliance of a savage nature-cult with the quietism of 'waterdrinking vegetarian celibates' are excellent : he believes Kaniska and Nagarjuna to be the chief offenders and we would recommend his strictures on the *popular* development of 'Southern Buddhism' (in Ceylon and elsewhere) to the notice of the idealizers (Rhys Davids e.g. makes no mention of these charges in his article *Enc. Rel. Eth.* 'Cey. Buddh').

exist but are void (*Sunya*). This nihilistic philosophy is not indispensable for layman or monk who takes the great vow : indeed, it is said explicitly that he who devotes himself to charity and compassion at the outset of the career, should not brood overmuch on the ' doctrine of emptiness.' With this belief were often joined theories of immanence and of monism, of which we certainly find the echo or reverberation in the muslim sectaries. The ' system of the mean ' or ' middle way ' (*madhyamaka*) was generally looked upon as Nagarjuna's creation (cent. ii. A.D.) and its textbook is probably his authentic work (according to Poussin). This philosophic school is largely responsible for the Great Vehicle and its activity may be assigned to the earliest centuries A.D. It could claim the example of the Master ; Buddha had on all points of transcendental dogma occupied the ' middle path ' and refused to dogmatize on many points of cardinal interest, steering between affirmation and denial. The *dharmas* (in a sense nearly approaching the meaning of *skandhas*) are realities, things which in their brief momentous life, really exist and make up the fictitious individual (*pudgala*) who is ' a bundle of sensations ' (Hume) ; a mass, collection or series of these *dharmas* following each other in unbroken sequence of cause and effect. The individual is thus merely a collective term, which as with the medieval nominalists is a *flatus vocis* and nothing more : the first step in salvation is to see through the illusion of egoism. As a waggon is but a name given to the collected parts which make it up, so man is but an aggregate of the elements, whether in body or mind, which constitute his pseudo-*ego*. Apart from them he has but an ideal existence—one of designation only (*prajnapti*). Where the ancient buddhism allowed itself to repose on metaphysics, these were the two cardinal dogmas ; ' the unit is *unreal*,' (*pudgalairatmya*) and ' the dharmas which constitute it are ' *though real* momentary and transient.' The school of *madhyamaka* declares the unreality of the *dharmas* themselves. The being who suffers does not exist, but no more does the pain exist. Everything is vacuity. As every phenomenon is caused, a link in an unending series, it is not produced in itself and does not exist of itself or in its own right. This negative attribute, ' not to be produced or exist in itself,' is indeed its essential nature : its very being is vacuity and non-being, *sunyata*, as in Hegel's Logic being cannot be distinguished from non-being. Some interpret this as literally ' nothingness ' ; others make of it a permanent and ' divine ' principle, transcendental and incapable of definition but immanent as their root and core in transient phenomena. At the same moment that Nagarjuna produced this nihilism, one school of basilidians was putting forward the same doctrine of ὁ μὴ ὢν θεὸς (Hippolytus *Ref. Hær.* vii 22). Into this notion a curiously *positive* meaning is forced : we trace a complete circuit in the evolution from *zero* reached by ' thinking away ' or abstraction to the very concrete source of things demanded by ordinary knowledge when it is inquiring into origins. This non-existent principle becomes thunderbolt, diamond, male organ : and the most ethereal of all root-ideas is transformed into a patron of the left-handed *tantrism*. Indeed to some *madhya* scholars the term ' vacuity ' did not imply *nothingness* so much as *origination from causes*, and was used to express the basal nature of things.

The *dharmas* do not exist substantially; they are like the beauty of a daughter of a barren woman. 'Absolute truth is silence.' But the real destination of this negativity is to reinstate *idealism* and thus to approach closely the old vedantine position. Buddha had analysed and annihilated the conscious *ego*, and the same principle had now been applied to the bodily and spiritual elements (*dharmas*) which constitute the figment of *ego* and its impressions. The reaction among the scholarly carried them back to a very early position of hindu thought: 'all we are is the result of what we have thought; it is made up of our thoughts' (*Dhammapada*, Sacr. Books of East x 1898). Hence *thought*, although it is held to originate (as in sensualist schools) either from sense-impression or to follow on a sequence of earlier thought, somehow contrives to vindicate a sort of independence against the *matter* out of which it arises. The same nemesis or reaction produced in the vulgar the revival of *lingam* cult and tantric ritual, and led directly to that alliance with *sivaism* which has been noticed elsewhere: for Siva is both source or instrument of life and also the 'great' yogi' who reduces everything to nothingness. Chandra Kirti believes that this *madhya* tenet of vacuity is actually found in the *pali* canon of *hinayana*; that (therefore) the Great Vehicle is an attempt to introduce a positive and philanthropic element into a universal abstract negation. It teaches, not merely the *dharmanairatmya*—which it had indeed inherited—but the stages of a future Buddha's beneficent career, his perfect virtues, his vows to save all things by the sacrifice of himself, his great compassion. It is then rather the social *remedy* of nihilistic quietism, than its dogmatic *exegesis* (cf. his *Madhyamakavatara*, Muséon viii 272 new series).

The intrusion of *devotion* into a system of self-help avowedly scornful of divine or angelic beings has puzzled modern students. Poussin is now certain that Amitabha and his paradise were dogmatized some time before *148–170* A.D. (the age of the Antonines and the chief gnostic heresiarchs): for to that period must be referred the *chinese* translation of the scripture describing this very genuine monotheism (under Emperors Chiti and Huenti of the Han dynasty). The sculptura monuments of *Gandhara* (not later than *c. 50–100* A.D.) also show us *bodhisattvas* associated in worship with the Buddhas. Although the early and orthodox school did not *deify* Gautama in the *hinayana* documents [1] its scholars concluded that he did not come down to earth in person but sent a semblance or phantom. This is the later *mahayana* doctrine in its completeness: a Buddha almost eternal saves mankind by dispatching magical creations. If the *Katthavatthu* [2] as a whole is authentic we must suppose that this belief arose before Asoka's reign (*c. 270–220* B.C.); and in any case the theory of almost deified, almost everlasting Buddhas predates by a long time the formal documents expressing it. Poussin sees in this a 'natural evolution of buddhist doctrine on hindu soil': it is really a syncretic blend with the conception of *Krsna*, reigning happily in his own paradise (*goloka*) and appearing at times in human form: so Buddha has

[1] Here Poussin abandons a construction he had put on certain passages in 1908.

[2] Cf. p. 212.

his own permanent abode in the 'western land' and sends to earth his magical or docetic bodies. The belief in the providence and saving grace of Amitabha and Avalokita has 'very little in common with primitive 'buddhism' but is excellent *krsnaism*.'[1] Max Muller and Beale preferred to see in this development a *parsi* or mazdean element, exerting an influence on N. India, Punjab, Kashmir—where (with hellenic traits) religious art and theory acted and reacted.[2] Poussin however, while open to conviction by future evidence, cannot believe that Amitabha is either Ormazd or Apollo. It need not be said that this devout address to gracious and fatherly deities cannot be reconciled with the earlier philosophy. In that, a man 'took refuge' in the Buddha only in the sense that he practised and meditated upon certain virtues or qualities of which Buddha had given a (quite human) example.

Although the *mahayana* school claimed to be a legitimate outcome of Gautama's own teaching, it is certain that its tenets gradually dethroned him both from the reverence of the philosopher and the *cultus* of the devout. He still occupies a leading place in the *Lotus of Good Law* but disappears from the formal religions founded on the Great Vehicle. Maitreya supersedes him—the Buddha that shall be revealed: at the present time he is far more alive than Gautama who has passed behind the veil. It is also clear that Avalokita, Vairochana, Amitabha himself, are not really buddhist figures but are introduced by syncretism. Still the school labours to show that all its special dogmas are *immanent* in the Master's own teaching: (1) the elements of the *ego* are themselves unreal (*Samyutta* ii 17 iii 14): (2) the Buddha's teaching is multiple and adjusted to the ideas of the world: (3) the *Mahavastu* itself (though within the *hinayana* canon) teaches the perfect virtues (*paramitas*) and the stages in a *bodhisattva's* career. They claim the right of development and expansion: if the whole doctrine was not revealed to the ancients it was owing to their weakness. These doctrines, too sublime for hindu disciples five centuries before Christ, were preached by Buddha to the gods in heaven and to the *bodhisattvas*. The later enlightenment was gained through the direct revelation of Maitreya to Asanga; Manjusri took a *bhiksu's* form and made known the *Prajnaparamita*. Nagarjuna is said to have acquired this writing from the Nagas. This person (according to Kern *Manual Ind. Buddh.* Strasburg 1896) may have been one of the most gifted leaders of the movement rather than its actual originator. Manjusri is represented as uttering his vow in these terms: 'I do not wish to become a buddha quickly; I wish to 'remain in this world to the last to save its creatures.' The name Brahma is even given to this *bodhisattva* (*Namasamgiti* viii 19); which proves that

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[1] On the other hand, the idea of many buddhas each ruling separate universes in infinite space and time, is good early buddhism (cf. *Mahavastu*).

[2] Attention must be called to the very beautiful and complete work of Rudolf Hoernle and other scholars just published by Clarendon Press: *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan* Vol. I (part i. MSS in *sanscrit, khotanese, kushean, tibetan* and *chinese*) May 1916.

these buddhist saints and deified mortals tend to pass into hindu deities: so Avalokita becomes Siva. It seems clear that the origin of many of these figures is foreign. Manjusri is said by the pilgrim I-tsing to dwell in China ; the nepal MSS. represent him as worshipped there and as coming from China to Nepal. It is certain then that China and the intervening region between the Pamirs and Great Wall contributed largely to the evolution of buddhism. Huber already notes in *pali* canon of one *hinayana* sect, traditions foreign to Hindustan, e.g. the legend of a town in Khotan. He suggests that the canon had been largely augmented and modified in Turkestan (cf. article in *Bulletin de l'école française de l'extrême orient* vi 335, Paris 1906 and Hoernle op. cit. 1916).

In conclusion, a few words may be added upon a most popular treatise which gives a more accurate notion than any other writing of the changes which spiritual needs and physical surroundings produced in buddhism. In 'Lotus of Good Law' (*Saddharmapundarika*, tr. by Kern *Sacred Books East* xxi 1884, sanscrit text Kern-Nanjio, Petrograd 1908–9) we have Buddha as a sublime being, almost eternal, unveiling in a kind of phantasmagoria the 'divine splendour' (like Mitra's cloud) which is now attributed to all the Buddhas. He is no longer a simple mortal teacher, passing to and fro before a strictly historic background. He is a hindu 'god'; a glorified magician, saint and superman, showing himself in miracle and myth (though neither a creator nor a power immanent in creation). Thus Poussin's paradox is literally true : 'Although completely divine, he is not 'God in the *Lotus*.' There is not a word incapable of an orthodox and *atheistic* sense. He is 'Buddha from the beginning,' father of worlds and even universal providence. He appears in (docetic) form as a man ; but all the time (and in the countless other incarnations) he is still reigning serene on the Vulture Mountain, imparting true wisdom to the future Buddhas. Yet he exists only from the beginning of this present cosmic age and in the end he will be supplanted by another. And indeed, even now he is not unique : elsewhere other Buddhas are reigning and teaching the secret of the universal mystery, though they may not be his equals in merits, glory, or compassionate activity. He is (once more) only 'world-father' as instructing the future Buddhas ; not as creator either of the universe or of the human race. Yet it is clear that while speculation kept within orthodox lines, religious sentiment boldly pronounced Sakyamuni to be actually God, providence, and the recompenser of saints.

Note : The earliest chinese version dates from *255* A.D. the next (with additional matter) from *286*. Kern believes the (now lost), original to precede this date by several centuries. Poussin compares its buddhology with the 'Amitabha Sutras,' transl. into chinese (as above) between *148* and *170* A.D. Winternitz however does not place the first writing earlier than the year *200*. This is certainly too late and we shall not err in referring the original to *c. 100* A.D.

CHAPTER B. CHINESE BUDDHISM: FUSION WITH TAO AND DOCTRINAL CHANGES

Buddhism enters China in a philanthropic garb suited to her needs.—It is now time to consider more closely the changes or additions which mark off this later religious development from the subjective and philosophic eudæmonism of Gautama. He merely gave an attractive and novel answer to the universal inquiry of the indian mind, how can I obtain release from existence? But to the normal chinese spirit ultimate questions (whence? whither? wherefore?) can hardly be said to present themselves. The Hindu had long before Gautama's age identified life with suffering and recognized the 'inexorable causal nexus' which bound one existence to another. The extinction of all willing was the sole method of escape. Apart from his single original dogma of *no-soul* Buddha taught that this was attained not by self-torture or anchoritism but by a common life in mendicant fraternities, free from worldly cares and ties. The spiritual calm which was the goal, Buddha refused to define either as *being* or *non-being*; he rejected as needless for the great practical purpose all subtle metaphysics. Under his followers, as we have seen, two alien influences crept in: (*a*) the need of apology and defence in the terms of current dialectics, (*b*) the compromise with popular paganism in a system which after all, like Epicurus, never denied the heavenly beings but only depreciated them and put them in a place far inferior to that of the perfected sage. They were forced to admit the persistent belief conspicuous in the *Yoga* discipline that the contemplative life (no less than the ascetic) produces in the adept supernatural powers; and almost from the first, magic was no less sought after than in the chinese *Tao*.[1] Quite early in buddhist development a

[1] It cannot be denied that B. himself placed a mystical ecstasy transcending consciousness as the final term in discipline; a state (as in Yoga or even Sankhya) attained by bodily exercises and self-induced hypnotic trance, and giving release from material restraints: the adept can pass

doubt had arisen whether *personal sainthood* was the aim: a more ardent section preferred the attainment of buddhahood not for any selfish purpose but in order to preach deliverance to manhood in a more perfect life. Thus buddhism, from the first inclined to missionary effort, became a religion and a church. A common brotherhood became a highly organized hierarchic system. This new philanthropy which indefinitely defers the prize of *nirvana*, provides for the zealous and ambitious a much wider scope than could be found in the philosophic protestantism of the founder. It was in this catholic form that the doctrine entered China to meet and coalesce with the school of Tao.

Answer to problem of Immortality secured a welcome: Chinese 'numinism'.—While contempt of life and indifference to ultimate questions are features absent from the normal chinese character, a small number had always shown interest both in metaphysics and in a somewhat practical mysticism. Most citizens aimed at securing earthly goods and were contented to possess and use them in a social commonwealth, the units of which were bound together by reciprocal duties. The few and elect were interested in securing immortality, mundane rather than spiritual, an extension of the present life rather than the hope of an eternal future. Even on this ground the way was prepared for a popular welcome: the one permanent religious feeling in China was, and is, respect for departed ancestors not unmingled with fear. Buddhism, at the stage in which it arrived in China as a developed system, could minutely describe and qualify the somewhat vague and nebulous ideas of soul-survival among an unimaginative people. Like the orphic schools in Greece the buddhist doctors come with authentic tidings of recompense and happiness beyond the tomb. The parallel is indeed complete; the homeric *ghost*, twittering feebly and depending on draughts of blood to resume its lost powers of reason and speech for a space, becomes the (platonic) soul with a brilliant yet terrifying vista of spiritual bliss and misery stretching before it, when released from earth-life. To the notion of retributive justice in this world the chinese mind was well accustomed; of future recompense (even in Tao) it had thought little. Authentic accounts of the real paradises and

through walls and fly through the air: even in early writings these powers are attributed to B. without any denial of his own doctrines in which they were certainly latent.

hells, where the dead felt the after-effects of life, were eagerly hailed, and it is to this revelation that the pertinacious vitality of buddhism in China must be referred. The ancient religion of China must have largely resembled that of Rome; it was directed to practical and earthly ends and addressed its petition to non-human colourless spirits; named and defined only by the functions each fulfilled and the narrow department each supervised. Buddhism entered China not merely with a dignified cultus and ritual but with a doctrine which replaced these vague abstractions by gracious deities full of love and compassion for men; with a hope of immortality which brought tidings of their forefathers' mode of life beyond the grave. For the first time religion, hitherto confined as a state-service to the narrow circle of officials, became a living power for the private citizen and a personal relation to an accessible Saviour.

Richer development of Buddhism in Japan.—For an inquiry into chinese schools or sects and their doctrines we cannot be satisfied with chinese authorities alone. In its days of supremacy buddhism in China displayed the various hindu subdivisions or even independent native offshoots. But these rivalries and distinctions which tell of vigorous intellect and practical aims, have disappeared since the middle of cent. xvii. The *regular* clergy now show a fusion of the older sects of *Mahayana*; and the *secular* attendants at funerals and readers of 'masses' for the dead represent a peculiar school which is seen at its best in Japan. Here the daughter is a safer guide than the mother. Still, chinese buddhism can be studied by itself with profit, if we remember the decline which has of late produced an unscientific syncretism and a merely popular compromise.

The World-Path or Order (negative and positive) in Tao.—But there is one native system which must be briefly treated here before the soil can be rightly estimated on which the buddhic seed has produced so plentiful a crop—I mean the system of Tao.[1] We do not know if the 'Tao' is the work of the almost

[1] The texts of Tao have been published by Legge S.B.E. xxxix, xl 1891, with the '*Tao-teh-king*' (of which abstruse work Victor Strauss's translation 1870 is perhaps the best, Wilhelm's the more recent) *Chwancius* (or *Chwang-tsze*) (also tr. by Giles 1889), 'Acts and their Recompense': for Licius (or *Lieh-tsze*) we have Faber's essay of 1877 on *Naturalismus* among the ancient Chinese. Among general essays R. Dvora's second division of *Chinas Religionen* 1903 is certainly the best and most exhaustive. The

fabulous Lao-tze or Laocius, an older contemporary of Confucius (*c. 600–520*), with whom the sage is brought into somewhat mythical connexion at the court of Chow in Honan. The conservative view (e.g. in Grube) suggests that the book embodies his teaching but with additions and arrangements by disciples and interpolations of still later hands. *Tao* is an almost exact equivalent of the buddhist *dharma*, as *way, method, order, norm, standard* (like ὁδὸς used of the profession of Christian belief in the *Acts*). Confucius uses it of the *way of heaven*—the *moral world-order* which he traced also (like Buddha) in the *physical* order of nature. In human affairs it is the path of reason, truth, unswerving principle. So far it might very well correspond to the stoic λόγος in its various senses. For the Taoist it has besides a peculiar meaning, the unknown, nameless substance of the world, Plato's *ἀναφὴς κ. ἀχρωμάτιστος οὐσία*. In chap xxv the writer pierces behind the world of appearance to the real essence beyond, to the changeless and motionless Being which is source of all flux and seeming, as *οὐσία* of *γένεσις*. Like Plato in the *Timæus*, Laocius uses the name and idea of God Shang-ti (ch. 6); but before the personal Lord and Ruler is the unknowable essence, as to Plato Form of Good is before and above the Demiurge.[1] As in Hegel's *Logic*, it is both *being* and *not-being*.

great works of Groot and Grube may also be consulted, though the former deals chiefly with popular forms of religious custom and myth and the attitude of the State to sectarians (2 vols. 1903–4): Grube besides his *Hist. of Chinese Liter.* 1902, has published *Rel. und Kultus der Chinesen* 1910. Suzuki's *Hist. Chin. Phil.* (Probsthain 1914) is good.

[1] It is interesting to note that modern Theosophy accepts this very ancient distinction of the *impersonal* and *personal* in God, placing the former above the latter: cf. Leadbeater *Outline of Th.* p. 23 1915: 'We 'distinguish between God as the Infinite Existence' perhaps Essence would be a better word 'and the manifestation of this principle as a Revealed 'God, evolving and guiding a universe. Only to this limited manifestation 'should the term *a personal god* be applied. In Himself God is beyond 'the bounds of personality.' For the practical purposes of religion 'we 'need not go further than that glorious manifestation of Him (a little 'less entirely beyond our comprehension) the great Guiding Force or Deity 'of our own solar system whom philosophers have called the Logos.' It will be noted that greek *humanism* prefers to name this power by a human quality, indeed, the very *differentia* of man: indian and chinese *cosmism*, on the other hand call it by the impersonal name of *order* or *law*, into which man must fit and adapt himself.

Or we may say that as the absolute quiescent negation it gave birth to itself as active principle. It is both parent and grave of all things. Every particular creature has issued from this source and will return thither when its partial and fragmentary life is done. Though on its *passive* side it is unknowable (as with Spencer) it has, as the *positive* cause of an actual world, certain well-marked characteristics,—which, like the Philonian Logos and the Powers, are a guide to the nameless and inscrutable essence behind but by no means exhaust its infinite nature. The chief feature to Laocius seems to be the *ease* and *spontaneity of natural action*. Heaven does not fuss or strive, yet it has always its own way: 'Heaven and earth treat all things with equal care-'lessness and cast them aside when their turn is served, as men 'throw away puppets used for the sacrifice' (cf. *Chwancius* xiv 2). There is no benevolence or kindly purpose to be traced in the divine and the very different teaching of the buddhist missioners must have come as a welcome relief.

Text: 'Do nothing': no State-action or interfering Altruism. —Man must take this calm yet effective procedure for his model: he must not strive or allow his 'voice to be heard in the streets.' 'Do nothing and everything will be done.' Let the *cosmic* principle become in us the *ethical*, and all will be well. Purpose, planning, reasoning, reflexion—all these are self-defeating. The sage has no aims, desires or ambitions; no activities or impulse towards 'fatal doing.' He is *gentle*, *humble*, and *frugal*—the three jewels of passive virtue. He does not follow out the indifference of the Universe to its creatures, but spends gladly on others; by the usual paradox, 'the more he gives, the more he has 'himself'—love for all even the undeserving takes the place of Confucius' perfectly just 'reciprocity,' just as the Gospel in Christendom supersedes the Law. But it is the good will of a perfect quietist, who refuses to be troubled or indignant at others' injuries or grievances. If only the reformer would give up trying to regenerate the world and the statesmen to interfere, everything would go well. 'The sage is free from wrongs and injury 'because he refuses to regard wrongs in that light': exactly the position of Epictetus and Aurelius:—so-called harm or insult are but neutral things outside taking colour and quality from our thoughts and judgments about them. The author uses hard language about the 'benevolence, justice and filial piety' which

arose only when society became disordered and fell from its primitive innocence into conscious rectitude and hypocrisy. Virtues are only the opposites of vice ; in an ideal (paradisaic) state there would be neither. Virtue and wisdom are the results of a Fall from simplicity, as with an extreme naturalist of the school of Rousseau. The following maxim may be commended to the notice of reformers and socialists in the modern well-meaning and interfering State : ' The Empire is a divine trust ' and may not be ruled ; *he who rules, ruins* ; he who holds by ' force, loses.' In the best state of nature ' men knew not that ' there were any rulers, in the next they loved and praised them ; ' in the next feared, and at the last despised them '—a curiously accurate account of men's progressive change in their civil attitude towards all ' pastors and masters.' Like other quietists (e.g. the Friends) the true taoist objects to war and capital punishment : wherein ' man usurps the place of One (judge) who ' alone can inflict death.' He is a consistent anarchist and opposed to education on principle : ' The truly wise, if a governor of the ' people, will empty their mind and fill their belly, will weaken ' their will and strengthen their bones.' While Confucius still retained a lurking belief (from the most ancient days of sympathetic magic) that rites duly performed by man can help along the course of nature, he regards such ' works ' as vain, puerile and unseemly.

The End, harmony with Universal Order and Absorption.—The path to blessedness is to become, through pure passivity, *in tune* with the Universe, not to bring the Universe into harmony with our own desires. God is named only to show that he is a secondary being, and as among the gnostics, perhaps the meddlesome ruler but neither the parent nor the creator of the world.[1] When the cosmic law becomes the law of his sage's own soul, he is one with the Universe ; by self-emptying he admits the inrush of the ' divine ' principle, by giving up creatureliness and self-will, he is one with the Eternal and unqualified. So taoist hermits were at the first those who tried in solitude to follow

[1] Chwancius says quite boldly : ' A man looks upon God as on his own parent and loves him in equal measure ; and shall he not then love that which is greater than God ? ' As in buddhism there is no desire to deny the gods or teach average mankind to refuse their worship ; only there was unfolded to those who could understand, ' a more excellent way.'

nature's way without effort or intent, thus being united with her spontaneous order. Chwancius (a coeval of the confucian restorer Mencius *c. 350* B.C.) praises the 'pure men of old who' (in complete indifference) 'neither loved life nor hated death, 'neither forgetting whence they sprang nor hastening' (before their due time) 'to return thither.'

This purely mystical absorption into the impersonal is put very clearly by him in another passage. 'This is the very axis 'of Tao when *object* and *subject* both lack their correlates. When 'that axis passes through the centre at which all things infinite 'converge, *positive* and *negative* alike blend in the One.' Emerson himself might have written: 'The world and I came into being 'together, and I and all things therein are One . . . a myriad 'years as they revolve leave unscathed the oneness of the sage; 'the universe itself may pass but he still will flourish.'

Yet this Quietism cannot dispense with a master and a school: possible influence of Hindu Thought.—Although training and education, indeed any outside influence, was disparaged as unwarranted interference, need arose of guidance even to 'do nothing' aright. The progress of a novice is thus described by a master: 'I imparted as though withholding' (these paradoxes and oxymora occur at every turn) 'and in three days this condi-'tion of things below the moon had for him ceased to exist, 'with all its trivial distinctions of prince and subject, high and 'low, good and bad . . . in seven days the external world itself 'had ceased to be . . . after nine days more he was unconscious 'of his own existence—first as ethereal, then filled with perfect 'knowledge, then without past or present; and at the last, able 'to enter where life and death are no more, where to kill does 'not take away life, or length of days add to the term of being. 'In that condition he is ever in harmony with the demands of his 'environment.' This ultimate state at which the adept arrived cannot be distinguished from the rapture and *unio* of the mystics or the trance of buddhism (though the founder carefully guarded himself from any notion of union with a supreme being). Like Euripides' *Who knoweth if life be not death*?—indeed like Heraclitus more than a century before—he plays with the thought that our life here is a dream or a dying: 'by and by comes the Great 'Awakening, when we shall know that this existence here is 'but a vision of sleep. Only the foolish think they are wide-

awake now, and flatter themselves that they know for certain if they are princes or peasants '·(a passage curiously like an instance quoted by Kapila in the Sankhya). Chwancius tells how he himself dreamt he was a butterfly and awoke to find himself a man : ' I do not know whether I was *then* a man dream- ' ing that I was a butterfly or am *now* a butterfly dreaming that ' I am a man : between the two there is of necessity a barrier ' and the transition is named Metempsychosis.[1] ' This mystical attitude was always confined to the small circle of a few exceptional natures and became rapidly modified in the very mundane outlook of chinese materialism. Search for the ' life ' eternal ' in the sense of Spinoza and St. John was altered into alchemical prescriptions for the potion of immortality and a search for the philosopher's stone. Interest was limited to the attainment of good things in this life ; and the anchorites were regarded, not as saints retired from the world to save their souls, but as wonder-workers and magicians who, like Zanoni in Lytton's story, managed to stave off the attacks of Time and old age. For them were made the same claims that, from the days of Herodotus down to the *mahatmas* of esoteric buddhism, have been demanded for the true adepts ; the soul could leave the body, ascend into heaven and return to earth again.[2]

Tao, both by its contrasts and sympathies, prepares the way for Buddhism : its present condition.—Buddhism entered in the form of brotherhoods ' of the common life,' aiming at mutual

[1] The common elements of indifference, quietism and return to or union with the One, prevalent throughout northern India before Buddha are here apparent. It is difficult to avoid surmise of direct contact *c.* 350 B.C. between indian mystical thought and practice (brahman and buddhist) and such writings of the further East. At the same time, the phrases and similes, the aims and descriptions, of all mystical writers are identical everywhere. But the inaptness of the normal chinese character for such reveries is also incontestable, and the suggestion of a loan is hard to reject. Still, all that we maintain is that here at least the ground was ready. But it is also certain that Taoism had in large measure been modified into magic and alchemy by the time that the first definite buddhist teachers arrived.

[2] The Tao alchemists and professors of magic were held in high honour by Tsin and Han dynasties, their influence culminating under Vouti I (140–86 B.C.) of the latter house at the very moment when buddhism was pushing its first advances towards the Middle Kingdom. The concoction of cinnabar, by which they claimed to prolong life beyond normal limits, is said to have proved fatal to several emperors in this period.

support and encouragement on the way to release from the toils of existence. Nothing could well be imagined in greater contrast to Tao ideals. Their solitary wizards were no doubt regarded by the vulgar as already *genii* or visible gods (*shen*). But buddhism brought in a regular *cultus* as well as the doctrine of liberation which had already lost much of its earlier emphasis. The Tao had nothing to do with religious observance, but very soon adopted it from the exotic creed. Deities are first heard of in our fourth century (i.e. somewhat earlier than the time of Fa-hien's visit to India); and images are found in the temples of heroized founders, the Three Pure Ones—an obvious loan from the chief images of buddhist shrines. An effort was indeed made towards a definite syncretism: Laocius (already honoured as a demigod *c. 150* B.C., shortly before Vouti I's reign) was said to have vanished from China to be reborn as the Buddha in Hindustan.[1] There is the same familiar tale of a prince who leaves his palace, divides his goods amongst the poor, withdraws to a mountain to study the Way and at last ascends into heaven by merit to rule the world. He is called, in the north, Yu-hwang-Shang-ti[2], in the south *Tien-kung*. With Laocius and this deified hero (who becomes ruler and world-providence) is united *Tai-shi*, an impersonal principle presented under human form: the above constitute the sacred triad of taoist worship. A host of lesser *genii* (in true chinese fashion) preside over walled cities, preserving from drought and fire, watching the deeds of the people, and reporting like recording angels to the powers of heaven and hell: their cult is recognized by the State and is performed by

[1] It may be noted that this myth is much more agreeable to the authentic dates of B. Gautama's birth than the usual eras as given in China, which vary from *c.* 1053 to 600 B.C. The birth of Laotze fell (it was said) in 604 and it would have been just possible for him to have lived two full lives before the now accepted *nirvana* of Gautama *c.* 480 B.C. But in this case he could not have met and conversed with the young Confucius—any more than Parmenides could have talked with Socrates as Plato makes out. This immediate rebirth in our world, without any interval for paradise or a sojourn in other spheres, is a chief tenet of mongolian Lamaism and this first instance of the belief should be noted with care.

[2] The yellow or exalted emperor; *shang-ti* being the official title of the one deity of the State-monotheism to whom he forms a counterpart: the one is deistic, the other, trinitarian and anthropomorphic in this third ruler.

the city-prefect and his officers. From buddhism is derived the detailed pictures of the ten hells of retribution after death, each circle of the Inferno having its own judges and fitting penalties. Immortality (or a jewish 'long life in the land') is the highest good ;—a proof that the people reversed the whole tenets and spirit of both founders in the new syncretism which took the place of their philosophic schools. A clear instance of hindu influence is the new doctrine of *kamma* (karma) found e.g. in the *Book of Rewards and Penalties*. Here to Laocius who as a fact preached the doctrine of *non-action* and indifference is referred the importance of *action* : 'man brings on himself his own good 'and evil fortune by his conduct,—it is not predestined before-'hand' by any external power or fate. Yet there are watchful spirits who mark the least fault and curtail the lives of men accordingly ; for a great crime twelve years is taken off, for a venial offence 100 days. There are two kinds of immortality ; of *heaven* won by 1300 good deeds, of *earth*, by 300. So far has the school declined from the maxims and aims either of Buddha or of Laocius ! The moral teaching and practical guidance of life differ in no degree from the usual chinese social code,—which is based in the main—whatever may be the religious creed or practice—on the secular utilitarianism of Confucius.

APPENDIX R

Present condition of Buddhism as a Religious System in China

To-day but a small number of so-called buddhist priests have received tonsure as *regular* clergy : most belong to the *secular* priesthood without taking strict vows or receiving the rite of consecration. Invited by all classes of the people (including their enemies, the enlightened confucian mandarins) to read the liturgy or masses for the deceased, they live meantime a worldly life ; marry, own property, and eat meat and fish. They are closely associated with the chinese nation and have assimilated the old beliefs and practices of this people into a very peculiar syncretism. The Government regards this irregular clergy with dislike and suspicion, demands from them letters of registration and licence and either limits the number of their pupils, or else altogether forbids their public teaching. Under Keen-Lung (cent. xviii) they were warned to procure leave for

ordination and to retire to an authorized convent or in default give up their clerical life : but for some reason this edict was soon relaxed and became a dead letter. The inmates of the convents to-day are in training, according to *mahayana* belief, to become buddhas ; and while winning by merit their own salvation they help others by their pious exercises and exorcisms. They do not beg as did their early prototypes, and but rarely retire to the cave of the ascetical eremite. The brothers live from their ecclesiastical revenues, still in great measure unconfiscated, from pious gifts or legacies, or regular collections made with the Abbot's approval. A novice is now allowed to pass very rapidly through the inferior grades ; he becomes after two minor stages in a short time full monk, saint, and candidate for buddhahood or *bodhisatva*. This last ambitious title is peculiar to the *mahayana* system which teaches that a man s highest aim is to become a teacher and saviour of mankind in a future life and not to enter *nirvana*. Their rule and guide for this high profession is contained in the fifty-eight precepts of the *Net of Buddha*—which, unknown in any sanscrit original, is not even named in China before the eighth century. Besides the duty of universal and unvarying goodwill to mankind, they recognize the latent soul even in animals, and on seeing one, utter a prayer that 'the saving ' thought may awaken in it.' There is no need, on account of the inactive sloth of many of the monks, to belittle the really disinterested attitude of the *mahayana*. In its highest modern form it is something far beyond the intention of the master in spite of the curious story in the *Jatakas* that he gave his own body on one occasion to be meat to hungry and motherless tiger-cubs ! There is both a hall for regular preaching (attendance being as nearly compulsory on the brethren as the mild system allows) and a Chamber of Silence for private meditation (*samadhi* and the like spiritual states) : at a certain period a retreat is held here for all members to encourage the habit of pious introspection. There is also public confession of faults at intervals, and acts or rather professions of penitence at matins, in which the sinner dwells on the sinfulness of his act and atones for it by his sorrow : his own contrition and not the forgiveness of any higher power blotting out his transgression, that is, its evil effect on his character. The faithful laity are admitted into the halls of worship decorated with statues of the trinity (*tri-ratna*) Buddha, Law, Order as seated human figures ; here are offered incense, flowers and cakes but of course no sort of animal sacrifice. It is clear that immense influence is attached both to right thinking, mental concentration, and to the *opus operatum* : the former no doubt amongst the professed religious, the latter for the unleisured laity. Thought and wish (e.g. the desire for the salvation of all things) are believed to possess creative force and efficacy ; the wish is not ' father ' merely to the thought, but to the fulfilment. A monk catually attains bliss by intense fixing of the mind upon the idea of blessedness, and the reciting of the *sutras* over the dead can in effect release him from his past offences and lighten his purgatorial penances.

APPENDIX S

I. China's Debt to India: Syncretism of Buddhism and Tao

It is to be remarked that the buddhist classics current in China do not depict chinese but indian life 'as it was 2000 years ago' (Edkins, *Chin. Bm.*, ed. 2 Trübner 1893); just as the Pali classics, though redacted in Ceylon *c. 80* B.C., represent the scenes and settings of life at Magadha, not those of a tropical island. The missioners did not bring with them the great indian epics (unsuitable to the chinese temperament), but gave their attention rather to edifying stories with a moral. Still it is likely that translators, e.g. with Taoist sympathies, may have modified or interpolated; e.g. 'Diamond Classic' depicts the Bikku as Shawei under Julai (or Buddha); there are two classes, those who give up *vice* and aim at *virtue*, those who give up both, and these are the highest. This taoist indifference is not that of buddhism under e.g. Emperor Asoka. The term *Julai* as title for Buddha is explained as '*thus come*,'—he who brings human nature as it truly is, the ideal standard, perfect type; just as our Lord is said to recapitulate (ἀνακεφαλαιοῖ) our race and its possibilities and stands at the zenith of its development. A *bodhisatva* (in pursuit of this indifference) should 'have no fixed resting-place for his thoughts—'acquiesce in no colour, sound, smell, taste or particular motion . . . in 'thus acting, without regard to definite objects he wins great virtue and 'happiness. . . . Whatever has form is empty delusion,' the only truth is therefore in the formless. 'He who sees that all things appearing to possess form are in reality *formless*, truly perceives Julai,' that is the formless and matterless indifference of Buddha himself, the 'thus come.' Buddha is represented (here and elsewhere) not as a man, but as a divine being endowed with magical powers, in an instant transporting himself to the most distant paradise of those gods, whom he recognizes indeed as existing but humbles and instructs as pupils. We may go even further west to discover the earliest source; Mount *Sumeru* identified with El Burz in the Caucasus is the central point of Buddhist cosmogony; did not the first aryan inventors of the legend live in that neighbourhood or at least retain vivid memories of it in their south-eastern pilgrimage?

II. Tao and Buddha's Teaching of a Moral World-Order

As every man aims at happiness or personal satisfaction (in some form) and by the law of his nature cannot aim at anything else, the *motive* and *sanction* for conduct is of far greater interest and import than the exact content of the ethical code. In Buddha's system this implied but a single principle, 'Fate or Moral Order' and its result 'cause and effect.' This rules the world and operates strictly; causes (*yuen*) are always working out their inevitable results (*yin*). It is impersonal and needs no legislator, judge or executioner: as each good act carries its infallible reward, so each bad act brings its fitting retribution; the *effect* is contained in the *cause*. There-

fore gods (or any external aids) are superfluous and it is in the power of each to save himself. It is believed by some that this notion of *impersonal moral law* is from primitive Chaldea (Edkins) ; ' This Mesopotamian fate ' Buddha did not resist or deny ; he gave it logical form.' No doubt he sometimes expresses himself as if this *moral order* were a delusion or as if deliverance lay in seeing it as illusion : but on the whole both he and the later development regard *cause and effect* as something real which had to be undone by *not-doing*, by refraining from every activity which could beget children : here the system met and blended with esoteric Tao, which (as we may well imagine) was not widely accepted by the industrious and social Chinese to whom work was and is a necessity. If we represent Buddha as a consistent teacher (an impossible task) we may say that he flatly denied the outer world, and believed with all idealists that we can take hold of nothing that is not our own immediate state of mind, wrongly called ' impression.' But for all practical purposes, this complete *acosmism* may be neglected : as a fact he taught that actions are of the highest importance and effect and that the aggregate of our activities or formed character becomes a physical force able to create new centres of consciousness (if not to bring each one of us back again to suffer the reward of our deeds). It is interesting to note that under the Tang Emperors, when *Fu-yi* the confucian minister proposed to force monks and nuns to abandon celibacy, doctrines of self-help had almost disappeared from the foreign creeds. ' It was false ' he maintained ' that the fate of men depended ' on Buddha's will ' (the peculiar theistic form it then took in contrast to the early and more legitimate *works*-theory) ' for a natural law regulated ' life and death, and with it man had nothing to do. A man had indeed ' control over wealth or poverty by his own exertions or sloth, and the ' recompense of vice and virtue lay in the Emperor's province.' Here the confucian objector is really stating in a very popular manner a principle which formed the essence of the early teaching, and had been entirely forgotten in the new and easier doctrine of *faith* or *grace*, supplementing the old theory of *works* and personal endeavour. Again under Taitsong (*c. 770* A.D.) a mandarin's remonstrance addressed to the throne states that wise princes of old got success by their own good conduct—not by prayers and sacrifices offered to unseen powers. So Edkins says of modern ' worship ' in the convents : ' good luck ' (sic) ' is expected not through ' the will of any god, but through an impersonal fate ' (*Ch. B.* ed. 2, 258). It was characteristic of all indo-aryan thought to prefer impersonal Fate to any divine ruler, spontaneous evolution to any creative act. This is *magic* or *science* as opposed to *religious faith* and creationism. The later chinese cosmogonies fell under buddhist influence and admitted no sovereign deity ; belief was inculcated in a ':Fate which creates and ' destroys, blindly impartial, entirely impersonal and incessantly efficient ' (op. cit. 323). Hence when the purely moral individualism and self-help of the first phase decayed, magic entered no less potently than in Tao ; charms, formulæ, spells, postures and the like exert influence not because a divine being is induced by our deference to act through nature to fulfil our wish, but because we place ourselves within the electric current of infallible

and retributive law which is the cause of all that happens and is in the highest degree *responsive* to the wisdom and virtue of the perfected sage (406). It is in this manner that we can reconcile the two opposing views, denial of the outer world and belief in a cosmic moral order: Buddha undertakes to set man free, not from the chain of *cause* and *effect* (which is impossible), but from the illusion that Fate is a grim external power: it is rather the very law of our own inmost being (so far, that is, as it can in any sense be said to exist at all).

APPENDIX T

I. The Series of Quietist Patriarchs until their Settlement in China

It became the fashion to connect the notion of complete (pyrrhonian) indifference with the highest form of sainthood. The chief 'office' is held not by an administrator or hierarch, but by the most signal instance of detachment. He is one who does not look at evil with dislike or make any strong effort to attain the good; while he does not approach folly he does not aim at positively comprehending truth. If he is thought to penetrate into the mind of Buddha more deeply than any other disciple, it is because he sees through the fallacy of rigid opposites into the 'coincid-'ence of contradictories.' Without any ruling power, living poorly and meanly dressed, he is nevertheless expected to perform magical acts; fly through the air, cross a river on a raft of leaves, rain down milk, and enter into *samadhi* or trances of various kinds. There were 33 such exemplars of quietism, including 5 patriarchs after the migration to China. (1) *Kasyapa*, a brahman of Magadha; (2) *Ananda* (the St. John of Buddhism); (3) *Shangnavasu* of Rajagriha who went to Candahar (Kipin) and taught the doctrine (? about the year *400* B.C.); (4) *Upagupta*, native of Madura (said to be coeval with Emperor Asoka (*c. 250*); (5) *Drikata*; (6) *Michaka*; (7) *Vasumitra* (rejected from the list by many as being the leader of the Contemplatist heresy) took a prominent part in Kaniska's council (date ?); in his place Chipan the historian at Ningpo under the Mongol dynasty (*c. 1270* A.D.) gives *Madhyantika*, Ananda's disciple; (8) *Buddhanandi* (like the rest from N. India); (9) *Buddhamitra*; (10) *Parshva*; (11) *Punayaja*; (12) '*Maming*' the neighing horse, born at Benares, residing at Pataliputra. He explained that the *physical* world (see section above) rests on the laws of the *moral* nature (*Sing-hai*) for its basis of existence; so do the powers of trance (*samadhi*) and other far-reaching perceptions of adepts; (13) *Kapimara*, whose many disciples spread the doctrine in S. India (to which the centre of orthodox gravity was shifting); (14) *Nagarjuna* or *Lung-shu* of S. India, a prolific author of the Greater Vehicle and an object of keen dislike (stated in the *Handbook* to have flourished *194–200* A.D.); (15) *Kanadeva*, also from S. India; (16) *Rahulata* from Kapila in N. India; (17) *Sanghanandi* a king's son and ascetic from the tender age of seven, also from the North; (18) *Sangkayasheta* a pure subjective idealist ('neither 'the bells nor the wind make the sound of ringing but my mind'.) (19)

Kumarada who teaches the orthodox doctrine of *cause and effect* ('man's 'unequal lot is on account of good and evil acts in past lives; happiness 'and misery recompense this: in a future life will our present virtue and 'vice be rewarded. . . . Let your mind be at rest and pure, without life 'or death, defeat or victory, act or recompense: you will then attain the 'same eminence as the Buddhas of the past. All vice and virtue, action 'and reaction,are a dream and a delusion' (thus the inner circle seems to hold views of moral indifferentism approaching those of the adepts among the Assassins in later medieval times (+*23* A.D.); (20) *Jayata*; (21) or (22) *Manura* went to teach in W. and S. India, leaving the easier duty of evangelizing N., Central, and E. India to *Yaja*. (23) *Haklena* came from Candahar +*209* A.D. (according to chinese computation): to a disciple asking the buddhist equivalent to 'Master what must I do to be saved?' 'To what must I give chief attention to obtain true knowledge of things?' He replied 'DO NOTHING; if you do *anything* there is no merit in it: 'by *doing nothing* you will comply with buddhist teaching. . . . By 'following the stream and recognizing the true nature you attain a position 'where is neither joy nor sorrow'; (24) *Singhalaputra* of Central India who also went to Candahar; he was beheaded as a martyr by the king reigning at Kipin: it is not a little curious that Mani was put to death (under Sapor of Persia) much about the same date. Here according to some ends the series with the martyrdom of the twenty-fourth patriarch; but the Contemplative School in China insist on the equal status of the four remaining holders of the title in Hindustan; (25) *Basiasita* a brahman from Candahar who travelled into Central and also S. India +*328* A.D.; (26) *Putnomita* of the warrior caste from S. India, converted the king of the now heretical E. India+*388*; (27) *Prajnatara* of Central India, travelled to S. to undertake education of the king's son *Bodhidharma*; he died *457* after prophesying that 69 years later(!) his pupil would visit China; (28) *Bodhidharma* left S. India for China by sea *526* A.D. (i.e. according to the curious chronology of the Patriarchal series, which allows far too long for each holder of the title; the date almost synchronizes with Justinian's closing of the Schools of Athens), probably on account of persecution: besides his natural foes the *brahmans* he had estranged many of his fellow sectaries by his contempt of books and learning, by maintaining that sheer unreflecting *ascesis* is the sole pathway to release.

II. Chief Events and Dogmatic Conflicts in China before Bodhidharma's Arrival

Before the arrival of the Contemplatist Patriarch the chief events relating to buddhism in China may be thus arranged:

61–68 A.D. official patronage by emperor *Ming-ti*, and advent of *Kasiapmadanga* (native of Central India) at Loyang in Honan.[1]

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[1] But probably buddhism had been privately propagated since 217 B.C. in Shensi; in 122 B.C. (Remusat) a warlike expedition to the district

335 formal leave granted to citizens to take monastic vows.

381 under Emperor Hiau's patronage translation of buddhist scriptures made at Singanfu, esp. *Lotus of the Good Law*. Wu (of the feeble later Tsin House) erected a pagoda at Nankin. (But compare other views p. 228.)

405 High office given to *Kumarajiva* ; he translates the sacred books (from a kingdom in Tibet) and 300 volumes are prepared and corrected by the aid of 800 buddhist priests.

399–415 Journey of *Fa-hien* exploring India and gathering books and relics ; writes his *Account of Buddhist Kingdoms* (*fo-kwo-ki*).

444–6 short period of persecution (cf. p. 218).

c. 420–450 arrival of embassies to Emperor Wenti from foreign powers to congratulate him on the advance of buddhism in China (e.g. letters of *Pishabarna*, king of Aratan under the shadow of the Himalayas, also of king Jebabada, also from Ceylon (said to be 3 years journey by sea and land), also from Kapila Buddha's birthplace).

451 permission granted to erect a convent in every city with 40 or 50 of the inhabitants as priests.

458 persecution II. on account of alleged complicity in treasonable plot.

467 in northern kingdom under House of Wei, emperor erects a statue of brass and gold to Buddha 35 feet high and in *471* resigns his throne to take vows as a monk.

483 Tsi Liang a minister of Emperor Wuti (or Vouti V) upholds the dogma of buddhist retribution (*Biogr.*) : he is said to have been reduced to silence when his interlocutor compared men to flowers on trees, scattered by the same breeze, some on curtains and carpets, others on heaps of refuse ; such is the distinction of lot owing to mere chance or accident : 'riches and poverty being due not to recompense for conduct' (*yin kwo*) but accounted for without it by the doctrine of no-design.' In another work *on the Soul*, he represents the confucian party as believing that 'soul' (*shin*) 'stands to body (*hing*) as *sharpness* to *knife*, and neither quality can remain after the material is destroyed. Such extract explains the hold of Buddha on the people's mind to which the pessimistic and unconsoling theory of a single life and no merit or recompense could make no sort of appeal. At this period the soul of China seems to emerge from its narrow prison of the present and enjoy the illimitable vista of previous and future lives according to a just system of compensation : this impregnated the views of normal men and the phraseology of daily life.

In the official *History* of Song Dynasty (cent. v) a native buddhist gives us (in biogr. section) a contrast of the rival doctrines, laying special stress on Confucius' *single life* while 'the aims of Shakya's doctrine are unbounded' 'saving from greatest dangers and removing every care. It has but one 'sentiment—*mercy seeking to save*, and cannot be satisfied by the renewal

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beyond Yarkand brought back a golden statue (? a specimen of hellenistic and greco-bactrian art) of Buddha, which formed the model for all later images of the Founder.

'of all living beings. It speaks of hell and lo! the people are afraid to 'sin: of heaven and they all desire its happiness.' The confucian replies, (quite in the style of Pomponazzo or of the adherents of aimless and disinterested virtue for its own sake): 'To be urged to virtue by the desire 'of heaven cannot be compared with doing right for its own sake. For 'the restraint of bodily appetite, a feeling of duty is better than a dread 'of hell. Acts of worship cannot spring from piety, if done to obtain 'forgiveness of sins. A gift comes not from pure inward sincerity which 'looks to secure a hundredfold recompense for the giver. To extol the 'embodied ideal tends to beget a love of the marvellous.' The buddhist rejoins (with a deeper knowledge of man's nature): 'Motives derived 'from a future state are required to lead men to virtue: otherwise, how 'are we to adjust the evil tendencies of our present life? Men will not 'act spontaneously without something to hope for; the husbandman is 'diligent in plowing because he expects a harvest, without such a hope 'he would be sitting idle at home.' The confucian by confusing the *earlier* and *later* phases of Buddhism, gets one thrust home: 'if religion '(*tau* not *tao*) consists in repressing *all* desires, it is illogical to use the desire 'for heaven as a stimulant to virtue.' But the utter change which had come over buddhist professions and promises is sufficient answer; the *mahayanist* did *long* for the salvation of all men, and *yearn* to enter into a better life (however he might define it).

c. 500 the number of Indians in China is reckoned at 3000, invited by the Wei princes to reside at Loyang (in Honan), many having being driven out of India; there were 13,000 temples: the Emperor himself discoursed publicly on the scriptures.

515 some are put to death for *magic* (the *ta-cheng* or 'Great Development 'Sutras' having by this time attached much value to a side of religion which had little place in the original system: unintelligible formulæ (*dharani*) had been imported from Nepal): a hostile critic represents a curious parallel to the chiefs of Assassins in Alamut in a strange conjuror who used wild strains of music to win followers, aimed only at murder and riot and taught them to dissolve the ties of kindred, on which sacred basis social China rested and still rests.

518 Sung-yun was sent from Loyang to get fresh scriptures from India; he travelled as far as Candahar and came back with 175 volumes. Such was the past record and present condition of Buddhism in China, when Bodhidharma arrived in *526*.

APPENDIX U

I. Bodhidharma's arrival: His Contemplative Nihilism and its Affinities

The hindu patriarch reached Canton by sea and was at once invited to visit Emperor Wuti (or Vouti VI) whose long reign occupies the

whole of the first half of cent. vi (*502–550.*)[1] The first interview between 'tyrant and sage' shows the peculiar nihilism into which the Contemplative (*dhyana*) School had now fallen. W. 'How 'much merit have I laid up who for 25 years have without ceasing built temples, ordained monks and copied out the scriptures?' B. 'None.' W. 'And why no merit?' B. 'All this is but the trivial effect of an imperfect cause,—a shadow that without real being follows the substance.' W. 'What then is the true merit?' B. 'Purity and enlightenment of soul; being wrapped in thought while surrounded by vacancy and stillness. This merit cannot be sought by earthly means.' W. 'What is the chief of the holy doctrines?' B. 'Where all is emptiness nothing can be called holy.' W. 'Who is this man that thus replies to me?' B. 'I do not know.' Bodhidharma then crossed into the Wei kingdom and remained gazing for 9 years at a wall in Loyang, being known under the popular name of the 'wall-staring brahman.' He spared however a momentary glance for a neophyte who, to prove his boundless altruism and hatred of self, severed an arm. After his death Sung Yun returned, found the body of the patriarch in the coffin and asked the dead patriarch whither he was going; he replied 'To the Western 'Paradise.'

The doctrine of Bodhidharma is further illustrated by the teaching of Matsu, a member of the *Chanshi* Order of monks some 3 centuries later—the *contemplatist* or *dhyana* division (though to-day the name is applied as a new title of honour to abbots of great repute). It was distinguished from the *Lushi* or disciplinarians who go barefoot and follow the ascetic rule, as well as from the *Fashi* or secular priests who engage in public teaching, read the liturgy, and study the scriptures. Matsu thus spoke to his disciples: 'You all believe the *mind* itself is Buddha. Bodhidharma 'came to China to teach the method of the heart. The *Lenga Sutra* 'which he brought hither has but a single subject, the teaching of the 'Founder concerning the mind: out of the mind, no Buddha; out of 'Buddha, no mind. The true method is to have no method. Virtue is 'not to be sought nor vice shunned. Nothing should be regarded as 'pure or as polluted. To have an impression of an object is only to 'become conscious of our mind's own restless activity; and mind blinded 'by its sensations does not know itself.' Religion continued he, 'does 'not consist in using means (to salvation); to use means is fatal to the 'attainment of the object. . . . Human nature is adequate for its own 'wants. All that is needed is to avoid both virtue and vice: to do this 'is to be truly religious.' Clearly Bodhidharma, whose doctrine Matsu is restating, aimed at restoring the pure indifferent individualism in which

[1] Further envoys came during this time (1)from the King of Bunam (Siam) who wrote offering the Emperor a hair of Buddha 12 feet in length—which agrees with Buddha's own statement of his long spiral tresses (elastic and of a bluish lavender colour) in *San-mei-king*; (2) from the king of Bauban, with pictures and pagodas in miniature 523, and (3) from another (unnamed) king in the same peninsula.

(as he believed) the true primitive doctrine consisted. The result was a dimming of the popular hope in a future life and less emphasis on the moralist doctrine of retribution by way of cause and effect.

The *Tientai* movement, of which we shall presently speak, was an attempt to reconcile this pure concentration on self with the use of external means, 'to combine' says Edkins (op. cit. 140) 'contemplation and image-worship . . . to add to devotional thoughts the help of the senses.' It was without doubt a practical reaction from the school of complete mental abstraction, which is never within the scope of the majority and for them must imply moral indifference. A Song Emperor (*c. 1100*) ordered many *temples* to be turned into *monasteries* for the use of Bodhidharma's followers: Emperor Chunshi, the first Manchu, more than 5 centuries later, wrote prefaces to some works of this school—a last sign of imperial interest in the buddhist creed, Kangi his successor having set the example of complete conversion to confucian rationalism.

Bodhidharma founded the *esoteric* schools on this doctrine, 'man becoming conscious of his own nature attains the state of Buddha.' Until of late an idea was even entertained that the Jains (*?dhyana*) and the school of our contemplative patriarch were 'offshoots from a common stock'; Bodhidharma being a heretic who continued the 'offshoot' from the jaina list of patriarchs beginning with *Basiasita*. I do not think the connexion can be upheld to-day, the independence of Mahavira's movement being firmly established. Bodhidharma's successors or native patriarchs in China are somewhat difficult to determine; among them must certainly be included *Hwei-Wen c. 550* A.D.; *Hwei-si*, founder of the Nangon School; *Chikai*, of the Tientai School (in Japan Tendai). But these do not appear to be considered successors of Bodhidharma to whose school the Chinese authority Chipan (*1270* A.D.) devotes only a very small space. But the writer of *San-kiau* gives him a much more elevated place, and if Chipan represents the orthodox opinion of 650 years ago, this author indicates the present day view of modern monks.

II. Bodhidharma's Reaction to Pure Faith from Book Learning

For everywhere the earlier buddhism of study and scripture-reading has been displaced by the idle mystic trance or contemplation, which Bodhidharma brought in in *526*. He compares Julai, the original Buddha, with the patriarch—the former teaching great truths and instructing men and Devas and delivering the exoteric tradition; the latter bringing from the western heaven (!) the 'true seal,' pointing directly to Buddha's heart and nature and sweeping away the parasitic growth of book-learning. The one set up the *kiau-men* or popular branch, the other the *tsung-men* or esoteric system. 'These two doctrines, while presenting of need a different aspect, form nevertheless but a single whole.' But though Bodhidharma is the nominal founder of the esoteric school, the real impulse comes down from *Nagarjuna*, who founded as we know the *madhyamika* school which denies both sides of every antithesis and blends all seeming contrasts; e.g. soul has neither *being* nor yet *non-being*, it neither lasts nor vanishes

away.[1] In this Contemplative School distinction of virtue and vice disappears ; the mind, given up to its abstract musings with the avowed aim of destroying discursive thought, loses sight of the outer world. Just as among stoics and later gnostics, if the heart is right no outward action matters. A man may revile Buddha without sin, for to him no act is sinful and he need offer neither prayer nor offering. However destructive in effect of all moral restraint, the school aims rather at reaching the 'higher sphere,' so familiar to students of hegelian Dialectic where all such distinctions are dissolved and transcended. The aim is that of Buddha himself, to reach *Nirvana* even in this life (*jivan mokta*)—just as in some Christian analogies, salvation is not a doubtful hope for the future but an ever present and assured possession now. To the *Chan-men*, virtue and vice, good and evil, only come to be through the imperfectness and relativity of our present condition ; they vanish as a mist when we escape into the higher plane of true spiritual enlightenment. *Nirvana* admits not of these delusive and fictitious contraries—antitheses of the understanding which pure reason surmounts. To it attaches no definite quality or term ; it is not good or evil, pain or pleasure. Only in the lower modes of life is there place for ethics and its irresoluble contraries. We cannot doubt that if it gave much to Tao it borrowed something from it,—even if we concede only this, that it met in China a remarkably kindred spirit. We shall have occasion to mention the Wu-wei sect, which is a lineal descendant of Tao as well as of Bodhidharma. Men recognized that the Taoist do-nothing (non-action) is the true counterpart of the 'vacancy, stillness, destruction' of the imported doctrine (*hu-wu-tsi-mie*). Contrasted with this doctrine of pure (subjective) *faith without works* is the popular *yen-wei* reliance on action or *works*, which finds outlet in pious deeds, ritual observances, and prayers for the dead. The truly mystical Buddhists follow Bodhid. in resenting such methods to win a future heaven when complete salvation now is within reach.[2]

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[1] Note that *Hwei-si* (Nangon School) follows Bodhidharma's teaching and therefore the path marked out by Nagarjuna (or, to give him his chinese name, *Lung-shu*) : *Chikai* (Tientai or Tendai Sect) succeeding him developed the school into its present form ; he long adhered to the *chau-men* (contemplative method) as laid down by Bodhidharma who had died in N. China 30 years previously. But he became dissatisfied with it and resented the discarding of knowledge and books, and, as we shall see, formed another discipline on new lines. But the operating influence throughout is the *indifference* of Bodhidharma. His statue is found in temples under the name *Ta-mo Chu-shi*, especially in those of the *Tsung-men* priesthood. In the shrine of *Hung-fa-tang* he is represented seated on an 'immortal one-horned bull,' carrying a pole to which a wonder-working sandal is attached.

[2] The name of Bodhidharma's school *chau-men* is derived from the indian *dhyana* or meditation—through the early form *dan* which later became *chan*. Edkins, who holds to a (now untenable) connexion with the jains, does not seem to associate the names in etymology, *jaina* = victor, he who overcomes ; while *dhyana* is an abstract word for mental concentration.

APPENDIX V

Chinese Translators of Buddhist Scriptures

A. Pioneers in the work were *Kasiapmadanga* and *Chu-fa-lan* (*c. 70* A.D.) under Emperor Ming-ti.

B. 150 A.D. a priest of the *An-si* Arsacid (or mongol dynasty in Parthia) is noted as a good renderer from pali (or sanscrit) into chinese :—this is a point of interest.

C. 170 A.D. *Chitsin*, priest of the indo-scyths (Getæ or Jats) gives a version of the *Nirvana Sutra*.

D. 226. Sun Kuen, king of Wu State, receives with reverence an indian priest who translated buddhist books.

E. c. 250. Dharmakakala translates the *Vinaya* at the capital Lo-yang (so often mentioned).

F. c. 290 Chusi-hing (a native) went to N. India (Udin=Khoten) to get books and translated a Sutra of 90 paragraphs in Honan, calling it the 'Fang-kwang-pat-niahing,' and about the same time *Chu-fa-hu* (an indo-scyth) brought books to Loyang and then produced a chinese version :—*Fa-ling* soon afterwards went from his native province Kiang-nan to N. India and returned with Sutras and a work on discipline :—*Chi-meng* in E. Tibet brought from 'Pataliputra' versions of the 'Nirvana' Sutra (*ni-wan-hing*) :—*Dharmaraksha* (a hindu) brought a new sanscrit copy of this latter work and compared it in Tibet with that of *Chi-meng* ; also translated 'Golden Light' and 'Bright' Sutras.

G. c. 300. Chi-kung-meng (a foreigner with a native chinese name) translated the 'Lotus of the Good Law' sutras (in sanscrit, *Saddharma Pundarika*, in chinese *Wei-ma* and *Fa-hwa*) : cf. pp. 228, 244.

H. 335 Tau-an (a native), finding the text of scriptures to be full of errors, begins a critical inquiry and is aided by *Buddojanga*, an Indian who claimed magical powers and induced the king of the Chow to permit ordination and monastic vows.

I. Kumarajiva, c. 405 entertained a high opinion of Tau-an's powers and came to Chang-an to visit him but found that he was dead, leaving corrections in the sacred text which were exactly those independently proposed by himself : he made clear the sense of many *hing* and *lun* (sutras and shastras) and divided into sections and periods (he was aided by *Seng Chau*) ; he translated the 'Wei-ma,' 'Tahwa,' and 'Cheng-shih' Sutras : these with Dharm.'s 3 sutras named above form the *Ta-Cheng* or 'Great Development' :—The 'Lesser Development' included 'Longer Agama' Sutra and 'Discipline of the Four Divisions' (tr. by *Buddhayasha*) 'Discipl. of the Ten Chants' (*Kumarajiva*), 'Suuplem. Agama' Sutra (*Dharmanandi*), Shastra on Metaphysics (*Dharmayagama*) *c. 300.*

J. Sanga-deva from Kipin or Candahar also translated two 'Agama' Sutras.

K. Fa-hien on return from his famous pilgrimage *414*, began to translate with the aid of the hindu *Bhadra*, the *Vinaya Asankhya* (since regarded as a standard work).

L. In *460* 5 buddhist travellers arrived from Ceylon by way of Tibet bringing miraculous images and the teaching of the Southern School (from which source in *Hist. of Wei Dynasty* a nearly correct date is assigned to Buddha's birth in place of a year in the *eleventh* century B.C.).

In consequence of the above labours the number of buddhist Scriptures was in *600* A.D. (Sin Dynasty) 10 times that of the confucian—in all 1950 works.

M. In *629 Huen-tsang* started on his travels and found on his return (*645*) the same Emperor *Tai-tsong* reigning who in *639* had favourably received the syrian or nestorian missions 'Alopen' and others.[1] Huen returns with 124 *mahayana* sutras, 657 works on discipline and metaphysics (carried on 22 horses) and at Taitsong's request began to translate at Singanfu with twelve monks to assist, the Emperor himself writing the prefaces: Huen survived 19 years (to *664*) and translated 740 works in 1335 volumes.

N. In *690* some one produced a new buddhist sutra (in native chinese ?) to present to the imperious empress-mother Wu, in which she was identified with the future Buddha Maitreya !—it will be remembered that a familiar title for the late empress-dowager (1910) was 'the Old Buddha': the civil and confucian historian mentions the ministry of a buddhist priest with as much horror as the active regency of a female.

O. From *714* onwards, we can notice the influence of hindu and brahman works (*ba-la-men* and *po-lo-men*) on mathematics and the calendar: even earlier were versions of hindu astronomy in 20 chapters, completed as early as *560*: also two later renderings of *arithmetic* text-books and one on the calendar: these, though now lost beyond hope of retrieving, prove the solicitude of the buddhist visitors in spreading the learning and culture of Hindustan and their acceptance of the title 'brahman' to express their rank as teachers.

APPENDIX W

I. Further Decadence amid Continual Protests of the Confucian Party

The mandarin's remonstrance in the time of Emperor Taitsong II at the close of cent. viii shows the radical incompatibility of the confucian and buddhist systems. The issue involved is the *efficacy of prayer* to secure earthly (or even spiritual) blessings. The Emperor kept many monks at court; and preferred to use their prayers to appease the unseen powers to any waste of blood and treasure in war: to their priestly chanting he referred the retreat of barbarian raiders. The confucian condemns

[1] It may here be noted that as the Chinese judged of the roman empire by its nearest point and deemed Antioch its chief capital, so the king *Pa-ta-lik* of the Fulin country must be, not Emperor Constans III, grandson of Heraclitus 643, but the *Patrician* who governed what was left of the Empire in the no th of Syria.

this reliance as baseless and unwarrantable ; to procure success by prayer, or other such methods, is not possible and it is equally idle to hope to win happiness after death in like manner. Under Hien-tsong (*820* A.D.) a bone of Buddha was escorted to the capital : and the usual protest was forthcoming from *Han-wen-kung* who became the typical instance of a remonstrating rationalist. He was degraded from the Board of Punishments and exiled to a provincial prefecture, and might have suffered further had not the court officials represented the danger of suppressing free speech. He refers the short duration of modern dynasties after Han to the evil influence of the foreign cult. He begs the emperor to follow his predecessor, the founder of the Tang House, in restricting the growth of the disease. The emperor cannot be himself ensnared, as none who were enlightened believed in the efficacy of any such relic ; the command to escort the loathsome and decayed bone must have been issued to win the hearts of the ignorant rabble. Buddhism was a foreign exotic, like its priests, its garb, its language, its moral code ; and from its entrance into China dates the decadence of the State. Han-wen challenged Buddha (if he had power and could inflict vengeance) to strike him with any punishment he liked :—a passage showing clearly (if need there be of witness) that Buddha was conceived as a potent deity, not as a saint who had entered into the rest of nonentity.

A confucian historian expresses regret that the great persecution of *844–5* lasted so short a time ; he compares with those under the Wei and later Chow Houses which continued for six or seven years. On the revival of buddhism under Suen-tsong, the ' Jovian ' of this period, *Sun Tsian* presents the usual remonstrance and succeeds this time in limiting the number of monks admissible to convents. Under I-tsong (*860–874*), devoted as he was to buddhist studies, priests were invited to discourse upon religion in his private chamber : the confucian remonstrant represents that Tao, with its teaching of gentleness and mercy, and the primitive cult of China with its basal virtues of honesty and good will, were alone adequate : he called on the emperor to follow no other religion but these. But I-tsong, to the great scandal of the confucian party, admitted yet another mythical bone and welcomed it with unbecoming prostration and a flood of penitent tears.

It is clear that at this time the *magical* and materialist side came more and more into prominence : e.g. *Bodhirucht* (an indian refugee under the Tangs, with others) gave himself out as a prince who had resigned the world to save his soul and as a magician who could *make rain*. *Pukung* from Ceylon shows a yet further stage of decadence and syncretism : though reverenced in China as a demigod, he brought only charms and the names of fresh *bodhisatvas*, forming a mixture of the yoga discipline (a brahman and sivaite development) with the Nepal *dhyana* and the already familiar *mahayana* acclimatized in China. He is explicit about the proper manner of feeding the *fo-kwei* (or hungry spirits) by employment of the fingers in certain postures. So Wu-len, a corean priest rises in the air a foot above ground before he died.

Official confucian rationalism was not the only enemy against which

foreign settlers in China had to contend : there was also native jealousy. Under Later Tangs, a priest of Wu-tai claimed that like them he could control wind and rain and hold the sky-dragon in obedience ; when the emperor and empress bent before him in homage he did not even rise from his seat. Being proved unable to end a long drought he was in danger of being cremated, but was at last allowed to return home to die of a broken heart. Under the last emperor of the Later Tangs, a court memorial recommended that novices for conventual life should be examined in the *Lun*, the *King* and their daily duties—whether monks or nuns. The same rule was to apply to Tao,—in both cases the aim was to secure the religious houses from being a mere refuge for idleness and ignorance.

Somewhat later, we find curious details of the self-tortures of buddhist devotees which were then placed under the ban : Bodhidharma's delight at the cutting off of an arm by an eager neophyte may be recalled : this had now become a usual practice ; feet were severed, fingers burnt off, lighted lamps were suspended by hooks from the living flesh ! Besides these instances, familiar enough among some Yogi sectaries to the present hour and utterly abhorrent to the spirit and plain command of Buddha, there were cases of ritual suicide (after the manner of indian gymnosophists and their half-insane emulators in the west e.g. Peregrinus Proteus in Lucian *c. 160* A.D.). Taitsong III (second in the line of Sung *976–998*) put a stop to the examination of novices for monk's order, as instituted above. He heard with anger of wood being collected by the public for the pyre of a priest who contemplated *sati* ; but having forbidden the erection of further temples he changed his policy, no doubt because of the popular discontent which was stronger than mandarin protests against superstition. At another time a Tientai monk professed himself willing to ascend the pyre when a certain shrine was completed. Here the emperor favoured the project, completed the edifice, ordered the wood to be prepared and summoned the rash monk to keep his vow : this he was forced with much violence to do. In *1035* the emperor Jen-tsong (*1023–1064*) tried to preserve the knowledge of sanscrit by appointing 50 special students of the language. Shen-tsong (favouring the Contemplative School of Bodhidharma) ordered many temples to be changed into convents for their use : Hweitsong in *1119* (*1101–1126*) attempted to reduce Buddha to be a mere Tao *genius* and ordered the hindu titles to be discontinued : his priests were to be known as *te-shi* ' virtuous scholars,' temples *kung* (instead of *si*) and convents *kwan* (instead of *yuen*). This definite policy of syncretism on a nationalist basis was very soon given up. Against conventual preoccupation with the human destinies in the hereafter the new materialist school joined in protest ; *Sma-wen-kung* taught openly that no one need practise elaborate burial-rites to deliver a soul from hell ; neither heaven nor hell are to be expected ; the spirit or breath being carried off by a puff of wind from the decaying body.

During the whole of this Sung Dynasty there was a lively intercourse with the cradleland of the sect : in the *Hist. Sung Dyn.* we find at 951 the arrival of Samanta with representatives of 16 families from W. India : at 965 *Tan-yuen* a native returned after a journey to India with 40 palm-

leaf volumes of scripture, after an absence of 12 years (6 being spent in Hindustan) : at 966, 157 native priests left China with the emperor's sanction to visit the Holy Land ; it is known that they passed through Kashmir (*Ka-shi-mo-lo*) but further tidings of their movements is wanting : at 970 one of the cadets of a royal E. indian house arrived at the Court, it being the custom in such families for all but the eldest and heir to seek their fortunes : at 982 an indian king (?) sent a letter of felicitation to Emperor Taitsong III, by a chinese priest on the progress of buddhism in the Middle Kingdom ; at 984 another native returned by sea with the usual cargo of scriptures, being joined at Cambodia by a hindu who desired to visit China, and was on his arrival made welcome by the Emperor and set down at once to translate. There were thus 2 routes, by land round the great Tsung-ling Mountain, and by sea (at least in part) by indo-China.

Under the Sung and Mongol (*yuen*) Dynasties the mass of translated (and original) scripture was raised from 4271 to 4661 chapters. Through the indian buddhists at the Tang court the calendar was brought to the Uigurs on the north-west : emperors of this house presented tablets to 50 temples in this region. Scriptures in a chinese version were in use here and in the country beyond. Temples of Mani were also to be found ; also heretic priests (*wai-tau, senga*) of the Parsi or adorers of fire : it is likely too that under the term *senga* nestorians are included, for this is the name they give themselves in the Singanfu Inscriptions. Buddhism was thus at this time the great cosmopolitan force and both the means and motive for the friendly intercourse of courts : embassies to and from Japan (under the Sungs as in earlier times) were always religious in character, and monks were employed as envoys : the influence of buddhists on the political fortunes and changes in Japan is now well established. But the sect was still attacked by sceptics on the ground of social needs : the Confucians were joined by the philosophic attack of *Chu-hi* ; he said that buddhists care nothing for heaven and earth (the two sacred correlates in all chinese speculation) ; each attends to his own mind alone, inattentive to that which goes on around him : they fabricate groundless legends of future bliss and misery—merely for gain from the ignorant rabble : they collect huge crowds at the temples on the pretext of burning incense but in truth to incite them to riot and robbery.

II. Buddhism under the Mongols, Sungs and Manchus

When the *Yuen* or mongol dynasty occupied only the north of China buddhist monks were held in honour and dignified by the title *ti-shi* 'imperial teacher,' or 'instructors for the nation' (*kwo-shi*),—such were *Namo* from a western province of China, *Baschpa*, from Tibet, who brought an alphabet into mongolian use based on the tibetan script : Emperor Kublai favoured it but it failed to hold its own against the now popular syriac adopted from the nestorian Christians. Under the completed supremacy of this great ruler, temples of the national cult were converted to buddhist uses ; and while Tao magicians were punished, the monks were encouraged to be diligent in their study of the sacred books. Kublai is said to have refused to attack Japan 'as a buddhist land,' and only

consented to invade it after his monastic envoy had been slighted and the usual light tribute or nominal present refused. The *yuen* historian refers this piety and propaganda of Kublai to a politic motive—the wish to tame the native roughness of his northern subjects, to form cities on chinese models and place all under civil mandarins and religious teachers. The monkish instructor (*kwo-shi*) was only subject to the prefect or chief lay-mandarins ; his orders received the same respect as imperial edicts : he enjoyed the right of remaining seated in a corner in every assembly of state-officials, and at court itself, was entitled to the highest honours that a subject could receive. Kublai ordered the Mongol *Kalutanasi* to learn tibetan from the *kwo-shi* ; and a complete version of the *sutras* and *shastras*, in *manchurian* dialect and in *uigur* characters, was presented to him in the year of his death (*1294*). A census taken in *1290–1*, gave 42,318 buddhist temples and 213,150 professed monks. In *1312* we read of a new *kwo-shi* from the realm of *Kan-mu-lu* who learnt *uigur* and *sanscrit* in his youth and at the imperial command was set to translate scripture. In this period recurs the last record of pilgrimage to the Holy Land : *Tau-Wa* a native priest roused by the reading of Fa-Hien's travels, visited the Turkestan kingdoms of *Kui-tsi* and *Shala*, reaching *Kipin*—the chinese name for Kandahar. There he learnt the original *pali* and *sanscrit* of the sacred books, traversed Hindustan and returned by sea to Canton.

Even on the fall of the Mongols the religion stood firm. The third Ming emperor answered the usual protest from a confucian mandarin by inquiring if he wished to emulate Han Wen-kung ? In *1426* again the emperor asked that candidates for novitiate should be duly examined as to their fitness and ability. Only in *1450* was attention called to the vast area of conventual property : each establishment had to be content with 6000 square feet of land, the excess being given to the poor to till, paying a fixed land-tax to the State. Under Emperor Kiatsong (*1506–1522*) the untiring memorialists tried once more to stir up persecution but succeeded only in destroying a buddhist shrine within the precincts of the palace. Still honours and titles were bestowed upon foreigners who gave out that they were priests from the enlightened western land (*shang-shi* or superior teacher). The Roman Catholic mission disturbed their ascendancy : Father Ricci contended publicly with the monks against the doctrine of Gautama, combating chiefly image-worship and transmigration ; while his convert *Su Kwang-ki* wrote a tract against the popular buddhist exotic superstitions, boldly concluding with an attack on the genuinely indigenous cult of ancestral spirits. The first manchu *Chun-shi* (*1644–1661*) favoured the sect but Kangi the great emperor (*1661–1722*) completely turned against the belief and practice which had comforted and civilized his race : his ' Sacred Edict ' makes his sentiments clear. At the same time nothing was done which could wound the feelings of Mongolia, whose lamas have ever been received with distinctive welcome by the court of Pekin.

APPENDIX X

Letters and Philosophy in the Far East

I. IN CHINA

Chinese poetry during our period is not marked by any religious fervour or curiosity, and does not help one to understand the general feeling of the people on the higher issues of life. As in Homer and still more in Hesiod, there is an undercurrent of complaint at the uncertainty of our human lot, the doubtful doom of human kind. With a genuine delight in the beauties of nature there is combined a heartfelt sympathy with the misery of man. Wine is eulogized as a stimulant and a comforter [1] and erotic poems are decorous and restrained. The lyrical side of poetry is prominent: its aim is to clothe in language the personal emotions as they surge through the heart. It is therefore *subjective* and in a modified sense *romantic*: it does not deal with a national *epos* or matters of general interest. It is therefore a protest from the exceptional nature against the complacent *positivism* of Confucius, whereby the unit is completely merged in his social relations and is refused any further life or intrinsic value. Some few (as Hao-jain *689–740*) wrote poems in seclusion as hermits and avoided any public fame; his friend Wang Wei (*699–759*) was an earnest follower of Buddha and converted his home into a convent on the death of his mother and his wife. Poetry became more serious but also more formal and precise when the Tang dynasty gave way to the Sungs (*960–1260*) and these three centuries are marked by many notable and still popular names: in the list are found writers of history—the great branch of chinese letters—and the socialist reformer Wang-an-Shi.[2] In sum, poetry became during our period a cultured pastime as well as a revelation of personal emotion. It is neither religious nor erotic; but lies much under the influence of a profound melancholy, against which active social work is sought as a palliative, and a love of nature which recalls Wordsworth and is certainly in large measure due to buddhist teaching and example.

In *philosophy* (if we except Chwang-tzu [3] there is very little advance

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[1] Li Po (705–762 A.D.) composed, as Æschylus was said to have written his tragedies, under the influence of wine and, like Anacreon or Marlowe, met his death in a tipsy frolic: his coeval Tu Fu (712–770) died from the effects of an excess of white wine. They were the two chief poets of the age.

[2] The Innovator (*c.* 1020–1086) desired to convert the very loose framework of the State into a highly centralized commercial company. Trade was to be a State-monopoly, produce of the district to be divided (1) for taxes, (2) local expenses, government to buy the rest at a fair price to use in times of future scarcity or for the needs of other poorer regions: State to advance money and capital to cultivators at 24 per cent.; fertility (not number of inhabitants) to be the basis of taxation over units of equal area.

[3] A writer with taoist proclivities (*c.* 350–280 B.C.) ed. H. A. Giles 1889:

upon Confucius or any decided challenge to his doctrine of the all-sufficingness and finality of the State-organism : everything for him is *relative*, man finding himself and his true end or happiness solely in the correct performance of duties prescribed by *relations*, of son, father, husband, subject. His dislike of transcendental questions or inquisitiveness about the hereafter led to the official 'suspense of judgment' (ἐποχή) on such subjects which still marks the educated world of the *literati*. Wang Chung (*c. 30–100* A.D.) teaches a fatal materialism, man being endowed at birth either with good or evil nature ; the vital fluid, a product and not a principle, decays with the body and cannot survive it ; ghosts are illusions and 'miracles' only a sign of our ignorance of nature's workings. He takes a gloomy delight in showing that virtue and merit often fare worst. In the last centuries of our period lived the two contemporaries Shao Yung (*1010–1077*) and Cheng I (*1033–1107*) who commented upon the mysterious *Book of Changes* which Confucius (as he said frankly) could not understand. The greatest confucianist Chu Hsi [1] (*1130–1200*), a coeval of Averros, also interpreted this very primitive method of divining and was supposed to have given the final solution. He is also held to be the wisest exegete of the confucian canon ; to its meaning he gives one turn still further in the direction of a rationalism which rejects all definite religious belief.

II. IN JAPAN

Here buddhism made great advance under the Regent Shotoku (under Empress Suiko, *593–621*) : soon afterwards, six sects were introduced from China by chinese and corean teachers of the Little Vehicle. Japan now sent forth her own priests to gather up and interpret the foreign doctrines : hence Dengyo [2] a coeval of the indian Sankara (*c. 800*) introduced the *Tendai* sect and Kobo Deishi, the Shingon (*774–834*). Out of the enormous canon of chinese Scriptures [3] eclecticism could choose without hindrance and develop at pleasure. Kobo was the chief mover in a transition from the Little to the Greater Vehicle—from the pursuit of selfish happiness and perfection to the zeal and effort of the mission. In *1153* A.D. Senku introduced the Pure Land Sect or *Jodo* : in which salvation is won by absolute trust in Amida-Buddha and ceaseless iteration of (magical) formulæ. This school forms the counterpart to the *solifidian* movement in India and

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only 33 chapters now survive : he threw contempt on the mere social activities of the confucian ideal and showed a rare vein of mysticism.

[1] Fujiwara Seikwa (1560–1620) introduced this sceptical writer to Japan and was followed by another commentator Muro Kiuso—two members of a well-defined class of chinese scholars, *kangakusha*, who made no secret of their scorn of buddhism and filled cent. xviii with their quarrels with the 'japanese scholars' (*wagakusha*) who were upholders of nationalism and Shinto against foreign influence.

[2] He studied at the Tientai Convent in prov. of Chekiang, founded by Chikai nearly 300 years before.

[3] Reckoned to be 700 times the bulk of our New Testament.

the Further West, since works are of no avail and there is no need to imitate the Saviour's person or character—*faith* alone being adequate. Senku's pupil Shinran founded the *Monto* Sect, the simplest and most popular of all. It bade farewell to all metaphysics, dispensed with precise injunctions on conduct or ritual, and imposed no hard vows of continence or world-surrender. Here still more than in the parent-school personal *faith* in a living Saviour is the sole test. Meantime the contemplative *Zen* Sect taught, as against this facile and unexacting creed, the value of quietism and meditation which alone can reach truth : the *Rinzai* Sect was founded in *1168*. In *1223* the *Soto* branch modified this system by enforcing scientific ' research ',—a study leading (as in India many centuries before) to a recognition of phenomenal life as empty, futile and unreal. We shall see that this nihilism led on to the development of *bushido*, just as the loyalist brigands in the muslim world founded their ethics upon *denial*. The last development of our period is the *Nichiren* Sect called after its founder *1222–1282* : there is but one true Buddha, all others being shadows or reflexions of him ; he is the source of all phenomenal existence and in him alone it has its being. In place of a cosmic law of cause and effect in a closely linked series, a single being, source and agent, was taught—*pantheism* or extreme *realism*, rather than pure *monotheism*. In religion proper about the time of Sankara, Kukai (*810*) proposed a blend of shinto (the primitive animistic cult, coupled with the imperial worship) with buddhism, to win over the conservatives. Two works of high merit and interest but not directly connected with the development of thought were written about the year *1000* : *Genji Monogatari* by a female authoress was the first novel, a prose epic of real life, giving a detailed picture of social life in the ancient and sacred capital Kioto. This was followed by another work, *Pillow Sketches*, on the same subject, a mirror held up to the aristocratic and courtly interests of the same refined and artificial period. Not long afterwards the dance was claimed and used by the buddhists as a vehicle for religious truth. The *shinto* had already a ceremonial pantomimic *kagura* but now the monks composed *libretti* for these, calling the new product *No* (drama). As in greek tragedy, the edifying themes of the chorus dealt with the eternal law of retribution, the passing show and emptiness of life, the need of fixing one's thoughts and hopes upon a better world. Thus they form a counterpart to the Miracle-Plays of the catholic west ; but the greatest period of the *No* falls somewhat later than the close of our period. When elsewhere we transgress these limits and represent a later condition of thought or worship it is because there has been no new development and the past can still be seen faithfully mirrored in the present.

APPENDIX Y

Conflict of Ideals in Buddhism: *Arhat* or *Bodhisatva?*

When Gautama had found peace he spent the rest of his life in guiding others in the same quest of happiness. He taught them that the supreme good was attainable in this life and held those to be misleading guides and heretics who deferred the attainment to the next world. In himself (as has often been said) he united the opposite qualities of the contemplative monk and the social reformer. His system was selfish and his practice altruistic—that is to say he took great pleasure in preaching and guiding other men, in controlling his disciples, in keeping together the little circle of friends. While he taught them the purest egoistic eudæmonism, he himself showed 'a better way'. Therefore the conflict of ideals was certain to arise, just as the problems of God's existence and human immortality could not possibly be shelved by his compromises or stubborn silence. The *arhat* is the type of the 'saved soul' who is assured and conscious of its salvation. He has followed the Eight-Fold Path, has reached the end and is now enjoying the fruits (*maggaphalattha*). He possesses the Higher Insight (*Sambodhi*) [cf. Rhys Davids *Dial. of the Buddha*, Oxford 1899]. The Canonic Hymns—264 by monks 73 by nuns—represent the blissful and calm contentment of the perfected. The master made this state of *arhat*-ship the climax of his sermons; (the *Jataka* commentator notices this, i 114, 275, 401). The pure utilitarian vein of Socratic common sense is never lacking; other advantages or pursuits or ways of life are weighed and compared and found wanting. In one section of the *Digha* 10 out of 13 chapters lead up to this conclusion. After his death as this assurance grew more rare it was held in more reverence. The *bhiksu*, who publicly professed *arhat*-ship, had to stand the test of examination; *Majjhima* Dial. cxii gives six questions to be put in the assembly of the brotherhood; if answered correctly the aspirant was held 'to have at-'tained'. When the comments on the Canon were being written, this practice had become obsolete; there were no more *arhats* to announce their spiritual proficiency. None are mentioned after *c. 250* A.D. and the term was applied exclusively to the saints or heroes or apostles of the primitive age.

When buddhist writers composed in sanscrit (to which this shorter word *arhat* properly belongs), this exalted meaning is no longer conveyed. The true ideal and climax is the state of the *bodhisatva*; *arhat*-ship does not now form a chief subject in Buddha's discourses. In *Lalita* and *Mahavastu* the word seems to be used as a mere epithet of the founder and his immediate disciples. It is however applied in its old and genuine sense in the story of Vitasoka (brother of the great Emperor)—'one who has 'found deliverance in this life'. But, it is clear that the doctrine—once the cardinal point of buddhism—has ceased to attract. In the 'Lotus of 'True Law' (the treatise which above all others most strongly impressed the mind of China) it is even used in a disparaging sense of the early followers. *Arhats* are termed vain and conceited if they do not accept the

new doctrine : we might compare Newman's doctrine of ' Development ' in the catholic teaching of the church. The new school held the primitive sect in very little honour ; it was the rudiments or ' beggarly elements ' rather than the golden age (*Sacred Books East* xxi 43, 189, 330, 387, Kern's version of the *Saddharma-pundarika*). The *arhat* is on a lower stage : one who listens to a single word of the new teaching stands higher ' in the ' kingdom of heaven ' than one who leads many to become *arhats*. The primitive ideal is thus openly attacked and with it the whole value of Buddha's authentic message to the world. We must inquire the reason for this curious change.

In the oldest books of the Canon there is no suggestion that the faithful should follow the master's example and make him the model for a busy and active life. It is not said that they are to become buddhas themselves. Their duty is to become *arhats*,—to quench the passions and restlessness of thought and thus destroy the seed of re-birth. But the mythology (already at an early data gathering round the person of Gautama) represented him as renouncing *arhat*-ship through nirvana of which he had discovered the secret, in order to preach the glad tidings of release to men in a future life (in the *Dipankararajataka*). In the interval and prior to his appearance on earth as Gautama, he occupies the dignity of *bodhisatva*, ' one who is on the way to attain perfect knowledge '. In this character he becomes ruler of the *Tusita* paradise and is there acclaimed by the gods (*halahala*) as the future Buddha. The *Abhidharmakosavyakhya* (a *hinayana* work) thus speaks of the difference of the egoist and altruist ideals : ' Having expelled self-love . . . they develop an interest ' in the affairs of others, born of compassion. The plain man and the ' *sravaka* (postulant for *arhat*-ship) desire merely *deliverance*, that is, end ' of suffering and not *happiness* during the series of lives in the *Samsara*. ' But the superior man (or *bodhisatva*) wishes for temporal happiness for ' others at the cost of personal sufferings and the definite end of suffering ' which is supreme happiness—or for others, supreme and temporal happi- ' ness and for himself the definite end of suffering (i.e. buddha-hood) as a ' means to realize this service of others.' A future Buddha acquires this quality of Buddha, not for himself but solely for the good of others. If he now, whilst preparing for his future mission, accumulates merit and knowledge, his aim is to put them at the service of other beings. He should now engage in the task of ' maturing ' them and thus anticipate the task which will one day fall to him. ' The thought of becoming Buddha ' for the salvation of creatures ' is the basis : it is essentially born of compassion and emptiness (*sunyata*). Therefore though he knows the path to *nirvana*, he does not realize it because this selfish satisfaction would terminate his work for others. Professor de la Vallée Poussin of Ghent speaks of the difficulty of ' reconciling the serious antinomy of the two dogmas ' " Nothing exists " and " we must work, labour, suffer for our neighbour ".' It is even sometimes conceded that this hope of becoming Buddha for the good of others is a mere illusion—but is yet the only way to destroy the *equal* illusion of the ego and to end its suffering : here once again ' social ' service ' is brought back to the motive of pure egoism. In the case of

Gautama ' his visible frame, audible words ', and entire personality, were but a magical show or projection contrived by his compassionate resolve to help mankind : hence the later Docetism. He is neither man nor God in himself ; he only *appears* as such. He is Buddha beyond and outside all existence. When the *bodhisatva*-deity of *Tusita* manifested himself in the world as Gautama he took on himself an empty fantom of humanity in condescension to the ways of the world : his body is only an illusion. Even in the *Kathavatthu* xvii 1 we find ' heretics ' asserting that he remains in heaven as he was before he sent down merely a double or ' shell '. His vow of disinterested generosity saves him from all evil re-birth. He knows that there is no one better than he in all the universe. Whatever act he undertakes it is always with the purpose of reconciling creatures, always with this thought uppermost : ' May I become the first of beings that ' every creature may come to me for help ! ' Even in the early stages of his course, when he is by no means so morally perfect as the ordinary monk who approaches *arhat*-ship, his aspirations are pregnant with *bodhi* and the future salvation of beings ; thus he is superior to the *arhat* who has selfishly attained. During the first six *bhumis* or stages he is very much inferior to them and is not tied by the same strict ethical restraint. Only when he reaches the seventh can he be said to surpass the *arhat*—and that not in virtue of greater personal holiness but because of his vow.

Santideva (*c. 610–680* A.D.) has left us a very interesting work on *Introduction to the Practice of the Bodhisatvas*. These beings grouped round the Buddha constitute the *sangha* or Order, the third jewel, which in the *hinayana* or Little Vehicle comprises the whole of the brethren. But they fulfil a more important part than the Buddha, as more active and merciful. One who desires to fulfil this function need not be a monk ; he can be a *gryastha* and a married man, like Gautama himself. Monks are more fit than the laity to practise certain virtues, but less capable in others. If a man aspires to these duties rather than to *arhat*-ship or personal perfection, it is because he has bound himself by a formal and solemn promise, because he thinks : ' My neighbour suffers his pain as I suffer mine ; ' why should I be anxious about myself and not about him ? ' Therefore is the merciful man permitted to commit sin, if his neighbour's advantage can so best be secured : for this he may break his vow of continence, and give up meditation entirely. Pity is his only virtue ; compassion atones for all the faults of which he may be guilty. Yet morality must be practised and all scandal avoided. It is essential that the future Buddha should ' stand well ' with men. However great his failings he must be revered by his fellow-man—if they dare to despise him they run risk of hellfire. There are certain acts, wicked in themselves, which when committed with good intention even become meritorious. He will kill a robber, who murders innocent *sravakas*, and even a holy bodhisatva : he will say (in a spirit not wholly differing from that of Torquemada) ' May this sinner escape hell ! it matters little if I am condemned to it '. It is argued (quite in the style of the jesuit Mariana) that wicked and confiscating kings may be dethroned—perhaps killed ?—that the tale of their evil deeds may not mount up against them. Exceptions or ' indulgences ' are allowed

in the case of chastity and all other moral commands (cf. the *Pratimoksa* of the bodhisatvas which is entirely given up to this casuistry). The end, here in India as in the west, must justify the means. At the same time any sort of anger—we should say 'righteous indignation'—is wholly out of place: 'How absurd is the anger roused by slander or loss of property! 'even when directed against iconoclasts or the deriders of our holy faith 'it cannot be justified' whereas sins arising from excess of love are venial. In the more social atmosphere of China (as de Groot *Mahayana* points out) men are commanded to defend with arms the Buddhas, the Church and even the State. Clearly this spirit penetrated to the militant monasteries of Japan in the great 'Fighting Period' of its history. The *bodhisatva* ideal begins to transcend not merely the egoistic calm of the *arhat* but the supra divine majesty of Buddha himself. 'By his good works the '*bodhisatva* is free from bodily pain and sorrow—he tastes ever-increasing 'joys superior to those of the Buddha entering Nirvana.' For the isolation of the body is not the true retirement; the life of the anchorite (as Christian teachers often suggest) has many dangers of its own—pride and the lack of spiritual friends (*kalyana-mitra*). For the *bodhisatva* pledged to his generous mission it is better to live in a village with his fellow-men than to dwell apart in the forest (*Astasahasrika*). Still Santideva does not wish to destroy the primitive ideal—the pure concentration on self (and in the last resort, on nothingness): he describes with eloquence the perils of secular life in the midst of fools, the beauties of forest-life in the companionship of 'trees, good by nature, whose sympathies we do not find it hard 'to win' [The buddhists' genuine love and appreciation of the natural world—which they are supposed to despise and are bound to shun—is a commonplace]. He follows up his preaching of a 'social gospel' in his *Bodhicharyavatara* where he subordinates meditation to the active virtues of charity, humility and patience of one's fellow-men. That the *ego* is nothing is no warranty for neglect of one's neighbour; the discovery should not make us inactive. Indeed we can find in it a reason for the (still further) sacrifice of self for his benefit. Once more the goodhumoured utilitarian motive creeps in: this practice of abnegation, as it destroys all our attachment or dislike, acts far more surely as a purgative of the mind than does contemplation selfishly pursued for its own sake. 'What 'you call *your* sorrow is yours only by illusion: you have no permanent '*ego*; there is only a series of mental phenomena which has no more real 'existence than a row of ants,—an aggregate of phenomena without an 'individual unit.' To the query, Why should I undertake the painful duties of a missioner? the answer is given: 'First, it is not really painful 'at all; next, even if it were it is a duty to undertake it, if the suffering 'of one can end the sufferings of many. The future buddhas, satisfied as 'to the equation I = thou [1] and finding only sadness in their personal 'joy if they see others suffering, plunge into the torments of the Avichi 'Inferno as substitutes for the condemned sinners! Their cup of bliss 'is full; in comparison with this, the rapture of Nirvana is insipid.'

[1] The very ancient *tat tvam asi*.

Elsewhere he states that 'to give one's flesh is good though to preach the 'Law and give spiritual nourishment is better'. He naïvely tells his readers: 'it is not needful to follow *Sakyamuni's* example and allow 'one's body to be devoured by a famishing tigress, when safety can be 'won for *men* by other means' (*Bodhichar., Mahavagga*, vi 23 and Takakusu's *I-tsing* 198). There is in all this much of the spirit of St. Francis; still more is the affinity seen when he speaks of the distress of the poor, sinful and wretched, whom the monk in his aloofness is apt to despise. The true evangelist thus apostrophizes his own proud thought: 'Renounce 'the belief that I still entertain any special interest in you; I have surren-'dered you wholly to my neighbour and care nothing for your sufferings. 'If I did not give you up to the creatures, there is no doubt that you would 'deliver me over to the demons who guard the gates of hell. . . . I 'remember your long enmity and I crush you, O Self of mine! If I truly 'love myself, I must not love my self!'

NOTE.—For the better understanding of Buddhist Nihilism, and the doctrine of Voidness and of Nirvana, the recent articles of Poussin must be studied (*Enc. Rel. Eth.* July 1917, on buddhist 'Mysticism', 'Nihilism', 'Nirvana', 'Philosophy'). The article by him on 'Nature' seems inserted in error or under a wrong title; it merely deals with Buddha's attitude to the hindu gods and demons. It is not Poussin's fault that he cannot enlighten us as to the real meaning of *nirvana* but the fault of his subject and the systematic incoherence of hindu thought, for all its fallacious schematism and symmetry: to him (after the study of a lifetime) 'Buddha's personality remains an unfathomable riddle,' and he suggests that he never started with a theory of annihilation or attracted disciples by such an odd promise of immortality. Rather, logic (*darka*) 'a most dangerous auxiliary of religious thought,' forced the conclusion upon him, in consequence of 'his rashness in denying soul' (*Enc. Rel. Eth.* ix 377). He was (it would seem) coerced into a 'nihilism' which he had not anticipated and against which his monks, to whom *nirvana* was a joyful and positive concept, made strong protest. That it was a completely otiose engine in the religious propaganda is of course obvious (cf. Hoernle *MS. Remains of B. Liter.* Oxford 1916; 3 short and recent monographs on the subject, Eklund, Upsala 1899, Senart in *Album Kern*, Leyden 1903 and F. Schrader in *Jl. Pali Text Soc.* 1904, 5; on the 'Voidness School' of Nagarjuna cf. *Biblia Buddhica* iv Petrograd 1913 and Chandra Kirti *Madhya makavatara*, do. 1912).

II. IN JAPAN AND THE SOUTH

CHAPTER C. BUDDHISM AND ITS SECTS IN JAPAN

Introduction and Court favour in the Fujiwara Epoch.— Nearly 500 years after the admittance of Buddhism into China, its envoys reached Japan through Korea (*552* A.D.). It had by this time assumed all the air of a religion and from a society of philosophic friends had become a church. The prevailing belief of Japan was a vague and severely simple cult of ancestors mingled with a sort of imperial apotheosis as at Rome ; it received the title *Shinto* only when a name was needed to distinguish it from the new creed. It had no images, scarcely any temples worthy of the name ; the meagre yet earnest worship invites respect. Religion played little part in the life of this secularist race. Shinto had no ethical, no emotional side : it provided neither rules for conduct nor ritual and spectacles to amuse. It was a tribute to the original ancestors of the royal house and its only explicit commands are injunctions to loyalty and unfaltering obedience to the heir of the sun-goddess. Into this land of austere and simple faith came buddhism with its gorgeous appurtenances and mimicry of Christian rites. It filled a want and was gladly welcomed, though its progress was slow. The korean king of Kudara sent sacred pictures or *icons* to Emperor *Kimmi*, a coeval of Justinian in the far west. His successor attacked the new faith because of a plague for which he held it to account (*572–585*). A certain Regent *Shotoku*, under empress Suïko, at the close of this century (*590–620*), showed singular favour to the new sect ; and saw in the priestly envoys a useful influence on the temper of the people. Indeed, it is only from the advent of buddhism that japanese history can be said to begin. The once unsocial recluses had become pioneers of culture ; the priests made roads and built bridges, like the ' pontifices ' at Rome a thousand years earlier. Native students were sent to

learn in China and the bonds were drawn close between Japan and the chinese court, the Byzantium of the Far East. Buddhism displayed its vigour and vitality by breaking into sects (*700* A.D.) or rather religious orders, represented to-day by six chief, and thirty-seven lesser divisions. As buddhism was without dogma in the strict sense, the field for original movements was unlimited. Emperor *Sinmu*, a contemporary of Leo the ' Isaurian ' and Iconoclast (*715–730* A.D.) ordered a temple to be built in every department of the realm. This imperial favour is not a little remarkable : for the new faith must have aimed a heavy blow at their divine origin and exclusive cult, just as the Gospel threw discredit on the worship of deified emperors at Rome. At the close of cent. viii Emperor *Kwammu* was still engaged in reconciling the State church and the new faith ; he removed his capital to Miako (Kioto) (*794*) which continued to be the mikado's home until our own times. Streams of students went to China for further enlightenment in what they believed to be the true home of the doctrine ; and *Dengyo's* introduction of the *Tendai* sect was a direct result of his sojourn in the Middle Kingdom (*798*). A special tone was given by the native temperament ; *Dengyo* and *Kobo Daishi* (*774–835*) led men from the low level of *Hinayana* to the more sublime heights of *Mahayana*. The change was significant ; the recluse or hermit, like St. Anthony in the nitrian desert, became a sympathetic evangelist. The one was engrossed with personal salvation ; the other strove towards the light that he might help others. As a creed buddhism lost the pure subjectivity which in common with hellenic thought underlay the doctrine from the first. The ' Great Vehicle ' is then a humanitarian doctrine ; it is altruistic not self-centred. Flight from the world is converted into a real interest in others. A school of philosophy became an active missionary church. At the same time the *Shingon* sect owed its origin to the impulse of a chinese visit (*816*) and was much indebted for its welcome to the favour of Emperor *Saga Kobo*. He was even successful in effecting a compromise between the old and new faiths : the *Shinto* deities were looked on as *avatars* of Buddha, and to the local demigods and family heroes was allowed an inferior cult. It was only with this emperor that the imperial suspicion was at last laid to rest. The royal house became whole-hearted adherents and it was the fashion as in the west, to resign the

crown and receive tonsure as a monk. It is to this pious custom (which has analogies in Siam to-day) that we refer the short reigns and willing retirement of these mikados of the Fujiwara Epoch, although there was at work another curious cause, the inability of a japanese official to exercise in practice his titular duties.

The Sects under the early Shogunate.—About the time of the first Shogunate (*c. 1150–1200*) *Senku* spoke against the efficacy of good works; he dissuaded the faithful from any attempt to imitate Buddha's human example. Instead, he advised (as a refuge from the evil world) a self-hypnotism induced by ceaseless repetition of sacred words, not as conveying any spiritual meaning but as lulling the senses and the reason. This *Jodo* (as the sect was named) well reflected the despondent feeling abroad at the close of the *Fujiwara* regime, when military vigour replaced courtiers' intrigues. This mechanical salvation marks a profound despair. A partial reaction took place under *Senku's* pupil *Shinran* (*1175–1262*) who returned to the social world and human concerns: vows of celibacy (hitherto the rule) were annulled; empty musing or metaphysics was given up; no charms, spells, or senseless verbal iterations were enjoined; and the sole means of salvation lay through personal faith in *Amida Buddha*. We are tempted to recognize a Christian influence in this faith, just as in the *bhakti* in India which supplanted both sacrifice and good works in the more deeply religious minds. The *Zen* sect reverted to pious contemplation; this alone could give truth and inward peace; and though some of the school were keen students and disputers, the aim and highest point of development was to recognize that our world was a vain show and the present life an unreal mirage. It is singular that this doctrine of nihilism is believed to have moulded *Bushido* in no small degree; that is, a belief in the indifference of all action lay behind one of the finest systems of moral conduct: at least, one thing was of value, man's sense of honour and his 'unconquerable soul'. So rooted and universal is the conviction of personality! The stoics held the same views; and with them instinct and roman training were stronger than logic. Soldiers were made brave, servants loyal, priests unworldly, by the thought that life was unreal and that nothing mattered; a curious paradox if we do not remember that the value of soul and personality (whatever the professed

desire for extinction or absorption) rose higher the more the outer world and the events of life were disparaged.

Fission : Militant Monasticism and Pure Contemplation.— It is not surprising that the zenith of the buddhist church in Japan dates from the establishment of the shogunate or military regency (*1200*) ; that the shoguns should have favoured a doctrine which, however transformed, must have raised serious doubts as to the divine lineage of the mikado. The next four centuries are really in large part the history of the great conventual orders. In *1191*, the *Rinzai* sect was set up by *Yeizai* ; and, as we saw, *Shinran* in *1220* began to secularize the church and encourage it to join in the quarrels and conflicts of a very turbulent feudalism. His aim was to abolish, like Luther, the fundamental barrier between priest and layman : the former marrying, eating meat, and serving in a chapel open to the public, was soon to plunge into the fray as an armed combatant. This *Shin* sect uses japanese characters, not chinese ; just as the vernacular displaced the use of latin in our own protestant movements. Their priesthood passed from father to son, like the old ' family-living ' in England. Penance and ascetic practice were discouraged ; and faith in Buddha is the cardinal axiom. Are we to find here traces of the influence of the hindu *bhagavata* church ? While *Daghin* founded the *Yodo* order in *1227*, a very important step was taken by Nichiren (*c. 1260*) who betrays a reaction from the new militarism of the shogunate and lays a new stress on self-surrender and contemplation. With him, the figure of Buddha undergoes one last and inevitable change ; he is not only the Son of Man and Saviour, he is the supreme deity ; from him all things issue and to him everything returns. He is source of all phenomena, and thus a first link in the eternal chain is found indeed, a permanent Substance. Human thought could not be satisfied with a circle, with no beginning or end : it demanded a First Cause. Buddha is then the *law* and the *material* of the cosmic evolution ; that is, he is now himself regarded as identical with *karma*, act and result, cause and effect. It is without doubt a studied counterpoise to the secular *Shin* sect, which had reverted to bigotry and austere practices and in later times took a leading part against the Christians. It is significant that in place of ' Honour to the Holy Buddha (*namu Amida Buddha*), a new legend, battle-cry and pious ejaculation

was invented ' All Honour be to the book of the Law that brings ' Salvation '. The student cannot help detecting a parallel to the differences between catholic and protestant outlook, indeed, to the earlier contrast of πίστις and γνῶσις at Alexandria (*c. 180–250* A.D.). Salvation is won on a lower stage, by following tradition and apostolic precept, by faithful obedience and much external rite ; or again on a higher plane by personal belief in an unseen power, which could be approached directly without ritual or priestly mediation. The one system had already created a well-disciplined secular society ; the other still forms a community indeed, but it is one in which the chief value was individual piety—not a common social welfare. When *Jippen* founded the last great order (*Ji*) in *1288*, the creative (and also fissional) period of Buddhism in Japan was at an end.

Suppression of Militancy by the Reformers.—In the confusion of the Feudal Period *1330–1600*, the buddhist priests played a double rôle,—they kept alive culture and letters, like the monks in the west, but they also took a prominent part in the clan-conflicts, which led to the stern centralized authority of the revived shogunate. *Nobunaga*, whose chief aim was to restore order in the interests of the community at large (*1570*), found it necessary to lay siege to the *Hieizan* stronghold of the *Shingon* sect, and after capture to massacre its inmates. A like fate befell the *Shin Convent* at Osaka ; a stubborn resistance was made ; and the mikado did not enter until 2000 of the garrison had been killed. With this the political power of the priesthood came to an end. The Shogunate favoured a sect not hitherto notable, the *Jodo* (dating from *1227*), whose tenets taught that salvation depends on prayer and punctilious observances, not on purity of conduct. Such teaching was well adapted to the new reign of order which the *Tokugawas* desire to establish throughout Japan. The burial-grounds of this secondary dynasty were in the keeping of the sect, at Shiba and Nikko ; there could be no surer mark of confidence. Thus in a certain sense, buddhism of a somewhat illiterate and formalist type, became a state-religion ; it had at least the patronage of the *bakfu*, that peculiar official class who controlled and spied upon the feudal princes in the interests of the central power.

Revival of Shinto : Temporary Depression of Buddhism.—The revival of *Shinto*, as a national creed of loyalty, belongs to

another inquiry; but the antiquarian research of cent. xviii reestablished both the supremacy of the mikado and of the simpler and primitive cult. At last nationalist ideas issued into action: and the revolution took place which overthrew the shogun. From *1750* to this crisis buddhism had grown weaker, with that curious diffidence and want of conviction which seemed to mark every branch of the shogun's usurping government in its later years. When the last shogun retired, a rival mikado of the imperial line (a high-priest of the Tendai sect) was actually set up by the defeated party; but it is doubtful if religious belief had any direct share in this attempted protest. The restored monarchy looked askance at buddhism; its rights were curtailed and many of its temples handed over to its elder rival. Shinto indeed became a state-religion and a department of Public Worship was added to the government bureaus. Its ministers formed a kind of corporate body, and, as in ancient Rome, magistrates and officials were encouraged to join. In *1871*, two still more severe measures were taken; the palace-chapel of Buddha was closed; the statue was removed and the imperial festival discontinued. The landed estates of the Convents were secularized; titles and honours were abolished and priests commanded to resume their gentile names. All 'taboos' were abrogated, as on marriage and the eating of meat; according to the now worldly policy of the reformers who had seized the sacred person of the mikado. These acts, like the modern movements in France or in Portugal, struck a heavy blow at a large section of society. In *1872* there were about 72,000 priests, and nearly double this number of novices and students of the *Shin* sect; while the buildings only fell short of the total number of priests ministering in them. The attempt to make the simple Shinto cult a national and state-religion, proved abortive. It contained none of the elements—emotion, wonder, ceremony, supernaturalism—which are needed for a popular propaganda. The official missionaries were bidden to teach morals, to make clear the laws of nature (regarded, as in confucian China, as providing a clear guide for human behaviour), and to inculcate attachment to the Emperor and love of the fatherland. At the same time the interdict on buddhist preaching was removed, except where it was contrary to these public laws of Shinto. In *1884*, the preaching body of the state-religion was abolished; and in

1889, toleration of all forms of worship was recognized as an integral item of policy. The first chamber of deputies refused (*1889*) to discuss the questions of difference between the three competing sects—whether from lack of interest or from a secret sympathy with a new factor, Christianity.

TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF JAPAN

(ACCORD. TO KAIJI ASHIDA OF DOSHISHA UNIV. AT KIOTO.)

538 A.D. Gifts arrive from Kudara in Korea.
593 First Court favour under Regent Shotoku.
624 There are 46 temples, 816 priests, 569 nuns.
(1) *708–794* or *Nara* period Buddhism is the Court-religion.
750–770 under Empress Koken, priesthood a 'political power 'overshadowing the throne'.
c. 780 Syncretist movement of Gyoki and Kukai who to meet popular discontent equate Buddha and the saints with native deities.
(2) *794* begins the *Heian* period: rise of sects.
A. *Tendai* by Saicho (*767–822*) after death 'Dengyo,' builds Monastery of *Hiei 788*.
B. *Shingon* rose to notice under Kukai (*774–835*) after death 'Kobo': who also gave impulse to
C. Buddhistic *Shinto* (cult of imperial *kami* is in truth worship of Buddha). These sects flourished till close of Fujiwara Supremacy.
(3) *1200–1600*. During civil strife a demand for deeper religion arose:
D. *Jodo* by Honen (*1133–1212*), 'Western Pure Land' won by faith in Amitabha, without *works* or *knowledge*: leading to
E. *Shin* by Shinran (*1173–1262*) his pupil who abolishes marriage-restrictions and other *tabus* and boasts of name 'tonsured 'ignoramus'.
F. *Zen* (early divided into two sects):
(i) *Rinzai* by Yeizai (*1141–1215*) for use of the military class: 'all ritual and learning useless, meditation (*dhyana* or *zen*) 'on one's own intrinsic nature is sole means to salvation' hence stoical indifference to hardship and peril.
(ii) *Sodo* by Dogen (*1200–1253*): otherwise *Soto* (p. 257).
G. *Nichiren* (from name of founder *1222–1282*, who, like Dengyo above, based his teaching on 'Lotus of True Law') characterized by bibliolatry, salvation by repetition of names and chart-worship.

Of the above A and B were in favour chiefly with the nobles, F with the warrior class, D and E amongst the poor. As to the problem of relation of *hinay.* to *mahay.* Captain Brinkley (*Enc. Brit.*) is clearly of opinion that the early preachers from China and Korea brought in only the 'imperfect *hinay.* systems'; that Kobo (*774–835*) led his countrymen

'by a path almost wholly his own from the low platform of *hinay.* bud-'dhism whose sole aim is individual salvation to the *mahay.* doctrine—'which teaches its devotee to strive after perfect enlightenment not for 'his own sake alone but that he may help and intercede for his fellows'. He lays more stress than Ashida on the *formalism* of Jodo (D), 'ceaseless 'repetition of pious formulæ . . . it is a religion of despair'. Shin (E) set itself against all futile metaphysics and outward acts of devotion : it is this sect which to-day is most progressive, sending missioners abroad to study in western universities ; it makes no use of charm or magic spell. He notes the sole new offshoot after the close of our period in *Zen* iii,—the *Obaku* (*1650*) 'truth reached by pure contemplation and knowledge trans-'mitted from soul to soul without use of words' : the older *Sodo* branch having (as was thought) placed undue premium upon scholarship and research. Of *Zen* influence on the Warrior-Caste and the evolution of *bushido* he says that the use of meditation as the vehicle of enlightenment played an important part. 'Whatever be the mental processes induced 'by this rite, those who have practised it insist that it leads finally to a 'state of absorption in which the mind is flooded by an illumination re-'vealing the Universe in a new aspect—absolutely free from all traces of 'passion, interest or affection and showing . . . that for him who has 'found Buddha there is neither birth nor death, growth nor decay. Lifted 'high above his surroundings he is prepared to meet every fate with 'indifference. The attainment of that state seems to have been a fact, 'in the case both of the *samurai* of the military epoch and of the japanese 'soldier to-day.'

As to G (*Nichiren*) Professor Anesaki (of the Imp. Univ. of Tokyo) regards it to-day as the 'most ardent expounder of the orthodox *Tientai* from China, of which the Tendai (A) was the early offshoot' : in this sect a question is often debated ; is chief importance to be attached to the *impersonal* Truth or *dharma* revealed by Buddha or to the *person* of the revealer ? (Cf. Appendix P, 212–217 above.)

As to B (*Shingon*), it seems that Subhakarasinha brought into China a text-book of buddhic tantrism (*Mahavairochana-abhisambodhi*) and Kukai (who died exactly a century later than S.) reduced this to a perfect system in Japan. Its chief tenets have already been treated.

APPENDIX A

Present Condition of Buddhism in Japan : Self-criticism

The present condition of buddhism in Japan shows the wholesome effect of friction, disfavour and poverty. It produces earnest thinkers and zealous preachers ; and much interest attached to such pronouncements as those put forward by the envoys to the 'World's Parliament of Religions'. There is a conspicuous absence of pessimism, and a humanitarian air, which prefers practical kindness to the pleasures of contemplation. This indeed is the chief feature, as noticed above in the contrast of *hinayana* and *mahayana*. Thus *Horin Toki* represents the former or

lower stage, as conformity to precept, the alexandrine πίστις, which will secure bliss hereafter. But *mahayana* is described as a state of mental harmony, indifferent to outward act, and unaffected by it, which secures the full bliss of man in this world. Another writer, *Banriu Yatsubuchi*, while holding that this *mahayana* is the higher form and Gautama's genuine teaching, standing perhaps as a Johannine 'gospel' to Petrine 'law', states that 'some deny this'. 'Some spiritual beings may be content 'with their own perfections': but not so the Master, who wishes to help all men and therefore permits all divers sects, creeds and tenets. *Mahayana* is to him 'the greatest truth of buddhism': and it comprises two teachings the *Sudden* and *Gradual*; the latter brings one step by step to the truth, as good deeds accumulate and evil habits are left off (*danwakushori*). The sudden conversion, as with some Christian sects, is won by introspection and by musing on the more esoteric truths (among which the Buddha-body, soon to be noticed, takes prominent rank). Buddha himself is said to teach the Apparent doctrine, *Buddha Dainichi*, the Secret. *Kobo* (*774–835*) has dealt with both forms. The *Shodo* sect aims at bliss in this life (the strict *mahayana* teaching); the *Jodo* aims at bliss hereafter: (this usage is of course just the converse of the one familiar). *Hinayana* (as contained in *Agama* Sutra) is explained by *Bhagavad* to priests (*bhiksus*) of both sexes in 250 precepts, and in ten to the novices: 'the core of the 'doctrine (says Horin) is to reach the realm of pure and clean tranquillity 'from the grievous appearing world of humanity.' The same teacher however in other *sutras* unfolds the higher doctrine that *even in the aspect of this world* is clear and pure tranquillity to be found; that even 'this 'present state of existence can be made equal to the calm, clear condition 'of perfection.' Horin believes the former to belong to southern buddhism; the latter and more optimistic theory (he thinks) is chiefly to be found in Japan. In his view, the former corresponds with a yearning for a far-distant heaven localized and filled with a content really borrowed from our best experiences here; the latter, with the (spinozistic) belief that heaven is in the soul;[1] that Soul is everlasting by apprehending eternal truth and not by grasping in some future state at selfish comfort or recompense. It is clear then that *hinayana* looks at things from the personal (that is relative) point of view; *mahay.* from the Absolute, where no shadow of selfishness is thrown on the unbroken light (or darkness) of God. It is of interest to note that Horin believes the two systems to be not merely reconcilable (*ekayana*) but in actual process of conciliation: 'We believe 'that finally these two views will come together without any contest, 'according to the development of the human intellect and the progress 'of science.'

Zitzuzen Ashitsu divides scriptures into the 'three stores of *hinayana*' (*Sanzo*), containing *Ryo* (principle), *Ritzu* (precept), *Ron* (argument or proof);—and the *later* compilation of *mahayana*. He believes both

[1] Emerson is entirely at one with this view when he uttered in protest to the missionary; 'Other world! there is no other world! it is here and 'now, or nowhere.'

prevailed together (as higher and lower course) for several hundred years after Buddha's death : then broke into three currents, passing north, south and east. The *north* includes Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria ; the *south*, Ceylon and Siam ; the *east* China, Korea and Japan. He adds with pardonable pride : ' Eastern *mahayana* in Japan is the most powerful of all Buddhism.' He gives the following variant of the contrast between the exoteric and esoteric method : *mahay.* aims at enlightenment by seizing ' hold of the *intellectual constitution* of Buddha ' : whereas *hinay.* teaches ' how to attain Nirvana by *strict obedience* to Buddha's commandments '. He considers the former as the chief part of buddhism, wherein ' it is taught how we may *become Buddha ourselves* '. Notice must again be drawn to the alexandrine parallel of πίστις and γνῶσις and to the third birth of Christ in each redeemed soul. The ' works ' theory of the catholic, compared with the solifidian tenets of extreme protestants, must also occur as a parallel. What is certain is the debt to Christianity. Both Hinduism (in the development of *bhakti* dogma) and japanese buddhism drew from this source. Mystical communion in place of external meritorious rite, is common to all earnest religions ; but the peculiar form of attachment to the divine, the belief that the faithful enter into the very nature of the Redeemer, is certainly a loan from Christianity. The third birth of Christ in the believer's heart was regarded as the supreme union of the divine and human element. It is then natural to divide buddhism into this exoteric and positive (rather philosophic) attitude, and on the other side, a mystical inwardness : of the one, self-help is the text. On this, all agree : *Soyen* makes clear the point we have noticed, that both Confucius and Buddha unfold the *law of nature*, the law that no one made, no one can thwart, every one can understand ; there is no creator, no value in prayer, no recompense (viewed as something differing in kind and removed in time), no personal judge ; happiness depends on oneself and is confined to the present life ; no cause outside ourselves can make us glad or miserable, since we are our own heaven or hell. Like the lover ' I am myself my own fever ' : this is the axiom of Epictetus and of Buddha. The law of *cause* and *effect* is not as in early chinese religion, a purposive and stable enactment of some moral power or person, but in the Lucretian sense, a rule that has grown up by accident but is none the less potent. The prophet only divulges this law ; he neither creates nor abrogates. ' This causal law ' concludes *Soyen* ' is the source of moral authority.' It is clear that it supplies the place of any other sanction or inducement to right action. It is however not strictly *moral* in our sense, for it is only an appeal to self interest, and the known consequences of action. *Ashitzu* (already quoted) believes that ' we can all be what Buddha was ' ; he is the Great Exemplar : so to the epicurean the Master was only a pattern of calmness, one who shows how far below the feet of the wise lay the terrors of hell *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. . . . inevitabile fatum Subjecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari.*

Yoshigiro Kawai (belonging to the *Nichiren* sect who worship a diagram *mandala*) says also that all can become what Buddha was, even the ignorant and humble. In *Horin Toki* we find the same belief ; the Buddha

nature must set itself free ; this freedom is within reach of all ; no outside power or grace is needed or can be efficient. In agreement with *Soyen*, he makes it clear that Buddha did not make the law ; that he only entered into it fully and pointed out the path to other men. All pleasure and pain is from within and depends not on things but on our attitude to things. Prayer (he says in a fine metaphor) is like a finger pointing out the moon ; when the moon is seen, the directing finger is wanted no more *Banriu Yatsubuchi* also teaches this doctrine of self-help (which is in truth the very essence of the most authentic preaching) ; a man must get salvation for himself ; for ' no man may deliver his brother nor make agreement ' with the Law of Cause and Effect ' for him'. Buddha is the great Deliverer, because he fully worked out both the results of *wisdom* and *mercy* ; first secure knowledge of the law and then entrust the secret to others. Buddha had no power to create or to destroy, or even suspend its working. What he did, we all in our turn can do. Every bit of the universe, every creature, has in it an instinctive craving for buddhahood (σύμφυτος ὄρεξις of the Greeks) ; and can become, like him, wholly illuminated. The philanthropic turn (peculiar to buddhism in China and Japan) is seen in the glad belief that ' we can save the worlds ' as in St. Paul, ' Know ye not that we shall judge angels ? ' Did not Christ preach to the ' spirits in prison ' ?

So far for the obvious lesson of self-help (which is *wisdom*) and for the natural complement, the duty of showing others how to help themselves (which is *mercy*). All this is just worldly wisdom, but there is an esoteric teaching of a mystical type. Even so mysticism followed on the track of the hard practical sagacity of the stoics. Aurelius is already far on the road to neoplatonism. When stoicism attempted to become a real moral doctrine and to take the place of religion, man found himself alone in an alien world, only by a stretch of fancy or abuse of logic and experience, *moral* or *purposive*. In protest he fell back upon *monopsychism*, the belief that all spirit nature is one—just as Averroes was supposed to teach in his interpretation of Aristotle. All men were reasonable because they had an inlet into the Divine Reason, or impersonal ' Over-Soul ' which somehow makes men persons. In the east, this was the curious destiny of Buddha : one who denied the value of metaphysics and the belief in any unity behind phenomena (except a physical ' law ') became the mystical unit of which every being formed a part. Thus by an irony of fortune, Buddha takes the place of Brahma whom he had dethroned. The doctrine differs from its western counterpart in giving place in this mystical communion to all beings and not confining it to man alone (as in the ascetic dualism of the later Porch) : ' all beings both sensible and senseless *have the nature* of ' Buddha . . . men, lower animals and plants are said to have . . . the ' essential spirit in full completeness ' . . . only they ' seem to differ by ' their various forms of development on the physical plane, in spite of ' their having the same spirit.' In *Nirvana Sutra*, it is plainly stated : ' all beings have the nature of Buddha.' Buddhism brings the light to all beings equally and makes them Buddha : either by Holy Path (freed by their own exertion) or by Pure Path (by external means) : all in the

end reach truth and become Buddha, or attain perfect development, that is, the virtue and power of Buddha inherent in all selves. This nature ' was ' already existent in all beings through eternity ' ; because no power or virtue comes from without ; no ' grace ' descends from an omnipotent and merciful being outside. We are only getting to know our true self. *Toki* asks if it is not a ' weak emancipation ' to teach that all beings can approach the divine nature in their spiritual nature, but cannot become *one* with the *one* ? To be Buddha then, is ' to display the same virtue ' and power that he did, to reach the plane of Principle or body of truth, ' and to manifest the intellect fully, and its application (?) of that one ' most divine [thing] in all the universe.'

Yatsubuchi devotes most of his space to this dogma. Buddha was ' one who developed from lower being. We must not think he was only ' an indian prince of this earth'. We must also understand how his body ' differs from our own : it has three different aspects ; A. *Hōsshin* is ' law- ' body ', without colour or form : in this stage Buddha makes the truth and the original body of the universe his own body,—this is truth which is wider than the universe and is everywhere. B. *Hōshin*, is ' body ' which was got as effect from a cause ', the law which even in his own case Buddha cannot annul ; he was subject to it himself and only rose from step to step by personal effort ; thus being *bodisatva* he ' made good cause to be Buddha '. C. *Ōshin* (*Nirmana Kaya* or transformed body) means that he was not satisfied with this achievement, but desired to preach to other natures by changing his body to suit their ignorance. The two former stages are too lofty for us ; so κατ' οἰκονομίαν he took on him the ' form of a servant ' that he might meet us on our own plane of weak- ness and ignorance. So though Lord Buddha had formed *hosshin* (A) ' omnipresence and eternity ', he changed his body to correspond to ours. ' Buddha was a man as we are, but he apart from us knew the Truth or ' Original Body of the Universe and cultured the virtuous works : in ' other words, worked thoroughly by his wisdom and mercy, so that he ' may be called our saviour.' *Wisdom* is the attainment of truth for oneself ; *mercy* is the (*mahayana*) complement of this knowledge—which is incomplete unless it is exerted for the benefit of other beings.

In substantial agreement *Ashitsu* gives the three ' personalities ' as he prefers to call them : A. is entirely colourless and formless, eternal, ubiqui- tous, and changeless. B. is that which he attained by refining his action, a state of mind full of enlightened virtues and free from desire and evil : it includes (he adds with emphasis) not merely self-enlightenment but the enlightenment of other minds : C. is the special and concrete personality which ' appears spontaneously to all kinds of beings in any state and con- ' dition to teach and illuminate them.' All these inner states of soul we also possess ; differing only in the sloth which makes us acquiesce in our degraded estate ; ' he developed by his self-culture, while we ordinary ' beings have our intellect buried in the dust of passions.' The much less speculative *Nichiren* envoy, *Yoshigiro*, says explicitly : ' The body ' of any one is nothing else than the Buddha's body . . . every one ought ' to set forth the buddha-heart (that is, benevolent heart) when any thought

' is formed in the mind. We can suppress the five appetites and seven ' passions and become possessed of a buddha-body.' This he believes can be secured even by the humblest through dutiful and unceasing repetition of the ' Daimoku ' or title of the Holy Book, *Na-Mu-Myo-Ho-Ren-Ge-Kyo.* ' Thus our bodies are the *body* of the Buddha of original ' enlightenment ' : but more than this, ' we ourselves are the Buddha's ' intellect '. The ' real state of things is the miraculous scene to be re-' flected by the Buddha's enlightenment, that is, to be known by the ' Buddha's *intellect.*' The meaning of this is clear ; ' in Thy Light shall ' we see light ' ; when we see and recognize the truth is it because God sees in us ? did not St. Cadog call conscience ' the eye of God in the soul of man ' ?

To the western mind these are hard sayings, but they are not mere fanciful tropes : they are orderly and methodical dogma. *First,* Buddha (like every one else) is part of the infinite—that colourless, formless, eternal, ubiquitous space-matter, out of which all spring to return thither again ; *next,* he is Buddha the *person,* keeping his personality, whatever may have been the early anti-psychic theory, clear and well defined, as he rose steadily through every rank of being ' to the primal height ', and saw gods and demigods before him in darkness and self-sufficiency : *last,* he is the gracious and merciful redeemer, who condescends to manifest himself on our plane, to reach us by becoming one of us. This is both *lowest* and *highest* form ; morally it is the best, just as the chinese goddess of Mercy turns back from a selfish beatitude to help mankind. The first theory is pure pantheism from India : the second is the nestorian merit-theory ; the last is the belief that ' he preached to every creature in their likeness ' even to the spirits in prison '. *Ashitsu* continues with a very interesting account of *Nirvana* : this is the person of Buddha when relieved from the condition of life and death. It has four classes A. *Honrai Nehan* (or *Nirvana*) is the person of Buddha ; ' has neither beginning nor end, clear ' from desire like a flawless mirror '. This original perfection, he hastens to say, is not the ' peculiar property of Buddha, but every being in the ' universe has just the same constitution '. (It will be noted how thought wavers between a desire to *exalt* the buddhic nature, and a desire to pronounce it just the same as ours and only purified by an effort which we can imitate if we will.) B. *Uyo Nehan* : then we advance from the former to a conscious sense that our care is vain and life an empty show ; that ' there is no such thing as the *ego* '. The title is interpreted ' something left ' and means that though mind is clear (not with *original* (as in A) but with *acquired* purity) the body still remains a clog. C. In *Muyo Nehan,* body and soul ' come to entire annihilation and there is nothing traceable ' : the name means ' nothing left '. D. The highest state is *Mujusho Nehan* when, ' no more subject to birth and death, we get a perfect intellectual ' wisdom and are also perfectly merciful ' ; not able to enjoy highest bliss because of our sympathy with struggling brethren below ; ' appearing to every class of beings to save them by imparting pleasures of Nehan.' The *first* and *last* belong to the *mahayana* (noticed above), the two middle to *hinayana,* being only stages in the progress of self-mastery. It will

be remarked how firmly rooted is the idea of helping others, which is foreign to most *subjective* schools of philosophy or religion : Dion Chrysostom and Epictetus brought this kindly interest in other men into the singularly frigid and personal creed of stoics and cynics. The four merciful vows begin with such an aspiration as this : Would that I might save all beings in the universe from this ignorance ! Horin Toki's views of Nirvana may be compared : the *hinayana* doctrine is but 'the beginning of nirvanic 'understanding' . . . the uniting with the law of passive uniformity 'to sink in the realm of calm extinction of mind and body' is the first stage no doubt but not the 'complete attainment'. The 'higher point' is called the *undwelling*, when a man goes forth from the selfish 'limit of 'calmness in body and mind and entertains the grand aspiration to develop 'everything to benefit mankind, to engage in active exertion for humanity 'from the circle of Buddhas down to the Sravakas . . . from animals to 'devils, from paradise to hell, without leaving any vacant place.' It is interesting to compare this philanthropic and evangelizing creed with those opinions of F. D. Maurice which excited so much bitterness in the middle of last century.

In *Ashitsu*, buddhism takes on the form of *pantheistic idealism*. 'The 'fundamental principle of buddhism is the Mind . . . so grand and mar-'vellous that even the heavens can never be compared to its highness . . . 'in shape neither long nor short, round nor square. It has no colour and 'form and appears freely and actively in every place of the universe. For 'convenience of studying its nature, we call it *True Mind of Absolute 'Unity*. Every form or figure, heaven, earth, mountains, rivers, trees, 'even man, is nothing but the grand personality of Absolute Unity.' It is also the sole source of enlightenment ; 'with it alone buddhism brings 'light to existing beings' ; so clearly it is the Mind.

The chief features of japanese buddhism are its gladness and its philanthropy. Of Buddha, *Ashitsu* says : 'the object of his own enlightenment 'is to endow all beings with pleasure and happiness, without making the 'slightest distinction.' *Yoshigiro* writes of the 'glorious light, eternity, 'peace, enlightenment, purity' which is the adept's reward. It is obvous that *extinction* has no place in the idea of Nirvana ; or, if it has, it is a selfish and cowardly way out of the series, a dereliction of duty which quenches usefulness. Such then is the received teaching of a church which has come tried out of a furnace. Allowing for difference of race, creed and character, it has many points of resemblance to Christian teaching, except that the First Person of the Trinity becomes *impersonal* law : Buddha leaves his home of peace, like the Saviour, in sympathy with man's suffering. The simple need not 'go away ashamed' but can subdue evil in the mind by pious rites and repeated formulæ ; the wise have an esoteric cult in which they see that they are united to the Redeemer, not merely by outward sacrament but in the spirit. Neither class can dispense with works of mercy and kindliness which, without undue effort at an impossible reformation of sinners working out their penal term, form the chief duty and chief delight of man in this world of trial.

Nobuta Kishimoto (*World's Parl. of Rel.* ii 1280) says that there are at

least 10 different sects in Japan bearing the common name of buddhism—some atheistic, others almost theistic ; some strict, others liberal ; some scholarly, others popular. Some are pessimistic in their principles, teaching that annihilation is the ultimate end of human existence. Others are optimistic and teach a happy life in a future existence, if not in the present world. ' But all unite at least in one thing, the law of Cause and ' Effect : a man reaps what he sows is the universal teaching of buddhism ' in Japan '. ' In northern buddhism ' says M. L. Gordon (op. cit. 1293) the Doshisha School at Kioto ' the masses certainly look forward to a future ' life in the " Pure Land of the West ". Yet question the more intelligent ' of the priests and we are told, not only that the objective existence of this ' western paradise may with equal propriety be admitted or denied, but ' also . . . that the distinction between *I* and *Thou* does not exist.' The mono-theistic ' or rather mono-buddhistic ' *Shin* sect makes Amitabha B. an infinite being—a man who obtained buddha-hood by his own exertions. They have no place for a Creator and deprecate prayer even that addressed to Amitabha since no outward power can alter the events of life or their consequences. ' If one presses for the thought of personality, self-con- ' sciousness, will in Amitabha or other buddhas, he is again disappointed. ' The *polytheism* of the masses becomes the *pantheism* of the learned.'

Of recent works on religion in Japan the following may be named : From New York, G. W. Knox *Devel. Rel. in J.* 1907, W. E. Griffis *The Rell.* of *J.* 1912, Harada *Faith of Japan* 1914 ; from Germany, Haas' two essays ' Des Buddhismus ' in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart* I iii 1 and ' Amida Buddha ' in *Religions-Urkunden* etc. II i (Leipzig 1910) ; also Inouyes *Entwicklung der philos. Ideen* Berlin 1897 and essay on japanese philosophy in *Die Kultur* (as above)I v, Leipzig 1913 ; papers on Buddhism at Oxford Congress *Hist. Relig.* in 1908 (vol. I Sect. 2), A. Lloyd *Creed of Half J.* London 1911 ; also articles by native writers in Hastings' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* of which the most comprehensive is Anesaki's Philosophy (Buddhist) in the last volume (July 1917) : the same author promises us an independent work on *Rel. and Mor. Devel. of Japanese* and has already published *Nichiren*, Harvard Univ. Press, 1916, and *Buddhist Art*, Boston 1915. Yamakami's *Systems of B. Thought*, Calcutta 1912 bears witness to the continued native interest. Anesaki recommends for Confucianism in Japan Armstrong's *Light from the East*, Toronto 1914, which he criticized in *Harv. Theol. Rev.* viii 563, 1915.—It may be said here that his general account brings into prominence the hindu (brahmanic and vedantinc) doctrine of ' autotheism ' as the real basis of japanese philosophy —e.g. in Ichiro Kanera (1402–1481) ' the sole principle ruling the universe ' is nothing but the primeval essence of our own soul ', coeval with the all-embracing deity. He believes the *Yuishiki* system of Vasubandhu (and the pilgrim Huen Tsang) to be ' an idealism teaching that ultimate ' reality consists in the *alaya* or innermost soul of each individual . . . ' identified with the Cosmic Soul'. Thus the ' mystic ritualism ' of the *Shingon* makes the ' final aim of every finite existence ' to be ' participation in the full life of the Cosmic Lord'.

CHAPTER D

Part I.—Buddhism in Mongolia and Tibet

Influence of Indo-Scyths on the Doctrines and Outlook of Buddhism.—The development of buddhism outside India has often been compared with the progress of the papal hierocracy in contrast with the small band of early believers who ' had all things in common '. In *Tibet* and *Mongolia*, there has arisen a gorgeous cult, and a hierarchy ending in a pope or rather in two pontiffs. Their doctrines are much like those current in China and Japan ; the special mark is the half-religious, half-secular government of the Lamas : hence the generic title for the system is Lamaism. Buddha's appeal was a call to self-knowledge and self-control, the state of the *arhat*, who attained happiness and peace by his own efforts and in this life ;—that is the sum and substance of a very simple and practical doctrine. All that was needed was mental discipline and change of heart. For several centuries no accretions were made ; or rather the subtle changes were insidious and unobserved. With the advent of the Yue-chi, began a series of *mahayana* writers by no means content with the ' plain gospel '. The *hinayana* (the original teaching) was both accepted and despised ; the lower grades of discipline were to be crowned by a deeper knowledge. The decisive moment was reached when the *bodhisatva* displaced the *arhat* as the ideal wise-man. An entirely new element was brought in ; St. Anthony or St. Simon Stylites gave way before the earliest missionary. Not that the Buddha had not openly taught and sent his disciples forth to evangelize the world ; not that Asoka had not tried to spread the good news over his immense realm ;—but the emphasis was laid so heavily on monastic celibacy, inward purity and repose, that the effect was Quietism, not zeal for other men's salvation. The *arhat* was interested chiefly in his personal attainment of bliss (however conceived) ; but on his perfection he ceased to be, as far as the world of gods and men was concerned ; his merit

was lost because he refused to 'be born again'. The *bodisat* (or bodhisatva) on the contrary, is not content with a selfish heaven; he wants others to share it; therefore he will retain consciousness and interest in our world, to bring numbers of the ignorant to enjoy the blessings. The political stimulus was much the same as that imparted to Rome by the barbarians. The church awoke to a sense of her mission, partly in compassion, partly in fear. The Indo-scyths in India played the part of the Teutons. A great social work opened before the anchorite who left his quiet retreat to convert the masses.

Missionary Zeal : beginnings of the Great Vehicle.—This was a novel doctrine; and the active new teacher was believed to have the spirit of the master; had not his *karma* (character) descended like Elijah's mantle upon his zealous shoulders? The return to earth in some mortal garb (*avatar*) was part of the duty of a hindu god; so Krsna and Rama had come among men. It was from this belief that the peculiar tenets of Lamaism arose. The earliest authors of this new period, writing in sanscrit, north and west of the old classical home of Buddhism, were in the very centre of sanscrit Brahmanism. There are nine chief works, which prove identity of origin for Great and Little Vehicle alike. Here sprang into life the marvellous tales of Buddha's life (*Lalita Vistara*) on the very soil where his simple doctrine had been imparted. None seem earlier than *120* A.D. and *Nagarjuna*, the reputed founder of the Great Vehicle, probably wrote about *200* A.D. and may be deemed a contemporary of Clement, Tertullian, and Philostratus in the west. Mythical beings press in and, like the *genii* in the arabian nights, wait humbly on Buddha's behests. Every new work increases their number; few in the *Lalita* (thus stamped as an early writing), they multiply afterwards with the well-known exuberance of hindu demonology. Two companions of Buddha received special notice, *Manjusri* and *Avalokitesvara*. The earliest chinese pilgrim Fa Hien (*c. 420* A.D.) states that they already receive a kind of cult at *Mathura* (in the Delhi district). They were in fact supernatural beings, who had given up the slothful ease of heaven to help mankind after Buddha's example. They took the great resolve of self-denial to enter a human body and live our life. They descended to earth to learn from the master, who had penetrated a more than divine secret; the one is *Love* personified, the other *Wisdom*.

Hence in place of a cold and cynical self-culture, a path to instinctive devoutness was found for these half-barbarians. India joined the western attempt (so marked in the second and third centuries) to explain the world ' by the mediation of angels '. Five Buddhas were acknowledged, each with an attendant *bodisat*, and a heavenly prototype ;—that is, a heavenly part which remained alone, while part in a human frame trod our sorrowful road in pure pity for human misery. Among these the Buddha of history held the first place ; his attendant daemon was *Avalokitesvara* (wisdom) ; and, like Hercules his celestial nature lived alone unperturbed in the western paradise as *Amitabha* (whence the japanese *Amida Buddha*).[1]

Compromises with Animism and Northern Magic.—Buddha's self-culture had discouraged any dependence on external aid, all preoccupation with metaphysic. It was a pure *moral* discipline and had no marvels to show. But the new races needed personal figures and a glittering pantheon. The old pre-aryan beliefs came back and were reinforced by the superstitions of the northern invaders. Animism revived, or rather fetishism, a still older theory of the world. Rites, ceremonies, spells, charms, *tantra*, magic, and sorcery supplied what was lacking for the religious practice of the ignorant. *Huen Tsang*, the second chinese pilgrim found a ruined convent near Peshawar, where a century before had flourished *Asanga*, the reputed reviver of the new magic. He was a ' syncretist ' and, while worshipping Buddha and arranging male and female pairs on the lines of Siva-cult, permitted gory sacrifices, dealt in the ' abracadabra ' to impress the weaker brethren, and attached importance to magic circles and pictures—as the *Nichiren* sect in Japan set up their sacred world-map or *mandala* as an actual object of worship. So mingled with strange elements, the pure buddhic faith ceased to exist ; the whole interest was transferred from the soul of the proficient (never more keen and self-conscious than when altogether denied) to the outer helps of amulets, ejaculations, and prayers to good and bad *genii*. Instead of *ἀταραξία* or calm of mind, indifferent both to present gain and future reward, men sought by black magic control over nature's elements and admittance without good works into heaven. Simple mendicant

[1] Further refinements of this complex and imaginative creed will be noticed in the Appendix.

hermits leading for the most part a common life, had given way to wizards boasting a special control over spirits and earthly forces.

Early history of Tibet.—It was in this changed condition that buddhism was introduced into *Tibet* and from thence into *Mongolia*. Tibet was the hunting-ground of barbarian hordes, and chinese Annals speak of a contingent of these nomads in the opening years of the *Chow* dynasty (*c. 1120* B.C.). They called *Kiang* (shepherds) the 150 tribes of nomad raiders who lived near Kokonor in N.E. Tibet. But the land had no history or unity, until the combined influence of China and buddhism transformed it into a nation of monks.[1] The Book of Kings tells how (*c. 50* B.C.) a wonderful infant, descended from Buddha himself, appeared as their 'culture-hero' and 'heaven-sent leader'. A peaceful kingdom was formed by the union of tribes, and the arts and comforts of life were gradually spread. In the second century A.D. iron was melted, the plough used, and fields watered by artificial means; in the fifth, fields were enclosed, leather used for clothing, and care taken to breed yaks and mules. These details are written under chinese influence and by those who wished to give antiquity to the custom of choosing a child as chief pontiff. But the indian origin of their culture (though unnoticed) emerges clearly enough; the ruling dynasty was supposed to spring from Buddha and to have its source on the other side of the Himalayas. This house desired to forward the welfare and enlightenment of the people by the use of this hindu influence; envoys in *632* A.D. (during the time of Huen's great pilgrimage) were sent to procure a truer knowledge of buddhism and returned with an indian script. In the next century (*700–800*) Tibet was the chief power in the S.E. of Asia, reaching its zenith of insolence when, in *763*, the chinese capital was sacked: retribution for a similar act on the part of the

[1] The royal lists are disclosed by the patient research of Prinsep, Csoma, Chandra Das, Rockhill, Huth—in addition to authors named as our guides (amongst whom Waddell's labours are conspicuous). Legend says that the first king was a refugee son of the *aryan* king of Kosala; though he was born with 'eyes obliquely drawn', which argue him a *mongol*. But the wives of this 'aryan' line were *lhamo* or goddesses, princesses of divine lineage like Helen in Greece. In the son's name the *mother's* name took precedence of the father's, and some have traced in this practice a proof of early gynæcocracy, certainly of a matrilinear system.

Chinese a century earlier. Peace was only secured between the two empires by treaty in *821*, ratified in *822* by bilingual tablets which still exist. Thenceforward until the mongol conquest civil authority became the founder and reformer of religion, and at last sank under the hierarchy which they had called into being; causes within were at work no less than foreign foes. The priesthood, with little taste for hindu metaphysics, were transformed by the original Shamanism of the people into magicians. From the eleventh century (*1000*) chinese influence prevailed: a chinese princess heralded the advent of chinese artisans; water-mills were built, wine was made, and woven stuffs took the place of leather. The mongol conquerors, themselves the champions of chinese culture and claiming to be like western Teutons merely a protective class, in no way interfered with the spread of this influence. Further details of this evolution will not be out of place here.

Royal Patrons of Religion and Culture (*600–1300*).—A powerful king of Tibet, *Tsan Gampo*, introduced the new phase of *mahayana* into his kingdom; and it is said that this was done in the year of the Hegira of Mahomet *622* A.D. If this is true, this era is marked by two events of supreme import in the religious life of man. Tsan was assisted by his two Queens, from Nepal and from China, and by a zealous minister of State.[1] The two former were raised to divine rank by the title 'glorious mothers', and the lurking preference for a feminine deity was satisfied by the belief that they were incarnations of Siva's wife, in her double capacity of *vengeance* and *love*. Under the civilizing influence of pious and able kings, the country made rapid advances. Reservoirs, bridges, and canals were made; tillage was more carefully undertaken. As with the monks of our western land, the first function of the world-renouncers was to increase its uses and its fertility. Higher instruction was given, no doubt under priestly control, in schools and colleges; two vast convents

[1] As opposed to current tradition (accepted e.g. by Rhys Davids), Waddell is inclined to deny that this warlike king gave any active assistance to religious propaganda. He was constantly at war, invading Central India in 647 A.D. and spreading tibetan influence so far that the Bay of Bengal was known as the Tibetan Sea. He built a few shrines, like Solomon, for his wives' holy images; and one was the nucleus of the great Lhasa Cathedral. But he settled no monasteries and the conventual system was not introduced till after a full century from his death.

were built and became not merely asylums of piety but social and educative centres. Yet the general success of the new creed was slight. Not till the reign of *Song de Tsan* (or Srong De-btsan) (*c. 740–790*; a coeval both of Charles the Great and Constantine the Byzantine Iconoclast) was the faith formally established as the state-religion. A third convent was built, *Samje*, not far from Lhasa; here learned men collected the *Sandjur* or sacred books in 100 volumes, each containing on an average seven pious works.[1] Song's grandson Ralpa Chan (*c. 800–842*) set the learned world to the task of translating sanscrit 'scriptures'—the later *mahayana* writings of Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu and others. He was murdered by his brother who headed a nationalist rising against the exotic influence. Active persecution of buddhism now followed and he in turn was killed by a buddhist monk disguised as a Bon devil-dancer. Thus *regicide* for the greater glory and profit of the True Faith was recognized in Tibet sometime after Santideva had written on the suspension of normal morality in certain crises. Once more buddhism passed under a cloud and emerged only in *971*; when the reigning sovereign again restored it to favour. A successor summoned the pundit *Atisa* to his court in *1041*;[2] and the deadly and immoral *Tantra* were put in the background. Three centuries of riches and success ensued: during which, with a strange analogy to the parallel development of Germany, wild barons and wealthy abbots disputed in feudal riot, and the central authority disappeared.

Chinese Suzerainty under the Mongol Dynasty: Lamaism to-day.—With Kublai Khan began the long chapter of chinese suzerainty. He laid hold of this divided country and drew it,

[1] This reign, the age of the Byzantine Iconoclasts, was marked by the advent of indian pundits. *Padma* Sambhava came to Tibet from the Nalanda College, famed for its ritual and magic (747 A.D.). He fixed the first *vihara* at Sam-yas two years later, 30 miles S.E. of Lhasa. Waddell defends this early lama from the charge of 'tantric' and superstition. The monks of his school show high literary talent and made very scholarly versions of the sanscrit classics: he was not a *quasi*-shamanistic wonder-worker. Still he believed, like Asanga and his brother, in the general outlines of tantric mysticism and is the reputed author of several (definitely) *theurgic* manuals—which show (as in ancient Egypt) how man by the use of spells *dharani* can coerce the gods to do his bidding.

[2] Waddell puts his visit earlier; it was in 1038 that he built his convent.

partly by force, partly by tact and gentleness, into the great chinese net. Among the fighting nobles and prelates he singled out the *Saskya* abbot to be the chief local prince under an overlord (*c. 1275* A.D.)[1] As in the west, the hereditary instinct was strong ; and the rule of celibacy was so far relaxed as to permit this hierarch to marry and leave an heir : after the birth of a son, he resumed his vows. A reforming and protestant movement began with *Tsong Kapa*, born *c. 1360*, and engaged for thirty years in teaching and collecting followers to found a school (*1390–1420*) : of such disciples he left behind no less than 30,000. He set his face against the *Tantra* and all that superstitious magic and animism, so dear to the mind of primitive man. He instituted a national day (or rather week) of intercession, with fasting ; and (unlike Luther) restored celibacy. The *Saskya* abbot still continued to enjoy a titular primacy, but the *yellow* followers of the stricter rule became more numerous than the *red* partizans. As a result of the division China (*c. 1450*) recognized two tributary Lamas, the *Dalai* (yellow) and the *Panchen* (red), whose titles, if not their authority, exist down to the present hour. Regarded as *avatars* of celestial beings, the Dalai should occupy not the first but the second place ; for he represents *Amitabha* himself, the Panchen being a reëmbodiment of *Avalokitesvara*. The Dalai (with the title *Gyalpo Rinpotshe*) is regarded until recent times not only as the secular ruler of Tibet under China, but as the spiritual head of all buddhists in China and Mongolia. In this latter country under a thin disguise of buddhism, which the founder would have trouble to recognize, the primitive shamanism of the steppes flourished—the favourite type of ural-altaic religion. It is a blend of nature- and ancestor-cult : the *shaman* (whose office is hereditary) appeals to the spirit of his forefathers to help him to resist the evil

[1] As regards the undoubted Christian and manichean influence on the Great Vehicle, it is interesting to note that the hierarch who crowned Kublai Khan emperor of China—this 'Saskya Pundit'—began the immense task of translating the tibetan canon into mongolian (after revising the text and comparing it with chinese versions). Now the *mongolic* character is a form of *Syriac* introduced into Central Asia by the nestorians. Tsong-kapa certainly learnt ritual and pompous accessories of worship from the nestorian missioners at that time (Waddell) settled at Tsong-kha the locality of his early youth and the origin of his name, in W. China.

demons and to secure aid from the good. His chief duty is to protect his applicants from malign influence ; he offers sacrifices and gives oracular response ; this latter he utters in a state of self-induced hypnotism to which the regular beat of a monotonous drum contributes. From these beliefs and practices, neither buddhist nor nestorian Christian kept himself free, and thus the primitive cult emerged only poorly disguised ; just as in Tibet the earliest native animism or Bon comes again and again to the surface of conventual buddhism.

The first work of value on Tibet was Köppen's *Lam. Hier. and Church* Berlin 1859, quickly followed by Schlagintweit's *Buddh. in Tibet* Leipzig 1863 and *Kings of Tibet* Munich 1866 : the russian work of Wassilieff —*Buddhism*, published in 1860 at Petrograd, is still a mine of information and deep learning. In the same capital in 1869 Schiefner published his history of *Buddhism in India*. Germany returned to the recondite subject in Grünwedel *Mythol. of Buddh. in Tibet and Mong.* Leipzig 1900 and *Padma Sambhava* etc 1912. The english reader must always derive his chief knowledge from the erudite works of Col. Waddell, *Buddh. of Tibet* London 1895, *Lhasa and its Mysteries* London 1905, articles in Asiatic Quart. Rev. (1912). To these may be added Francke's *Hist. West. Tib.* London 1907, Bushell's early work on the history *Jl. R. As. Soc.* 1879–80, vol. xii, Chandra Das in *Jl. Bengal. As. Soc.* 1881, Schott's *Buddh. in Higher Asia*, Gutzlaff's *Chinese History*,—not to mention Huc and Gabet's ever entertaining if not wholly convincing *Souvenirs* Paris 1858. For the tantric mysticism and theurgic formulæ in which Tibet reinforced its primitive Bon beliefs with ' copious sanscrit works ' cf. Waddell's monograph ' Dharani Cult in Bm. ' in *Ostasiat. Zeitschrift* i. 178, 1912.

Part II.—Buddhism in Burma, Siam, Ceylon

The Little Vehicle in Burma.—In Burma at the present day, while nine out of ten millions are nominal buddhists, the prevailing practice is the propitiation of spirits and demonolatry. The buddhist desires to ' secure merit ' for the next birth, and to this end uses alms, gifts to the priests, the building of convents (*vihara*), rest-houses and bridges, as infallible means to salvation. As with the ' good works ' of the Christian west, it is often hard to discern motives, or to decide where self-interest ends and pure service of others begins. It may be said that in these ' southern-buddhist-states ' the doctrine of *altruism* does not flourish as well as in China or Japan owing to the national temper : *Mahayana*, the northern dogma, set the apostle and missionary on a higher pedestal than the self-centred recluse. This is of course

due to the different spirit of south and east. The Chinese have always been keenly alive to the claims of the social order, to the duties of hearth and home ; Japan, civilized by China, has until the present time, displayed a notable loyalty to persons and (at least in certain classes) attachment to an exacting standard of conduct. But the Hindu is by nature an individualist. We do not remark in him the turbulent subjectivity of the teutonic Aryan, but rather the dreamy isolation of the hermit, who makes (and unmakes) his own world. The essential moment in a brahman's life was his retreat to the forest after having provided for the family succession ; which duty he must undertake by becoming a *grihastha*. The central point in the life of Buddha was his desertion of a sleeping wife and child. The ideal of both was the life of celibacy and detachment, in spite of the curious emphasis on the marriage and fatherhood of the brahman. As the doctrine of deliverance advanced north, it took into its fluid creed various hues and national tempers. It may be called *unselfish* (in belief and practice) in the social atmosphere of China and Japan ; but it remained preoccupied with self in the southern countries, where, although the individual entity was denied, nothing was so acute as self-consciousness.

The sources and origin of burmese buddhism are now referred (e.g. by such students as Sir George Scott) to a much earlier date than is generally supposed. There was intercourse with India before the Gupta Dynasty (*320–600* A.D.) and the doctrine may have been introduced long before. We need not for this reason discount the story of Buddhaghosa's arrival (*c. 450* A.D.) as a missioner from Ceylon. This may well represent the admission of the southern *hinayana* school ; but chinese and thai records and the monuments of buried cities prove that there were buddhists of the northern persuasion before cent. v A.D. It even seems probable that there may be truth in the legend of Asoka's mission to Burma in *241* B.C. They call him Dhammathawka, Asoka of the Law (in their curious lisping transliteration) and his envoys Thawna and Ottara. Burmese who know little of the later patron, Kaniska (between *90–120* A.D.) are well acquainted with the great eastern Constantine, who is said to have built pagodas and stupas in the remote country of Burma. There is also a story that a band of *ksatriyas* came soon after the founding of Old Pagan and established a head-

city of their own, called *Mawriya*—no doubt after the Maurya house to which Asoka belonged. Scott believes that the growth of the faith in Burma synchronized with the decay which set in soon after Kaniska's death in the west. The northern school established a footing at Prome (after excavations at Hmawza 1888–9), perhaps under the early Guptas (*c. 350* A.D.). It is likely that this *mahayana* school was in the ascendant until the reign of the national hero or 'King Alfred', *Anawrahta* (*c. 1010–1050* A.D.) It had lost its early character of agnostic idealism by the time of Kaniska and had adopted much from the *Bhagavad Gita* and the reviving Sivaism. It was already 'a speculative 'theistic system with a mysticism of sophistic nihilism in the 'background' (Waddell *Buddh. of Tibet* p. 10). Tibetan *bongyepa* (or mendicants) had already entered the country and given to Siam the term *phongyi* (monks). Serpent-cult and tantrism added to the ingredients of the medley. The *Ari* or *Ariya* (noble, aryan) were noble monks dressed in blue, leading dissolute lives like their homonyms the *Areoi* of distant Polynesia, and worshipping the snake. Anawrahta put an end to this debased religion and from this time dates the simple and ethical *hinayana* current to-day. Since his reign the burmese *bhiksus* have been noted for their study of the Canon and their scholarly researches into metaphysic and psychology. To their convents monks from Ceylon and Siam have repaired for centuries past; and to the *priestly* education of the burmese laity Scott pays a well-deserved tribute.

The last Royal Buddhist: Siam.—The siamese monarch is the last buddhist ruler and prides himself in his pious practice and orthodox dogma. Here a compromise is made between a rigid rule of celibacy and domestic life; every one assumes the robe of a novice for a certain time and after services as a monk returns to secular duties. The monasteries are still the centres of instruction, though controlled by government; and in their schools perhaps 100,000 students are educated. The moral standard in these retreats is high; and although the western cannot discern much public worship of a regular kind, processions and funeral rites are eagerly witnessed and carefully carried out. As with Tibet, Indo-China has no history until the Christian era. Ptolemy, with a surprising accuracy, depicts for us (*c. 150* A.D.) the *Champu* kingdom of the Chams in the south; in the

east and north, the *Khmers*; and (a notable detail) Σινδοὶ or Hindus along the whole coastline of the west. These brahmans (it is believed) came across by sea from *Orissa*, a recent conquest for their social and religious system; they did not enter by land from the north nor did they start from southern or dravidian India. Indeed they had not yet taken root in this non-aryan land; only later was a dravidian style of building brought into Indo-China. Brahman and sanscrit names of towns from *Madhya-desa* in these regions show clearly the source of the culture; and prove that dynasts strove to affiliate their house to the solar and lunar families; just as tibetan myth traced their first dynasty to a wandering cadet of the House of Kosala. Of this *brahmanic* period, countless temples, now lying in ruins, are witness together with sanscrit inscriptions; and their number increases every year with new discoveries. The cambodian kings can be read in sanscrit lists from *200–1000* A.D. Siva, Ganesa and the Lingam were held in especial honour, but the claims of Visnu were also recognized. Buddha was actually represented and received as an avatar of Visnu; and his image placed by the side of Siva. There was no question of a serious rivalry, when a compromise could be so easily effected. The new doctrine arrived from two points: (1) from *Ceylon* and southern India, whence (*c. 450* A.D.) Buddhaghosa started with his pali translations of scripture; (2) from *central Asia*, through the transforming medium of the northern (sanscrit) development. This latter was far better suited, as in the case of Tibet, to the mind of the half-barbarous tribes of the highlands. It would seem to have found a ready welcome among the Thai (free) tribes who correspond to the *frankish* confederacy of our western history somewhat about the same time. When this league descended (as Laos, Shans, Siamese) into the southern regions they were devoted adherents of *mahayana*. The splendid brahman temples decay with the worship of their gods: poor and jejune buildings shelter the simpler cult. In *700* the northern type found a footing; in Cambodia, a royal patron (*c. 1000*) furthered the cause; schools were entrusted to the monks about 300 years later; and in *1320* buddhism was recognized as the established religion of the State. Yet the original syncretism of the two faiths continued; Siva, Ganesa and Visnu were still honoured as heroes, if not as gods: in Bangkok their idols held a place near Buddha's statue. Visnu's

emblem is still a device of the royal standard of Siam; and certain rites and lustrations in the palace are still entrusted to brahmans. Here once more buddhism is seen not to oppose but to absorb; readily adapting itself to existing usage it could find a place for every belief. But the especial interest of the southern doctrine (Burma, Siam, Ceylon) must now receive notice.

Exposition of Chandradat of the Siamese Royal Family.—*Prince Chandradat* (a member of the reigning house of Siam) had written an account for the *World's Parliament of Religions* (p. 645). He begins with metaphysic: 'All things are made 'from *dharma* (sanscrit for "essence of nature"). It presents 'three phenomena; (1) an eternal evolution, (2) (leading to) 'sorrow and pain, (3) a separate power uncontrolled by man's 'desire and not belonging to him.' *Dharma* (like the god of Spinoza or the stoics), is formed of *matter* and *spirit*, existing from all eternity; spirit is man's mind. These two (in pali, *Rupa* and *Nama*) in varying proportion and at different stages of evolution) form the world as we have it. All differences however are but unreal: 'all is one and the same essence, a modification of one 'great eternal truth *dharma*.' It is quite likely the phrasing here may be due in part to western science, but the general principle is true to buddhism, when it became (as above) a *pantheistic idealism*; herein there is no difference between the schools of north and south. 'Man becomes conscious of separate exist-'ence . . . and through ignorance of the fact that all is *dharma* 'and of good and evil', he may give way to passion and become a tiger, though he still retains the semblance of a man. This spirit, which has laid aside its humane character, will be reborn in a more fitting body, as a tiger. But if man can thus fall he can also rise. He may adopt in his own life acts and wills of a Deva (or angelic being) and may actually become even in the present time such an exalted person. 'When death puts an 'end to his physical body, a spirit of the very same nature may 'reappear in the new body of a Deva to enjoy a life of happiness 'not to be compared to anything that is known in the world.' But it is 'undesirable to be born again into any being that is a 'modification of *dharma*: the only release is to possess a per-'fect knowledge of it, convince ourselves that we, together with 'all that belongs to us, are mere nothingness, lose the idea or

' impression that we are men, and we become united to *dharma*.' [1] The true method of deliverance is to ' cease all petty longings for ' personal happiness, and remember that one life is as hollow as ' another, that all is transient and unreal.' Thus we ' spiritually ' reach the state of *nirvana* '.

Practical Ethics.—The note of pessimism and disapproval is thus far more conspicuous in the south ; we noted its almost complete absence in Japan. In the north *nirvana* is perhaps never extinction or dying out ; even as a state not to be expressed in language, it retains some positive qualities and the highest form is always a life prolonged beyond personal advantage so as to help men. The siamese prince leaves no doubt ; ' What is to ' be hoped for is the absolute repose of *nirvana*, extinction of ' our being, nothingness.' The simile of the rope mistaken in the dark for a snake is given : when the passer by sees his error, alarm and fright give place to relief and peace. The *hedonistic* basis, as ultimate sanction and test, is as frankly accepted as in stoicism :—' lust, anger, ignorance . . . are called evils because ' they *cause pain*. Contentment, love, knowledge—are called ' good because *they give pleasure*.' At the same time, teaching is given how best to secure advantages in the present life, in a future existence, and to all eternity. For the first, the buddhist recommends the homely and typically chinese virtues ; thrift, industry, and the like. For the second, charity, kindness, knowledge of right, and wrong. For the last purity of mind, conduct and knowledge. The prince gives very practical advice for the husband and lay disciples, who clearly stand contrasted with the true monk. Temperance and celibacy are distinctly enjoined to one who would be perfect. That the pessimism is not very deep-rooted is found in a parting good wish, in which he desires for his brother religionists, ' enjoyment of long life, happiness and prosperity.' In this straightforward account, the striking likeness to later cynic and stoic teaching is detected ; a secular life (however necessary) is distressing and distracting and escape lies through quietism and aloofness from social duties. There is no idea of helping others, it is mainly self-interest that dictates ; and nothing is said about worship or religion in the strict sense.

[1] Conceived as the motionless ground, not as the restless striving of existence.

Present Condition of Buddhism in Ceylon : The Little Vehicle.— Two delegates from *Ceylon* addressed the conference, *Sumangala* by a letter in which he also introduces the second speaker, the young lay-missioner *Dharmapala*. The former gives in certain brief axioms the practical teaching : (*a*) happiness (that is of course ' virtue ' as with the stoics) is knowledge, (*b*) neither men nor books are to be implicitly trusted, (*c*) man can only set himself free, (*d*) it is *karma* that requites and brings about a just equilibrium, (*e*) desire must be conquered, (*f*) it is by this conquest that the penalty of new birth is averted, and man emerges ' into the calm and full wisdom of nirvana '. The able *Dharmapala* begins by denying that western minds as yet understand buddhism ; among many views of its aim and scope he names *positivism* (among Comte's followers), materialism (Buchner), agnosticism (Rhys Davids), *monotheism*, *theism* (Lillie), *pessimism* (Schopenhauer), *pantheism* (Fichte), *monism*, and *idealism*. He believes that his faith or school makes its appeal to the simple-minded as providing a plain code and guide of life ; to the ' earnest ' student a system of pure thought.' But ' the *basic doctrine is the self-purification of man* ' : that is, it is a revolt against priestly mediation and belief in a single and personal God : in place of this, it offers a synthetic religion called *dharma*, or reasonable religion. He does not hesitate to say that ' to be born as a man is a glorious privilege ' ; here again there is no real pessimism ; for one who has reached the stage of reason, able to live up to the highest ideal of ' pure life, calm thought and wisdom without extraneous ' intervention ' release is very near. He quotes the master as stating that ' *in this life* man can enjoy a glorious existence, a ' life of individual freedom, fearless and compassionate.' This is true and genuine buddhism in its earliest form. Buddha straitly enjoins on his holy disciples, not even to suggest to others that ' *life is not worth living* '. The law of *evolution* and its corollary *cause and effect* as endless series, is enough to account for the world as we know it, the perpetual turning of Ixion's wheel of self-torture. A creator is a figment ; and inquiry into the idea is strictly forbidden. But he can accept a Supreme God (of the brahmans) as all love, mercy and gentleness ; yet the perfect man is as good as this ' supreme god of the present world-period '. In the language of the scientific west, *Dharmapala* describes evolution as a ' continuous process unfolding itself . . . in

'obedience to material laws . . . a vast aggregate of original 'elements working out their own redistribution in accordance 'with their own inherent energies . . . infinite collection of 'material atoms animated by an almost infinite sum-total of 'energy (*akasa*).' What the system denies is a conception of 'a warring chaos restrained [1] by the constant interference from 'without of a wise and beneficent external power.' We are asked (he continues) not to speculate upon the origin of life, or of the causal law.

Practical Ethics in Ceylon.—In moral teachings, *Dharmapala* makes the same clear distinctions, curiously catholic in a system so protestant, between the lower and higher life. For the worthy householder there are many apt pieces of advice. But the advanced student embraces the religious garb: 'Full of hin-'drances is household life, a path defiled by passion; free as air 'is the life of one who renounces all worldly things. . . . Let me 'then cut off hair and beard, don the orange robe, and go forth 'from household life into a homeless state.' How ignorant is the vulgar eulogy poured by western minds on buddhism may be clearly seen from this passage. Like the paulicians or cathari, buddhists are of two orders; and the higher grade renounce all earthly ties and forbid to marry. The western world (whatever its practice) professes since Luther a profound admiration for the married householder who does not run away from life's troubles and problems, but rears good citizens for the State. The frank rejection of this is glozed over by the panegyrist, who hails in the theory of the school a genuinely scientific monism, in the practice, a peaceful and harmonious (if self-centred) life. But buddhism *without* the stress on celibacy and detachment would be unthinkable; it would be neither a religion nor a philosophy nór a guide of life. Therefore at least in the present mood of the restless and feverish west, it could not be transferred into our midst. It is after all a 'counsel of perfection', not a democratic and universal standard. What the future may bring forth is another matter. Strange indeed to average ears, sounds this maxim; which *Dharmapala* quotes as Buddha's own words: 'Let him fulfil all righteousness, devoted to that quietude 'of heart that springs from within: let him not drive back the

[1] As in Plato's *Politicus*.

ecstasy of contemplation, *let him be much alone.*' To 'realize 'the unseen' is somewhat strangely said to be the aim; the 'rewards of pure life and much meditation are thought-reading, 'thought-transference, clairvoyance, projection of the subcon-'scious self, and higher branches of psychical science'; these are within reach of the 'pure in heart', prepared by solitude and musing.

Nirvana in Sinhalese Buddhism.—As to the ultimate goal, 'Nirvana', the writer gives the same uncertain sound as other students. We read e.g. 'Buddha has realized eternal peace of 'nirvana and walks in the perfect path of virtue.' The condition then cannot imply extinction. He pronounces it 'beyond 'the conception of the ordinary mind, for it transcends all human 'thought and only the perfect man can realize it.' For him the law of 'change and decay' has no terrors: there is no more birth, no more death. '*On earth the perfected man enjoys nirvana,* 'and when the natural body is dissolved, there is no more birth 'in an objective world. The gods see him not, neither does man'. There is no mention of extinction; and I do not know by what other terms the most devout mystic could express the 'unio'—the peace which passeth all understanding. Not that buddhism is indifferent to the welfare of the present world. Our writer gives Asoka's humane edicts and the general effect of the teaching in social endeavour. Hospitals were first built for man and beast; evangelists sent to all parts; letters encouraged; drunkenness and cruelty to animals repressed. The *bhiksus* and *upasakas* (religious) must not be content with offering a good example but must teach and exhort the weaker, treating the fallen with mildness and sympathy. He who does not look after the poor is himself called a *vasala,* or lowborn. The rich should devote one-quarter of their wealth to good works and the relief of the needy. Buddhism strongly condemns war, aggression, and industrial revolt; conflicts of labour and capital are unknown where the faith is welcomed.

In another paper *Dharmapala* quotes Sir W. Hunter with approval: 'Salvation equally open to all men and won not by 'appeasing imaginary gods but by our own conduct.' Neither priest nor god can reverse the act once done or change its issue (the greek *ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσ' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα*). As a man sows so he will reap; and the golden rule is kindness to others

and mastery over the only real enemy self. *Nirvana* (he again insists in full agreement with early buddhic doctrine) can be *realized* on this earth ; he who reaches the fourth grade of holiness '*enjoys consciously the bliss of nirvana*'. This stage is reached when by unceasing effort [1] he destroys selfishness and, free from all *dualism*, '*realizes the oneness of all beings*'. Ideals to be admired are : self-sacrifice for others,[2] compassion based on wisdom, joy in the hope that there is final bliss for the pure altruist. Comparing the entire system with modern (darwinian) science, the writer believes that '*this high and joyous conclusion*' of western thought is just ' that which makes buddhism so glad and so hopeful.'

APPENDIX B

Buddhism in Ceylon

It is now believed that the doctrine made its way south to Ceylon even before Asoka's mission, rising out of an embassy sent *c.* 230 B.C. by King Tissa the Sinhalese. The eight extant accounts are all derived from the now lost *Mahavamsa* or Great Chronicle kept at the Cathedral of Anuradapura (cf. Geiger's monograph on *Dipavamsa* etc. Leipzig 1905). The buddhism of Ceylon which has prevailed since the age of Tissa and Asoka in its present form, shows no original doctrine or independence of thought. For 1200 years and more the tradition was maintained by a careful oral method. Long after the use of writing became general, the scriptures were thus transmitted by memory and recitation (' a curious and probably unique state of things ' (Rhys Davids *Budd. Ind.* 120–140). It is certain that apart from the temperament of the Sinhalese, this practice requiring untiring industry and care has precluded the rise of original ideas, and has preserved for us the authentic canon for more than two thousand years. As in other *hinayana* lands the masses still continue their animistic beliefs and rites ; but they readily attend the ' revival ' meetings which are held in the fine weather (Spence Hardy, a pioneer in the true appreciation of buddhism, *Eastern Monachism* Lond. 1850, *Manual of Bm.* Lond. 1860 : among the most recent works should be named Geiger *Liter. and Lang. Sinhal.* Strassburg 1900, Gogerly *Ceyl. Bm.* Colombo 1908, Farrer *In Old Ceylon* Lond. 1908, Parker *Ceylon* Lond. 1909.—last but not least in value Wickremasinghe's patient toil upon the *Brit. Mus. MSS.* 1906 and his *Epigr. Zeylanica*, Oxford 1909. But all students should still read Bishop Copleston's *Buddh. Primitive and Present, at Magadha and in Ceylon* Lond. 1892.

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[1] Salvation is no easy matter.

[2] As proof positive of the decay of the self-illusion.

APPENDIX C

Theistic development in Buddhism: Adibuddha, Avalokitesvara

Parallel to the great movement which in the end placed the *missioner* above the *mystic* was a tendency to restore the notion of *providence* to honour in the divine nature. The development of Avalokitesvara is very probably somewhat later than that of Amitabha, but the motive for it is simpler and it will be well to treat it first. There is no doubt that this figure is composite and the result of syncretism: Av. has much in him of Siva. He is not only a great lord but he is a divine providence as well. The name is interpreted either as (1) lord of the visible world or (2) lord who looks down from on high: and it is in this latter sense that the true significance of the mythical figure can be found. With a strange likeness to Proclus' and Dionysius' theory, it is held that this great *bodhisatva* turns his glance both aloft to the Serene Buddha and below upon the creatures, with the look of pity which befits his function. [Kern denies this *active* sense, '*seeing* not *seen*, is bad grammar'; but this is no hindrance Burnouf, Lillie, Poussin and others.] Now it is certain that he is regarded as an *active ruler* and administrator, as e.g. Mitra was in mazdeism. He is concrete counterpart to the vanished Buddha who, like Danton, is strictly *engouffré dans le Néant*. In him the *dharmakaya* is once more embodied; he is god of daylight and 'the living, as Amitabha, dwelling in the land 'of the sunset is god of paradise' [F. W. Thomas however notes that the chthonic or funerary character of Av. cannot be denied; for one rendering of *avalokita* is 'he to whom farewell has been said, he who is seen for 'the last time': thus he becomes like Osiris lord of the departed and comforter of the dying]. Many years ago Edkins (*Chin. Budd. pref.* to *ed.* 2, xii) insisted upon the parsi influence on Northern Buddhism. 'This 'branched out in striking manner from the old root of buddhist ideas and 'the cause should be sought in its close contact with pers.and babyl.thought. '. . . Amitabha the Buddha who leads to the western paradise is a 'new Ormuzd god of light; to the Persians the supreme deity promising 'his followers eternal joy. . . . The buddhists incorporated the *persian* 'view of a supreme God and a future life of happiness.' Into China the buddhists came bringing news of the paradise and the worship of its sovereign. The northern school 'has gone through the purifying process 'of a thousand fights with brahmans and other sects in India, with parsis, 'manicheans and Christians abroad and with confucians in China.' He very pertinently adds: 'It is surely worth the earnest thought of *pali* 'students that buddhism was developed powerfully in N.W. India under '*persian* and *Christian* influence so far as to allow of the teaching of a 'future life, and (in effect) to treat *nirvana* as a euphemism for death. In

' this state buddhism entered China ' Now later research has made it clear that both Amitabha and Avalokita have a distinctly *solar* character. The former represents Siva unrevealed in his eternal formless essence, the latter is Śiva revealed to men in his activity or existence, finite light as contrasted with infinite, indivisible radiance. Av. is represented as having *sun* for his body and ' bearing on his head Amitabha ' (cf. Bayley's *Lost Symbolism* i 140. Will. and Norg. 1912). Amitabha's western paradise is closely connected with the town Varuna in the far west, also called Sukha (*Sacr. Books East* xlix 22). Av. is called by the old solar title ' lotus-bearer ' *padma-pani*, which was given to Surya the vedic god. It is therefore possible to give yet another origin to his name ; ' the god who ' is seen ' that is ' revealed ', while as to the gnostics (with their primordial Silence and Abyss) the first god is unknowable. Poussin believes that in the *Lalita* there is reference made to Avalokita under the name *Mahakaruna*, great and compassionate one. It is clear that this mythical figure only rose into prominence by slow degrees. As late as the *Mahavyutpatti* (which may be dated in its present form *816–838* A.D.) he is one among several others, a group of 5 or 8 *bodhisatvas* who are superior to the rest. He is neither the only compassionate *bodhisatva* nor even the first. The future Buddha Maitreya certainly at this stage took precedence [he is the only one acknowledged by the *Little* Vehicle and played an important part in founding the *Great*: the chinese pilgrims were more interested in M.'s heaven and held the coming Buddha in greater honour than the *present* world-ruling *bodhisatva*, Av.] Still there is reason for believing with Poussin that from the dawn of the Christian era, at least in certain circles, ' Av. became an important personage and a jealous god '. In the great chinese ' gospel ' *Lotus of True Law* he is far superior to the others in the small group who listen to Buddha : perhaps Manjusri is almost his equal. In the *Sukhavati*, there is a very clear theology of Amitabha and Avalokita. The former was once a *bhiksu* called *Dharmakara* and he then vowed that he would have a wondrously blessed land of his own ; so to him there now flock from all other ' buddha-fields ' those who are predestined to *nirvana*, as *arhats* or as Buddhas. It is now 10 ages since he became a Buddha himself and it will be a long time before he is extinct (!). At the end of our present age, Avalokita will appear, thousandth and last Buddha of the *Kalpa*. He is more majestic than his single companion *Mahasthama*. This precedence is due to his vow ' to bring all creatures without exception ' into this Happy Land '. He never forgets that he is the purveyor of this blessed immortality, though his body is constantly traversing the infinite worlds (by magical projection or other means). He quite eclipses the real owner or founder of the heaven ; it is he rather than Amitabha who is lord of the *sukhavati*. There now comes into play a very exaggerated form of the doctrine of ' compelling grace ' : these two deities save men in spite of themselves, as it were, as a cat takes her helpless kittens in her mouth. Now in the *hinayana* even the Buddhas are only teachers, in the *mahayana* they are models and the new order of *bodhisatvas* are our friends, guardians and advisers :—as yet the whole emphasis is on *self-help*, the chief buddhist doctrine.—Already at the time of Huen's visit to India actual worship was

paid to these fabulous figures : in book vii he speaks of Chen-Chu or the modern Ghazipur [50 miles E. of Benares on R. Ganges] ' where the students all accept the Little Vehicle '. The master had taught and sojourned there, yet homage was being transferred to his successor. ' Hard by is an ' image of Maitreya ; though small in size its spiritual qualities are great ' and from time to time its divine power is displayed in a marvellous fashion ' (cf. Beal *Bud. Rec.* ii 61 Trübner 1906). In the time of Asanga, he tells us, in book v (i 227), he talked on this wise with his brother Vasubandhu and another : ' We are engaged in framing our life here so as to ' enjoy the presence of Maitreya after death ' and they agreed that the first to die should communicate with the survivors. Avalokita, named some seventeen times by Huen, seems to have received cult in Ceylon.[1] But the older spirit survived : Gunapradha refused to worship Maitreya when taken up into his heaven, since an ordained *bhiksu* is superior ' to a bodhisatva '. Here the ancient belief in *θεωρία* as against *πράξις*, contemplation against social life, is very clearly seen. Also the philosophic scorn for one who took delight in a vulgar paradise : ' I have left the world as a ' disciple, whereas this Maitreya is enjoying heavenly beatitude and is no ' associate for one who has become an ascetic.' It is said that Gunapradha was not ' a vessel of instruction ' owing to this monkish ' pride of ' self ', received no encouragement from Maitreya, and though he practised in solitude ' the *samadhi* called opening intelligence, he could obtain ' no fruit '.

In later times came the syncretism with puranic hinduism and Avalokita's identification with Siva. In *Karandavyuha*, he learns the law from Amitabha and goes with a present of flowers from this master to worship Sakyamuni. Yet on the other hand he is far superior to the Buddhas and they cannot even estimate his infinite worth or discern his marvellous body. From this body issue the lesser gods and worlds—for hindu demonology was now pressing into the creed of the philosopher. From his eyes issue sun and moon ; Mahadeva from his forehead ; Brahma from his shoulder ; from his fingers flow rivers of mercy to cool the devils in hell. He has now become the great yogi or magician, who knows the all-compelling formula *om mani padme hum*. It belongs to him alone and when it is revealed to the votary he becomes another Avalokita—distinction of god and worshipper is abolished ; for the formula is the very heart of the deity. The modern tibetan cultus only repeats hindu models, attested in cent. x and xi but no doubt existing very much earlier. It is a composite figure, represented in every conceivable shape and connexion as polymorphous (cf. Foucher *Iconographie*). ' He is the Fish-being of the Yogins, ' the Lokesvara of the buddhists, the Sakti (or female cosmic energy) by ' the votaries of Sakta—in his true form he is Brahman.' When he appears in China as a goddess Kwan-yin the Merciful, he is only completing a

[1] See Foucher's *Iconographie* 110 (1899, 1905) : Jl. Roy. As. Soc. 1900 p. 42. Some students think the *original* Po-ta-la (E. of Malaya Mountains) is Avalokita's first home. The name (as is well known) was transported to China and Tibet (cf. Edkins *Chinese Buddhism* 139, 266).

development into a feminine principle already begun in India. In Tibet to-day he is incarnate in the Dalai Lama, as Amitabha in the Panchen Lama.

APPENDIX D

Theism in Nepal: Adibuddha

The *Aisvarikas* of Nepal represent a movement in buddhism analogous to the *Bhagavata* church in Hindustan. It is the final evolution of the Great Vehicle, developed under sivaite influence (which is *pantheistic*) but also under the presence of a distinctly theistic tendency or demand. Poussin very suggestively marks the transition from the older school: 'The 'formula Of all that proceeds from causes the Tathagata has *explained* the 'cause, is transformed into, Of all that proceeds from cause he *is* the cause' —which can be interpreted in the spirit of theistic creationism or pantheistic evolution. The true Buddha is primary, uncreate, eternal, *svayambhu* (existing of itself), similar to Brahman. It is for ever in *nirvana*, dwelling in the upper region of the realm of forms [where saints released from earth-life but not yet fit for *nirvana*, have their abode]. Though he is pure light, infinite and formless, yet he issues from the void *Sunyata* [1] and takes every form *visvarupa*. He creates 5 Buddhas (or allows them to proceed from himself) in 5 acts of his contemplative power—among them is Amitabha.[2] These in their turn by the twofold power of *knowledge* and *contemplation* give rise to the 3rd degree of deity,—the *bodhisatvas*. These give birth to the visible world, being its actual creator, all perishable: we are living under the providence and in the world of Avalokitesvara. Its Buddha, remote yet worthy of homage, is Amitabha; its instructor is Sakyamuni. A variant of this cosmogony is found in the prose version of the *Karandavyuha*, which the tibetan church values highly: Svayambhu Adibuddha appears at the beginning as light and meditating 'on the making of a world' begets Avalokita as demiurge,—without the intervening *second* order of Buddhas: of whom he is said to be made up. It seems certain that this 'gnostic' or 'platonic' type of creed was already well defined in cent. x and probably at an earlier date. In the *Namasangiti* this Adibuddha is identified with Manjusri, 'the knowledge

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[1] As in western theosophy, the No-thing is also All Things: the apex or zenith 'end of being' *bhutakoti* is that region where being ceases. Yet it is at the same time crown of things, primary cause, inexhaustible source—not merely the most *negative* but also the most *positive* conception. De Groot *Sectarianism and Rel. Pers. in China* Amsterdam 1903–4 speaks of the 'apex of nothingness' which contains nevertheless the whole creative cause of being.

[2] Amitabha also, in one very popular tibetan system, causes *Amitayus* to emanate from him, as an 'active reflex' of his own deeply meditating nature (Waddell). He was worshipped as giver of earthly blessings and long life in medieval India (central region). It is in honour of Amitayus that the Lamas' eucharist or sacrament of bread-breaking is celebrated.

' whence buddhas originate ' ; and this tract is earlier than cent. vii when (as Taranatha asserts) a certain Chandragomin wrote a commentary.

It is possible that this development may be traced to the doubtful meaning of *nirvana* and the constant debates upon its true significance. At first it implied the stilling of evil passions and the peace and joy which ensues : then, it was a state of the glorified Buddha, among some perhaps as *extinction*, but amongst others as *return to his original and infinite state*. It is said to be undefinable but by no means on that account pure nothingness. Elsewhere we notice the *docetic* theory, by which the earthly life of Gautama was the activity of an image deputed by him to act in his place, a magical substitute or projection of the real divine and infinite being. But a return into this infinite *law-body* implies a denial of effective personality. A Buddha is either ' extinct or plunged in egoistic *dhyana* ' (Poussin) and though of greater dignity than the *bodhisatva* cannot receive the cultus and homage demanded by these latter who are actively benevolent. They are the real creators and saviours of the world. The hindu mind, as in the vedic hymns, delights to juggle with paradoxes and they are by turns represented as sons and parents of the Buddhas. Sometimes, as to Amitabha and Sakyamuni, a certain measure of action is admitted even in this exalted order ; but ' activity is not their proper function ' . . . the ' bodhisatvas placed below them in relief, are their servants now and ' successors hereafter '. It is impossible not to connect this doctrine with the curious political system of Japan during these middle ages in which the father resigned the crown to his son in order that as regent he might have some real power : abolished in 1868 it still lingers in Nepal. Therefore Poussin is right in referring the strictly *theistic* element to the cult of the *bodhisatvas* ; not to the otiose homage paid to Adibuddha, who resembles Brahma or the old parent (Uranus or Cronos) of savage mythology who has long been deserted for other and younger deities.

Note : Takakusu, the japanese student of buddhism, identifies ' Apollo Patareus ' with Avalokita of Potala—both deities of mariners, and worshipped in islands at the mouth of rivers, in Asia Minor, in India and in China. For the present this must remain a conjecture. The name Potala (Patara) is so inseparable from the deity Avalokita (who becomes Kwan-yin in China) that we find it in the palace of the Dalai Lama (cf. *Enc. Rel. Eth.* vii 765).

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DIVISION B

Islam : its Sects and Philosophy

PART I

Peculiar Developments in Semitic Creed and Politics

A. RELIGIOUS BRIGANDAGE IN ISLAM

CHAPTER I.—RISE OF ISLAM AND FORTUNES OF THE CALIPHATE

A. Life and teaching of Mahomet

Influence of Islam (direct and indirect).—The greatest series of events outside Europe in this period is the rise of Islam and the muslim powers. From one side it might even claim to be treated before Europe, for the aims, fortunes, ideals and learning of the west, depended largely upon mahommedan influence. It was Poitiers (*732* A.D.) that pointed the way for Charles and the new roman empire : it was the norman attack upon the Saracens in Sicily that set the precedent of the Crusades : it was the Crusades that not merely began the disencumbering of western thought from its orthodox swathings but set our society on the path of economic and industrial development from which the modern era (with its novel ideas and political experiments) took its rise. These centuries witness the birth, climax and decline of muslim power : not that the Crusades succeeded but that henceforth the two creeds agreed to suspend animosities in the east, while from the end of the epoch the muslim tide in Spain slowly ebbed for the next 200 years. Free thought and the new secular spirit is as much the child of arabian as of revived classical studies, and cent. xiii is once again a culminating point for a new departure. Again, current political ideals were not less modified by the example of anti-feudal centralized autocracies

than by any zealous devotion to classical precedents : it is Frederic II who begins the modern State, and the belated republicans with their archaic defence of personal rights have little to show beyond a widely diffused literary influence, and a rare stage effect (as in Rienzi). A careful inquiry into the origins of this new creed and power is essential for a study of western development. For the west only became independent when it came to terms with mahommedan thought and forces, and had repulsed the last serious invasion (of the Mongols) from Central Asia. It is only from the beginning of cent. xiv that the evolution of Europe is free : after that date it fears nothing and borrows nothing from the world outside.

Mecca and the Koreshites *c. 580* A.D.**: Mahomet a trader.**— Of sacred Mecca, Mahomet's birthplace *c. 570* A.D., we are very ignorant. In the retrospective age of Islam (*c. 950*) nothing was known of the migration of the tribe thither and very scanty were the pre-islamic memories or traditions. The tribal deity was Allah, represented as a Black Stone (or identified with a coarse fetishism ?). This shrine suddenly acquired great sanctity when the Koreshites (its hereditary defenders) repulsed the ' Elephant's Raid ' from Christian Abyssinia about *550* A.D. Many tribes came in pilgrimage to see the sacred city : four months in each year were protected against arab *razzias* by a kind of *treuga Dei* ; and within its precincts no blood was to be shed. Of these priestly castellans Mahomet was a scion : he seems to have been chiefly a trader and the *economic* basis of his religious polity will be seen later. He went with caravans from Mecca to Syria, and perhaps to Egypt and the Euphrates. On his marriage with Khadija he was partner in a shop and sold corn there : the Coran is full of commercial similes and phrases. Probably he could neither read nor write : he had no ear for rhythm or poetry. He belonged to what might be called the premier tribe. Government was in the hands of this koreshite oligarchy, usually led by some able member : there was no means of coercing the various clans to common action. There was even no regular tribunal or recognized legal authority ; disputes were settled by soothsayers—half-magicians and half-arbitrators. The worship at the shrines was however organized with care and detail ; there was a hierarchy of servitors with different duties at ordinary or festal worship : one rank of ' *Rainbringers* '

reminds us of a stubborn savage belief on which much secular government has been founded. Besides the Stone each tribe had its own patron and symbol ; and in the perplexing variety of cults we find it difficult to decide if the symbol is a mere sign of deity, its home, or its very self. As in every ' pantheon ' with its artificial affiliation, there are clear traces of a reflective refinement adapting the legends into system. Certain goddesses (with whom the Prophet coquetted in spite of his austere monotheism) were Allah's daughters. What is clear is that the paganism of Mecca had been long decadent and was no longer a living force. Christians to the north and west (even in Najran, far south), Jews and Persians in the south, had weakened rude native convictions. With ' religions of the book ' were combined ideas of power and culture, to which the Arabs were by no means wanting in deference ; whether one, two or three gods were honoured : many gods were a mark of barbarism, a genteel paucity a sign of civilization, of which their worshippers were quite aware. Some time before Mahomet (and under Christian influence ?) men had risen who believed Allah to be the same god as the Christians of Syria worshipped. A cousin of Khadija is said to have copied or translated a gospel ; ' monks ' beat themselves for pleasure or gave up wine and other pleasures in imitation of Christian ascetics.

Demands Implicit Obedience : Revival of Judaism.—We have then, in a society still tribal, a religious belief (never properly unified) in a complete state of deliquescence and already confronted by new views and new professors. Mahomet passed beyond the stage of this individualism, and, far more interested in *empire* than in *faith*, desired to be the consolidator and lawgiver of a disintegrating people. His own views were very fluid and often varied ; but he never wavered in demanding implicit obedience to himself and to the latest utterance revealed from heaven. He was the *prophet* or *apostle* who knew God's will : if men obeyed him all would be well ; if not, divine vengeance here and hereafter awaited the rebellious. Islam's central dogma is that the Prophet is God's mouthpiece. For the punishment of the disobedient he drew upon hebrew scripture and arab myth ; in the latter was the overthrow of the tribe Thamud because they would not hear the prophet Sali, of the tribe Ad because they disdained Hud. Every nation had its own divine lawgiver :

now Mecca has one for the first time. This message took the form of a call to revive primitive Judaism or the 'religion of 'Abraham': when he adduced the biblical ethnology based on the exile of Ishmael, his hearers readily believed.[1] He thought the temple of Mecca and its (really idolatrous) rites had been founded by the two jewish patriarchs; that Ishmael was the son of a slave did not trouble them any more than a Sultan's necessarily servile lineage to-day. Full of the sense of a divine call he assured others and himself that God had charged him to deliver a message; this conviction was far more definite and unvarying than his doctrine was precise.

No precise dogma or attempt at codification: The Hegira.—His teaching (or rather inspired utterance) was at first imparted only to kinsmen and friends forming a secret society; first in the form of a written address, but very soon orally and by trance. This hypnotic state was induced by great heat, and the prophet prepared for it by rolling in a thick blanket. One scribe suspected imposture and abjured Islam. No care was taken to preserve or set in order these fugitive and sibylline sheets. His first utterances insist strongly on their *magical* and miraculous origin; only later is there *dogma*; last of all, *legal* rules or principles. After securing attention and homage for his inspired deliverances, he formulated a very simple creed: the usual content of the later Deism, *belief in one god*, and in *immortality* (for which new life, as in our own church, the body was to rise again). Yet he tolerated the idolatrous rites at Mecca, was certainly no iconoclast, and seems more than once to have been thought lukewarm by the more eager monotheists. When under siege by the oligarchs of Mecca he withdrew his own uncompromising articles on the divine unity and was prepared to acknowledge the goddesses once again: his more zealous followers refused to accept the revelations on which this compromise was based. Muslim public worship was at first a meeting to hear the inspired discourses which became more formal sermons only after the prophet's death. The early proselytes were important men in Mecca and proved of use in later time. This secret band of ardent admirers, firmly convinced of his divine mission, forced him on at the crises of his career—much as the zealous supporters of the third Napoleon

[1] Perhaps in this quest for a hebraic kinship there had been earlier forerunners and even here Mahomet was not original.

put pressure on a titular leader. Meantime the oligarchy suspected him with justice of aiming at a ' tyranny ', of desiring to become a *spiritual* and *civil* autocrat. The King of Abyssinia thought that he was in truth a Christian suffering ill-treatment and sent envoys to the oligarchy. On his wife's death he fled, almost friendless and without influence, to Taif and thence to Medina at the invitation of the Yathribites who hoped to get the aid and prayers of a holy man persecuted for conscience sake. Mahomet had now to specify more exactly the requirements of his faith, and, besides the dogmas of obedience to his own word and belief in one God, he put a veto on the *killing of infants, theft, lying, adultery*. The Yathribites sent deputies to ask him to be their leader and the Jews of the district were strongly in his favour. The oligarchs now saw that a foe was being settled in power on their caravan routes and decided to kill him, in spite of the sacred custom against the shedding of blood in Mecca. He escaped, and this crisis is the Hegira (*hijra*), September 22, *622* A.D.

Rupture with the Jews: he becomes a Brigand Chief: returns to Mecca.—He was soon convinced that, though he appeared as reviver of the true hebrew faith, he would never find loyal or trustworthy supporters amongst the Jews. He courted them at first assiduously and wished only to simplify, as he thought the Prophet of Nazareth had done : they charged him with imposture and met his overtures with insult. Suddenly changing his plans he resolved to annihilate them and relapsed once again to the paganism from which he was never very far : he even turned in prayer to Mecca and not to Jerusalem. Meantime he borrowed customs and rites from Jews and Christians alike, only making very slight changes. Converts were now accepted as full members after making the profession of faith, and an income-tax was required for the benefit of poorer members of the brotherhood ; not for the support of government (there was none in any technical sense) nor for the private purse of the prophet himself. At quite an early stage the presence of necessitous elements was felt, a *democratic* even a communistic factor which has coloured much of the history of Islam. At this juncture and with poverty in prospect, he became an outlaw and a chief of banditti, like David during Saul's later years. After some failures a successful attack was made against a meccan caravan ; and public feeling

in Arabia saw a still greater crime than felonious burglary in this violation of the sacred month. But success brought many converts to his standard, and the *razzias* in the desert became very popular. At Badr (March 17, *624*) a battle was won by the brigands, while (it is said) the prophet, in a state of utter collapse at the sight of blood, waited near by in a hut with camels ready for flight. The curious want of union or discipline among his enemies is seen in the conduct of the ' punitive expedition ' which ensued : a league of 10,000 Meccans and others dispersed without striking a blow. The road now lay open for his return to his birthplace as ruler : to acquire Mecca was to gain the best part of the peninsula. In an early treaty (securing for his followers right of pilgrimage) he gave up his title ' prophet of Allah ',— once again to the anger of his more earnest supporters. The victory was used with great moderation : only two persons were proscribed : he refused to retaliate on the spoilers of the Refugees' estates and the Caaba, cleansed of idolatrous symbols, was left in the hands of its former custodians. The pilgrimage was now confined to ' believers ' and all Arabians summoned to the faith within four months.

A Universal Creed : Democratic Tyranny, envoys to the Powers and death, *632*.—A sermon of the prophet about this time dwells on the brotherhood of Islam : which, no doubt at first intended merely to unite the quarrelling tribes of Arabia, was extended to the whole world and gave Islam its peculiar complexion of a *democratic tyranny*. Before the prophet's eye the horizon of religious propaganda widened into almost infinite vistas. His first message was to his fellow-citizens ; in his exile at Taif a larger prospect opened and in his struggle to return to Mecca he was bound to contemplate the reduction of the whole country. At first the test of faith by the formula was not exacted from all : pagans were tolerated at Medina ; and only after Badr was membership of the bandit-corps made conditional on accepting it. Those heathen tribes who still retained honest conviction felt that the capture of Mecca meant a serious blow at their local religions. In the Day of Honain the great movement was nearly crushed at its birth ; but the heroism of Ali (and this time of the prophet himself) saved the situation. Envoys were now sent everywhere asking that idols should be destroyed ; in Taif alone, seat of his former exile, was any resolute resistance offered.

The idea of a world-wide mission seems to have dawned upon him on the eve of the capture of Mecca. With the same insolence as Rienzi (but, as events proved, with far better warranty) he sent a summons to the great rulers of Persia and of the Romans to embrace Islam. The axumite king of Abyssinia returned a favourable (but possibly temporizing) reply ; so also did Cyril of Alexandria, viceroy and patriarch of Egypt. Heraclius is said to have been a secret convert, and in his wars with Persia, Mahomet's full sympathies were on the side of the last of roman conquerors. The persian king sent envoys to arrest the prophet who contrived to penetrate as far as Medina. The war against the byzantine empire started in the hasty act of an insignificant proconsul ; the roman governor of Bostra killed the muslim messenger. Hence an attack which at once despoiled Byzantium and exposed her weakness ; while after this success a scheme was set on foot to reduce the whole of Syria—at which moment the prophet died (*632*).

A 'Robin Hood' by force of circumstance : learns later to use his resources.—In *dogma* (in which after all it is hard to state his views with any precision) he claimed to complete and purge both Old and New Testaments. He never doubted the truth of the Bible or the 'divine legation' of Moses : for him, in theory, Israel was the chosen people of God. He derived his Christian views from *docetic* sources which, admitting the virgin-birth of our Lord, all miracles of healing, and the Ascension, denied the death on the Cross and the Resurrection in common with earlier gnostics (with whom the extremists of eutychian theology had no little sympathy). As a fact, however indebted to these religions, policy compelled him to break with both. The Jéws he found to be poor soldiers, sceptical of his claims and disinclined to join his piratical adventures. Economic distress in his own body forced him to attack a flourishing and unwarlike community : he took their goods for the benefit of his own poorer members and the raid on Khaibar was clearly due to no fanaticism of belief but to the want of money and the need of satisfying the malcontents in his own forces. It was after the wasteful expropriation of an industrious class, that with true insight the prophet replaced this method by a *tribute*. This new policy is that of every conquering caste towards a rich body of subjects at a higher stage of culture : e.g. the Teutons towards the Empire,

or the Mongols in their more protective moods. The future success of Islam depended on this knowledge of the proper use of resources; in place of banishment or massacre, infidels were now left as owners of the soil, on condition of paying *a fixed proportion*,—not, as in the less successful system of the Feudal epoch, a fixed *quit-rent* with the disastrous principle *ne varietur*.

His Personal Theocracy: Local Autonomy and Primitive Finance.—As to *internal government*, Mahomet had neither bureaux nor ministers nor officials: certain scribes were kept in employ to copy his prophecies and write his letters. His earliest form of rule (at Medina) was a *theocracy embodied not in a priestly caste but in a single favoured person*, without any conceivable limit of power or division of function: he was at once war-leader, judge, legislator: sometimes he named deputies to administer or lead a campaign, but with no formality or secure tenure. In the fashion of John of Leyden at Munster he began by inviting all 'believers' to flock to Medina; but soon allowed local communities to retain their land and their customs, managing their domestic affairs with full autonomy—with the same indifference which we find in all archaic and incomplete systems of Empire. To these were sent only Instructors in the Faith and Collectors of the Alms due to the poorer brethren (as in the *Acts*): at the close of his life he sent judges to give sentence according to the Coran or to follow local usage,—no doubt in effect to adopt a compromise between the two. The Alms (which only later became a regular tax on income) was a willing gift, like a church-collection or a donation of Freemasons, for the use of the poor. In no sense was it a payment towards official stipends or bureaucratic government (like that of Byzantium) or the upkeep of professional troops: not even for the prophet himself was a share set aside. The cost of war and public business was defrayed from spoils and booty, the prophet receiving one-fifth (instead of the earlier chieftain's share of one-fourth); the large remainder being distributed amongst all the fighting men of the band. Grievances arose when the original members of the brigand-troop, bearing the burden and heat of the day, saw the latest converts of 'the eleventh hour' sharing equally. But the main revenue of a muslim State (then and at the present day) must come from the *tribute* or rent paid by owners for leave to occupy and till land in theory forfeit to the conquerors. After the capture

of Khaibar some tribes sent tribute unasked, little dreaming what weight their precedent would have in the future. Conquered territory was regarded as Mahomet's private demesne, which he graciously allowed the unbeliever to hold to ransom. (Abubekr withdrew this rich gift from his family under Ayesha's advice and to the anger of Fatima, on the plea that the prophet left no inheritance.) The *tribute* developed later into the infidel's poll-tax and the muslim's land-tax, equally paid by all land-owners.

Rudimentary Militia : Piratical Democracy : No Law ; no Officials.—Neither in *war* nor in *law* can we find any greater preciseness. The regimental unit was the *tribe*, as with all primitive nations, like the Germans of Tacitus. He did not divide his men in any new or artificial manner nor did he appoint a series of officers with ascending rank. *A military (or piratic) democracy of perfectly equal units receiving without question orders from an inspired leader* :—such was the ideal which led alike to the developments of Freedom and of Absolutism. Early arab law, as with the early greek kings, depended on the inspired utterance of diviners, where custom did not dictate a rigid precedent. Law was now Mahomet's will and pleasure : his words were a unique source of jurisprudence. He never thought (until his deathbed) of codifying his floating pronouncements or forming a body of law. As there was no council for the arranging of business, there were no officials or police to execute commands. Every faithful muslim as shareholder in the successful corporation, was supposed to stand in direct relation to the prophet and fulfil any order of the moment without demur. Margoliouth says with great truth : ' Although the titles he took were religious ' in character and his office might not be described as *sovereignty*, ' his interests appear to have lain far more in the building and ' maintenance of an Empire [1] than in *ecclesiastical* matters.' His frequent lapses into pagan compromises shocked the more ardent theists among his companions.

His Morality, simple obedience : super-tribal sanctions.—Mahomet carried on the tradition of gnostic *solifidianism* ; where profession of faith was perilous it might be concealed or denied. He laid emphasis rather on obedience (of which the formula was the text and token of full initiation) than on any cordial accept-

[1] Of the predaceous or assyrian type.

ance of doctrine by the heart and soul. He did not scruple to purchase an adhesion that he must have known was insincere and mere lip-service. He avoided extreme rigour in prayer and fasting and gave when need arose wide indulgences. Even for the letter of his own inspired law he did not deny the need of abrogation and annulment. It is clear that the secular and military rule, as much thrust on him by circumstance as won by ability or design, taught him to value two things; unqualified loyalty and submission in his own followers; regular tribute from the rest of the world. His system was that of a knighthood of equals living on the labour of unbelievers. Among his own men he sank every tribal quarrel and distinction in the one common brotherhood of Islam: vengeance and blood-feud he strictly limited: all disputes before conversion were to be utterly forgotten as among sworn brethren. At the same time he allowed the massacre of enemies for the furtherance of the faith, shed blood in the sanctuary and asylum of Mecca, and gave sanction even to the murder of kinsmen in the holy cause, a crime unheard of in the strictly tribal stage. The new religious aggregate overrode all family ties.

A Captain of Sworn Companions: 'Booty or Paradise.'—Mahomet, like the teutonic kings and their henchmen, is then the captain of a body of sworn companions who descends on areas of a far higher culture and lives on their produce without wanton destructiveness. On the other hand, he is like Cromwell a leader of profound if confused and mistaken convictions, who could instil a holy zeal and assurance into converts of very different races and tempers. Fixed policy he had none: he was led by events to widen, and in some senses to modify, his schemes. He ceased to be the lier-in-wait for caravans, the raider of peaceful Jews without warning; he began to use his victories without injustice. But to the end his subjects were a band of undisciplined and equal knights subject to an inspired leader who had strictly no lieutenants or mediaries. The force of his appeal lay in his doctrine of the next world: it was the hope of paradise which gave boldness and made men lose their lives gladly for a cause which promised so speedy a reward. Meantime the survivors would 'inherit the earth', and as the prospect of conquest and world-empire unfolded, the needs of the present became more urgent. Hence the curious and anomalous development of the

empire after its founder's death under the secular caliphate.

Individualist Eschatology : Potent Force in Development.—For however ambiguous Mahomet's own teaching and however late the rise of theology in any strict sense within it, it cannot be denied that a religious impulse lay behind the first movement and indeed the whole evolution. As an authentic envoy of God he made a personal appeal to every man : he held out hopes and fears ; and from a very early moment made his creed hinge on eschatology. When the tribal system of unreasoning routine breaks down, a man's real interest is in himself : and he gives ready welcome to any one duly accredited who makes clear to him his present lot and future destiny. The early and ideal period of the first four caliphs owed its courage and simplicity to this emphasis on the next world. Mahomet admired though he did not imitate Christian monks and ascetics. The joys and punishments of the hereafter blurred the insistence of earthly needs and led to genuine self-denial and to the traditional austere simplicity of an Omar or Abubekr. 'The affairs of the early successors of the prophet' says an arabian writer, 'were guided 'less in view of this world than of the life to come.' As in India 'but with a far intenser grasp of personality' converts sometimes gave up all worldly concerns and lived in poverty and retirement : hence the dervishes. Early parts of the Coran give special prominence to the doctrines of the Last Things : on the day of *resurrection* or *judgement*, an angel sounds a trumpet and earth dissolves : God from His uncreated throne *Kursi* judges mankind from an open book of good and evil record. As in later Egypt, a balance weighs the deeds : to the righteous peace and joy in paradise *Jinna*, to the unbeliever pains of soul and body in Gehinnom *Jahannam*. This belief was the lever which carried Islam on a wave of triumphant conquest north, west and east : it was not the tribal heroism of the Japanese who will not disgrace their ancestors, but the strongly *individualist* ethic of men doing battle for the right which must in the end win and recompense its champions. The terrors it held out to unbelievers [1] were in some systems modified by a 'catholic'

[1] Of the 73 muslim sects said to have been foretold by Mahomet only the *Rawandis* believed in soul-transmigration. A sense of *personality*, only bounded by the divine omnipotence, coloured Islam and accounted for its strength of personal character side by side with its dogmatic fatalism.

doctrine of *limbo* or *purgatory*, but also by the hopeful theory that in course of time the whole world will form one State containing no citizens but faithful muslim. Unlike Christianity (' When the Son of Man cometh shall he find faith upon the earth ? ') and untroubled by[1] fears of arrested victory and final exile, the pious muslim in theory believe that God will even on earth ' accomplish the number of His elect and hasten His king-' dom.' Hence in part arose a tolerance towards other forms of belief which as ' creeds of a book ' are near the truth ;—a tolerance which also springs from sloth, contempt of foreign opinions, and an inability either to centralize government or to codify law.

Religion=Surrender to Absolute Sovereign (in heaven and on earth). His whole Theology a loan.—Islam is complete surrender to the will of God as an absolute sovereign, able to reward faithful, and punish disobedient, subjects. Besides purely theological virtues (or the Deity as *unique, almighty, self-existing, ubiquitous*), God gives proof in creation of His great mercy : *ar Rahman*, the Compassionate, is a standing epithet. Besides God, the *Throne* and the *Coran* are uncreate : a sanguinary schism arose on this latter point. The Angels, borrowed from jewish and Christian sources, form a heavenly choir to sing His praise and a body of messengers to convey His behests : they are sexless beings who fight with the muslim against unbelief : some are guardian angels. Mediate between God and man are the (Christian) Persons the Word (*amr*) and the Holy Spirit (*ruh*)[2] : besides these obvious loans we find the undoubtedly jewish Schechinah (*Sakina*) half-personified. God made the world in six days and could not overcome duality in spirit and matter. Whence the good and evil impulse in man. Satan (Iblis) roused this latent evil to life. Adam lost God's grace and favour ; and this by His great mercy is restored only to true believers. Satan (as in many Christian sects) was an angel expelled from heaven for jealousy towards the first man, or ' protoplast '. Prophets reveal God

The *Wasilites*, upholding human freewill, also taught a purgatory, midway between the extreme and eternal opposites of heaven and hell : the *Thumamites* took the merciful view that unbelievers would be reduced to dust at the Resurrection ; immortality being held, as in some later Christian sects, a special boon and not as in Deism a natural right.

[1] Modern Turkish.

[2] Cf. the Mandean doctrine, to be noticed later.

to man ; as do also the three books, Law, Gospel (*injil*) and Coran ; to which correspond Moses, Jesus, Mahomet, who is the chief and final member of the prophetic class. As in the case of St. John Baptist his early mission was to warn men of imminent doom, and to carry the lesson that man was saved by use of his natural faculties ; later, God's predestination entirely banished free-will. Fear of judgment is then the first motive to action ; then will follow repentance and good works, chiefly those of a social kind, though personal piety forms an important part. The duty of a good muslim is comprised in *creed* (or profession of the simple faith), *five-fold prayer*, *fast*, *alms* and *pilgrimage*.

Unlike Jews in having no Legal System : Problems arising for a Cosmopolitan State.—The legal ideas of Islam here deserve mention, because they expose the difficulty under which must labour all political systems of compromise developed out of simple beginnings. Any decision of God's prophet sitting at Medina was valid : but Mahomet himself, besides his own personal judgment, followed arab usage, or for the Jews, a rabbinic refinement on mosaic law in which a roman element might be detected ; or again, the law and custom of meccan traders. Mahomet is well called an ' eclectic opportunist ' (D. B. Macdonald). He left nothing final or complete to guide his successors, and since his death there has been little official codifying and no fresh legislation. The natural respect of tribal society for usage and routine was transferred to his person and his rulings : his sayings were taken down and his verdicts recorded. In this respect he is a glorified *shaman* who overpowers an obsolete gerontocracy.[1] Had Islam remained confined to the limits of Araby there would have been little need of evolution or adjustment. But the Arabs confronted and overthrew the political power of great foreign nations for whose social habits they did not suggest an equivalent. Though Mahomet began like David as a captain of outlaws, his armies were never a ' devastating horde ' like the Mongols. Where they conquered they took over the administrative system : roman law and persian methods insensibly permeated Islam. In its earliest period Medina was the centre of a small homogeneous theocratic kingdom, the government lay in the hands of austere and ascetic ' monks '.

[1] This thought will be found more fully worked on in my article in *Folk-Lore* xxvi 4. (Dec. 1915).

The Protest of Law and Pietism against Ommiad Secularism.—With the Ommiad Dynasty the visible State and the invisible Church came into contrast and opposition ; schools of pietism developed tradition independently of the civil power, now become frankly secularist. The true believers felt that there was no real substitute in the worldly damascene caliphate for the old patriarchal theocracy. So might some holy monk in medieval Rome have regarded the ambitions and intrigues of Avignon. The orthodox Law had become a kind of *canon law*, an all-embracing system of duties, a veritable deontology : it divided acts even more precisely than the Stoics—the *forbidden*, the *indispensable*, the *recommended*, the *indifferent* (*ἀδιάφορα*) and the *disliked*. It was more a book of ethical casuistry, designed to replace a spiritual director, than a plain law-book. It stands aloof from the worldly State, which has to respect, even if it does not accept, its ruling ; it governs the *private* lives of true muslim and, like Common Law in the west, is recognized even in such public concerns as marriage, inheritance and divorce. When (as these expectant parousiasts believe) the Mahdi has reclaimed the world for righteousness, the ideal standard of this law will govern the muslim in the millennium which is to follow.

Rifts within the Church-State.—Professedly the abbasid rising was in large measure a protest of the pious and reactionary element against worldliness : the success of the black flag promised a return to a religious attitude. In form this promise was kept and once more Church and State could work together, although the canon law of the orthodox was far from being the guide of rulers. The ascetic or ' tolstoian ' mind alone held aloof ; and an irreconcilable party of *intransigeants* kept up the purity of tradition. The party of compromise soon divided into the four principal schools which survive to this hour.

Appendix AA. Schools of Legal Interpretation

A. The *Hanifites* ; founder *Hanifa*+*767*, not of arab race, speculative jurist in contact with commercial interests ; demanded concession to *local* needs against abstract and universal law, not for actual cases but a regular system of casuistry, intended to cover all possible facts : his pupils worked out his theory and accepted public office, inducing the abbasids and (later) the ottomans to adopt it, the latter appointing only disciples of Hanifa as Cadis : the sect dominates in Central Asia and Northern India as well as through the Turk's dominions. B. The *Malikites* ; founder Malik ibn Anas+*795* at Medina, a working lawyer in touch with life, and

strict follower of the tradition of the Prophet : but he also set up test of public expediency and compromised strict usage by utility ; accepted *agreement* of the Prophet's Companions as test of truth ; represented old arab nationalist school in whose eyes Medina is still the centre of the muslim world : the sect prevails in Upper Egypt and Northern Africa as far west as Morocco. C. The *Shafiites* ; founder a pupil of Malik+*820* ; emphasis on tradition as no less valid, if authentic, than the Coran itself : ' My people will never agree in an error ' (Mahomet) = *vox populi vox Dei* : agreement in popular opinion (*ijma*) really supersedes both Bible and tradition : dominates in Syria, Southern India and among the Malays. D. The *Hanbalites* ; founder Hanbal a shafiite scholar+*885*, a divine rather than a practical lawyer, protests against speculative curiosity in religious matters, is silent where Coran and tradition say nothing. Against the Motazilites under Caliph Mamun Hanbal stoutly maintained the Coran to be *uncreate* ; ' all theology founded on reason (or reasoning) was futile ' : he suffered persecution for his faith ; see W. N. Patton : *Ahmed ibn Hanbal,* Leiden, 1897. His disciples have been regarded as uncompromising traditionalists who demand literal interpretation and deprecate *agreement* as a test : his school, though still surviving, is the smallest of the four—perhaps confined to the Wahabi purists in Central Arabia. To these may be added E. The *Ibadites* ; founder Abdallah ibn Abad,+about 80 years after Hegira or *700* A.D. ; a stiff and conservative school older in tradition than the rest ; accepting besides the Coran a sparing use of tradition, and *agreement* (but only that of legists in their own sect) : strong dissenters from the actual course of muslim development ; in force at Oman, Zanzibar and part of Algiers ; last offshoot of kharijite protestants. Against the cruel child-murder and sectarian aloofness of kharijite sectaries Abdallah held that children of unbelievers should be allowed to grow up and then make their choice ; in everyday life he allowed free intercourse with all men but forbade marriage (even with other muslim) outside the ranks of the sect. F. The *Zahirites* or ' externalists ' ; founder David+perhaps at same time as Hanbal : insisted on literalism, *agreement* limited to the unanimous judgment of the Companions, so the Wahabis (on the Zahirite sect I. Goldziher has written, Leipzig 1884 ' *The Z. their doctrine and history* ') ; the church was to have no posthumous constructive powers, no ' development '. Although extinct this sect has passed on its ideas to the *Hanbalite* Wahabis, who hold that the people of Mahomet can err and have erred (cf. our own article, Ch. of E.) : in default of the ' catholic ' criterion, *each man* is thrown back on himself to interpret and adjust the law and tradition with present life.

B. Insoluble Problems of Muslim Law and Government

Islam profoundly modified by its Foreign Character: Conquests of its Law and Government.—Meantime Islam had spread far beyond Arabia, into peoples and climates where arab methods and fashions could not be maintained. So far from Islam imposing such a strict and uniform rule it was itself modified : much

that ill agreed either with written scripture or prophetic tradition was perforce made welcome. A *customary code* grew up in each land, in effect annulling or obscuring the rules of the orthodox Canon Law. This latter, though earnestly studied by the learned and pious, was regarded even by them as a purely *ideal standard*, the 'expression of an impossible theory to be realized at best with the coming of the millennium' (Macdonald). By its side, no doubt under disguise of an ironical homage to its impracticable maxims, went on the common jurisprudence of every country, the actual working of court law. But if the *theocratic government of ascetic saints* settled into a worldly absolutism, the will (or rather the pressing needs) of sovereign rulers must be taken into account. Though his successors were no longer directly inspired like the Prophet, it was impossible to limit their competence or authority. The ruler (as final Court of Appeal) must decide and act in disputed cases at his own discretion; a new Statute Law issued from the sovereign's mouth. Hence in muslim lands the anomaly of two court-systems; one, to administer orthodox Canon Law for private cases and religious life; the other, to administer local custom and the sometimes arbitrary decrees of rulers. It is easy to point to a certain analogy with indian history: there from the first, religion has in effect prescribed the conditions of social and domestic life and rendered the State, as it is conceived in the west, really superfluous: hence the despotic and adventitious character of government and grouping of peoples which shift and change without altering their character or exciting their interest. In spite of the claims of Islam to constitute Church and State as an indivisible unity, the result has been the complete secularism of State-policy and the aloofness of the puritan orthodox, who have exerted little or no effective influence on development. Hence the history of Islam becomes the astonishing record of alien adventurers, of clever slaves whose startling vicissitudes form the diversion and perhaps excite the contempt of the mass of the people. Everywhere unbelievers have been allowed to retain their law and usage; Islam cannot accept any true community but that of the faithful; over other folk they can exert merely an unsympathetic hegemony. The original arab conquerors had no methods of government and adopted the prevailing system in every land which they annexed. They found it useful to deal with Christian or Jewish

groups through their president, patriarch, bishop or rabbi.

Loose Confederacy under Military Caste : cannot be transformed into a modern state.—From the first they abandoned the ideal of welding all members and constituents into a single corporate life : a muslim government *is a federation of client-states* very loosely united by an autocrat who is quite indifferent to nine-tenths of what we believe to be essentials of government.[1] This attitude of aloofness and non-interference is due partly to contempt, partly to indolence : it has had the most serious effects in the politics of the Turks of Europe. Usage and their express treaty placed the foreign trader under his own consul for jurisdiction and control. By capitulations, the sanctity of an ambassador's person and house is extended to his compatriots. Hence laws affecting non-muslim residents or ' metics ' must receive the sanction of the Christian embassies : any change, if held to be contrary to the convention, may be set aside. Macdonald (article *Enc. Br.*) has well compared the anomalous authority wielded by these alien interpreters of the constitutions, to the Supreme Court in the United States. At present then, there stand, mutually opposed and in silent reproof and conflict, the Canon Law ; the ' tangled thicket ' of actual civil rules, based on diverse usages and the arbitrary will of rulers compelled to cut through the underwood ; the international law, based on contract with foreign powers, in an economic field becoming daily more important. If a muslim State could form an *integrum*, homogeneous and sympathetic, there might be reason for Macdonald's hope in an *agreement* of muslim peoples and in their ability to make and unmake laws. But if religious conviction is kept as the original basis of success and enterprise, of conquest and government, there can be no law except for true believers ; and for the other client-groups there must be frank autonomy. If a purely secular and utilitarian code is to supersede all others and bind together

[1] It is far too late to retrace these initial steps of policy. It is an absurdity for a muslim government to abandon its lofty and scornful system of non-intervention and pose as free-thinking and humanitarian. A parliament in such a country can only be a cockpit or a fraud, disguising (as elsewhere) the violent and secret rule of some cabal. The sceptical freemasons who upset the throne of Abdul Hamid have not united the peoples and creeds ; they are still artificially grouped under a muslim military caste, and their rulers have lost the only undeniable virtue of this religion, its earnest and practical faith and success in war.

the various elements, the promise is altogether visionary and futile. Either the Canon Law must retain at least its sacredness and supremacy in theory or else the ' muslim peoples ' exist no longer. A bandit military communism, tolerating while despising other creeds and productive classes for its own behoof, cannot possibly be transformed into a modern national government.

NOTE A. TRADITION

Under the ommiad dynasty the Government (like the papacy in the tenth century) was captured by a purely secular party, which scarcely laid claim even to outward piety. Those who wished to appear pious, and yet hoped to benefit by the new world-enjoying secularism invented *tradition* to excuse and account for their mode of life. The puritan opposition did the same. Many forgeries arose. Omar II. (*718*) the one religious Ommiad, ordered a collection to be made. But not till a century later (*815–920*) was the work completed and the Six Orthodox Collections made which Sunnites now include in the Canon. Bukhari (*817–890*), a coeval of Hanbal and David the Zahirite, compiled the most venerated edition ; he journeyed 16 years in muslim lands, and of 600,000 *traditions* included but 4000 in his own authoritative work.

NOTE B. IJMA

Ijma is universal consent or *agreement*, held to justify a practice or belief for which no clear warranty is found in Coran or tradition. Like local saint-worship or pagan festival in the west, many such had arisen from pre-islamic customs of races, only accepting superficially the very simple formulæ of Mahomet. Their actual conflict with scripture became matter for serious notice under the abbasids who at least in externals wished to revive the orthodox religious side. They were too deeply rooted to be repealed by a simple edict. Two courses were open : to invent a tradition to supersede the earlier, or to acknowledge by a ' law of development ' as in catholicism that *ijma* is above tradition ; hence the (forged) utterance of the Prophet : ' My people does not agree to an error.' It will be seen that while no legal sect denies the force of *agreement* as a (practical) test of truth, they define differently : as the consent and usage (i) of Medina ; (ii) of the whole muslim community (as arranged and codified by the doctors during abbasid rule) ; (iii) of the Companions only or of the earliest doctors and teachers (though the Shiites allow that there is a continuous but secret series of such inspired authorities).

C. Internal Conflict and Rationalist Compromise

Early Conflict of Democracy and Legitimist Absolutism.— Thirty-five years after the Hegira occurred the first great and (as it was to prove) irreparable breach in the unity of Islam (battle of Siffin, *657*). The religious arab party supporting Ali were *democratic* tribesmen, some few being professed republicans

in accordance with the whole history of the arabian Semites. They demanded that a caliph should be freely chosen by all from any family (not from the koreshite clan alone) : they held that for sin or misrule he might be justly deposed. Thus early Islam had its ' conciliar ' or parliamentary movement, which in the Catholic Church of the west did not show strength until the beginning of cent. xiv. The extremists of this democratic party held a compromising world-empire to be anathema, killed off the children of unbelievers and refused to hold intercourse with heathen. The persian supporters of Ali included Arabs who had adopted city life and believed in the divinity of their leader. Strict legitimists, they clung and still cling to Ali and his line, and, outside an orthodoxy held in leash by the ottomna Turks, form to-day the largest section of Islam.[1] With the Quadarites began the interest in anthropology which in the Christian world only emerged with Pelagius and St. Augustin after four long centuries of purely dogmatic speculation. Islam's ' surrender ' to God ' was enough for man's encouragement in the early days of continuous success : they fought bravely because their lot was safe in the hands of God who had preordained the lives of all men. But the epoch of compromise came when the Caliph's court at Damascus was careless and opportunist and put unlimited trust in officials who were often Christians. Disputes arose as to the import of the parenetic appeals in the Coran to be virtuous, brave and pious—as if it were assumed that character and acts were in a man's own keeping. The predestinarian branded the Quadarite ' pelagian ' as a heretic ; in *699*, not eighty years after the Hegira, an apostle of human free-will was executed.[2]

Early Attempts to Rationalize Dogma for purposes of Apologetic.—Further admixture of thought is found in Irak, where the need of apologetic in face of Christians, parsees, manicheans and even buddhists was keenly felt. Hassan-al-Basri was the first systematizer of muslim doctrine and from his disciples came that *rationalizing* movement which ran parallel to western

[1] They held that a bad muslim would be punished in hell like an unbeliever, and against this puritan rigour the solifidian Murjits believed (like the contemporary sects in Hindustan) that a pure faith in God and the Prophet atoned for every sin.

[2] A. de Vlieger has written a french treatise on the Quadarites *Kitab-ul-Qadr*, Leiden 1903.

scholastic. These *Motazilites* (that is, separatists who left the pious orthodoxy of Hassan) opposed (i) the personifying of God's attributes under persian (and neoplatonic ?) influence, (ii) the crude anthropomorphy of the Coran, (iii) the extreme sanctity attributed to scripture, the Coran being only a *human* product under *divine* guidance. They thus resemble the Broad Church party or higher critics, from Abelard through the rationalizing deists down to the present day. Mamun (*813–833*) took the notable step of promulgating his view as caliph that the Coran was created : and even tried to enforce the doctrine. Motawakkil (*c. 850*) restored the more orthodox view, just as the Empress Theodora was restoring, about the same period, the practice and doctrine of image-cult in the Greek Church. Ashari (*c. 870–940*) held the motazilite rationalism for forty years ; but, becoming orthodox, tried to find arguments from *reason* to support the articles of *faith*. Some teachers had already held such tests in private and secret teaching ; but he first allowed to *reason* a definite scope in theology. He took a middle course between a gross (and often grotesque) literalism and a pure abstract philosophy : ' God's attributes exist but cannot be compared with ours : ' man has not free power to determine himself but yet he is to be held responsible.' Dogmas he passes in review, and gives a rational ground for their acceptance. Ashari's system received the sanction and support of the Buyid dynasty ; after a brief persecution by Togrul Beg the Seljuk, it was restored to favour under Alp Arslan whose vizier formed a college with salaried professors to spread its tenets. From Persia it advanced to Syria and Egypt (under the Mamluks) then to Northern Africa (*c. 1130*) under the Almohads. It is to-day the predominant system ; and no new movement in theology has arisen since cent. xii—if we exclude those puritan dissenters, the Wahabis in Arabia, a similar sect (the Babis) in Persia, and the Senussis who to-day are exciting our interest and concern on the western frontiers of Egypt.[1]

D. Gradual Changes in the Central Government : Limits of Autocracy

No Working Theory of the Caliphate : its varied and personal functions delegated.—We cannot find explicit or complete systems

[1] Cf. article on defeat of these sectaries *Times* Monday March 20, 1916.

either in law or religion or philosophy : it is even vain to seek for a definite theory of *politics*. Almost throughout its entire history the caliphate has been the sport or creature of circumstance, the plaything of adventurers. Though it was to be the central point and pivot round which the muslim world revolved, no clear or precise instruction was left by Mahomet on the nature of *Sovereignty* or the powers of his successor. Alexander and Augustus, from very different motives, were equally reticent and ambiguous. The prophet had enjoyed absolute authority, both as an inspired *shaman* and as a successful leader of banditti. His decisions were final and he led the public prayers, like any chaldean *patesi* or priest-king of olden time : in his person was centred a strong, but very rudimentary and much too personal government. On his death a leader was chosen with the same powers but without the same prestige : the successors had no direct guidance from heaven but inherited the tradition of autocracy, which might now be questioned very reasonably in case of failure. Like the roman emperor, the caliph held an elective office,—chosen by the people, according to Sunnite belief, by God Himself, according to the Shiites. In any case the rule is absolute. When once power is delegated a democratic equality [1] is always seen to lead to an unlimited personal autocracy. The successor of Mahomet exerts very multifarious functions : he is to preserve the sacred law, raise armies and guard the muslim world, put down internal disorder, maintain the Friday services and receive the alms, decide all disputes, tend the orphans and divide amongst the faithful the booty taken in war. With expansion of territory this personal supervision could not be secured and the duties passed into commission ; until, at a very early stage, the caliph became a ' mikado ', titular source but not actual wielder of all authority. Various bureaus [2] of com-

[1] As in China where the same democratic equality prevails and there is no class enjoying hereditary rank or privileges (though from a very different origin and reason) : there is one notable exception in Islam ; the *Sayyid* form an aristocratic class of the Prophet's kinsmen who are respected by the State and protected from degrading trade or alliance,—thus resembling in some degree the family of Confucius.

[2] Under Caliph Motawakkil (cent. ix) there were bureaus of *taxes* and *finance* ; of the crown-lands or *demesne* ; of *accounts* ; of the *hired troops* ; of the *postal system* ; of *payments* and of *pensions*. Under the early abbasids the *Chief Cadi*, the *Colonel of the Lifeguards*, the *Minister of*

missioners, in theory subordinate, controlled state-departments for taxation and revenue. To some share in the growing tribute all muslim had a right; it was 'booty' of which four-fifths should be allotted to the faithful band of sworn companions. Caliph Omar appointed the first Diwan, and the status of dominant and subject classes was then fixed; non-muslim paid poll- and land-tax, thus redeeming their person and the estate justly forfeit to the conqueror; muslim paid a *voluntary* poor-rate as alms and allowed one-fifth of the spoils to the central government. Thus the military fighting caste (as in western or japanese feudalism) is kept apart, like the Levites or Plato's Guardians and supported by a productive and (in theory) servile class, without rights. A non-muslim embracing the faith entered this ruling caste and lost those rights to 'copyhold' land which marked him as an infidel and a tributary. He now received instead of paying and was awarded a modest pension, like a Manchu in China until the recent Revolution. The registers of this formidable list of annuitants were kept by Persians, Copts and 'Romans'.

Caliph supplanted by Vizier or 'Pretorian Prefect': With the *secularist* transfer of power to the Ommiads and Damascus new changes were made. Moawiyah I was a constructive genius who, like Diocletian, withdrew the sacred autocrat behind curtains and guardsmen and railed off an enclosure for his appearance at public worship. He developed the postal system (as in ancient Persia) independently of the governors; he received news in person and sent secret orders, not always to the recognized officials. He set up a chancellor's office for the affixing of the authentic seals of the caliphate. He acquired control of the pension-fund and of the state-revenue. But in return he gave the provincial rulers (as in China) practical autonomy, requiring only the surplus revenue after the local demands had been fully satisfied. These had no *sacred* or *religious* functions, being only captains of an Army of Occupation; hence *cadis* and *imams* (for justice and religious ritual) were still sent out as a check and counterpoise, and the absolute independence of a satrap is only secured when he is named by the caliph as *cadi* and *imam* also. But the

Finance, and the *Postmaster General* (as at Byzantium) were the most important officials—apart from the ever-increasing influence of the officers of the household.

caliph's name always stood on the coinage and was mentioned in the public prayers. Meantime bureaus (with their double vice of stagnant routine or corrupt intrigue) usurped the place of a strong personality. Abul Abbas the first abbasid, named a Vizier (' helper or bearer of burdens ') to stand between him and the people : for the first time we have a minister in the modern sense of a recognized adviser. He must partake of the double nature of ruler and subject : be loyal and truthful, firm and prudent, generous and clement, and have dignity of demeanour and eloquence of speech. It is no over-statement to say that the fortunes of the dynasty, indeed of eastern Islam itself, hung on the wisdom of the Barmecides, who played the same part as the Kuprili viziers in the later times of the Ottomans. These were the brief ' golden days ' which came to an end with Harun's insane jealousy. After his reign the office varied with the character of the sovereign. Under Radi (*935*) the *civil* vizier was replaced by the *military* commander of mercenaries—the turkish colonel of the guards or household troops.[1] The Buyids thrust the caliph back into his purely spiritual duties and allowed him only a scribe or secretary, giving the name of vizier to their own minister. Under the Seljuks the monarch regained a share of *secular* power and once again named his own vizier. Although this lieutenant appears to be a minister, like the shogun or frankish *major domus*, with plenary power, even the most expert of these ministers could not make a centralized State : the abbasids (e.g.) only ruled as sovereigns over that part of Irak where irrigation (as in the earliest days of Sumer and Accad) demanded a single control. Elsewhere a very large measure of autonomy was granted to the satraps and to tribes standing outside the range of Islam, as the Mardites of the Lebanon, or the Albanians in Europe down to the recent victory of the Young Turks. Though the caliph could delegate every active function he could never lay

[1] The *army* was, as in the early days of all healthily expansive States, a strictly citizen force ; every able-bodied muslim was a unit of the national *militia*. The armies of the conquest formed great military colonies in city-camps, a garrison of consecrated monkish knights. By a slow process of decay this system disappeared, and the rich treasury was able to supply venal troops or slave-mercenaries who found every avenue to power open. For ancient Egypt, for Rome and for Bagdad, it was the desuetude of arms which led to foreign usurpation. We are slowly learning the truth of this lesson to-day.

aside his responsible character any more than a modern king, however swathed in constitutionalism and robbed of any direct initiative. He was always the supreme righter of wrongs and the helper of the oppressed. Justice he could not refuse. Abdulmelik the ommiad established a central court of appeal (in the reign of the byzantine Justinian II *685–705*) and it was an exception to depute another to be president of this court. The caliph himself was unfettered by strict law and precedent and applied rather a system of equity, like Aristotle's personal ruler who is *διορθωτὴς τοῦ νόμου* and adapts the universal and therefore vague rule to the concrete case before him. Where Church and State overlapped so completely the powers of the civil *police* were extended as in Geneva and presbyterian Scotland into inquisitive sumptuary laws and domestic details. The *muhtasil* saw to public order in the street and examined weights and measures; for brawlers he had a summary jurisdiction, a 'court of pie-'powder'. Under his charge were slaves, beasts of burden, Jews and Christian: he exercised a perpetual vigilance against the use of wines. Though he might not violate the privacy of houses so dear to the oriental mind, he could interfere with outdoor costume and behaviour, and the excesses of the fatimite caliph Hakim in Egypt shows how far such police powers might be carried. Yet this systematic encroachment upon the subject's freedom was confined to the capital and the caliph's immediate environment.

Prof. Margoliouth in his admirably clear and learned articles in Hastings' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* again emphasizes the 'political adventure' as against the 're-'ligious propaganda' of Mahomet. 'The fact of primary importance in the rise 'of Islam is that the movement became considerable only when its origina-'tor was able to draw the sword and handle it with success . . . his ability 'to gauge the capacities of other men was abnormal; in the choice of 'subordinates he seems to have made no mistakes. . . . It is not easy to 'say whether the prophet had any desire to inculcate any particular 'doctrine; there appears to be none which he was not prepared to abandon 'under political pressure.' He admitted (Tabari) the goddesses of Mecca to the pantheon; and 'probably the only part of the program which never 'varied was the restoration of the religion of Abraham.' The positive parts, of dogma or discipline, seem to be posterior to the Hegira, 'largely suggested by the judaism with which he then became familiar. His theory of God (by whom he honestly believed himself inspired) was, on the whole, crudely anthropomorphic: Allah's court in heaven is modelled on the palace of an oriental despot. The chief life of Mahomet represents a robber-chief portioning the booty of successful raids among his followers

and demanding implicit obedience to the commands of a leader whose power over the next-world was guaranteed by his victories in this (Life, by *ibn Ishak*). Islam was, then, 'primarily a political adventure' and the later fortunes of its successive dynasties or sects amply prove this. I have represented it as introducing a new political conception, of the unlimited autocracy of the captain of bandits : this notion exaggerated into a caricature by the Assassins without doubt passed to the west and impressed Frederic II and the Angevins. If it be true that Philip IV exterminated a very similar phenomenon in the Templars, there can be no doubt that he borrowed their worst features and handed on the conception of the brigand-state ; an ideal which, kept under restraint until the present moment by Christian influence, has now of late shown itself in its true light, and left behind it (even if it be suppressed) an example which others must of needs follow in the deadly struggle for survival.

[APPENDIX J. See p. 159

Table of 'Nestorian' Missions in Asia

150 A.D. From Edessa (where the gospel is firmly fixed) missioners preach in Persia as far as Bactria.

325 Bishop John 'of Persia and Greater India' at Council of Nice.

334 Merv becomes a see-town and series of Metropolitans of Babylon begins : a syriac mission visits Malabar (but the references in Arnobius to the evangelizing of the Seres, vi 123 ii 32, are purely rhetorical).

431 Expulsion of Nestorius and beginning of strenuous propaganda.

498 Establishment of N. patriarchate in Babylon ; it follows the Caliph to Bagdad *762*.

505 Nestorian Christianity reaches China.

541 By this date sees are established at Samarcand and Herat ; N. tombs found of this date in Balkash basin or 'Seven Rivers' (extending from *547–1027*).

550 Cosmas Indicopleustes represents N. Churches in Malabar, Ceylon, Socotra, under clergy ordained in Persia ; in Bactria and among Huns in Scythia, Hyrcania and other lands E. of Euxine (perhaps at no subsequent time till our own days was the gospel so strongly represented in Asia as in Justinian's reign).

551 N. monks bring silkworms from China to Justinian.

650 N. Patriarch writes to persian bishop complaining of his neglect : Khorasan had lapsed from the faith, and India from Persia to Cape Comorin was deprived of regular ministry : he wrote also to converts in Socotra and in Balkh and undertook to provide bishops for Upper Oxus region.

661 His successor visits Balkh to compose an old quarrel with the bactrian churchmen.

635 Olopan (Rabban) appears in China at Singanfoo and is well received by Emperor Taitsong I (*627–650*), who orders a church to be built in the capital with 21 'religious men' attached to it : Olopan becomes 'Guardian of the Empire' : Professor P. Saeki of Tokyo

has just published (May 1916 S.P.C.K. London) an important monograph on *the Nestorian Monument in China*; in a preface Prof. Sayce refers to the 'still-abiding influence of that early 'Christianity in the religious thought of China and Japan'.

683 Persecution by envious buddhists.

c. 720 First Metropolitan appointed in China.

744 Fresh missionary effort: arrival of Kiho; Emp. Mingti of the same Tang Dyn. (*712–756*) builds Christian shrines and altars anew, and many officials keep Christmas.

745 Mingti decrees name 'Roman Temples' to the N. churches: Archpriest of Edessa sends out a colonizing mission to India (from Bagdad, Jerusalem, Nineveh).

750–850 Period of widest development and activity of missions: unbroken series of bishops in India and China and at Merv: arab references to strength of the Gospel in Far East.

774 Charter granted by ruler of Malabar to his Christian subjects, engraved on copper; a second charter was issued in *824* or 50 years later: about same date (perhaps earlier) inscription at Madras (St. Thomé).

781 Marble tablet set up to record the favour of God and the chinese emperors to the church: dated in the reign of the Bagdad Patriarch, Hanan-Yeshua.

790 Bagdad sends a new metropolitan to China who is killed on the way by bandits: another is at once despatched to take his place.

800 Bishop Abraham journeys from Basra to China.

900 Expansion begins to meet serious checks: Islam spreads and in letters becomes self-sufficing; conservative reaction in China; great decline in Christian converts after Civil War of *878*, when the Tang Emperor Hitsong 'did not possess a palace and all the chief towns lay in ruins'.

1008 Khan of Keraits (near Lake Baikal) is converted (Prester John).

c. 1250 and onwards Marco Polo finds N. Christianity thinly dispersed all over China: from this date onwards the Roman Catholic Missions supersede it.]

[APPENDIX OO. See p. 383

Three Semitic Speculators

Some radical tendencies of medieval thought will be made clear by a comparison of three reflecting philosophers of semitic stock—Abul-Ala Ahmed ibn Abdalla, born at Maarria (20 m. S. of Aleppo in Syria) in *973* A.D. Is usually called from his birthplace *Maarri*. He lost his sight at an early age through smallpox and lived on a small pension from a benevolent trust-fund, composing his 'Sparks from Tinder'. After a visit of eighteen months to Bagdad (*1008–10*) he returned home and retired from the world. Though he complained of poverty and his own misanthropic solitude, it seems certain that he had considerable means and many friends. He survived this retirement nearly 50 years and died in *1058*. His lifetime

thus covers the unusually lengthy reigns of Caliphs Tai and Qadir (*973–1031*) and more than half that of Qaim (*1031–1078*). His most notable poems were written during his retirement and after his visit to the capital. The tone of these writings is sceptical and pessimist, but there are passages of orthodoxy which create curious problems as to his real sentiments. Is he equally sincere when he accepts and when he casts doubt upon muslim beliefs ? He was at least a convinced *rationalist* who knows nothing higher in the world than human intellect and rejects any foreign authority whose dictates come into collision with it. ' Reason ' he says ' is the ' loftiest gift man has received. . . . Traditions, if genuine, possess much ' weight, but they are but weakly attested ; consult Reason and heed ' naught else. . . . My reason is indignant that I should lay it aside and ' follow Shafii and Malik. . . . O Reason, thou speakest truth : perish ' the fool who invents or expounds tradition ! ' Yet with all this outspoken sceptical frankness he speaks—somewhat needlessly it seems—of the value of caution, hypocrisy and disguise. ' Conceal thy real thoughts ' even from the friend at thy side. . . . Society compels me to play the ' liar. . . . I raise my voice to approve absurdities but the truth I whisper.' The divine origin of religious faith through revelation he ignores without explicitly denying. He sees that faith is for the most part a matter of slothful acquiescence in an ancient heritage aud convention : ' men live ' as their fathers before them and bequeath their religion mechanically, ' just as they found it.' Once he says boldly after dismissing Christian, muslim, jewish, magian doctrines as erroneous : ' There are but two classes ' of mankind, the intelligent without religion and the religious without ' intelligence.' The religion of the mob is reared upon fear, fraud and greed. The great creeds are a mass of forged traditions and dogmas which, in themselves repugnant to reason, have been constantly altered by their adherents. In the Christian creed he cannot understand why God the Father abandoned His Son to His enemies. He often ends upon a note of agnostic nihilism ; but he will not go as far as ' men who assert that ' nothing really exists but cannot prove that there is no misery or happi- ' ness.' He admits that the soul may be immortal but ' no one knows ' whither it goes ' after death. If mind accompanies it, it may have remin- iscence hereafter of its present life. On metempsychosis (as on the truth of Islam) he expresses two opposite views without trying to reconcile them : it is a theory unsupported by reason, yet (in another place) the destiny of all living beings is an endless cycle of dissolution and re-aggrega- tion, of death and rebirth. Death is the only certainty and the poet has no great love of life : ' May I never rise from the dead, for in living I take ' no delight.' Human existence is pure misery and to beget children is a sin, because thereby the sum of suffering is increased and more innocent victims of torture brought to consciousness. Yet he bids fathers find husbands for their daughters but forbid their sons to marry. The ineradic- able evil in all men is not their own fault but the decree of Fate ; ' the ' crow cannot change its colour . . . do not seek to make that world ' better which God has not ordained to righteousness.' Belief in a future improvement is pure self-deception : he is at one with Horace in his

pessimistic stanza ending *progeniem vitiosiorem* ; ' if this age is bad, the ' next will be worse '. This attitude to life did not drive him to epicurean relief ; he is a stern ascetic. ' The happiest man on earth is the ascetic ' who dies without issue.' He respects all life, like the Jains who were very likely his real instructors ; he will not kill or hurt any animals and refrains even from eggs, milk and honey. ' There is more merit in releasing a ' captive flea, than in giving alms to a mendicant.' He is full of admiration for the hindu ' gymnosophists ' who hurl themselves into the flames alive.

Nevertheless he is not without a formal religion of his own : a deism combined with a true muslim belief in all-compassing fate. Unlike the hindu, the semitic mind cannot dispense with a theory of God—not as *thought* or pure *being*, but as *will*. He is a convinced monotheist : ' reason ' assures us that an eternal Creator exists '. Religion (based on rational thought) implies the avoidance of sin, the surrender of worldly pleasures and dealing justly with our kind. Acts and forms of worship are useless unless we obey the moral law written and engraven on the heart. This is sufficing for a good life ; a man need not attend public prayers nor go as a pilgrim to Mecca. ' A slight wrong to a neighbour will be more gravely ' punished hereafter than omission of fasting and prayer '—where he seems obliged to accept the soul's survival and judgement in order to ratify the moral law. He is above all sectarian intolerance ; ' a Christian ' priest may do one more good than a muslim preacher.' ' Ask pardon of ' God Himself and pay no heed to what is said by the mullahs. . . . Serve ' God not His servants, for religion enslaves and only reason sets us free.' Although man is by nature and destiny evil, he believes that virtue may be acquired : it must be its own end (as in the opinion of Averroes and Pomponazzo, the apostles of ' disinterested morality '). We must not seek praise of men or recompense from God ; virtue as *mens conscia recti* is in itself a solace for the woes of life. Humility and charity are the two chief virtues and should go hand in hand : ' forgive thy neighbour ' but to thyself be merciless '. He enjoins the kind treatment of birds, animals and slaves. (Fullest work on Abul-Ala by Kremer in *Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akad. d. Wissens.* cxvii 6, 1889 : Margoliouth's edition of *Letters* Oxford 1898, and *Corresp. on Vegetarianism*, Jl. Roy. Asi. Soc. 1902 : Bärlein's edit. of the *Diwan*, London 1908 and monograph on the poet 1914 : Nicholson's admirable *Hist. of the Arabs*, London 1907).

It should be mentioned that Margoliouth is more firmly convinced of Maarri's heterodoxy than is Nicholson. He shows that Yakut's *Dict. of Learned Men* contains samples of his heretical and even atheistic axioms ' which go as far in the direction of agnosticism as it is possible to go. . . ' The real meaning of the assertion that *there is a Creator outside time* and ' space is that he who asserts it has no intellect.' The following passage is worthy of Leopardi : ' All the statements of the Prophets are fabri- ' cations ; men lived comfortably enough until they came and spoiled life. ' The Sacred Books (so-called) are a set of idle romances such as any age ' could produce. . . . As for the promise of a second life, the soul could ' well have dispensed with both existences.' Maarri, with his vegetarian and ascetic jainism is the 3rd of the great muslim *zendiks*—a name applied

to those who denied a personal deity and the ruling of a moral providence in the world.[1] But how loosely the term was applied is clear from this fact : the followers of Mani were constantly branded with the name. In the reforming Century of the Iconoclasts at Byzantium, there existed a society of 12 or 13 sceptics, of whom 3 bore the name *Hammad* ; one of this sect *Yunus* wrote to the Emperor (? Constantine V) at Byzantium a treatise on the folly of Islam and the vices of the Arabs. Another member, Aban Abdul Hamid, carries on this strange dialogue with Abu Newas, the orthodox poet : (Abu) Glory to God (Aban) Glory to Manes (Abu) Jesus was an Apostle (Aban) of Satan. . . . ' Before this stubborn blasphemer I held ' my tongue '. Tabari seems to show their hindu affinities (whether jain or buddhist) in their vagrant habits, respect for animal life, and frequent washings—in which they approach the mandean sect. Cent. viii certainly produced some strange figures and tenets in theology : Bassar ben Burd the poet (who died in *783* A.D.) prayed to Mahomet to join him in an attack upon the deity ! We cannot dissociate this from the antitheistic hero-cult which formed the real religion of both the humanist hindu sects. Even the orthodox Abu Newas (named above+*810* A.D.) was charged with manichee dualism, because he made light of the angels (Tabari iii 964). In the same century there arose (and from the same motive) the peculiar sect of the *Rawandi* (from a district near Ispahan), who caused Caliph Mansur no little trouble by insisting on offering him divine worship (*c. 758* A.D.) ! Some fifty years after one of this sect Abul-Hosein al-Rawandi recited his sceptical works in Bagdad and died forty years later (*c. 865*). He is accounted the first of the three *Zendiks*, who seem to occupy in muslim thought something of the position of the ' Three Impostors ' in the mind of western Christendom (cent. xiii). Now it is notable that he held the ' eternity of matter '—the very dogma which in the west somewhat later was to mark off finally the heretic and philosopher from the orthodox. Ibn Hazm (*c. 1000–1064* A.D.) gives in his *Sects* a class of men who ' say ' that the world is everlasting and has neither Creator nor Governor ' and distinguishes this extreme view from the opinion that the world is eternal but has a Creator. Gazali (+*1111* A.D.) divides the worst heretics into 3 ranks ; the *Duhris* (or zendiks) who ' denied the Creator and upheld the eternity of the world ; the *Naturalists* who admit a Creator but believe that life and soul arise from a certain admixture and constitution of matter and cease altogether at death ; the *Deists* or the hellenic philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle with their disciples in the east. A Hammad before had spoken of men ' who assert that the heavens made themselves and that earth was not laid out by its Creator '. In *965* A.D. (under the troubled reign of the unhappy Muti) died al-Mutanabbi, who made very free in his verses with sacred subjects : he writes to a patron ' If thy ' sword had smitten Lazarus, Jesus could not have restored him to life : ' if the Red Sea had been like thy right hand Moses could never have ' crossed it.'

[1] He was seen by a pious man in a dream being devoured after death by two serpents (cf. Margol. *Letters of Abul-Ala*, Oxford 1898).

Muhyi Al-Din ibn *al-Arabi*, born in Murcia (S. Spain) in *1165*, studied theology at Seville, visited Granada, Tunis, Fez and Morocco, journeyed eastwards to Egypt and Mecca (*1201*), travelled widely in Chaldea, Lesser Asia and Syria, preaching endurance and hope to the muslim powers threatened by the Crusades, died in Damascus in *1240*. He was a sufi mystic and visionary and his longest work *Futuhat* (published Bulak 1876 in 3300 pages) contains a record of the mysteries imparted to him in dream and ecstasy. In the *Fusus* he discusses the import of the divine revelations made to 27 prophets, from Adam to Mahomet. His mystical poems (*Tarjuman*, ed. Nicholson, London 1911) are written in a highly allegoric and erotic style, which gave offence to the orthodox until the poet published a paraphrase and explained the allusions. He was a *zahirite*, member of the *literalist* school which rejects opinion and authority in interpreting the Coran. But with this legalist precision he combined (for doctrine and piety) the mystical views of the *batinites*, who looked past the letter to the inward spirit of which the text was only the symbol. Like many others, he tried to combine orthodox belief with ' philosophy ', which for the arabian thinkers really meant the neoplatonism of Plotinus. He has to reconcile the active and sovereign will of the muslim deity with the negative theology of later hellenism. In the Coran, God has attributes as well as essence and is a real creator and providence ; in Plotinus and his school, God is beyond every attribute, quality and relation—indeed, above essence itself (according to a single phrase of Plato). He is therefore in a difficulty ; if we reject the notions of will and designing intelligence, how did the *one* become the *manifold* ? He uses for this Plotin's favourite simile of light which (whether it will or no) cannot be hid : just as for Aristotle, God's beauty and perfection cannot but exert a magnetic influence on all creation. In the Intelligible World there are *seven* beings ; *God*, First *Intelligence*, *Soul*, *Nature* (as in Plotin's scheme), Ideal *Matter*, Ideal *Body*, Ideal *Figure* : in which the last place accorded to *form* or figure may excite some surprise. These realities, before even they are manifested in our visible world, exist in potency in the darkness which for ever hides the divine essence. The relation of the world to God is that of shadow to sun. The aristotelian *form* (εἶδος) as al-Arabi calls *spirit* (ruh)—the principle which gives life and perfectness to the *shapes* which Nature produces (*suvah*), to each according to its capacity. Man is highest in this graded hierarchy ; he is a microcosm in which are united all the divine names and attributes. Man is the mirror in which God reveals Himself as He truly is, indeed, beholds Himself reflected. This adequate reflection is however found only in Perfect Man (*al-insan al-kamil*), such as Adam and other prophets who have had a unique knowledge of God. Knowledge is reminiscence. When soul is purified, it receives light from Universal Reason (the second reality in the scale of being), by direct revelation (*wahy*), and from soul (the third) by inspiration (*ilham*). The *rational* soul which receives this enlightenment has but an accidental connexion with body and cannot sin, whereas the *animal* soul is inclined to evil and suffers punishment for sins committed in the body.

Like other mystics al-Arabi, while giving unique reality to God, regards

the universe as an indispensable counterpart—rather are they two sides of one Absolute. ' Creator ' and ' creature ' are necessary correlates, and one term cannot be of force apart from the other ; although no doubt he admits that the one is eternal, the other contingent. Like Angelus Silesius, he delights in believing that he is as necessary to God as God is to him : in the *Fusus* he says very boldly ' How can He be independent when ' I help and aid Him ? For that reason God brought me into existence ; ' therefore I know Him and bring Him into existence.' Yet he is no pantheist in the sense of Hallaj the heretic ; he does not confuse the natures : man is *a* truth not *the* truth. Yet man is essential to God : because he stands to Him as pupil to eye ; in man God knows and beholds His creatures ; indeed, knows Himself—a view very closely resembling the hegelian. ' When we contemplate God, we contemplate ourselves, ' and so when He gazes on us, He gazes on Himself ' (*Fusus*). He can even assert with conscious pride ' we are the food that sustains God's being and He in turn is our food '. Therefore, as in the heretical and orthodox Realism of the Middle Age, God is the inmost *self* of all created and manifested things. Therefore the true mystic will combine *tanzih* and *tashbih* ; will worship God as wholly *transcendent* (negative theology) and yet also as externalized and *immanent* in nature (positive or pantheistic). Therefore again, all forms of religion have a relative, but not an exclusive, truth ; of all created beings God is the *Self* (as in hindu *atmanism* or autotheism) and man in framing a notion of the divine cannot be wholly wrong. Let sectaries give up their bigotry and understand aright the coranic verse ' Wheresoever ye turn, there is the face of Allah.' Agreeably to his whole position, Arabi maintains that the torments of hell are not everlasting : each soul is indeed responsible for the good and ill produced by the spiritual capacity within it, as foreseen and predetermined by God before it is individualized in our world ; but on the other hand, each soul is a mode of God (as in Spinoza) and its recompense, whether in bliss or torment, is experienced by God Himself. Lastly, Arabi placed the *saint* above the *prophet*, or rather, the saintly element in the prophet stands higher than his apostolic function. He is sent here to bring to men a religious law, also to reveal such knowledge of God as they are able to hear and understand ; but above the sphere of these relative duties is the eternal and inward element of sainthood, in which the prophet passes away from earthly ken and is at peace in God. We may note that Arabi's *Fusus* caused public riots and that Ibn Iyas in his *Egyptian History* called the book the product of a worse infidel than jew, Christian, or idolater. Pantheist indifferentism is certainly to be detected in this account of the Golden Calf : Moses reproved his brother Aaron for repudiating its worship ; for ' nothing but God could ever be worshipped ' [whatever the visible medium or object of cult] ' and therefore the calf was (like everything else) God '. (It is believed that Arabi's views had much influence over the mind of Raymund Lull, cf. Julian Ribera, in the *Homage to Pelayo* Madrid 1899 ; also Palacios ' Abenarabi's Psychology ' in xiv *Internat. Congress Orient.*, Algiers 1905 ; besides Nicholson's and Brockelmann's *Histories of Arab. Liter.*, cf. D. B. Macdonald's *Devel. Muslim Theol.* London 1903).

With Arabi may be named two ascetics 'Abdel-Kadir' al-Jilani (*1078–1166* A.D.) and his follower in the Qadarite Brotherhood, Abd-ar-Razzak (*c. 1250–1330*). The former created the school or order which is flourishing to-day and spread its influence by means of his 29 sons. The influence of the gospel is very clear; he had the greatest respect for our Lord and laid great emphasis on the 'Christian virtues' of meekness, charity, humility and obedience to the Spiritual Director—in which however he also recalls the attitude of later hindu sects to the *guru*. His disciples attributed to him, not merely miraculous levitation when walking with his pupils, but also words and phrases by which he seemed to rival the pride of Hallaj the pantheist. 'Sun greets me or ever he rises; year too gives me greeting' and unveils all that is about to happen in its course . . . I plunge myself 'in the sea of the divine knowledge: I have seen God with my own eyes: 'I am the living proof that God exists.'—Ar-Razzak ('the provider') is a follower of the platonists in his doctrine of Emanation; he only transcribes Plotinus in his 3 hypostases. From the Universal Mind the types emanate or float down into the world of Soul, whence, becoming individualized, they are transmitted into the concrete world. Like Scotus Erigena he holds that no sooner is the 'downward path' of these divine thoughts accomplished than the reverse process begins—an upward movement by which all individual souls and forms are drawn up and reabsorbed into Mind or Primal Intelligence: the alternation of συστολή and διαστολή, Heracitus' ἄνω κατω, nebular homogeneity and the passage to heterogeneity. Like most mystics he is an optimist and a strong vindicator of freewill. 'Whatever is, is best' because if God could have made a better world, He would have done so. We need a world of opposites and divers capacities, and no one will be judged by the mere default of his nature. In the future judgement men will enjoy just that punishment or felicity to which they are strictly entitled. Here we notice a tenderness for individuals which is not always a marked feature in mystics. He denies that punishment will be everlasting; 'unless God so decree': evidently he believes (universalist that he is) that this is unlikely.

With these two typical instances of rationalist and mystic may be compared and contrasted Maimonides, in certain aspects of his mind which elsewhere in this volume receive only brief mention. The object of his *Ductor Dubitantium* is to supply a harmony between *reason* and *faith*—the chief scholastic formula, problem and conviction. Faith in the *Torah* (as the one certain and eternal embodiment of divine truth) cannot be at feud with the secrets discovered by philosophic reason. As in Justin Martyr and the liberal alexandrines, God is represented in the last resort as the guide and illuminant of the philosophers also. The anthropomorphism of jewish scripture can be explained and reconciled with the abstract spirituality of the pagan theologians. But Aristotle was certainly once completely in error; the world was verily created by God out of nothing. From Primal Cause or Creator (a secondary phase of the divine essence as Brahmā masculine of Brahmā neuter) there emanate the sphere-intellects (*motrices animæ* in the west). God created the universe by first producing these minds, which take the place of the lesser creators in *Timæus*,

of the angels in the Old Testament. It is they who impart motion to their spheres and so influence and order things on earth, whose changes are due to their revolution. Abelson remarks with truth that his theory of Emanation (*hashpaa*) is a wonderful blend of two frames of mind, *rationalism* and *mysticism*, usually regarded as diametrically opposed. But indeed the whole neoplatonic current in arabian thought is such a blend and perhaps it is true to say that few champions of clear reason are without their private moments of mystical fervour. Moses' views on prophecy are as mystical as those of Philo : man is wholly a passive instrument in the divine hand, to sound forth whatever tune it lists. In prophecy Active Intellect descends upon a place prepared for it, by our intellect and imagination. Yet though moral purity and clearness of mind are needed as prerequisite, they are not invariably followed by this enlightenment nor can a man by holiness compel God to bestow this crowning gift. Only at the command of a divine and arbitrary fiat does a man become prophetic.

He is as unwavering an optimist as Maarri is a pessimist. As in platonism any positive existence is denied to evil, which is pure negation or defect : God made everything good and ' no evil thing descends from ' above ' (*Bereshith Rabba*). Providence extends to individual men, but not to animals. Man must learn to *obey* God before he can *know* and *enjoy* Him ; and to *know* God is to *love* Him. God tests and disciplines us before He brings us into the Promised Land, as Israel in the wilderness. The worship of God (as pure spirit) is not a prescribed series of legal and mechanical acts, but a (mystical) movement of man's soul towards its divine source. Man's intellect is his highest asset—though he does not believe, with Maarri the ' jain,' that its chief duty is to see through the futility of life and effort. It is partly owing to Maimonides that judaism has not become fossilized ; he imparted a progressive spirit which can develop and adjust itself as human conditions change. On one side he is a dogmatic ritualist, whose simplifying of the Talmud produced a rigid system ; on the other, an earnest harmonist of jewish faith and hope with new circumstances and foreign knowledge. It is further not easy to overestimate his influence on scholastic thought in the west : William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales studied the *Ductor* with eagerness and profit. Albert and Aquinas show distinct traces of its impression on their system ; and Duns Scotus was no less indebted. (Among the most recent writers on this peculiar rôle of M. may be named Bacher-Brann-Simonson-Guttmann *Moses b. M.*, Leipzig 1908 ; L. G. Lévy *Metaph. de M.* Dijon 1905 and *Maimonides*, Paris 1911 (*Coll. des Grands Philos.*) ; Münz *M. b. M.* Frankfort 1912 ; Gorfinkle *M. Eight Chapters on Ethics*, N. York 1912).]

APPENDIX A

Development under Ommiads and Abbasids

(i) To the End of Arab Supremacy (*750*).

The blend of religion and politics, of saint and brigand, of faith in the hereafter and close attention to worldly interests will account for all that is

complex and anomalous in the history of Islam. On the Prophet's death the Bedouins revolted against the payment of taxes : it was a rebellion within the fold, but also a defection from Islam ; the leaders of these immigrants posed not as *princes* but as *prophets*. The piratical traditions and prospect of rich spoils led many to join the band who had no interest in personal ' salvation '. Motives and policy within the heart of the Commander of the Faithful were in perpetual conflict. Did he wish the number of converts to increase ? The rapid conversion of the masses in Syria and Egypt, all at least nominally Christian, showed their very slight hold upon the Gospel and keen desire to join the winning side. ' They changed their creed merely to acquire the rights and privileges of citizens ' (de Goeje). They were certainly not compelled to conform ; and the Ommiads, at least, were alarmed at conversions which still further reduced the dwindling returns of the poll-tax. The chief danger to the stern simplicity of Islam came not from the lukewarm Christians of the east but from Persia with its national self-consciousness and traditions, its glorious memories of an ancient world-empire. If Islam was leavened (as we find it to be) with a policy and refinement quite alien from its primitive temper, the influence came from Persia. The persian converts were a ' thorn in the flesh ' to the native arabs : they gave the early State of sanctified brigandage its death-blow. ' The fall of the ommiads ' says de Goeje ' was their work and with the ommiads fell the arabian empire.' Omar sought to make the host of God a military monkhood, or an order of levitical knights : the ruling (and protective) class was to be an army whose soldiers were forbidden to acquire land : this was to be a source of revenue, either as state-property or granted out and redistributed to the conquered peoples. With the reign of Othman other motives and interests made an entrance ; under him the Koreshites seized a monopoly of office and it seemed to him quite a matter of course to promote and enrich his kinsmen. Irak was actually called the ' garden of Koresh ' : Islam was secularized or rather turned into a system of almost feudal appanages. Against this the ' spiritual nobility ' of Mahomet's Companions (*ansar* = defenders) raised constant protest without finding a much worthier motive. The same party resisted the ommiad supremacy in Syria from the old centre of the sacred cities in Arabia : the movement triumphed in the transfer of sovereign power to the abbasids. In its puritan ranks were no doubt men of piety who saw with anger the great feudal lords promoted to chief places—men who had done nothing for the faith and had submitted only from policy at the last moment and with obvious reservations. The most part however wanted no change of *system*—only of *persons*. Mahomet, who had in him much of the time-server and opportunist, had been the first to blame : his State needed not only fanatics and zealots but skilful rulers and officials : his kinsmen, foes of yesterday, were the honoured colleagues of to-morrow. The ommiads succeeded after the murder of Ali but the irreconcilable elements made good their vengeance after a century.

The foes of ommiad supremacy were the ' old school ' of the *Ansar* who nicknamed the recent noble converts ' freedmen ' (*tolaka*) ; Ali's partizans whose views spread rapidly among the Persians ; the ' clients '

(*maulas*) under the patronage of arab families but chiefly comprising wealthy Iranians ; the ' intransigeant ' and republican party of the Kharijites. For the history of the ommiads we depend on the testimony of unscrupulous foes ; there is no unsuspected witness.[1] Moawiyah I, if we can see aright through the mists and prejudices of centuries, was a typical arabian sheikh, not a fanatic : he ruled not by force or threats but by mildness, strength of character and genuine political insight. His chief crime was that he made the caliphate *hereditary* ; this patriarchal method had been of course the rule in arab tribes, subject to the fitness of the claimant and to ' recognition ' by the chief men. His champions deny that a strict and religious disciple of Islam could have left power deliberately to a drunken and dissolute sceptic, Yazid—as the historians unjustly account his heir. Damascus is claimed to be the home of pure manners and a startling contrast to the licence and corruption of the sacred city, Medina. Yazid was a bold hunter and it was not under him that the seclusion of the caliph became a matter of policy : ' *jucundissimus* ' says the continuer of Isidore of Byzantium ' *et cuncti nationibus regni ejus subditis vir gratissime habitus, qui nullam unquam* (*ut omnibus moris est*) *sibi, regalis fastigii causa, gloriam appetivit sed cum omnibus civiliter vixit.* Under Merwan I the sacred cities lost at Zobair's death that political weight which had been slowly passing from them since the cruel murder of Othman. The interests of Damascus were without doubt temporal and Islam came under strong exotic influences and civilizing elements, beside which pure arabic factors disappeared. But the ommiad sovereigns still showed ability and virtue : Abdalmelik was renowned for his pious and ascetic youth. Some time before *700* A.D. he had given up byzantine and persian coinage and set up a mint with islamic forms. Arabic he made the official tongue, and all members of bureaus had to use it in administration. To Abdalmelik is due the better arrangement of the postal service from Damascus to the provinces, to allow of swift and secret knowledge of passing events. He was perhaps the first veritable king ; he was not one of a group of saints or nobles, but a patriarch with absolute powers who gave his kinsmen office. Magnificence and luxury began under Walid I who felt it needful to enhance the splendour of the Imam ; by his example he gave impetus to building throughout Syria. Under him Spain was annexed and the great viceroy Hajjaj brought the system of a muslim protectorate to a fine art in his long government of the easterly regions. Under his successor Suleiman the first reverses were felt : the repulse from Byzantium in *717* was reputed as great a blow as the defeat by Charles Martel in *732*. He was neither as firm nor as simple in life as Walid, but he was strict in conduct and a severe censor of the licence that strangely enough seemed to reign in Medina. Omar II as a civil ruler as well as a pontiff, carried the religious side of the caliphate almost to excess : worldly policy and statecraft he submitted wholly to the higher interest of the faith : no slander has ever taxed him with selfishness or hypocrisy.

[1] Modern writers (as de Goeje) have appeared as champions of this much decried dynasty ; the above paragraph represents this vindication.

His fiscal measures on the ground of expediency, are open to objection ; he allowed the tribute-paying tenant of conquered land to leave his estate at will if he adopted Islam, breaking the salutary rule of Hajjaj which tied such firmly to his ' glebe '. Hence a great influx of persian ' clients ' (*maulas*) into the towns and a great stimulus to urban life, to the neglect of production and the detriment of manhood and vitality. In Africa and Khorasan large numbers embraced the faith, and great discontent arose when the treasury had to impose a tribute on those who had only been converted to escape it. Maslama (under Yezid II) though a caliph's brother, was dismissed from his post because he could not send his full quota of tribute from Iran and Khorasan. Under his successors, a policy of extortion in the far east begins, which worked towards the fall of the ruling family. In Africa fiscal needs obliged the governor Yazid to order back the converted Berbers to their holdings and to pay the old tribute from which Omar II had, unwisely, exempted them. Nor could Yazid II avenge his lieutenant's murder when he was slain in a tumult and replaced by a popular favourite. The hold of the dynasty begins to weaken, both on its own officers and the subject-class. The caliph was no longer a prophet zealous for his people's spiritual good, but a man of refined taste and most un-arabian pursuits, devoted to poetry and music ; his grief at the death of the singer Hababa passed into a proverb and hastened his own. But the tone of syrian society was still austere and decorous. Hisham, wise, able and an enemy of needless luxury and display, turned his care to internal troubles : the fiscal tyrants of Irak and Khorasan he replaced by Khalid (*al Qasri*) who held office for 15 years. But reforms and good government came too late to save the dynasty. In the latter province in *736* Nasr (*ben Sayyar*) as governor repealed earlier and vexatious measures and enacted that all who held conquered land (whether believers or no) should pay tribute or *land-tax* except in the native country of the dominant caste ; unbelievers were to pay in addition a *poll-tax* from which conversion would exempt them. On the extreme verge of Islam discontent grew on account of the problem of reconciling religious and political claims. Omar II had induced indian tribes to embrace the faith under promise of equal rights ; this was not kept by his successors, and ' democratic equality ' of old and recent converts alike, gave way before a caste-supremacy. Hence proselytism was arrested in Sind. In Africa also the Berbers were treated as tribute-bearing serfs, in spite of Omar's solemn promise and although they had given many recruits to the wars. Again a governor of Africa was quite powerless against a rebellion which was not reduced without serious fighting. Hisham, a devout and hard-working prince, led the life of a recluse, and, like Abdul Hamid II, kept the reins of government in his own hands for 20 years. But he rarely admitted visitors or pleaders to an interview and left his chamberlain to see applicants. Under him the muslim power met its greatest set-back in the far West (*732*). His son Walid II was a powerful man, a hunter and a poet, but unversed in business, from which his father had jealously kept him—an example followed by most later rulers and dynasties, to the great detriment of any continuous autocratic tradition. He was misrepresented as irreligious

and dissolute by a conspirator of his own house, and murdered, when unguarded, after the success of a small rising of about 2000 men (*746*). The murder of Othman had given supreme power to his family who could claim to avenge a martyred saint : this internecine strife, and the massacre of a caliph while reading the Coran, took it away. Khorasan under the brief reigns of Yazid III, Ibrahim, and Merwan II became the centre of sedition, and Shiite missionaries in the Alid cause spread their religious propaganda against a now detested family. In the events which transferred power to the abbasids, the real part was played by Abu Moslim who was not an arab at all but a persian ' client '. It is not too much to say that it was he alone who achieved and ensured the victory (*750*) and that the success of the new line was due from first to last to alien help. Arab supremacy then came to an end. In the new world of Irak it was a persian civilization that again blossomed. The Bedouins of the desert were not needed there, and would have compared ill with their supplanters as supple agents of the new State. Henceforward the Arabs are not a favoured class ; they are not even soldiers. The dynasty relied on non-arabic troops who formed a standing army recruited from regions ever further and further eastward. Soon no barrier existed to mark the Arabs as a ' chosen people ' set apart to rule the earth for the service of God. Only their religion, language and culture spread. After yielding this fruit to the world-development, they had gone back sullen and disappointed to their desert home.

(ii) The Masters or Persecutors of the Abbasid Caliphate to its Extinction

Fitful tyranny of the early Abbasids : Foreign Ministers.—The real rulers under the abbasids were viziers of foreign extraction and (later) turkish commandants who had been slaves. Abul Abbas (+*754*) was a simple man of limited capacity who had very little share in winning his caliphate. He did not presume to govern without consulting Abu Jahm, who was Abu Moslim's vizier or coadjutor. Mansur, the next caliph, killed the dangerous monk who had restored the rightful line : henceforth the caliph's authority will be shown not in the routine and hard work of government, but in acts of intermittent cruelty towards ministers who served him only too well [1]. Already Spain and Africa were independent ; and in the latter country an ommiad exile reigned. Another danger (an unruly populace) appears side by side with the vizier's *civil* influence : this new peril thrust the caliph into the arms of a foreign guard. The citadel and palace of Mansur rose at Bagdad in *766* a date accepted as marking a new era. Ibn Hazur [2] writing in Spain at a calm and reflective

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[1] These acts were however highly popular with the subject-class who suffered from the vizier's greed of authority ; and, even if unaffected, rejoiced with a thoroughly human malice at the downfall of an upstart.

[2] Abu Mahommed Ali (Ibn Hazur) 994–1064 born near Cordova became vizier after his father ; deposed for heresy he spent his life in the study of history, law and theology. He joined the *Zahirite* School of

distance has exactly seized the features of the present and the later house. 'The ommiads were an arab family and had no citadel or fortified residence. 'Each one dwelt in his own country house where he lived before he became 'caliph. They did not wish the faithful to address them as slaves address 'a master or to kiss the ground before them. They gave care only to 'appoint able governors for the provinces. But the sons of Abbas were 'a persian family and under them the tribal system of the Arabs (as Omar 'II had prescribed) fell into ruins. The Persians of Khorasan were the 'true rulers and the government became once more despotic, as in the 'age of Chosroes Nushirvan.' Khalid the leader of the vizier-family of Barmecids gained Mansur's favour (it is said) by perjury, swearing that he had heard Isa renounce his succession-rights to Mansur's son. Mansur died on the road to Mecca and was buried there. He was ambitious and capable, knowing how to choose agents and to fill his treasury. For a short time the caliph becomes a real power in the land and at times he will be seen to lead his armies in person (e.g. in *780* Mahdi with his son Harun advances through Syria into byzantine Cilicia). Under personal rule the empire flourished and the people were contented. The vast range of muslim influence appears in the embassies and treaties of the chinese emperor, the tibetan king, and several minor princes of India. Under Hadi (+*786*) we have the old persian crimes of the harem and the queen-mother beginning anew: Khaizoran made two young slaves smother her elder son to make a way for her favourite Harun. This prince of mythical fame owes his great renown, as he owed his proverbial prosperity, to his well-chosen persian ministers. Khalid's son Yahya, Harun's former tutor, was made chief adviser, and great posts were created and given to his two sons. So effective was this delegacy that the Barmecids' foes could rouse hatred and jealousy by pointing out to Harun that he was caliph only in name. All but one member of the too powerful clan were proscribed and Fadl ben Rabi succeeded to the tutelage of a sovereign who neither by character nor tradition could rule alone. Yet Harun was a brave personal leader of armies, and no less redoubtable to the 'Romans' as caliph than he had been as hereditary prince. In return for an annual tribute he acknowledged the independence of Africa; and if Islam as a political power reached its zenith under him it assuredly also began to decline. The civil war which displaced the young and incompetent Amin by Mamun in *813* was entirely the work of powerful ministers who used the caliphate as a tool to further their private ends. Another Fadl as Vizier treated Mamun as a figurehead, and the war had been decided by Tahir's insolent murder of his brother. Only in *819* could Mamun begin to rule as sovereign. Tahir the regicide after the removal of Fadl (by poison?) wisely retired from court to found a proconsular dynasty in Khorasan. Letters, science and unorthodoxy marked the 14 years of personal rule in a now tranquil Irak; but the caliph often appeared at the head of his troops.

'externalists', who held to a pure literalism in explaining the Coran. His chief work is the *Book of Sects* (Cairo 1899); see Brockelmann's history (Weimar 1898).

After Mansur, Mamun was the best ruler of the abbasid line. He completed the process of denationalizing Islam by firmly fixing the persian ascendancy, and began the fatal practice of summoning turki nobles from the wilder regions of Central Asia to take service at his court.

Rule of the Pretorians : Attempted reform of civil abuses.—With Motasim begins the rule of the turkish guards. He prepared his succession by yearly purchases of slaves ; when he went to war he had round him a personal and devoted bodyguard of 3000 foreigners. When he had persuaded Mamun to name him his heir he went to Bagdad and bought still more slaves, amongst whom were Ashnas, Itakh, Wasif, and Sima, whom he made officers over his turbulent and irreligious foreign guard. Tired of the feud between these turk soldiers and the citizens of Bagdad, he built a new palace at Samarra, a few miles north of the capital, where his successors became the slaves and the victims of their own pretorians.

Under Wathiq (or Vathek), his son, an attempt was made to remedy another side of public abuses which took their rise from the greed of officialdom : corruption being the chief fault of *civilian* as violence of *military* rule. These governors in a vast democratic empire, without traditions of honour or regular schools of training, enjoyed unlimited power solely with a view to gain. Omar II had attempted, like a byzantine Cæsar, to wrestle with this chief evil of democratic absolutism : when malversation was proved he confiscated half the fortune of the culprit. The service of the caliph (or, more often, the favour of the vizier) led to posts of great emolument ; and, in those more unsettled days of bold communist beggars, rebel provinces and mutinous guards, seemed to provide the only sure way to a fortune. After Mansur's reign luxury increased at an alarming pace : money, hitherto scarcely an important factor in public policy or in private life, became the unique motive. Harun had seized the Barmecids' estates on their downfall, but Vathek was the first to impeach ministers, to imprison and fine them on the charge of peculation. Bogha was his chief turk general and two other Turks (already named), Ashnas and Itakh, received rich appointments as governors of the provinces 'in west and east' ; these duties they were allowed to perform by deputy while taking the full salary themselves. The vizier Mahommed Zayyat was cruel and arbitrary, and Motawakkil on his accession killed him for resisting his right to reign. He owed his good fortune to Itakh, who (like Arbogast under the second Valentinian) treated his nominee with insolence. The caliph took his dangerous patron unawares and murdered him at Bagdad : it was seldom that a captain of mercenaries could count on any support or vengeance in spite of all his great powers. Itakh's successor, Wasif, was no less masterful and intolerable ; to escape his tyranny, the caliph removed his court to Damascus. But he soon returned to Samarra, where he spent nearly a million sterling on a new fortress-palace. He despoiled many officials of their unjust gains, and as a counterpoise to the Turks, admitted 12,000 Arabs into his armies, just as his brother had before sent for recruits from Africa. But this new favour to the old race and primitive stock of Islam did not rally round the abbasid the support of the Bedouins. Intending to murder his eldest son,

Wasif his unwelcome minister, and some other turkish generals, he was forestalled by them and killed in a drunken stupor : the story currently believed, that his scribe and confidant, Fath, had killed his master and paid the penalty of treason, shows how easy it was to account for a caliph's death. The vizier Ahmed ben Khasib and Wasif, the chief *civil* and *military* powers, now quarrelled : to oblige the former the new caliph Montasir exiled Wasif to the frontier and deprived his two brothers of their right of succession to gratify the turk generals : he did not however escape poison. Ahmed prevailed on the turkish guard to recognize Mostain Billah, Montasir's cousin. When the roman armies pressed the muslim, the faithful offered themselves as volunteers for the holy war : the Turks, alarmed to see a bellicose spirit reappear among a people whom they despised, treated them as rioters. A new united party of Wasif and Bogha now procured the exile of the vizier Ahmed to Crete : in *865* they fled to Bagdad (carrying the helpless Mostain) from still another cabal which in the end set up Motazz, Motawakkil's son. Wasif and Bogha were granted amnesty, but the former was soon killed by his own troops, the latter by the new caliph's orders. The inevitable problem of a military ascendancy now became acute. How were the guards to be paid ? Tabari (iii 1685) tells us that 200 millions dirhems were required for this service (£6,500,000).[1] To satisfy them Wasif's son Salih, in spite of the caliph's protest, confiscated the goods of *civil* officials. Motazz was seized, tortured and starved to death in *868*, the year after Michael III the Amorian, had been killed by Basil I in Constantinople. Seistan (under the Saffarids) and Egypt (under the Tulunids) now gained their independence. Salih now made Mohtadi a son of Vathek caliph. Serious and devout, he used his remnants of power to reform the court ; he banished singers, musicians and all pastimes ; he sat as judge for the common people and tried to redress their grievances. He raised detachments from the *abna*—descendants of the persian soldiers who had set up the abbasids a hundred years before—to become a counterpoise to turki supremacy. Two generals, Musa (the son of Bogha) and Salih, now engaged in a quarrel and the latter was slain in hiding. The caliph sent Musa against a revolt and during his absence tried to get rid of the turkish influence ; but Musa's brother survived the massacre and, gaining followers, killed Mohtadi in *870*. Under Musa's continued regency followed a long and feeble reign of Motamid (23 years) ; and the civil power regained some authority under the Vizier Obeidallah and an abbasid prince Abu Ahmed, brother of the caliph who defeated a saffarid army which had annexed the heritage of the Tahirids ; the caliph also appeared in the campaign carrying Mahomet's staff and mantle. Annoyed at his secondary place in the State Motamid sought to fly into Egypt, which under the Tulunids had spread its authority into Syria and even Mesopotamia. Ahmed, his brother and the vizier stopped his project and brought him back as prisoner to Samarra in *880*.

[1] It is true that at this time 360 villages to the north of Bagdad paid 225,000 *besides* a tribute in kind ; but the immense total of the wages is said to be double the land-tax from the entire (but now dwindling) empire.

Prince Ahmed Mowaffaq died in *891* and his son Abul-Abbas was allowed to succeed (excluding Motamid's own heir after a very brief reign) in *892*. Under this caliph (who took the title Motadid) the reigning house revived and with it public welfare and public confidence. Finance, war and administration were reformed ; and in *902* his son Moktafi succeeded to a much improved inheritance. The new caliph led his troops in person against the armies of Egypt and the carmathian sectaries ; and his general Suleiman won a signal victory. His death in *908* was a blow to the reviving caliphate. His brother Moktadir was but thirteen years of age and was under the influence of his mother and her ladies : fifty million dinars were lavished in doles to courtiers ; bribery and corruption reigned unchecked, and the oriental 'war against private wealth' and opulent officials was the unique means of obtaining revenue. As if aware of coming doom, the court-officials (with vizier Ibn abil Forat at their head) amassed gain while Ali ben Isa tried to stop the wasteful policy. Fatimites and Carmathians reduced the caliph's dominions and imperilled even the safety of Bagdad. These latter sectaries, returning to the brigand habits of primitive Islam, attacked the pilgrim caravans from Mecca in *924* ; in *926* a large ransom had to be paid for safe conduct ; in *927* a punitive army was severely defeated and Bagdad lay at their mercy ; in *928* Mecca was stormed and sacked and the Black Stone taken to their fastness at Laksa (till *950*). A palace cabal dethroned Moktadir ; Munis, the chief general, restored him, but, losing favour with the party then dominant at court, fled and became a dangerous outlaw. The caliph, forced to take the field against his old friend, was killed in the battle *932*. Munis proclaimed an amnesty. He was unable to secure the election of his late master's son and the hero of the recent intrigue, a dissolute puppet (son of Motadid), succeeded. He governed by means of wholesale confiscation and killed Munis and Yalbak, to whom he owed his place. He was blinded and deposed in *934* and died in extreme want in *941*.

The Caliphate from the definite recognition of a Military Regent : Buyids and Seljuks.—With Radi, son of Moktadir (a pious and well-meaning caliph) came the turning-point. The capital was mutinous, the exchequer empty, the foreign troops quite careless of the public interest. The vizier Ibn Moqla tried without success to maintain order in Irak and Mesopotamia ; only the districts around Bagdad obeyed the caliph. The new house of the Buyids held the province of Fars, the Samarids Khorasan ; Mesopotamia was under the Hamdanids, Egypt under the Ikshidites, Armenia and Aderbaijan under the Sajids, Africa under the Fatimites, Arabia under the brigand Carmathians. At Basra Ibn Raiq had got together soldiers and money, and the caliph was obliged to create for this nearest rebel the office of *Amir al Omara* or Emir al Omra and put himself under his protection : he could not secure the safety of the sacred caravan even with this additional strength and the Carmathians again received a heavy bribe. In *940* his brother Mottaqi succeeded with Bajkam the Turk as Emir in place of the deposed Ibn Raiq. Once again a rebel prince Baridi, entrenched at Basra, marched on Bagdad and seized it, but was quickly expelled by the general of the Buyids, who reinstated Ibn Raiq.

Baridi tried to recover the caliph and the capital: the former flying to the Hamdanid at Mosul returned with his escort and repelled Baridi. But the turkish guard would not tolerate a Hamdanid as Emir; and the turk Tuzun took the office. Again the caliph fled to Mosul and was invited to Egypt; Tuzun followed him, enticed him to his tent and put his eyes out (*944*). Mostakfi son of Moktafi, succeeded, only to become a mere creature of Tuzun and of his successor Ibn Shirzad. So feeble was this government that a brigand could purchase a civil and religious 'indulg-'ence' for all his crimes by a monthly payment. In *945* the buyid leader, long watching his time, entered Bagdad and, with the new title sultan wrung from the Caliph, assumed full powers; he soon blinded and deposed his puppet (*946*). Moizz Addaula, the resident buyid sultan, at first thought of naming a descendant of Ali but at length raised a son of Moktadir, Moti, to an office now shorn of all its powers, allowing him 5000 dirhems a day.

Meantime in the south and west Fatimites and Carmathians were pitted in a truceless war; the latter intrigued with the caliphate, offering to recover Egypt. Though victorious in Syria, the sectaries lost so seriously in the campaign that, after a treaty in *980* A.D., the next century witnesses their continuous decline and extinction in *1081* A.D. Moizz's son, Baktiar, was a lover of pleasure and like his father, a strong Shiite; in a tumult Moti was deposed and Baktiar expelled; but his cousin Adod restored the buyid sultanate, not even troubling to remove the titular caliph, Tai, who had been appointed during the revolt. Adod the Regent set to work to repair mosques and build hospitals and libraries (Shiraz being chiefly famous); and to care for the complex system of irrigation on which the life of the country depended. His death in *983* was followed by seven years of civil war between his three sons: the youngest being successful (in *990*) forced the caliph to abdicate the next year. Caliph Qadir, a grandson of Moktadir, opposed the shiite partizans and refused to name one as chief cadi. In *999* a turkish prince put an end to the Samarid house in Bokhara and a strong rampart against the turkish hordes was now removed: the turkish dynasty of Mahmud of Ghasni was the chief gainer. Qadir reigned for the long period of 40 years leaving behind him some treatises on theology; and in *1031* his son Qaim succeeded, under whom the seljukian Turks sprang into notice and power. He summoned Togrul Beg (to the Byzantines Ταγγρολίπιξ) to help him against the Buyids and their regency became extinct in *1055*. On Togrul was bestowed the title 'king of the east and west' (resembling one divided between the 2 turki slaves, Ashnas and Itakh, at the end of Vathek's reign *846*). Moktadi II (*1075* A.D.) was Qaim's grandson and under seljuk influence his spiritual power and titular supremacy was widely acknowledged—over all provinces to the east, a large part of Asia Minor, Arabia and the greater part of western Africa. After a contest in the seljuk family (recalling the quarrel of the three sons of Adod, the buyid sultan) Barkiarok entered Bagdad and poisoned the caliph (*1094*).

His son was named as successor, Mostazir II at the age of sixteen; after *1104* Mohammed the Seljuk was regent until his death in *1118*, in

which year the caliph also died and the byzantine emperor, Alexius Comnenus. His son, Mostarshid, strove with energy to regain real power, but in *1134* he was confined to the palace under a promise never again to take the field. Rashid his son intrigued *1135* with a prince of Mosul ; the Sultan Masud took Bagdad and in *1136* deposed the caliph ; who trying to escape from confinement was murdered in *1138*. Moktafi II son of Mostazir managed to recover authority over Irak owing to the weakness of the seljuk central power. His son Mostanjid (*1160*) maintained this position and put an end to the State of the Mazyadites at Hillah. His ten years' reign was marked by the conquest of Egypt by Nureddin, the overthrow of the Fatimites and rise of Saladin. The name of his son Mostadi now replaced that of the fatimite caliph in Egypt, but as in the mikadate of Japan, a wide and unchallenged supremacy in spiritual matters did not imply accession of power at home. Under his son Nazir (*1180*) [1] a ruler in Khiva, aggrieved at the caliph's refusal to grant a titular rank, decided to replace him by a scion of the long proscribed family of Ali. Nazir called in the help of the Mongol Horde under Jengiz khan, a momentous step in the history both of Europe and Asia. When Nazir died in *1225*, they had already plundered and ravaged the eastern provinces. Under Zahir his son and Mostanzir II his grandson (*1227–1242*) the invaders continued to advance : Mostasim, his great-grandson, was the last caliph of Bagdad. In *1256* Hulagu crossed the Oxus and began to destroy the Ismailite strongholds. In *1258* he took Bagdad, plundered the rich city and put the caliph to death. Five centuries had elapsed since the first abbasid. A descendant of the house was indeed named successor at Cairo in a spiritual dignity which lasted until the turkish conquest, when Motawakkil II was forced to abdicate his rights in favour of the Ottoman Sultan (+ *1538*), Another abbasid, Mostanzir's great-grandson, fled to India and found an asylum with the sultan of Delhi : the traveller Ibn Batuta found him there and compared his impotent riches with the destitution of his kinsman at Bagdad.

(iii) Retrospect : Causes of Decline

Failure of Islam to create a Church and State : Artificial and precarious character of the Caliph's power.—This dreary chronicle of the curtailed powers, titular splendours, real sufferings, and transient masters of the caliphate, is nevertheless required for any true understanding of oriental thought and policy in the age under review. Nothing was made precise or formal by Mahomet any more than by Augustus : he was a prophet- or

[1] From 946 onwards the average reign of a caliph becomes much longer with the decrease in his effective power : from Abul-Abbas in 750, for nearly 2 centuries, 22 caliphs reigned at Bagdad, giving an average of 9 years ; in the next 3 centuries, we find only 13, giving an average of 23 years (including the long reigns of Qadir (991–1031) his successor Qaim (1031–1075) and Nazir (1180–1225) who thus account for 130 years between them) ; this compares favourably with the duration of reign in any regnant series except the unparalleled list of the early Capetians.

priest-king, who preached a coming judgment and won followers by promises in heaven of which his earthly successes were the guarantee. At his death a small company of bandits had become an army of zealots bent on religious propaganda and world-dominion. All depended (as we saw) upon a supreme office or captaincy of the band ; but nothing was fixed as to its rights, duties or laws of succession. One party, like most anabaptists in the west, were convinced republicans : others, wiser, demanded a visible leader in the interests not only of despotic efficiency but of ' democracy ' itself. Some believed that a successor (as among the Romans) might be elected anywhere and from any family ; others would confine the great office to the koreshite clan ; others (the Shiites) to the Prophet's own family and descendants. Absolutism and legitimacy go ill together ; wherever a hereditary line is accepted the very exigencies of the case and the dangers of change will be found to curtail actual prerogative. The caliph, besides, was pope and emperor in one ; and being too holy to interfere directly in affairs made a speedy delegation of his burdensome powers. After a few pontiffs of austere life and real influence and character a feudal epoch ensued under the Ommiads who have been, as we know, very differently judged. Meantime the Alid rift had begun—a schism which to the present hour divides the mussulman world. At the same time that the Carlings in France dispensed with the effete titular Merwings, the Abbasids began their long and unhappy rule ; ostensibly as reviving the true law of Islam but really as the tools of a faction, as the puppets of a nation which detested the Arabs. The armies of Khorasan, the arts and ability of noble persian houses, the colonels of the ' pretorians ', or foreign viceroys—these were the successive supports of a throne which could neither describe nor enforce its claims. Like the pagan and medieval empire in the west, Islam was *supranational.* While it left a substantial measure of autonomy to the provinces, it created an artificial centre in the person and residence of the caliph, who (like a chinese sovereign) was strictly accountable to God alone for his subjects' welfare. Unable to govern in person, this arabian family was yet (like the pope) regarded as the source of all authentic power. In both east and west an age of frank violence was yet an age when the credentials or charters of legitimacy were most carefully sought by the powerful. Hence almost from the moment of Harun's demise, the caliph became the legitimizer of any ruler who could make himself felt and dreaded. His purely nominal autocracy excited no jealousy, no constitutional protest ; the strong minister hoped to seize its real power for himself, the weak and oppressed among the people to the very end looked upon it as the last, if not the unique, resort of the unhappy. The very large franchises enjoyed by the Bagdad citizens and rich merchants are apparent in history, legend and folk-story : they gladly risked an occasional forfeiture or confiscation, and willingly purchased their liberties by a bribe to some minister or palace slave. The official element was however the natural enemy of the average man, like the *tchinovnik* in Russia ; it was known that the centre could not control its own delegates and men were content to wait for the day of vengeance when the fattened culprit was made to disgorge his spoils. Oriental despotism was nevertheless confined

at a hundred points by tradition and public opinion ; against any arbitrary or meddlesome interference the legal and passive resistance of the pious was as a rule forthcoming.

No real despotism ; no aristocracy ; no respect for official class ; no rank interested in 'liberty'.—The democratic basis of society gave to the lower classes the chances of an adventurous career which was far more to their taste than any formal franchise. But it cannot be denied that in the curiously complex and tangled system of Islam irresponsible power rose to heights quite unknown before. The caliph's vassals were absolute rulers in a new sense, however circumscribed his own direct influence became. As in India something of an accidental and illegal character adhered to all political authority, which no true muslim takes very seriously. Office does not ennoble in the public eye ; government is a necessary evil, and its timid and fitful pressure is not irksome enough to foment a democratic revolt. Meantime there is no recognized class of nobility, and wealth shifts among the equal units whose struggles form the life of the State. Popular franchise in our times has been won either by merchants wishing to limit their liabilities to the State or to know how their money is spent, or by idealist noblemen who fight for what they take to be justice for the people : the leader of a servile war is very rarely a slave. One class, an aristocracy, simply did not exist in Irak ; the other, the enterprising and opulent traders, was too discontinuous and broken into envious groups or households to take any concerted action. But all the time, in a measure as yet undreamt of in the west, ordinary life and private hopes were regulated by an independent and religious power, which from the first resented the secularism of the government. Hence liberty in essentials was won and retained under the ægis of tradition.

CHAPTER II. THE ANTINOMIAN SECTS AND SHIITE GROUPS

§-I. Scholastic and Scepticism

Sources of Muslim Indifferentism : the Sceptical Sects.—The effect of dogmatic conflict and political dispute was to bring to light in Islam a peculiar antinomian tendency, based partly on the old gnostic [1] indifferentism, partly on a new militant spirit of sectarian adventure, born of Islam's bandit side and encouraged by its worldly success. Within the church, the sect of *kadar* fought for human free-will against the strict predestinarians (*djabar*). The *moattil* refused all attributes to God and the party of *sifat* stoutly opposed this negative theology ; the *teschbi* (no doubt reviving an ancient gnostic belief) made God in the image of man, and the *hascha* carried this materialism to an extreme, regarding deity as a superman on a visible throne : the *aschar* united the libertarian views on *man* with a moderate belief in *divine* qualities. The rationalizing spirit of the liberal *motazilites* (like that of later protestantism) satisfied no one and was objectionable to both parties as a compromise which refused to meet either position fairly. Their naturalistic view of the origin of revelation at once offended the convinced *prophetism* of the orthodox, while the belief that reason is of itself adequate to lead to truth and salvation was plainly a challenge to Mahomet's claim. We see how the attempt of the *Pure Brethren* failed to secure its end or solve the scholastic problem (so-called), the reconcilement of a given *faith* with our *reason*. As to the *motakallemin* [2] it will here be enough to remind the reader of two special tenets of this school ; *atomism* and the *unique* and *immediate agency* of God in the physical world—a sort of ' occasionalist ' cartesian doctrine such as we find it in

[1] And even stoic : *omnia peccata paria*, which in Chrysippus' extreme paradoxes must produce an absolute chaos in the moral standard.

[2] Averroes translates θεόλογοι in Aristotle by the word, and constantly assimilates them to the school of *Motazel* (*Refut. Refutt.* iii.)

Sylvanus Regis or Malebranche. Meantime doubt was active ; the party of *oman* (regarded as unorthodox) rejected all knowledge derived from reflection and allowed nothing that could not be tasted and handled : that of *baten* believed (like the gnostics and Raymund Lull) in the mysterious efficacy of letters and numbers for the discovery of truth ;—lastly the party of *talim* (' papal ' as it might be called) founded all certainty on the authority of a single infallible man, the Imam. On the verge of muslim society, and in their more secret circles, hopelessly at variance with the creed of Islam, were to be found the offshoots of Shiism —Carmathites, Druzes, Fatimites, Ismailians, Assassins—in part sceptics in the more advanced stages of initiation, but in the lower ranks an army of fanatical bandits united for purely secular motives by an unlimited devotion to their leader.[1] It was currently reported among the orthodox that these sworn members admitted no normal rules of moral restraint, beyond the duty of submitting absolutely to the chief ; and that in the higher ranks, ' allow everything, believe nothing ', was the acknowledged axiom.[2] Others, denying everything for which the senses did not give proof, earned the name of *ahl el-tahkik* ' people of evidence ' : and with them were grouped the sects issuing from the school, or usurping the name, of *Bardaisan*—the one gnostic who founded a durable party. There were, too, the embers of the old school of Mazdak († *539* A.D.) who, during a brief triumph under a sassanid king, had left behind the repute of being both communists and antinomians. Besides, there were always the manichees, the sabians (often rightly suspected of anything but true sabian belief), and lastly the open idolaters. These sects were known under a collective term, *Zendik*, about which more must be said at a later time. Now it is quite clear that unless we appreciate

[1] Renan is right in pointing out in his *Averroes* the alliance of ' bigotry ' and unbelief, licence and religious zeal, the frankness of the free thinker ' with an adept's superstitions and a quietist's indifference ' ; but one may doubt the sweeping charge that such a sect concealed the most revolting immorality, the most extreme impiety under the disguise of initiation. Perhaps however it is better grounded in the case of muslim secret societies than in the case of the greek mysteries, the early Christian assemblies, the medieval pantheists, or the modern freemason of the continent : , but we have learnt to be on our guard against hasty censures of the esoteric and unknown.

[2] As in a modified form at Thelema or Medmenham Abbeys.

the feeling of the orthodox and respectable muslim with regard to these movements, we shall not be able to sympathize with the true motives of the suppression of the Albigenses or the destruction of the Templars.

§ II. Religious and Political Sects in Islam: Shiism

The Lineage and Divine Right of Ali: The Spiritual and Invisible Imamate.—When Ali was deposed in *658* like a pope by a General Council, the old *democratic* Arabs, holding to a purely elective and (in a sense) limited Caliphate, claimed the imamate for any duly elected arab muslim (kharijites). The Shiites were equally strong *legitimists* and to this party the Persians brought their tradition of *king-worship* as an effective influence: they believed, as a dogma, in absolute and personal monarchy by divine right. The rest of the faithful did not attribute superhuman powers to Mahomet's successors: but the Shiites thought that such powers as he held descended undiminished to Ali and his children, so that they could interpret God's will and foretell the future. The Imam as God's *living* mouthpiece was infallible; this belief led to a disparagement of the *written* word and many Shiites believed the Coran to have been created. Into the sober tenets of Islam strange theories crept. Abdullah ibn Saba prophesied under Othman (like any western parousiast) the speedy return of Mahomet and on the caliph's murder had preached Ali's actual divinity; when he in turn was killed Abdullah told his followers that Ali spoke and threatened in thunder and lightning.[1] Some Shiite leader, disowned by the extreme divinizing Alids, put forward the Abbasids, and Abu Moslim the Persian was the chief and captain of this very practical school. The Abbasids down to Motawakkil were lukewarm Shiites. The *Zaidites* (from Zaid a grandson of the 'Martyr' Hosein) also admit a compromise; though the imamate inheres in Ali and his children by Fatima, the appointment of another caliph might from time to time be justified; e.g. though Ali had the better title, Abubekr and Omar are acknowledged. Of these Zaidites one family held Tabaristan (*864* to *928* A.D.) another, rising to power at the close of cent. ix in Yemen have remained there for 1000 years. The *Ismailites* follow Ismail, son

[1] Even to-day the Ali-Allahi sect in Persia hold Ali to be a divine incarnation.

of the sixth Alid Imam, disinherited by his father for drinking wine : the sceptical Abdullah ibn Mamun took him as his ideal leader. Hence arose the *Carmathian* sect which reverted to the first predatory policy of Mahomet ' the exile and outlaw ' ; whose interesting records belong rather to history than to dogma.

Present Condition of Shiism in Persia.—All Shiites transfer to the person of Ali the inordinate respect paid by orthodox Sunnism to the uncreated Coran ; they add to the orthodox profession of faith, ' and Ali is God's vicegerent ' (*wali*). Religion is for them loyalty to a *person* not obedience to abstract *law*. As in later Avesta tradition, ritual purity (instead of courage, honesty and almsgiving) becomes the chief duty of the *persian* muslim. While the prayers are the same, there is no obligation to attend public worship ; for there is no qualified Imam to lead the service ; and in Persia to-day the Shah is only the temporary substitute for *secular* matters. The Shiites pay great reverence to Ali's supposed descendants and honour their graves ; they have instituted festivals and passion-plays in memory of Hosein's death in *680*. From their training issues a kind of sacerdotal civil service, the *mollahs* ; after a course at the *madrasa* the learned student goes to some village as notary and local judge in petty matters. In larger towns, there is a college of such students under a presiding *sheikh ul Islam*. Presidents of mosks in some cases bear the title *mujtahid*. Divines are selected by consent of the whole people (laity included) and empowered on their own judgment to form binding decisions, in the absence of the infallible Imam. The familiar Sunnite terms, *cadi* and *mufti* are differently used ; the one is an inferior judge acting under a *Sheikh ul Islam*, the other a trained legist or solicitor preparing cases for the court. At Ispahan, the president and the chief monk *imam juma* is regarded by the people as representing the invisible Alid Imam who is the true Head of the Church. Shah Abbas (*1586–1628*) abolished a supreme Pontiff in Persia as Peter the Great the patriarch of the church in Russia a century later : Shah Sufi his successor (+*1641*) put the office in commission : even this form of a supreme office was abolished under the new conquering dynasty of Nadir Shah in 1736.

§ III. Communistic Chiliasm: Incarnationism and Denial of Morality

Devotion to Alids a pretext: appeals to the Discontented Classes.—The Shiite devotion to the murdered Ali was a curiously tardy and posthumous piety. At the time of his death (*661*) the muslim world generally was indifferent to his murder, his tomb and his memory. The reaction was late and depended by no means on the orthodox beliefs or influences of Islam: rather upon an *incarnationist* revival, for which the name of an unhappy and persecuted ruler formed a ground of appeal and a rallying-cry. Caliph Mamun (*813–833*) was strongly shiite in proclivity and designed to leave a scion of that house as his successor.[1] The sect held that, after Mahomet, Ali was chief of mankind; that the true and spiritual leadership of the faithful was vested in some invisible member of his house, in opposition to the secular ruler of the usurping abbasids; that this guide in direct descent and in virtue of hereditary right was to be called the Mahdi; that his divine reason had formed the universe and that deity was immanent in this person, whose teachings, having absolute validity, must supersede the letter of the Coran; that scripture should be interpreted by allegory and an immediate return of a visible deity was to be soon expected. In this sectarian doctrine we can trace all the familiar features of later *communistic chiliasm* in the west; the same rejection of the existing church and its rulers, belief in a new interpreter of the divine will, appeal to the discontented classes, promises of speedy adjustment of wrongs and of a final triumph over enemies. Soon after *810* A.D. there arose the sect of Babek, which, becoming the focus of all men with a grievance, united religious zeal with contempt for convention and normal morality. His band was trained in the profession of thieves and assassins, and (as is always the case with secret associations) his followers were held guilty of incest and other nameless crimes, by which they were thought to pour scorn on social conditions. Kindi (*Apol.* § 46) tells us that they were the curse of the empire; only under Caliph Motasem (*837*) were Babek's strongholds seized and the chief ringleaders put to death. This 'civil war' is said to have cost over a million

[1] The Shiites however execrate this caliph's memory, for he is believed to have poisoned his son-in-law.

lives and one of his executioners boasted that he had accounted for the death of 20,000 insurgents. In the Caucasus there arose the sect of the *Sefidd-shamegar* whose veiled prophet wore a golden mask and taught that the Deity assumed human form in heaven when he bade the angels adore the Primal Man ; that this divine nature was incarnate in a long series of prophets of which he, Hakin ben Haschem, was the last ; and that after death the good souls would be received into the deity while the bad would migrate into beasts.[1] On the banners of the insurgents in the Carmathian revolt *924–928* was inscribed the *Sura* text 'the meek shall inherit the earth'. The general aims and ideals of the sect were those of the anabaptists or the semi-religious fanatics of the Revolution in France : it was reserved for the Ismailians to realize them on a throne, for the Assassins, in a brigand encampment.

The 'Grand Lodge' of Cairo and its offshoots under the Fatimites. —A mahdi from the sacred house of Ali : Such was the rallying cry of the able *condottieri* who detached Egypt from the caliphate of Bagdad. Mahomet, son of Ismail, 7th in descent from Ali and so from Fatima the prophet's daughter, was declared to hold these unique rights. Obeidallah was summoned to be the rival caliph, and the schism was created which to-day divides, and still at intervals agitates, the muslim world. Of this system both the Druzes and the Assassins were offshoots. It was said that the Grand Lodge at Cairo dispensed nine degrees of initiation according to the zeal and proficiency of the candidate ; the aim being to secure unfaltering obedience to the command of superiors, as in the Christian military orders or the later Jesuits. In the early stages, doubts were instilled and the literal sense of the Coran shown to be absurd ; hints and promises were given that under the forbidding husk lurked a pleasant fruit. Absolute trust in the personal guide or spiritual director was enjoined : also a profound homage to the Imam as the source of inspired knowledge.[2] In the sixth degree the dogmas of religion were shown to be subordinate to the rules of 'philosophy', that

[1] Here the connexion with the syrian Incarnationism of the Clementine writings is very clear : of this we shall speak at length in a later section.

[2] The Fatimite Caliphs were however but tools in the hands of the military banditti who used their titles and prestige for their own purpose, as will presently appear.

strange amalgam of greek and chaldean elements which we shall hereafter describe. After this a mystical pantheism was taught, and the welcome news that 'all things were lawful' as well as expedient. The fatimite throne was thus surrounded by a counterpart of the turkish guard at Bagdad—sworn soldiers who knew no restraint of ordinary morals or private honour, devoted only to the advance of their order. However popular rumour might exaggerate these systems of anarchic nihilism, it is clear that some ground remained for a universal belief that in the Lodge all truth, justice and humanity were denied and derided.

The Assassins.—From the Lodge of Cairo missioners were sent forth to preach a gospel of adventure and freedom, strangely coupled with the duty of implicit obedience to command; Hassan Saba was expelled on this plea by enemies at court jealous of his predominant influence. Making converts throughout Persia he seized on the fortress of Alamut in Deilem, where he founded the band of Assassins, first as a dutiful lieutenant of Cairo but soon as an independent bandit-chief of the type of Babek. He slightly modified the degrees of initiation; but his antinomian tendency was the same, and the cloke of Islam only concealed the genuine aims of the sect from the lower ranks and servitors. Here once again the most absolute devotion to command was required and many instances are given of suicide at the master's word. An earthly paradise was, it is said, created where the drugged neophyte was allowed for a brief space to enjoy those pleasures which were promised for all eternity to those who were 'faithful unto death'. Hassan while sending his envoys forth to murder caliphs and Christian princes[1] spent

[1] Conrad of Montferrat was a noble victim, on the instigation (it was idly believed) of Richard I of England—who was also said to have attempted the life of Philip Augustus by the same means; the pope when excommunicating Frederic II accused him of murdering the Duke of Bavaria by the use of the same tools; Frederic II in his turn charged the Duke of Austria with hiring Assassins to kill him: nearly a century before, an Arab was discovered during the siege of Milan (1158) on the point of stabbing Frederic I (his grandfather). From these charges it will readily be understood how genuine was the uncritical panic in the vulgar mind, stirred by all secret societies. Nor must it be forgotten that grades of initiation and divisions into *aspirants* and *disciples*, or *hearers* and the *perfect*, always seemed to betoken an attack upon morals and even society itself. So have the Order of Jesuits suffered in fame and won a disrepute born, it

his time in religious exercises and in writing treatises on disputed points in theology. A curious feature of the sect of Assassins was the parricide which seemed inseparable from the chief dignity ; either a son killed his father or the father killed the son : both were always preparing for extreme measures of defence or retaliation. Although the descendants of Busurg continued to rule, it would seem that the founder had no design of establishing a dynasty but rather a democratic sect to be ruled absolutely by the most capable commander. The mongol inroad under Hulagu finally put an end to the order and to a real peril to society both in east and west. Fragments of the order are said to exist still in the Lebanon where they no doubt fused with the kindred Druzes, also in Persia ; there is a colony at Zanzibar.

APPENDIX B

The Carmathians : an Independent Rebel State

Tenets of the Sect : grades of Enlightenment.—The dreaded Carmathian sect arose from the adroit sceptical propaganda of a certain Abdallah in Irak, a land which never accepted Islam with a whole heart. This itinerant teacher wished to undermine the arabian power and strictness of faith and practice. He started secret societies with various 'freemasonic' grades, ranks and stages of initiation, rejecting the primitive creed and morals of Islam in favour of unquestioning obedience to the head or general of the order. Qarmat, the Hamdanite, borrowed this ideal from Hosein an envoy of Abdallah's son Ahmed (*c. 900* A.D.). Their followers are Shiites and further Ismailites : as Ismail was infallible, his action only showed that the veto upon wine was futile. From the creation there had been an *imam*, but often unknown ; a new one was expected, meantime his envoys (*dais*) might teach his doctrines. Hamdan professing allegiance to Ahmed, really took the chief place. There were seven, afterwards nine, stages or degrees for the proficient : in the *first* he was taught that the problems and mysteries of the Coran needed a teacher to solve them ; he submitted his private judgment and paid an entrance-fee : in the *second* the earlier teachers were shown to be at fault and the Imams alone infallible : in the *third*, he was taught to accept only seven Imams and to reject the other Shiite sects : in the *fourth*, he learnt that each Imam had a prophet, Abdallah ibn Mamun being the interpreter of the last : in the *fifth*, tradition was rejected as useless, the precept and practice of Mahomet being a temporary accommodation and not binding on his more clear-sighted successors ; in the *sixth* the adept might abandon

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must be confessed, from their imitation of these autocratic militant societies —to which in our period the Templar was held to approximate most nearly.

all the rules of an orderly muslim life—prayer, fasting, pilgrimage : the *seventh*, and afterwards the *eighth* and *ninth* degrees disclosed still further the entire ' indifference ' of belief and conduct, the whole fabric of Islam being already overthrown.

Political Fortunes : Bahrein an independent State to *1081*.—The Carmathian rising took place at the same time as a dangerous mutiny of the negro slaves in Basra under Caliph Motamid (*869–883*). It was almost an accident that the two rebellions did not unite. Under Caliph Motadid, Abu Said al Jannabi founded a State in the north-east of Arabia ; Bahrein, with its capital at Laksa, could threaten the pilgrim caravans to the sacred cities as well as the wealthy trade routes of Basra. In *900* he routed the caliph's army and warned him to let the Carmathians alone. Their history as a separate State now begins and continues until *1050*. Meantime, the chief director or ' general ' of the sect, feeling himself unsafe at Salamia in Syria, fled to the far west of N. Africa (Tafilat) whence in *910* he appeared at Kairouan as the Mahdi and became first caliph of the Fatimites.[1] Under Caliph Moktafi (*902–910*) the syrian branch of the sect routed the troops of Egypt and subdued Damascus. After a signal defeat by the caliph in person, they took a terrible vengeance in the massacre of 20,000 pilgrims returning from Mecca : at last their leader Zikruya was taken and slain. In Bahrein, Jannabi's son Abu Tahir sacked Basra in *923* and in succeeding years plundered the sacred caravans as above related : the Black Stone was restored at the express wish of the Imam who by that time had become fatimite caliph. Under Moti (*946–974*) the Fatimites and Carmathians broke their alliance and the sectaries joined Bagdad ; the caliph accepted their offer of troops but refused to make over to them the government of Egypt and Syria, saying that both parties were heretics, *Carmathians*, and enemies of Islam. The two rivals came to terms again in *979–980* but, decimated by their losses in war, the Carmathians dwindled until *1050*, becoming extinct as a sect in *1081*. Although their independent State disappeared from Arabia, this doctrine in a modified form survived in Egypt and in an intensified form was handed on to the Assassins in Persia and Syria : some survival of the sect is said to be found in Zanzibar, and in parts of India, Syria, Persia, and even in Arabia.

APPENDIX C

The Fatimite Caliphate : A Rival and Schismatic Dynasty

Ambiguous Origins and indebtedness to lieutenants.—The *Fatimites* are the *right* wing of a revolutionary movement sobered by success and responsibility, of which the Assassins are the extreme *left*, the Carmathians the middle party. Their connexion with this latter sect is obscure. The descent of the fatimite family from Ismail was not doubted until their ambitions became a menace to the abbasid house : attempts were then

[1] De Goeje's *Mémoire sur les C. de Bahrein et les F.* Leiden, 1886.

made to prove the falsity of their claim and to associate them with rebels and sectarians.[1] The Fatimites as a sect must not be identified with Assassins, Carmathians, or Druzes ; there is no ground for belief that they held the doctrine of ethical *indifference*, gave leave for wine and licentious habits, or entertained community of wives and property. Though often confused with the extreme sectaries, the Anabaptists of Islam, they seem to differ from orthodox muslim in small details rather than in moral practice or profound dogma. But they certainly carried veneration of a *personal* ruler beyond the usual limits of loyalty, and, like their Christian analogues, held a kind of chiliasm and admitted converts with secret and awe-inspiring rites of initiation. Maqrizi attributes to the Fatimites the same gentle and gradual method of instilling doubts, enhancing the prestige of teachers and at last demanding an implicit obedience : in the end a *natural* religion (or phase of Deism) was said to replace any *revealed* faith or definite creed. Their views thus form a counterpart to the Jains in the east and (on a somewhat different level) to the Templars in the west : reverence for persons takes the place of respect for tradition or private judgment : the atmosphere is that of a camp where orders are issued by an autocrat and must be obeyed without demur. The existence and success of these sects are strong evidence of the dislike of people at large for a system and dogma which have not grown up spontaneously in their midst ; and of their delight in an absolute personal ruler who sweeps away custom and restriction and deals out summary justice.

Sometimes the founder of the fatimite line was said to have been a Jew. About the year *890* Obeidallah the leader of the Ismailite-Assassins lived at Syrian Salamia (as stated above) and spread his envoys and agents everywhere. One Abu Abdallah al Shii was sent into Arabia on a secret mission and became chief of the Berber tribe Kutama, being able to resist the Aglabite ruler of Kairouan. He then wrote to his master asking him to come forth from his hiding-place and take command ; Obeidallah made good his escape and reached Tripoli. Abu had prepared the way by promising to reveal the Mahdi to his tribesmen. But in *905* he was arrested at Tafilat, on the caliph's orders, by the Aglabite prince Ziyadatallah and, in spite of his lieutenants' successes, lay a prisoner for 4 years. Abu expelled the Aglabites from their capitals Raqqada and Kairouan ; new coins (without a name) were struck, a governor sent to the provinces, and Shiite ritual introduced into public worship. Obeidallah the Mahdi

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[1] The buyid regent in Bagdad, Adod Addaula (*c. 980*), though himself disposed to favour the Alids, caused the fatimite claim to be publicly refuted.

[2] His original home in Kairouan was given to a native dynasty, the Zeirids, and fatimite suzerainty was in 988 restricted to coinage, public prayers and tribute, with the natural centrifugal tendency of all muslim provinces. The fourth native vassal Moses paid homage to Bagdad and was punished for his defection (1051) but no real power was exerted from Cairo and a number of small princedoms sprang up, until Roger II of Sicily ended the Zeirid line in 1148. (Cf. p. 356.)

was now set at liberty and the kingdom of his captor overthrown. It was of course said by the abbasid partizans that he had long ago been slain and that the pretended Mahdi was a jewish captive. Whoever he was he at once assumed full rights as caliph ; and (like the Abbasids) rid himself in *911* of his too powerful patron al-Shii. Did this ungrateful act forfeit the support of the Carmathians who now figure as independent ? Obeidallah died in *933* : and was followed by his son Qaim who left the throne to Ismail Mansur in *945* : he, dying in *952*, left a son aged 22 years, Abu Tamim, who took the name of Moses (Moizz lidin Allah). The Fatimite realm now comprised Algiers, Tunis, Morocco and Sicily ; Spain was next to be attacked, and in *972* the eminent and able Vizier Jauhar could at last invite his master Moizz to reside at Cairo as lord of Egypt. Once more a muslim dynasty is set up by foreign aid : Jauhar is variously represented as slav, greek, roman-byzantine, and sicilian ; he entered Fostat in *969* : the Ikshidite dynasty came to an end—a Turkish house from Ferghana, which had ruled Egypt for 34 years : its founder had been on friendly terms with the Fatimites and once proposed to substitute the fatimite caliphs in public prayers. Cairo was speedily built by the industrious regent Jauhar. The Carmathians as we have seen, joined the Abbasids, took Damascus and laid siege (*971*) to Cairo, being dispersed only by timely bribes and a sudden sortie. Aziz Billah (2) ruled from *976–996*, and was followed by Abu Ali-al-Mansur or Hakim (3) : in his minority a *slavonic* vizier Burjwan administered the government who preferred to employ Turks rather than native maghrib Bedouins from north-central Africa. (Note 2 on p. 355.)

Hakim as Incarnate Deity : his unhappy successors.—Hakim is for our present purpose by far the most interesting figure among the Fatimite caliphs. He killed his tutor and reigned alone from the age of 15. Like his turkish predecessors in the government he made stringent sumptuary laws : the first *Ikshid* (*935* A.D.) had obliged his soldiers to dye their hair. Hakim resembled Caligula in his peculiar caprices and entertained a scheme for the forcible conversion of all Jews and Christians in his kingdom : he destroyed the church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (*1010*). Though he could not dispense with Christian servants in posts of trust, he ordered all churches to be destroyed throughout the land of Egypt. In *1020* his new claims as *incarnate Deity* obliged him to conciliate these non-juring subjects and restore to them their churches and the free exercise of their religion—as a counterpoise to the resentment of the orthodox muslim whom his blasphemous heresy had completely estranged. He disappeared in *1021*, assassinated (it is said) by his own family. The remaining fatimite rulers may be briefly dismissed : his son Al-Zahir (4) *1021–1037*, Mostansir (5) *1037–1094*, whose mother a negress increased the black troops as a check upon the Berber Maghribs and to the Turks who had been called in to control them. In *1044* a Jew became vizier, Abu Sad who had owned the queen-mother before her elevation ; he was killed by another Jew Zedekiah whom he had raised to office. In *1055* owing to the feuds at Bagdad Mostansir's name was actually mentioned in the prayers at the abbasid capital ; but Togrul Beg the Seljuk restored the rights of the

orthodox rulers. In *1068* his palace was plundered, his library burnt and himself reduced to poverty by Nazir the turkish general of the Abbasids. Against these invaders he called in an Armenian, Badr al Jamali, who expelled his rivals and received sole authority in the State ; Damascus however was lost to the Fatimites. Egypt was covered with pretenders, and Syria was overrun under the orders of the Seljuk Malik Shah.

Foreign Regents and Oppressors of the Caliphate.—In this reign the Assassins rose to prominence, supporting the claims of the *eldest* against the *youngest* son of the caliph ; the armenian vizier al Afdal, son of Badr, placed the latter on the throne after a short civil war, and after Mostali's(6) seven years' reign, his infant son, Amir, who for 20 years was under the tutelage of Afdal till the too powerful vizier was murdered (*1121*) in a street of Cairo, perhaps with the caliph's connivance. In *1125* Amir (7) decided to rule alone and, becoming his own premier, employed only minor officials as secretaries, one being a Samaritan the other a Christian. Cruel, grasping and incompetent he was killed by the Assassins who still regarded the claims of the elder line of Nizar as indefeasible (*1129*). A cousin Hafiz (8) aged nearly 60, was kept in prison for over a year by his presumptuous vizier, Afdal's son, whom the army had replaced in the chief post ; the titular caliph was only set free on his murder in *1131*. This unfortunate prince was the mere spoil of victory for a number of pretenders to the absolute office of First Minister, one being his own son whom he contrived to poison in *1135*. His son Zafir (9) succeeded him at the age of 17 ; he was murdered by his vizier Abbas—for whom he intended a similar fate. The brothers of Zafir were also put to death and his infant son Faiz (10) was made caliph at the age of 5 ; he was of weak mind owing to ill-treatment during the massacre which inaugurated his reign. Under him a prefect named Talai came to the capital and expelled the vizier Abbas, and on Faiz' death in *1160* continued his absolute power in the name of another infant Adid (11) who succeeded to the miserable and splendid dignity at the age of 9. Though Talai was killed in *1160* with the complicity of the caliph, his son Ruzzik succeeded to the post of First Minister, until another prefect, Shawar of Upper Egypt, came to Cairo and beheaded him in *1163*, only to yield in turn to another adventurer, Dirgham, a lieutenant in the guard. Shawar fled to Nureddin at Damascus ; kurd troops were sent by the northern sultan and Dirgham killed. Then the Syrians claimed the regency and overcame the vizier's alliance with the frankish king of Jerusalem at Babain in *1167*. Shirguh the kurdish general was now summoned by the caliph who appointed him vizier and sanctioned with relief the execution of Shawar. On Shirguh's (natural) death in *1169* Adid appointed Saladin vizier. On the orders of Nureddin, a strict sunnite, he weakened the power and prestige of the fatimite caliph and at last attempted to replace the Abbasid in the public prayers (*1171*). No disturbance ensued, the people heard with complete indifference and before the experiment could be repeated the last of a feeble line sank unnoticed into the grave (Sept. 20, *1171*) at the age of 21.

Typical instance of Muslim Bandit-State : its vivid contrasts of splendour and insecurity.—The fatimite dominion in Egypt was a veritable night-

mare of government. Its wealth was enormous. The caliphs lived in pontifical seclusion behind the walls of the cairene citadel in the guarded city, taking no part in a government which they wholly abandoned to their ministers. Sacks of emeralds, crystal cups, thousands of silver goblets, works of art and priceless embroidery were seen there: princesses left behind fabulous fortunes and intrigued in affairs of state. The viziers were for the most part grasping time-servers, eager only to make money; the troops first berber, then turki, lastly negroes from the Soudan terrorized both their masters and the populace. Yet it is clear that the evils of this 'despotism in commission' were confined to a very narrow circle. Great industrial activity prevailed, the manufacture of glass and pottery, of woollens and silk, were brought to high perfection. The arts of painting and sculpture were encouraged, for the shiite sect did not object to the drawing of human figures, since in such a form Deity was from time to time incarnate. In the new fiscal arrangements the people as a whole had little ground of complaint: the revenue was no longer leased out to exacting publicans and the tax-gatherers insisted on prompt, but not excessive, payments. A Jew, Ibn Killis, was given high office in this department and a Copt was made president of the customs. No personal virtues on the part of the sovereign upheld the dynasty for two centuries: after Moizz, Aziz his son, father of Hakim († *996*) was the only ruler of energy and firmness: he was a vigorous hunter, with red hair and blue eyes, who married a Christian wife and showed toleration to her people. Amongst his personal friends and advisers were the coptic patriarchs and Severus, bishop of the Ashmamein; he allowed the rebuilding of coptic churches; he enforced justice and repressed corrupt officials, giving them fixed salaries in place of indefinite gratuities extorted from the subject-class. The madness of Hakim, though it started a sect which exists to this very hour, was the ruin of the fatimite house. He went in disguise through the streets to spy upon his subjects. He maintained besides a very perfect system of police which kept him so well informed that he won the fame of omniscience. He set fire to Cairo that like Nero he might enjoy the spectacle; he tortured Jews and Christians (hitherto left in peace) until they abjured their religion: he then gave them leave to profess it. He turned night into day and ordered at one time that all trading, traffic and public business should take place after sunset. Women were closely confined to their homes, and might not appear on the flat roofs to take the air in the cool evening; shoemakers were forbidden to make them shoes for outdoor wear: for seven years no woman was seen in the streets of Cairo. The use of wine was strictly forbidden and vines were cut down; even the innocent raisins were confiscated and honey was poured into the Nile to prevent its use in fermenting liquors. Games and amusements were prohibited and dogs killed by the urban police at sight. Christians and Jews (though still employed in high offices) were forced to carry humiliating badges. In the usual eastern fashion, justice took the form of waiting until corrupt officials were fully gorged with the spoils of iniquity; they were then killed by various refined methods and a special state-department was created to manage their forfeited estates. The wrath felt by orthodox

muslim at his new creed, Hakim withstood by means of his sudanese negroes ; but Berbers and Turks joined the populace against them. Under his successors Zahir and Mostansir (*1021–1094*) the real power lay with the guards and their officers : the art of government lay solely in satisfying their demands. Notwithstanding, a traveller, Nazir-i-Khosrau, has handed down a picture of a prosperous society in *1046*, a welcome interlude of peace perhaps, in the midst of famines, slave-wars, palace intrigues and camp mutinies. From *1066–1072* a seven years' scarcity prevailed, during which human flesh was exposed for sale. Great officials were reduced to absolute want and took posts as servitors in the public baths. The Caliph Mostansir sat on a mat in an empty palace which his own guards had plundered (*1068*) ; the daughter of a scholar made him a daily dole of two loaves of bread. Once again, Islam, without recuperative powers of its own, depended on alien succour. The armenian regency lasted for nearly 50 years (*1073–1121*) and restored the fortunes of Egypt : the father killed the turki officers, restored order and rebuilt the walls of Cairo ; the son like a frankish Mayor, felt himself strong enough to rule alone ; the coinage and public prayer were conducted in the name of the expected Mahdi, the Hidden Imam, Muntazir, whose advent was promised just as that of Obeidallah had been at the beginning of the fatimite dynasty. Though caliph Hafiz in a brief moment of autocratic energy killed his armenian master, he was still compelled to choose his viziers from the same race. The armenian settlement in Egypt was highly favoured : Copts held all posts as clerks in the bureaus ; Christian monasteries were sanctioned and protected under charter, sometimes even visited by the caliph in person. Russik, vizier from *1154*, was a great patron of architecture—an art to which the fatimite epoch was extremely favourable. The most violent contrasts are thus seen in this alid dynasty ; colossal riches and incredible want ; uncontrolled power over the life, the estates and (what is more remarkable in the east) even the customs of the subject-class, alternating with contempt and ill-treatment, assassination or long exclusion of the sovereign from any sort of influence on politics. Strangely enough there was no safeguard for public order in a genuine religious devotion; the better classes were of alien faith and race and the populace had no real sympathy with fatimite claims. Nor had the caliphs themselves any profound conviction or belief in their rights. Their patronage and toleration of other creeds was only interrupted by spasmodic bigotry and purposeless violence. The ' incarnate deity ' received on that account no further guarantee of reverence or safety ; and the only relic of the dynasty is the peculiar heresy of the Druze communities in the Lebanon.

APPENDIX D

The Druzes

The strange and fantastic tyranny of Hakim settled down into a religious monomania : he believed first that he held direct intercourse with God, and at last, that the divine reason was incarnate in him. As early

as *1016* this claim was publicly announced in a mosk at Cairo and Ismail *Darazi* (whence the name *Druze, not* from Comte de *Dreux*) bore witness to its truth. Darazi encountered a furious opposition and fled to the Lebanon carrying with him a zealous and proselytizing spirit: a great conversion took place in this region to the new chiliastic belief in *1019*. The mad caliph meantime found a more effective apostle in a feltmaker, Hamza ibn Ali, a persian mystic and therefore in secret a bitter foe of Islam. Created vizier by Hakim, he adapted the new faith adroitly to the prejudice of the various sects and creeds (*1017–20*). Hamza gave out after the caliph's murder that he had only withdrawn for a season and would return in triumph. The unhappy Darazi was branded by Hamza as a heretic; and a school of convinced evangelists was sent forth, among whom Moktana Bahr was well known from Byzantium to the confines of India. He carried the deifying process one step further and approached the emperors Constantine IX (*1025–1028*) and Michael IV (*1034–41*) with the tidings that the Christian Messiah was reincarnate in Hamza! It seems clear that the seed of the new gospel (fed upon the syncretism of a new alexandrian age) met with congenial soil for its growth. Incarnation of the deity (a common hindu belief) was found (albeit in disguise) in the *Clementines*—writings which (as we shall see) contain a compromise between pagan thought and Christian belief. There are among the Druzes traces of the theology of a 'common west-Asiatic stock'; the Maronites, the Ansarieh or Nozairi, and the Metawali have sympathetic features. The Alid message therefore received a precise outline in the teaching of Darazi and Hamza and met eager listeners amongst a people who had never given a genuine welcome either to the Gospel or to Islam. This seems clear from a very slight acquaintance with the Lebanon, its natural features, past history and present inhabitants. The Druzes appear to be a mixed race of refugees, in which the *arab* element now predominates over the *aramœan*—a very primitive semitic stock in which 'Incarnationist tendencies' (so D. G. Hogarth) were strong. They became a distinct and united people under Khalid ibn Halid (*c. 860*), recruited later by turkman and kurdish factors. Somewhat later Mount Hermon received 15,000 arab colonists from Hira and Yemen: the name *Druze* is first found in Benjamin of Tudela (*1170*). At their first appearance on the scene, the Druzes are found in village communities of clans ruled by sheiks, at times united under one or more emirs. During the first Crusades the Arslan family held the chief place, but at the close the *Inuks*, one of whom was defeated by a Memluk sultan of Egypt who forced on the Druzes outward conformity to the Sunni rite at the end of our period (*1300*). Afterwards a new immigrant family from northern Arabia—the *Maan*—took the lead and gained the emirate by adroit alliance with the Ottomans in *1517*. Since the privileged province of Lebanon was set up in *1861*, the Druzes have collected in their old home, the Hauran, east of the Jordan. There are two other centres in Shuf and in Homs, by Anti-Lebanon and Hermon. But in these districts the Druzes are far outnumbered and their peculiar features are seen in their integrity in Hauran alone.

The religion of the Druzes is an esoteric creed superimposed upon a

primitive worship of Nature, of which traces remain in the east of Hauran. The educated Druzes are, like the muslim, strict unitarians (with a negative theology). God makes himself known to man by a series of *avatars* or embodiments—not of His essence but of His Spirit. The sixth fatimite Caliph Hakim was the last of these divine embodiments, but in all there are seventy to correspond with an equal number of world-epochs. From this list Mahomet is excluded though Christ finds a place : in Mahomet's age the ' Universal Reason ' was made flesh in Mikdad al-Aswad. Hakim made a final appeal to mankind ; when evil and misery have increased to the predestined height he will again appear, to conquer the world and to make his religion supreme. The ' chinese ' Druzes (a fabulous body) will then join those of Hauran and fix the capital of the new world-faith in Mecca and Jerusalem. God then is Himself unseen, passionless, ineffable, not to be defined : Universal Reason (the λόγος of Philo) is first of His creatures and creator of all the rest : he alone has direct communion with God. He became flesh in Hamza the vizier. Supporting the Throne are 4 spirits ; Soul, Word, Right and Left Wing (also embodied in Hakim's age in 4 men) : beneath are angels of various degrees. Our visible world emanates from the Divine Intelligence and is its mirror. The number of souls is strictly limited, and there can be neither increase nor decrease in the sum of spirit life—only metamorphosis. In a regular process of transmigration the good pass into even higher births, the bad into animals, for instance, the camel or dog. All earlier religions prepare the way for the one true faith and their dogmatic utterances must be explained by allegory : Gospel and Coran are inspired books, but must not be taken for final religious guides.

The Druze community [1] no longer accepts converts, and it allows its members, like Valentine's gnostics and mystics of Persia, to conceal their faith in hours of danger and to adopt the religious practice of their neighbours. The body of the faithful observes Hamoza's sevenfold commandment : to be truthful (to Druzes, not to the rest of the unconverted world) ; to be watchful over the welfare of the brethren ; to abjure all other religions (except for safety's sake) ; to separate from the company of all in error ; to recognize the unity of the Lord in all ages (in His varied embodiments) ; to be resigned to His will, and to obey His orders. They do not pray, for they would not interfere with God's counsels ; but as against muslim fatalism they hold strongly to human free-will. Wisdom and the esoteric faith is entrusted only to the Akils or ' intelligent ', a small number : the rest (even those of high standing and influence) are called the ' ignorant ' (*Jahels*). To the former rank of adepts belong over ten per cent. of the total body, men and women being admitted on equal terms after a year of strict probation. As amongst the paulicians and cathars, in this higher division there is no further distinction of rank and no supreme official :

[1] The name of the community might possibly come from arabic *darasa* (readers of the book) or *darisa* (possessors of the truth) ; durs also = clever or adept : most students however connect with Darazi, Hakim's first apostle in the Hauran.

the emir used to appoint a nominal head or sheik, but he was without any real power. The ' converted ' or professed abstain from wine and tobacco : the women, like the Quakers until recent times, did not wear gold, silver, or embroidery ; and though by no means enforced, celibacy and a life of ascetic retirement are held in high honour. They wear a white turban and eat special food reserved for them by the hospitable Jahels. The ' sabbath ' of the community is on Thursday, the assembly being held in *khalwas*, plain and undecorated rooms ; to these (as in muslim mosks) revenues are attached for the relief of the poor and the entertainment of visitors. A transparent black veil divides women and men : strangers (oddly enough) are readily made welcome even when the Akils are present, but in this case the Coran is read and not their own genuine scriptures. Of such a secret cult strange rumours are certain to spread, as against the early Christian assemblies : there seems to be no truth in them. But in eastern Hauran there are primitive hill-top shrines, stones covered by rug or curtain, as the Caaba before (and after) Mahomet's monotheism : animals (e.g. goats) are sacrificed, perhaps to a spirit of evil whose power is disregarded by the more enlightened members : (the Ansarieh in Cilicia are said to *worship*, not to *sacrifice*, a dog). It is believed that a calf (representing Darazi ? is kept in a niche); traces of a phallic cult and of Left-hand Tantra worship are also alleged. Though no certain proof of these latter cults is forthcoming it cannot be forgotten that in this region were great centres of the female-religion of the Great Mother : in her rites nothing profane or indecent was of necessity present. Polygamy is forbidden, and women enjoy respect and influence, being equal in all religious services, though closely veiled. Divorce is easy and the wife, if aggrieved or discontented, can proceed against the husband. The clans have family burying-vaults, which are walled up after each interment ; but the Akils are interred with face towards Mecca, within their own houses.[1]

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[1] Guys wrote 1863 on the *Théogonie des Druses* and 1864 *La Nation Druse :* before him de Sacy in 1838 an *Exposé de la religion des Druses*. Cf. Wolff *Die Drusen* etc. 1842, Chasseaud's *Dr. of Lebanon* 1855, Ray's *Voyage dans la Haouran en* 1857, 1858. Of english writers Churchill's voluminous *Ten Years in Lebanon* (3 vols 1853) and *History under Turkish Rule* (1862), must be named. The latest notices are in Oppenheim's *Vom Mittelmeer* 1899 and Gertrude Bell's *The Desert and the Sower* (1907). But the *Book of Witness to the Mysteries of Unity* (70 treatises brought in 1700 to Louis XIV from the house of the chief Akil) still lacks a competent editor : Druze MSS. are by no means uncommon, being found in the Vatican, at Oxford, Leiden, Vienna, Upsala and Munich ; but the sources of Druze theology have been strangely neglected by oriental scholars and divines. Yet their peculiar views form perhaps (with Sabian doctrine) the unique link between modern and primitive religion, as will appear in the sequel.

APPENDIX E

Maronites and Nosairi

(i) The Maronites (now a Christian people under increasing papal influence) number 500,000. Under Justinian II the Christians of the Lebanon were certainly not orthodox and ranged themselves against the Melkites though they had assisted the emperor against the muslim (*690*) ; they were Mardaites and he removed them into the Balkans by agreement with the caliph. In cent. xii and even later they were monothelites (Will. of Tyre and Bar-hebræus). Probably monothelite Christians from Antioch after the ban of Conc. Constantinopol. in *680* under Constantine IV, fled to this fastness, discovering and fraternizing with a very primitive people in the mountains who already professed a form of theanthropic religion. In *1182* some of these settlers and natives were induced by the *Roman* patriarch of Antioch to submit to Rome ; at the Conc. Florent. *1445* the Maronites were formally received into the papal fold : the inferior clergy and the mass of the people objected strongly and stubbornly to the union. Only in *1736* did their church accept a compromise with Rome, giving up mixed convents but retaining a syriac liturgy and a married priesthood. But the papal legate at Beyrut exerts daily more influence on government and politics and the tendency to encourage a celibate clergy increases with greater conformity to Rome. This community has given up its tribal system under feudal chiefs and the blood-feud since *1860*. It has increased and waxed rich at the expense of the Druzes and become far more civilized. It forms three-fifths of the populace of the Lebanon Proper.

(ii) The *Metawali* are *Shiites* of the Lebanon, and outnumber the feeble section of the *sunnite* muslim, being one-twenty-fifth of the whole populace, being strongest in the northern district. They are said to be descended from *persian* tribes, but may be as primitive and indigenous as the Maronites —a remnant of the old ' Incarnationist ' people (Hogarth) who did not accept the gospel with its unique *avatar* and kept an heretical form of Islam free from the influences which modified the religion of the Druzes. In their hands was the great capital Baalbec until Jezza Pasha broke their supremacy after *1750* ; not till *1840* did the ottoman Turk really govern there.

(iii) The *Ismailites*, about 9000 in number said to be kinsmen of the Assassins and of persian origin, still survive as an independent sect and people, outside the new Province of the Lebanon.

(iv) *Nosairis* or *Ansarieh :* in N. Syria between north end of Lebanon and Orontes, with settlements at Antioch, Tarsus, Adana ; in the Cilician plain are large numbers who have migrated from the syrian upland —they are said to worship a *dog* ; in all about 150,000. The name is variously derived from (1) *Nusair* a freedman of Caliph Ali, (2) Ibn *Nusair*, a son of Moawiya I's vizier, (3) Mohammed ibn *Nusair*, an Ismailite follower of the eleventh Shiite Imam *c. 900* A.D. But Plinius (H.N. v 81) already speaks of the *Nazerini* from whose tetrarchy Apamea is divided by the river Marsyas near Bambyx or Hierapolis which the Syrians called Mabug, seat of the cult of *Atargatis prodigiosa* whom Greeks call Derceto. Here

without doubt a very primitive paganism remained ; no churches of *400–650* are to be found in these heights. The first muslim apostles did not penetrate their fastnesses and only the Alid Ismailites succeeded. From *1132* for about half a century, they fell under the cognate sect of Assassins : Saladin recovered power over them in *1188*. The Mamluk Bibars *1317* tried to convert them and built mosques which they declined to use (Ibn Batuta). Autonomous for 500 years, they were torn by their own dissensions. Ibrahim Pasha reduced them in *1832*, and they are to-day directly governed by the Turks. Their *religion* is a blend of Ismailite and Alid doctrine and the ancient naturê-worship of Harran : it seems to have changed little if at all from the reign of Hakim the Mad. Their sacred book is the *Majmu*. As in the Clementines there are embodiments or *avatars* of deity corresponding with the 7 ages of the world : in the seventh and last age God is impersonated by Ali : ' I bear witness that there is no god but Ali ibn Abu ' Talib ' (*Sura* 11). He is the *Mana* (or idea, as λόγος in New Testament). Ali created Mahomet (the Name, *Ism*),[1] Salman ul Farisi is the third person (the Door, *Bab*). The three letters *Ain*, *Mim*, *Sin* form a mystical symbol, being the initials of Ali, Mahomet, Salman. The Nosairi initiate (*Sura* 6) thus speaks of his relation to the three : ' The *Door* I seek, to ' the *Name* I bow myself, the *Idea* I worship.' God's sevenfold *avatars* have on each occasion been thwarted by an adversary,—as in other semi-dualist systems. The *Shamalis* unite this cult of persons with nature-worship ; A = heaven, M = sun, S = moon (the name of the latter being the old name of the moon-god) ; the *Kalazis* (or kamaris) hold that Ali is the *lunar* deity not the *solar*. Religious poetry is addressed to the moon (translated in *Journ. Asia.* ser. vii, vol. xiv 190 by Huart) ; the *Ghaibis* give most reverence to the air, for god is invisible, thus agreeing with the usual ismailite transcendentalism. The church consists of *sheiks*, recruited (like assyrian bishops) from certain families only ; and the initiate members, adults over 15, introduced by a spiritual sponsor (who may not be a relative). In the first degree, the neophyte meditates on the mystical letters : in the second, he learns the titles of the *suras* in the sacred book ; in the third (after 7 or 9 months of waiting, to denote physical gestation—' Ye must be born again ') he learns the chief suras by heart and understands the meaning of the Trigram. Firm believers in metempsychosis (both for God in a sense and for man), they hold that the good Nosairi goes to take his proper rank among the stars (cf. belief of Araucan people in the S.W. of S. America) and condemn the bad to many transmigrations to expiate their sins (see Dussaud, *Hist. d. l. Relig. des Nosairi*, Paris 1900 : articles and reviews by Ganneau, Seybold, Hartmann, Duval, Halevy, Goldziher appeared directly after (1900, 1) : also René Basset *Rev. Hist. Rel.* xlvi, 1902 and *Enc. Rel. Eth.* ix 417–420 (1917) : the latest account is Lammens' ' Visite au Saih Suprême des N. Haidaris ' in *Jl. Asiatique* xi (1915) : the *Majmu* was published at Beirut 1863 in the *Kitab ul Bakuta*).

[1] It is quite likely that the term Ismailites may be derived from *Ism* and *Ali*.

APPENDIX F

Surviving Congeners of Anatolic Religion : *Kizil Bash* and *Yezidi*

The Alevis of Asia Minor, called from the colour of their head-dress Kizil Bash, number about a million sectaries, scattered over the districts of Sivas, Angora, Erzerum, Kharput. They were settled in this region by the Sultans during the wars with Persia. As to their language accounts differ ; Cumont asserting that they speak *turki* or *kurd*, Ernest Chantre in his *Recherches Anthropologiques dans l'Asie occidentale* (Lyons 1895) calling them persianized Turks who speak pure *persian*. Many of the same persuasion are found also in Afghanistan, where their presence dates from the time of Nadir Shah (*c. 1740*) ; they are good soldiers and horsemen but also follow the trades of doctors, merchants and scribes. The asiatic branch are reckoned as *sunnites* but in truth are not followers of Islam at all and only practise the precepts of Mahomet to avoid persecution. They do not credit him with any measure of inspiration. When secure they neither pray nor fast nor perform ablutions ; they do not read the Coran nor attend mosk. They do not veil their women nor keep Ramadan nor shave the body as the Turks do. They drink wine, are friendly with their Christian neighbours and entertain a profound abhorrence for their turkish masters, first defiling the dishes if they are obliged to give them food. Although they form so large a part of the population, their tenets and observances are still a mystery and their secret religion no one has yet penetrated. Their hereditary priests are called *dedeh* and above these are prelates ; these in turn yield obedience to 2 patriarchs who are believed to be scions of the House of Ali. One of these ' metropolitans ' lives at Khubyar, some 34 miles N.W. of Sivas (Sebastè). Their shiite tenets, kept intact since their transplantation from Persia, have received certain accretions from Christian belief. God is One in Three and our Saviour is recognized as the principal theophany before Caliph Ali. The latter is an incarnation of the First Person and our Lord of the Second. It is wrongly asserted that they regard Mahomet as the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit—but it is certain that their respect for the Prophet is purely formal and assumed for reasons of safety. They call the Blessed Virgin ' Mother of God ' or θεότοκος and firmly hold the Virgin-birth. Below the Trinity are 5 ' Powers,' resembling the *mazdean* amshaspands, the *gnostic* archons, and the *nosairi* yatim. These are mediating principles between God and the world. There are besides twelve ' ministers of God ' who correspond to our apostles and the *naqibs* of the syrian Nosairi. They regard the devil as God's irreconcilable foe and offer him no worship or propitiation ; on this point they differ from the Yezidi (*v. infra*). At the end of the ages Christ will again be incarnate and the evil spirit will come forth to fight a last battle in a losing cause. They bewail the death of Hasan and Hosein like orthodox Shiites and fast like them in the month *Muharram* ; at which time (as well as on certain other occasions) a curious ceremony is observed. The officiant sings hymns in honour of Moses, David, Ali and our Saviour ; he consecrates holy water with a willow cane (cf. avestan

barsom) and listens to the *public* confession of sins, prescribing for each offence due penance and fines. The lights are extinguished and they lament in the dark over their past transgression ; when they are rekindled, the priest gives the absolution. To the penitent and pardoned he then distributes the sacrament, bread dipped in wine. The Kurds among the sectaries sacrifice a sheep before the general *exhomologesis* and the minister hands round parts of the flesh together with the sacrament. They celebrate Easter on the same day as the Armenians and respect many saints in the eastern hagiology. Such is the account of Grenard, French Consul at Sivas, in *Journal Asiatique* X iii 1904.

But underneath the compromise of shiite and Christian doctrine primitive paganism of Anatolia can still be traced. The ' Red Caps ' regard as sacred certain rocks and mountain-ridges, sacrificing there on festivals sheep and fowls to the immanent powers of nature : so Taylor *Journal Roy. Geogr. Soc.* xxxviii 1868. The pine-groves adjoining are held in veneration and no one may carry an axe in the vicinity ; so Cumont *Voyage dans le Pont*, Brussels 1906. Streams, springs and the element of fire are also honoured. The hearth-fire must not be allowed to go out and to spit near it is sacrilege. At Manasgerd they worship at a fire-altar hewn out of the rock ; so Wilson *Handbook of Asia Minor* London 1895. Like the Essenes they adore the sun at rising and setting, regarding a day in which its face is hidden from them as a portent of ill-omen. They are accused of incestuous orgies after the extinction of lights at the public confession ; and the same charge, familiar enough in the early Church, was directed in Central Asia against the ismailite *Chiragh-Kush* or lamp extinguishers by Mirza Haidar, the mogul chronicler, to whom reference is elsewhere made. It is by no means unlikely that the Kizil Bash have kinship with the Assassin sectaries. The term in Haidar is applied to the *Mulahida*, but was certainly used of other societies as an abusive name. The modern *turkish* equivalent is *terah son-deran* those who put out the ' light '. In cent. ix. (says Franz Cumont) the very same indictment was levelled at the Paulicians, who not only occupied the regions now tenanted by the Red Caps, but celebrated their New Year's festival much about the same time. Cumont believes that he can here detect a vestige of the ancient cult of Ma or Anaïtis, of ritual prostitution in the service of a Mother-Goddess. It is also stated by Count de Cholet in *Arménie* etc. Paris 1802 that a young maiden is offered each year to the priests or *dedehs* : if the offspring is a son he becomes a priest, but a daughter becomes a consecrated virgin.

In sum : the fundamental basis is primitive *naturism*, the significant anatolic cultus of the Great Mother. Over this is laid a mazdean *dualism* which is now tinged and reinforced by kindred convictions in our own Christian faith. Formally, however, the sect is merely a branch of ismailian *shiism*. Their affinity to the later Paulicians is quite incontrovertible, and although there is no need to believe implicitly the unvarying charge against all esoteric rites, there is ground for holding that their dualism is compromised by certain quite alien elements. As an *anatolian syncretism*, this doctrine presents all the typical features which we have tried to

bring out, and as an existing survival is of great interest and value to the student. (Other information is to be found in Oberhummer-Zimmerer *Durch Syrien* etc. Berlin 1899 and Cumont's short article in *Enc. Rel. Eth.* is still the best guide for english readers).

In Kurdistan, Armenia and the Caucasus still exist the Devil-Worshippers or *Yezidi*—a sect showing some affinities and some contrasts : on them Menant has written a useful monograph, Paris 1892. They show kinship with the beliefs of ancient Iran and Assur, but also traces of *manichean* and even *nestorian* influence. In cosmogony they are *gnostics*—the devil is the creative agent employed (or permitted) by the Supreme God : he is (as in the bogomil or ' paulician ' creed) a fallen angel who is author of all evil and is represented under the form of a peacock. Our Saviour they regard as an angel in a human frame. Abraham and the patriarchs of the Old Testament are held in reverence as well as Mahomet. They practise circumcision and baptism and believe in a life hereafter. Their sacred book *al Yalvah* was commented upon by Sheik Adi about the year *1200* A.D. (A recent writer, *Jl. Roy. Asi. Soc.*, holds it a forgery.)

APPENDIX G

The Assassins

The *Assassins* are a branch of the Ismailian Shiites, the extreme left of a movement which begins by deifying man and ends by denying God. Hassan Sabah (? a Sabian) was a native of Khorasan and his father [1] had been forced to ' conceal his faith by conforming to sunnite ritual and belief. Hassan rose to office under the seljuk sultan, Malik Shah, in *1070* : but, on trying to supplant his benefactor, he was forced to take refuge in Egypt, where the Lodge of Cairene Shiites received him with honour. He became councillor to Mostansir (whose long reign of 60 years stands out as a striking exception in the troubled annals of the Fatimites). But, once more intriguing at court about the succession, he became again an exile and betook himself to Damascus. Here he founded a secret society with peculiar varieties of Ismailian tenets, and in *1090* obtained the fortress of Alamut in Persia on the Caspian Sea. In a purely political aspect, Hassan was the general of a semi-religious military order of banditti, which in the disturbed state of the muslim world stood to gain by allying with different combatants. Secret murder and terrorism were the distinguishing features of his policy. As in the Cairene Lodge the Sheik al Jabel, ' Old Man of ' the Mountains ' was entitled to absolute and unqualified obedience. Under him three grand priors (*dai al Kirbal*) each with a province ; under these again the priors *dai* the fully initiated ' Master Masons ' ; next the

[1] Browne *Lit. Hist. Pers.* ii. 190 examines with care the *Jami at tawarih*, which gives fullest account of Hasan. His father was a native of Kufah but migrated to Qum when Hasan was born : Hasan left the *Sect of Twelve* to join the *Sect of Seven*, under the influence of missioners despatched from the court of the Fatimites.

Refiqs, associates or ' fellow-crafts ', in training for the highest degree : lastly, the *Fedais* (or devoted) the ' entered apprentices ', who undertook to deliver the secret blow upon which the Old Man and his ' past masters ' had decided. To secure implicit obedience they were deluded into a belief that their ruler controlled the keys of paradise ; and, as in the earliest days of Islam, the whole force of the movement depended on these hopes of a sensuous hereafter. Under these came the ' novices ' or rather lay-brethren, *Lasiqis*, and in the seventh degree, the common people. Strict uniformity to Islam was demanded from all the lower rank of uninitiated ; but the adept was taught to see through the deception of ' faith and works '. He believed in nothing, and recognized that all acts or means were indifferent and the (secular) end alone to be considered.

Hassan killed both his own sons, his former benefactor and employer Sultan Malik, and his vizier Nizam-ul-Mulk before dying at a ripe old age in *1124*, naming as general of the Order the chief *dai Kia-Busurg* (*1124–1158*). A stronghold in the syrian mountain was acquired : [1] two caliphs (Mostarshid and Rashid) were secretly murdered. Mahommed I (*1138–1163*) was Busurg's son, the hereditary law being effective even in this scheme of democratic absolutism. His son Hassan (afterwards Hassan II *1163–1168*) was learned and amiable, but the devotion of the body to him as the promised Imam now become visible on earth was inconvenient to his father who killed 250 of his followers. But he was allowed to succeed his jealous parent and on his accession he disclosed to the common folk the secret tenets of the adepts ; that the precepts of Islam were abolished, that he himself was the long expected Imam, God's regent on earth, and that the sole end of life was feasting and pleasure : the analogy of John of Leyden in the Anabaptist War is suggested. He denied the parentage of Mahommed, and claimed descent from Nizar, son of the fatimite caliph Mostansir (whom Hassan had supported to his own mischief). This ' second Hakim ' was killed by a brother-in-law but his son Mahommed II succeeded (*1168–1214*) under whom the syrian branch became autonomous under its *dai* Sinan [2]. After a long reign he was poisoned by his son (Jelaladdin)

[1] It is not certain if these Ismailians in Syria recognized the Alamut suzerain at first (Quatremère *Mines de l'Orient* iv. 1814 and Defrémery's *Recherches* Journ. Asiat. 1854, 5). They long enjoyed the favour of the Seljuk Prince of Aleppo who used them to get rid of a rival Prince of Homs (1100). Apamea they won in 1106 and although Alp Arslan the Dumb massacred the sect in 1113, its numbers went on increasing. In 1140 they acquired the Masyat stronghold and before 1200 controlled ten or eleven fortresses. Their power survived the extinction of the senior branch by Hulagu (1256). They were favoured as useful tools by Bibars and other sultans of Egypt : in a compact with Margaret of Tyre his general promises that no emissaries of his *except* the Assassins shall molest the princess.

[2] Rashid ad-Din Sinan (cf. Guyard's life of this Grand Master in Journ. Asiat. 1877) was sent in 1160 by the Lord of Alamut to supersede the commandant of the garrison at Kahf. He was respected for his piety, kindness and ascetic humility. He refused to supplant the governor and

Hassan III (*1214–1226*) who stopped the practice of secret murder and won the name of a good muslim by restoring an exoteric conformity to Islam for all the lower ranks. Under his young son (Aladdin) Mahommed III, weak in body as in mind, the old policy was revived. He was taken off by poison like his father in *1255* and succeeded by his son, Rukneddin, last ruler of the Assassin Order. Hulagu the Mongol took Alamut in *1256* and treated the Grand Master well : he requited this by inciting the people against the Tabars on his journey to the court of Mangu the Great Khan. This prince therefore ordered all the prisoners to be slain, to the number of 12,000. The syrian branch lingered on till Bibars the Mamluk ravaged their fastness and almost extirpated the order. Remnants holding the ancient doctrine are however said to exist to the present moment in northern Syria. (Cf. Dozy's *Essai sur l'hist. de l'Islam* Leiden and Paris 1879).

The Assassins, in the eyes of whose adepts dogma and duty disappear entirely, closely follow the early model of religious brigandage in which the career of Islam began. Everything also must subserve the corporate interest of a society set apart from the rest of a world alien and hostile. The ethical *indifferentism* (latent in stoics and calvinists as well as in gnostics and ' solifidians ') is clearly marked, and the antinomian tendency with which their undoubted imitators, the Templars, were charged. Their truest counterpart in the west is (as already said) the militant anabaptists of cent. xvi.

' The tenets ' says Margoliouth (Hastings *Enc. Rel. Eth.*) ' are very ' imperfectly known . . . doctrines essentially esoteric and communicated ' in their entirety to very few persons.' He thinks it certain that the Ismailian system was ' a conflation of philosophic pantheism (emanating ' from India) with the formulæ of Islam '. The name *Sabites* may mean that they recognized only *seven* Imams while other Shiites recognized *twelve*. But it is more likely that the term applies to the *seven* embodiments of the deity (*natiqs*)—Noah, Abraham, Moses, Christ, Mohammed and Ismail ben Jafar. Between every two of these (I am still following the Professor's invaluable authority) came a series of *seven* Imams, each in his turn at the head of another heptad of classes—*catechumen*, *believer*, *trainer*, *permitted missioner*, *greater missioner* (dai akbar), *imbiber* of *knowledge and argument*. In making a convert *seven* methods were enjoined ; in the third, doubts of Islam were suggested, in the sixth all religious rites were abrogated. They explained away muslim and Christian scriptures by allegory—that Christ had no human father means only that he received instruction from no trustworthy teacher ; he brought light to dull minds and so was said to raise the dead. The ' ablution ' of Islam was implicit obedience to the Imam, washing with sand (permitted in case of need)

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only succeeded on his death. He then shook off his allegiance to Alamut and declared himself, not merely Imam, but a visible incarnation of deity : he assumed the title *natiq* hitherto confined to the Clementine Heptad or divine *Avatars*. He was a magician and conjuror, read unseen letters, and held converse, as did Sylvester II, with a trunkless head.

meant submission to the *permitted missioner* when the Imam was absent. Whilst their public symbol was ' We believe in the God of Mahomet ', they maintained a sceptical attitude in theology. The *world of mind* (as in Plato) first issued forth into being, followed by the *world of soul* and then the rest of creation : this is of course pure Plotinus. Men are receptacles of a partial soul (μερικὴ ψυχὴ in the later platonism) which at death again become merged in the Universal Soul. Hasan (or his colleagues) left treatises in which the principles of Batenite Allegorism were set forth. Gazali the great reviver of orthodoxy dedicated to Caliph Mostazir a work in condemnation in the last years of cent. xi. In his *Just Balance* (Cairo 1900) Gazali represents a sectary as maintaining that a Hidden Teacher exists who sees everything in the world ; this doctrine he had from his mother and ' our master the lord of Alamut.' Gazali tries to prove (in true protestant fashion) that there is no need of such an infallible instructor—human reason being adequate for its purpose if it thoroughly understands logic and the ruling of the syllogism. Shahrastani writing in 1127 A.D. makes excerpts from Hasan's then extant works (afterwards burnt by a successor !). Hasan decries the value of human reason and proves that for true knowledge of God recourse must be had to a teacher divinely authorized—his object being to enslave the mind of the convert.

As to the **Modern Condition of Assassins,** it is certain that Rousseau (in his Memoir on Ismailians and Nosairis *Ann. de Voyage* xlii 1818) found in the province of Qum a sect with its chief at Kehk S.W. of Teheran. Fraser (*Journey into Khorasan* 1825) names this same chief as Khalil Allah whom he met at Yezd and terms ' head of the Hasanites '. He was treated with almost divine honours and included among his subjects and worshippers many hindus. Rousseau also found a survival of the sect in its ancient *Syrian* district Masyaf W. of Hamath, whose governor appointed (or ratified) their sheik, exercising power over no less than 18 villages. They still possessed one of the old citadels at Qadamus. Some 7 or 8 years before his visit they had been treacherously attacked by their neighbours the Nosairi (*1809*) and were in a weak and wretched condition. In *India* they are far more flourishing and are represented by the *Khojas*. This body traces its origin to an Assassin missioner Sadr ad Din who about the year *1500* began to preach among the merchants of upper Sind. Here and in Kach and Gujarat, it spread rapidly even to Bombay and the sultanate of Zanzibar, establishing thriving trade-centres along the E coast of Africa. The leader of the *persian* branch Aga Khan, having in vain attempted to revolt in Kirman fled to Sind in *1840*. When Khalil Allah (already named) was killed at Yezd in *1818* he had succeeded to his dignity. When he became a refugee in India, efforts were made to transfer the Khoja property to orthodox muslim but in *1866* a trial in the high court resulted in his favour. Balfour (*Encycl. of Ind.* 1885) says that their sacred book is in 10 chapters of which *nine* treat of the avatars of Visnu, Ali the prophet's son-in-law holding the tenth place. Napier used the services of the Aga in the Afghan War, and a large pension with the title *Highness* was bestowed upon him. His religious influence was felt in Persia, Afghanistan, Arabia, Khorasan, Central Asia. Syria and even Morocco. His

son ruled over this scattered community for 4 years (*1881–5*), and his grandson the present Aga Khan II (b. *1877*) has known how to combine the knowledge and culture of the west with ismailian principles and has manifested the noblest loyalty to the British Throne (cf. Naoroji Dumasia *Brief History of Aga Khan* 1903).

TABLE OF DATES IN ASSASSIN CHRONICLES
(AFTER PROFESSOR MARGOLIOUTH)

A.D.

1079 Hasan Sabah at court of Caliph of Egypt; expelled for holding that the Imam cannot change his mind (cf. Daniel's 'Law of Medes and Persians') in the matter of succession to throne.

1081 Returns to Persia; *1085* preaches Batenite allegorism in Khorasan and Irak; with 18 associates begins to practise his peculiar worship at Sarva.

1087 First murder and first seizure of citadel, Qain (between Ispahan and Nizapur).

1090 Hasan Sabah seizes Alamut near Kasvin, a fortress held till *1256*; *1106* Apamea.

1100 Aleppo seized.

1127 Doctrine preached that souls are imprisoned in body, solely to fulfil Imam's commands: if death ensue during faithful performance, they are at once transported into the upper light realm.

1140 The sectaries occupy Masyaf; *1148* murder of Count of Tripoli.

1149 Invasion of Templars who force them to pay tribute.

1182 Murder of Conrad of Montferrat (titular) King of Jerusalem.

B. SUCCESSION OF CHIEFS (WITH YEARS OF HEGIRA)

Hasan I *c. 480–518 a.h.*
Buzurg Umid *518–532*
Mohammed I (son) *532–557*
Hasan II (son) *557–561*
Mohammed II (son) *561–607.*
Hasan III (son) *607–618*
'Aladdin' (son) *618–653*
Rukneddin (son) *653–654* (*1256*)

APPENDIX H

A MODERN DERIVATIVE : FREEMASONRY

It seems now beyond question that theoretic (or speculative) Masonry in modern times, is a direct and legitimate descendant of the old *practical* gilds of freemasons—themselves no doubt affiliated in rules and constitutions to the older roman *collegia*. The name is first found (as far as we know) in *1376*, when, in a list of companies entitled to send deputies to the London Common Council, 'Free Masons' have the nineteenth place.

Their 'extant' charges date from *1390*—comprising a prayer, the mythical history of the craft, and sermons or addresses to the apprentices or joining members. As early as *1352* ('Fabric Rolls of York Minster') the workmen are given the proper hours of labour and directed to break their fast in the *logium fabricæ*—no doubt a temporary hut erected near the building-site. That these collections of workmen under rules tended to become *organized* (and often itinerant)[1] *communities* we have positive proof in the *loygge lathamorum* attached to Canterbury Priory with lists of its members (1429, 31, 33, in MS. now in Bodleian). Secret signs and passwords were due not merely to jealousy of outsiders but to the convenience of fellow craftsmen travelling between lodge and lodge. No doubt too in the ceremonious Middle Age, when every outward act was sacramental, and the inner sense was only appreciated by means of a visible symbol—the novice would be admitted and 'charged' according to a very definite and impressive ritual. Such 'close' societies (always connected with some form of worship) had grown up all over the roman empire; where every town had its authentic *collegia* recognized by the State and treated as legal persons, with trade secrets, signs and countersigns, and rules sternly enforced upon its contributing members. Codes of rules for *Co-operative Masons* are found in Scotland in *1598, 99,* signed by a certain William Shaw 'Warden of the Masons': he had been made controller of all the royal palaces in *1584.*[2] The extant records of the London Masons' Company date only from *1620.*[3] Now it is clear that from the first the *mythology* of the origins of the Craft was prominent in the ancient charges.[4] It began in Egypt and Euclid was the author; it came to England (c. *300* A.D.) in the time of St. Alban who got better pay for the craftsmen. Much masonic symbolism may really be traced to antitypes in Egypt, which was both the cradle of architecture, the home of the 'mysteries' (according to Foucart, at least), and very likely the theatre of the rivalry of gilds and corporate bodies highly organized by the priesthood. No doubt, together with some knowledge of geometry regarded as an esoteric trade-secret, many symbols to-day current did pass down from very primitive times. But a more certain model was the Grand Lodge of the Ismailians at Cairo, to which we have already referred. The modern *speculative*

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[1] Hayter-Lewis in *Brit. Archæ. Assoc.* 1889 denies this: he finds 'no 'distinct trace of the general employment of large migratory bands of 'masons, going from place to place as a *gild,* or *company,* or *brotherhood.*' So W. H. White (*Proceed.* R.I.B.A. vol. iv 1887) commends Papworth for destroying these figments; fraternities of travelling bridge-builders (pontifices) or freemasons, he believes never existed. Cf. also Freke-Gould's *Hist. Freem.* chap. vi 1887 or his *Concise History* of 1903.

[2] The Lodge of Edinburgh has continuous existence and records from that date—no doubt it was in being for some time previously.

[3] But Conder, its historian, believes it to have been established in 1220; the erection of Westminster Abbey being begun in the next year.

[4] E.g. Halliwell MS., Brit. Mus. 1290.

side, which in its 200 years of being has made such marvellous advances,[1] started in *1716–7*, but was foreshadowed in the whole preceding century by the admission of non-operative members of dignified position.[2] This symbolic and ethical side must then have been slowly developed for at least two hundred years before the four London Lodges decided to unite under a Grand Master, at the very first appearing desirous of having a noble and influential Head—a policy since followed with notable success. In *1725* an Irish Grand Lodge was set up ; and in *1736* the Grand Lodge of Scotland. From these centres by direct or indirect means all other Lodges have arisen throughout the world. It cannot be doubted that (whatever may have been the Jacobite and even Catholic deviations of the Craft) this union was founded for the double purpose (1) of supporting the ' powers that be ', in this case the new dynasty from Hanover, and, (2) in what looked like the decline of revealed or positive religion, of joining men in the simple tenets of a natural faith, which on inquiry is found to be plainly affiliated in its origin and tenets to english *Deism*. Before *1717* Masonry was undeniably Christian ; cf. the orthodox trinitarian invocation (Grand Lodge MS. no i. *1583* A.D.). A ' First Charge ' directs the neophyte to be ' true to God and the Holy Church ' ; York MS. no. 6 ' pray heartily for all Christians ' ; Melrose MS. of *1674* ' merchants and all other Christian men '. ' Until the Grand Lodge era ', says W. J. Hughan, with truth ' Freemasonry was thus wholly Christian '. The british development seems to have been quite independent of any parallel movements on the continent : in spite of the efforts of Grandidier (*1779*) followed by Fallou, Heideloff, Schneider, to derive the english craft from the medieval *steinmetzen* of Germany. Freemasonry in this latter country is at all events to-day a loan from England, introduced after the napoleonic wars from Grand Lodge. The deistic and cosmopolitan basis of the fraternity has proved of conspicuous advantage in connexion with Islam and the religions of Hindustan ; but ' the unalterable foundation of belief in ' the Great Architect of the Universe remains and without it there can ' be no Masonry ' (Hughan *Enc. Brit.* s.v.). The statute, rescinded by the Grand Orient of France, as to belief in such a deity is an ' inviolable land-' mark of the society which makes it impossible for an atheist either to join ' or to continue a member '. For the indebtedness of the present formulæ, ritual and symbolism to ancient models, Heckethorn's *Secret Societies* (2 vols. London 1875) may still be consulted with profit (i 191–295 and the analogies found in other times and countries in vol. ii). It seems absurd

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[1] 110 autonomous Grand Lodges with 23,000 *subordinate*, and over 2 million members—in every country in the world except Russia, China, Japan.

[2] Thus an ancestor of Johnson's friend, John Boswell, Laird of Auchinleck, Ayrshire, was present in the Edinb. Lodge and attested by ' his mark '. Sir Robert Moray was admitted in 1641 at Newcastle by some members of the same Lodge. Elias Ashmole (founder of the Ashmolean, Oxford) was admitted in 1646 at Warrington and the list given of brethren assembled shows not a single practising mason.

to deny the survival by continuous tradition, or (if preferred) the presence by conscious imitation, of phrases, signs and tokens familiar to the eastern world during our chosen period. But the beginning of cent. xviii was, it might be thought, an epoch the least favourable to a deliberate resuscitation of the past which it so heartily despised. Together with much that is purely fanciful, grotesque or erroneous, there is sufficient material in Harold Bayley's *Language of Symbolism* (2 vols. Will. and Norg. 1912) to prove an unbroken sequence in the use of ' heretical ' signs and emblems, after the official triumph of the Church over heresy at the close of our period. That these were closely connected with eastern mysticism, whether muslim or coming from the fringe of Christianity, cannot for a moment be doubted. It is well known that the Troubadours claimed to possess a *noble sçavoir*—though we may suspect that Mrs. Cooper-Oakley has perhaps overstated her case like many other eager specialists (*Traces of Hidden Tradition in Masonry* and *Medieval Mysticism*). The survival of gnostic and even mitraic emblems and ideas in the ' liturgy ' of modern masonry will hardly be denied, however we may choose to account for their presence. Its harmless and indeed socially useful character in anglo-saxon countries is acknowledged to-day by all ; in latin lands it has often been used for political purposes and seditious intrigue. Regarded as a cloke for an organized attack on established religion and government, it has sometimes merited the charge in foreign countries : in its sacred symbolism, ritual, initiation and mythology, it forms, like a medieval sect, a rival authority to the roman church (itself a corporation of *bridge-builders*) and has never been forgiven or recognized by her.

APPENDIX I

Sufism and the Dervishes

Reaction of Race and Temperament against Islam : Affinities with Hindu Bhakti and Christian Sects.—Sufism, a curious phenomenon in Islam, is yet another product of this fertile religious soil of Chaldea and Persia. In one aspect it is merely the appearance in Islam of a universal feature in all creeds,—the desire for a better and more direct road to lead to a closer intercourse with God. Those clothed in woollen garments (*suf*) wished to retreat from the world, surrender the life of action and prepare themselves for ultimate union with the divine nature. Both in Mahomet's own character and in his sacred volume there is justification for this attitude of aspiring quietism ; he held in honour the ascetic life of prayer and fasting and revered the Christian Hanifite hermits, though he did not encourage the muslim to take them as models. God is represented as a power ' not far from each one of us ' as well as an inaccessible despot : ' wherever ye turn there is Allah's face ' ii. 109 : ' God is nearer to man ' than the vein in his neck ' (l. 15). All latent germs of a really spiritual mysticism were forced into life by the curiously secular development under the ommiads and abbasids. The faith appeared in the guise of a military despotism under which the wealthy cared only for luxury, the

orthodox for a hard mechanical pietism. The poor consoled themselves with messianic and chiliastic hopes (of this the whole evolution of Shiism is witness in its extreme forms). The pious desired a more emotional faith : a strong sense of sin and a fear of hell drove penitents, as later in the west, into ascetic rigour. Sufism is emphatically a practical religion, not a speculative theory : ' It took its rise,' says a Bagdad writer Jurealyd, ' not from contentiousness but from hunger ' (after the unseen), from a desire ' to take leave of this world and break all family ties, to renounce ' what most men hold precious '. Lucian's *Hermotimus* is a good instance of the same feeling in an earlier age. These ascetics journeyed about alone or in groups, like later pilgrims : they lived by alms (like buddhist monks) or by the profit of their own work. They recited the names of God, a devotional exercise (it was thought) superior to the five (equally mechanical) prayers of Mahomet's canon. They developed trust in God or practical faith (*tawakkil*) into an abjuring of all initiative and willing : they left themselves impassible in God's hands ; some at least refused to learn or practise a trade. Meantime from a *negative* desire for salvation (conceived as avoiding the pains of hell) the adventurously pious aimed at dying to self and creaturehood so as to live wholly within God. About *820*, just 200 years after the Hegira, a female ascetic, Rabia, began to express this aspiration in the terms of human love. In the next century there arose a decidedly anti-muslim movement in theology, both speculative and pantheizing. Its leader was a *persian*,[1] the son of *Christian* parents, Maruf of Bagdad. He defined Sufism as a *gnosis* or theosophy ; its aim, to apprehend divine truths. In *Syria* al-Darani, in *Egypt* Dhul-Nun [2] believed that these ineffable secrets could be attained (as in Platonism) by ecstasy and inspired vision. Pantheism was definitely formulated by the *persian* Bayazid of Bistam (*810–874*) to whom (as in all hindu soteriology) the end was *extinction*, individual consciousness in the final act of the drama being wholly merged in God. The identity of all substance was his favourite theme, just as it was of Barsudaili [3], ' I am the wine, the ' cupbearer and the drinker thereof . . . I went from God to God, until ' they (?) cried from me in me, O Thou I ' (the *tat tvam* formula of India).

The Sufis, besides displaying in one anomalous phase of Islam a common craving of piety found in every religion, were clearly amenable to very distinct and definite influences—Christian, buddhist, and platonic. The syrian Euchites gave up all worldly goods and ties and wandered about

[1] Firdousi (author of the great *Shahnama* 940–1020) is the origin and exemplar both of *didactic* and of *mystical* poetry in Persia : besides ' ethical ' reflections and wise maxims . . . equally plain are traces of that mystical ' tendency, soon to pervade almost all products of persian genius ' (Herm.-Ethé) Shah Khaikhosrau at the height of earthly fame renounces the world in disgust and disappears for ever from human ken.

[2] Dhul-Nun (800–859) was an alchemist and theurgist, and shows the alexandrine influence still strongly felt by a compatriot of Plotinus.

[3] A Christian (?) mystic of a singular and interesting type—to whom reference will be made later.

repeating the name of God in perpetual prayer. The sayings and teachings of Jesus are reproduced in the muslim world without bigotry : devotees of both creeds are shown talking amiably together : we remember that the arab Ibn Wahleib discussed the Bible with an emperor of China not so much later. Buddhism too had been a favourite ' philosophy ' or way of life beyond the Oxus in Balkh and Turkestan before the arab conquest. Even after this event (*c. 650*) the monks or *bhiksus* carried their ideas and practices among the muslim settlers ; some have held that the word *fana* extinction is but a form of *nirvana*. From this entirely kindred ' School ' the Sufi borrowed the use of rosaries in devotion and the somewhat pedantic system of degrees in the long road towards annihilation. In the oldest treatise extant, these travellers' ' stations ' (*maqamat*) are given as *repentance, abstinence, renouncement, poverty, patience, trust in God, surrender to His Will.* After the ' stations ' comes a series of mental states of feeling—*fear, hope, love*, leading up to *contemplation* and *intuition*. Yet a third influence is found in the *greek* learning, strongly syncretist, which poured into Islam (*800–860*) under the liberal or sceptical caliphs from syrian convents, a persian Academy in Khuzistan (at Gundeshapur) and the irrepressible Sabians of Harran (or Carrhæ). From these hellenizers came the *Theology of Aristotle* translated into arabic *c. 840*, and a widespread knowledge of the *pseudepigrapha* of ' Denys the Areopagite '.

Humanistic Features: the Director, the Axis.—By the year *920* Sufism had become a regular system, ' a school for saints ' with fixed rules of discipline, imparted to carefully tested novices by the adept who had travelled the long road before them. As amongst the Assassins and even amongst Shiites, a general dislike of mere canon and tradition, dully interpreted by a priestly or scribal class, led to a spiritual directorate of the most absolute type. The director (like the *guru* in India) was to be obeyed implicitly and the tie between master and pupil is of the most intimate. These confessor-saints had no doubt of their own miraculous powers (cf. *mahatma*) derived from a close intercourse with God. At the head of this scattered body stood a supreme officer called the Axis (*Qutb*) : the whole order of the universe was said to depend (as amongst the brahmans) upon this president and his hierarchy. This strong *humanistic* reaction marks both the stoic, the jain and the buddhist as well as the sufi. All acknowledge a Life or World-order more or less personal (the extreme left is of course occupied by Buddha) but disparage or openly laugh at the vain gods of the people (as the gnostics poured scorn on Ialdabaoth) : much better is the wise man who by himself has attained perfectness and avoided the temptations which the envious gods strewed along his path. From *900–1100* we have the *scholastic* period of Sufism, describing carefully the stages of the spiritual ascent, the discipline and purifying process which must precede the contemplative life. Abu Nasir al-Sarraj, Abu Talib al Makki, Qushairi, Hal Hujwiri [1] and Gazali are the best known writers. Abul-khair of Khorasan (*968–1049*) wrote quatrains

[1] Published in 1075 a handbook of Sufi theory ' the Revealing of ' Things Hidden '.

expressing in earthly and sensuous language the relation of the soul to God ; henceforward symbolic terms for the highest verities became the rule. He gives the most concise form to the aphorisms which Omar afterwards developed in a somewhat ironic and sceptical spirit. It fell to Gazali, (as we shall see presently) to reconcile this emotional faith both with greek philosophy and with orthodox Islam. He made muslim theology mystical ; and claimed to provide another avenue to truth, the *revelation* of the seer (*Kashf*) being now held in honour beside *reason* (aql)[1] and *tradition* (naql).

The religious attitude of the sufi may well be understood by contrast and comparison with another product of purely islamic piety. Hasan of Basra (*641-728* A.D.) was born near that city of servile and perhaps negro parentage : his father Habib was said to have been a Christian. (It is remarkable that Dhul-Nun the egyptian mystic (*c. 800–860*) was also the son of a nubian slave.) He disputed on human free-will but returned to the orthodox theory of predestination. He wrote a Commentary on the Coran and recommended that the ' Traditions ' should be *explained* and applied to practice, not merely recited. It is clear that in his circle the dogmas of Islam were discussed with surprising freedom. Yet it is from the side of *practical* religion that he is most interesting, as a foil to the joyous mysticism of the true persian. He looked (it was said) like a man under sentence of death—as though for him alone the tortures of hell had been created. From the wrath to come he sought escape in constant devotion and ascetic rigours. No man (he thought) could be a true divine (*faqih*) unless he utterly renounced this world and fixed his thoughts upon the next. As a complement to his ascetic self-discipline he entertained also mystical views : he is indeed believed to have been (apart from the persian influences which entered later into Islam) the chief pioneer and spokesman of the movement. He discussed mystical science and employed to explain its leading ideas terms and phrases unfamiliar to his contemporaries. True knowledge (said the basra school which took its rise from his teaching) consists in knowing one's own heart by a scrupulous examination of the worth of all the thoughts which enter the mind. In his house at Basra he held devotional meetings, greatly resembling those of the Quakers in later time. The members of the community exchanged their spiritual experiences and discussed the symptoms and pathology of the ' religious life '. Qushairi and other sufic writers are therefore clearly correct in believing that he attached far higher value to inward piety than to outward observance, such as public prayer, fasting or alms. But he cannot be included among the devotees of sufism. He was driven to righteousness (it was said) by the goad of fear, not drawn by the rapture of divine love. It is said that a disciple journeying with him crossed a river on foot while Hasan remained on the other side unable to make the ' venture of faith '. Utbax, the wonder-working pupil, gave as the reason : ' For a whole generation thou hast done what God *commands*, I what he *desires* '.[2]

[1] The second and higher stage of druze ' enlightenment ' is called *akil*, as we have seen (p. 361, 2).

[2] Cf. R. A. Nicholson *Liter. Hist. of Arabs* (London 1907, also translations of *Tadhkirat* 1905–7 and *Kashf al Mahjub* 1911 by the same).

Sufism passes on its Explicit Pantheism to the Dervish Orders.—Sheik Ḥabdallah Ansari of Herat (*1006–1089*) helped to spread the pantheizing tendency by his ' Invocations of God ' (*munajat*) ; he also wrote biographies of earlier sufi saints. He was a pioneer for the issue of such a volume as the *Garden of Truth* by Hakim Sanai of Ghazni (*c. 1100–1065*, published in 1130) in whom later writers agree to acclaim an unrivalled master in all spiritual knowledge. Jelaluddin Rumi (*1207–1273*) is the most explicit and uncompromising pantheist : he was born at Balkh in Khorasan of a very ancient family, but he also claimed descent from Abubekr the caliph. He grew up at Laranda in Asia Minor where his father was principal of the College ; whom Kaikobad (Seljuk Sultan of *Rum 1219–1236*) called into his personal service at Iconium. The young Persian after short visits to Damascus and Aleppo returned to this capital and, becoming professor, made a special study of mystical theosophy. His spiritual directors were Sayid Husaini of Tirmidh and the vagrant Sufi Shamsuddin of Tabriz—who was murdered by the populace together with Rumi's own son during a riot. In memory of these two martyrs he founded the Mevlevi Dervishes, who wear mourning, and imitate in their sacred dance (*sama*) the planets circling round the sun—emblem of the soul vibrating with eagerness to rejoin its creator ; an order which still exists under the presidency of one of Rumi's direct descendants. In their honour he wrote his odes and hymns ; even his great work the *Mesnevi*, dictated to his friend and scribe Hasan after the year *1258*. The treatment is discursive and without method or plan ; but the general doctrine is clear. *God is sole reality* above all particular names and restrictions. He is absolute *being, goodness*, and *beauty* (as in Plato or Cousin's *le vrai, le beau, le bien*). The problem of self-revealing in an Absolute he overcomes by laying down the axiom that all beauty desires to be manifested. An ancient tradition had said of God, ' I was a hidden treasure and I wished ' to be known ; therefore I made the world of creatures '. There are a number of worlds intervening between our own and God ; the first ' creatures ' being (as in neoplatonism) *Intelligence* and *Soul*. Things can only be known by the foil and contrast of their opposites, hence *being* only through *non-being*—an empty mirror (as it were) reflecting reality. Our phenomenal world is only a shadow or a mirage. *Man*, the centre of the universe, *bears within him something divine :* even here, amid mocking phantoms and semblances, his soul ever strives to be reunited with its source. Ecstasy can sometimes bring this blissful unconsciousness of self even in this life. For this end (as in buddhism) the illusion of self must be utterly abolished : human love (as in Plato's *Banquet*) may be used as a stepping-stone or propædeutic ; but the end is to bathe and drown oneself in the love of God. It is unlikely that he propounded Spinoza's chilling axiom that God cannot love us in return. Among the corollaries of this doctrine (innocent enough in their author), he asserts that the genuine lover feels himself one with God in act and will, since *God is the only true being and true agent in the universe : hence he is above all* law or specific observance or religious rite. All that a man does is produced by God's sole and direct agency ; he does ' right or wrong ' (as men call it) when the

great flute-player breathes at will harmony or discord into his passive instrument. Rumi is not merely indifferent to, but abhorrent of the bonds of formula, ritual, and pious practice : a good idolater is in his eyes better than a cold orthodox hypocrite. God speaks in infinite ways to the souls of men ; there are as many ' paths of salvation ' as souls : ' all ' things by all ways attain unto me, saith the great Unity ' (Indian proverb). The list of chief sufic poets may be here fitly completed by Farid uddin Attar (born at Nishapur, killed in the first mongol invasion at the age of a hundred and ten *1229*) : besides prose biographies of Mystical Divines, he wrote in verse a ' Book of Counsels ' (*pandnama* [1]) and ' speeches of birds ' (*mantik uttair*), the latter an allegory,containing the famous apologue of the great Simorg Bird to illustrate the final absorption of the true Sufi in God. The birds of the air, tired of a headless republic, desire a king ; and the lapwing suggests Simorg who lives in the Caucasus : the way is long and dangerous and of those who start only 30 (? three) arrive at the court : hungry and fatigued they are ushered into the presence-chamber and find their identity lost in that of the bird-king,—an allegory which pleased Emerson very much (*Persian Poetry*).

' They saw themselves all as Simorg
' When on each other they gazed. . . .
' The Highest is as a Sun-mirror
' Who cometh to him sees himself therein
' . . . Him hath none of us seen at any time,
' ants see not the Pleiades.
' . . . What you see is He not,
' What you hear is He not '

'—a very different form of pantheism from Lucan's *Juppiter est quod-*
' cunque vides, quodcunque moveris :

' For over you am I raised
' since I am in act Simorg,
' Ye blot out my higher being
' that ye may find yourselves on my throne,
' For ever ye blot out yourselves
' as shadows in the sun '.[2]

Farid's name is really a title, ' chemist or drug-dealer who is a pearl ' of religion '. One day a kafir expressed grief on his behalf at having to leave his worldly goods behind at death. Taking this as a gentle reproof he began to study under Sheik Rukneddin and to travel in India and Egypt, visiting also Mecca and Damascus.

In these commonplaces of mysticism there is nothing novel or original : mystical writers of every age and country have said exactly the same.

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[1] Transl. by Silv. de Sacy Paris 1819.

[2] The text was published by de Tassy in 1857 and a french rendering appeared in 1863 : cf. Browne's *Liter. Hist. of Persia* 1902, 1906, Herm. Ethé in Geiger's *Iran. Philol.* Strassburg 1906, Horn *Gesch. Pers. Liter.* 1901.

The universal charges against the school follow easily enough ; that the distinction between good and evil, God and man, disappears and every act is left indifferent ; that for a discipline of the *will*, it substitutes a purely *physical* union ; that the adept in the last resort can claim actual divinity and say with Husain al-Hallaj, ' I am the truth '. To orthodox Islam there was another stumbling-block,—it was at least conveyed that Mahomet's religion had no exclusive value and that in any case propaganda was unwarranted. As von Kremer points out (Leipzig 1868) Islam is not directly attacked; but the truth is implied that all positive religions are but partial rays from the central sun, that all prophets have proclaimed but one message from the eternal Goodness and the eternal Truth. This again will be found in western development after the Crusades.

Foreign Influences overpower Strict Dogmas of Islam.—Very powerful then are the foreign influences and even alien beliefs which have either invaded Islam boldly or managed to conceal themselves under its cloke. The transparent simplicity of Mahomet's profession of faith needs to be supplemented ; wherever Islam spread, the form of this supplement was already provided by the earlier beliefs, habits and usages of the conquered peoples. Even the Catholic Church could not always resist the inclusion of earlier cults under a disguised form, the recognition of local heroes and pagan hagiography. ' Islam ' says Margoliouth ' has been to an even higher ' degree, overlaid and almost buried by the superstitions of the people to ' whom it has come.' Mahomet, in accepting the pilgrimage to Mecca and the Black Stone fetish as a symbol of his unique Deity, gave a fatal precedent for compromise and reserve. The worship of wonder-working saints is everywhere prevalent, though no less alien from the principles of Islam than theism and buddha-cult from buddhism. Certainly such an exotic accretion is Shiism, in the peculiar growths which we have already traced. In Islam belief arose (or intruded) very early that there always existed some one *person* in direct communion with God to whom belonged of right the governance of all men, whether he was acknowledged by them as sovereign or not. Hence, as against immobile tradition and the ' dead hand ' of Authority, the doctrine of a living development, at least of a living and personal representative, of Truth. The Ismailites and Shiites held such a belief ; the Assassins made use of it (as we saw) to establish a pure spiritual despotism in a secret Order ; the Sufis adopted it into their hagiology. There is a single great invisible Church of the Perfect, a saintly Board of Directors who carry on the government of the world : the greatest saint for the time is chosen Axis by God, being entrusted with wonder-working power and the right of intercessory prayer. Unrecognized by men and a homeless pilgrim he wanders through the world, performing his duties. Under him there is said to be an organized (but still invisible) hierarchy of God's friends (*Walis*).

The Successive Schools of Dervishes : Antinomian Sects.—The *Mevlevite* community, already named, formed a link of transition between the sufi saints and the other dervish orders. Round any revered teacher (*murshid, ustadh, pir*) gathered a knot of disciples—just as the travelling Mendicant Orders in the west supplanted the regular clergy (= *ulema*) in public

favour. In the holy wars they even fought[1] under his guidance against the unbeliever. But these teachers left behind no continuous corporation : Gazali ruled over a cloister of monks in his lifetime but founded no convent. The first permanent body, the *Adawite* Brotherhood, was founded by Al-Hakkari at Mosul († *1163*). Three years later died al Qadir al Jilani founder of the *Qadirite* Order (*1166*). Of the 32 separate Orders commonly given, some have long ago vanished and others have taken their place. All have a *rule* and a *ritual*, presumably dating from the time of their founder. The *Mevlevites* (Rumi's foundation) pass through the severest trials in the noviciate : before the candidate can be received at all he must work as a ' jackal ' at menial tasks for 1001 days ; if he fail on one day, he must begin his servitude afresh. These profess pantheist views and are regarded with disfavour and suspicion by the regular clergy ; but they are tolerant and broadminded. The *Rifaites* (howling) cut themselves like Baal's prophets ' with knives and lancets ', eat pieces of glass, snakes and live coals. Over the prostrate bodies of the *Sadites* the head of the Order used to ride at Cairo without doing them bodily injury. All claim powers of healing, and there are divisions with different rights ; one may eat glass but not serpents, another serpents but no glass. Some sects or brotherhoods are antinomian, that is, consider all acts (even the vilest) as indifferent when done in a state of coma or ecstasy ; the soul is then supposed to be in heaven and both unconscious of bodily deeds and not responsible for them. Thus moral and ritual law may be neglected with impunity by the *bishar* or ' without law ' brotherhoods in Persia and Turkey. Of other *lawless* Orders the *Bakhtashite* is the best known in european Turkey and Albania, and is connected by legend with the Janissaries. From this order the ' Calenders ', or *Qalandarites*, severed themselves to fulfil their vows of ceaseless travel. The latest order to appear, the *Senussi* is also the most strict ; they are orthodox and puritanic and do not make mystical claims an excuse for moral aberration.

Discipline and Initiation : Gnostic and Chaldean Affinities.—All Dervish Orders seek to attach the novice to his spiritual director by the closest ties ; on applying, the ' seeker ' (*murid*) repents of his sins and accepts the prior as his guide (*murshid*). In the course of his discipline and training he passes through the ' stations ' (*maqamat*) which we have already met with in the Sufi writers.

Here we may compare, with Margol., the upward-path of a gnostic proficient through the Seven Portals guarded by Archons : this according to Bousset is clear proof of the babylonish and planetary origin of the syrian *gnosis*. We may also believe that the sheik, as in the savage boys' initiation, hypnotizes the candidate. It is clear that narcotic drugs also form a part of the religious equipment : see William James (*Var. Rel. Belief*) on this curious method of being ' religious ' and finding God ; the object is clearly to lose sense of self, ' blot out the shadow on the sun ', and (as it is supposed) bring one's nature into harmony with the current

[1] Hence *marabout* = one who pickets his horse on an enemy's border ; *ribat*, a frontier-fort or guard-house = a convent.

of universal life. Attached to the regular members are lay brethren; most religious Turks are affiliated in this way to one order or another. The fishermen in Egypt mostly belong to the *Qadirite* Order and, like our Friendly Societies of Druids or Buffaloes, carry nets on their annual festival. The *Bakhtashites* (antinomian) order is supposed to have had influence on the Templars and the Freemasonry which secretly survived their dispersal. The Druzes of Lebanon also claim connexion with the Rosicrucians and with the scottish rite of Freemasonry.

NOTE

Hallaj (Husain ibn Manzur, executed *922*) deserves more than a simple mention. His grandfather was a *parsi* and he was born *858* near Persepolis. He became in youth a pupil of the mystical ascete and *sufi*, al-Tustari in Khuzistan, whence he repaired to Basra. After *877* he completed his training as a sufi neophyte under the most famous exponent in that age, Junayd. In *897* he made the pilgrimage to Mecca and after a year's seclusion seems to have put forth those claims to actual divinity which revolted his sufi teachers and associates. It is however worth notice that Hujwiri says explicitly that communion was broken off solely on account of a breach of discipline, not for heresy in dogma. He spent two years in retirement at Tustar, his old school, and then for 3 years more travelled in Khorasan and Fars, preaching and composing mystical treatises. He then received the title *hallaj* or wool-carder. Again he visited Mecca as a pilgrim and from Bagdad on his return set out on a prolonged tour to India and the furthest limits of Turkestan. For a third time he repaired to the Holy City and then returning to the caliph's capital, delivered a blasphemous discourse for which he was put into confinement (*908*). He escaped (*910*) but came back and three years later was arrested for the same offence by Isa, caliph Moktadir's vizier, in *913*. He was kept in a very mild custody for eight years and was even allowed to receive visitors and impart his peculiar views. Not until *922* was he brought to trial, on 3 charges, complicity with the Carmathians, belief in his essential unity with Godhead (*ain al-jam*), and the worship which he tolerated at the hands of his disciples. The *cadis* insisted on adding a fourth, possibly more damaging than the rest and (as it must appear to us) singularly unsuited to so constant a pilgrim :—that the pilgrimage to Mecca is not a binding duty, but may be abrogated. He was executed in the same barbarous way as Bruno and Vanini many centuries later ; and his ashes were thrown into the Tigris. His adherents in Khorasan maintained that he was not dead but had been taken up to heaven and that the actual victim was a horse or mule !

There is no clear evidence to connect him with the Carmathians. But just at this time (the first quarter of cent. x) these strange rebels had established a reign of terror in the vicinity of Bagdad. Hamid the vizier had incurred much odium by his new taxes on imported corn and it is thought that he tried to recover favour with the mob by punishing an emissary of the brigands. He is described in the oldest histories which mention him as a shiite propagandist, a reckless agitator who dabbled in alchemy and

magic, who imposed on the vulgar by conjuring tricks. *Fihrist* 190 says that he carried on a plot to recover power for the alid house ; but the definite statement in Browne (*Lit. Hist. Persia* i 429) that he was the acknowledged envoy of Ali al-Rida, eighth shiite Imam, appears to be baseless.

As to his deity there can be no doubt that he laid claim to it in the most uncompromising terms : ' I am the Real Being ' *ana'l-haqq*. This term, in sufi language, is used for God as pure essence, like brahm, opposed to the manifold of the phenomenal world. Even mystics reputed orthodox held that such union was attainable and it may be doubted if his pantheism would in itself have cost him his life (Reynold Nicholson). They held (as we see) that man in stripping off his phenomenal self (*fana*) becomes of necessity one with true Being. The divine element in his nature is now free to rejoin its parent, when the illusions of egoism and creaturehood are dispelled. Again, a doctrine of Incarnation was certainly held by Shiites and Sufis alike (*hulul*) and his disciples certainly addressed him in terms, applicable only it would seem to the Recurrent Prophet, in the *Clementines* and other strange heresies : ' We bear witness that thou art He that in every ' age assumeth a different form and in the present age hath appeared as ' Husain ibn Manzur ! We implore thy blessings and hope for thy com- ' passion, O thou knower of secrets ! ' He styled himself the Radiant Light, but did not regard himself as bereft of personality or as indiscernible from God. He seems then to be far nearer the shiite than the sufic conception.

Whatever his real views, it is certain that later muslim thinkers of established orthodoxy tended to regard him as a martyr and a saint. In their eyes he was a genuine theosophist, guilty at the most of a trifling indiscretion of phrase. Gazali declares that his famous sentence ' I am the Real ' is the highest expression of unitarianism. Others said that his offence was to divulge before the profane and literal the hidden mysteries of godhead, and therefore he had deserved death ; but his teaching (they thought) was the inner truth of Islam. The later Sufis and mystical poets of Iran celebrate his praises ; he is a martyred hero who laid down his life in order, by self-extinction, to gain perfect union with True Being.

The indefatigable labours of Massignon (in *Révue de l'Histoire des Religions* June 1911, in *Der Islam* 1912 and his editions of the texts of unpublished treatises ascribed to Hallaj) have enabled us to take a clearer view of this speculator. The still surviving sect of *Yezidi* or devil-worshippers (noticed elsewhere) are said to derive from him their veneration for Iblis—probably because he contended eagerly against the *dualism* of principles in a world that could only be for him an already realized unity.

[Here belongs APPENDIX OO (see pp. 326–333) misplaced in error.]

DIVISION B. [Part I]

2. MUSLIM AND HEBREW SPECULATION

CHAPTER C. SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF 'ARAB PHILOSOPHY': A GENERAL SURVEY

§ I. 'Persian' School in the East under the Liberal Caliphs

Universal and Direct Agency of God (as Will).—In its *religious* and *sectarian* development we have seen to how great an extent Islam was beholden to foreign influences. The same exotic character can be traced in its *philosophy*, which has been termed 'little more than a chapter in the history of aristotelianism.' It was an adaptation of greek thought modified by oriental ideas, fostered by princes and students and confined within a narrow, if famous, circle which the orthodox throughout suspected of heresy. Its chief professors were Persians from Khorasan and Bokhara, like Farabi and Gazali and 'Avicenna'. Al-kindi, the pioneer of the whole movement, sprang from Basra on the Persian Gulf (where, perhaps 6000 years before, the earliest seeds of human culture began to bloom). In Spain the great names of 'Avempace', Ibn Tofail and 'Averroes' whilst they suggest arabian stock are in truth the product of a complex society—a moorish ruling class lying strongly under jewish, and in some measure under Christian, influence. Islam in its early and more independent days had a religious philosophy of its own: the *motakallemin* (loquentes), who in interpreting the world used the scholastic method of stating *a priori* how matters ought to stand and then declaring that they would be found so standing in effect. The problems of *creation, providence*, and the *limits* (if any) *to divine power* occupied these students. They showed a cartesian zeal for preserving to God an *immediate* and *continuous agency* in the world. Space was filled by atoms (without quality or extension) and God's will caused every change in their grouping by a direct act. They long forestalled Hume in his denial of *causality*; for them 'fire burns' or 'moisture wets'

is (like our ' sun rises ') a convenient but erroneous phrase expressing a habitual connexion which our senses observe. Like Sylvanus Regis, or Spinoza himself, they refused to man any real activity : when a stone is hurled, it is God who creates motion : if a being die, it is because God has created death. To the visible cause is denied any efficient power over the obvious effect ; and the uniform ' laws of nature ' are referred to God's momentary intervention. At any time God may rescind the custom and (with the scotists) inaugurate at His good will and pleasure another system : there is no trace of the stoic maxim in theology—*semel jussit, semper paruit.*

Denied by the Religious Philosophers.—To this attitude Averroes objects as the negation of science. Its theological aim is clear ; God is placed as pure will (or wilfulness ?) above all limits and constraint, above all conception of form or law or matter ; things were bereft of any inherent causality, being in themselves dead and inert ; and there was no hindrance to a belief in occasional miracles, for the whole course of Nature was one standing and continuous marvel. It is not a little strange that these (cartesian) vindicators of God's direct agency should have so readily availed themselves of neoplatonic intermediates, —*Mind*, the first born and mirror, *Soul* and *Nature*.[1] With Philo and ' Dionysius ' they held fast to a *negative* theology in the matter of God's Essence : we can only say what He is not ; reason stops short at the *active intellect* (νοῦς ποιητικὸς), a world-soul which regulates the development of mankind and is the ultimate goal of the individual spirit. The philosopher (avoiding the arbitrariness of the theologian's deity) was content to elevate his reason by constant exercise, that at last it might unite with the world-intellect as it draws to itself the spirits of men who thus prepare for its influence. Although philosophy is nearly always a religion, and if it begins in *logic* ends in *mysticism*,—yet there are few clearer instances of its identical aim. Their god with whom they yearned to unite was not the First but the Second Deity : yet, as in the sufic poets, their doctrine was but another form of a common theory of man's intercourse with a spiritual world. Mahomet had made the Deity inaccessible : faith and emotion demanded a nearer communion. Muslim

[1] As we saw above in the peculiar system of the Assassins (370) or of the Druzes (361).

philosophy, though more cautious than its mystical schools, was from the first *practical* and *religious*.

Christians make Greek Philosophy known to the Arabs *500–900* A.D.—The transfer of the material of greek learning into the sassanid and arab empires has been already mentioned. Nestorians and Monophysites alike used the logical terms and method of Aristotle. On Emperor Zeno's expulsion of these scholars of Edessa the further study of the *Organon* was continued on persian soil (*480*), Nisibis was the home of abstract science and Nishapur (Gandisapora) of a medical school. The Monophysites made syriac versions of Porphyry's *Introduction* and Aristotle's logical treatises, in their school at Resaina and their convents at Kinnesrin. But the nestorian interest in practical and applied science gave them the greater influence under the caliphate. During cent. viii and ix they translated the chief works of Aristotle first into *syriac* and then into *arabic* ; such a student was Husain ibn Ishaq or *Johannicius*. The physics, medicine, astronomy and mathematics of Greece were made known to the arab world. Galen and Aristotle represented in their eyes the sum of secular wisdom. With them the latter thinker became something more than human ; human reason had reached its zenith at Stagira. They were more free from ecclesiastical prejudice than subsequent commentators in the latin world ; they adhered to the literal text, accepted the obvious meaning, and refused to judge their authors by the standard of Islam. In them began that divorce of the truths of *faith* and *reason* which marked so much of our later medieval thought and still continues to-day.

Persian Influence : Muslim Culture exotic, artificial and restricted.—With this greek influence coalesced a very strong persian current. With the abbasids began the supremacy not only of Khorasan but generally of all persian thought and ideas. Refinement, study and culture were not a part of Islam's first program ; nor were they acceptable either to the people or the narrow and orthodox clergy. The princes who were patrons, the scholars and doctors who were clients, always stood under a cloud of suspicion. Hence largely the indifference of muslim to secular government ; it is for them something which had released itself from religious scruple and restraint and might be allowed to sink into an empty arbitrariness in its own sphere. It was not mere fatalism or love of passive obedience—for

its own sake—nor again, belief in caliph's or sultan's divine mission, which made them accept autocracy : it was because government (as in India) was a foreign agent with which the real life of the true believer had little to do. Hence no society has ever been so artificial and unnational as that in which 'muslim' culture flourished. Colleges for 'heathenish lore' in Bagdad and Nishapur attracted students from all parts ; from the land of Spain and the remotest steppes of Turkestan. Mansur favoured the diffusion of greek science ; and Mamun (*813–833*) was the most liberal patron of every school and professor. It was under this enlightened caliph that Aristotle first appeared in arabic ; and the orthodox muslim doubted if a prince so intent upon the wisdom of unbelievers could be saved.

Kindi, the Basra Brethren, Farabi.—Al-kindi of Basra [1] (*800–850*) leads off the series with a scholar's universal interest ; he wrote on *medicine*, *theology*, *physics* and *music*. He reflects the neoplatonic harmony of platonic and aristotelian doctrine, which passed into the western mind and was only dispelled by a critical study and comparison of the texts. The desire to comprehend all human knowledge in a single system guided the Brethren of the Pure Life (*Ikhwan us Safii*), who fixed their college at Basra *c. 80* when the noonday of the caliphate had passed and the reign of turki violence and disorder had already begun. Their object was to reconcile *faith* and *reason* and show the continuous stages of human inquiry, from the direct study of nature and numbers up to the mysteries of religion. The compromise of a rigid and formal creed with increasing knowledge of the exterior world finds its counterpart in the latin Schoolmen, or the 'harmonies of science and religion', in our own day. They arranged an encyclopædia, with aristotelian material arranged in a platonic spirit. From the Alexandrines they borrowed the idea of a world-soul of which our own are parts, the μερικαὶ ψυχαὶ of Plotinus. *Alfarabius* or Farabi (*870–950*[2]) in his paraphrases of Aristotle

[1] Or as some say at Kufa of which city his father was governor under Mahdi and Harun (*c.* 800). When the truculent caliph Motawakkil led an orthodox reaction and again insisted on the 'Coran uncreate', Kindi's books were confiscated. Of his 200 works less than one-tenth survive. Roger Bacon places him in the first rank of *opticians* after Ptolemy (cf. de Boer's 'history of muslim philosophy,' Stuttgart 1901 and London 1903).

[2] Abu Nazir Mohammed ibn Tarkan, born of turkish stock at Farab in Turkestan received court favour and a pension from Saif Addaula the

gave a lead to Avicenna ; and his logic had a direct influence upon the latin scholastics. In him appear, mature or in germ, all later problems of the thinking muslim world. He is the precursor of Averroes in his hierarchy of being, in his double aspect of the reason, in his belief in a future bliss of souls gathered into one and relieved of the burden of isolating bodies. With him begins that futile hunt of the scholastic age in east and west alike : ' the universal and particular are not distinct from each ' other as *understanding* from *senses*, but both are in a sense *intel-* ' *lectual* just as both play a part in *perception*.' He distinguishes universal essence in its abstract nature from the *universal* considered in relation to a number of *singulars*. This conception of the Idea as both *ante* and *super res* as well as *in rebus* is no doubt guided by his religious belief. Islam struggled against a physical pantheism by making God remote from the world, by representing Him as arbitrary *Will*, not as universal *Being*—as the Christian pantheists of Sudaili's type in Syria or the sufic poets seemed to do. Platonism taught that God was transcendent, and that the work of divine agency in this world was undertaken by a mediating principle, νοῦς or intelligence. It is then with this alone (strictly speaking) that *philosophy* is concerned ; the absolute essence being left to religious *faith*—or, later, to pure *emotion* and rapture by the side of which reason is dumb and silent.

Avicenna and the Scholastic Problems of Universals.—Avicenna[1] (*980–1037*) is the most famous name in this short list of eastern philosophers. Western logic was content to follow in

Hamdanid ; he died at Damascus. His writings have been unjustly overshadowed by Avicenna ; Dieterici has done good service by publishing (at Leiden 1890–1904) various translations of his treatises ; as well as versions of the writings of the Basra ' Brethren of Sincerity ' 1861–1872. For other arabic schoolmen consult Brockelmann's *Gesch. der arab. Litt.* Weimar 1898.

[1] Abu Ali ibn Sina born in Bokhara of a native mother ; his father, a persian from Balkh, tax-collector under the Samanid Emir. He became physician at Court 997 with access to the court-library, the Samanids being good patrons of letters and science. After 1004 came the fall of the dynasty and a time of vagrancy : at last he found a home at Rai near Teheran ; became vizier to Shams Addaula and was nearly killed by the mutinous kurd and turkish guard. From this perilous service he escaped to Ispahan and spent the last 12 years under the protection of Abu Yafar the prefect. He certainly hastened his end by his devotion to wine and spent his last days in penitent remorse for his dissolute life and bad example.

his footprints. Porphyry had suggested to the east and to the west, almost at the same moment, the problem of general terms or abstract ideas. Avicenna thought that the *universals* (essences, forms, *νοητὰ*, *intelligibilia*) might be regarded in three ways : *in themselves* (metaphysics) *embodied in sensibles* (physics) or *expressing thought-processes* (logic). In the *first* inquiry, we think of form or idea as self-contained in the principles of its own being ; in the *second*, with the accretions and limits of real (sensuous) science ; in the *third*, in the dialectical process of thought. A universal or common term is the common feature derived from a survey and comparison of particular instances : it is embodied in things, the type being represented more or less perfectly by the constituents of a natural group or class. Logic (in the *third* place) does not treat the general terms as eternal Ideas (*before* multiplicity), or as immersed in our world of Sense (*in* multiplicity) : but rather as they exist for the reflecting mind after its said inquiry and comparison. Logic does not come in direct contact with things ; its terms are relative and subjective, modes (that is) of our comprehending : they do not prescribe a law to the world outside but describe the forms which our thought must take, set forth the relations which the object has to our consciousness.

Stages of Rational Enlightenment : Intuition : Attempt to Reconcile Faith and Reason.—The general system of Avicenna is Aristotle seen through neoplatonic glasses. It is another attempt to harmonize *faith* and *reason*, to frame a compromise between free thought and the canon of Scripture. In his psychology he teaches that man's rational soul has two faces like the moon, one practical turned to the body ; the other open to heavenly influence which reveals to us the forms. It is the Active Intellect which enables the dormant faculty of reason in man to become active. Much intellectual work is merely detergent and purgative, Porphyry's *cathartic*,—it serves but to clear away the obstacles which hinder the influx of the Intellect into the human vessel of clay : only after a certain training and cleansing is this capable of receiving the light. The stages must be clearly set forth to the learner, like the stations (*maqamat*) in the sufic system or the careful itinerary of Theresa or John of the Cross. *First*, there is mere *potency* of the higher intellect, as in a child before learning to write ; *second*, the bare possibility on its way

to be realized (by ἐθισμὸς), when the child is learning the elements of writing. This is the period of the half-trained reason, when without art or science we sometimes make happy guesses or conjectures. In the *third* stage, mere experiment is over and we enter the path of certain science and demonstration; the *fourth* is as when writing has become a 'permanent accomplishment or lasting property of the subject' (Wallace), the stage of the complete mastery of a science: it now corresponds to the νοῦς ἐπίκτητος. There are grades of susceptibility to the Active Intellect or divine illuminant: sometimes the influx is so vigorous, the subject so thoroughly recipient, that all the stages are in a moment surmounted, and 'without teaching the soul rises at one bound to the vision of truth', by a holy force which Plato half approvingly called madness and accident (θείᾳ μοιρᾷ, *Meno* and elsewhere). Hence Avicenna is forced onwards to a religious and even mystical theory of reason and its training. In Islam a place had to be found for the phenomenon of *prophecy*, of *miracles*, of the guidance of *inspired men*. The Active Intellect, which like Plato's 'sun' gives forms to objects and makes them intelligible, also acts on the souls of men by special and uncovenanted means. The end of logic is to supersede itself, and while for ordinary use a careful grading of class-rooms, subjects and teachers is needed, the philosopher does not wish to cast doubt upon the fact of an *instantaneous irradiation*. If we believe in God as a moral governor, we must believe also that revelation by *prophecy* is possible: and it must be accompanied by *miracles* to guarantee that it is authentic. It is not quite easy to decide if Avicenna held neoplatonic views on Active Intellect or νοῦς as an actual hypostasy and real being; or considered it to be an abstraction of a philosophy which does not recognize *persons* but only *ideas*. In any case his attempt at compromise between *faith* and *reason* was a failure, and only provoked among the orthodox, long silent and indignant, that reaction of which Gazali's *Overthrow of the Sages* is the best monument.

The Orthodox and Pietistic Reaction: Gazali.—Here as in the west (much about the same time) mystical piety and emotional faith made protest against the formulas of divines and text-books. In place of *reason* in religious matters, the chief honour was to be given to *love* founded on *faith* and *obedience*.

Gazali [1] believed that the sole result of secular studies and an attempt to find any *rational* basis for Islam, was to cast the inquirer into doubt or indifference. He applied to the various sects, asking what standard of truth they used. He examines the current peripatetic views and though he stands here as a mere sceptic we can discover his own convictions. He protests against the *eternity of matter and the world* ; believes the current view of souls [2] in the celestial sphere unproven ; and thinks (with our earlier muslim divines) that to attribute *effect* to the very nature of the *causes* is to derogate from God's unique agency. He taunted the followers of Aristotle with failure to prove the spirituality and future existence of soul, or the oneness and being of God. He ascribes the motion of the spheres to God's direct action, not to any influence, mediated by angels or spirits,—the *motrices animæ* which lingered on in the west into cent. xvii. With Hume he asserts that our ' natural law ' by which effects are said to arise unvaryingly from the cause is a figment of custom ; there is no *necessary* tie. But unlike Hume, who denies *necessity* altogether and threatens us with a purely *accidental* world, he removes it a stage back into the mind or will of the deity. How

[1] Born at Tus 1058 of a family noted for its deep knowledge of canon law. He went to the college at Nishapur and studied under Juwaini until the age of 27. The great seljuk Vizier Nizam al Mulk appointed him professor at Bagdad 1091, one chief duty being to combat the insidious opinions of the Ismailites (cf. Appendix G 370) of whose perfidy the Nizam was fully aware. Four years later he adopted an ascetic life in which he tried to stifle the doubts and mental unrest which his championship of the reason against ' illuminationism ' had awakened. This distress gave way to a peaceful and resigned attitude. He was invited by the Almoravid Yusuf to visit the far west in 1106, but on the sultan's death abandoned the journey. He visited the great capitals, Damascus, Jerusalem, Alexandria—as well as the holy cities Mecca and Medina. Malik Shah the great seljuk Sultan prevailed on him to return to the duties of a professor at Nishapur, but Gazali soon after died at his birthplace Tus in 1111. Baron de Vaux has written a useful monograph (Paris 1902) as well as a standard work upon Avicenna his enemy. His most famous work *Tahafut ul falasifa* was published Cairo 1885, Bombay 1887 : the *Kitab ul Munqid* (in which he recounts the changes in his thought and attitude) at Constantinople 1876 and translated next year by de Meynard in *Journ. Asiat.* Claud Field has published *Confessions* of *Al G.* (London 1909). The most recent authorities for his life are D. B. Macdonald (Jo. Amer. Ori. Soc. vol. xx 1899) and de Vaux.

[2] A mélange, as we shall see, of Chaldeism and several hellenic currents.

little satisfaction the inquiring mind found in orthodox Islam after the study of Aristotle is clear from Gazali's final position which is that of a Sufi. Like Pascal, Kant and Mansel, he had in him a vein of mysticism which underrates the very reason which it knows so well how to use. In a vague monism or abstract unitarianism with its impassable gulf between God and man he cannot rest. He discovers that the sufis apprehend the laws of life by intuition and can absorb their souls into the divine nature. He found in their dogmas a peace which *motakallemin* orthodoxy could not afford. He condemned the allegorists who trusted to the *ipse dixit* of an infallible Imam; that reaction to blind faith in a personal guide or spiritual director, which had been prepared by an arid traditionalism.

Extinction of Philosophy and Free Thought in the East.—Gazali's work heralded the death of free thought and independent inquiry. The liberal and pacific caliphate failed to establish itself, chiefly because of the pressure of the barbarians of the further steppes, but partly because it had no genuine hold on orthodox loyalty. The drama of the decadence and fall of Rome was now reënacted: in spite of the culture of the Seljuks the Dark Ages set in. The Turks were rude proselytes with all the zeal and intolerance of new converts. Philosophy after all was not a native product of the arabian mind; it arose, throve and fell, with the ascendancy of Persia and of Syria. The early tolerance, broken by Motawakkil and the savage feuds of the coranic problem, passed to the west and gave rise to a new and glorious period of enlightenment. In *1150* a caliph Mostanjid burnt a student's library as mischievous and heterodox; nearly fifty years later (*1192*) the medical treatises of a physician were solemnly cursed and committed to the flames, while their owner was sent to prison. But a few years later, on the death of Averroes, the sun of arab enlightenment set for ever in the west.

§ II. Arab Philosophy in Spain

Development in Spain began under Hakim II (*961–976*) who was an exact coeval of the two great regents in Byzantium, Nicephorus Phocas and John Zimisces. The state of western Europe was distressing; Otto of Germany revived in some measure the dignity of a roman emperor, and of a roman pope. Elsewhere the framework of society was dissolving. Hakim

followed the example set by the Safaites of Basra and bought books from all the eastern centres of learning, Cairo and Alexandria, Damascus and Bagdad. He started free schools for the poor of Cordova in primary education. He opened the mosks for lectures on letters, science and law. His successor succumbed to a reaction : learned doctors took an inventory of the court-library and burnt all books dealing with the study of the visible earth or heavens. Not till the close of cent. xi was the embargo removed and the long suppressed spirit of inquiry allowed a free scope. During the last period of real muslim supremacy in Spain, Avempace, Abubacer and Averroes thought and wrote. Even in a fanatical dynasty (the Almohads) Yusuf (*1163–1184*) and Yakub al-Mansur his successor welcomed philosophers and heard them gladly. In *1195* a panic (half religious, half political) stopped this advance : wise students were banished and their work burnt. Al-Mansur's son set a new precedent in hitherto tolerant Spain, by killing Ibn Habib for the crime of studying philosophy—a precedent mercilessly followed by the Christian world in the succeeding age.

Avicebron's Jewish Platonism.—The prelude was played by a Jew, Avicebron or Ibn Gabirol (*1021–1058*) who was born at Malaga and died at an early age in Valencia.[1] His chief work, *The Fount of Life*, is not jewish in tone and betrays no hebrew idiosyncrasy : it is almost purely platonic or syrian pantheist in doctrine. (1) All things created are composed of *form* and *matter*, all matters being contained in a single universal *Substance*, all forms in one universal *Form*. (2) Between the Ineffable One (of Plotinus) and the νοῦς or intelligence, which is the real world-regulator, there is interposed the Divine *Will*, above the distinction of *form and matter* and the cause of their union in νοῦς : or rather at this point the distinction begins to exist. It was translated about a century after his death by Gundisalvi and John of Seville and at once began to exert a potent influence on the latin schoolmen. Duns Scotus adopted

[1] Scholars are much divided as to the date of his demise. Al-Harizi says he died at the age of 29, Moses ben Ezra at 30,—that is about 1050 or 1051 ; Steinschneider (1893) and Kaufmann (1899) give 1058 for the true date ; Abraham Zacchuto (1857) believes that he survived till 1070 and died at Valencia. The latin text of *Fons Vitæ* was published in Clement Bäumker's *Beitrage* (Münster 1895). See further on 403.

from him the notion of a common material element in things (as against Albert and Aquinas) : and he was also led by him to place *Will* above *Intellect* in his system, both in God's nature and in our own—thus paving the way for nominalism, science and the new ethic of endeavour and self-help. His other work (certainly authentic) is a practical exposition on the improvement of character (Wise, New York, 1901).

Progress of the Intellect in Isolation : Bajja and Tofail.—Ibn Bajja *'Avempace'* [1] was a mussulman born at Saragossa about *1100*: like Avicebron he died at an early age in *1138* at Fez. He wrote comments on Aristotle's *Physics*, and the *Regimen of the Solitary*, a work for mystical devotion. With a scholastic passion for organized systems and body of rules, he gave minute directions for the ascent of the soul from sense-life to a share in the divine Intelligence. His ideal *Solitary* will not, as a Christian hermit or muslim ascetic, withdraw from society ; but he will guide his own life as the citizen of a better order of things. He parts psychic faculties into various groups with that love of classifying which has often sterilized thought. When the human mind can grasp the pure intelligible forms, Plato's εἴδη, it becomes itself in a measure divine. This ' self-consciousness of ' pure reason ' is the highest goal of human activity. It can of its own inherent power reach truth ; it does not need Gazali's mystical irradiation. Ibn Tofail is better known to a very much wider circle by his romance of the solitary man *Hayy ibn Yakdhan*, ' the son of the Waking One '. In this account an isolated seeker after truth raises himself, without human instructors or example, above earth and his own passions, past the orb of heaven [2] up to the eternal forms (νοητὰ εἴδη) which impart to the stars their movement, until at length he is united to the Supreme Intellect.

[1] Ibn Khagan says he was poet and musician, as well as student of the exact sciences. In common repute, he was a sceptic who rejected the Coran, denied the return (of all things ?) into God and regarded death as the end of man. He became vizier to the Emir of Murcia, lived at Valencia and Saragossa his birthplace ; on its fall (1119) he repaired to Seville and is there said to have been reconciled to a belief in Islam (!) He was (it is said) poisoned at the Imoravid court at Fez.

[2] Is there not here a reminiscence of the babylonian star-worship which is transcended but never quite forgotten in the *persian* religion ?

Individualism : Insistence on Delimitation of Piety and Science : Averroes.—To this notion, common to the platonizing muslim both in east and west, Averroes (Ibn Roshd *1126–1198*) [1] gives more precise outline. Averroes was both a muslim and an aristotelian. He did not strive after a facile or syllogistic harmony of *faith* and *reason*. Like Spinoza he did not believe that religion depended on erudition or the sophistries of intellect : philosophizing in matters religious he believed to be the great source of heresy and doubt. The message of faith was so simple that it needed no abstruse knowledge or technical formula to compass its meaning and value. It was within the grasp of the simplest and most ignorant soul. Here intellect could claim no superior rank or function : in religion all men were equal. Theology must return to the words and actual teaching of God's Prophet : science and thought must not puzzle men and intrude into a foreign sphere. Men must cease to dogmatize on the subtleties of metaphysics and must confine their studies to a *careful survey of the present world* for which science and philosophy are suitable. Pure apodictic proof in theology cannot be obtained : a higher faith cannot be built up by intellectual cleverness on the ruins of the old sensuous childlike belief.

In spite of this really religious purpose—the design of Bacon, to keep science and faith apart, each in its proper sphere—his independent pursuit of aristotelian wisdom scandalized the timid and orthodox. Devout muslim puritans saw in him the

[1] Born at Cordova, he studied law, divinity, medicine and mathematics. Abubacer (Ibn Tofail) introduced him to the court : he became cadi of Seville in 1169 and filled official appointments for 25 years. In 1195 the hatred of the fanatical people banished him to Cordova ; he was however recalled to Morocco in 1198 and died before Al-Mansur his patron. With the two the muslim supremacy and muslim culture both came to an end. His works comprise treatises upon law, grammar, medicine, philosophy and the stars. The best introduction to his general views is found in *Philosophy and Religion* (published in arabic, Munich, 1859 and a rendering in 1875) which may well be compared with Spinoza's *Theol. Polit. Tr.* It is a serious reflection on the energy of modern scholars, that so many of his MSS. remain untouched in the Escurial and other spanish Libraries : they include works on law, astronomy, logic and criticisms of Farabi and Avicenna. The latin editions however of his Commentaries numbered nearly 100 during the century following the year 1480 : these comprise notes on Aristotle, an ' Overthrow of the Overthrow ' (an answer to Gazali), the *Substance of the Orb*, and a treatise in 2 books ' on the Soul's Bliss '.

leader of an *anti-clerical party* which spread materialism and doubt and in the end denied both God and the Soul. He set frankly in the clearest light those points in Aristotle which by no cajolery could be made to cohere either with Christian or with muslim belief. Religion to him was not, as to the Catholic Schoolmen, a matter of knowledge but an inward *personal* force, an emotional power, which is quite distinct from the abstract universalities of science and logic: —*distinct* but not therefore (he thought) *contradictory*. The comfort and the mild restraint of religion he claimed as the heritage of all men, even of the poor and humble whom the scholastic and the mystic left alone or despised. Religion did not deal with universal truths, but made a special and direct appeal (without demonstrating its premises) to the inner life of each, to the individual and personal consciousness. On the other hand, Science in its own proper domain must be left to work at its task, free and unfettered. It is concerned not with persons, their hopes, beliefs and conduct, but with universal and necessary law: of such a cool rational inquiry religion could never become a branch, to be reduced to axioms, definitions and dogmatic systems. A theology which blurred the frontiers of science and faith was a hybrid blend that could do no one any good, as Francis Bacon and Spinoza also taught in later time. Such an unwarrantable alliance was the source of all the unrest and disquiet of the time: it led, not merely to private doubt and to the despair of the devout and humble, but to the intolerance of persecutors who idly believe that philosophy entertained a special grudge against religion.[1]

His double attitude, (1) Nominalist.—In Averroes can be traced that new interest in personal feeling and individual life which is the keynote of our self-centred modern development. Aristotle found that the platonic *realism* ended in a disparagement of singulars and a contempt for things mundane: it is not a little strange that he should have been for many students a type of extreme pantheism. Christianity gave a quite unplatonic emphasis and value to the unit; and in spite of the vague realism of certain phases of religious socialism it has always owed

[1] It is worthy of notice that S. Wise (*Jewish Enc.* vi 528, 1904) uses these words of Gabirol (Avicebron): 'Unlike other jewish medieval 'philosophers who regarded *philosophy* as the handmaid of *theology* G. 'pursued his philosophical studies regardless of the claims of religion'.

its influence to its *individualism*—its answer to the question, 'What must I do to be saved?. . . He took him apart from 'the multitude'. But this *nominalism* in its widest sense—as interest in the living and concrete rather than in logical abstractions, or 'nouns of multitude' like empire, church, state—is quite as characteristic of Aristotle. It was a truer and closer reading of his text that helped to dissolve the realistic dream-visions of the Middle Age and of the earlier schoolmen.

Yet still a (2) Realist in the last resort.—The Arabians however were wedded to Realism : if God was not conceived as arbitrary *sovereign will*, he was thought of in the regular eastern sense as *universal being*. The whole was always greater than the sum of its parts and Averroes adhered to Aristotle's doctrine that the *world is eternal*. In the movement and change, growth and decay which make up world-history, the process may no doubt be pictured as a restless striving after a perfectness which cannot be reached. But this aspect is presented only to the eye of sense ; it is almost a mirage, a perpetual illusion—like individuality and 'severalness' to the hindu. The eye of reason sees finality always attained. The actualizing of the cosmos, wherein we see only embryo potencies at strife, is somehow clear for reason. What the world of sense is always vainly seeking, exists somewhere—a transcendent and abstract being in which is no shadow of turning or default. This is thought or intellect, not conceived as creating the world, but as its ideal end, guiding the operations of nature and not waiting on their success for its existence : 'God as the unchanging essence of the movement and therefore its eternal cause'. (Wallace *Enc. Brit.*). In simpler language, the *perfect* must be anterior to the *imperfect;* as in Aristotle himself (*Metaph.* xii. 7) against Speusippus and the pythagorists, who put zero (or nebula) at the start—the Chaos of ancient cosmogonies—and derived therefrom the complex heterogeneity of our experience. But the perfect cannot exist close to the sublunar sphere ; hence this domain is handed over to a secondary God, Numenius' or Tennyson's δεύτερος θεὸς the νοῦς of Plotinus and the Arabians. This Intellect (active and productive) is the real author of mental development in man ; and is the eternal Form or rather Thought which is the truth, ideal, and stimulus of the whole cosmic movement. This truth is revealed and explicit in mankind, and, so long as humanity

lasts, there must be some people fit to show it forth. We may conceive *education* in the commonsense or rationalist way, as the securing of truth and right principle by study; on the other hand, in a transcendent metaphysic, it is the beaming light breaking through the earthen vessels, wearing out or burning up the thin vesture of flesh—the Divine Intellect manifesting itself in the transient individual. In the highest stage (in Averroes' system) the bliss of the soul is won even in this life (as with Buddha) by a complete union with this transcendent essence. So far then as we can partake in Intellect, it is one and continuous in all; we differ only in the degree of illumination. Intellect is one, but this is not monopsychism; there is not one soul common to all men. Nor must his doctrine bear the slur cast upon it by the ignorant of destroying the hopes of immortality.[1]

With Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon, *1135–1204*) a younger coeval of Averroes, the spanish school comes to an end,[2] and this

[1] It must be confessed that the above section does not fully explain the true position: in intellectualism or modern Absolutism there is a great and perplexing *mystical* residuum, religion and ecstasy somehow postulated without creed or object,—in the last resort, like stoical pietism, without sense or value. Averroes' doctrine is mystical and not untinged with emotion: he is not a purely scientific rationalist or deist who allows God to appear at the beginning and the end of things (as Creator and Moral Judge), but claims for free search and free will the whole intervening space and epoch. But an interpreter of Aristotle cannot after all fail to be in some sense a *mystic*—a fate which a student of Plato (on the other hand) may very easily escape.

[2] A Jew of Cordova he was brought up in jewish tradition and in the new secular culture which had then reached its height. In 1148 the stern dynasty of the Almohads seized Cordova and claimed to restore Islam to its early severity. Orthodox Jews were ill-treated; Maimon escaped and settled in Fez, leaving for Egypt in 1165. At the cairene court he was at once a celebrity and the recognized leader of all the jewish communities in the east. Losses at sea reduced him to poverty and becoming a practising physician he was attached to Saladin and (it is said) refused an offer from Richard I of England. His chief work is the *Guide of the Perplexed* in 1190 through which he has wielded influence on the later development of Aquinas and Spinoza. (See Yellin and Abrahams *Maimonides* London 1903.) While in Spain he commented on the entire Talmud, and wrote treatises on logic and the calendar: his notes on the Mishnah were *Light* (1158–1168); in Fez, *On the Sanctifying of the Name of God*. In Egypt, the Biblical and rabbinic code; Letter to the Yemenites; and additions to the Mishnah Commentary, on reward and punishment, on immortality,

name reminds us that we have to travel backwards to understand a jewish development which could produce such a philosopher in cent. xii.

on the jewish creed and the like. In Maimon the jewish version of hispano-moorish culture found its highest expression. As against Averroes or the mystics he tried to show that *faith* was *reasonable* (*Moreh Nebhukim*).

DIVISION B. [Part I]

2. MUSLIM AND HEBREW SPECULATION

CHAPTER D. DEVELOPMENT IN JEWISH DOCTRINE

Points at issue in Judaism (*200* B.C.–*100* A.D.).—Modern inquiry seems to call in question Josephus' account of Sadducee doctrine, where as in the *Acts*, they are represented as pure *secular thanatists*; cf. Oesterley's excellent work[1] *Books of Apocrypha*, Scott, London 1915. They certainly believed in Sheol and while repudiating the idea of posthumous reward and the *fravashi* or *ka* superstition ('it is his angel') assuredly did not call in question the angelic apparitions of Scripture to which (as against oral tradition and accretion) they held with devoted zeal. Still Loewe is quite right (*Enc. Rel. Eth.*) when he says: 'The greatest achievement of the Pharisees was the advance which they taught in the doctrine of the future life.' The train of thought which could find no comfort in a personal hereafter or in a Messianic kingdom to be set up on earth settled down into the pessimism of *Ecclesiastes*. Meantime it was from the 'rigid and exclusive' pharisees that the *universalist* doctrine arose. Their teaching was optimistic; life was good and obedience to God's Law was in itself a joy. The Essenes disappeared because they were dualists; the Sadducees in their primitive form could not survive the extinction of a visible kingdom; in which for them lay the sole hopes of judaism. The divine fatherhood was extended to all men and the gentiles were to share in the coming revelation of Messiah.

Culture and Doctrine after the Dispersion: Universalism.—At the final Dispersion of the Jews under Hadrian it is curious to

[1] I am dispensed by this scholarly production from the need of inquiring closely into the formation of dogma and the assimilation of alien influences by the jewish mind, from the Maccabean Period (*c.* 175 B.C.) down to the close of the 'Apocryphal Canon'—if the paradox can be justified. Let me here once for all acknowledge my indebtedness to this book which forms the ground and starting-point of the following disquisition.

note that heretical sects began to manifest themselves in Palestine : Justin Martyr speaks of five such bodies besides the two great parties. In the hitherto barbarous district of Galilee, rabbinic academies were set up at Usha, Tiberias and Sepphoris. Mesopotamia was a ' fruitful soil ' (Loewe) and lent the wisdom of Babel to the mother-land in Hillel. Here is the home of the larger Talmud, with its ' undying influence ' on Judaism : Egypt was only the cradle of the LXX and of Philo whose vein of hellenic theosophy cannot be compared with the work of the rabbis of Babylon in impressing doctrinal character. Still even by the rabbis the effect of gnostic speculation and continuous hellenic thought was keenly felt. Four (it was said) ' entered ' paradise ' that is, indulged in metaphysics, one to lose his reason, another to apostatize, another to die young (never a sign of heavenly favour as among the greeks) : only Aqiba retained his faith and his sanity. Cosmology was now discouraged and an interdict placed on allegorizing certain of the more obscure passages. The victory of the Pharisees over their rivals was marked by *optimism* ; the dogmas of immortality and resurrection, now firmly held, are proof of this. In the *Haggada* the Messianic age is an age of peace, not of vengeance.

Influence of Babylon.—The Babylonian Age succeeds to the Tannaitic (so-called) ; and Babylon now enjoys a higher repute than Palestine or Galilee. Rabh (*175–247* A.D.) taught a *universalist* doctrine and eschatology, and inculcated love towards all mankind. The leaders in Judæa acknowledged the supremacy of his successors. Rabh's austere rival Ariokh (*165–257*) became an astronomer and was certainly under chaldean influence ; he knew his way (he professed) as well among the stars as in the streets of Nehardea but was puzzled about the comets. In the time of Ashi (*352–427*) began the collection and arrangement of the Talmud ; the creative power had declined, and it was now high time to ' seal up the tradition.'

Islam and the Karaites : Saadia *c. 900* A.D.—The next influences of judaism were, from without, Islam ; from within, the karaite schism—the latter chiefly due to purely political causes. The sectaries leaned towards the motazelite doctrine of free-will (among the muslim libertarians) and opposed an arbitrary omnipotence at the moment of creation. Mahomet's treatment was by no means wholly unfriendly, and when the Arabs adopted

greek philosophy under the liberal caliphate, judaism was closely affected. Hitherto jewish theology was concerned with practical questions (*Halakha*), with refuting Karaism and its 'pelagian' tenets or with defending the talmudic system. But jewish writers now began to harmonize their ancestral doctrine with the new thought of the age; and Isaac Israili of Kairouan (*c. 850–932* A.D.) was known as a man of science and a physician.

The karaite schism, largely political though it was, certainly stimulated thought and reflexion at this time. The rabbis were now put upon their defence and produced positive statements of the now impugned orthodoxy. 'Said the son of Joseph 'of the Fayyum' in Egypt, otherwise Saadia, lived between *892* and *942* and came thence to be Gaon or chancellor at the academy of Sura. His great work[1] is entitled *Faith and Philosophy* and was the earliest attempt to bring revealed truth and human learning into line. 'No Jew should discard his Bible and try 'to form his belief by the sole light of his own reason. He may 'only endeavour to prove by means of reason the material or *corpus* of the Faith.' He gave to subjective faith a peculiar and mystical sense; it is soul's absorption in truth's very essence, which thus becomes part of it. Philosophy (he believes) did not lead to doubt: with equal justice might astronomy be identified with dangerous or foolish superstitions.[2]

The Spanish Theologians: Bahya.—Bahya of Saragossa (*c. 1040* A.D.) began to expound a system of ethics. His *Guide to the Heart's Duties*[3] aimed at proving that the jewish faith rested on Reason, Revelation and Tradition—stress being laid on its practical character, as 'joyful readiness to fulfil the duties of life 'through love to God.' Faith must not be blind and unreasoning but able to 'give an account' of itself. Reason shows that there must be a Creator and that there cannot be more than one. God's essence cannot be known . . . only His *active* qualities were within our scope; the *negative* (as in Philo's system) are beyond our understanding. Scripture speaks of God in anthropomorphic metaphors; and these (though needed for thought, speech and instruction) are pure symbols and must not be pressed. It is silent or at least reserved on the problem of the hereafter,

[1] In *arabic*, into which tongue he also translated the Bible.
[2] Cf. Abrahams' *Short Hist. Jew Liter.* London 1906; also App. J. (411).
[3] In *arabic*, tr. by one of the great Tibbon family into *hebrew*.

because only mature reflexion can compass the doctrine of immortality. It is well to purify oneself by ascetic practice and abstinence ; but such a course is not recommended for general adoption (Broydé-Kohler ' Bahya ' *Jew. Enc.* ii 447, 1902). Moses ben Enoch had transferred the torch of Hebrew learning from Babylon to Cordova (*900–965*) and already before Bahya we have the names of Shaprut (*915–990*), Saruk, Labrat, Hayyuj, Janah, and Samuel the Nagid (*993–1055*), vizier of Habus, emir of Granada (who will receive further mention).

Avicebron.—To the same region and period belongs Ibn Gabirol or ' Avicebron ', the hymnologist and philosopher.[1] He lived between *1020* and *1070*, spending the decade *1040 –50* at Malaga. It is worthy of note that in one of his best known hymns he takes his text (as it were) from the aristotelian treatise *de mundo*—' As pilot to ship, as charioteer to car, leader ' in choir, general in army—so is God to His world.' In philosophy proper, he wrote *Improvement of Moral Qualities* at Saragossa *c. 1045*.[2] In this he shows a distinct advance upon Saadia or Bahya (who was writing about the same time : ethics are to be set free from the tutelage of religion and set forth as an independent science. Of the celebrated *Fons Vitæ* the arabic original is lost ; hebrew and latin renderings survive. (*c.* Bäumker's edition Munster 1895).[3] This work exerted influence on the Cabbala but had little effect on the scholastic theology of the Jews—as being based on authorities outside Scripture which the divines could not recognize. It is an attempt to harmonize jewish and platonic monotheism ; and the peculiar phases of the latter doctrine reappear in Duns, the precursor of nominalism at the close of our period. Avicebron's cardinal doctrine is a *monistic parallelism* of spirit and matter.[3] There is an identity of substance running through the universe of body and spirit : so in ethics he had strongly maintained ' the correla- ' tion and interdependence of psychical and physical in moral ' conduct ' (cf. *Jew. Enc.* article vi 529). Wholly excluding God

[1] Whom Munk *Mélanges* etc. Paris (1857–9) identified as one and the same person—being highly commended for the discovery by Renan.

[2] ed. Wise in *arabic and english* New York 1901. Cf. note, 393.

[3] Consult Steinschneider *Die heb. übersetzungen des Mittelalters* Berlin 1893 : also Neumark's ' history of jewish philosophy ' in the same period, i, Berlin 1907 and Kaufmann's *Studies* Budapest 1899.

from the category of universal substance he asserts that every creature—whether spiritual or bodily—possesses *matter* as well as *form*. Duns accepts this position as against Albert and Aquinas; he agrees with the Jew *quod unica sit materia*. The further step to identify this *materia universalis* with God—will not be taken in the church until David of Dinant, in the hebrew communion until Spinoza. But it is easy to see how this platonic 'realism' trembles on the brink of a complete (physical) pantheism and that it cannot long be kept secure from the *salto mortale*.[1] Everything in the world is reduced to three categories: *God*; the *universe* as matter and form; *will* as mediating between the two. Here again we find a premonition of scotism: it is *will* not *thought* that connects the two extremes, God and the world. Hence though both philosophers are in a sense rationalists, the agnostic doubt at the root of all nominalism can be clearly detected. Some minds, uncertain of their power to reach a deity whose 'thoughts were not as their thoughts', would fall back upon obedience to churchly precept and tradition, without troubling much as to the rational basis of faith. However little use Avicebron made of this concept of *will*, it is certain that he opposed it to a purely necessitarian efflux of Godhead into the world of things.

Halevi.—Halevi of Toledo (*1085–1143*) shows the reaction from a complacent rationalism which is assured of the harmony between *faith* and *reason*. In philosophy he is like Gazali the Arab a sceptic that he may open the door for faith (Hirschfeld *Khazari* of Halevi London 1905). 'Both writers' says Morris Joseph (*Enc. Eth. Rel.*) 'aim at displacing the wisdom of the world 'by unconditional belief, and the rabbi was probably moved to 'write his treatise by the polemical works of the muslim divine.' In a supposed dialogue with the King of the Khazars—a sort of analogue to the *Milinda* discourses in buddhist greco-Bactria—he dismisses the claims of muslim and Christians and karaites, resting proof wholly on a *direct revelation* and a *continuous* churchly *tradition*. He upheld the ptolemaic cosmology because it seemed to be supported by the Mosaic account in *Genesis*. He opposed extreme predestinarian views (as of the Jabariyya) without accepting the unlimited freewill of the muslim *motazel*.

[1] Cf. Steinschneider's work already named, see p. 403.

While he admitted mediating causes between God and the world he earnestly attacked both the *platonic* belief in Emanation and the *peripatetic* doctrine of the eternity of matter and the world. For this reason his plea on behalf of jewish independence was displaced by the harmonist Maimonides, who adjusted the faith with the teaching of Aristotle. Halevi will not admit the competence of philosophy on the basal questions of the faith ; God's existence and His close relation to the universe and chosen people as a personal deity. To orthodox muslim and jew alike greek thought appeared to contaminate the holy tradition and bring in wrong views on the world's origin and the divine attitude to it. The historic facts of the Bible and the unbroken tradition of Jewry are for Halevi the impregnable rock.

His Dialogue of the Khazar.—The positive teaching of the *Khazari* may be shortly summed up : the end of religion is practical, the good life ; the guide needed for this is best found in Judaism which is attested by the long biblical records. Scripture is wholly reconcilable with reason : God does not alter but man's different relations to Him give rise to the adjectives ' merciful ', ' jealous ', ' wrathful ', ' long-suffering '. Scripture must be supplemented by an Oral Law, such as is to be found in Talmudism, which adapts to the needs of successive ages the ' faith once delivered '. As in the catholic doctrine of ' develop- ' ment ', the pious are thus assured that in obeying this rabbinic tradition they are fulfilling God's will. Judaism is the religion of joy ; it sets limits on ascetic practice and teaches that soul and body must be equally developed. Man is free although God's all-power and all-knowledge control the course of the world. Prophecy is a direct gift from God ; but the man thus favoured must merit it by a holy life. Israel has a special aptitude for this gift and outside the Holy Land there is no prophecy. The present exile is no proof of God's rejection ; the Jews are the ' martyr-people ' dispersed throughout the world to spread the true religion. The dry bones will live again ; the Gospel and Islam, though erroneous, are forerunners and even coadjutors ; they prepare the way for Messiah at whose advent all men shall be gathered in one fold. A better specimen it would be hard to discover of that generous *universalism* and self-sacrifice which began to mark hebrew writings from *c. 200* B.C. His poetry moves in much the same plane of thought : there is expressed a desire for closer

communion with God and an absolute trust in His righteous dealing. At times he is afflicted by the thought of Israel's 'low estate'. He often speaks with bitterness of the enmity of Edom and Ishmael (Christians and muslim). At times he even invokes God's vengeance on the persecutor. But the final note is never sombre but one of faith and hope and forgiveness. At last Israel shall be redeemed, her long and painful task achieved, and in the revival of her national life all families of the earth shall be blessed.

Avenares.—Ibn Ezra 'Avenares' was born at Toledo (*c. 1095–1167*) and after *1040* became a wanderer, and visited Africa and Egypt, Southern France and even England. From 'Avicebron' he adopted his neoplatonic tenets and also showed sympathy with the pythagorizing tendency of the Basra 'Brethren' of Purity'. God is substance alone; all the rest of the world is matter and form in some proportion. Quite in spinozan fashion he calls God 'the power from which issues that which is *felt* and *thought*'. God's knowledge is very different from that of man; indeed the two are incommensurable: 'He is at one and the same time the *knower* and the *known*'. This knowledge, again, is limited to general ideas—the eternal and unchanging paradigms or types of Plato: of the *individuals* which make up the *species* He has no cognizance. We only describe His *actions* or relations to us when we call Him 'wise', 'good', 'righteous': His intrinsic nature or essence is inaccessible to our thought. When we speak of *creation* we mean only the moulding of the world below the moon: the world alone—heavenly bodies, angels, spheres—has neither beginning nor end. God determines the *species* to whom as to subordinate demiurges He entrusts the power to fashion the *individual*. God only acts upon the world by *media*; in nature through *angels*, in history by means of *prophets*. He explicitly asserts that the sublunar region was created by the instrumentality of angels—as in the gnostic schools. God works too upon the nether world by means of the celestial bodies, which send good or ill upon mankind. But—as the *parsis* sought to overcome the planetary fatalism of Chaldea—so Avenares tried to save his religious conceptions (the doctrine that God can overrule or overpower these conjunctions); tried to save freewill by supposing that only over the morally unsound can the stars have unlimited sway. The universe is made up of (1)

Highest World or angelic. (2) Middle World of sun, moon and stars. (3) Sublunar, made up of the four elements and the three kingdoms. These notions, not contained in a specific work on philosophy but scattered among his writings and poems, suffice to class him with the *gnosis* or blend of parsi and chaldean elements the development of which we have tried to trace in this volume. In his critical comments on Scripture text (in which he was almost a pioneer) he delights to relapse into astrological surmises. He exerted on Spinoza a very obvious influence—seeing that he divided the prophecy of *Isaiah* between two writers and held that the latter part of *Samuel* could not have been composed by the prophet himself.[1]

His Cousin Moses ben Ezra.—His kinsman Moses (*1070–1138*) was a prolific writer of hymns and penitential psalms, and his fame as a religious poet has eclipsed his just merits as a philosopher. In his *Arugat ha-Bosem*, he discusses the unity of God and shows that we cannot apply to His unique nature either attributes or definitions.[2]

Close of Rational Thought in Moses ben Maimon.—Of Maimonides (*1135–1204*) we will here only say that in him we have a convinced harmonist of *faith and reason* who wrote expressly to reassure those who were embarrassed by the *antitheta* of gentile thought and the literalism of the Torah. He goes further than his forerunners in discussing anthropomorphism, and lays far more stress on the nature of God as pure bodiless spirit. Following Aristotle in almost every particular he nevertheless corrected him in the *creatio ex nihilo* and maintained that the greek had not really taught the world's eternity. The Spheres and Intelligences did not coexist with the Prime Cause but were created by it. He revived, in a refined form, the old secular utilitarianism of the hebrews ; teaching that the aim of existence is *happiness* and the sole end of the legal precepts is to secure this. His outlook is that of a tolerant and optimistic universalist. He recognizes the merits of the Gospel and of Islam and holds that salvation is not confined to the Jews : the pious of all nations have a

[1] Cf. further Chapman *Introd. to Pentat.* Cambridge 1911.

[2] Richard Gottheil has a poor opinion of this work and thinks it impossible to extract a coherent system : he cites in it greek philosophers, Farabi and, amongst the Jews, Saadia and Avicebron. Dukes published some fragments in the periodical *Ziyyon* 1842.

'share in the world to come'. [1] His attitude to a future life (like that of Aristotle) is doubtful and indistinct. He certainly recalls the old sadducean austerity of Antigonus of Socho; the Saint must not serve the Master for sake of reward and needs no inducement to live well. His true reward lies in raising his mind to the level of the divine essence,—a restrained mysticism in which he is at one with Aristotle and his own coeval Averroes. Commenting on *Mishna Helek* he makes out that immortality is of the intellect (? alone) and holds that the wise are virtuous for love of virtue. But he sees the need of extraneous reward and promises hereafter, and knows well that for the masses this inducement of future profit cannot be dispensed with.

Articles of the Jewish Creed.—Love of systematizing and the persistent attacks of muslim led Maimon to formulate a creed.[1] Maimon's famous *Thirteen Articles*—part of his *Comment* on Mishna *Sanh.* xi—were intended as a protest against Christian and muslim misstatements, that the anthropomorphic language of scripture was in effect a denial of monotheism, that Mahomet had now quite superseded Moses, that the rabbis had altered and interpolated the Torah, that the Messiah was still to be expected (?). The *creed* proposed as a remedy was translated by Samuel Tibbon (*c. 1200* A.D.), and is now prefixed to the Talmud: (1) God is and is cause of all things. (2) God is one. (3) God is bodiless and the language of the Bible is largely metaphor. (4) God's unity has no beginning. (5) None other—whether angel, sphere or element—may be worshipped. (6) Prophecy is a gift granted to holy men whose soul rises into relation with the creative intellect (*νοῦς ποιητικός*). (7) Moses is father of all prophets. (8) Torah is of divine origin and the whole of the

[1] Cf. Abrahams-Yellin monograph London 1903.

[2] An attempt not wholly novel in Judaism since we find in Halevi the rabbi explaining his belief in articles to the Khazar sovereign: (1) belief in God of Abraham who led Israel out of captivity in Egypt with signs and wonders; (2) He is the only ruler and abides for ever; (3) from Him came the Torah; (4) proof of this is seen in His careful providence towards our forefathers and chiefly in the *exodus*. About 1161 David of Toledo in his arabic work on the 'Lofty Creed' gives six necessary dogmata: (1) God is a spirit; (2) and is one only; (3) He has attributes; (4) He rules the Universe; (5) our faith is based on tradition and tested prophecy; (6) certain teaching on Providence and Freewill (no doubt an attempt to preserve and reconcile both factors).

Law was revealed to Moses, as it is in our hands to-day. (9) The Law will never be abrogated nor will any addition be made. (10) God knows the actions of all men. (11) God rewards all who obey the Law and punishes its violators. (12) The Messiah will arrive without fail no matter how long he tarry. (13) There will be a General Resurrection of the Dead. Hirschfeld very well says that these *articuli* may be grouped round the three principles of God's being, Revelation and Retribution—that is, to abstract theology of a strict unitarian character is added the *historic* and the *personal* element, without which a religion, able to influence human conduct, cannot well be conceived.

APPENDIX J.

Political Fortunes of the Jewish People

Congregationalism and Partial Autonomy under Rome.—To the religious forces at work in Chaldea must be added the influence of the Jews. On the overthrow of the jewish nation a great spiritual revival had invigorated the Chosen People. Released from a central and (in fact) alien government, they had broken up into a *semi-tribal synagogism*,—in which the communal life was clearly guided by the assembly and its leader :—a condition of religious society clearly analogous to presbyterian and congregationalist movements in the *protestant* church. The *Mishnah* was completed in those early days of mournful retrospect and rabbinic law controlled every side of life. Over these scattered communities the Sanhedrim held sway ; and the ' patriarchs ' like Gamaliel of Jamnia or Judah the editor of *Mishnah* (+ *c. 210* A.D.) enjoyed *political* as well as *religious* power. Long before the modern turkish system of group-autonomy under recognized rulers, the Romans granted jurisdiction to the jewish leaders. Even under Theodosius I (+ *395*) internal affairs were formally entrusted to their patriarch and the advisers of his son Honorius (+ *423*) permitted the tax (*aurum coronarium*) to be collected for his revenue from the Dispersion. The office was abolished after a life of 350 years under Theodosius' grandson of the same name (+ *450*). Not until a century later did an emperor interfere in the religion of the Jews : Justinian I in *553* forbade the use of the Talmud. They were still allowed to settle disputes before their own courts, but the emperor denied to them the right of appearing before an imperial tribunal against a Christian. Under Honorius in *418* they had been excluded from the army and all public office, being only bound to the costly dignity of *curiales* ; in *425* his successor, acting under byzantine advice, forbade them to take the profession of advocates. In *537* Justinian says summarily, ' honore fruantur nullo '.

Settlements in Persia : the Democratic Universities.—The Jews had

found ere this in Babylonia another fatherland :[1] here before the year *500* the Talmud was completed. As under the Abbasids in later time a large part of Persia was to be nestorian, so now Mesopotamia (in the strict sense) was chiefly occupied by Jews : Nehardea (east of Euphrates) became the capital of an almost entirely hebrew region. A rabbinic academy had been founded here as early as *150* A.D. and lost its prestige only after the arab conquest (*c. 650*). Another established at Sura by Abba Arika (*c. 219*) kept its place and renown till cent. xi as a focus of learning and tradition. It was at Nehardea that Samuel drew up rules for the jewish attitude to a foreign government ; a *concordat* of the Church with the (unbelieving) State. Ever since his time loyalty and obedience to the civil power is part of religious duty,—except of course where its commands were found to conflict with law and conscience. In *259* after Odænathus of Palmyra had dismantled Nehardea, Pombeditha rose into notice as a new centre of religion and culture. The *democratic* basis of these universities is worthy of remark · twice a year a vast crowd of students of every age and rank gathered to discuss various matters of social and religious import ; the President of this General Assembly or national Parliament (kallah) only put his seal and sanction to the expressed will of the majority. Under the Sassanids the jewish communities were to all intents autonomous—uniform government from the centre and a single comprehensive law being either outside the scheme or beyond the ability of the new dynasty in Persia (*225–650* A.D.). The Prince of the Captivity (*reshgalutha*) was a recognized vassal of the persian king who dealt through him with the entire body of Jews, just as the Khan of the Kipchak or Golden Horde used the russian *kniaz* as their fiscal agent and satrap.

Exilarch and Gaons under Muslim Rule.—Islam in spite of its early loans from Judaism and its reverence for their scriptures, began with intolerance ; Caliph Omar (a greater rigorist than Mahomet) forced the hebrew people to wear a distinctive dress. Like Honorius and Justinian, he forbade them to own land or hold office and subjected them, with Christians, to a poll tax. But these laws soon became a dead letter : for several reasons the Jew was needed and made welcome in the muslim community—*genus hominum quod semper vetabitur, semper retinebitur.* In the Middle Age the Jew lived more freely and securely under the Crescent than the Cross ; and whatever might be the public disabilities of the community, the skill and learning of individuals were gladly employed. A new central authority the academic *gaonate* was allowed to spring up in Babylon, with a power greater than that wielded either by the patriarch in roman or the exilarch[2] in sassanian times. The two chancellors or presidents

[1] On the continuous presence and religious fervour of jewish settlers in this region, cf. Sam. Daiches *Jews in Babyl. in the Time of Ezra* London 1910.

[2] The exilarch Mar Zutra headed a movement aiming at complete freedom in the last century of the Sassanids and was put to death, the office remaining for some time in abeyance. From 650–1050 the office was restored to its former dignity and held by the Bostanaids.

of the Academies at Sura and Pombeditha held sway from the muslim conquest to the middle of cent. xi ; they paid a nominal homage to the exilarch but otherwise were independent and acted as the final court for all social and religious disputes. Hai Gaon died in *1038* and closed the series. Hezekiah (*c. 1045*) was the last exilarch in Babylon ; though Benjamin of Tudela names David ben Hisdai in cent. xii. Pekahiah also names his successor, a nephew who held office jointly with a certain Rabbi Samuel. The splendour of his court and retinue was a byword under the muslim rule ; his installation was an impressive ceremony and he received homage from his own people as an official of the caliph. From a canopied stall in the Synagogue he gave a discourse and his name had special mention in the concluding Doxology. He visited the caliph with a stately retinue ; collected taxes from his own people under muslim sanction ; and could punish and excommunicate his ' subjects '.

Saadia's Harmony of Faith and Reason : Jewish Scholastic under the Caliphate.—One of the most notable jewish figures in this age of the caliphate is Saadia ben Yusuf (*894–942*) a native of the Fayyum in Egypt. He appeared at a time when reaction had suppressed the forward and liberal movement under Caliph Mamun, and learning seemed to be dead both in the east and west alike. Little of value had been written by Jews since the completion of the Talmud. Only the sect of the Qaraites cultivated learning and restricted their observance to the letter of scripture, just as certain ' puritan ' sects in Islam followed only the exact words of the Coran. A schism arose about the time of the abbasid victory (*750*) when Anam (with a hereditary title to the office of Exilarch) was set aside, because he was believed to disparage the Talmud and ' oral tradition '. Migrating to Jerusalem he founded a school (extant till the epoch of the first Crusade *1100*) and died in *765*. The whole schism turned upon the ' arbitrary additions and subtractions ' of the Rabbanites ; many points of minute detail being involved—how to calculate the new moon for the passover, at what hour to kill the paschal lamb or burn the remnants. Their liturgy lacked hymns and poems (*piyyutim*) and was composed only out of the text of Scripture. Against this austere sect Saadia came forward at Bagdad at the age of 23 ; his disputes turned largely on the calendar and the dates of festivals. In *922* he procured the banishment of Ben Meir by the exilarch David ben Zakkai, who in return for his services made him Gaon of Sura. After two years both excommunicated the other ; and David bribed a needy caliph Qahir (*932–4*) to forbid Saadia to act as Chancellor of that University. But the two became reconciled after 4 years and Caliph Radi reinstated him in his office at Sura, where he died in *942*. He translated most of the Bible into arabic and wrote on grammar, the *liturgy* and the *Talmud*. In *philosophy* he commented on the *Sefer*, a pseudonymous and mystical treatise on which the later Cabbala is based: in *933* at a time of singular dearth of writers throughout the world, he wrote a *Book of Beliefs and Convictions* (the hebrew title being *Emunoth we-Deoth*). Here as in Maimonides nearly 3 centuries later, *reason* and *revelation* are complementary, not opposed. It is a jewish scholastic, an attempt to find a *rational* basis for the *faith* : creation, God's nature,

the soul, free-will, revelation, the Messiah and a future life—are the problems treated. Saadia shows a thorough knowledge of Aristotle and of Christian, muslim and even brahman tenets. In this book he refuted the rationalizing and sceptical Hivi of Balkh who in the century before had published a treatise on the difficulties of the Bible.[1]

APPENDIX K

Jewish Thought in the Middle Age: Movements Leading to the Cabbala

Comments and Paraphrases of the Law: The Series of Authentic Doctors. —When *hebrew* had to be rendered into *aramaic* that the common people might understand (A) *Targum*, as exegesis and amplification of the Law, came also into vogue. Much was made of the tradition that Moses received an oral tradition handed down secret and intact through the LXX Elders [2]. To this esoteric source may be traced both developments in Judaism—*ritual* and legal as well as *mystical*. In the one the 'church' was able to develop and amplify the sacred text by a continuous prophetic power inherent in her rabbis; in the other, a personal doctrine of mystical devotion as well as an imaginative cosmogony was fathered upon the 'patriarchs'. (B) The *Halakha* represents the chain of oral tradition applied to the details of every day life and regarded with hardly less reverence than the Law itself. This floating body of gloss and comment was reduced to uniformity and a definite code in cent. ii by *the* rabbi *par excellence* Judah ha Nasi. (C) In the third place we may reckon the *Mishnah*, while (D) the *Midrash* was the body of scriptural exegesis gradually forming. The *Tannaim* (teachers) occupied the first two centuries A.D. and were followed by the *Amoraim* as chief authorities from the close of the Mishnah (*200–500*). During this period of roman supremacy the *Mishnah*, once compiled, became like Scripture itself the subject of discussion and interminable comment; and this further material was written down and named (E) *Gemara* (complete learning) the two together forming the (F) *Talmud*—found (as we know) in two recensions, of Palestine and of Babylon though both had the same basis. With the reigns of Justinian and Chosroes

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[1] Of which a fragment is published by Schechter in *Jewish Quarterly Review* xiii, 345, who has also given extracts from Saadia, Cambridge 1903. For his philosophy of religion, see Guttmann, Göttingen 1882 and Engelkemper in Bäumker's *Beitrage* iv. 3, Munster 1903, where is to be found part iii of the *Book of Beliefs* in German.

[2] See II *Esdras*, xiv 26, 'When thou hast done, some things shalt thou 'publish and some things shalt thou show *secretly* to the wise: 45 The 'Highest spake saying, the first that thou hast written *publish openly*, 'that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, 'that thou mayest deliver them only to such as be wise among the people; 'for in them is the spring of understanding, the fountain of wisdom and 'the light of knowledge.'

the age of anonymous writings ends and scholars for the first time come forward in their own name with original works : this new period of hebrew activity will continue until the close of our present division (*1300*).

The Gaonates and the Dispersion.—The order of *Amoraim* was succeeded by that of the *Sabaraim* who continued to explain and expound on the same lines (*500–600*) ; these again by the *Geonim* or academic chancellors (*589–1038* or *1040*) who for four centuries acted as the Court of Final Appeal for the Jews of every country. Their answers to enquiries on ritual and legal points were accepted as the *responsa prudentum* of an earlier age, some being actual decisions of *Geonim* as it were *ex cathedrâ*, others being an official analysis of a general debate by school members. Sherira (of Pombeditha) who died at the close of cent. x (*998*) sent a rescript as far as Kairouan ; his son Hai the last Gaon (+ *1038*) wrote response in arabic, a lexicon and commentaries and poems, all mostly lost. His son-in-law, the last Gaon of Sura, rendered the Five Books of the Law into arabic, wrote paraphrase and comment on several other books of Scripture, and composed (also in arabic) an introduction to the Talmud. In the middle of cent. xi, the eastern schools were broken up and their members, forming a new Diaspora, fled to the west and there promoted rabbinical studies. In Fez, Kairouan and along the whole northern coast, there had been great *grammatical* activity, in close connexion with Spain, where already a literary revival had taken place.

Jewish Writers in N. Africa and in Spain.—There were even traces in cent. x of more edifying studies—a history of the Jews having been composed by ben Gorion and treatises written by Donnolo on medicine with a commentary on *Sefer Jezirah*, the mystical pseudepigraph attributed to Abraham, which has been already mentioned. Still earlier were the medical and philosophic tracts of Isaac Israili (+ *932*) at Kairouan ; and in Tunis the mythical record of the Ten Tribes, from which western scholars in the Middle Ages freely borrowed. In cent. x Hushiel, a talmudic scholar, was brought (a captive ?) from Babylon to Kairouan, and his son (+ *1050*) wrote a commentary upon the Talmud. His coeval, Nissim ben Jacob wrote from the same centre to Samuel the Nagid in Spain and to the last Gaon of Pombeditha (+ *1038*). This activity then passed westwards into Moorish Spain, where it found its final and most famous home.[1]

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[1] Samuel Nagrela the Nagid (+ *1055*), became vizier to the king of Granada, patron of Avicebron ; Behai ibn Paquda, dayyan at *Saragossa* (author of a moral treatise in arabic) ; Gayyath wrote on ritual at *Cordova* (+ *1089*) ; Abraham bar Hiyya on mathem. and astron. (+ *1136*) ; Moses ben Ezra of *Granada* (+ *1040*) ; Abraham ben Ezra of *Toledo* (who visited England and the East and died *1167* ; wrote a commentary on Bible, grammar, astron., mathem. ; Judah Halevi of *Toledo* (+ in Jerusalem *c. 1140*) one of the chief hebrew poets and writers of apologetic, composed a treatise defending revelation against alien philosophy and the Karaites ; ibn Migash of *Lucena*(+*1141*) ; the great traveller Benjamin of *Tudela* (+ after *1173*) ; Abraham ben David of *Toledo* (+*1180*).

The arab conquest of the peninsula had given a new stimulus to the Jews already settled there. They soon began to compete with their eastern brethren in enterprise and intelligence. From the very first they were made welcome to high offices in the State. Hasdai ibn Shaprut is accounted the founder of jewish culture in cent. x; becoming minister to Caliph Abderrahman III in Cordova, he encouraged and protected jewish settlements in 'Andalos' and was a liberal patron of letters, art and science. He was the first of a long line of scholarly statesmen and administrators which includes Samuel Nagrela in cent. xi and extends to Abrabanel (+ *1492*). In moorish Spain the Jews played the same part as the persian 'enlightenment' under the abbasid dynasty at Bagdad.

Maimonides: his friends and opponents from *1200*.—We have now reached the name of Maimonides, already mentioned (407) as a member of the Spanish School, although his chief activities found scope in Egypt. There is no doubt that his broad aristotelian views were repugnant to the orthodox and called forth a mystical reaction,—just as scholastic reasoning upon matters of faith evoked the protest of the victorines and later of Eckhart and his followers. Of conservative protest in the name of tradition Moses ben Nahman[1] is a good representative; he disputed with his own people as well as with Christians (even in the presence of the King of Aragon). He wrote on the Pentateuch to counteract the views of Maimon and ibn Ezra, and is credited with the authorship of certain cabalistic works, being at least in sympathy with the secret reaction which produced the Cabbala. Solomon Adreth of Barcelona (*c. 1251–1310*) wrote against Islam and the new school of Cabbalism in favour of which Abraham Abulafia (+*1291*) and his pupil Joseph Gigatilla (+*1305*) took up the pen. His pupil Behai ben Asher of Saragossa wrote on the Pentateuch and other treatises in which he made use of the Cabbala. Meantime Abraham ibn Hasdai had translated (*1200–1250*) a large number of arabic works, among which one embodying Aristotle's *De Anima* and Gazali's *Mozene Zedeq*: he was then a supporter of the liberal views of Maimon. Falaquera took up the same position and combined these doctrines with those of Averroes (*1290*): he commented on Maimon's *Guide of the Perplexed* *Harizi* (*c. 1250*) made numberless translations of Galen, Aristotle, Hariri and Maimon; while Isaac Abrab (+*1310*) combined Aristotle with mysticism.

Pietistic Reaction produces the Cabbala: Platonic Theology.—In such a century of ferment was produced the Cabbala—at least the principal extant works by which the system is known. There can be no doubt that the two chief text-books *Bahir* and *Zohar* made their first appearance in cent. xiii. Nahman, if he had no actual hand in compiling these mystical treatises, was at least in full sympathy with their ideas. The *Bahir* some refer to Isaac the Blind of Posquières (+*c. 1225*) and believe him to be the founder of modern Cabbalism. *Zohar*, attributed to cent. ii and Simeon ben Yohai, is probably the work of Moses of *Leon* (+*1305*), who took his material from earlier sources, such as the *Sefer* or *Sepher Yezirah* (on which

[1] Or Nahmanides, born at Gerona 1194,+in Palestine 1270.

commentaries had been written in cent. ix).[1] The *Zohar*, 'the cabbalists' 'Bible', arose from the problems of *creation*. Why did a Perfect Being create ?[2] The answer (as in early hindu and later sufi theology) attributes to deity *a wish to become known and manifest*. The *En Sof* is the Boundless One, above *being* and *thinking* (as in Plato) ineffable by word, incomprehensible by reason,—the Nothing *ayin* (iii 283). The difficult transition from self-involved deity to active and creative providence is secured by the 10 *Sefiroth* :[3] for creation implies intention, purpose, wish, material,

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[1] (A) The *Sefer* or *Sepher*, ascribed to Abraham and to Aqiba (*c. 100* A.D.) is probably not earlier in its main features than cent. iii or iv and must represent an afterwave of *gnosis* invading the unitarian and monarchian traditions of Judaism (L. Ginzberg, in *Jewish Encycl.* iii 603) ; (B) *Bahir*, also referred to cent. i, and the pen of Nebuniyah ben Haqanah, is sometimes attributed to Nahman's teacher Azriel (1160–1238) : in it a *Trinity* is first taught and the outlines set for the more developed (C) *Zohar*, in which a complete mystical cosmogony is set forth under the guise of a *Comm. in Pentateuchen*. Yohai (cent. ii) is supposed to discover in a cave in Galilee this esoteric teaching given to Adam and handed down through patriarchs and prophets. But the writing discloses the secret of a very much later date : its mystical meaning of the vowel-points prove it subsequent to 570 A.D. ; it quotes a hymn of Avicebron who lived *c.* 1020–1070 ; it names the capture of Jerusalem by the Crusaders and its recapture by the Saracens ; it mentioned the comet of 1264, seen at Rome under Urban IV ; and it gives a reason why its contents are not divulged to the world before *anno mundi* 5060, which corresponds to 1300 A.D. This points to the truth that Moses of Leon (+1305) wrote it and sold it as an early jewish treatise ; even the learned Jews in a not uncritical age being deceived, by its embodying old theories and many current views.

[2] *Zohar* begins by expounding *Gen.* i 4, whence its name ; after 1, *additions*, we have in § 2 *Mansions and Abodes*, describing the structure of paradise and hell § 3 *Mysteries of the Law*, the evolution of the Sefiroth from En Sof § 4, *The Hidden Meaning*, showing in true philonian spirit how secret doctrine can be derived from the plain letter and narratives § 5 The *Faithful Shepherd* (Moses) who talks with Elijah, as in the Christian Transfiguration, and ben Yohai the supposed rediscoverer and compiler of the treatise § 6 *The Secret of Secrets*, treats of physiognomy and psychology § 7 *The Aged One*, or Elijah discoursing on transmigration (*Exod.* xxi 1 and xxiv 18) § 8 *The Book of Secrets*, on cosmogony and the history of demons § 9 *The Great Assembly* (with certain reference to the *Kallah* or democratic debate of Sura and Pombeditha), herein Yohai lectures to a large class on the nature of God § 10 *The Young Man* on ablutions § 11 *The Small Assembly*, discourses on the Sefiroth to a small band of chosen disciples.

[3] Variously derived from *safar* count, *sappir* brilliance, and *σφαῖρα*—the last being held most likely by Henry Loewe. It may here be stated that they bear a direct relation to the members of Adam Kadmon's primitive body—the Primal Man of the gnostic schools, known also to Philo

design and working—all inconceivable in such a deity as Philo and Aristotle had described. They imply limit and a circumscribed personality. The *first* Sefireh was spiritual substance coeval with God, *second* emanated from *first*, and so to the end. These powers (which of course remind one of Philo's δυνάμεις) *are not creatures* : with *En Sof* they form an indissoluble unity, different phases of the same being (sabellian), different rays of the same sun. They are both infinite and perfect (as En Sof Itself), yet at the same time are the first finite things : the one when It imparts, the other when It withdraws Its fulness from them. They are various ways of regarding one and the same absolute Being, according as its functions or relations vary. Their names are fanciful ; *Crown, Wisdom, Intelligence, Love. Justice, Beauty, Firmness, Splendour, Foundation* and *Kingdom.* The *first* sefireh is called Holy Aged One ; from it emanated *wisdom* in male form, from this *intelligence* as the mother ; from whose union the other pairs emanated (iii 290). These are the *first* triad : these represent the head of *Primal Man* (Adam Kadmon), *beauty* the bosom, *love* and *justice* the arms—forming the *second* triad. *Firmness* and *splendour* are the legs, *foundation* being the generative part—forming the *third triad. Kingdom* or Sovereignty, though emanating from the last or ninth encircles all the rest, being Shechinah.

The World-Series : Gnostical.—This *first* world (of Emanation) is the Primal Man, the first-born (Ezek. i). The 3 triads are *intellectual, moral, material. Crown, beauty, kingdom* form a trinity of themselves. Besides, each member is in itself a triad, with (*a*) its own character, (*b*) what it received from its parent (*c*) what it imparts to the rank below ; this is pure Proclus. ' As the Holy Aged One is represented by the number 3 so all ' the other Sefiroth are of three-fold nature ' (iii 288). It is clear that Creation is then (as in Ionia or India) only an expansion or evolution of these Sefiroth. The cosmos reveals the Boundless : but a long interval stretches between the heavenly world and ours. From the world of *Emanations* (1) come that of *Creation* (2), the ' Throne ',[1] also composed of ten sefiroth but of more limited powers : in it lives the angel Metatron [2] who governs the visible world, keeps the harmony and guides the spheres

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and adopted by medieval alchemy as the microcosm. This being is sexless or bisexual : St. Paul may have borrowed his heavenly Adam (*Cor.* xv) from the idea. Some hold that like Philo's λόγος, Kadmon occupies a place midway between *En Sof* and the *sefiroth.*

[1] Is this derived from, or does it give the precedent for, the muslim ' Throne ' ?.

[2] Metatron : Angels, in Apocrypha and Talmud, appear as active agents and intercessors, but had no share in the work of creation. *Bereshеth Rabbah* strongly condemns this gnostic heresy. The name *Metatron* is explained as μετὰ θρόνον or *metator* the ' measurer of heaven '. Kohut (*Aruch* Vienna 1878–1892) suggests that it is derived from *Mitra* ! Elisha ben Abuya thought that M. was one of the two creative potencies. Streane (*Chagigah* Cambridge 1891) adds to possible roots, μηνυτής or ' informer ' (p. 85) or delegate of God and a *chaldee* world for ' guardian ' : for him

as captain of the whole angelic host. The world of *Formation* (3) is the abode of these angels, wrapped in garments of light and divided into ten ranks ; here the Sefiroth (? leaders of the ten ranks) as further from the Primal Fount are of less refined substance yet still without actual matter. The world of *Action* (4) emanates therefrom, with Sefiroth made of grosser elements and clothed in matter controlled by space and perceptible to sense. Here we reach (Aristotle's) sublunar region, open to the influences of change and decay : it is also the dwelling place of evil spirits, marshalled like the rest in ten ranks. The third degree of this reign of evil is *Abode of Darkness*, and seven are Halls of Hell (as in the kindred mandean system): these are subdivided according to human sin into fitting torture-chambers over which demons preside. The Prince of this realm is the same Samael who seduced Eve ; his wife is the Mother of Fornication and together they are the Beast (ii 255–259).[1]

Importance of Man the Microcosm : Psychology.—But the universe still awaits its key and centre, even in all this lavish abundance of spiritual life. The earthly Adam (as microcosm) is created by the heavenly Adam, the *Primal Man* or first ten sefiroth (II 70) ' Man is the true import and ' highest degree of creation, wherefore he was formed on the sixth day. ' When he was created all things were complete, even the upper and the ' nether worlds, for *everything is comprised in man* : in himself he unites ' all forms ' (iii 48). All human souls preexist in the world of *Emanations* [2]

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metator means not a creative power but =*præcursor* the angel who went before Israel in the desert. He is sometimes identified with Enoch, with the ' Prince of the World,' even with Christ. While other angels have but one foot and that a calf's, M. has two and is alone able, and permitted, to *sit* in heaven. In *Chag.* he does not rise in horror when Acher propounds a *dualistic* theory and so is punished. Acher fell into the error of supposing M. to be a *second* god when he saw him sitting in heaven (!). Moses asks his intercession with God to postpone his death ; M. shows him the Promised Land and together with other angels, buries him.

[1] It is a little strange that the devils with their prince and ten ranks should not have a region to themselves which would make five worlds in all : the torture-chambers scarcely form part of this present and visible world but are subterranean depths or caverns as in most popular medieval notions.

[2] The whole theory of emanation is of course pantheistic and marks a reaction against the aristotelian *transcendence* in theology. God is in all the series which form a link between deity and the world. All creatures (as in alexandrine platonism) are *issues* or *outpourings* from His ' over-full ' cup of being ' (Plotinus). Apart from Him nothing can exist. Bahya at first made this dogma welcome in Judaism but Halevi and Maimon expressly reject it. It had already appeared (cent. iv) in Midrash (*Ex. Rabb.* xv) : 3 first elements (fire, air, water) produce other 3 (darkness, light and wisdom) ; it is hard not to see in this an imitation of jain cosmosophy). Repudiated by the philosophers, the Cabbala revived the belief ; it is found

and each prior to its entry into the material world (why does it so enter?) is male and female united in one being ; it is separated here, and has to find its mate (? a reminiscence of Plato's *Banquet*). In marriages which are truly ' made in heaven ', man is united to his lost consort (i 91). Besides this psychic doubleness, each soul contains in itself ten potencies, each 3 composing (1) the *Spirit* on which the *Crown* works (the κόσμος νοητός): (2) the *Soul*, on which *Beauty* works, the seat of moral qualities : (3) the *lower soul* or vital principle (*nephesh*), cause of the bodily life and movement, on which *Foundation* works :—these 3 correspond to the *intellectual*, *moral* and *material* world. The destiny of each soul is to develop the germs of implanted perfections ; it will, in the end, return to the source whence it emanates : if it yields to temptation and becomes polluted by sin, it must thrice inhabit a body, till after repeated trials, it can reascend in a purified state. If it fails under a third experiment it is united with another soul. When all the pre-existent souls have descended, served their probation and reascended, then the soul of Messiah will come down and begin a Messianic reign or Jubilee upon earth. Sin and pain will vanish, Satan (Samael) will again become an angel of light and the everlasting Sabbath will dawn. All souls will be joined with the Highest Soul (?) and in the Holy of Holies each to all eternity will be the complement of the others (i 45, 68 : ii 97). This religious Averroism is worthy of note : in both systems soul or rather spirit has a determinate number of expressions, and does not spring from infinite matter but is added to it. In both systems the final end is that soul-substance shall become once more one and indivisible (ἀμέριστος οὐσία).

Indebtedness and Influence of the Cabbala.—The Cabbala then, borrowing from every known source of esoteric enlightenment, represents the jewish form of that universal religious craving which seeks to enter into fuller communion with God. Like all later Judaism it shows strong affinities with the ancient (planetary) creed of Babylon.[1] It is, like the mandean religion, an epitome of all pre-christian belief in that central region where all prehistoric culture was preserved side by side with later developments. On its *personal* side (as distinct from its *theosophy*) it belongs to that epoch in the west when faith demanded a closer union with things divine than legalism or scholastic could afford. It is of the same class as the victorine literature or the sermons of the german Mystics. Though it appears like a belated form of *gnosis*, it is in effect a protest against intellectualism and formula. There is no emphasis on law or outward Authority but solely on the inward experience of the soul. Prayer and meditation were the first steps on the road upwards to God which culminated in ecstasy. It had the antinomian side common to all mysticism, which disdains an appeal to anything external to consciousness. Scholastic had held (among Jews, Christians and Muslim alike) that the

in *Massekheth Asiluth* (cent. xii). Still, it was not a necessitarian efflux, but an act of divine will.

[1] A. Jeremias *Babylonische in N. Test.* (Leipzig 1905) : E. Bischoff *Babylonische Astrales im Weltbilde des Thalmud und Midrash*, 1907.

divine mysteries could be plumbed by reason, that anything so unattainable by the (legitimate) means of logic and syllogism was unknowable and perhaps non-existent. Against this limitation, which doubts as to the competence of reason made always more intense, the devout mind protested. God could be realized and felt even if He could not be known. It is an easy charge against such thinkers that introspection only gives subjective feeling and cannot lead to any reality beyond the mind which creates its own world. The pietist in all ages becomes a 'law to himself' because he does not recognize any authority in the experiences of mankind and refuses to learn from the 'education of the race'. The Cabbala was also a protest against extreme literalism; the anthropomorphic language which had long perplexed jewish divines, the over simple narratives of daily happenings: hence under every letter 'jot or 'tittle' a profound import which the initiated could discover. The contempt of a learned Allegorist for the 'day of small things' and homely lessons is seen: 'If the Law consisted but of common phrase and stories, 'as Esau's words, Hagar, Laban, Balaam's ass or Balaam himself, *why 'should it be called the law of truth, the perfect law, God's true witness* ? Each 'word contains in itself a sublime source, each narrative points not merely 'to the *single* instance in question but to all such general cases' (iii 149,152). In such philonian allegorism (or modern Absolutism) it is easy to detect a profound distaste for the concrete example, for the actual instance, for the given: it is merely a signal, a reminder, of a general truth and apart from this intimation or hint of the Idea has no value in itself. Thus Isaac or Joseph (or our Lord) may or may not have lived,—it is no matter; what is of moment is their symbolizing some universal truth. Hence this *realism* which disparages the concrete and finds delight in an 'Averroism' which is not content until the distinction of persons and souls is absorbed into the Highest Soul: just as Sudaili (or Erigena after him) will not rest until 'God is all in all' in the most literal sense.

Affinities with Christian Doctrine.—That, besides obvious loans from Babylon and Alexandria, the Cabbala is under debt to Christian influence is very clear. The doctrine of the Trinity (ii 43, iii 65) we read, 'As voice 'though one is threefold, *fire, air* and *water*, all three being one in the 'mystery of the voice,—so do Yahweh, Elohenu, Yahweh constitute one 'being—three forms which are one.' On Isaiah vi 3 one MS. shows: 'The first *holy* denotes the Father, the second the Son, the third the Holy 'Ghost.' The Primal or archetypal Man or first Sefiroth-decade is like Christ of a double nature, both perfect and imperfect, infinite and finite. The Atonement (ii 12) is stated in a thoroughly Christian spirit: 'Messiah 'invokes all Israel's sufferings and pain upon Himself: if He did not so 'remove them no man could endure the afflictions of Israel, due as their 'penalty for transgressing the Law.' Whatever may have been the aim of the writers or compilers in cent. xiii, there is no doubt that many learned men were led through the Cabbala to the Christian faith. Shem Tobh ibn Shaprut (*c. 1380*) retranslated St. Matthew's Gospel into hebrew, and Hasdai Crescas (*+1410*) wrote strongly against the Christian faith as well as against Maimon's peripatetic liberalism. In the middle of

cent. xv some jewish converts in Spain (including Heredia, Davila, and Vidal de Saragossa) made extracts from such treatises to prove the truth of the Gospel ; Emperor Maximilian's own physician Ricci followed suit. Christians, in the ferment of the Renaissance and a secularized papacy, were glad to fall back upon these confessions of an enemy. Mirandula, Reuchlin, Agrippa and Paracelsus found in these mystical writings not only the chief argument for Christian belief but a key to every mystery of nature and science. But this phase of the Secret Doctrine belongs to a later period than that with which we are concerned.

Later Mystical Developments : Luria.—But since both Islam and Judaism henceforth (after cent. xiii) stand aside from the course of world-development, one later product of this mystical cabbalism may here receive notice : Isaac ben Solomon Luria, a german Jew born in Jerusalem in *1534*. In *1559* he lived in Cairo trading as a spice-merchant. In *1551* he had become owner of a copy of *Zohar* ; to read it he withdrew to a hut by the Nile, only issuing forth on the Sabbath. He now began to see visions, held converse with Elijah and, like St. Paul or Mahomet, was rapt into heaven to receive instruction from the great teachers of the past. In *1567* he removed to Safed in Palestine, already the head quarters of cabbalist students : here he lived in an atmosphere of saintliness for six years (+*1572*). Luria founded a school of mystics who by abstinence and penance sought to deserve and attain a close converse with heaven. He preached to the birds and worked miracles in company with his disciples . he went forth with them on long country walks and taught orally without committing his doctrine to books. Prayer was his chief support and vehicle : by it (it was thought) man could control this lower world (cf. the modern claims of mahatmaism) and at a higher stage rise above earthly things to God. In every pious jew celebrating the sabbath-day with due reverence dwelt the Over-Soul, which in this fashion united all the faithful brethren. There grew up a complex and fanciful ritual-cultus of this over-soul. He was convinced that he himself was a chosen mouthpiece of this divine emanation ; and when dying begged his disciples to ' be at ' peace and bear with one another and so be worthy to hear me when I ' come again to reveal to you what mortal ear has never yet heard '. He adopted all the commonplaces of mystical practice or doctrine—rigorous penance and emaciation, the notion of an alternating process of contraction and expansion in the divine essence, the belief that God though unknowable by *reason* can yet be seized by *feeling* and direct intuition, and a somewhat dangerous fetishism depending on the symbolic meaning of everything visible. But he transformed them and gave them new values by his personal influence and his saintly life.

Jews as Transmitters of Greek and Arabic Culture to the West.—The part played by Judaism and jewish culture in handing on the learning of the east is quite as important as its cabbalistic influence. The *spanish* Jew even in cent. xi had a rival in the *french* Jew. Gershom ben Judah an 'Ashkenaz ' (+*1040* at *Mainz*) was a noted Talmudist ; his pupil Jacob ben Yaqar (also a german Jew) and Moses of *Narbonne* ' the Exegete ' (*ha-darshan*) were pioneers for Solomon Rashi ben Isaac (+*1105* at

Troyes) who has been called the ' greatest of all jewish commentators ' ; he studied at *Worms* and *Mainz*. He commented (in his native French) on the entire Old Testament and most of the Talmud. The school of Rashi of Troyes developed, as interpreters of traditions, into a very subtle and refined casuistry both in France and Germany during cent. xii, xiii, while the spanish Talmudists aimed rather at simplifying. Nahmanides says of them ' They would force an elephant through the needle's eye.' This (northern) predilection for casuistry however was of service in drawing them to greek writings,—many of which, destined to exert wide influence upon our modern world, have already passed through syriac, arabic and hebrew versions before appearing in the medieval latin. Connected with this school of biblical exegesis was Joseph Qara of *Troyes* (+*1132*) and his teacher Menahem ben Helbo : somewhat later appeared Jacob ben Meir of Ramerupt (+*1171*) and Samuel ben Meir (+*1175*) also of *Ramerupt*. Arabic not being understood in France the ' Tibbonides ', a family with a hereditary gift for translating, set themselves to convert the chief spanish treatises into Hebrew. Judah the founder migrated from Granada to *Lunel* in France (+*1190*) ; his son Samuel (+*1230* at *Marseilles*) also rendered Maimon's *Guide of the Perplexed* and treatises of Averroes and other Arabs. His son Moses (+*1290*) translated the rest of Maimon, Averroes and Avicenna : he also wrote a treatise on immortality (no doubt in reference to the current ' Averroism '). His nephew Jacob of *Montpellier* (+*1304*) gave attention to arabic works of science, and arabic versions from the greek of Euclid, Autolycus, Theodosius and Ptolemy's *Almagest*. Many of these were afterwards translated into latin ; the Jew thus making much greek and arabic lore accessible to the newly awakened intelligence of the latin world.

The no less important family of the Qimhites also came from Spain, whence Joseph ben Isaac fled from the Almohad puritanic revival to the *south of France* to die there in *1170* : he wrote on grammar and commented on *Proverbs* and the *Song of Solomon*. His son Moses also wrote on grammar (+*1190*) but the younger brother David of *Narbonne* (+*1235*) is the more famous ; he wrote a grammar and a lexicon and clear expositions of hebrew scripture. Menahem of *Posquières* (+*c. 1200*) and Moses ben Jacob of *Coucy* (*c. 1200–1250*), Abraham ben Isaac of *Béziers* a poet, and Joseph Ezobhi of *Perpignan* (also an ethical and didactic poet), carried on the jewish culture in cent. xiii. Also from Béziers was Jedaiah writer of poems and a defence of Maimon the rationalist (+*c. 1340*) ; coeval were Kaspi of *Largentière* (+*1340*) who wrote on grammar and mystical lore besides hymns and commentaries, and ' Leo Hebræus ' or Levi ben Gershom (+*1344*) one of the greatest franco-jewish commentators and peripatetics, who also wrote on the stars and on mathematics. Berachiah, compiler of the ' Fox Fables ', is said to have lived in *Provence* in cent. xiii (though some place him in England in the century preceding). Across the Rhine, Eleazar ben Judah of *Worms* (+*1238*) was an impartial student of Talmud and Cabbala. Isaac ben Moses (+*1270*) came from France but studied at *Wurzburg* where he was tutor to Meir (Meyer) of Rothenburg (+ *1293*), a prolific writer of hymns, legal *responsa*, and halakhic treatises.

His pupil again was Mordecai ben Hillel of *Nuremberg* (+*1298*). Another pupil Asher ben Jehiel migrated from *Germany* and settled at *Toledo* (+*1328*); his son Jacob of *Toledo* (+*1340*) wrote an important manual of jewish law; and Jacob's pupil David Abudrahim of *Seville* (+*1350*), commented on the hebrew liturgy :—a line of scholars all owing something to early *german* influences. With cent. xiii hebrew letters reached the final term of their development; and the scholastic or purely byzantine period began.

NOTE

Modern Opinion on the Cabbala

The above account represents fairly the agreement of the latest and most competent scholars on the still disputed problem of 'cabbalist origins'. Loewe (*Enc. Rel. Eth.* vii 602) adds several valuable suggestions. He is clear that the Jews of Spain enjoyed a wider liberty of thought and were repelled by the cold peripatism of Maimon and the arid formulæ of the *Halakha*. 'The mysticism of the gnostics, reëchoed in the *Haggada*' but long suppressed now found vent. He believes the Cabbala to be a 'revolt against logic', an attempt to unite the divine element in man with the world-spirit (*shekel happoel*) by purifying one's mental nature. It taught the recognition of harmony in all things, and encouraged man to believe that in the unveiled mysteries of his own nature he held the key of the universe. The microcosm is a counterpart of the macrocosm. The gnostic doctrine of emanation was now worked out with precision in all its details—the En-Sof (infinite) and its spheres (*sefiroth*), grades and functions of angels, the successive revelations of the divine nature, the relation between *real* and *ideal* worlds. Metempsychosis had been accepted, from Pythagoras through the muslim speculators, by the Karaites and denounced by the pioneer of harmonism, Saadia. Isaac the Blind, a coeval of Abbot Joachim, was perhaps the first to revive this belief, as an essential part of theodicy. Ramban (*1195–1270*) posed as a champion of hebrew authority as against the exotic rationalism of Maimon. Grätz calls his peculiar Judaism 'a religion of the feelings' whereas Maimon's is rather a 'cult' of the intellect' (iii 550).

Now Cabbalism (in the view of Loewe) insists on the divine *immanence*; although its theology is strictly negative, yet it represents a protest against 'excessive emphasis on *transcendence*'. Its tendency—unlike that of most mystical movements—is to 'strengthen, not to destroy the ceremonial Law'. From the time of Grätz (he complains), it has been the fashion to decry the Cabbala 'as a later incrustation', something of which judaism had good reason to feel ashamed. Yet it is an integral part of it and the material of the later treatise *Zohar* is far older than its detractors will allow. It is a complement, not an *excrescence*, to the rabbinic Judaism of the Middle Age. From the earliest times (he believes) the mystical germs were rife: in Philo and in the Midrash we find the doctrine as a 'well-constituted element' in religion. After the Dispersion the mystic movement grew in Egypt and Babylon on parallel lines, and Saadia did not think it beneath him to compose a treatise on the *Sefer Yesira* (*c. 900*

A.D.). Eleazar of Worms believed that the secret doctrine was conveyed from Babylon to the west by Aaron ben Samuel—whose authenticity as a real figure in history has been established by Neubauer (*Medieval Jew. Chron.* Oxford 1895). Aaron travelled to Italy and lived (*c. 870*) in Benevento and Oria, just at the time when Emperor Basil the Armenian was restoring the byzantine power in the south of the peninsula. He wrote little but to him are ascribed 2 small tracts, *Nikkud* and *Pardes*. From Italy the Cabbala was transferred to Germany,—the chief names being Judah ben Samuel or ' the pious ' (+*1217*) and his pupils Eleazar and Abulafia. Judah was respected and consulted by the Bishop of Salzburg and other churchmen, and his mystical leanings are clearly seen in his *Songs of Unity and Glory* if we are right in believing him to be the author. The ascetic Eleazar of Worms (*1176–1238*) wrote on mysticism as well as on ethics and the *Halakha* : he attached great value to the letters of the alphabet ; he invented new combinations by which miracles could be performed (So Broyde *Jew. Enc.*).

Meantime in the east the movement was quietly proceeding. Bahya ibn Pakuda expounds in his *Men and Animals* the beliefs of the basrene ' Brethren ' on cosmogony, the angels, the soul and man's relation to God. The Jews borrowed their *emanatism* (Dieterici's *King of the Djinns* Leipzig 1881) and the nine numbers.

In the west, the antithesis of the *inner* and the *outer* began to appear in an antagonism between mystical piety and the Talmud (cent. xiii). In Germany, prayer and *halakha*-study were held incompatible. In the ' school ' itself divergences are seen ; the spanish branch was more visionary and devout, the german more addicted to permutations of letters and magic. When philosophy spread to Provence—which is the Syria of the west—the Cabbala, hitherto obscure, ' came forward as a protest against ' the coldness of rationalism '.

Among the most recent works may be named Isaac Myer *The Q.* Philadelphia 1888, Waites *Doctr.* and *Liter. of K.* (London 1902) and *Secret Doctr.* 1913, Abelson's *Immanence of God,* Lond. 1912 and *Jewish Mysticism* do. 1913, Sperling's essay in Simon's *Aspects* of *Hebr. Gen.* London 1910. Ehrenpreis has written on the evolution of the emanationist theory of the Cabbala in the last century of our period, Frankfurt 1895 and Tritel on *Alexandrine Doctrine* in Cohen's *Festschrift* Berlin 1912. It is unfortunate that the *Zohar* is chiefly accessible in editions by modern esoteric mystics, such as ' Eliphaz Levi ' (Paris 1894), and Mathers (London 1887) and even Jounet (*Clef. du Z.* Paris 1909). The best edition is probably that of Jean de Pauly (Paris 1908).

DIVISION B

Islam : its Sects and Philosophy

PART II

Syncretizing Influences : Parsism, Islam, Buddhism and Christian Heresy

CHAPTER A. PERSIAN REVOLT AGAINST ISLAM : THE DIVINE IMAMATE

Conflict of Legitimism and Democracy.—From the earliest days of Islam (as we have seen) there had been two parties, the *democratic* and legalist, the *monarchic* and personal. The latter (identified later with the shiite movement) upheld the rights of a family and the doctrine of a continuous inspiration. In the former the independent tribesmen of Arabia preferred to any permanent dictatorship a law once made known and thereafter binding, ' a faith once delivered to the saints '. An absolute and personal government in a single divinely-commissioned family was the ideal of the Persians inherited from the earliest days of human culture. They joined in supporting those muslim who believed that the superhuman powers given to Mahomet descended to Ali and his children rather than to an elective head chosen by popular vote or private intrigue. The ommiads represented a movement in the direction of wealth, worldly culture and absolutism ; the abbasid revolt was in large measure helped to success by the declared or secret enemies of Islam, as a simple democratic religion of arab nomads.

Early Sources of the Divine Imamate.—We may now pass, in more careful review, the stages of thought leading to the monarchic and shiite belief in the Divine Imamate which to the present hour forms a distinct line of cleavage in the muslim world. It is important for our purpose, the true understanding of western thought and social development, because at one period in cent. xiii such a claim is actually put forth by a roman

emperor ; because such doctrines may well have given *momentum* to the theory of Divine Right. On another side societies recognizing the Imamate have tended to become sworn bands organized for the destruction of all non-members, and to menace the very existence of the established order, with its feebler vitality and less potent means of enforcing its will. It is our object to explain and in some measure to justify western policy in cent. xiii, and to show that the new views, on the one hand democratic, on the other imperialist, were irreconcilable with the continuance of the social order on ancient—indeed on any conceivable—lines. The three great movements in the struggle, the Albigenses, Frederic II, the Templars, will be found to need this light thrown upon them by the east, before we can realize what was at stake in the conflict.

Essene and Ebionite Sect.—Among the religious problems of early Christian times the essene fraternities and the ebionite sect are the most puzzling.[1] It seems to-day certain that the former were ascetic communities of brethren, displaying the chief quietist features of the ' Friends ', averse to marriage, cultivating medicine and magic, holding sacred certain books of esoteric law ; offering no sacrifices ; but in other respects devoted to the Mosaic law, having an inner circle to whom the holy volumes and the ' names of the angels ' were entrusted ; combining with a spiritual Judaism (really incompatible with Old Testament teaching and practice) a rudimentary worship of the heavenly bodies which shows the distinct influence of Chaldea. This eclectic hebraism confined to celibate members of a sworn brotherhood, this jewish *gnosis*, cannot have arisen wholly from jewish soil. It may have had contact with neopythagorist [2] tendencies from the west, as we know to have been the case with the kindred enigma, the therapeuts of Egypt ; but the blend of *astral cult* and *light-worship* which the later followers of Zoroaster put together was certainly a constituent and it is possible that proselytizing buddhism was again sending out missioners to the west.[3]

Now certain features in Ebionism seem to be akin to the tenets and practice of the essenes. It was in its origin a sect

[1] Lightfoot terms the former ' the great enigma of hebrew history '.

[2] Zeller regards this alexandrine and hellenistic movement as the decisive influence, Lightfoot prefers *parsism*, Schurer holds both to have had a share.

[3] Hard though it be to prove any direct influence from Hindustan.

which neither wholly rejected nor wholly welcomed the teaching and person of Christ : strict and pharisaic, it admitted the new Prophet with some reluctance into the series of jewish teachers, but only after the Fall of Jerusalem. This compromise had no doubt many phases ; with one only are we concerned—with that *gnostic ebionism* which upheld incarnationist tenets and in course of time became further and further estranged from the orthodox church. For this branch of the ' sect ' Adam and Christ are one ; Christ is a superior being, created before the worlds, higher than the angels but in no strict sense divine, descending to earth as the First Adam [1], next taking visible form in the Patriarchs, and lastly, in the fulness of time, returning to suffer and die, clothed once again in Adam's original body. In these successive manifestations of the divine nature Moses certainly retained the chief place : Christ rather ' republishes ' Mosaism and shows the true spiritual meaning of the Law which these sects clearly no longer professed to observe in the letter.[2] He is the Prophet of Truth who comes to give knowledge and instruction when the nation forgets the right teaching.

Elkesai and the ' Recurrent Prophet '.—The doctrine of *Elkesai* (*c. 100*) seems like a continuation of this heresy and in the *Clementines* we see a distinct attempt to put essene ebionism into literary form and recommend it to the world as a rival teaching to orthodoxy. A determined effort of propaganda was made in *220* A.D. when elkesaite envoys visited Rome under the ' false Antoninus ' VII or Heliogabalus, under whom Emesa and sun-worship won a brief victory in the capital. Both display a spirit of propaganda which is Christian in tone, although their aims are quite hostile to the church. Both are the works of syncretists who wish to offer a universal faith and believe they have something better to put forward than the now crystallizing orthodox creed. A ' natural ' religion, it was believed, had emerged out of the narrow chrysalis of Judaism, purged of ritual Mosaism and ethnic exclusiveness. It is to be noted that the Pharisees

[1] It will be remembered that in the *Clementine* Writings great annoyance is shown at the doctrine of the Fall of Adam which is there expressly denied.

[2] The *Batenians* will readily occur,—a muslim sect with affinities to ismailian allegory or (as their foes said) nihilism : for every *outward* letter or fact there was an *inward* and mystical meaning which alone had value.

had already begun to carry back speculation to Adam, giving Moses the second place. 'Judaism' says Harnack, 'was feeling 'its limits too narrow' : the effect would be to transform Mosaism into a universal religion and surrender the peculiar ritual and specific observances. Here once again we see analogies with later developments in Islam. In both the doctrine of *successive incarnations* of a heavenly (if not divine) being holds the chief place.[1] Adam is Christ ; and Christ is born from time to time, as other men are, both before His more recent coming and in incarnations yet to be. At the fitting time when knowledge and faith were at a low ebb He would appear again to comfort and to instruct, undergoing alternations of physical birth, while His soul is transferred from body to body.[2] In practice they only added an extensive system of baptismal purgings and lustration in rivers—a feature also adopted by modern sects—and promised an assured forgiveness of sins by this material means.[3]

The sect of Elkesai (who, we need not doubt, was a historic character) marks therefore a distinct step in the development of essene ebionism, away from jewish and Christian belief. It

[1] Hippol. *Ref.* ix 14 ; Χριστὸν δὲ λέγω ἄνθρωπον κοινῶς πᾶσι γεγονέναι . . . οὐ νῦν πρώτως ἐκ παρθένου γεγεννῆσθαι αλλὰ κ. πρότερον κ. αὖθις πολλάκις γεννηθέντα κ. γεννώμενον πεφηνέναι κ. φύεσθαι, ἀλλάσσοντα γενέσεις κ. μετενσωματούμενον which theory of transmigration Hippolytus after his wont refers to a pythagorist source, 464 ed. Duncker, Göttingen, *1859*. So x 29. Αὐτὸν δὲ μεταγγιζόμενον ἐν σώμασι πολλοῖς πολλάκις κ. νῦν ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὁμοίως ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γεννᾶσθαι ποτὲ δὲ πνεῦμα γεγονέναι, ποτὲ δ' ἐκ παρθένου ποτὲ δ' οὔ· κ. τοῦτον μετέπειτα ἀεὶ ἐν σώματι μεταγγίζεσθαι κ. ἐν πολλοῖς κατὰ καιροὺς δείκνυσθαι, etc.

[2] 'It is alone pious to regard the Messiah-spirit, not as associated with 'every unit of our race, but to claim it as the exclusive privilege of that 'subject who, standing above all individuals, runs through all time from 'the beginning of the world, changing his name with his form, until he 'come upon his own peculiar age and, anointed by divine grace, shall 'find eternal rest for his labour's sake, already proved worthy in Adam 'to be lord and ruler of all things.' Symmachus (who translated the Bible) belonged to this sect and held its peculiar views, cf. Victorinus Rhetor on Gal i. 19, ii 26. *Apost. symmachiani faciunt quasi duodecimum* (manifestation of divine) *et hunc secuntur : adjungunt judaismi observationem quanquam etiam Jesum Xtum fatentur ; dicunt enim ipsum* Adam *esse et* animam generalem. Harnack classes Symmachus with Alcibiades who lived somewhat later.

[3] Students are much exercised to know whence this emphasis on purely physical washings could arise ; some believe it an element in *parsism*, others refer it to *hindu* teaching. 'Sobidi' seems to be aramaic for *the baptized*.

seems certain that this Christology of *recurrent incarnations* was added to the original doctrine of the founder, in order to win the adherence of the Christian world, which had long been (*220* A.D.) in a state of dogmatic ferment.[1] The zealous missioners with Alcibiades at their head, seem to have claimed their founder as himself an incarnation of the eternal and *recurring Christ*—perhaps the greatest ; a claim which he himself certainly never put forward. It is thought likely that this Christology was added at Apamea, on a soil very fertile in religious theories, while the envoys were preparing their case for Rome. The sect, though failing in this spiritual siege of the metropolis and displaced by extending hellenism in Syria, lasted on amongst the aramean people and (as far as we know) even made further progress.[2] This advance teaching and proselytism may surely be seen in the *Clementines* to which we must now direct attention, and in the later development of *imamism* : is not Salamia to the present

[1] How far Elkesai himself (a century and more earlier) was from orthodoxy may be seen in his marvellous vision (Hipp. ix 13 p. 462) of the two gigantic figures, 96 roman miles high—male and female figures confronting each other like colossal rock-hewn statues, Christ and the Holy Ghost (*ruah* being a feminine term for the divine spirit) : in the same place he delivers his book of revelation to a certain Σοβιαὶ, which certainly, reminds one of the later *Sabians* : again, the mention of Σῆρες πάρθων, Seri a parthian city, may possibly refer to a much further eastern origin among the distant nations called generally *Seres* or Chinese. (Cf. 427 *n.*)

[2] Brandt the learned writer on this sect (articles published at Leipzig 1910, 1912, Hastings *Enc. Rel. Eth.* etc.) says : ' It has been often asserted ' that elkesaite doctrine had influence on the system of ideas embodied in ' Islam ; but this has never been proved.' He no doubt refers amongst others to Harnack : ' this *syncretizing Judaism* had indeed a significance ' in world-history, not for that of our own church but for the origin of ' Islam, which (as a religious system) is based partly on *syncretist Judaism* ' (including the enigmatic Sabians) : we need not question Mahomet's ' originality but his system can only be historically understood by taking ' this into account '. Harnack also welcomes Wellhausen as a partner in this belief. If it is true for the origins of Islam, how much more for the great *parsi* reaction which produced the phenomena we are now treating ? I do not for a moment uphold the idea of a direct and conscious borrowing on the part of militant adventurers looking around to find a theoretic basis and taking wholesale from the esoteric beliefs of an obscure sect. But there is nothing inadmissible in thinking that a system, already cognate and sympathetic, adopted at least some of its ' schematism ' from the *Clementine* writings—a mere extension of the *Book* and representing (as will presently appear) a second and later stage of missionary fervour.

hour the home of such a sect, and is Emesa so far from Apamea ? [1]

The Clementine Writings.—The false *Clementines* (*Homilies* in greek and *Recognitions* in latin), represent, we may be certain, the literary dress of this gnostic ebionism, carried one degree further than Elkesai's *Book* or Alcibiades' interpolations. These writings seem to lay still greater emphasis on a christology of successive *avatars* of the divine. As to the date they must be later than *Elkesaite* theology as noted by Hippolytus a contemporary (to this all but Ritschl agree) : which is the prior form is a disputed point. Baur, Schliemann, Uhlhorn, Lightfoot place the *greek Homilies* first, Ritschl, Lechler, Hilgenfeld, Salmon the *latin Recognitions*. All students seem in accord as to a common basis for both in a lost work (*tendenzschrift*) the *Preaching of Peter*, the *historic* side being prominent in the latin version, the *dogmatic* in the greek. The exact aim of the present versions is not clear—they have no doubt suffered a good deal of change and editing. While Harnack believes the *Homilies* to be a *catholic* revision (!) of a *sectarian* treatise, Bigg holds them an *ebionite* revision of a *catholic* original—which is certainly likely ; but this original is very remote.[2] The writings are clearly syrian and syncretist. In pursuance of the aim of offering a universal religion to supplant the Gospel the writer is at pains to show that *Mosaism* and *Christianity* are one, the latter being purified Judaism. Adam and Christ are one ; and in all three the great Natural Religion is promulgated or republished when men

[1] From them arose the *Mughtasila*, or ' washers ', as the Arabs called them, whence Mani and the tremendous development of *physical* theories and ascetic *dualism* : these (as we have some reason to believe) held to an astral cult under disguise of a nominal monotheism.

[2] I confess to some bewilderment in reading Harnack's cool statement that ' in their present form they were not written by heretical Christians ' but most likely by catholics '. He must allow for very considerable interpolations by a virulent heterodox opponent : again, ' Solely a catholic ' literary product ' he allows that they ' add nothing to our knowledge of ' catholic Church or doctrine but show at best in their immediate sources ' a jewish Christianity strongly influenced by catholicism (!) and hellenism.' It seems clear in spite of the judgment of this great authority, that they have nothing to do with *Catholicism* at all (of which he makes a curious bogey and speaks sometimes as if it were a *gnostic* creation)—and very little indeed with *Judaism* : as for any debt to hellenism it is quite trivial compared to the heavy loan contracted from oriental incarnationism and, it is quite possible, *hindu* sources.

have from time to time forgotten it.[1] The central doctrine is of course that of the True Prophet, returning again and again to enlighten faithless or ignorant mankind who have let slip the truth. His mission is almost wholly *pedagogic* and instructive. It is *knowledge* that men lack, because sin has blinded their eyes to the light. The Seven World-Pillars in whom the one Prophet reveals himself are *Adam, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses*—Christ completes the *ogdoad*, as we may term it, of inspired teachers.[2] To Him has been adjudged the sovereignty of all things in earth and air and water. The *dualistic* element, the pythagorist syzygies are treated elsewhere :—here we will only mention further the emphasis on the knowledge of angels' names *ἀγγέλων ὀνόματα γνωρίζειν* iii 36 sure proof of affinity with the primitive *essenes* (Joseph. *Ant.* xviii i 7). It is worth notice that in pharisaic *arcana* we find the theory that the world was created and the Law given ' by means of angels'.[3] Here then is offered once again to the world (with local and superfluous ritual curtailed) a religion claiming to be universal and unchanging since the foundation of the world—the historic Christ being the final form of the eternal Prophet of Truth. It is in truth a *deistic* republication of a primitive faith. Only one subject ever knew God and therefore all figures in history who rightly laid claim to this knowledge are one and the same person in successive ' theophaniés ' (*Hom.* xvii 4, xviii 4, 13, 14). Such is exactly the shiite doctrine in the muslim world, forming the basis of the insurrectionary sects which spread havoc far beyond their own neighbourhood.

[1] The ritual side of *Elkesaite* forgiveness by repeated washings is dropped ; perhaps Hippolytus in his vehement attack had convinced the leaders of the sect that the church would not tolerate any tenet which threatened the *unique* place and value of Christian baptism.

[2] *Rec.* i 16, 40, 41, 45 : *Hom.* ii 6, iii 11, 49, 20 (the best passage). How could any *humanly* born son of man (*ἐκ μυσαρᾶς σταγόνος*) possess the Spirit, if the First Man had not the Holy Spirit of Christ ? To say that He alone possesses it is the greatest piety *ὃς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αἰῶνος ἅμα τοῖς ὀνόμασι μορφὰς ἀλλάσσων τὸν αἰῶνα τρέχει* [*percurrit sæculum* as Dressel rightly, ed. Götting. 1853], *μέχρις ὅτε ἰδίων χρόνων τυχὼν, διὰ τοὺς καμάτους θεοῦ ἐλέει χρισθεὶς εἰσαεὶ ἕξει τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν.*

[3] Cf. Ep. *Hebrews :* Celsus (Origen *c. C.* i 26, v 6) roundly asserts that the Jews adored angels ; so *Kerygma Petri* and Aristides, the Christian Apologist.

APPENDIX L

Syncretism in Ismailian Preaching : Further Details on Fatimite Egypt and the State of Bahrein

Incarnations of the Divine Reason and Soul.—A certain Persian (*c. 890* A.D.) Abdallah ibn Mamun lived in Khuzistan and desired to overthrow the foreign yoke by undermining the true teaching of islam and restoring the zoroastrian religion of light—at this time highly charged (as we know) with chaldean and platonic elements and showing distinct traces of that incarnationist syrian doctrine which we found in its clearest form in the *Clementine* writings.[1] The usual incomprehensible deity produces by an effort of will [2] Universal *Reason*, this again Universal *Soul*, which creates the triad, *time*, *space*, *matter*, necessary for a visible world of sense. As in neoplatonism every order tends to return to its source and to pass upwards through its immediate parent towards the One : man's aim and chief good is to acquire *perfect union with the Universal Reason*. So far we have merely the common doctrine, half-rationalist, half-mystical, which the Arabs of our period were already beginning to formulate in precise terms before passing it on to the west. But there is a complement to this first part which is incompatible with platonism or with Islam. This union is quite unattainable by man in his natural condition, unless *Reason* and *Soul* appear visibly embodied in likeness of our flesh, to enlighten and guide mankind : the one as prophet-legislator, the other as his assistant and coadjutor [3]. It is always the same Being who is from time to time incarnate in different forms ; the soul of each *Imam* passes into his successor after a fixed interval. When the message is delivered the prophet (or

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[1] How widely spread were the sources of this syncretizing faith ! Guyard has justly shown that it has affinities with magian, jewish, gnostic, orthodox-Christian elements, and with ' philosophy '—a name implying in this age a fixed system of belief (itself highly composite) and in the main =Aristotle as reconciled with Plato and seen through neoplatonic eyes.

[2] This may be a lingering trace of respect for Islam which regards God under the aspect of an arbitrary earthly sovereign ; in other emanatist systems, God produces not by *will* but by *nature*, or rather *necessity*.

[3] Krsna (in *Bhagavad Gita*) answers a difficulty of Arjuna. ' Both thou and I have passed through many births ; to me mine are known but ' not thine to thee. In my nature I am not subject to birth or decay, ' yet having command over it I make myself manifest by my power. ' When there is a decline of virtue I am revealed and from age to age I ' reappear for the saving of just men, the destruction of the bad and the ' revival of righteousness. . . . Life am I in all things,' [cf. the *anima generalis* above], ' zeal in the zealous, understanding of the wise, strength ' of the strong, glory of the proud. . . . Many seek me but the sage alone ' is constantly occupied in serving me ; I esteem the wise as myself, for on ' me alone doth his spirit depend.'

Reason incarnate) disappears, leaving behind him a series of *assistants* to maintain the faith until he come again.[1] In world-history there have been six such pairs—*Adam . . . Seth, Noah . . Shem, Abraham . . . Ismael, Moses . . . Aaron, Christ . . . Peter, Mahomet . . . Ali*. Mamun the persian now announced himself as *assistant* of yet a seventh embodiment of the Divine reason, Mohammed son of Ismail, *Seventh* Imam, in whose envoy the most unlimited trust must be placed. With the vanished Imam's reappearance (analogous to the *parousia* of the early church) the world will come to an end.

A Confused Doctrine : Mahdi and Imam.—Great obscurity and confusion reign as regards this subject ; sometimes the *Mahdi* and *Imam* are identified, sometimes distinguished (de Goeje) ; sometimes the vanished prophet is Ismail (whence the sect's name, sometimes his son Mohammed ; sometimes this very Mohammed is given as the son of Jafar (therefore brother, not *son*, of Ismail) disinherited for his attachment to wine, and believed to die in India as an exile *180* A.H. + *796* A.D. Some maintain that Ismail was the last lawful Imam, and while waiting for his return Mamun the persian must be obeyed. We shall see in an equally doubtful subject that the first fatimite caliph was reckoned his grandson. In some pedigrees the name of Ismail *does not enter at all* ! The succession accepted by the *Imamiyya* (who established in *1502* the present Shiism in Persia) is this : *Ali* with his two sons *Hassan* and *Hosein* (+ *680*), Hosein's son *Ali II* (+ *710*), his son *Mohammed Abu Jafar* (+ *736*), his son *Jafar us-Sadik* (+ *765*), his son *Musa* (+ *799*) (*brother* to Ismail and Mohammed above who are not admitted into the true series), his son *Riza* (+ *818*), his son *Mohammed II* (+ *834*), his son *Ali III* (+*868*), his son *Hassan II* (+*874*), his son the twelfth Imam *Mahommed III ul Mahdi*, still to-day in hiding, the Shah being only his temporal vicegerent or deputy (during a long absence). The accounts of Margoliouth and de Goeje, those very competent arabists, should be compared (*Enc. Brit.* and *Enc. Rel. Eth.*). Among these perplexing varieties of lineage (which the fatimite claims will only render still more doubtful) the sect of *zaidites* may receive passing notice : this erastian or ' de facto ' party among the shiites (Shahrastani *Sects* etc.) agreed that the Imamate belongs of right to Ali's house. They nevertheless

[1] This is the centre of jain and buddhist soteriology, and this feature in Shiism (whether ismailian, carmathite, fatimite or assassin) may well have met and blended with genuine oriental influences ; in these systems the ' flower ' of the human race (in realizing which the distressing and painful process of the world is ' worth while ') is the man who has attained buddha-hood and appears now and again in history to preach the only saving doctrine ; e.g. the buddhists to-day look for the appearance of Maitreya, and so the annals and development of mankind are not wholly devoid of worth. In Hindustan also even among the religions of cosmic illusion and nothingness there are vestiges of chiliasm and Messianic hope : that this belief borrowed something from Christian influence is also quite possible. See references to jewish *optimism* in the very able and complete article ' Judaism ' Hastings' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* by Herbert Loewe.

acknowledge the first two caliphs, Abubekr and Omar, and hold that circumstances may justify the election of other caliphs : even in Ali's house a choice might be made between two or three members—quite after the fashion of western feudal monarchy, half hereditary, and half elective.

Real power lodged in Vicegerents of Unseen Prophet.—The result of this attachment to a long vanished Prophet or Mahdi (representing Divine *Reason*) was in effect to transfer all power to his lieutenant—who might in this sense even be said to hold the actual dignity of Imam. But even this Imam himself (if we allow him the title) did not often appear, being wrapt in the mysterious seclusion which always forms part of the oriental ideal of monarchy. But in his name missioners (*dais*) were sent about to preach and stir up discontent ; and, above all, to rekindle a burning devotion to the prophet's family, long extinct or successfully disguised in orthodox circles in Bagdad.[1] The letter of muslim legalism—with its arbitrary deity, somewhat mechanical prophet and tendency to deny human freewill—had left no room for the warmer emotions which can never be kept out of religion. Hence the welcome given to this revival of passionate devotion to the martyred sons of Ali, which forms an analogue to the ancient Mysteries of the ' dying God ', and still supplies a focus for devout and personal sentiments. These apostles of the hidden Mahdi led pure and regular lives, performed miracles or tricks of jugglery and won many converts to the new faith. Men were admonished to prepare for the return of the Mahdi, and meantime to give unquestioning obedience to the Imam. The outward letter of Islam was insensibly relaxed in the ' masonic ' degrees which opened the fuller secrets to the convert : the personal authority of a spiritual guide replaced the rigid literalism of dogma and observance. Here we see a trace of that truly *democratic* tendency to repose a blind faith in an autocratic leader, whose word is law,—against submission to the impersonal code or body of statutes, civil or religious ; this is found at the end if not avowedly at the beginning of every democratic movement.[2] There can be no doubt that a similar reaction against the arid literalism of protestant communities and their disputes over interpretations of Scripture helped to restore to papal absolutism in cent. xvi that hold on the church which it seemed to have lost for ever. It is possible again that some dim knowledge of Plato's text may have

[1] It is impossible not to see here a compound of Christian *faith* (which is also *love*) towards Christ and the new hindu doctrine of *bhakti* (or lively faith in a person) which was even now moving towards the later reforms of hinduism.

[2] Since obedience to normal law is distasteful to people awakened to a sense of social grievance. Nearly every (so-called) democratic movement is strictly religious in origin and impulse. They seem always to embody *chiliasm* and *communism* which clearly demand the universal recognition and uncontrolled power of some dictator. The figure of Kobad or Cabades the persian king (486–531) is interesting ; see my *Constit. Hist. Rom. Emp.* ii 352, 3 ; he was expelled (497–501) for an attempt to blend autocracy with the idealistic socialism of Mazdak.

helped on this instinctive preference for *personal* rule : had he not belittled the ' reign of law ' so dear to the average Greek and called it the prescription of an absent doctor which the presence and living efficacy of the physician himself completely annulled ? This semi-monarchic and personalist tendency is however so common in Greece that it is superfluous to refer to Aristotle's theory of the *παμβασιλεία* ; or to the stoic ideal of a *personal* wise man like Socrates or Diogenes, which was the really effective part of their moral appeal,—submission to abstract law which is ' no respecter of persons ' and cannot be either merciful or friendly, having no possible charm for ordinary men. Most certainly too a reaction against predestinarian views was met and satisfied by the new teaching ; revelation was not a closed book or a *fait accompli*, man's salvation or doom was not a decree from all eternity but something was still left open for new tidings, new commands and the free obedience of volunteers.

Reaction against Predestinarian Views : life of obedience and adventure. —But above all the life of adventure and mystery summoned these devotees to a career of blind docility and sacrifice, in which nevertheless lay the true secret of their success. Islam is the supreme and most successful challenge to the clan, the family and the caste : its teaching provides a perpetual stimulus to *egoism*. It had entered into the democratic-imperial heritage of Alexander and the Diadochi, where amazing power and wealth was suddenly grasped by any successful captain if only he were bold enough. Even the prosaic folk of normal temperament were delighted to hear of the actual rise to supreme power of a slave, or to listen to the interminable recitals of the bazaar, in which (as in our western folk-story) the out-cast and vagabond younger son marries the princess and acquires the kingdom as her dowry. In a word, Islam had again excited the pirate's love of adventure and the buccaneering spirit of the nomad of the desert. Hence the peculiar developments of shiite faith, and the apotheosis of the adventurous career in the Assassins or in their more respectable imitators, the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt. This was indeed throughout the unconscious goal of muslim political theory. True, the caliph had at all times belonged to certain privileged houses but underneath this unique dignity is the absolute equality of a horde of bandits contending for his favour. The most powerful persons in Islam have always been aliens and slaves who (according to a very old complaint) enjoy a monopoly of office and profit. The system is not therefore what is implied by the phrase ' dominion of a conquering caste ', like the Normans of later time ; it is a veritable republic, where the perilous prizes are open to ability wherever found, and where there is no time to create noble families or transmit wealth because there is not security of tenure.

The two Dais [1] and the new Caliph.—About the year *890* then, Hamdan Carmat accepted the new and interesting gospel and with his brother-

[1] As in Clementine syzygies, everything was in *pairs* ; even *good*, opposed to *evil*, must be itself subdivided ; both *Reason* and *Soul* became incarnate.

in-law Abdan became a *dai* in Irak to undermine the abbasid supremacy by a pious mission outwardly the most devout and respectable. Purity of life, devotion of purpose and a Christian brotherly love to the other members of the confraternity—these were their ostensible aims. Both de Goeje (1914) and Guyard (writing on *Fragm. relat. to Doctrine of Ismailians* 1874) are convinced that the usual slanders levelled against esoteric societies are here quite groundless. But as in the west in the case of Cathars and Templars, grades of initiation always suggested to the critic revolting secrets and rites only slowly revealed to the neophyte. As will be seen later there is really no proof of this in the Carmathians' private life, although their public policy was aggressive and aimed savage blows against the holiest places and ideals of islam. Bagdad, occupied with the great Slave Revolt, had paid at first little attention to this noiseless propaganda (*c. 874* & sq.). It is certain that the leaders of the new sect would have welcomed an alliance with the rebels and made overtures but found that agreement on matters of belief, and perhaps conduct, could not be reached. In *897* Abdallah ibn Mamun went into hiding at Salamia in Syria [1] because the government, now roused to a sense of danger, tried to suppress the sect. There is not a doubt that the absolute secrecy of the Imam's abode led to great difficulties ; in the end to the adoption by different sections (unable to cohere or correspond with head-quarters) of several different scions of the alid family. Their legitimate titles have never been satisfactorily established or compared. Obeidallah, the first recognized Alid, is a figure as obscure and mysterious as the Man with the Iron Mask ; and his identity has never been proved. Strictly, to occupy the dignity he filled he must have been of alid descent and was generally believed to be a member of the family.[2] Whether genuine claimant or impersonating usurper, Obeidallah was invited from Syria to help in the Aglabite overthrow ; but he was thrown into prison in Egypt (and, as some maintain, murdered there). Some one bearing his name, appears at Kairouan in Tripoli (*909*) and soon claimed to be the true Mahdi and fatimite caliph. His son al-Kaim Mohammed followed in *933* or *934* A.D.[3] and his grandson Ismail al-Manzur (*945–952*) reigned with varying success in Tripoli. Obeidallah killed his two benefactors who had set him free from an egyptian dungeon (*921*), al-Shii and his brother : nor is it unlikely that this crime estranged the Carmathians in the further east, who now

[1] Near Emesa (Homs) already for many centuries a hotbed of religious novelties—which had once threatened to impose a sun-worshipping dynasty upon Rome itself (218–222 A.D.).

[2] Margoliouth believes him legitimate ; as late as 1015 he was allowed by the official Registrar of the Prophet's family. When the fatimite successes came nearer to Bagdad his claims were attacked ; he was said to be a *grandson* of Mamun the persian and so connected with the terrible carmathian leader (de Goeje, denied by Marg.) : or again, a mere impostor Jew substituted for a real Alid murdered in Egypt, that a triumphant revolt might not lack a titular hero.

[3] Margoliouth gives both dates.

ceased (at least for a time) to act in concert. The aged Abdallah ibn Mamun was killed (it was said) by his ' grandson ' for doubting his divinity or at least his divine mission : ' Satan ' wrote Obeidallah to the muslim world ' caused them to slip, and I have purged them with the sword ' (*910*). In *972* the great prize of Egypt was secured. It had always been the objective of fatimite policy and now brought the dynasty into closer relations with its rival at Bagdad. Its general history has been already recounted. At the last caliph's death, the Assassins wanted to unite against Saladin and the Sunnites by investing some putative alid scion with the title Mahdi ; disturbances and pretenders taking the holy title are heard of up to the end of cent. xii (*1174–1192*).

As to the doctrine and life of this political sect in Egypt, it is not fair to class it with Carmathians, Druzes, and Assassins, though these are all off-shoots and of common dogmatic origin and public motive [1]. Makrizi has left an account of the gradual steps of initiation, exciting and stimulating doubt in the literal sense of scripture, and (it may well be) substituting in the end a pure natural religion or deism for the highly complex observance and rite of Islam. Yet so far as history informs us the sect seems to differ rather in minute points of law and ceremony from orthodox muslim. They were charged with indulgence in wine and community of wives—for neither reproach is there any foundation.

The Carmathian ' Mutual Benefit Society ' at Bahrein.—Meantime the Carmathians, severed by long tract of country from the successful marauders in Tripoli, pursued an independent course and while menacing Bagdad set up in Arabia the autonomous State of Bahrein (S. of the Persian Gulf). Abu Said was its founder, the lieutenant of Hamdan Carmat. He pretended horror when Mamun's ' grandson ' Obeidallah proclaimed himself the promised Mahdi (or Messiah) in Tripoli. We have noted the violent deaths of Mamun the Persian ; and now Carmat himself and his partner Abdan were assassinated. A lieutenant in Yemen assumed the title Imam and was promptly poisoned (*915*) also, it is suggested, by the intrigues of Obeidallah. From this moment for half a century the government of the State of Bahrein strongly supported the fatimite dynasty in Tripoli and any suspicion of its authenticity seemed then to be lulled to rest. Yet the situation was extraordinary and anomalous : the fatimite caliph, with all his contempt of literalism and ordinance, was nevertheless a muslim and claimed to represent as well as to reverence the Prophet. But the brigand-state of the Carmathians in Bahrein made no such pretence. In *927* it overwhelmed an immense army from Bagdad and next year sacked Mecca and carried off the Black Stone which this sacrilegious government of bandits kept for many years as a trophy. Thus intercourse had to be secretly conducted between the two allied enemies of Bagdad ; no one suspected their complicity and the whole muslim world was stricken with horror at the impious treatment of the Holy City. On the eve of the Crusades the carmathian State of Bahrein dissolved and henceforth

[1] So Margoliouth in *Enc. Rel. Eth.*

the sect, though by no means extinct, consisted only of isolated adherents, some of whom passed into the new sworn militia of the Assassins.

Its Organization and Commendable Features.—So far as we can judge in relation to its own members, the organization of Bahrein merits the warmest approval. The chief power lay in the *Ikdaniya* or Council with the right to bind and loose. Of the twelve members six were princes of the ruling house of Abu Said, six belonged to other chief families and were coopted or perhaps elected by a public vote. Absolutism, the very corner stone of the original sect was kept in the background, but it is not doubtful that the founder and his son Abu Tahir exerted autocratic power by sheer force of character. According to the account left us by Nazir ' the son of Chosroes ' (*Khosrau*), ' the citizens paid no tribute or tax whatever to ' the State : indeed, if they fell into poverty through old age or misfortune, ' they received relief from the government as of right '. Hard work and menial tasks were deputed to negro slaves, who (it would appear) joined the insurgents after all : no doubt these were well treated as they are in the east generally at all times. The citizens proper formed, like Plato's guardians, a military caste of strictly pure and regular life, and were monogamous. Education consisted chiefly in the arts and practices of war. The use of wine was strictly forbidden and women went about unveiled [1]. Every positive ordinance of Islam was laid aside, as if abrogated by the esoteric wisdom of the ' Higher Criticism ' ; prayers, the friday meeting, fasting, ritual washings—all had vanished from the life of the State,—and no restriction was placed on the flesh of ' unclean ' beasts. Their doctrine was clearly the resolution of every definite precept or external usage into mystical allegory : their convocations of the ' elect ' were only held to impart the pure symbolic sense of the Coran. Thus were spread the doctrines of a bare Natural Religion—which was also a religion of nature. They dressed in white, emblem of their cult of light and of the principle of moral purity. Their social administration was effective and honest, they made admirable provision for the nurture and instruction of the young, for the relief and comfort of the aged [2]. When their society came to an end (*c. 1084* A.D.) another branch of Ismailians arose to be a terrible power in the north in Syria and on the Caspian Sea ; since the destruction of these brigand eyries the sect has enjoyed no political power. But (as we have seen) the *khojas* are its lineal descendants, and are found in most countries of the East—Syria, Arabia, Persia, Zanzibar, Kiriman and India. The present Agha Khan, the loyal and devoted friend of the British Raj, resides at Bombay and traces his origin to the Princes of Alamut, the Grand Master of the Assassins' Lodge and to a legitimate fatimite princess who married one of their line.[3]

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[1] De Goeje, the doughty champion of Bahrein and its sectaries, believes this custom to be the sole source of the evil rumours of community of females and of a total disregard for moral restraints.

[2] The unprejudiced account of Haukal bears out the favourable judgment of Nazir.

[3] Each year there arrives in Bombay a deputation of envoys bringing

A type of Predaceous State or Communistic Sect.—Now it is quite obvious what type of society we have before us : a voluntary association for mutual benefit without much regard to the rights of communities outside it,—a type seen in purely predaceous bands grouped for plunder, in any and every phase of religious communism, in the modern highly organized trade-unions,[1] and above all in Freemasonry. In all these, the very ' watery affection ' felt for each other by average members of our artificial and despotic State is exchanged for a warmer and genuinely fraternal bond. Among banditti it is well known, certain types of virtues flourish with much greater success than in refined and civilized society—obedience, loyalty to the death, devotion of self to the cause, kindly help to all brethren in distress. Such a society does not maintain itself except in defiance of an established order which it detests and challenges. It does not publish all its doctrines to the world and knows the value of mystery to impress both friend and foe. Its orders, degrees or ranks, with the secrets allotted to each, are ingeniously contrived both to arouse interest and to keep curiosity alive. Such a body, though at the outset religious, is very seldom dogmatic. In the highest circles, long accustomed to train and impose upon the ignorant or to develop their intelligence by slow degrees, there is apt to prevail a certain scepticism ; and the last secret of all is very often the denial of any secret whatever. Meantime the social order, against which this band of malcontents raised aloft a banner inscribed with the promise of the Beatitudes, sees in the movement the most dangerous menace, not merely to privilege, but also to faith and morals. When similar movements take place in the west, we shall see civil and religious rulers roused to a frenzy of panic and a resulting orgy of pitiless cruelty. Neither State nor Church can tolerate seceders or volunteers for a secret *imperium in imperio*—still less an invisible sect [2] of sworn companions, who disguised (as it was held) the most poisonous and nihilistic views under outward conformity. Philip the Fair may have been, like our own Henry VIII, the heroic criminal in a drama of colossal injustice. But it must be remembered that the treatment of the Templars was but the logical conclusion of a deliberate policy of State-supremacy—and the State was then also the Church. It was another case of American ' North against South ', and ' death to all seceders '.

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gifts and homage to their Imam from distant Salamia where his ancestor Abdallah ibn Mamun abode in hiding more than 1000 years ago, and sent forth the mysterious Obeidallah to conquer a fourth of the muslim world.

[1] Which have inherited more than they suppose from older ideals.

[2] The teaching schools (διδασκαλεῖα) of Carpocrates and Tatianus the Encratite must have resembled Masonic Lodges in some degree : Euseb. *Hist* v 13. Rhodon speaks of such an academy of Marcionites—Tertullian (*adv. Val.*) calls it *collegium*—Iren. i 13 and elsewhere uses the term θίασος (of Marcosians), *factiuncula, congregatio.*

CHAPTER B. BUDDHISM AND HERESY: FROM QUAKER TO ANARCHIST

Section I. Early Buddhist Ideals; witness of Asoka and the Hellenes

Buddhism as known in the West : its wide evangelism.—That the Further East played an important part in forming the later syncretism of which we write cannot be doubted. Two extreme schools have hitherto confronted each other with axioms which cannot be reconciled : the one deriving all religious creeds from hindustan and ascribing an impossible antiquity to the aryan immigration, the other disparaging indian influence altogether. We have the names of aryan gods in the records of the Amarna period (*c. 1500–1420* B.C.) but there is no proof of later intercourse, so that Max Muller may be justified in believing hindu culture and religion to be primitive and indigenous. After Alexander the case is very different : not only have we the valuable witness of Pyrrho and Megasthenes (*300* B.C.) two generations before Asoka, but we know that the greco-bactrian kingdom in the next two centuries created a link between east and west and enabled each to know and borrow from the other. King Menander (Milinda) is a buddhist convert and the most notably lasting art-form in religious history is the quite hellenic figure of the seated Buddha, universal to-day in China and Japan. Again, apart from these facts, there is the mission-spirit of the new church which may justly be thought to have directed its influence westwards into the new regions opened up by the greek invasion. There is the tradition of a train of hellenist ' monks ' from Alexandria taking part in a great buddhist assembly (*c. 170* B.C.) which it is unwise wholly to ignore. There is reason to believe that the very ancient trade-route between Ceylon and Egypt was kept open in the period *300–1* B.C. ; and also that both by sea and land Persia and India were kept united by traders who (like the *colporteurs* of a later day) were sometimes

pilgrims and missioners. Some stoutly maintain that the Essenes are a buddhist community ; thus both in Egypt and in Palestine these ascetic and quaker-like bodies are held to be connected with the earlier movement in Hindustan.[1] Clement of Alexandria speaks of the buddhist legend ; Hippolytus, a little later, classes together Pyrrho, the hindu brahmans, the ' celtic ' druids and Hesiod.[2] The story of ' Barlaam and Josaphat ' was certainly current much earlier than the days of John Damascen (its supposed editor) ; and neither the sassanid religious revival (*c. 226* A.D.) nor the almost simultaneous movement of Mani were free from indebtedness to Hindustan ; indeed with the latter we stand on firm ground. We can now say with certainty that the *quietist* yet in some phases antinomian movement which roused alarm in the west before and during the crusades has a direct descent from the indifferentism of indian ascetics. It seems likely that in the ' muslim philosophy ' (after *820* A.D.) and in the rise of the adiaphorist sects direct indian influence was not wanting : the peculiar development of shiite tendencies is most certainly not wholly due to parsism, and the doctrine of Divine Right. Meantime from the days of Nestorius, zealous missioners or expelled priests traversed Central Asia and disputed with manichees and buddhists. During the first four or five centuries of our era—we cannot doubt—there was a constant

[1] Arthur Lillie, in a curious and uncritical book, has repeated the old statement that the Essenes are buddhists and that our Saviour was an Essene : a recent french book bears witness to the knowledge of Christ in Tibet—to both we shall have occasion to make further reference (*La Vie Inconnue de J. Ch.* by Nicolas Notovitch, Paris (Ollendorff) 1894).

[2] He also gives countenance (*Refut.* i 13)to the persistent legend that Democritus conversed with gymnosophists in India, priests in Egypt, astrologers and magi in Babylon ; his chief reference (i 24) makes it clear that the jains (*svetambaras* and *digambaras*) were familiar figures to the western mind and that at home they were by no means distinctly marked off from the brahmans ; they are ascetic vegetarians, naked celibates who despise and even court death—though the brahmans coming from the further side of River Tagabena marry and are given in marriage, admitting women into their community : here we have clearly that division between the *novice* and the *hermit* or recluse which is found everywhere in buddhist countries and was a constant mark of all medieval heresy. But it is needless to enlarge on the knowledge which the Greeks had of brahman ideals after Alexander (Calanus, Dandamis and their voluntary *Sati*) : what is important to notice is that these figures are much more akin to *jain* and *buddhist* standards than *brahman*.

interchange of ideas between religious communities which followed the rule of ascetic and vegetarian celibacy. Even if the direct influence be denied there is proof enough of an unconscious intercourse between like tempers and theories in this age ; and the result of this was projected westwards in the several movements which roused the alarm of Church and State in our period. In any case a study of medieval heresies would be incomplete without some reference to so striking a parallel, even if we have to grant the developments to be wholly independent.

The Real Nature of Buddhist Teaching.—Certain facts have but recently been established by students of buddhist origins. The jain movement—we know to-day—was both independent and perhaps slightly earlier ; the *sankhya* school had already set out most of the tenets which we identify as buddhic. The reaction against brahman influence has received too an undue emphasis and it is clear that the jain and buddhic brotherhoods excited at first very little hostile attention. The latter very soon became an imperial and established church under Asoka without any direct attempt on the part of the State to suppress nonconformity, or supersede brahman rites and influence. Both these ' heresies ' were concerned solely with the individual's deliverance, and in this matter the older creed allowed the greatest latitude. Each was a ' way of life ' and a practical guide for conduct, first for novices and next for an inner circle of professed monks.[1] Both were *protestant* movements in favour of self-dependence and ethical purity against ritual and ' indulgences ' of supposed magical efficacy from without. The motive was happiness here and hereafter and nothing more or less.[2] The

[1] The *memoria technica* in psychology, list of mental and mystical states and the like, can be neglected without loss by a student of the practical influence of these teachers :—these solemn numbered lists and rarefied distinctions are due merely to the logical refinement of the Hindus and their love of analysis ; also to the need of helps to memory in an instruction largely, if not wholly, oral.

[2] No sober critic reading Asoka's inscriptions can doubt that *amrti* is immortality in paradise, promised instead of reincarnations in this hopeless earthly cycle : or that to the common people this preaching was a chief inducement : or that *parinibbana* was held out as a goal of striving, whatever its true sense—if it ever did have a single meaning—to a very few even among the *bhikkus :* or that the main attraction was the wholly optimistic promise (at least so it seemed to the eastern mind) that *in this life* it was possible to attain ultimate bliss by personal effort, and that

appeal was issued directly to those lovers of oriental calm for which the brahman system (with its ritual, its compromise and concessions to dravidian devil-cult) had made little provision. Jains and buddhists alike held up for admiration heroes who had overcome. If either system can be called a religion, it was really a hero-worship : careless of the gods (though by no means denying their existence) they placed them, as did the stoics, beneath the level of the Wise Man. Kindness to others and considerateness to all sentient life followed their self-love as a natural corollary ; there was no sort of meddlesome altruism or pretence at self-sacrifice in the highest stages of the spiritual life. The higher ideal was always found in the man who did not even know that other people existed ; and, even for the proficient, the chief virtue was a negative tolerance and a supine benevolence. Yet on the other hand no church was ever more active in the mission field or in the service of mankind by spreading abroad the glad tidings. Other individualist systems began and ended with the Self and its salvation ; but buddhism was at once individualist and evangelical, and achieved the remarkable success in the Further East which need not here receive further attention.

Quakers or Vegetarian Celibates : affinity with Western Types.—While we do not admit the direct affiliation of the judaic essenes to any buddhist prototype, their great resemblance shows the persistence of a universal ideal common, it would seem, to all mankind. The highest aim of man was to be a water-drinking, vegetarian celibate, offering a cult of pious memories to dead saints in simple rites and by solemn processions round a cairn covering sacred relics.[1] This worship displaced the gory and perhaps cannibal rites of primitive peoples as well as the costly system of hieratic animal sacrifice. It appealed to the low caste and the poorer yellow races[2] to whom it opened out hopes of peace, honesty and public order. It relieved such people from the terrors of devil-dancing and sorcery, revealing a spiritual

even the less competent could get nearer to it by his own endeavour and thus avoid odious rebirth in the present cycle.

[1] The *tope* and the tree were the two symbols of the saintly departed ; cf. *Tree* and Pillar-cult in Crete and Mycenæ. In the *sanchi* and *amoravati* topes men are represented worshipping *trees* and *cairns*.

[2] One modern theory even traces it, in spite of its emphasis on the 'noble aryan path' and the thraco-scythian name *Sakya*, to an indo-chinese movement *against* aryan supremacy.

life within the reach of every man who would take pains with himself. From such hopes the haughty Aryans had expressly excluded them.[1] Whether in technical axioms the Soul was denied or not, the inner calm of the self was the sole object aimed at. The *ego*—as a feverish and restless entity, striving vainly after objects it could not control, desires it could not satisfy —was to give place to the *non-ego*. The antithesis is no less strong than in our contrast of *matter* (world or flesh) and *spirit*. The two orders of things were set in opposition ; this world and the next, or the false and illusory world and true being,—just as philosophy had done from the very beginning. In the end this mystical calm places the saint on the highest pinnacle of development ; he is exalted not only above the *samsara*, the wheel of birth[2] but above the gods themselves. This philosophy is the 'wisdom of the other bank' *prajna paramita*—a phrase reminiscent of Virgil's *tendebantque manus ripæ ulterioris amore*.[3] There were the worlds of *appetite* (kama-loka) and of *spirit* brahma-loka) set over against one another[4] : only he who lives in the latter is secure against shocks and disappointment and the illusions of *mara* who spreads her net to catch souls. As with the gnostics only knowledge saves (*bodhi*,—of self not of external facts). It is likely that Gautama himself taught that a man could, as it were, slough off his gross body and make himself by force of will a thin aerial envelope or magical body, so as to pass through material obstacles, influence things at a distance and read thoughts : and it is also clear that he did not value these privileges as much as serenity of soul. Yet modern writers are not justified in suppressing these details and representing him as a mere godless positivist who came to mankind with a message that there need be no hereafter. He reproved current brahman notions on union with Brahma as gross and material—not because he disbelieved in it : he simply denied that unspiritual men could

[1] Severe laws were made and enforced in the Southern States (U.S.A.) within living memory against the instruction of slaves.

[2] Already in Buddha's time familiar in the orphic west as κύκλος γενέσεως, no doubt in complete independence : yet it has been suggested that the name Pythagoras = Buddha Guru !

[3] And in its completely opposite sense showing the difference of eastern and western ideals.

[4] As in the doctrine of Two Realms common to all hindu creeds, Parmenides, Parsism, the Gospel, Islam.

know spirit. The true method of approach was only within reach of the celibate monk, not to the greedy householder—to Mary not to Martha : only the homeless pilgrim and mendicant can find the way. No doubt moderate fasting and concentration of mind granted visions and dreams to which Gautama was far from denying value. Immortality then was open to all by self-help and personal effort, by surrender of outward things, by quietism : it was not the privilege of a caste, or to be won by painful devotion to priestly rules. The evangelists are only preachers, not celebrants or officiants in a magical rite. ' The Tathagata ' can only teach ; it is the hearer who must make the effort.' In the famous ' Last Words ', ' O Ananda, be to yourselves your ' own beaconlight, your own refuge ; seek no other ! Let ' *dharma* be your light, and asylum ! Whosoever is a light unto ' himself, the same is my true disciple.' Again ' not by tonsure, ' vows, discipline, continence—not by holy inspiration, alms-beg- ' ging, rule of silence or outward acts—is a man a true *shaman* [1] ; ' not by these can a man earn the release which no worldling can ' ever know ; the real *shaman* is he who has quieted all evil ' in his soul '. There are but few among men who can attain this and their chief duty is to show the example and convince mankind that ideal happiness can be won and is not denied to us by any jealous deity. Nevertheless ' few can reach the opposite ' shore ; many run up and down our bank always preparing ' to cross the current '.[2] Compassion, long-suffering and love form an integral part of this peace of mind and where a wise man emerges into full buddhic knowledge and self-consciousness there is even hope for the age in general. ' Wherever a super- ' natural person is found that race will prosper ; but he is by no means found everywhere.' He is not conceived as an innovator but as a restorer of the old pure religion,—not as an antisocial influence but as a healer of strife and a saviour of society. Thus in an earthly State, as well as in the private soul, everything *matters*, as effect must always follow cause, and idle acts or words

[1] Or *sraman*, the Σαμαναῖοι, Γαρμᾶνες of Strabo.

[2] It is more than possible that this simile is connected with the thought (or fact) in Hippol. *Rel.* i 24 οἱ δὲ ὁμοίου βίου ὀρεχθέντες ἐκ τῆς ἀντιπέραν χώρας τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαπεράσαντες ; the *Peratæ* too were thought to have got this name among gnostic sects from this ' passage across ' (though the origin of the word is very likely quite different) : *ib.* v. 16 περᾶσαι τὴν φθορὰν μόνοι δυνάμεθα. ἐστὶ δ' ἡ φθορὰ τὸ ὕδωρ.

must bear fruit. Hence the duty to cure oneself of illusion and sin, and to show other men how easy and blissful is the method. It will be noted that, in spite of this public service of the true *bhikku* and the historic fact of a great buddhist empire or confederacy under Asoka, there were never wanting accusers of their *antisocial* tendencies,—as in St. Paul 'forbidding to marry and 'commanding to abstain from meats' is typical of 'seducing 'spirits and doctrines of devils' (1 *Tim.* iv 3). The strenuous and practical aryan of Persia objected as strongly to the influence and example of hermits and homeless beggars as could any modern anti-clerical writer.

Asoka's Witness to Buddhist Doctrine : no Driving Force in Nihilism.—Asoka's inscriptions (little more than two centuries after Gautama's death *c. 480–477* B.C., and perhaps seventy years after Megasthenes) clearly show the chief features of the new faith. It is not atheist or thanatist, but appeals to man's sense of humanity, his longing for a better life hereafter, his desire to address a higher power which can help him. 'Believe in God '(*isana*) for He is worthy object of obedience . . . religion is 'where the name of God rests . . . give glory to God.' The prize of the holy is to be united with Sugato, the deity of happy advent.[1] The king's aim which he sets before his subjects is very clearly 'otherworldly': it is to obtain *svarga* (paradise). 'Salvation (that is, to be good) brings blessings for inhabitants 'of this world; and in the next endless moral merit accrues from 'charity well bestowed. All the heroism which I Piyadasi, 'beloved of heaven, have here exhibited is in view of another 'life hereafter.' (*Rock Edict,* x Burnouf) 'For all who differ 'from me in creed I pray that they with me may attain eternal 'repose! . . . Earthly glory can bring but little profit, but to 'toil for heaven is hard either for peasant or prince unless by a 'supreme effort he surrenders everything. . . . May my loving 'subjects—who so well know my affection for *Buddha, dharma, 'sangha*—[2] attain bliss both in this world and the next. . . . 'Piyadasi, friend of the devas, values alone the harvest of the 'next world : for this cause has he chiselled these words that his 'sons and grandsons may make no fresh conquests; for this is but 'ruin, confusion, violence; only the *dharma* can bring true

[1] So Turnour transl.

[2] The *teacher,* the *law,* the monastic *Order.*

victories'. He will have order and mercy to reign throughout his realm; no animals are to be sacrificed; wells are to be dug for man and beast, roads, bridges and post-houses kept in repair; the good tidings is to be published by eager envoys to an expectant world; the holy mendicants are to give their time to the perusal of the Seven Treatises of the Canon and learn them by heart.[1] It seems certain then that, as conceived 200 years after his death, Buddha was the apostle of a glad and comforting 'way of life' answering many doubts about death and disease and unmerited distress. This doctrine promised for converts a joyful hereafter in *svarga*, relieved from endless migration. The special cult is saint or hero-cult of a simple kind but the old worships were not abolished; the holy saints and martyrs do not reside in nothingness but still continue their kindly interest in human affairs.[2] So too with the homeless mendicants; like St. Francis of Assisi, their heart overflowed with goodwill to all living creatures, the more because their own peace of mind was so amply provided for. In their vigorous propaganda they bear as little resemblance to the monks of later times as the massive *viharas* to the primitive booths of the brethren. Active missioners (*edict* iv Senart) they were enjoined by Asoka (*edict* xii) to conciliate heretics and win over by gentle persuasion. Within these two centuries they were spreading their gospel over Cambodia, Gandhara, Surashtra, Petenica; and the king directs them to travel to the furthest limits 'of barbarous countries for the welfare and pleasure of all mankind'. The driving force behind such strenuous preaching could not have been nihilism. It is this attitude to life which has been repeated in a hundred forms in the west; whether (as is likely in certain cases) from actual contact and imitation, or as one of the limited number of possible world-theories which in every age and clime the uniform human mind must reproduce. It is a thoroughly *humanist* reaction against

[1] Clearly 7 quite short and simple tracts—two being only of the length of our *Epistle to Philemon*; the enormous literature of buddhism had very modest beginnings.

[2] Schopenhauer and Buchner seem quite wide of the mark in laying a chief emphasis on *atheism, pessimism* and *acosmism*: Monier Williams' estimate is certainly wrong, Rhys Davids' rendering of *amrti* is quite unconvincing and makes the success of the religion a perfect mystery, Mrs. Rhys Davids most rightly calls attention to the element of joy and tranquil gladness which fills the poems of the early converts.

magic and creature-worship, an appeal to the sense of freedom within, an answer to the demand for personal happiness.

NOTE

Primitive Type and Name of Bhikku

As yet the ' monasteries ' or rather cœnobitic brotherhoods were neither permanent nor wealthy : Buddhaghosa represents as primitive a later development which (as in St. Francis' Order in the west) was in truth a perversion. In 300 B.C. Megasthenes (150 years and more after the alleged convocation on the founder's death) says nothing of stone structures, but depicts the *bhikkus* as celibate bark-clad pilgrims, bound to a wandering life and living on wild fruits and water ; in Strabo xv 711 Σαρμάναι *cod.* Γαρμᾶνες (who are quite distinct from the brahmans and less famous). They account their most important branch to be the *wood-dwellers* (ὑλοβίοι) eating leaves and wild fruit, dressing in bark, not marrying nor using wine : some are kings' counsellors, some physicians, some ascetics (καρτερία), some divines and charmers (ἐπῳδοί) skilled in knowledge of the condition of the deceased, begging from village to village : in their company are women who also maintain celibacy. Clement (*Str.* I 303–305) quotes or paraphrases this and compares with the Encratites : of professed disciples of Buddha οἱ τοῖς Βούττα πειθόμενοι παραγγέλμασι he seems to make a separate class. Bohlen was the first to maintain the *sramanas* (pali *sammana*) were buddhists ; Lassen held that the word referred more often to brahmans. Only Megasthenes uses form Σαρμαν-αι or -ες, Bardaisan the heretic, and Alexander Polyhistor prefer Σαμαναῖοι—one is *sanscrit*, the other *pali*. It is almost certain (Schwanbeck following Bohlen) that they are the same ; and Bardaisan evidently takes his knowledge from Megasthenes merely altering the word (Hieron. *ad Jovin*). It is worth notice that *suicide* is looked upon (by all hindu philosophers or gymnosophists) as νεανικὸν, and Calanus, a self-immolator, as ἀκόλαστος but Mandamis or Dandamis (*c. 320* B.C.) is a higher type :—he looked forward to a better life (μεταστὰς εἰς βελτίω κ. καθαρώτερον βίον (just as the sages generally held death as birth into the true life γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον κ. τὸν εὐδαίμονα for all who have studied and practised wisdom). There is clearly no emphasis in either sect on annihilation nor is their pessimistic or rather dualist outlook one whit more marked than in any average greek thinker.

Section II. Blend with Lower Cults : Antinomian Nihilism in India and Central Asia

Humanism *versus* Naturism : cf. Epicurus.—If students are right in speaking of a primitive caveman's religion (not unconnected with bloodshed and cannibal feasts), it may well be that early Dravidians in Hindustan were then practising such a cult. Siva may be an aryan deity and the chosen patron of brahmans, but he covers the whole of a pre-aryan religion of fear. For the

appeasement of terrible gods by terrible means, the brahmans really offered no alternative and merely compromised with an existing usage which they could neither prevent nor remodel. Gautama (like Mahavira the jain) set up human excellence, effort and merit as superior to all these nature-powers. Though he laid no claim to divinity, it was inevitable that he should receive a homage by degrees becoming actual worship of a deity. Epicurus whose teachings were in many ways strikingly similar[1] taught a philosophy of hope rather than of despair and received a devout cult from his followers even in a most sceptical and secularist age. The shrine where the saint's relics lie is perambulated in solemn procession and simple offerings are made in gratitude to one who has solved the great secrets for mankind.

Contamination with Cthonic Worship: Sivaism.—But the fears of average men and their sense of dependence on higher powers thrust back this creed into *sivaism*, a mysterious worship of a supreme God (in the end rather destroyer than creator). It is supposed by some that this worship was marked by an ancient and secret ritual underground, in a succession of dark halls and deep grottoes, with terrifying alternations of gloom and light, and a final initiation in a dark chamber with no object of worship but the *lingam*. If buddhism claimed to be a return to the noble aryan path and the almost homeric or olympian worship in the open air of kindly celestials,—this emergence of a subterranean (or cthonian) and terrible element, must be due to dravidian revival. The brahmans are certainly not a pure aryan development; like the druids among celtic peoples, they derived much of their doctrine and practice from an earlier race. Gautama tried to restore a simple cheerful life of fearless self-reliance—a pelagian ideal for which India was certainly unprepared. Later history is the record of a long deterioration. The cult of Siva (representing a recurrent cycle of birth and decay) brought back the old virtue of fear, finding vent sometimes in orgy, sometimes in human sacrifice and cannibalism. In the innermost sanctuary was no figure of a man who had overcome and reached happiness, but a formless *herm* betokening that the same power

[1] See Hicks' admirable account *Stoics and Epicureans*, Scribner New York 1910, p. 166, 167. How true is Mme. de Stael's statement (*de l'Allemagne* Paris 1819) that Epicurus' system is really the only native greek contribution to philosophy!

which creates also destroys its handiwork. The Great Yogi Siva is also the great nihilist. The beatified human saint is pushed off the pedestal and a new deity installed who is *not being* as well as source of all life.

One possible source of Asiatic Antinomianism: Parsi Protest.—It is quite impossible not to associate this doctrine with the peculiar antinomian tendencies which recur once and again in the east and spread like a silent plague westwards. Let us compare two passages from asiatic writers separated by more than 1000 years, in which the distrust and abhorrence of nihilism is shown. In *Avesta* (Fargard iv) we read this injunction : 'Of a truth 'Spitama Zarathustra, the man who hath a wife is far above him 'who begetteth no sons ; he who hath a house is better than the 'homeless wanderer and who hath riches and children than he 'who is poor and childless : of two men he who filleth himself 'with meat hath more of the Good Spirit than the man who ab-'staineth : he can strive against the onset of the fiend of death, 'against the winter-demon in thinnest garments, against the 'evil tyrant, and can smite him on the head, against the ungodly 'heretic (*ashemaogha*) who refuseth to eat.' This is of course the poor harmless ascetic of all time against whom (it would seem) the man whose religion implies worldly comfort and a 'hebraic' success is needlessly enraged. But a single turn will transform the blameless teetotaller and vegetarian into the magician acquiring black arts by his continence, about to become a real menace to the community. Hence a detestation and a fear which we shall find repeated in the west—a curiously double feeling of respect in the vulgar mind for the catharist *perfecti* and a fierce hatred of men of uncommon sanctity.[1]

Hatred and Fear of the Extremists in Islam.—We turn now to Moiz Mohammed Haidar's History of the Moguls.[2] 'The sectaries of Razi-ud-din used to put to death every one they 'met, deeming such murder a means of salvation bringing reward 'in the hereafter. . . . He was one of the accursed *Mulahida*

[1] This paradox is no greater than its complement, the union of mortification and licence, not merely in the same system (as that of Siva) but by turns in the same person.

[2] *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, ed. Elias, Sampson Low 1895 p. 217 (part ii, ch. xvii) : the author died in 1551–2.

'of Kohistan whose evil record is to be found in all histories. 'Most of the people of Badakshan are adherents of this sect; 'they hold the world to be without beginning or end: [1] they do 'not believe in resurrection or a future state.[2] They say that 'while the Prophet was alive all the faithful were bound to abide 'by the statutes of the Holy Law; but at the present day the 'whole duty of man is to speak fitting words and be faithful 'to their meaning.[3] All other ordinances are futile: sexual 'intercourse with kindred is lawful and its enjoyment need not 'depend on marriage-rites; if one has a passion for some-one— 'be it daughter or son or mother—it is lawful to gratify it if it 'be practicable. It is also lawful for them to take one another's 'lives or property.[4] *In fact the sect of Mulahida* [5] *is the worst 'form of heathenism in the world.*' It seems that nearly three centuries after the mongol Hulagu's capture and destruction of Alamut (N.W. Persia) the sect still flourished in the hill country

[1] This was one of the chief articles of faith by which in cent. xiii the dangerous heretic of the west was to be recognized and convicted.

[2] ? of retribution; clearly no more than the average buddhist did the Assassin face danger except for reward after death.

[3] Implies wholehearted loyalty to their chief and truthfulness with in dealing with other members of the sworn brotherhood: surely not with the rest of mankind.

[4] Trans. of Denison Ross; must surely be wrong; for 'honour among thieves' is the necessary principle of all banditti whose hand is against the world; it must be 'lives and property of other men'—not belonging to their confraternity. Or the reference may be to a harmless communism of goods within it.

[5] = impious, while *Chiragh-Kush* = extinguishers of the lamp—suggesting (as in the case of the early Christians) licentious orgies in the dark at the close of their meetings:—no doubt with equal injustice. These terms with the name Assassin, are purely opprobrious; *fedawi* means 'devoted' to the service of the Old Man of the Mountains. Marco Polo, ch. xxii also calls them *Mulehetites* and describes their overthrow (giving a wrong date 1262 instead of 1256). d'Herbelot says 'it is the plural of Melhed, '*impious, a man without religion*': Polo translates 'holders of heretic 'views' as we apply the term Patharini to certain heretics among Chris- 'tians'. This easy transition from Assassins to Patarines is worth notice in a writer of cent. xiii: the one secret society seems to suggest the other. The capture of Alamut is described by Abul-faraj in his *Hist. Dyn.* of Jengiz' descendants, and by Mirkhond (tr. Jourdain, Paris). The perhaps mythical story of the 'Garden of Paradise' where the young emissaries were drugged, is fully recounted in Polo.

of Badakhshan and the region of the upper Oxus.[1] The Mullah Mohsin Fani explains thus in his *Dahistan* the title Ali-*Ilahiyah* by which they are sometimes called : 'This sect holds that 'spirits from heaven have appeared in palpable form, who 'otherwise could not be known. God Himself has taken human 'form,—especially in the person of Ali Murteza whose image (?), 'being that of Ali-ullah or Ali-God, they deem it lawful to worship. '. . . They say he returned to the sun when he left the earth, 'and the sun is his own proper nature and identical ; whence 'they call it also *Ali-Ullah*. They do not admit the Coran, as it is 'now extant, and believe that *God migrates into the person 'of their Imams*. In this age of the world they affirm that He 'was manifested in Ali-Ullah and his glorious posterity : Maho-'met was but a prophet sent by him ; for God, seeing that he was 'inadequate for his task, Himself took human form to assist him.'

Quaker Pietism evolves into a Social Menace.—We notice then in the above development, a simple quakerlike quietism, an epicurean 'way of life' with its due honour to the good men who first taught it—by degrees corrupted by blending with materialist doctrines of the hereafter, devil-worship and moral indifferentism. This evolution, beginning no doubt with the indo-scyths and Kaniska, took place in central Asia, and implied the permanent alliance with the very *shamanism* which Gautama detested. It seems also to have met and coalesced with the antinomian views which arose through a persian reaction against Islam—of which Ali was the convenient figure-head. The Incarnationist views wholly alien to Islam, gave rise to the peculiar loyalty to certain prophets or captains of banditti, whose commands override any known moral law. From hostility to the letter of the Coran arose a malignant enmity against all mankind who were outside the sworn brotherhood. Thus the harmless water-drinking and celibate mendicant became the type, for popular prejudice, of the dangerous antinomian, bent upon the overthrow of the true religion, all social order and all moral restraint.

[1] To-day they survive in Shignan and Roshan as *Ismaili*, and acknowledge the *Agha Khan* at Bombay (as noticed elsewhere), sometimes bearing his name (437).

DIVISION B

Islam : Its Sects and Philosophy

PART II

(ii) Final Form of Arabism

CHAPTER C. CULTURE UNDER THE LIBERAL CALIPHATE (TO AVIÇENNA)

Section I. Foreign Influences in Irak and Arabia

God as in Islam as Supreme Will : Transcendence and Agency.— Islam starts, like judaism but unlike hindu theosophy, from the concept of deity as a unique and almighty Being absolutely distinct from the world. Philo, under greek as well as eastern influences, had tried to modify the antithesis and bring the two into relation by means of the Word and the Powers. The problem before scholars and divines under the short-lived liberal caliphate was to safeguard the *transcendence* of God without denying His efficacy in our world : religion demanded that He should be conceived as near and powerful, if not with the *motakallemin* sole agent. But philosophy (which at least in the alexandrine age was never *pantheist* in the strict sense) insisted that His true essence and inmost nature should be kept from contact with the world and held to be unknowable. The Coran taught, entirely in accordance with biblical views, that God is great in *nature*, in *history*, and in *miracle* ; that He knows and watches over everything, the physical order being so directly the result of His unique agency that a too curious science was held to be sacrilege.[1] God created the several ranks of intelligent life, men, angels and djinns, that they might adore Him—' for His pleasure they are ' and were created.' The idea of revelation follows the lines of this conception of God as Absolute Potentate. It is external ; He commissions an angel to convey a message. There is no trace of the belief that spiritual beings in any sense emanate from the divine nature ; the highest archangel down to the meanest reptile, all are creatures of His will. Following a rough division

[1] An attitude in which augustan and later writers of Rome, like Seneca and Lucilius, shared, no less than Thomas à Kempis.

of faculties [1] we might say that while the hellenic deity represents pure *thought*, the God of Islam is pure *will*.

Problems of Human Freedom : the Libertarians of Basra.—Islam turned, sooner than the Church, to the human problem of *predestination* and *liberty*, because this arbitrary voluntarism in pure theology did not lend itself to analysis or discussion. It seems clear that the Coran by no means teaches a doctrine like calvinism (as it is commonly conceived), and inquiries on the extent of man's freedom were by no means ruled out as impious. Nevertheless God's absolute power over man as a creature had certainly been the accepted doctrine during the glorious period of the first triumphant advance : and very naturally. In *728* A.D. died Hassan of Basra, leaving two pupils who openly declared themselves partizans of human free-will and took the title *kadarites*.[2] Wazil the son of one of these pupils founded the sect of *Motazel*, acknowledged a *physical*, while he denied a *moral*, necessity, and, like the opponents of Gottschalk the reprobationist a little later in the west, held it impossible for God ' to wish or decree evil '. At the same time he strongly maintained the abstract unity of God and denied to Him qualities or attributes : ' he who affirms an eternal quality by the side ' of God is already a polytheist.' This strict monotheism was soon to be modified by the influence of the new greek learning. Indeed Hodeil of Basra [3] already rejected this very negative theology, and, without granting to the divine qualities [4] separate or hypostatic existence, regards them as modes under which the divine essence appears in a world of relations. God knows in virtue of a *knowledge* which is His very essence and His will is only a mode of His knowing :—' God wills that which He *knows* ' to be good.' Already we have the true mark of an intellectualism which will afterwards bear the name *thomist*. It is plain that he also tried to reconcile the novel greek theory of an *eternal* world with orthodox belief in a creation by will *in time*. In one respect

[1] Which can never be otherwise than artificially held apart or contrasted ; witness the disputes of thomists and franciscans or Kant's discussions on Reason.

[2] Or *qadarits :* a doubtful term which might imply the *power* or decree of God, or the *liberty* of man.

[3] Whose long life covers the first century of the Abbasids (752–850).

[4] Shahrastani is certainly hasty in comparing his views with the hypostases of the Christian Trinity.

he showed a liberal spirit which was not long to be tolerated in the east: *natural* law (he held) was anterior to all *positive* or revealed religion and was quite adequate as a guide. As in the later treatise of Ibn Tofail [1] a man can have knowledge of God, of moral distinctions and of duties, before any express revelation: by his own reason he can discern the beauty of holiness. Before the liberal if not sceptical caliph Mamun (*813–833*) disputed Nazzam, also a member of the Basra School, upholding *man's* will as the sole free activity in a world of necessity. God, Bichr believed, had not created the best of all possible worlds (as the Motazel held that He had); we may not however pass judgment upon the world since our standards of opinions on the good and just are not valid in connexion with Him. He is not bound to satisfy our demands; man is free, can by natural light discover and follow the wiser course; at God's fitting time, he can benefit by His positive revelation in Islam. It was clear however that Bichr thought that that world would have been a great improvement on the present, wherein all men were called to the true faith and were all found worthy of salvation.

Emphasis on Divine Transcendence: Negative Theology.—This tendency to lay stress on God's remoteness and on negative theology was increased by Mamar, who in a sense excluded God from the natural order, by denying that He directly produces *accidents*—but only *bodies*: in them resides an immanent force which of itself produces birth and change and the various forms and activities of being. God (quite in the greek manner) cannot know the particulars of our world—is there 'knowledge in the 'Most High?'—for if He is the object of His own thought there is division of *knowing* and *known* in a simple substance, and if His object be outside He is dependent upon it and no longer Absolute. Once again then, our concepts are irrelevant and cannot be applied to Him and He is in the last resort unknowable.[2] But

[1] Pococke's well known *Autodidactus*.

[2] When Baron Carra de Vaux terms this theology *pantheist* in his valuable work *Avicenne*, Felix Alcan 1900, p. 29, I cannot follow him: it is true that some aristotelians call the Philosopher by the same name because he places in nature a 'something divine' (θεῖόν τι) and makes Nature (somehow personified) the single really efficient cause in the world instead of God. But Mamar's tendency is surely clear: to remove a too absolute power from a universe (where otherwise everything that is or happens is equally divine as in spinozan positivism) and allow some inde-

Tomamah (+*828*) expressed an opposite doctrine which shows greek influence : the world is a *natural* act of God and not an act of *will* ; it follows of necessity (as in spinozism) and is an eternal and necessary counterpart of His essence. About this time appears the first notice of the Active Intellect, from which issue forth the forms of beings ; the saved will not see God in person but only thus secondary being or First Intelligence.

The Word or Reason : Sifat Anthropomorphism : Predestination.—Already then under Habit and Hodabi (pupils of Nazzam) appeared the distinction so intolerable to islam, of God and His Reason or Word. Djajiz, page to Nazzam and a distinguished member of the basrene School (+*868*), held (like Kant) that ' in knowledge there is no freedom ' ; knowledge which we receive passively comes from natural necessity ; *willing* is only a mode of *knowledge* ; a voluntary act is merely one of which its author is conscious. Hachim, son of Djobbay (+915) found the negative theology then current very unsatisfying, and tried to justify the conception of divine attributes as modes having a subjective value for one who knows the divine being. His father blamed this attempt and returned to the teaching of Hodeil. It is not then surprising that an *anthropomorphic* protest arose in the sect of Sifat ; some even maintaining (like Kerram in Syria (+*869*) that God has a body and form like His creatures, that we can speak of and explain His qualities as if they resembled our own.[1] Again, opposed to the libertarian sect of *Motazel* we find arrayed the sect of *Djabar*—as Austin against Pelagius. Man, says Djahm, (a teacher beyond the Oxus), has no power over his acts, no will, no freedom, God creating directly all his acts as He creates other beings and results in the natural world ; punishment and reward follow as necessary consequence of necessary acts :—that is, man's categories are vain and

pendent life for the world and our freewill. He is therefore rather correcting Pantheistic tendencies than promoting them.

[1] The jewish sects of Karaites, no less than the Christian monks of Nitria, held these material notions, for fear of losing all conception of the divine in the absolute nothingness which we find taught by Bar Sudaili and the pseudo-Dionysius. But the theory has much deeper roots ; it went back to the gnostic Primal Man, met and satisfied the Incarnationist beliefs of the nearer east, and was already giving proof of vitality in the doctrine of the Divine Imamate and the apotheosis of Caliph Hakim of Egypt ; cf. de Sacy's work on the *Druzes*, Paris 1838 xix.

futile, he cannot apply any judgment to the world of men and of things; we can never say it ought to be, only it is so. Man in the scheme of the world is only a mechanical toy with an unhappy gift of consciousness.

Greek Wisdom as a Perfect and Final System: Activity of Translators.—When the greek wisdom was made known in translations during the short liberalism of the last prosperous Abbasids, Aristotle was without doubt held as the chief exponent of a unique, final and perfect system of thought. Philosophy appeared to muslim eyes as a real unity, not a series of tentative surmises but a body of doctrine, a living science which unbroken tradition had handed on. Masoudi tells us 'how the hearth of human 'cult was transferred from Athens to Alexandria, how Augustus 'set up another centre in Rome, how Theodosius closed the latter 'school (!) and brought all learning to Egypt, how under Caliph 'Omar the chief place of study was transferred to Antioch and 'later, under Motawakkil, to Harran:' a very suggestive if not wholly accurate record. The aramean world began about *150* A.D. to study with impartial coolness the writings and doctrines of Christian and gnostics alike; witness the peshito rendering from hebrew into syriac.

The 'Nestorian' Versions: Greek Influence Unbroken for 500 years.—Edessa was already a resort of the followers of Valentine and Marcion.[1] Bardaisan founded his school and his peculiar literature in this important borderland of east and west. As we know to-day, he was certainly a gnostic and only in a few eclectic doctrines a Christian at all: his sect lasted on into the Middle Age as a separate body, as both Masoudi and Shahrastani testify. His astrology is just for us his most interesting feature. Without a doubt he did much to spread interest in the *chaldean star-theories* which appear so clearly in the arab philosophy—though in a form tempered by a knowledge of Aristotle and a certain regard for human freedom.[2] About *200* A.D. the bishop of Edessa consented to receive orders from the patriarch of Antioch; the aramaic spirit united with hellenism. Zeno closed in *486* (as we saw) this vigorous and independent school of Edessa because it was in sympathy with nestorian beliefs

[1] Duval, *Hist. d'Edesse*, Journ. Asiat. 1891 ii 262.

[2] Cf. Brandt, *D. Mand. Relig.* and the chapter on 'chaldean philosophy' 182.

on which perhaps its influence had been of no little weight. The scholars met on the more tolerant soil of Persia at Nisibis, and the shah himself, Chosroes Nushirvan, founded in *530* an academy for their use at Gundisapora (Djandisabour) where medicine and philosophy were studied for more than 200 years. The exiled 'nestorian' bishop of Edessa, Ibas, gave the first impulse to translation. Against this heresy the monophysites fought and protested, Philoxenus, patriarch of Antioch, having urged Zeno to ruin the heterodox 'school of the Persians'.[1] Both rival schools were engaged in making versions of the greek authors, and already a regular scholastic method of commenting on the text was popular, e.g. with the brilliant Sergius of Rasain who died in *536*. In sum, we have for 500 years before the arab inroad an unbroken tradition of greek culture, maintained both in orthodox and heretical circles by syriac scholars acquainted with greek.

Arabs already under Christian and Jewish Influence : Axum, Hira.—Nor did the Arabs arrive from their desolate steppes entirely untouched by such influence. Islam is in its essence and impulse little more than a 'republication' of the primitive jewish creed, corrupted, as Mahomet supposes, by idol-worship and by a dogmatic subtlety which threatened God's unique dignity. Iconoclasm was in truth a sister-movement, and it was hardly religious differences that made Leo III (*717–741*) the champion against the arabs of an hellenic ecclesiasticism which he detested. In Mahomet's day there were Christian communities in the Yemen, and a Christian kingdom at Axum, which had dealings with New Rome. Between the two world-empires there had long been established semitic or saracen principalities in the borderland, some embracing the Christian faith and accepting the emperor's suzerainty.[2] In the kingdom of

[1] Roughly, the nestorians correspond to *pelagians* who desire to leave something to man's agency and to safeguard the human and progressive element in Christology—the monophysites to the *austinians* who set in the foreground God's absolute power and the immediate absorption of the lower finite element in the divine. In dealing with such terms as *nestorian, austinian, pelagian* we are using only convenient adjectives showing the general tendency and ultimate deductions of doctrines, which in their extreme and logical form, were never held by their reputed inventors.

[2] E.g. the families of Salikh and Tanoukh, the dynasty of Ghassan (which in Nicephorus I, the successor of Irene in 802, gave an emperor to Byzantium).

Hira the Christian element was important : though a vassal of Persia, Amrou (+*568*) was son of a Christian captive and himself became a Christian. Nestorian settlers attained to riches and honour in this kingdom of Hira and took the name ' Ibadites ', ' servants of God '.[1] Arabs then had long been in contact with eastern creeds and culture—before the fourth and greatest exodus of the semitic family. Islam at first not only borrowed wholesale from the Bible, and even from Christian belief, but was inclined to favour these ' peoples of the book ', hoping to gain their help against its real enemies the idolaters. The Arabs were only a conquering caste, but neither intolerant nor destructive ; they kept in office[2] the roman and persian clerks of bureaus. Jews and Christians (wearing their cross) were seen at court as advocates, administrators, physicians and men of science.

Liberalism of the Abbasids : Patronage of Unbelievers.—Under the first abbasid Mansur (*752–774*) the work of translation went on apace ; besides greek books, pehlevi and parsi gave up the secrets of Bardaisan, Marcion and Mani.[3] In cent. x it will be seen that the gnostic element plays an important part in the syncretism which passed westwards under the scarcely deserved title of ' arab philosophy '. The Arabs knew *Mazdeism* both in its original form and in its peculiar restatement by the last named leader of heresy : of indian systems they knew much less, though the vogue in the west of *Barlaam* and *Josaphat* shows that buddhism, at least, was not unfamiliar at an early date ; and though Kharismi, the astronomer under Caliph Mamun, compares indian with hellenic methods. This caliph founded an official bureau for translations within the palace ; at its head was placed Honein, a nestorian ibadite from Hira who

[1] Some interpret the word *bogamil* in the same way, as ' servants or friends of God '.

[2] In Egypt, the coptic element, and in Persia, such civil servants as John Damascen and his father, were simply invaluable ; the Arabs knew no organization save that of the clan and (as we know) when the ' vanquished ' land took its victor captive ' the clans retired sullenly to the desert again ; while the caliphate, now (like the roman empire) ecumenical and non-national, became a victim first of disintegrating *persian* thought and manners and next of *turkish* violence.

[3] Masoudi *Golden Meads* viii 293 : Flügel, *Mani and his teaching* 1862 notices the acquaintance of Arabs with his *dualism*.

maintained his favour at court under the three successors to his patron.[1] His son Isaac (+*911*) and his nephew Hoblich continued the work ; the former rendered into syriac, besides the usual aristotelian writings, Plato's *Sophist* and various commentators as Porphyry, Themistius, Ammonius and Alexander. Other nestorians were Naimah from Emesa, translator of John Damascen's notes on the last four books of the *Physica*, and Matta of Deir Kana (+*939*) who, like Naimah, gave a version of the *Sophistic Elenchi*. Kosta the son of Luke[2] of Baalbec under Caliph Motasem studied in Greece itself and returned with books from the dead to the living hearth of hellenism. Tekrit, a jacobite Christian, studied under the great Farabi, flourished under Caliph Muti and died in *974*. With Abu Ali the son of Zaraah (+*1007*), also a learned jacobite Christian, we reach the times of Avicenna : besides versions from the greek he wrote original comments on Aristotle and Porphyry's *Isagoge*.

Planetary Cult from the Sabians : Their Negative Theology.— So far then for Christian activity in a work so much applauded and honoured at the caliph's court : but it would be unfair to omit mention of the labours of the Sabians (to whose peculiar and still doubtful religion we must so often refer). The influence exerted by these curious survivals of chaldean belief was far greater than muslim doctors are inclined to allow.[3] In the sacred books of the Mandeans the thesis so often stated in our survey is explicitly repeated as the cardinal tenet : *a messenger from the light-world visits the realm of darkness to conquer its king.*

[1] He is said to have been poisoned by orthodox christians for spitting on an image of Christ, 873 : it is curious that in legal proceedings against him Motawakkil allowed the Christians to judge him according to their law.

[2] A work on the *distinction of soul and spirit* attributed to Kosta has been published in a latin version in *Bibl. Phil. Med. Æt*, Innspruck 1878.

[3] Three other similar systems are the Yezidi, the Nosairi, and the better known Mandean—of which we have spoken elsewhere : Chwolson in his monumental work identifies the sabians *of the Coran* with the elkesaites as ' people of a book ', and compares the kindred but not identical sect of the Mandeans : he holds that these ' elxaites ' owe their title to a prophet of the name from N.W. Persia who attempted like Zoroaster a reform of *parsism* : common to Elkesaite and Mandean sects were the constant rites of baptism : here again we may name Brandt's *Mand. Writings* Göttingen 1893, preceded by his *Mand. Relig.* (Leipzig 1889).

From this 'gospel' Mani is said to have borrowed his battle of light and darkness: it describes the *descensus ad inferos* in epic form and with wealth of detail but the chaldean origin (whether in the myth of Ishtar or of *Tiamat*) is not to be concealed. Meantime (as we saw) another sect, but of star-worshippers, welcomed the protection offered by the name Sabian, and enjoyed peace under its disguise. In *830* Caliph Mamun bade the men of Harran choose one of the *religiones licitæ*: 'no one knows', suggested a friend at Court, 'what a Sabian is, except that Mahomet 'tolerated the sect; take their name and continue your own faith; 'no one will raise objection and you will be allowed to live in 'peace'. Now this second class of pseudo-sabians are of great importance: they adored the stellar-spirits and continued the primal priestly religion of Chaldea. It is likely that at this time there was both an exoteric and an esoteric cult—the former polytheist, the latter tending to a gnostic monotheism. *The planets are subordinate to a Supreme Deity*, as in other gnostic systems. In a prayer to Ursa Major, appeal is made to the force which the Creator placed in that constellation; Jupiter the planet is conjured in the name of the 'master of the lofty edifice, first 'among all beings, the only eternal'. Nedim in his *Fihrist* (*c. 987*) states that many notions and terms in their system had been derived from peripatism; e.g. on *matter* and *form*, *time* and *space*, the elements, movement. They held that weighty doctrine of the fifth body (πεμπτὸν σῶμα) which marked off the perfect stellar world from our own evil region: *beneath* the moon things were compounded of four elements, beyond, of the pure and eternal fifth element alone. The Supreme God (as in most gnostic systems) was beyond knowledge and possessed no attribute which the finite mind could understand. Man's higher soul, common to him with the angels and opposed to the animal soul, moves the body freely: in the angel it is *active*, in man only *potential*. Intellect is a function or form of this Soul which perceives the essences of things. In a word, their debt to Aristotle and his successors is quite evident. Like the Mandeans and Mani,[1] like Zoroaster long before, they are pure and explicit

[1] It is interesting to note that Kindi (+ 873) under Caliph Motamid combated expressly the *manichean* cosmogony together with their views on the constitution of heaven and the theory of light and gloom.

dualists and contrive to combine this theory with Aristotle : [1] ' Spiritual beings are the forms of light (Shahrastani) ' corporal ' beings are forms of darkness . . . the two realms are opposed ' to one another, perfection and excellence belong only on high ' and not to the gloomy depths '.

Influence of Erudite Harranians.—The learned and eclectic character of Harran is seen in its two prophets *Agathodæmon* and *Hermes*, names which plainly connect their faith with Egypt.[2] Tobit of Harran (*835–900*) was a friend of Caliph Motadid before his accession and continued afterwards in favour. He displays the wide and encyclopedic interests which marked this age ; he knew three tongues, greek, syriac, arabic ; wrote 150 works in the last language and sixteen in syriac. Among his disciples were Christians and jews : his skill in geometry and stellar science was remarkable and in his careful renderings he corrected many errors of earlier translators. In this ' Sabian ' school we note the union of philosophy with the exact sciences and the observation of the stars, agreeably not merely to chaldean origins but to their neoplatonic kinship. It is then clear that a richer literature existed in Mesopotamia and Irak than anywhere else in the world at that time.

Rich Compound of Creeds and Ideas in Irak : The ' Theology ' Neoplatonic.—Aristotle held the chief place but his doctrines were seen dimly through the mists of the pseudo-*Theologia* which consists of excerpts from Plotinus' *Enneads*. Plato was certainly less known and Plotinus almost wholly ignored, no doubt owing to the similarity of name : Porphyry his pupil was a much more familiar figure ; Galen, Marcion and Mani complete the curiously eclectic list of chief authors. The general features of the Philosophy were however those of Plotinus [3] and no other ; and when the pythagorean is named by Masoudi (*966*) as the

[1] No doubt by exaggerating the distinction of *heaven* and earth which he helped to make so popular.

[2] De Vaux thinks that this gave an impulse to the problem of *prophetism* in Islam, not strictly in harmony with the belief in Mahomet as the final revealer of God's will. A further revelation (as in montanism) was always possible : on one hand this might lead to private heresies of subjective hallucination, on the other to Messianic hopes, to *imamism*—with tendencies taking curious form in the shiite sects.

[3] Plotinus, when he *is* named, bears the title ' Sheikh of the Greeks ' *al-iounani* in Shahrastani (the learned historian of eastern thought).

system most in vogue, he clearly means the alexandrine revival to which the later movement called neoplatonic was loosely affiliated. The Theology of Aristotle [1] a pseudonymous compilation—was turned into arabic by Naimah of Emesa in *840* and Kindi revised the translation for the son of Caliph Motasim. It is just an exposition of Plotin's triad, *One, Mind, Soul*—the latter hypostases being first and second emanation from the unmoved *One*. If *One* be compared to light, *mind* is fire, and *soul* is warmth; this soul is bond or link between the eternal thought-world and the perishing world of sense: she is believed to create the beings of the stellar universe and the sublunar sphere when she turns from the contemplation of mind in which lies her truest activity. In the universal *Mind* are all later beings, all together as one in the thought-world; in the *World-Soul* are all forms and forces of life: at the last verge of existence, in the last feeble stage of emanation from the *One*, is the singular, a living concrete individual with which our finite experience must make a start. *Love* (which is a form of *intelligence*) can however unite even these remote pilgrims or prodigal sons with their Parent: 'the upper world is altogether love.'

Kindi: Stages of Human Reason: the Active Intellect.—Kindi (*873* under Caliph Motamid) is the first genuinely arab name that meets us in this long period of Enlightenment. This pioneer steeped himself in all the current learning and showed a wonderful and versatile energy. He accepted Plato's axiom that no one can be a *philosopher* without being a *mathematician*, and shows by the absence of emphasis in his writings that the mystical side of thought had not yet evoked the attention it was to receive later. He is the first to distinguish *four* states of Intellect of which *three* are within the soul and *one* without: (1) In potency δυνάμει, (2) in act ἐνεργείᾳ=the scribe actually writing and using the art which lay dormant, (3) the νοῦς ἐπίκτητος, (4) the Active Intellect. Nothing moves or develops into the *actual* unless stirred to do so by something already *in act*—the well known canon of Aristotle against Speusippus and pythagorean evolution (from chaos or night or the world-egg). *Soul becomes intelligent by means of the Active Intellect* (νοῦς ποιητικός). When looking up to this it unites itself with intelligible form

[1] Dieterici, Leipzig 1882, 3.

(*νοητὸν εἶδος*) : this form and the Active Intellect are the same within the soul—but only there (and for the time being)—for Active Intellect is not identical with the intelligible. Here in terms not very clear or precise is stated the problem which will exercise so deep an impression on the western world—the problem of the origin of supersensible knowledge.

Abu Zeid of Balkh was a traveller and a critic (like John of Salisbury) of the thought and tendencies of his time : he refers in his *Book of Creation and History* [1] to the Carmathian sectaries, to Hindus, Manichees, Harranians, and Parsis : he mentions the distinguishing dogmas of *dualist, pantheist, anthropomorphite* schools. He states the problem of immortality as conceived by one sect : ' soul must either be destroyed by the death of its ' owner, *or* absorbed into the world-soul, *or* migrate into another ' body '.

Section II. Farabi and the Basrene Brethren

Farabi : the Problems of Universals.—Farabi, the most distinguished name before Avicenna, was a turk from the banks of Jaxartes, pupil of a Christian doctor who died at Bagdad under Caliph Moktadir (*907–932*). He betook himself to the Hamdanid court where he lived in the muslim habit of a sufi : he followed Seif Addawla to Damascus, dying there in *950*. Like other members of his school he was encyclopedic in attainment and interest ; but he was not a physician. At first sight he appears as a decided nominalist. He believed *individuals* were first substances ; *singulars* are prior in substantiality and have more right to the name of substance than the *species*. But he allows that from another point of view the *universals*, as being fixed and permanent, have more right to the name substance than these transient *singulars*. In this he recognizes the basal difference in outlook of the theoretic and the practical reason : the former is only concerned with the general and enduring, the latter wholly with the actual concrete being in which for the time the universal embodies itself. ' The *Universals* ' he says, ' do not exist *in act*, *ἐνεργείᾳ* ' except by means of ' *individuals* : only then do they exist and so their existence is by ' *accident* : not that they are themselves by *accident* ' for they

[1] Ed. Huart, Paris 1899.

are unchanging and eternal in essence but their existence *in act* can only be by accident'.[1]

Problem of Knowledge : Mystical Union with Active Intellect.—He has the same quadruple division of intellect that we noticed in Kindi ; but there is a closer approach to what may be termed a mystical or purely idealist attitude. 'When the being who is 'intellect *in act* (*actu*) comprehends a thing, that which he 'comprehends is not a being external to his essence, but is *his* '*very essence* itself', *thought* and *being* are identical ; only when they are one is there true knowledge. When this second stage of intellect seizes the νοητὰ εἴδη it becomes at once the intellect ἐπίκτητος (*el mostafad*). These intelligibles are the *universals* and exist *objectively* in the world, but when *subjectively* appropriated by us (in the union of *thought* and *being*) have a different kind of existence and are set free from many of the predicates (which belong to actual being) *time*, *place*, *site*, *quantity*, *mode*. In this obscure doctrine he seems desirous of displaying a hierarchy of *forms*, rising up and out from matter and separating themselves by degrees from it. In the scale of *being*, *thought* and *value* (which is identical) there are lowest elements, then nature, the soul's inferior powers, then *virtual* intellect ; above this again νοῦς ἐπίκτητος (the third stage), then discarnate intelligences, lastly the *Active Intellect*. This is *pure form* and acts upon our slumbering reason as sun upon eye (which even in the dark is *virtual* or potential sight, only becoming *actual* seer when the light comes). At this point our intelligence mounting upwards[2] by induction from *particulars*, meets and coalesces with νοῦς descending on the reverse path from the most perfect and general downwards to *singulars*. This is precisely Plotinus' second hypostasis, in which all forms coexist at once and together (ἀυλλῆ) ; divided out or planted here and there in our sense-world they are united above in the world of Forms (κόσμος νοητός).

The Two Worlds, *Creature* and Commandment.—In *Jewels of Wisdom* (Dieterici §§ 27, 39, 41 etc.) Farabi explains from an *ethical* and personal point of view what is certainly obscure

[1] *Letter of the Second Master in reply to questions submitted*, § 10 : Dieterici, Leyden 1890 : Prantl's *Hist. of Logic*, ii 301 seq.

[2] In *Jewels of Wisdom* § 41, he uses this very conception : 'the human mind is that which goes to meet the intelligible forms', and thus enters a world more truly divine than the world of *the creature* here below.

in a merely *logical* exposition : man is composed of two substances separated in essence ; he is a citizen of two worlds of *creation* or of strict sovereignty, and of the *commandment.* ' The ' spirit is like a mirror and the theoretic intellect is like its polish : ' the intelligible forms (νοητὰ εἴδη) are there portrayed and their ' reflexion cast on its surface by a divine effusion, like bodies ' upon a mirror already polished with care '. Here pure logic takes that *mystical* turn which it is so often apt to do ; the vacant glass reflecting nothing is made clean by man's own activity, but the final irradiation is a divine grace from without. Thus ' if a ' man's soul is pure and he turns to the world of the *commandment,* ' he joins the higher realm and attains supreme bliss '. In sum, spirit is the purified soul, fixed on its own proper object, and like an untarnished mirror reflecting every flash from the divine, until these detached rays settle into a fixed and steady radiance —which is life eternal. We may note that God knows and governs both these strongly contrasted words or orders : Farabi is not one of those who deny Him a knowledge of *singulars.* In the lower world of sovereignty the *One* (as form) explicates itself into the *manifold* of our experience. ' The skies revolve according ' to the First Principle and there begins the world of *creation :* ' whence the purified soul ' can return into the world of the *com-* ' *mandment* by which everything becomes once again one '(*sub specie æterni*).[1]

Farabi's Political Theories : Souls in the Hereafter.—Farabi takes this hierarchic form of *psychology* (as he believes) from the universe itself ; and he introduces it also into *politics.* Just as the soul's faculties rise up in orderly sequence until it touches the world of truth, the body is a corporate state with heart for president, the city is an organism or a graded system, the universe itself is a harmonious whole : stars and the sublunar realm follow one on the other and are linked together. We may not dwell on his *politics* : but their close resemblance to Dante's ideal must be noticed : he is convinced that the *most perfect state should include the whole of mankind*—a logical result of muslim propagandism by no means so strange or novel in the east as might be supposed ; a principle indeed which must be found in every

[1] It is difficult to see in Spinoza or modern absolutism aught but a restatement of this doctrine, at any rate in its essential features and promises.

proselytizing theocracy. As in Dante the supreme ruler or *imam* is not a coercive authority; the master of the habitable earth must have, not skill in arms, but intelligence, memory, eloquence, temperance, a taste for study, firmness without obstinacy, love of justice and loftiness of soul. No doubt like the greek publicists [1] he prefers monarchy, but if these virtues cannot be found combined in one man, let there be two (consuls) or three or even more: thus he arrives at something like a modern Cabinet. As in Dante the perfect State on earth looks beyond itself to an eternal end; its aim is to procure for the souls of its subjects happiness after death. In the life hereafter the souls are closely united to one another and each addition of a soul delivered from the flesh sensibly augments the happiness of the group; we may compare Plato's συναγυρμὸς φρονήσεως. 'Souls' are joined together as one intelligible form is united to another'. In this heavenly kingdom ever receiving fresh supplies of knowledge and happiness 'there is increase like that of a scribe's talent 'in writing'; and this increase is indefinite. Two things must be noted; language is used which might be turned in a monopsychist channel; yet our author is clearly bent on safeguarding in the 'collectivism' of soul-substance hereafter both the sense of progress and development and the certainty of individual consciousness and bliss, experienced by the several centres or souls, unmerged in any impersonal unity beyond.

He Contrasts yet Conciliates Plato and Aristotle.—For the proper understanding of the too famous medieval dispute about Universals, Farabi gives us by his clearness and sobriety no little aid. Trying to conciliate the thought of Plato and his disciple he shows the different tempers in which they seem to approach the same problem. Plato (he thinks) held himself aloof from earthly affairs while Aristotle loved them and sought honour and fortune; the one spoke by myth and parable and demanded purity of heart for the understanding of wisdom, the other ordered and classified ideas and explained them for the use of all men alike; the one placed at the top *substances*, the most general notions removed from sense and particularity, the other taught that *individuals* were the primitive reals.[2] Thus he regards Plato as a

[1] *Pace* Professor Barker.

[2] Wherein, as we saw, Farabi shows that there is no real conflict, only different points of view.

mystic, Aristotle as a 'secularist'; the preacher demanding *moral* purity contrasted with the logician demanding *mental* clearness : the lover of *forms* opposed to the student of *particulars* : the believer in a *creative* fiat against the upholder of the world's *eternity*. Without sacrificing his thesis of their concordance, he can point out the empiric and sensualist element in Aristotle, who in his *Analytics* makes the senses sole avenue and source of knowledge ; *intellect* being thus in one sense merely *experience*. But he holds that this was the real meaning and import of Plato's reminiscence (ἀνάμνησις) ; for our first impressions are unconscious and 'he who reflects seeks to grasp that which experience 'has already placed within the soul, and it is then as if a man 'recollected himself'.[1]

The Brethren of Basra : their Lodges of Instruction and Definite Policy.—The sect of the *Brethren of Purity* at Basra must be once more briefly noticed—a subject on which F. Dieterici has spent for more than thirty years a patient labour of love (from 1858). They founded various centres, (the first 'masonic' lodges), confined to members and designed not merely to spread culture but to exert an influence on politics and society. 'In each region where our brethren find themselves let them 'have a private hall for meetings at fixed times, where no one 'else shall have right of entry, where they may study science and 'converse on their hidden doctrine'.[2] These conventicles were something between an orphic community and a later cœnobitic society : for there were ranks among the members according to capacity ; and if one taught, another less gifted could contribute money ; and from these unequal elements arising from mutual needs was formed a harmonious whole. Advancing beyond the letter and perhaps the dogma of Islam they seemed to have held the principle of *salvation by knowledge*—common it may be said to most medieval thinkers. Their religion was a syncretism which admitted the writings of Moses and the prophets, a popularized philosophy—in which many ancient elements met and were

[1] Cf. unconscious cerebration and the doctrine (perhaps now exploded) of the two sides of the brain, of which one works more rapidly : it must be confessed that he deals in a rationalizing vein which we hardly expect with a theory closely joined in Plato's mind to *transmigration*,—in which Plato (at least) was without doubt quite serious.

[2] Dieterici *Die Abhandl*, etc. Leipzig 1883.

fused. Their grades of initiation (at intervals of ten years) promised the disclosure of ever loftier secrets ; and the proficient who had adhered for fifty years was believed to acquire the *angelic intelligence* (that is, surely, permanent union with Active Intellect). We cannot but see in this a direct result of a theory which must have been long familiar : *at a certain stage our mind becomes of itself divine*, or (in a more popular and mythical phase) entered into full union, either with its guardian-angel or with the divine reason conceived as a single hypostasis as in Philo or Plotinus.

Philosophy and Faith against Literalism and Works.—It is plain that they denied that religious literalism and moral works could grant this privilege : for them the religious law of the Coran was imperfect [1] and contained errors which only the Philosophy could correct. True doctrinal perfection would arise only by a closer union of Islam with greek wisdom. Their *encyclopedia* aimed at providing this supplement and completion. The Brethren were warned ' not to reject any knowledge or scorn any ' religious belief, because their aim was to include and harmonize ' all creeds and all sciences '. Man's *differentia* is found to lie in his morality, which is quickly given an intellectualist turn : ' the qualities by which man won the day over the brute creation ' in the presence of the king of the Djinns, consist in the mainten- ' ance of those sciences which we, in a fashion as terse and direct ' as possible, have united in these fifty and one treatises '.[2]

Their Cosmology and Wide Syncretism.—The cosmology of the Brethren followed the unvarying lines of alexandrine Emanation. The first effusion from God's being is creative *reason*, in which are the forms of all later beings ; a second is universal *soul*, still a simple and primitive substance : from this as final stages issue first universal *matter*,—from it *body* itself with which soul now becoming multiple unites and gives order and beauty to the visible world. This creation God *wills* and *knows* but He is not Himself the creator. The syncretism

[1] So Tanhidi tells us († *c.* 1009) who was both a *Sufi* and an encyclopedist of the school of Basra.

[2] It is interesting to note their fondness for the pythagorizing syzygies or pairs (*matter* and *form*, *cause* and *effect*, *night* and *day*, *male* and *female*) which the syrian pseudo-clementine writings must have made familiar in the east after 250, no less than the obvious dualism of the parsis.

of the Brethren is clearly shown in an appeal to the disciple (Dieterici *Macrocosm* § 91) to embark with Noah on the vessel of salvation, enter the heavenly realm shown to Abraham ' our father ', appear with Moses on the right side of Sinai, be delivered from the stains of the flesh like Jesus ' who is so near to God ', come forth from Ahriman's darkness to behold Jezdan, secure admittance into the temple of Ad and Tamoud to view there the celestial spheres of which Plato makes mention, which are not spheres of stars but spiritual Intelligences. Here in solution are all the elements which, receiving clearer and more detailed exposition from Avicenna, will pass westwards, and, summarized (but not notably modified) by Averroes, will enter scholastic thought in the first years of cent. xiii.

Section III. Avicenna

His Anomalous Character : Doctrine of Illumination.—The life of Avicenna was spent under the titular sovereignty of Caliphs Tai (*973–991*) Qadir (*—1031*) and Qaim (*—1075*), when the unhappy Successors of Mahomet exchanged the perils of direct authority for security of life and tenure and three names occupy more than a century.[1] He wrote on every conceivable subject, but we are in the main concerned with his work on metaphysics and psychology—including those *mystical* treatises which are so great a puzzle to modern students acquainted with his dissolute habits.[2] On ethics proper he left like Hegel very scanty fragments, and indeed he was but little qualified to discourse on the subject. Ibn Tofail[3] says that he wrote his *Chifa* according to accepted peripatetic doctrine, but that his complete truth must be sought rather in his *Philosophy of Illumination* (or

[1] For his life see de Vaux' excellent recital, chap. v 127–157.

[2] Mehren has done for Avicenna in this respect what Dieterici did for the Brothers of Purity : at Louvain 1887, *The Bird* ; at Leyden several editions of the *Hay ben Yahsan*, mystical allegory (1886, 89). The *Icharat* (with *The Bird*) and comments on sufism 1891 ; treatises (1894) on *Love*, on the *nature of prayer*, on *deliverance from the fear of death*, on *influence produced by pilgrimage to holy places and prayers repeated there :* in 1899 a treatise on *destiny*. Besides these Avicenna wrote *Astrologers Refuted*, *Solomon* and *Absalom* (a mythical apologue on the soul's release) and a treatise on the *Soul's Return Home ;* a further treatise on the *Philosophy of Death* (written for his brother) exists in persian in the British Museum.

[3] In his *Self-taught Philosopher* tr. by Pococke, London, 1700.

Eastern). Averroes (*Tahafut*) remarks that Avicenna's disciples think that he only called it *Eastern* because it contains the beliefs of oriental people, *divinity being for them a study of the heavenly bodies.* It is likely that some of these wished to divert his theology into chaldean or hindu channels. There is no ground for attributing to this work any new doctrine not contained in his other mystical writings. This method of *Illumination* is obtained by the *ascetic practice* of the sufis 'if they are 'still faithful followers of Islam'.[1] Now this illuminative method is nothing but the mystic teaching of neoplatonism in which was embodied the later but cognate belief and practice of sufism.

The Two Worlds and Stages of Soul's Ascent : His Rejection of Pantheism and Metempsychosis.—Avicenna follows Farabi in referring *sense* to the world of the *creature*, *intelligence* to the world of the *commandment.* Above these is a third sphere which is veiled from both faculties. Our *practical* reason presides over the animal world which it is its duty to rule : our *theoretic* reason looks upward to the regulative principles above it. While Farabi was content with three stages of the mind above and outside which as a fourth is placed Active Intellect, Avicenna gives four ; the new grade being that in which mind apprehends universal and necessary truths.[2] Above the fourth or *acquired intellect* is a fifth, which he calls Holy Spirit and attributes only to a very few men ; at this stage mind knows and grasps truth directly and without a medium. The potential phase he compares (*Icharat*) to a niche for holding a lamp ; the two next to the glass and oil of a lamp ; next the wick ; last the fire from without which is Active Intellect. 'It is clear' he says, 'that virtual 'intelligence does not issue into actuality except by cause 'of an Intelligence which is always actual' : that is, the great axiom of Aristotle against the evolutionists, that perfection cannot be a *result*, only a prior *cause.* Therefore, for his loyal

[1] Says Hadji Khalfa in his *Biogr. Lexic.* ed. Flügel iii 87 : this is to be contrasted with the way of *argument and speculation* which if united with faith in revealed religion is the method of *motakallemin* (or orthodox divines); of *falasifah*, if the inquirer does not believe or believing keeps the two separate and distinct. 'There are thus 2 ways' says Khalfa 'of attaining knowledge of the Author of all things'. This reference to the Double Truth (of science and religion, of reason and faith) is of interest.

[2] E.g. whole greater than part, if two things equal same they are also equal to one another.

disciples even in man the true completeness of the mind cannot be altogether a growth from within but a new force added from without by that which is always perfect. *Mind* says our author expressly, *does not understand anything except by its junction with Active Intellect* (*Ich.* 179) in which reside the eternal, intelligible forms (νοητὰ εἴδη), *but it does not itself become it.* This doctrine in Farabi and his successor is an adroit reconciliation of *empiric* and *idealist* views. He recoils from any pantheizing tendency to which his theory might seem to lend support : he has a strong belief in personality : ' is there any state in which one doubts ' one's own existence, is not sure of oneself ? Whether drunk, ' asleep, or in meditation, one always grasps the self . . . not ' what you see or touch, a limb or heart or brain, or even a ' collection of all these members ' : the self is something more than an aggregate of parts or a complimentary title given to the sum of psychic and bodily faculties. Immortality follows from this distinction : a reasonable *Soul* is an independent spiritual substance which knows and grasps truth without mediating organs : *body* is merely its implement or utensil. His proofs of Survival are curiously free from any *mystical* or even *moral* implication ; they depend, as in Plato's coldest manner of dealing with such evidence, on pure *metaphysics*. Each soul is created separately [1] and cannot exist before the body is formed to receive it. Every being perceives within itself a single force which acts and freely governs the body ; another soul suddenly introduced would be powerless, there would be no harmony or correspondence between spirit and the material which it has to employ. Hence he decides against *transmigration*—no doubt then a popular belief in some circles—with the same arguments which Aristotle might use.

Astralism in his Neoplatonic Theory of Procession.—The Procession of Being from the One he has treated in a New Year's gift to Emir Abubekr.[2] It is quite needless to repeat that from the One issues the world of *Ideas*, from this the world of *souls* ; the

[1] *Nadjat* 51, an abridgment of the *Chifa* or ' Healing '.

[2] Where he explains mystically the letters of the alphabet prefixed to certain *suras* in the Coran : if he supposes that these letters represent or symbolize different degrees of being, he resembles those gnostics who attached magical value to the greek *vowels* and held that each one was related to the several planets and had power over them.

Ideas are almost described as angels turning towards God, concerned in imitating Him as their higher duty and happiness and fulfilling His commandment upon earth in intervals of contemplation. There are in the *psychic* world a number of beings not separated from the world of matter : clothed in the most subtle and perfect envelope, the souls of the spheres administer their departments and achieve between themselves a sort of unity because of the fervent love which courses through the ideal world. Each has a special number peculiar to it which binds it to one of the Ideas. In the physical world are (not *angels* nor *souls* but) impersonal *forces* wholly infused in matter and controlled by magic. Contrary to usual doctrine, the visible *corporal* world, even extending to the ether, comes last, the higher natures having circular, the lower various—indeed disorderly—movements. The stars, then, do not in this theory seem to occupy so lofty a place as in the usual system.

The usual theory is not nearly so cognate to platonism and the plotinic ideal world : it is a blend of Aristotle and the ancient chaldean *astralism*. In the form which became later so familiar in the west, God stands at the top or apex : from Him [1] the First Caused, pure spirit or Mind (*primum mobile*) ; thence, the body and soul of the utmost sphere, and second mind ; from this mind issue soul and body of planet Saturn, and a *third* mind ; from this mind again, body and soul of planet Jupiter, and a *fourth* mind for the sphere which comes next to him in the order of planets ;—from the mind of the last planet or Moon issues a last intelligence, Active Intellect : and upon this depends our sublunar world. It is certain that we have here a compromise between two views : —the *gnostic* separated a hostile planet-world from a saving influence which descends through them even down into our sphere ; *platonism* (and in a certain degree *peripatism* also) saw no ultimate dualism between parts of the universe, only a gradual efflux from perfection and a failure of force at each successive stage. The *minds* of the spheres are somehow kept distinct from the bodies and souls ; which, however, they are said to produce : *and it is by conjunction with the last of these that man attains* to an uplifting past the material to the realm of pure ideas and true being. The Stars are then (as with

[1] Conceived in abstract terms as the One, the Necessary Being, the First Cause.

Plato and Aristotle) the first visible gods and the planets though less perfect are still composed of a tenuous and refined matter to which our earthly matter has no counterpart. This primitive astrolatry was revived in the very place of its chaldean origin by syncretists who united it with elements of every other known religion. The more enlightened thinkers were fully convinced of the unity of truth, of the identity of *natural and positive* religion, and found no difficulty in believing islam, recognizing the celestial influences, and adhering to the monistic theory of emanation :—in themselves three separate systems which cannot be reconciled. So too their encyclopedic knowledge led them to redact a *corpus* of all possible sciences to form a coherent and harmonious whole ; they were not beset like the modern mind with the irreducible antitheses of science in its various branches and of the conflict of religion in its turn with any and all of these.

Problem of Transcendence and Cosmic Agency : Gradual Descent of the Divine.—In the *Nadjat* Avicenna shows how the First Caused answers the recurrent problem, how did the One become the Many ? This second hypostasis is triple, because he knows the First Cause and knows himself, first as *necessary* in the light of the First Cause and as *possible* in himself. From the knowledge of the First Cause (the most perfect faculty in him) issues the *mind* of Saturn's sphere : from his knowledge of himself as *necessary* issues the *soul* of the utmost sphere ; and its body from his knowledge of himself as *possible*. So far as the Saturnian mind knows God he creates a Jupiter's intelligence ; the soul and body of his own sphere in the same fashion as described. Many readers will agree with Gazalith at this ' procession ' is simply incomprehensible. Yet it may be favourably compared with the refinements of Proclus on Plotinus and the complexity of the divine orders in the latter platonists. Its motive is clear : the *intransigeant* Unitarianism of Islam must be transcended to explain how the universe came into being at all. The philosophers learnt from the greeks to avoid this unreconciled dualism, by fusing the divine gradually with the world, not abruptly as in vulgar pantheism : a decent interval was set between the sovereign and the last and meanest of his subjects. Again, the Harranian influence was quite strong enough to provide a ladder, or means of harmonizing, in those ancient deities of the east, the stars and planets. The movement of the spheres

is not (as perhaps in the earlier chaldean phase) fatal, constrained, or malefic ; it is voluntary, an act of homage to ultimate perfection ; therefore it is *soul* that moves, in desire and adoration of the Good. It is not *mind* that sets in motion or directs, though it may be the remote cause ; for mind already has truth and the good and need not stir itself or anything outside to attain them (οὐθεν ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ). In a sense then, the motion of the spheres is a moral end : ' The principle of movement for the ' spheres is their passionate desire to resemble the Supreme ' Good ', that is, in the highest states of perfection allowed to them (*Icharat*). The first efficient motor is the soul of the utmost sphere ; and indirectly therefore the intelligence of this sphere is the First Caused who moves this sphere by way of *desire*.

Active Intellect, Last Intelligence of All : God Beyond Human Judgment.—The last mind of all, Active Intellect, governs our world and from it issue the forms which *matter* must receive there. The First Cause of all knows itself as *cause* ; and, though there is no end or motive of utility and purpose which impels Him to create, there is no necessitarian and unconscious efflux from His nature ; He is aware that ' virtue has gone out of Him ' and finds satisfaction in it. He seizes and grasps the world in a single instantaneous intuition : everything exists in so far as He understands it ; that is, has its cause in His comprehension of it. Thus *intelligence, cause, being,* are all one (*Nadjat* 67). But He does not know the changes of earthly things, else He would change too : ' He only comprehends the whole in a sort of univer- ' sal manner, yet ' (here he speaks from the religious side) ' spite ' of this no individual thing remains hidden from Him ; and ' herein is a marvel which only very subtle minds can conceive '. Evil has no substantive existence and is pure defect or vacancy. ' Providence (*Icharat* 185) ' is the enveloping of the whole by God's ' knowledge ; He knows what it should be to exist in the best ' order, and He knows besides that all this results of necessity ' from Him and from His embrace of the whole. This two-fold ' knowledge is Providence. He approves what He knows as the ' best order, and there is no need of quest or effort. The source ' whence the good flows down upon the world is in the knowledge ' that God has of the goodness applicable to the universal order '. Every cause of evil (if he allow its existence at all) is shut up in the sublunar sphere ; and having no hold upon ideas or intelligible

form ' attacks *individuals* only in limited periods of time whilst the *species* are exempt '. (*Nadjat* 78). A world wholly without evil could not have come into being : for us such an order would be inconceivable. Avicenna is quite ready (like other student optimists) to sacrifice victims of special disasters to the general good : ' God should not extinguish the irascible faculty in man ' or the element of fire in nature because both lead to untoward ' accidents in detail '. Treating of *Destiny* (*Risalet el Kadr*, tr. Mehren) he maintains that God and His own works are inscrutable and cannot be judged from our limited standpoint ; ' good and ' evil, ugly and fair, are not the same to man and God, or else He ' would not have created ravening beasts of prey . . . in creating ' He had not the same regard as you to feelings of compassion, ' did not follow the same principles of intelligence : in His ' wisdom, which our poor reason cannot penetrate, He has given ' His consent, you have not the right to exact from Him com- ' pensation for torn limbs or broken necks '. This strictly non-moral Being recalls the deity of Aurelius and will lead on to the First Cause of the philosophers and to Spinoza's God, who is wholly beyond good and bad, or indeed any human judgments (except possibly those of logic). But Avicenna's optimism reposes without doubt upon a firm belief in the soul's survival and future reward. Our soul's perfection here is to be wise and reasonable, knowing the world-order and modelling itself on the ideal world which the visible in part conceals and in part discloses ; when such a soul is set free from the body, it flies towards its end and goal and there enjoys rest. Only those who have lost the power to enjoy good will find no peace ; nevertheless, long divorce from matter will even purify the poor vicious soul. De Vaux adds an allegory or story ' mystically ' interpreted by Nasr ed din Tousi, much resembling the hidden sense extracted by Kingsley out of the farewell of Hector and Andromache. A king Hormanos stands for *Active Intellect* ; Solomon is *reasonable soul*, which issues from it without any mediation of *things corporal* ; Absal, his nurse, is the complex of animal faculties. The passion of Solomon for his nurse stands for *soul's* downward gaze and taste for physical pleasures—their flight to the western ocean shows the soul utterly submerged in the transient ; their suicide together in the sea is the end of body and (lower) soul in death. But Solomon is saved because the higher soul is immortal, and his

passion of desire is turned into aspiration after ideal beauty, when he has once seen the vision of Aphrodite Urania. The accession of Solomon to the throne of his father signifies his arrival at soul's essential perfection. All this is no doubt interesting and edifying ; but it is not in a very strict sense *mystical.* We are still without precise knowledge of Avicenna's concept of the operation of *Active Intellect* or of the union of souls in the hereafter with any divine substance.

Summary : A Harmony of Religion and Philosophy by means of Syncretism : almost at once rejected.—Such then is the final form in the east of the so-called ' arab philosophy '. It aimed at universality and a fixed dogmatic form : it believed every religion to be at heart the same, every science to be a department of a great and coherent whole. These students were assured that they had succeeded in adjusting the various parts to this ideal whole. For them ' Philosophy ' was a single system, in which they saw no conflict between the constituents which to us seem so far from blending. Harran, Plato, Aristotle, the latest School of hellenic thought, all contributed to this end and in Harran were collected all the most archaic elements of chaldean faith. They did not admit (or even conceive) that this syncretism could not be brought into line with Islam and its central doctrine of an arbitrary, personal, transcendent deity. But they did undoubtedly tend towards two presentations of the same truth, one *religious* and the other *philosophic* ; they contrasted *exoteric* dogma with an *esoteric* creed. Persecution arose not merely because the vulgar mind was terrified by any infringement of orthodoxy and convention, but because in practice esoteric teaching (such as that of the Pure Brethren) had often ended in nihilism and a denial of all religious truth and moral law. The East had not forgotten Mazdak, and the recent developments within practical Islam, though but slightly concerned with philosophy, were attributed to its influence. *Philosophy passed eastwards as a complete view of the universe and its truth, superior to the popular religious conception but not therefore contrary to it ;* just as it is conceived by Hegel and the hegelians. Hence we have already the concept of the twofold Truth. With Gazali and the more orthodox caliphate this system by which the wise could ' go on to perfection' was doomed, and almost at once became extinct ; yet not until it had passed on its theories to the western world.

CHAPTER D. DOCTRINE OF THE SPHERES AND ACTIVE INTELLECT: AVERROES

Section I. Theory of God and the World

Philosophy, a Recoil from Islam and Arabism: Alarm of Orthodoxy: Suspicions of Gazali.—Arab philosophy is not merely a passing episode foreign to the genius of the people among whom it appeared. It may be called more positively a reaction against arabism by those regions of the muslim world most remote from the peninsula—Samarcand, Bokhara, Cordova, Morocco.[1] Caliph Mamun (pupil of the Barmecide) represented a persian reaction partly mazdean, partly rationalist and eclectic, against the rigid system of Mahomet with its dogmatic voluntarism. This spirit was always esoteric and 'in opposition'. It was not, either in east or in west, a progressive movement; Averroes differs in no important point from Ibn-Tofail or Avempace, who did but continue in distant Spain the studies of Kindi, Farabi and Avicenna. Sufism met and blended with neoplatonic doctrines of ecstasy and union with the divine: peripatism supplied a logical framework and temperate formula for such unions with Active Intellect and indeed for a final absorption. It is clear that at the very outset Kindi held views on this subject beyond which the latest averroist did not advance in a serious degree. Farabi (according to some critics) held the hereafter to be fable; here and now man receives (as in buddhism) the recompense of his toil and the purified soul becomes *prophetic* as soon as the veil falls between it and Active Intellect;—in any case this greatest happiness is attainable in this life. Some held that the secret doctrine of Avicenna in spite of his exoteric defence of God's knowledge and the soul's life hereafter was pure pantheism of the type of Spinoza.[2] Against this whole hellenizing tendency

[1] Renan *Averroes* ed. 2, 1861, p. 90: in the same way all impulses in hellenic philosophy came from the fringe in contact with barbarism.

[2] Averroes, *Refut. of Refut.* x: Ibn-Tofail, *pref.* and Roger Bacon hold that this identifying of God and the world is in truth Avicenna's

Gazali protested. Without doubt, says Renan, he was the most original spirit of the arab school. In part akin to Hume, but still more like to Pascal, he tried to cure his doubt, which reasoning had aroused, by ascetic practice, by mystic dances of sufis which dull thought and bring to the mind the repose and contentment of bodily fatigue. In the interests of muslim orthodoxy he denied the laws of nature and the existence of *cause* ; God alone is unchanging and what we call law is only something we see habitually. His foes accused him of attacking philosophy and reason merely to divert the suspicion of the divines ; there exist treatises by him in which he gives the reconciliation of reason's antinomies ; and Tofail (*preface*) seems to quote from him an ambiguous counsel to a pupil, to leave behind what he has heard : ' when the Sun has risen there is no need to gaze at Saturn.'

A Complete Rationalism Attempted by Avempace and Tofail : Union with Divine only at the very summit.—Avempace took up the challenge on behalf of reason : it is only by gradual and patient advance in knowledge that man is able at last to identify himself with Active Intellect—not (that is) by *ascesis* or by any sudden irradiation by the divine. It would be possible (he believed) to form a social order wherein each man without painful effort should reach the goal, triumph over his animal nature, arrive at full possession of latent power by study and meditation, and so having reached perfection calmly await death ; which is the only experience that is now left untried and which has lost all its terrors. Tofail (or ' Abubacer ') is also a rationalist who believes that man can rise by training his own faculties to the highest perfection. But here the goal is mystical (though all the stages are human and pelagian) and the end is union with God. Of all this now forgotten literature this little treatise is the only one which has any real survival. *The self-taught philosopher* (Hay ibn-Jokdan) is adopted by Quakers for edifying reading. In both these spanish thinkers the *mystic* begins his work where the *rationalist* has ended.[1]

final word and genuine doctrine—all these build on the *Eastern Philosophy*, on which see last chapter : whether right or not, their opinion is worth notice.

[1] Before them ibn Gebirol ('avicebron), a Jew of Malaga, in the *Fons Vitæ* had set forth the same doctrine, but only began to exert influence at a much later date.

The Two Rival World-Theories : Creation and Evolution.—' The entire spirit of arabian thought ', says Renan in a remarkable passage (chap. ii § 3) ' and therefore of all Averroism, may be ' summed up in two doctrines intimately bound together and ' making up a complete and original interpretation of peripatism [1]; ' the *eternity of matter* and the *theory of Intellect.* Philosophy has ' never proposed more than these two hypotheses to explain ' the world :—on one hand, God free and personal, having attri- ' butes which determine Him ; providence ; causality in the ' universe transported into God [2] ; human soul, substantial and ' immortal : *on the other,* eternal matter, evolution of germ by ' latent force ; indeterminate deity [3], laws, nature, necessity, ' reason ; impersonality of Intellect, emergence and reabsorption ' of the individual :—the former view reposing upon a too exalted ' view of the *singular* or *part,* the latter upon a too exclusive ' regard for the *whole* '. In a word, acute realism confronted by nominalism in a form equally acute. It is not doubted that as Averroism reached scholastic ears it was wholly identified with this pantheizing theory ; but Renan is not justified in saying without reserve ' the arab philosophy *and above all that of ibn* ' *Roschd* must be decidedly classed in the second of these cate- ' gories '. It is now at length possible to do justice to a philosopher who never desired to be other than a faithful member of islam and is not wholly responsible for the doctrines which pass under his name. It is certain that unorthodox inferences were formed out of his expressions. Before him Gazali (himself accused of the vilest heresy) in attacking the *falasifa* had not called them unbelievers, but had rebuked them for bringing forward opinions not likely to subserve religious interests and offering material for mischievous constructions to other less enlightened men. It must in justice be said that Averroes, just like Farabi or Avicenna, was sincerely trying to establish a *philosophy* compatible with *muslim faith* : in this popular sense of the word, he is therefore a true ' scholastic '. The attacks of his orthodox

[1] He should have said *neoplatonism* with which (as de Vaux shows) he is somewhat apt to confuse genuine *aristotelian* teaching.

[2] As in cartesian or kindred theories.

[3] When we find ibn Sabin (under the early Fatimites in Egypt) defining God as the ' reality of beings ' we see the chief text of medieval realism with all its latent dangers.

foes are more accessible to us than his original arabic texts or their crabbed and obscure latin versions, on which the Paduan School bestowed such tedious and inopportune labour. He is represented as a pure *evolutionist* and *determinist*; his world by some immanent force unfolds itself with inner necessity and no conscious providence presides over this explication—though it may vaguely be termed the ' unfolding of God ' from an indeterminate to a determinate state.[1] Meantime this central Spirit—who is both *cause* and *product* and has no will or purpose as motive in self-revelation through the manifold and transient,—can be aware only of general laws and has no time to think about *singulars* or persons. All this is pure spinozism ; and although Spinoza put out frankly and without reserve the logical deductions of jewish and arab thought, his system must not be fathered on those harmonists, mistaken though they may appear, who believed it possible *for a thinker to be at once a good philosopher and a good mussulman.*

His design to Reconcile Islam with Philosophy : Creation Eternal.—It would seem that Averroes was neither a *sceptic* nor a *peripatetic* nor a *pantheist* (in the strict sense). The ' philosophy ' which he accepts and comments upon with an almost religious devotion is neoplatonism, not Aristotle's system.[2] He marks no advance upon the general position inherited and made welcome, never in substance altered, by the ' arabs '.[3] He is of a less mystical temperament than his forerunners, but he is hardly less neoplatonic. Some of his aryan and scholastic critics in the west were quite right in saying that at times this great semitic scholar misunderstood Aristotle's meaning.

His reputed dogma that the *world is eternal* by no means implied that it was self-sufficient or *causa sui*, developing by mere immanent law and necessity. Rather he upheld that the *act of creation* was *eternal.* God's agency is being renewed every moment, not as in deism relegated to a single act outside time : a continuous and incessant activity (he thought) is worthier of

[1] From Spencer's *homogeneity* to *heterogeneity*.

[2] Though we have pointed out how entirely the later elements were immanent in the stagirite.

[3] It is but in unessential detail that he modifies the accepted *corpus* of doctrine : at times indeed he seems even to welcome the corrections of Gazali.

the divine than an arbitrary fiat. The first creation did not take place in *time* ; to Averroes, as to other muslim speculators, time is the result of movement in the spheres. *The world is then eternal in that God is always creating :* it has an Agent and is not moved by its own inner impulse. In the same way, the heavenly bodies have a perfect and eternal life in that form of motion which befits their nature. But it is the Agent who imparts this movement, and enables them to maintain it for ever ; these spheres are ' ensouled ' and incorruptible, having spirits or angels presiding over each severally.[1] From God issues a single potency whence the whole universe is derived, a coherent and harmonious system, at unity with itself : this force, remaining one, penetrates into the *manifold* without becoming multiple. God knows the world but not as we reckon knowledge. He embraces all creatures in their truest and most exalted state of being.[2] *Particulars* God does not recognize in our fashion (as distinct individuals) but in a mode peculiar to Himself : '.My thoughts are not your thoughts neither are My ways your ways '. [3]

Intellect and Soul : Soul a Real Substance.—It seems quite unfair to accuse him of denying *immortality* to the soul, but he certainly held the *unity of Intellect* in the universe. Aristotle [4] has expressly sundered *νοῦς* and *ψυχή* : there was therefore for the muslim a profound difference between the faculty which

[1] Here also Averroes is no innovator ; he makes very few changes in the current views of *falasifa* on the sphere-souls and their procession (*πρόοδος*) down into our realm below the moon.

[2] This belief may well have been assisted by the peculiar jewish theory of *pre-existence of all things in God*—on which cf. Harnack's *Hist. Dogma* (*excursus* period I) : he well contrasts it with the hellenic view which exalts, not the *sovereignty and sole agency* of God, but the independent existence of *partial souls*.

[3] This is not of course meant to explain the exact method of God's knowledge *sub specie æterni*, only to combine the two notions, each important either for *philosopher* or *believer*, that God is not ignorant of the happenings of this world or of individuals' conduct and destiny, but that He apprehends these in a divine way which seizes the *part* only through the *whole*.

[4] And of course all the later hellenic development, in which (as Whittaker and others) *neoplatonism* is a far more authentic and legitimate offspring than the half-semitic brooding subjectivity of the Porch ; or even the ' philosophy of Epicurus ' which, though a thoroughly greek ' way ' of life ', is in effect the denial of all philosophy.

grasped universal truths valid for all reasonable beings, and the soul, variously regarded as the *creator*, *controller* or mere *resultant* of bodily desires and temperament. The Master's easy (and perhaps ironical) attitude toward *ethics* proper was seen again in these very faithful followers: *soul* was too closely interwoven with the material tissues and objects to exist apart (as a purely *speculative* question); the character, formed by the long experience of dwelling in a particular frame, had no value or meaning apart from it, whereas *intellect* is one, pure and unmixed.[1] It is wholly unconcerned with the slow and *serial* development or moral training of the person, at home only in the domain of abstract and general truths.[2] Yet, plainly with the utmost sincerity, Averroes remarks that the soul may very well remain *singular, personal, individual,* after death; but the arguments for this do not come to us from pure philosophy which in such a matter can supply no *coercive* proof: it can only show us that survival is possible and in the end we must leave it to revelation. It is certain that he did not (in the last resort) consider the soul as pure *resultant* or *harmony*, a convenient term for the assembly of bodily faculties and powers: with Plato he believed *soul* formed the *body* and therefore cannot be dependent upon it. He quotes with approval Galen's term, the informing faculty (*Tahafut al-Tahafut* 138 Cairo 1303 A.H.). It is something superadded to the innate celestial heat or vital principle in a creature. 'Each species has its soul, mediate between the souls of stellar 'bodies and souls in separate bodies here below'.[3] He also cites another author;—'when the *body* dies the *soul* returns to 'its spiritual condition and to those subtle bodies which are

[1] As in those famous texts wherein Aristotle is really commenting on Anaxagoras' dictum.

[2] There can be no doubt that the peculiar Christology of certain gnostic schools *either* helped in this sundering of our spiritual nature into two disparate elements, *or* was at the outset expressly derived from Aristotle's transient visitation of νοῦς in an alien world: the heavenly Saviour descends upon the man Jesus at baptism (καταφοίτησις) to deliver the message through him, and remains until the Passion when He somewhat cruelly deserts him.

[3] This is a true touch of that speculative *realism*, of which church dogma showed its counterpart in the *massa peccatrix* or Fallen Humanity (after Adam), as a single continuous and responsible entity.

'invisible'.[1] We cannot then deduce that *soul* is mortal because body is.[2]

Averroes believed himself a Pious Mussulman : Sage not to set himself above the Current Faith.—Averroes always claimed to be one of the faithful and never despised the needs of the average man. *Soul* may be individual and remain so : in *Intellect* there is nothing of the nature of individuality ; it exists only perfectly when freed from all conditions of individuality. 'But with 'soul it is quite otherwise'. Thus again he refused to deny *resurrection* ; 'Religious Law had always taught it before Philo-'sophy appeared and it was useful in leading average men to 'seek happiness beyond the grave'.[3] It is certainly clear however that he believed[4] *philosophy* to be a higher stage than *religion*, or (shall we rather say?) to give a deeper insight into its truth. 'Religion has to teach the crowd ; philosophy can 'only be grasped by the few, the elect, and enlightened' (*Tahafut* 139). 'The sage' he continues in a noteworthy passage, 'must 'however not stand aloof : *he must accept the teaching that suits 'the people best'*, though he would not be debarred from private interpretation of dogma : *'for this class of philosopher only 'arrives at complete and perfect life and at happiness by associating 'with the multitude'*.[5] As to the kind of life in a future state he

[1] A very obvious analogue to Mani's tunics left behind in paradise by the angel-spirits driven forth into the world of matter ; and to the tenuous envelope accompanying soul in its migrations among the hindus.

[2] There is a very curious passage which must not be omitted or overcharged with meaning by the side of other statements : 'There is *one* 'soul and its *multiplication* to infinity in individuals is only a secondary 'matter'.

[3] It will be seen that the theatrical disinterestedness of paduan averroists like Pomponazzo (cent. xvi) falls wide of the mark : 'it was far better to follow virtue for its own sake rather than for its consequences or external rewards of which it is held by the vulgar to be the unpleasant condition'. Yet Pomponazzo himself would not have denied that to love virtue for its own sake and seek no other recompense because none was forthcoming, was scarcely a doctrine to be safely preached to the western mind after the fall of empire and papacy, after the examples of the Italian Renaissance, after Machiavelli's careful apology for the tyrant, and the ominous beginnings of the purely selfish and secular State.

[4] Like McTaggart and Hegel.

[5] This is just the attitude of Spinoza ; he warmly approved of churchgoing and would examine the younger inmates of the house on the text and teaching of the sermon. It may be contrasted with the cynical

entertained certain dim (but not less important) surmises: 'the future existence has a kind of generation loftier than that 'of our actual existence, constituting a more excellent order 'than our own cosmic order here' (140).

Doubtful Meaning of the Doctrine—Unity of the Intellect.—The Unity of the Intellect seems on inquiry to be nothing more than Plotinus' *νοῦς* as comprising the whole *κόσμος νοητός*. It only implies that there is a realm (of abstract truth) where all reasonable beings must think alike; that general ideas are universal. 'Intellect' he says 'starts from the *particular*'[1] 'but advances past it to lay hold on the *common* element (*τὸ* '*κοινὸν*) the *quiddity* of the species, which is not divided with the 'persons who are constituent members of it'. These *general* ideas (so held the *falasifa*) really existed together as units in Active Intellect (the counterpart of the neoplatonic noëtic world). We apprehend them only so far as we can enter into relation with it; when a man's reason does so it becomes perfect and completely developed; it is now in *actuality* (*ἐνεργείᾳ*) and has brought into full use its *potential* or dormant faculty. All the previous stages of reason's use form but a prelude; it is now awakened from its slumbers of bare possibility. It is this *intellectus acquisitus* which persists; for the primary intellect, as the merely virtual, does not persist in itself. At the summit then of spiritual development he puts a relation with Active Intellect which easily passes into mystical terms, can indeed with great difficulty avoid them. Now all mysticism implies, first, an almost exaggerated and exclusive emphasis on the subject or self; and secondly, an invariable desire to transcend it or fuse it permanently with the truth of which it is in quest. As to Aristotle at the end of his rational system—a long and prosaic pilgrimage from single and detached things to a coherent order of general truth—there takes place a kind of *illumination* of which naturally he cannot clearly explain the process.

mendacity of our own deist school who, for political and social reasons only, desired the mob to be kept immune from their own doctrines; religion to them (as to Critias) is a 'ruler's lie', to preserve property and make the poor respect their betters—just as Bagehot shamelessly justifies Monarchy only because it dupes the lower class into obedience to Whig oligarchy.

[1] There is always a sound commonsense *empiric* basis both in Aristotle and his arab disciples.

The old problem cannot be better expressed than in Dorner's language : ' The knowing subject ' says he (*Pers. of Christ.* Period I. *ep.* i) ' which had ' by its own effort attained the dignity of absolute knowledge would soon ' fall under a doubt whether the Christ (viewed as objective) was not ' rather a *projection of the subjective consciousness* . . fully declared by this ' that the subject properly in itself is Christ '. So Doutté (*Magic* and *Rel. in N. Africa*, Paris 1909) ' The god is the collective desire *projected* or ' personified.' So to the impersonal brahmans, a personal supreme God was only a gradual creation, reached by reflection. The power of prayer and mental concentration or will-power was objectified and regarded as a real entity, outside the suppliant. (So Murray *Four Stages Gr. Rel.* New York 1912, p. 42). Zeus is called ἀφίκτωρ, that is the suppliant ; ' the ' assembled prayer, the united cry that rises from the oppressed, is grown ' to be a god and the greatest God '. So in the Diasia, the mysterious deity Μειλίχιος is but ' the personified Shadow generated by the emotion ' of the ritual—as Father Christmas is a *projection* of our Christmas cus- ' toms ' (29) . . . . ' magical ceremonies (32) produce a kind of strange personal emanation of themselves '. So Murray sees in the *Kouroi* the rise of a similar *projection*, ' the god is in part merely identified with the ' inspired chief dancer, in part the intangible *projected* incarnation of the ' emotion of the dance. . . . The worshipper of Bacchus became Bacchus ' (142) simply enough, because in reality the god Bacchus was at first only ' the *projection* of the human bacchoi.'

Is Intuition the work of the Soul (Pelagian) or of God (Austinian)? This contact and interpenetration with objective truth may be called *intuition* by our own soul's eye at its clearest, but the objective element cannot be altogether ruled out. There is a sense in which (to use religious language) a divine grace is infused : ' In Thy light shall we see light '. ' Averroes ' says Baron de Vaux ' seems in the end to identify the *Philosopher* and the *Prophet* ' : there must always be prophets on earth or great mystics.[1] So must there always be philosophers, a few great men must always partake in eternal truth. In a word, Averroes so far from delighting to upset the revealed faith of the people is very careful not to do so : again, his *rationalism finds its natural complement* (where it is helpless or transcended) *in an attitude which cannot be called other than mystical.*

Creation and Evolution : Criticism of God's Unique and Arbitrary Agency.—I have set forth in the first place the most modern and critical views on a man and on a philosophy which

[1] To keep up the relation unbroken between this earth and ' heaven ', just as in Plato it is enough that wisdom exist in one man who shall be absolute ruler.

has been greatly misunderstood. But further inquiry into special doctrines ought to follow before the vindication is complete. Taking first *will-less and naturalistic evolution*: on the origin of things (he says *comment in Met.* xi or xii) *there are two conflicting views, some explaining the world by* development, *others by direct* creation. *For the former, generation is but the issuing forth, the doubling (as it were) of beings; the agent only drawing forth beings the one from the other and distinguishing them, his functions being merely that of* motor. *The latter say that the Agent produces being and there is no need of pre-existing matter. In certain mediating views this is a common element, that generation is but a change of substance, that there is a* subject *for the process, that nothing is born except from its like. Avicenna calls the agent 'form-giver' and severs time entirely from matter;* (like Plato's Demiurge) *he impresses the form on a matter already existing. Themistius and perhaps Farabi hold that the Agent is sometimes separated, sometimes not, from the material. Aristotle (the third view) says that the agent imparts movement to matter so that the virtual becomes the actual. Here Agent only brings to* act *that which was* potential, *and all creation is reduced to a movement of which heat is the principle.*[1] *Though Nature is devoid of Mind she produces with order and perfection, as if guided by mind. These proportions and productive energy that the movement of sun and stars imparts to our elements, are what Plato called* ideas. Here he follows such theories as e.g. the chaldean and hermetic (of Egypt) where the entire dependence of sublunar things on the heavenly movement is expressly taught. As we have seen it was because man desired release from this fatalism that gnostic and parsi beliefs came to the front, promising freedom to all who could rise above the planetary spheres to the 'First God'. As to Plato's *forms* it is well known that Aristotle's rejection of them was due to their helpless inefficiency as principles of *movement. Aristotle denies that Agent* creates *any form; if so something would arise out of nothing. It is a false theory which represents forms as* created, *and some have been led to suppose that forms are something real and*

[1] This is much like the spontaneous generation from heat acting on mud, found in many savage cosmogonies and in earlier evolutionists like Empedocles to whom the *imperfect* and tentative was the *prius*: In Tofail a current arab view is seen—that in putrefaction and sun effects (as in Lucretius) we see a purely natural process of generation.

substantial, and that there is a form-giver *: so divines of the three existing faiths assert (in error) that* something *can come from* nothing. *Hence our muslim divines suppose a single Supreme Agent producing all beings without mediaries, exerting power at the same instant in an infinite number of conflicting acts. Everything in this theory of the* motakallemin *has need of a special and direct creation.*[1] *When a man throws a stone they hold that the action belongs not to the man but to the Universal Agent ; thus they destroy all human activity.* It seems clear that Averroes is here rebuking two doctrines : that at a certain moment of time God suddenly brings the universe out of nothingness into being, and that He remains ever afterwards the *only effective agent* of all changes, whether in nature or man. He belongs to what we might call the pelagian or arminian party against a determinism which reduced man to a puppet of some Power, not to be described by human attributes or judged by human standards. He is anxious to preserve human agency, *as long as he can*—just as the discipline and self-culture of the philosopher is a matter of patient endeavour until crowned by the divine irradiation at the summit.

God Remote from World : not Cause of every happening : Analogy of Eastern Sultan.—His single subject or substrate is formless matter, simple virtuality—which in cent. xiii David of Dinant will pronounce to be the only existence. It is not productive and it will not die. The world-order (which Avicenna had put in the category of the *possible*, like Leibnitz) could not have been otherwise ; God is not free to act arbitrarily. Both *cause* and *movement* of the world are necessary and eternal. ' An ' old will ', he says ' cannot start a new action '.[2] The world could not have been greater or smaller than we actually find it to be ; else, caprice would have determined its size, and it is sacrilege to attribute heavenly movements to hazard or chance (though it is admissible to refer sublunar events to accident). God then knows only the *general* laws of the universe ; He is concerned with *species* not with *particulars*[3] : for if He knew

[1] As in the cartesian system where God is the *sole agent* (and, in human actions, the obsequious valet, accomplice or executive of our desires).

[2] *On Phys.* viii, folio 159 *imposs. est quod actio fiat per voluntatem antiquam.*

[3] *Tahafut* Disput. xi, xiii ; *Comm. in Met.* xi or xii 37.

these directly, there would be constant changes in His being. If He ruled directly, as the muslim divines maintained, He would be author of evil. His providence is then the *general order* of things, and all the good in the world is His for He has willed it ; while evil is not His work but the fatal result of a material substrate which thwarts and baffles His plan. Like the edicts of an oriental sultan His will filters down through many mediating, and (it may be) thwarting or distorting, agencies : ' the universe ' is governed like a city, where everything starts from the same ' centre, but where all is *not the immediate work of the Sovereign* ' (*Tah.* Disp. iii). Aristotle's remote deity had left a standing problem both for the pure naturalists who succeeded him and for the more pietistic thinkers of the roman age :—How can movement start at all ? How does God as principle of motion have contact with the world ? With curious analogy to the system of absolute ministers or viziers [1] it was supposed that God made a plenary delegation of all effective power, by the single ' creation ' (or emanation) of Philo's λόγος or Plotinus' νοῦς. ' *From the One only one can arise* : the first thing created by God is the Intelligence ' says the Coran.[2] This First Mind is really the Aristotelian deity, first mover of the remote stars. To the belief that these were real divinities and spiritual forces, the Arabs gave ready welcome.[3] Ineradicable dualism had from the first

[1] The true type of eastern sovereign was the Mikado before 1867–8 ; such a one lived entirely secluded and limited his intervention in politics to the single instant when he appoints or cashiers an absolute ruler to act in his place : in a very true sense he knows only the most *general* laws and cannot be supposed to condescend to the *particular*.

[2] That intelligence (reason, λόγος) was first-begotten of all creatures was a common doctrine in the east for all faiths and schools of thought (e.g. Fatimites, Sabians and Batenite allegorists) except the *motakallemin* who, like the Cartesians, preferred a *direct* agency : this would be pantheistic, if it did not lay stress on the Divine *will* conceived after quite a human fashion. Whether the influence was hellenic from Alexandria or gnostic or parsi or (as is very likely) Christian, the theory was well-nigh universal and, as we saw, fitted in well with the normal conception of government in an eastern country.

[3] It is not surprising that modern rationalist interpreters should have denied that Aristotle could have meant anything so childish as to deify the stars (*Met.* xi or xii § 8). Reading their own mood and tendencies into the text, they have either held it to be (as it were) an ironical tribute to the ' old Divines ' or an interpolation ;—beginning from Vacherot

marked the greek mind ; we with our firmly attested belief in a *homogeneous* universe cannot enter into the feelings of those who divided the world into the *two realms*, one of *the four elements*, the other of *the fifth body*. To Averroes heaven is an eternal being, all *act* and moved by a soul (*de Subst. Orbis* v).[1]

Chain of Subordinate Causation.—Circular movement can only come from *soul :* if it halted but for a moment all else would turn to destruction. Hence it is not immortal *in its own right*, but only by virtue of the eternal action of the First Mover (vii) who is thus like the heart radiating life into the several members. Each orb has its intelligence, which like our rational soul, is its *form*. These compose an unbroken chain of motive agencies which propagate movement down to the sublunar sphere. Averroes is certain that they are moved by *desire* (*on Phys. viii de Cælo et Mundo—on Met. xi or xii* 337, 351). *They only move because they are unceasingly seeking the best ;* their intellect is always *in act*. They know both themselves and all that occurs in the lower sphere ; through them the First Intelligence (the Grand Vizier of the universe) has complete acquaintance with all that passes in the world.

Section II. Theory of Man and the Reason

Active Intellect—an objective reality : it is, and it is not, Human Reason.—Passing now from *cosmic* to *psychic* and ethical concerns, we find that Averroes' doctrine, like that of his forerunners, is founded on an aristotelian text : *de Anim.* iii, where the Active Intellect (superior to the *passive*), is separate, impassible and immortal.[2] *We cannot then look for the Active Intellect in the individual.* It is therefore a gift or grace coming to us *from without* (θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι *de Gen. An.* ii § 3) although sometimes it is

(*First Principles acc. to Ar.* Caen 1836), Ravaisson, Pierron and Zévort, Michelet (all on the *Met.*).

[1] This work, often found united with the *De Causis*, is one of the most popular and widely spread in latin and hebrew : it is made up of several essays written at different times.

[2] νοῦς παθητικὸς, ἐν δυνάμει opposed to ιητικὸς or ὢν ἐντελεχείᾳ : it is the latter only which (in Anaxagoras' language) is χωριστὸς κ. ἀπαθὴς κ. ἀμιγής. Aristotle had started with *a fact* and a *principle :* clearly man only has intelligence *in potency* or *virtual* and by slow degrees rises into his full inheritance ; yet, the axiom must be clearly held that the perfect is the *prius* and the hen earlier than the egg.

called a second kind or class of soul which alone has immortality.[1] But the *transcendent* and *occasional* notion is in the foreground not the *immanent*; *it is, and yet it is not, the human faculty of reason at its highest point.* Without a doubt peripatetic students like Aphrodisias, Themistius and Philoponus understand it in the semi-mystical sense; and this is the unvarying doctrine of the small but important line of arab philosophers. Now it is obvious that Aristotle never reconciled with the *understanding* (verstand), that which he held together in unity by the *reason* (vernunft); the double view that is, which makes νοῦς a man's truest personality, and yet a power intruding (as it were) from elsewhere.[2] Aphrodidias helps on the more mystical sense by comparing *passive intellect* or ὑλικὸς νοῦς to the barest potentiality:— it is not even a *tabula rasa* in which at least there is a surface ready to receive impressions; rather is it like the writing which may at some time be inscribed there.[3] Therefore this purely virtual mind becomes everything that it thinks or is conscious of[4]: it is merely chamæleon, or better, a transparent crystal, formless and colourless in itself and thus has aptness (ἐπιτηδιότης) to mirror what passes: it is *pure receptivity*.[5]

[1] ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι κ. τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδεχέται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ, *de An.* ii § 2: in *Phys.* viii § 5: he says frankly that he has taken the idea and the terms from Anaxagoras (ἀπαθῆ κ. ἀμιγῆ), with which account Simplicius' extract (from the fragments of the earlier philosopher) quite agrees νόος ἐστιν ἄπειρον κ. αὐτοκρατὲς κ. μέμικται οὐδένι χρήματι ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ ἐστι.

[2] Professor Case thinks that Aristotle somehow never acutely felt the dilemma in which he was landed; in a sense everything is *passive* in acquiring knowledge, but in the last resort he could not make Intellect dependent on sense. So he introduced, as if from another sphere, an alien element or a *deus ex machinâ*: the end is pure mystery or mystification and the rationalizing and harmonizing commentators have to acknowledge it or else deny one very important point in his system.

[3] ἐοικὼς πινακίδι ἀγράφῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς πιν. ἀγράφῳ ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ πιν. αὐτῇ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ γραμματεῖον ἤδη τι τῶν ὄντων ἐστι.

[4] Δυνάμει πως Aristotle had said (*An* iii 4) ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς ἀλλ' ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδὲν πρὶν ἂν νοῇ. So too to Simplicius, 'mind becomes what it thinks', πᾶς νοῦς ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ὁ αὐτός ἐ. τοῖς νοουμένοις κ. ἔστιν ἄπερ τὰ νοούμενα: therefore we may add if it *thinks* God it must already *be* God: this is certainly a step in advance of the *ontologic* argument, by which if we can think God it is proof enough that He exists. Of this union or coalition of *subject* with *object* Philoponus uses terms like ἐξομοιοῦσθαι and even ἐνυπάρχειν.

[5] Averroes seems so far to agree: *Omne recipiens aliquid necesse est ut*

The act of knowledge is due to God's intervention ; He uses our faculty as an instrument : *Active Intellect is then God Himself who for a short space enters into relation with our soul : it is but a transient theophany* and the mortal element soon relapses into its nothingness. This notion of employing man as a tool and then allowing him to fall back into his own petty life, is a common feature *both* of the gnostics (to whom Christ's union with Jesus was of this sort) and of the whole creed of Islam.

Views of Hellenic Commentators on Aristotle's Text—Mystical.—Themistius followed the same mystical view : intellect *one* in its source (God) is *manifold* in those who partake of it, as infinite rays come from a central sun. Our dormant intellect conceived by him more substantively than in some other peripatetics) *desires* to perfect itself and aspires (in the mystical doctrine of every age) to complete union with that Being, in which it both achieves its final development and as the price ceases to be itself. This intellect is for Simplicius *mortal*, like everything which lives a *serial* life in time. Philoponus brings in a *realistic* [1] element by speaking of mankind as a *collective thinker* who is always thinking. Units of the human family may be asleep or abstain from thought in any true sense, but there are always some who keep the sacred fire burning, and maintain the electric current between heaven and earth.[2]

Averroes' Emphasis on the Human Side as against Grace.—Now Averroes was highly displeased with this undervaluing of the *subject*, this identifying of man's highest faculty with a pure empty receptivity. ' What is this, Alexander ? ' so he apostrophizes Aphrodisias (*de An.* iii f. 169), ' you pretend that Aristotle ' wished to speak only of a *disposition* and not of a subject *dis-* ' *posed* ? A disposition is neither a substance nor its quality. ' If Aristotle gave us intellect as mere *aptitude to receive forms* [3] ' he would have made an *aptitude* without a *subject*'. He pleads

sit denudatum *à naturâ recepti* (*de An.* 160). So once again *On Connexion of Act. Int. with Man* 358 *Oculus si esset habens colorem, non esset possib. . . . recipere colores.*

[1] Of course in the *medieval* not the *modern* meaning.

[2] οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἕνα τῷ ἀριθμῷ νοῦν λέγομεν ἀεὶ νοεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοὺς ἀεὶ νοεῖ.

[3] It will be noted that this is the very same definition that matter received from the time of Plato : therefore (as with the stoics, David of Dinant and Spinoza) every distinction vanished in the confusion (not

thus for a substantive existence in man as well as in God. Yet it must be confessed that the Arabs never completely freed themselves from the oppressive sense of the divine agency which Islam taught them. Personality or consciousness was never clearly expressed by them ; they were more struck by the unity of objective reason, than by the manifoldness of subjective thinking.[1] With naïve realism that always marks awakening intelligence they conceived of Human Thought as a real substantive entity, a ' general phenomenon of the universe ' (Renan).[2] Averroes compares soul to light just as do Plato or Themistius (above) : *sicut lumen dividitur ad divisionem corporum*, and therefore in 'one sense ' the souls of Plato and Socrates are the same and in another ' different ' (*Tahafut*). But this unity was not a mergence or fusion of individuals : unity of intellect is nought but the universality of the principles of Pure Reason—that domain in which all individuals lay aside their special features and idiosyncrasies. As in mathematics all alike bring out one single accurate answer to a sum and all approach the problem by exactly the same methods : in the whole race, that is, the psychic constitution is one and unvarying.[3] If some part of humanity did not always think, the tie between earth and heaven would be broken and something new introduced into the universe—or rather lost from it.

How Intellect works upon us : Stress on Rational Development in Man.—In one sense therefore this dogma of the Unity of Intellect means little more than a conviction that reflection and culture will never wholly be stamped out, because *human* reason is necessary as an organ of the *divine* expression. So for Averroes the ' sciences are eternal, not generated nor liable to ' death, except by accident ' as when they are for a term united to Socrates or Plato,—*quoniam intellectui nihil est individuitatis*

reconciliation) of extremes, and of the monistic amalgam left you can say nothing but that *it is so*.

[1] *Necesse est . . . ut sit etiam quid unum in Socrate et Platone*, from *Tahafut*).

[2] There is no doubt a certain tendency to this in Plato's latest phase ; cf. the συναγυρμὸς φρονήσεως and the remarks of recent commentators since Lutoslavsky.

[3] *On ne peut douter*, says Renan, 137, *que telle ne fût sa pensée ;* and he believes the whole question becomes just a statement that ' mankind ' will always live and think in some part at least of its members '.

(from Tahafut). In *Ep. de Int.* in *two* latin versions of cent. xiv, from Italy,[1] there is an interesting but obscure passage: *quia intellectus noster in actu nihil aliud est quam comprehensio ordinis et rectitudinis existentis in hoc mundo, sequitur ex necessitate quod quidditas Intellectus Agentis hunc nostrum intellectum moventis nihil aliud est quam comprehensio harum rerum.* That is, the true essence of the λόγος of the world is (as to Philo) the power to 'embrace and hold fast' the 'order and justice of the universe'. It is here spoken of as 'driving' or acting upon our mind so as to allow us to be partakers in the eternal laws of God, by which He rules the realms of *thought* and *things*, the two worlds of *commandment* and of *creature.*

At this point I certainly cannot follow Renan in calling Active Intellect identical with the knowledge that we have of the universe; no doubt it is when we have made it our own or been infused by it, but it exists objectively as well, as a separate and eternal being, into which we have only rare inlets—as into Emerson's 'Oversoul'. The existence of some philosophers (one at least) in human shape (*de An. Beatit.* and *de An.* 349) is not needed to keep this objective Intellect alive, because it would exist without any thinker; but it *is* needed because the bond between heaven and earth would otherwise be dissolved—which would be very bad for earth but would leave heaven the same as before. To reduce all the hypostases of ancient philosophy to mythical figments within the brain is to show little appreciation of its temper and introduce purely modern views. 'This union of Intellect 'with the particular soul (*de An.* 163), takes place neither by 'multiplying intellect nor by unifying individuals':—it is the eternal participation of all mankind through its chosen representatives in a certain number of principles as everlasting as itself. As *form* acts upon matter, so *Intellect* upon sensible images (?). These principles, in their transient union with the mortal, contract nothing of its mortality or singularity; they are independent of individuals and are valid in the most desolate regions where man has never trod. They are really the Platonic Ideas (or forms) in their true and proper sense, as *universals.*[2]

This Union is Reward of Patient Toil: Man's Supreme Blessedness.—Averroes is not slow in giving a devout turn to this

[1] Steinschneider maintains that he had also seen it in hebrew.

[2] Not as causes of movement in the physical world.

very logical and abstract discussion: 'in each being (*de An. Beatit.* 356) there is a divine intent [1] to arrive at the attainment 'of such measure of that noble End as its nature can realize . . . '*even for brute animals*[2] *is it possible to have such virtues as will* '*enable them to mount aloft in the end to such perfection, as belongs* '*simply to the First Being*'. Renan adds very rightly, not here underrating the mystical note: 'Acquired intellect (*νοῦς ἐπίκτητος*) 'only conducts-man to the door of the sanctuary': it does not usher us into the presence chamber. 'As sense prepares for 'imagination and vanishes when the imaginative act is too 'intense, so it disappears as soon as the end is attained'; it is *παιδάγωγος εἰς λόγον*. Then Active Intellect, like Beatrice or heavenly wisdom, completes the task, unites with the forms (*νοητὰ*) and makes man in a sense God; inasmuch as he *is*, because he *knows*, all things. This happy and perfect state stands not at the beginning but at the term of development, when man's spiritual nature is wholly *in act* and in no part *virtual* only. It is the crowning of a slow process not the direct intuitive union of the impatient mystic. Averroes hymns its blessedness in words which, like Buddha's eulogy of *nirvana*, leave no doubt of its very positive and satisfying qualities, though like any mystical goal it cannot possibly be defined.[3] 'How wonderful it is! '*and blessed be God who has given to each several thing its rights*!' Man (he says) whose special right is this complement [4] is himself more noble than all other things found in this world: for he is the *bond* and link of continuity between things of sense and those more noble and pure essences—in which no *virtuality* is mingled with their act.[5] Therefore it is only right that everything in the

[1] Or straining forward, *intentio*.

[2] This is very curious and reminds us of several phases of hindu thought: is every soul (the number being of course limited) straining up through every form of life to a perfection which each one will one day, sooner or later, certainly reach? This is the extreme of 'universalist optimism' and cannot be ruled out of the (so-called) pessimistic creeds of jains and buddhists.

[3] Cf. *de An.* 180: *de An. Beatit.* §§ iii, iv: *Ep. de connexione* Activi Intellectus *cum homine*:—in this it is called *quaestio magna et fortunium sublime* . . . whether A. I. can be joined with our material intellect *while in the body*, the point on which several philosophers felt uncertain: it is *secretum divinum, subtilitas venerabilis*.

[4] Of a spiritual addition to his natural faculties.

[5] *Complementum* . . . *ipse est ligamentum et continuatio.*

world should but subserve man's purpose (*creatum propter hominem et totum ei deservit*). It is proved then that he acts very unfairly who would hinder man from the attainment of knowledge, since plainly he contradicts the invention or intention of the Creator (*inventione vel intentione*). ' Just as he is happy indeed who ' devotes his time to this service and study and the Blessed God ' draws nigh to him, so too is the man fortunate who by slow ' degrees draws nigh to Him by knowledge.[1] . . . Blessed be God ' and may He bring us to that which is His will and lead us into ' that for which we have been formed at first and hereafter, ' that is, in life and in death ! ' ' I nourish well ', says Mencius, the chinese sage and confucianist, ' my vast-flowing vigour . . . ' it is not easy to explain ; it is supremely great and in the highest ' degree unbending : nourish it correctly and do it no injury and ' it will fill up the vacancy between heaven and earth '.

Communion with God obtained through perfecting our faculties. —This ' Union ' is no doubt expressed in less mystical terms by Averroes than by earlier writers. Avempace had insisted on the need of ascetic practice to attain it (*ittisal, ittihad* or *djam*). Tofail (the favourite author of our Quakers) recommends violent dervish dances, or sitting alone in the dark in a cavern and resolutely quenching any conscious thought.[2] Gazali (as is well known) became a sufi and hoped to win certainty by *emotion* and fatigue, which his sceptical mind could not attain by *reflection* or argument. Thus a curious physical externalism is made the means of conquering the last heights of the Spirit. Averroes dislikes this half-corybantic and sometimes wholly sensuous method : union can come about only by knowledge, when consciousness is raised to its highest pitch. *God is reached when our faculties are at their best and highest state of perfection.* This blessedness is only attained in old age when our spirit has won final triumph over the flesh ; by constant study, and by renouncing needless luxury without falling into the opposite error

[1] This is very obscure : *Quemadmodum fortunatus est qui consumit tempus suum servitio seu studio et appropinquat ei laudatus, sic ille in approximatione.* It may however mean that both he who draws close is ' praiseworthy ' and also he who is only coming a little nearer to an unattainable ideal. (I suggest *appropinquans ei laudatur ?*)

[2] The vagaries of the mystical mind may be seen in James *Var. Rel. Exper.* Longmans 1902, espec. 387 sq : ' Revelation through Alcohol and Anæsthetic '.

of unwise rigour. He believes that many only taste this felicity at the moment of death itself ; a sentence in the *Connex.* A. I. etc. reminds one of Gautama's insistence that bliss is attainable in this life (*jivanmukti*). ' Avenazar (= Farabi) believed that he ' might reach this perfection in the end of his days, and when ' he failed to, set it down as a vain and impossible goal and the ' tales of old women '.[1] This intellectualism holds that life is justified if reason, triumphing over sense, is able to contemplate, were it but for an instant, the unveiled truth : ' one day in thy courts '—in this vision duration plays no part ; for in a sense he who sees the Eternal must be already himself eternal. These brief flashes of intuition are glimpses of the same bliss that God enjoys for ever—as Aristotle asserts.[2]

Active Intellect is Last Planetary Intelligence : always present in some group or individual.—The Active Intellect is not a mere sum of rational humanity when it thinks ; it is not, like the gods of pantheism, a resultant. Averroes insists on its real objective existence ; it is the last of those spiritual powers which bind the earth with a golden chain to the throne of deity.[3] In his *Abridgement of Metaphysic* he identifies it with the last of the planetary intelligences (397, ed. 1560) and calls it the *Holy Spirit* (*de An. Beatit.*) or in the Mosaic Law, the *Angel* (*Tahafut*). It was most

[1] *Posuit imposs. hoc et vanum et dixit esse fabulas vetularum* (Plato's γράων ὕθλοι).

[2] Such a life (*Nic. Eth.* 3. 1177 fin) is more than mortal ; it is not as *man* that we can attain it but inasmuch as we have in us something divine (θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει) 1178 fin. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιάυτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. Therefore εὐδαιμονία and θεωρία are interchangeable terms, and he who is not qualified for *speculative* study cannot be in the truest sense *happy*. It is easy to see how one slight additional turn of this eulogy of *human* faculties will annul them altogether, and place *man's goal not in becoming his best self but in transforming his nature into something wholly different* —the old problem of νοῦς ἕκαστος yet νοῦς θύραθεν.

[3] Cicero *Acad.* Poster. 1, after stating Aristotle's view of the wholly dissimilar nature of our world and heaven, speaks of the *vis* or *qualitas* or *anima mundi*, or *mens et sapientia perfecta*, or *Deus* which *first* is concerned with the care of heavenly things but also next with that which affects men (*procurantem cælestia maxime deinde in terris ea quæ pertinent ad homines*). Although Cicero is syncretizing Aristotle with stoic immanence, yet he clearly preserves quite enough of the former to show that this Force is (1) transcendent and (2) more interested in the higher and perfect world than in our own.

emphatically not God Himself—he vigorously combats this error of Aphrodisias ; nor is it in any sense the stoic *world-soul* or general principle of life. In his ' hierarchy of eternal and auto-' nomous beings ', ' vaguely attached to a supreme Unity ' (Renan), *thought has a special place to itself and an objective existence of its own*,—always manifested or rather manifesting itself at some point in the universe, in some group of rational men. It is motionless and unchanging and in it the individual shares in various degrees of fulness.

Ambiguous Views on Personal Survival ; or rather, Current Conceptions.—*Solicitudo divina* (he says in *de Anima* 133) *quum non potuerit facere ipsum* (*humanum genus*) *permanere* sec. individuum, *miserta est ejus, dando ei virtutem permanere* in specie. Renan well points out that, like Aristotle (*immortalist* in *Eudemus* dial. *thanatist* (?) in other more profound treatises), Averroes vacillates on the subject of individual *survival*. In *Tahafut* he has almost opposite views on successive pages ; after showing that *soul* is quite independent of *body* : ' if the old man ' had a youth's eyes he would see as well. . . . So the sage comes ' to partake in vulgar beliefs on the subject of survival, intellect ' being attached to no special organ.' Shortly afterwards he says ' soul is one in Socrates and Plato and intellect has no indi-' viduality which comes only from sense '. He is angry with Plato for his story of *Er*, because it induces men to practise virtue for the sake of external rewards and not for its intrinsic beauty : so ordinary tales of the nether world fill him with disgust. At other times he speaks with a certain respect of the great religions [1] whose teachers established the dogma of *resurrection* ' to moralize men and excite them to virtue by consideration ' for their own proper interest. . . . I do not reproach Gazali ' and our school of orthodox divines for saying that the soul ' is immortal, but for pretending that soul is but an accident and ' that man can resume at the Judgment the same body which has ' fallen to decay. No, he will take one *like* the former but not ' identical ; that which has once dissolved cannot be recalled to ' life ! '

Lack of interest in normal Ethical Life or Problems : his Politics.—The fact remains that like Gautama, Aurelius, Spinoza,

[1] Including the Sabian, whose creed, as ibn Hazim tell us, ' is the ' oldest in the world '.

Hegel, Emerson, Averroes was somewhat indifferent to the thought of a *personal hereafter* ; but he certainly did not expressly deny it, although he tried to clear it of unworthy accretions or corollaries. Again, like many intellectualists, he was not in the least interested in the *ethical* life or in social reform or in giving moral advice as a preacher. His ethics are *objective*, part of the visible State-system with which he deals in his *Paraphrase on Plat. Rep.* Government should be placed in the hands of the old—a maxim in which both Plato and his great pupil concurred. Poetry (above all, the arabic Muse) is pernicious ; to inspire *virtue* we must train our citizens in the rhetoric, topics and the true poetic art. The army should only watch over the public order and the ideal State is realized when men need neither judge nor physician. He believes military fiefs to be the curse of mankind. Women (as certain african tribes have attested to Plato's wisdom) are capable of taking part in war and differ from men in degree but not in nature. It is on this score that he stands most aloof from orthodox muslim dogma. ' Our social State ' does not allow scope for the resources of female nature ; it ' seems they are destined only to give birth to children and their ' state of slavery has destroyed in them the faculty for great ' things. We see then with us no women dowered with moral ' virtues. Their vegetative life passes like that of plants and ' they are a burden to their husbands : hence the distress that ' devours cities, for women, in number double the men, cannot ' procure their own livelihood by work '. The first declension of the State of Islam (he thought) took place when Moawia the ommiad founded a syrian autocracy and opened the epoch of revolution, ' from which our own isle of Andalusia is by no ' means yet delivered '.

A devout and ' practising ' Mussulman : testimony.—In spite then of the pursuit of envious foes and suspicious bigots it would appear that Averroes lived as an orthodox muslim and to the end believed himself to be one of the faithful. The devout Abd-el-Kebir assured men that the charges of impiety and doubt were wholly unfounded : that the philosopher practised regular prayer and ablution. ' It is certain ' says another witness [1] ' that jealous intrigues led to his condemnation ; for his own

[1] Also cited by el-Ansari of Morocco, Averroes' most authentic biographer.

' part he thought only to write comments upon Aristotle and to *' reestablish harmony between religion and philosophy '*.[1] He had very strong views on the poisonous influence of Gazali's ' infidel ' book on the Destruction of Philosophers,—which (like Pascal or Mansel) founded orthodoxy on wholesale doubt. He wished himself to vindicate the rights of reason and of human freedom —against the *motakallemin* whose universe consisted of an infinity of atoms shuffled about by a single arbitrary Will. In the *Physics* he is scornful of the purely *customary* belief of the crowd, ' believing that which is repeated often enough '; the result being that such faith, unfounded and without ballast, if once shaken, utterly dissolves : ' we see in our own day men who ' entering of a sudden into the study of speculative science, lose ' the religious faith which they held only of long habit, and ' become *zendiks* '.[2]

Dislike of Shallow Conventional Belief—but no less of a Vulgar Scepticism.—Al-Makkari says of the andalusian arabs : ' if any one remarked of another that he takes lessons in philo- ' sophy or works at astronomy the people at once applied to him ' the term *zendik* or impious unbeliever, and this epithet was ' sure to adhere to him for the rest of his life '. Averroes saw the danger[3] of a narrow and illiberal policy of formality and legalism ; ' of all tyrannies the worst is a regimen of priests ' (*Paraphr. Plat. Rep.* 513). But in religion he was genuinely interested and wished to save it from its friends. *Philosophy* (he maintains)[4] *is the highest ideal of human life*,—he meant by it the appropriation by the personal reason of truths imparted to the vulgar by *prophets* under the guise of revelation. This lofty condition is only for the few. What we call to-day Free Thought

[1] Of this hostile attitude of the *legales* or *loquentes* A. had no doubt ; in prologue to *Tahafut, inimici reperiuntur philosophorum . . . livor persecutorum nostræ matris carissimæ Philosophiæ.*

[2] A general term for a motley group of sects (manichees, mazdakites, babekites, the free-thinkers or ' evidence folk ') which to the horrified orthodox mind in east and in west were united only on the one antinomian motto : *believe nothing and admit no law.*

[3] Like Clemens Alexandrinus in the case of the ψοφοδεεῖς or ultra-orthodox, who are horrified at the slightest ' contamination ' of the gospel with serious pagan thought.

[4] In the treatise *Harm. Rel. and Phil.* published together with *Ways of Proof for Rel. Dogma*, by M. J. Muller, Munich 1860.

and open discussion of the *credenda*, he feared and abhorred. 'Disputes are not made for the people; they end only in weakening faith: they are quite rightly forbidden, for it is enough 'for the happiness of the simple soul that they should understand 'what they *can* understand' (so *Tahafut Disp.* iii and vi).

The Sage must be allowed to study God's Works: but the Heretic must be Executed.—But God in the Coran has clearly bidden those who are qualified, to seek the truth by means of Science: '*The peculiar religion of the sage is to study that which is*; 'the worthiest worship we can give to God is the knowledge of His 'works which leads us on to know Him in His full reality. This 'in His eyes is the noblest activity': just as the vilest is to tax with 'error and presumption' the votary of this highest of all creeds (*in Metaph.*). Popular beliefs on deity, angels, prophets, prayers, outward worship, sacrifices, have for their object the inciting of (ordinary) men to virtue; and positive religions are an excellent and indispensable instrument of public morality. Before a man begins to live his own proper and personal life, he must submit to the guide of general convention and the canon of custom; even when he has reached a more individual method of thought, *instead of scorning the doctrines in which he has been brought up, he should give his mind to interpret them in a noble sense.* He who inspires in the people doubts on its religion and draws attention to the contradictions of the prophets [1] is a heretic and should suffer the penalties which religious law enacts against such. The sage does not permit himself a single word against the established faith; the epicurean who tries to overthrow at once religion and virtue must 'die the death' and he deserves his fate.[2]

Misrepresentation of this Philosophic Attitude by the Orthodox: Grace not excluded.—Religions are not composed exclusively either of *reason* or of *prophecy* (as we should say, of revelation)—but of one and the other in varying proportions. The figurative

[1] It is quite likely he may have heard of Abelard's *Sic et Non* where conflicting views of the Fathers are juxtaposed without any attempt to reconcile them and the average man is certainly encouraged to distrust them all—though this was certainly not the writer's intent.

[2] From the closing paragraphs of 'Tahafut,' *oportet omnem hominem recipere principia legis et procul dubio ut exaltet eum qui posuit ea* (i.e. Mahomet): *nam negatio eorum et dubitatio in eis destruit esse hominis* quare oportet interficere hæreticos, 335 of ed. 1560.

and material part of their doctrine (*vorstellung*) must be explained in a spiritual sense (*begriff*). Speaking to the same effect Gazali had introduced a typical ' philosopher ' whom he holds up to execration : ' What I do, I do not on any man's authority ; ' after a study of *philosophy* I understand very well what *prophecy* ' is—wisdom and moral perfection—that is all. Its commands ' aim at restraining the women-folk and preventing them from ' quarrelling and killing each other, or following their own evil ' passions. But as for me who have nothing in common with this ' ignorant mob, I am not obliged to put myself out, being of the ' number of the wise : armed with wisdom which is my own, I can ' well dispense with the *authority* of other men '. Nearly all agree in believing *prophetism* to be the highest point of a trained natural faculty, rather than a *magical* gift suddenly infused : all desire to save the freedom of man and urge the need of careful training and steady progress in the spiritual life. Renan notes that Tofail, Avicenna, Averroes express themselves to this effect ; as also the jewish thinkers Saadia, Moses Maimonides, and Levi son of Gerson. Yet it would be a great mistake to exclude the notion of divine *grace* in the last resort, just because they felt obliged (like Pelagius and Nestorius) to lay stress on the *human* and the gradual elements in the scheme of redemption. They only displayed the same pardonable inconsistency as Aristotle himself in his *νοῦς ἕκαστος*. For the moment no doubt they isolated and strongly defended one side of truth (and utility), which they saw unduly threatened by the doctrines of an arbitrary God, of a passive and impersonal humanity. The orthodox, both in east and west (during cent. xiii), saw in this claim nothing but blasphemy and revolution. Though no doubt unduly enhanced by popular report, there was ground enough for panic in the suspicions and scandals of *antinomian sectaries*. Theology (they would maintain) must be all or nothing ; pretend to do without it for explaining God, the world, and man, and in effect you declare it superfluous : he who makes this claim, whether he will it or not, is its enemy. ' The unfailing result of these ' (independent) sciences [1] is to believe in fate and the eternity of ' the world, to deny the resurrection and the last judgment, *to* ' *live without rein and surrender oneself to appetite*'. After all there

[1] Said Gazali in his *Release from Error*.

was the witness of the Assassins and the life of Avicenna, at once mystic and voluptuary.

APPENDIX M

Averroism: Modern Analogies

Reconciler like Hegel of Faith and Reason: Hegel's Irenicon.—In spite of the attack of the orthodox it is not to be doubted that Averroes sincerely aimed at a reconciliation of *faith* and *reason*—was in fact a typical scholastic. Passing by the analogy of Spinoza we come in our own time to that of Hegel. If we wish to understand the real aim of Averroes and the panic he caused in the west we cannot afford to neglect this parallel. The development of the Extreme Hegelian Left was an *antinomian individualism* which, carried into practice, would subvert all society, like the esoteric teaching of the Assassins: it has not been without influence upon the lamentable retrogression of teutonic morality[1]. To these subjective hegelians 'each man is his own god, which as his own ideal he projects 'on vacancy: having no hereafter he has a right to everything here 'which he is strong enough to grasp and hold'. So Spinoza had taught, with all his own personal unselfishness and quietism: and Nietzsche's theory is only a wild paraphrase on doctrines logically elicited from Strauss, Feuerbach, Bauer and Stirner. But it can scarcely be denied that Hegel's own private aim was exactly that of Averroes. '*In philosophy*' he says,[2] 'which is *theology*, the whole object is to point out the *reason* in religion. 'In it, religion finds itself justified from the standpoint of thinking con-'sciousness: unsophisticated piety does not need or perceive this *apologia*'. He does not ridicule the 'charcoal burner's faith', but like Averroes he does not believe it to be the last word. 'Rationalism, that vain conceit 'of the Understanding, is true philosophy's most deadly foe and is offended 'when the presence of reason in our religion is demonstrated'.[3] 'Every act of mind' (*Logic*) 'contains implicitly the principle which, purified and developed, rises to religion'. Philosophy only comes to analyse and prove once again the truths already possessed by religion. In the third part of his great work[4] he identifies his own peculiar and triadic system with

[1] Though it is unfair to exaggerate this (largely) academic influence.

[2] *Phil. Relig.* ii 353 a work justly styled by its posthumous editor Marheineke as 'the most perfect bloom of Hegelian Philosophy'.

[3] Sterrett (*Stud. Heg. Ph. Rel.* Sonnensch. 1891, p. 85) 'the speculative 'comprehension of the religious relation never comes to many men and 'comes to others only late in life. It is never tired of asserting that *religion* 'and *philosophy* have the same content, only differing in form of knowing 'it . . . the *phil.* content of religion is comprehension in a living system 'of the abbreviated knowledge of faith. As such, it is the highest form of 'theology: but this can only be the religion of the few'. It would not be 'easy to find a better parallel to the views of Ibn Roschd.

[4] *Philosophy of Religion.*

Christianity. He seeks to rehabilitate genuine and catholic dogma after the iconoclasm of a shallow 'enlightenment'. It is said that he died with the calm assurance that he had succeeded in making eternal peace between theology and the wisdom of the world. In the need for positive dogmatic teaching he firmly believed : quite sincerely he blamed Tholuck for his lukewarmness in defending the dogma of the Trinity. He was warmly attached to the Nicene creed and upheld compulsory religious instruction on definite and doctrinal lines.

Reverence for the Objective as the true vehicle of Theophany.—Like the spanish arab, he had little real interest in *morals*. On its *subjective* side he never wrote a word ; he was content to examine it in its *objective* form in human society. The *Philosophie des Rechts* is his sole work on *ethical* questions, and here he is examining the State and its public usage and opinion rather than the private conscience. He belonged to the party of natural reaction against Kant's claim for finality in ethics.[1] He was a little impatient of the negative stoical temper of the Good Will, and did not believe that therein lay a clue to the highest truth. But his intellectualism is tempered by his distrust of the vain and captious knight-errant who resists the *zeitgeist*, or common reason of his time, and thinks to be wiser than his teachers and better than his age. With Green then, he is tempted to exaggerate the sanctity of the *objective* forms in which God reveals Himself to the world, in which the Absolute Spirit clothes itself. The State[2], the church, mankind, the universe,—these are he believes the only means by which the divine nature makes its theophany. His whole work is a long protest against the self-satisfied *aufklārung*, the selfish subjectivity of 'free thought'. His catholic mind loves the objective and the institutional, is afraid of the vanity of the slothful individual who has not taken the trouble to make himself a *person*.[3] So he would see the work of the divine spirit operative in the development of catholic dogmatism. Hence the Church is justified in taking action against heresy, maintaining its completeness in the face of any one-sided or egoistic apprehension of its content.

Dislike of both for the Mysticism of Ignorance.—But the most remarkable

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[1] Of which Bradley, MacTaggart and Taylor are the best-known exponents to-day.

[2] With the best intentions hegelians have helped on that mischievous deification of the modern State (without defining it or explicitly identifying it with a 'Christian' society) to which much of our present distress can be traced. From many latter-day protests I quote F. W. Hirst (editor of *Economist*) : 'We were told that *the State was a higher thing than the sum of individuals who composed it* : that idea was not an english idea ; it was not a humane idea ; it was not a right idea. It was a continental growth fostered by a small group of rulers and bureaucrats who wished the people to fall down and worship them.'

[3] By merging his idiosyncrasy in the current of Reason, by communing (we might say) with Active Intellect : he has all Averroes' conviction of the objectivity of Thought.

agreement of the two is to be found in the relation of the human mind to truth and its kinship with the divine. Neither philosopher is in any strict sense a mystic: nothing was more abhorrent to them than the common claim of the zealot to represent God in his own unkempt person and untutored intelligence: divinity is won by effort; it is not already there, or imparted magically in a moment. 'When man' (says Hegel *Ph. Rel.* i 211) 'is said to be *divine*, or the mere finite spirit as *natural* spirit is identified with God—this is sheer pantheism: the church declares plainly 'that only through death of the *natural* man can he be united with God'. For Hegel fully accepts the Fall: as related to *God* man is bad and must be born anew, as related to *nature* he is unhappy. Before the atonement can be mediated by the incarnation, he must become fully conscious both of *sin* and of *misery*. He must feel himself unable to regain his lost estate: mere morality and 'culture' cannot heal the breach. Here is the 'deepest depth' (*die tiefste Tiefe*). In the section on *The Absol. Rel.* ii, 3 'the 'essential Nature of Man', he speaks of the stoic or sceptical view in which soul is 'undeveloped naked monad, empty soul devoid of content '. . . conceiving itself as extreme of abstract being-for-self, of abstract 'freedom, it plunges into its depths, into its absolute abyss'. This is sheer empty *individualism* and is the lowest and most worthless point in human development; except where it becomes of need the spring or starting point for a new upward movement. It must be transformed into *personality*,—the steepest and loftiest summit towards which we move, *die höchste zugeschärfste spitze*—the very antipodes of the sorry and futile individual[1]. This steepest summit, he says, 'is the Pure Personality 'which alone (through the absolute Dialectic forming its nature) includes 'and holds all in itself, because it elevates itself to freedom'.

On the way upwards to true Personality, man meets God: Synergism.—On this upward path through knowledge the endeavouring spirit of man is met by a higher power. As in certain phases of orthodox Christology, man in knowing is exalted to God, while on another side (not less important) it is God who is manifesting Himself to man. In this *synergism* God and man (if I may so put it) each keep their proper place; in God *all finite* things *discover* and do not *lose* their selfhood and reality. Into the Spinozan lions' den, the Absolute, all particulars vanished, and left no trace nor made the one Substance any the richer; but for Hegel all finite beings emerge from God and still exist in Him but clothed *sub specie æterni*. Man is but *abstractly* rational, made in God's image; only by mediation, culture, discipline does he become *concretely* such in the divine kingdom. In a sense this is all God's work, in another all man's; there is the constant paradox of the Pauline 'work out your own salvation, for it is God that worketh in you'. That which is man's goal or 'the Eternal Consciousness' (Green's *Proleg.* to *Eth.*) is a being 'with whom our human spirit is identical in this 'sense:—He *is* all which the human spirit *can become*'. It is only in this relation that soul feels itself *at home*, either with God, or nature, or itself. 'Religion is the knowledge which, through the mediation of finite spirit,

[1] Though confounded so often with it.

'the *divine* spirit has of itself. So in the Absolute Idea, religion *is not* '*the work of a man*,' but is in essence the highest determination of the 'Absolute Idea itself' (*Ph. Rel.* i 200). Worship then is a two-fold activity; 'a religious act of sacrifice on my part and also the means of 'the divine act of grace . . . God's act may seem to overpower my free-'dom, but my true freedom consists in His knowledge and will. . . . In 'this divine activity man seems but a passive material like a stone's. . . . 'His grace is to pass into me and through me. My self-surrender, my 'receiving divine grace, are my own acts, but at the same time God's' (quoting *Galat.* ii, 20). 'I have to open myself to the influx of the Spirit 'that I may become spiritual; *this act of worship is at one and the same time* '*my act, and the act of God*' (*Ph. Rel.* ii, 222). He very frankly contrasts this 'paradoxic truth of the religious experience with the merely moral 'standpoint of self-realization as held by Kant and Fichte'. With the 'impervious self' he has no sympathy. He still plainly declares himself a countryman of the early german mystics; it is the inflowing of God into man that, so far from abolishing the person, lifts him into wider freedom and fuller life[1].

The Absolute Self-Consciousness: how the Individual becomes the Person.—The presupposition of all knowledge is not my subjective consciousness, but a thought or self-consciousness *beyond* all individual thought, which thinks *in* and *through* individuals—this is true both in Averroes and in Hegel.[2] The self-centred individual is an empty concept, like the freedom claimed by the *aufklärung*; he must, in order to become a person, die to live, put off his creatureliness and self-hood,—like the grain of seed-corn perishing in the darkness of the earth that it may enjoy a richer life above it. The guarantee that man can attain completeness of *personality* is the (already) complete personality of the Absolute Reason or God; thus Hegel's First Principle is 'adequate to originate, to explain and 'to fulfil the personality of finite spirits' (Sterrett, *l.c.* 177). Thus for

[1] The sturdy independence and nominalism of the english and scottish mind shows itself in Pringle-Pattison (*Mind.* 1 and liii); his libertarian, pelagian, arminian views display the native dislike of regimentation, whether divine or secular: an acute american writer says of this attitud broadly 'God is warned not to tread on the holy ground of the individual will, unless first He put off his shoes' . . . 'He betrays a jealousy *of* God rather than *for* God; he is jealous of his own individuality, not for human personality as *personalized by God* which is really Hegel's conception'—and, if so, that of Aristotle and Averroes.

[2] Sterrett *l.c.* 196 'The real presupposition of all knowledge is not my 'own consciousness of myself as an individual but thought or self-conscious-'ness beyond all individual selves, which is *the unity of all thinkers and all* '*objects of thought*.' So Morris *Phil. and Christianity*—56, 'the finite self-'consciousness involves, and reveals its dependence on an Absolute Self-'consciousness which provisionally we can only call (in agreement with 'philosophy and religion) the self-consciousness of an Absolute and Divine 'Spirit'.

Hegel, 'religion is not merely the spirit putting itself into relation with 'the Absolute Spirit, but He Himself relates Himself to Himself.' 'Perfect 'personality' says Lotze, 'is found only in God; in finite spirits but a weak 'imitation.' 'The self-communication says Green (*Prol. Eth.*) of the 'Infinite Spirit to man's soul is such that man is conscious of his relation to 'a Conscious Being, who is in eternal perfection all that man has it in him 'to be. . . . He is a Being in whom we exist, with whom we are in principle 'one. . . . God is the Eternal Spirit or self-conscious subject, which com-'municates itself (in measure and under conditions) to beings who through 'that communication become spiritual'. In each act of conscious thought, thought finds itself mirrored or rather realized; it is a dialogue or colloquy of spirit with spirit. The knowing agent finds himself *at home* in an intelligible world of which he forms a part as a free member. The forms of his intelligence (as Kant showed) are not his own, in a narrow protestant sense; they are the necessary forms of the world's existence.[1] When our reason discovers a truth it is not a sudden flash out of darkness into darkness; it is the union of a feeble light within with the original Light.[2] Reason is not only that of the individual man, but of mankind; nay more it exists in its own right independently of all knowing men. It exists first in God: *before ever man or the world was, there was Absolute Intelligence.*[3] Only as the empty and formal *individual* attains concrete fulness and *personality*—by merging himself first in the social life and at last in the divine thought—can he be said to *be* really or *think* truly: *Deus nos personat*, as the self-abasing medieval realism took for its text.

Averroes' Influence on the German Mystics: True Personality is Divine.—It has been shown by critics how closely Eckhart follows in cent. xiv the lines drawn by the arabian thinker. Karl Pearson (*Mind* 1886) says that Eckhart's mysticism owes its leading ideas to Averroes. The Active Intellect (*νοῦς ποιητικὸς*) can be traced through the muslim from Aristotle to the great german pioneer of mystic theology. Lasson shows a close resemblance between Eckhart's *Seelengrund* and Averroes' principle of reason in all men. Quite in Hegel's spirit he makes the notion of *person* the central point in his system; the (empty) individual must try to become a *person*—just as Christ the Son of God is in the truest sense a person (Monogr. on *Eckh.* 348, 9). He writes: 'In the act of knowing, God 'and I are one and the eye whereby I see God is the same whereby He 'seeth me: God has become man that man may become God'—Athanasius' *ἵνα θεοποιηθῶμεν.* In this blissful union our *personality is not blotted out but achieved and made perfect, by becoming active in and with a personal*

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[1] Hegel, the modern gnostic, has been much laughed at for making logic = *metaphysics*, for spinning the whole world of reality out of his head; but his meaning is clear and, I think, his principle incontrovertible.

[2] Which is not merely *transcendent*, but like Anaxagoras' *νοῦς*, takes the trouble to visit our world: this is the right sense of John i 9 *τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει . . . ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.*

[3] This objective existence was very strongly held both by Aristotle and by Averroes: the perfect must be the *prius*.

God. That Hegel (once again) held no absorption or extinction of the unit in the universal seems clear : he even justifies the pietism that is without any proper object [1] because with all its faults of slothful agnosticism it recognizes the individual : ' this cognition of the absolute worth of the ' individual [2] may be said to be the great attainment of our day. Indivi- ' dual subjectivity is a very essential determinant of religion. . . . The ' unity of God and man is in the first place but implicit or potential, but ' it is also eternally being realized. This progressive free reconcilement ' only takes place because of the inherent *potential unity* of the *human* ' and the *divine* ' (*Ph. Rel.* part iii). ' Whoever says that God cannot ' be known, says that God is jealous ' with the ancient Greeks ; ' and he ' is not in earnest in *believing* in God, no matter how much he talks about ' Him '.

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[1] Such as Schleiermacher professed no less than Count Zinzendorf ; also Spencer in his almost devout attitude to the Unknowable and Infinite Energy. How completely ' averroist ' he was (in the popular sense) is clear from his last work *Facts and Comments* 1902*:* ' What becomes of ' consciousness when it ends ? We can only infer that it is a specialized ' and individualized form of that Infinite and Eternal Energy which ' transcends both our knowledge and our imagination, and that at death ' its elements lapse into the Infinite and Eternal Energy whence they were ' derived '. So Emerson (*History*) : ' There is one mind common to all indi- ' vidual men ; every man is an inlet to the same and to all of the same '. The numberless poetical analogies in his writings cannot now be quoted ; it may suffice to direct to the *Over Soul, Montaigne the Sceptic* (e.g. ' Let a ' man learn that he is here, not *to work but to be worked upon* '). *Experience* (' the subject is the receiver of Godhead and at every comparison must ' feel his being enhanced by that cryptic might ') *Intellect* (' we do not ' determine what we will think ; we only open our senses, clear away as we ' can all obstructions from the fact and suffer the Intellect to see ') *Nature* (' if, instead of identifying ourselves with the work, we feel that the soul ' of the workman streams through us, we shall find the peace of the morn- ' ing dwelling in our hearts '.)

[2] Cf. Gierke's *Pol. Theory in M. Age,* where he makes this primitive teutonic claim, reinforced by the Gospel (' for whom Christ died ') the main feature of medieval political theory,—in opposition to the modern secular State. This is apt to deny all worth and rights which itself has not arbitrarily allowed, and as at the present time demands a wholesale sacrifice of units to the objective which on its own principles it cannot possibly justify.

Moral Side of Early Religion in Asia

Evidence seems to be gathering in favour of a highly ethical and personal religion in W. and Central and E. Asia in very early times, from which both branches of the indo-persian family afterwards declined—the former owing to *dravidian* demonolatry, the second owing to *magian* Shamanism. I will here only state the several points of late raised or accepted by students: (1) the Chinese official and imperial cult, historically recorded since Emperor Shun (c. 2300 B.C.) is an *ethical monotheism*, to which the cult of the Six Worthies or (under Chows) Four Lords is distinctly subordinate: (2) the prehistoric word-form *Assara Mazas* (with his court of seven *Igigi* and seven *Anunaki* or sky- and earth-spirits) must date back to 1500 B.C.: (3) About this time *Assur* appears as the most personal and paramount figure reached in the *Sumero-semitic* pantheon: (4) Zoroaster (whose dialect cannot be far removed from vedic times) made of this (? joint) concept an exclusive deity and propounded the familiar outlines of moral religion for all later time: (5) the aryan invaders of India called this deity *Varuna* and for some reason, perhaps the jealous enmity of near kinsmen at feud, degraded the name *Asura*—which is still, curiously enough, the name of a non-aryan tribe in Chota Nagpur, who believe in a benevolent Creator and Preserver of the world and (in the strict sense) are not demonolaters (Ferdinand Hahn): (6) About 1500 or somewhat later the aryan *Harru* (with king and nobles forming a small dominant caste the *marya* or 'men') were in contact in N. Asia Minor with Hittites to whose semitic deities they equated their trinity of gods—*Varuna, Mitra, Indra*: (7) This chief god of *rta* and *asa* (law and order) was at first (as elsewhere) a *lunar* deity and Mitra the special sun-god is his lieutenant: (8) As moral judge he is surrounded by spiritual abstractions or virtues, which are refinements on the notion that '*planets* ' are spirits subservient to Sin the moon-god's will' (Carnoy *Enc. Rel. Eth.* ix 569, 1917) and there are traces that the same theory prevailed in India, even the names of these ethical hypostases corresponding.—The conclusion would seem to be that from the fatalistic Chaldean conception of *world-order* connected in the Bab. Period (after 2000 A.D.) with star-cult, the Aryans borrowed a nearly monotheistic religion, which they humanized and moralized—until both in Persia and Hindustan the ' weeds ' sprang up and choked it'. In China the cult of Heaven may be a lineal descendant and this retained its purity until the recent downfall of monarchy.

DIVISION C

Greek Thought and Chaldeism : the Nearer East and Christian Heresy

A. Science and Mysticism in Greece

PART I. ARISTOTLE

Aristotle or the Final Form of Greek Philosophy : His Important Influence.—On leaving Hindustan the next area for study has been the Nearer East—Irak, seat of the earliest culture and religion and scene of the great muslim development within our period. We have to some extent inquired into Syria and Palestine—it will not be needful for our present purpose to examine Egypt. In this region of Irak exists from very early times a welter and medley of religions—a general knowledge of which must form a prelude to any study of the strange blends arising after our Christian era. But one chief factor has not yet received full notice, an influence moulding all the more prominent forms of belief. This is *greek philosophy* in its classical and later stages,—not only because of the direct impression left by it upon the arabs, but because all sects of syncretic *gnosis* (pagan and semi-Christian) borrowed something from the greek ; and the later heresies, however eastern in origin, take on a semi-hellenic form. The name of Aristotle is therefore as important for our purpose in the general survey as that of St. Austin in the narrower inquiry into purely Christian dogma or politics. Whether in arabian or later medieval development he is the chief figure ; for further formulation of dogma or for heresy there are few other sources than his works, whether rightly understood or wrongly interpreted by his devout students. Whether we think of Authority or of free thought he is the principal source and constituent. We cannot advance to any lucid conception of philosophy unless we have examined this final form of the hellenic intellect. If this is done it is surprising to see how many of the

logical problems or strange positions in later thought become clear.

After *Material*, the Problem of *Motion and Motive*: Ionia, Elea etc.: the Visit of *Mind*.—After the earlier thinkers of Ionia had laid stress on the world-material, taking its regular movement and evolution for granted (hylozoism), it became more and more apparent that the real problem was that of *motion*, or that of motion combined somehow with order, change within unity. Some schools unable to explain or justify *movement*, denied it altogether (*Elea*) and held that *movement* and the *multiple* in our world were but a mirage: as we saw in the east the realm of *samsara* was *maya* or illusion. Empedocles first introduced *motives*; he spoke of *love* and *will* (ἔρως, φιλία) which brought all things together, and of *discord* (νεῖκος, ἔρις) which severed them into the individuals of our present distressful experience. Hitherto when *motion* was postulated the greeks were content to refer it to some immanent force or inner impulse of the world-mass. But now there appeared with Anaxagoras another solution, upon which later greek philosophy was little more than one long commentary.—His hypothesis of νοῦς has deeply coloured all later phases of west-aryan thought, and on the whole placed it in a certain contrast with the east-aryan thought of Hindustan. 'An extraneous power once visited our world 'and imparted a *motion* which could never otherwise have arisen'. When this was called *mind* it is clear that we are beginning the long period of *dualism*; between object and subject, present and future world, earth and heaven, the true function and the secondary duties of our soul. We are also at the first stage in that mystical interpretation of man as a 'pilgrim and sojourner' with no 'abiding city', the exile of eternity who cannot be content with time or any temporal series.

To Awaken Matter to a Pursuit of the Good.—But if the visit of Mind (ἐλθὼν διεκόσμησεν) imparted a stir and impulse to dead matter, *how* and *why* did it do so? The former—or scientific—problem was left for Aristotle; as to the latter—or ethical—there was from the first some general agreement. *Mind* aroused slumbering *matter* to a search for a better state, for its own good. The good must be the end of *birth* and of *movement*. When Aristotle discarded what he took to be Plato's Theory of Forms, he did so because they seemed to offer no help in this problem.

Ideas,—whether as thoughts in a mind, class-concepts, general collective terms, a republic of eternal paradigms—did not explain motion towards an end—the *good*. As the moving and really efficient principle, then, he replaces *thought* by *will*. If we use cumbrous terms, we shall say he is a *voluntarist* and a scotist instead of an *intellectualist* and a thomist. Like the so-called pessimist school of modern date, he sees in the ferment of our world a ceaseless exercise of will; motion being but a means to an end and not in itself the highest state of being; 'we make war that we may be at peace' (πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν). In a pedantic vocabulary this might be called 'actualizing the possible'; that is, drawing out latent virtue or capacity to its perfect state in which it would find its highest happiness. No greek doubted that the two—*work* and *satisfaction*—went hand in hand (at least in theory). The pursuit of the *good* was universal and must in the end always win its way to achievement. Aristotle being a nominalist and an individualist, thought that each being (or class) had its own special *good* or that form of *The Good* which it could compass: he objected strongly to Plato's sacrifice (as it might appear to some) of the individual to a transcendental *good*, in which he could share or find joy only by a very misleading metaphor.

So then, the will or life-principle in everything seeks satisfaction in the *good*, and *movement* (κίνησις) is a transition from *possible* or virtual to *actual*, from seed to perfect tree. It will be seen later how at this point Philosophy *sub specie æterni* comes into conflict with religion, that is, with ethical individualism. Philosophers profess that they cannot understand why, having attained its perfect state, a thing should wish to go on maintaining it: 'one day in Thy courts is better than a thousand' is taken to mean that a man who has for one precious moment realized eternal truth has laid hold of eternity, has reached his allotted goal of perfection: he has become in a sense divine and perfect: he need not trouble himself further with time-series or his own continued being as a mere individual. This belief, against which the normal and selfish consciousness breaks into vigorous protest, is really at the basis of buddhism—a gospel of attainment which in most essentials is quite analogous to later greek thought.

The good must be *prius* not *product*: Evolution and Theism.—Now with Plato's nephew Speusippus there had

appeared a very modern doctrine ; rather perhaps he revived the normal doctrine of world-origins and evolution in the savage mind—a spontaneous development from the vague and imperfect toward the perfect and definite. This analogue to the old nebular hypothesis or modern evolution or even bergsonism, is almost ubiquitous : God to primitive or savage thought is nearly always a late product of a process at first blind and chaotic, as in Schopenhauer and Hartmann. Aristotle's importance for theism and religious development is due to his unfaltering assertion that perfection stands at the beginning of things and is not a product. Except with theists, this *ontology* is by no means in favour to-day : for every other school the world is yet ' in the making ', and so is the divine principle which is its moving force and final form. Aristotle denied this with emphasis : there could be no regular *motion* unless there was an end in view : motion always implied a purpose, an aim quite well understood, or else followed by an instinctive impulse that was learning to be rational.[1] If perfection did not already exist, as achieved and complete, it could not stir anything to move towards it. Therefore perfection is a *necessary prius* to the world of our experience, and this is really the basis of all arguments to prove the existence of God.[2]

Providence : Plato Believed, Aristotle Denied.—But to this perfect Being, Intelligence, Aristotle did not even allow the single visit to our world which the pregnant phrase of Anaxagoras seems to suggest.[3] Plato had been in great doubt as to the creative function of the Good (*Republic*) or the Demiurge (*Timæus*), or more simply Mind or God (*Statesman*).[4] He plainly shows that he cannot believe God's action upon the world to be either *direct* or

[1] God moves the world by exciting *desire* and *will* : desire, aiming at particular objects, will, at a universal *good*, at a design in which all particulars are subordinate as means to end. Now the *will* of reasonable beings (λογικὰ ζῶα) is only determined by the objects of their thought ; therefore, there must already exist actual good towards which they aim and in them too (as we shall see) there must be something divine.

[2] That is, all logical arguments which appeal to the reason ; it need not be said to-day that these are not the chief evidence.

[3] It need not here be said how very obscure the ionian thinker was on this point ;—he threw out a sentence (which the world has never forgotten) without, it would seem, being fully conscious of its value or meaning.

[4] This does not exhaust the various forms under which he conceives the Perfect Being or His relation to the world : the above will here suffice.

unintermittent. Like an eastern sovereign, God entrusts the real work to secondary powers; and in the course of the world, there are periods of violent reaction from the divine guidance, when God 'hideth away His face', or in Plato's phrase, 'retires to His own watchtower' (εἰς τὴν περιωπὴν) and holds commune only with Himself. Still, in Plato there is a doctrine of Providence: God knows His world and at times of trouble condescends to become the Helmsman in person. He has an interest in the creature and it is His ethical law which is vindicated in the rewards and penalties awaiting us hereafter.

God, not Self-Revealing: Magnetic Influence.—This Aristotle could not for one moment admit. God was not an *active* and *formative*, but a *magnetic principle*. His perfection and self-sufficingness exclude the notion of interest in anything beyond Himself. He is pure Thought; without that further belief of Plato's that he was *good* and did not begrudge a share in Himself to other beings. He is not then a God who reveals or discloses Himself; the very notion of revelation is put out of court.[1] But since He is perfect, all things in their measure and according to their several capacities yearn after Him, desiring to become like Him as far as possible.[2] He is then not (as in Evolution) a *final term* in a development, but an *eternal prius* of a process which goes on for ever: we cannot conceive the *attraction* of the divine nature losing its force. The complex world of things striving to become like God always has been and always will be.[3] These complex movements of separate life-centres (struggling to be perfect even as their Father in heaven) constitute our world and are summed up in a single pardonable personification: Nature who 'does nothing in vain'.[4]

[1] Except for one point upon which almost the whole development of our period will turn.

[2] Plato's φυγὴ ἐντεῦθεν and ὁμοίωσις θεῷ: to regain the divine likeness lost by the Fall is the epitome of the later greek church theology: θέωσις is with it (as with the post-aristotelian greeks) the real and sole aim of man: how it is attained by us is a problem which exercises them greatly.

[3] On this single point later orthodox schoolmen could not follow him: the *eternity of the world* was the doctrine which finally marked off the philosopher and heretic from the communion of the orthodox.

[4] It is not unlikely that this shifting of interest to a Mother Goddess (as in Lucretius' very kindred sentiments about *Venus Genetrix*) is a revival of the ancient Ægean Religion: the real source of life is the 'yearning

Nature the Real Agent : her Remoteness from God.—But Nature is not after all a conscious artist and is often baulked of her ' aim ' through the imperfection of *matter*.[1] In our world she is besides handicapped by her remoteness from God. For it is with Aristotle that that curious *localism* begins, from which few of us are free to-day after three centuries of copernicanism. The degree of perfectness attainable by the creature varies according to the spatial distance from God who is rather the enfolding circumference than the centre and heart of the universe.

God Attracts Her only Through Mediation of the Spheres.—His beauty acts directly upon the outermost circle of the visible, namely, the sphere of the Fixed Stars—in which there is a uniform and circular movement. It cannot rest because it is roused to ceaseless activity by the propinquity of God, but it does not move outside a perfect orbit and always returns upon itself. Next come the inner spheres, one within the other, each with its moving soul or spirit—there are fifty-five of these.[2] These are the visible gods to whom honour is due :—a common religious feeling among Plato's disciples, no doubt derived in part from Pythagoras who may well have learnt so much from the east before he set up the italiot school. God then moves the world from the periphery, and the outermost motion is therefore the most perfect, while disorder only enters by degrees as we descend the spheres to the planet-orbits. The most irregular and least perfect motions are those of earth—that ' sublunar sphere ' where chance and accident [3] bear rule and matter thwarts the purposive designs of Nature. So then the *first heaven* (πρῶτος οὐρανὸς) is the solid vault or firmament of Fixed Stars revolving in perfect orbit ; the first Moved and second Mover.[4]

of the creature ' not the goodness of God ; from this point of view Aristotle began to pantheize and his ' immanent teleology ' often puts his theism in some jeopardy.

[1] The greeks never decided on the nature of matter, and the question of its *positive* and *negative* existence does not concern the broad doctrines stated above.

[2] Others give 56 or 47 ; in any case Aristotle is not here a strict chaldean.

[3] Otherwise conceived as fate and ἀνάγκη ; the two opposite terms being merely different aspects of the same incalculable force.

[4] The old expression *primum mobile* is not complete without the addition *movens*, as the really important point is its influence on the succeeding spheres, who are only magnetized through it by the divine.

Gradual Intrusion of Evil through Freedom of Movement.—The inner spheres are solid but transparent, and revolve round earth, the common centre ; their complex movements prove that they have special spirit-guides [1] or motors who have free-will (in a disparaging sense) and are not tied by their very nature to perfection. For the regular movement of the remotest sphere is a sign of true freedom and divinity, not of ' bounden duty and service '.[2] The bright Fixed Stars, removed from all contact of our lower sphere and in direct communion with God, enjoy happiness unalloyed and are immortal. The Planets, inferior in dignity as in perfectness of motion, are nevertheless also immortal and uncreate—spirits endowed with life and rational activity. With them (as we saw) begins the realm of Free-will ; their planet-angels or *animæ motrices* display movements opposed to the divine circuit of the Fixed Stars and (as it were) declare their independence [3] of God and hostility to the universal order. Here there is but a very slight beginning of *free-will* (in the sense of arbitrary and subjective choice) and its attendant *evil*, but it is enough for his system. Down below, the seven planet-spheres (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Sun, Moon) begin to exert an influence already malign ; which centres on our earth—lees of the universe, and scene of birth, failure, and death. The only true abode of perfection and bliss is above (*Met.* xi 6, 12).

[1] ὅσας εἶναι τὰς σφαίρας, τοσούτους κ. τοὺς κινοῦντας θεούς. So too Plato LL. 898. The question was always rising between *naturalist* and *humanist*—was the heavenly body itself divine ? had it a soul *within* or an angel *detached* from its substance to guide it (like naiad from her physical province) ? or was the archaic animism a pure fallacy and was motion due to nothing but the weights and measures of Strato of Lampsacus, or the atomic collisions of Democritus ?

[2] It is odd and unsatisfactory that the modern world always expresses virtuous action in terms of *constraint*, unpleasant obedience to a law or standard set from outside (Kant in vain insisting that it is really our true self alone that dictates the law). The greeks really maintained that such a service was ' perfect freedom ' : the slave (Aristotle saw with an acuteness unfamiliar to day) is really the person who can ' do as he likes ', whereas his master by his very dignity is tied (in politics or in the world of thought) to the dictates of pure reason, *noblesse oblige*.

[3] I do not say that Aristotle carries his *personifying* and *voluntarism* so far as this ; but the doctrine of rebel spirits is latent in his theory and will be found to fit in with the oriental creeds, chaldean and other, which are seen at a later date in alliance or confusion with peripatism.

Aristotle, Admitting Both Principles of *Rest* and *Movement*: places them in Two Different Worlds.—We may now notice the deeper aspects of this somewhat naïve cosmic system. Aristotle is the union of Elea and Heraclitus, of the principles of *rest* and *movement*. Being or substance is not dead and inert but in ceaseless motion; it realizes itself by passing over from the *virtual* (or dormant) to the *actual*. It is not a globe of crystal [1] but is stirred in its inmost core by a restless and purposive process. Life is not the meeting-ground and arena of conflict for two independent powers which have already existed apart as among the parsis or in some platonic developments.[2] Not that Aristotle altogether escapes the platonic dualism of *Form* and *Matter*; sometimes he represents them as separate realities and (as will be seen) falls in the end into a far more complete dualism than his master.[3] But at least he started from the old ionic idea of a single substance unfolding itself in a continuous and unbroken development—a monistic theory which perforce is always the conscious aim of the philosopher. Yet this self-developing and automatic process must (as with the stoics) be presented to discursive reason as the play of a *moving* force and a *moved* stuff (*Phys.* iii. 2). Even if our whole object is to say with Spinoza that there is after all but one thing in the world, we cannot help

[1] σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιος ὄγκῳ in Parmenides' poem, of which the σφαῖρος of Empedocles is another form: but the latter has a cyclic evolution from (Spencer's) *homogeneity* to *heterogeneity* and back again; in the former, all movement whatever is expressly denied.

[2] In the Zoroastrian *Avesta* the real problem is, why did the realm of *light* and *gloom* intermingle? So to Plato's successors, what was the relation of the *Forms* to *Matter*? two 'idly confronting realms' (Schwegler), of which surely one was otiose and superfluous.

[3] It is one of the chief merits of Caird's *Evolut. Gr. Theol.* (Gifford Lect.) Glasgow 1904, to have clearly shown this, against the almost ineradicable prejudice that the greek nature was blithe and buoyant, supremely contented with the world; that their theology was always *pantheistic* (if they had any at all) and that they were as a race quite careless about the soul's destiny hereafter, being so well satisfied with the present life. Goethe has consecrated this curious illusion and we even find Professor Pringle-Pattison and Deussen repeating it with assurance. Another and related illusion is the dividing of world-history into 3 great periods corresponding to the fichtean and hegelian *thesis, antithesis, synthesis; hellenic*, wherein man's spirit and nature are in complete harmony; *medieval*, in which owing to the ascetic ideal they are violently discerpted and set in contrast; *modern*, in which the early harmony is said to be completely restored!

allotting to it its concave and convex sides, *thought* and *extension*. Aristotle felt himself charged with the duty of reconciling the new *mechanism* of Democritus with the socratic and platonic *teleology* and humanism ; *ἀνάγκη* with the Form of Good.

God and Matter : Aristotle's Cosmogony Retrograde.—Matter is conceived in two ways : as that which longs (*ὄρεξις*) to realize the form ; on the other hand, as that which ever prevents the form from becoming actual : *it is at the same time both the* cause and the hindrance *of such perfection as there is*. At the other end in the scale of being God, since He is self-sufficing and without want or defect, cannot be *active* or *good* as creator ; and although this postulate may satisfy the intellect, it will not be found to satisfy the religious sense. The divine being is really a self-conscious person, embracing the whole of Plato's *ideal world* ; in Him centre as absolute sovereign all the attributes which Plato at one time gave to the republic of Forms. In the end neither *commonwealth* nor *monarch* are active, except as a magnetic paradigm by which matter is attracted. Yet it must not be forgotten that this deity is no bare postulate to round off a system, no constitutional sovereign ' to dot the I's ' or put an apex on the pyramid, but is the corner-stone of Aristotle's entire system of cosmology. It must be noticed that his theories by no means marked an advance in science : his *weltanschauung* is rather a retrograde and all ' too human ' system which sat heavily on the western mind for a thousand years. His concentric spheres in a strictly limited and circular world, encompassed on its outermost verge by Godhead, pushed aside the schemes of Pythagoras and Plato—which, with the ' infinite worlds in infinite time ' of Democritus and the ionians, stand far nearer to the truth of things.

Again, his Spirit-guardians of the spheres helped along the later current of demonology, and subjected the earth-life to those *astrologic* influences which were familiar enough in the east. For the eternal and (in a sense) regrettable vicissitudes of birth and decay were due to the restless movement of sun, moon and planets [1] whose self-will (as we saw) first introduced a strain of discord into the music of the spheres. The fundamental distinction of heaven and earth led readily to the blending of peripatetic science with gnostic and parsi dualism ; and helped to create that peculiar ' Philosophy ' amongst the Arabs and latin

[1] *Gen. et Corr.* ii 10 (336).

scholastics, against which, in the end, the religious conscience was obliged to protest.

Man Epitomizes and Explains the Macrocosm : Immanence or the Divine in Nature.—The physical universe he thus represents as an unbroken series upwards, from the first vague impulses and early strivings in matter to Man. We have at last reached the nature for which all this development was preliminary. Nature in every part is but a herald for man and in every abortive effort to produce life after the 'heavenly pattern' she is really striving to produce a man-child. But even now we cannot quite understand this strangely persistent character of *purposiveness* : why does Nature strive to produce the best possible? We have reached a permanent and insoluble problem in interpreting Aristotle; for in Nature there is for him 'something divine' (*θεῖόν τι*) which seeks itself or its kindred and its true happiness in the transcendent God beyond the spheres. *This activity carries every nature not only to its own perfection but beyond itself :* it dies just on the verge of achieving something better than its own completeness. This activity is in the world of our experience and not in God; and it is so conspicuous that Nature can be justly personified as pursuing a conscious end, like the purposive and rational animal, Man. Thus the divine is as well *immanent* in the world as *transcendent*, just as there is order in an army, or law in a State, apart from, yet somehow linked to, the general or statesman who is its author. Aristotle cannot (as we saw) account for this by the self-revealing *goodness* which in the eyes of Plato formed God's chief attribute. This he can say, that God *thinks* the ideal order of the world of change *sub specie æterni*, though He cannot condescend to take notice of particular things or happenings.[1] But how far removed from this sphere, wherein God gazes eternally on a complete and ideal whole, is the world of our striving, the painful and discordant process of the finite! The real tendency of this theology comes out clearly in the stoic school; for which the ideal was a subjective brooding and concentration on self-consciousness,—after the pattern of God wrapt up in His own perfection. Just as God is indifferent to the cosmic process, indeed not even aware 'that virtue has

[1] Deity says Caird in effect (Lect. xiv and xv), is not an empty blank as in later apophatic and nihilistic theology, but a transparent and flawless unity in which all differences are taken up and resolved.

gone out of Him ', so is the wise man wholly indifferent to outward events over which he has no control. He does not seek to objectify, in an unmeaning world and by a series of detached moral acts, the timeless perfection that he feels within his soul.

Nature attains the Divine in Man : Influx of Grace.—God who sees only the ideal order may be compared to some modern sovereigns for whom the papers are carefully edited that no untoward news may spoil their complacence. We do not see why the final world of repetition and process should exist at all and develop (as it does) in time and space ; there is no ground for it in the divine Being. Of Nature herself, the imperfect creature, one can only say in a half poetic strain that there exists somehow a love which yearns towards God, not merely as its *object* but as its *source*,—though how this can be, Aristotle does not explain until he reaches Man. It is a very one-sided affection, which is never reciprocated : as in Spinoza ' man must never expect God ' to love him in return '. Our world, in endless revolution, conflict, change is always pointing beyond itself, is ever seeking and failing to find. But its aim can only be to unite itself with the centre (or goal ?) of its being. The ' somewhat divine ' can (so Aristotle tells us) at its highest earthly stage rise to the same consciousness that God has, and in the end becomes ' partaker of the divine ' nature ' and of the eternal blessedness itself.

Man's Reason, and Divine Inspiration.—Man is thus, as the microcosm, the only key to the universe so far as it is a process towards an ideal unattained, not the enjoyment of an unbroken and fully realized satisfaction as in the Stars. Man is at the end or the apex of earthly development ; he recapitulates creation. His soul embraces and brings to complete perfection all the faculties shown in plant and animal life. Just as in Empedocles, the nature of the soul can be treated as a natural product by *physiology* : man is just the most complex result of a long evolution and no break can be observed in the gradual ascent. But at this point there is a sudden irruption, a new element. There is something more in man's soul than can be supplied by nature : *reason*. This is at once man's *differentia*, marking him off from the animals, and his veriest self.[1] All other psychic faculties are so tied up with the senses of body that they cannot be supposed

[1] νοῦς ἕκαστος = the mind is the [true] personality : cf. previous section on Averroes.

to survive its decay and dissolution. But *mind* or *intellect* exists in its own right ; it does not need to lean on the suggestions or impressions of sense and the outer world. It is therefore in the truest sense immortal *suo jure*. Alone, this *reason* is not a function of the body [1] : it is not a *dependent* but an *absolute* principle, ' something divine '. Aristotle here leaves *physiology* and becomes a *mystic*. There is that in man which cannot be explained by natural causes and enters his nature from another sphere.[2] Man's mind, bound to the senses as the sole vehicles or avenues through which knowledge can reach him, is at first a *tabula rasa*.[3] His intellect may be divine but it cannot manifest itself in this lower world without the stimulants of sense-impressions (*φαντάσματα*). But this dormant or *virtual* faculty becomes *active* by a gradual union with a divine power, also regarded as entering from without. *This power to appreciate abstract truth is then transcendental both in source and destiny.*[4] It is like the creative *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras an ' occasional visitor ' to our world, a special ' grace ' or dower which comes from heaven.[5] It can be argued that his philosophy falls (like most others) into two disparate halves which cannot be reconciled.

His double Attitude : *Orphic* and Physiological.—The *transcendentalism* was soon sloughed off by his successors (e.g. Strato) as a needless accretion, but it is probable that for Aristotle himself it formed the most important part. Like Empedocles he can look at soul both as a *naturalist* and a *mystic*, and in the latter respect he only gives a slightly different turn to the orphic and pythagorist doctrine or superstition, which existed side by side with pure impersonal science in almost every greek thinker. We must distinguish then between the *physical* and the *mystic-intellectual* theory of soul (*de An.* i 403, *part. anim.* i. 641) : just as other thinkers abruptly alter their standpoint when they regard man from the *objective* or the *subjective* side. To earlier in-

[1] *τὰ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς οὔκ ἐστι χωριστά de Anima* ii 9.

[2] The famous passage is found in *Gen. Anim.* ii 3 : *λείπεται τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι κ. θεῖον εἶναι μόνον.*

[3] *de An.* iii 4 *νοῦς* = *γραμματεῖον ἐν ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐνεργείᾳ γεγραμμένον.*

[4] *de An.* iii 5, almost in the language of Anaxagoras.

[5] It will be objected that I read an unwarrantable *mysticism* into the most matter-of-fact author : even if the charge is justified, I am only trying to enter into the mental atmosphere of his interpreters who for at least 1500 years were convinced that this was his meaning.

quirers, man's Soul was at one and the same time a fallen demon, a mere resultant, coefficient or harmony of a particular natural body, and an entity which passes through successive bodies by transmigration : man is both a mere animal, a vagrant spirit on its travels, and a god. The more important passages in this context are *de An.* ii 412, *εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ* —that is, soul from the scientific point of view : 413, *ἔοικεν ὁ νοῦς ψυχῆς γένος εἶ ερον εἶναι . . . τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι.* Also in 413, he says ; it is quite conceivable that there may be some parts of *soul* separable from *body,* because they are not the expression of any particular body ; it is further a matter of debate whether soul as perfect realization of body may not stand to it in the same separable relation as a sailor to his boat :—just as Plato's Grand Pilot of the Universe is by no means tied to his vessel but sometimes leaves the helm and enjoys his own true nature apart and alone. While he starts from a desire to show orderly and continuous development from the lowest stage, he ends in this peculiar and abrupt *dualism.* In a sense the whole motive of his system is to avoid Plato's antithesis of the *real* and *ideal* worlds. He seems to strive against the common orphic tendency to sunder body and soul, against the pythagorist scorn of the physical vesture (*σῶμα = σῆμα*) which is the ' tomb of the spirit '. Yet he is in the end inevitably drawn back to Plato's position ; ' the soul is not at home here ' and is not doing its proper work '. Spirit is dragged down into a lower region, where like a philosopher who is forced to become a backwoodsman or a Crusoe on a desert island, it is reduced to low and imperfect activities.[1] If the Christian believes in a *threefold* nature—body, soul, spirit—he is only following in the steps of Aristotle and the gnostics who restated him.[2]

Immortality—conditional and non-ethical : the End is Dualism.—Man leads a complex existence because he has a mortal body and an *immortal* spirit—not (be it noticed) of right

[1] In which of course the purely *ethical* must be included.

[2] His *νοῦς* is only the *πνεῦμα* of the valentinians and others, who divided mankind into the *pneumatic, psychic,* and *hylic* : —the first were sure of salvation or redemption, the third were *ipso facto* excluded from all hope, and the intermediate group might or might not be saved : only for them was there any freedom of choice.

or without effort. Aristotle, for whom continued existence hereafter is not an *ethical* postulate, upholds *conditional* immortality, which is the privilege of the elect few only. The highest part of his soul (when purged of passion and devoted to the attainment of truth) is a unity lifted above all change, serene and untroubled, unaffected by the desires and passions which torment all other men. Hence as *faith* (and grace from another point of view) is the only really important thing, *works* do not matter (as in the hindu systems already examined) ; and *reason*—perplexed, discursive and dialectic in the lower function, asking and solving questions by argument and syllogism—is in the highest region silent, and gives way to direct intuition *θιγγάνων κ. νοῶν.* The constant ' nagging ' dialectic of *discursive* reason ceases, and something arises analogous to the immediacy of sense-perception. In *intuitive* reason we perceive the highest truth directly : it is beyond judgment and is infallible. Between the uses of the *understanding* which analyses and judges and the enjoyment of *reason* there is drawn a deep line. Aristotle has forsaken at the most critical moment his avowed design of preserving at all costs an orderly development and organic union. In the end *matter* and *form* (in the truest sense) are irreconcilable opposites and can never be joined.

Is this Pure Intellect Man's true Self ? Atman.—What is this peculiar faculty which completes and perfects, yet in a sense, annihilates, the nature of man ? Is it his true self ? In a sense yes, since *νοῦς ἕκαστος*, and herein is his *differentia*. But in another sense it is not his *self* at all, but *God*. Plain logic demands that we identify man at his best and highest with God ; for the state of mind, the calm fruition, the ideal objects of thought exactly correspond in the divine and human. It is conceived in this double sense as the highest apex of the individual soul's development and as the sudden infusion of a divine grace ; man, at his last and most perfect stage, or man when he has passed beyond himself and become something better, even God Himself.

The Gift of the Elect Few : to become God.—The definition of *νοῦς* in man agrees with that of *νοῦς* the Supreme which is God—both are unmoved movers, both are in the words of Anaxagoras *ἀπαθὴς, ἀμιγὴς, καθαρὸς, χωριστός*. This being must be *unique* ; there cannot be a *manifold*, for a plural is mate-

rial and this must be regarded as wholly spiritual.[1] Our personality is then in the last resort *divine*, God Himself :— is He then the *being* of all things ? (a perilous belief which we shall find at the back of medieval Realism and other tendencies more heretical still). No, the grace of union with the Active Intellect comes only to a few, for whose sake (it may be said) this cosmic development exists. Divinity is not an immediate gift, but slowly and painfully achieved or purchased at a great price (like Festus' franchise).[2] In the end it is perhaps best to refer the ' divine something ' only to man ; and not generally to Nature. It is because man can be the vehicle of the divine spirit that she subserves his purpose and strains, like Penia in Plato's *Banquet* in her want and emptiness, towards the good : in man her aim is satisfied and she rests content.[3]

No Loss of Self in Thought, either for God or Man.—Aristotle's doctrine is not *nihilistic* ; God does not indeed think of *particulars* nor has He providence for special cases or for anything outside His own perfect nature. But He contemplates the world of Forms as a whole (*νοητὰ εἴδη* forming the *κόσμος νοητὸς*, which is both God Himself and yet the object of His eternal thought). So in the supreme stage the soul is not rapt, as in other mystics, into an emotional nothingness (if the term be allowed) ; and just in so far as there is no fusion of subject and object (either in God

[1] *Met.* xii 3, 10 : Aristotle is so far *pantheist* at times that it might almost be said that *νοῦς* is a sort of *immanent* world-soul of which our partial souls are transient modes—as in Spinoza and all hindu systems and their kin. But the transcendental side must never be forgotten as the complement and correlate : in Aristotle it is at least as important. At any rate throughout our period he is justly regarded as the champion of transcendental theism.

[2] *Immediate* and premature pantheism of all things, willings, and happenings, is obviously a doctrine liable to have inconvenient results as we saw in Hindustan ; but ' to *become* divine ', to be in St. Peter's language ' partakers of the divine nature ', is the avowed object of man and the goal set before him in the eastern church.

[3] The question arises ' are there few that shall be saved ? ' both in this system, and in a very kindred one, buddhism. The aim of this long misunderstood school is to secure the fullest happiness attainable *in this life* (no doubt by methods which a western mind cannot readily appreciate) : the buddhas are the ' fine flower ', the last bloom, of the world-process, and this is even justified so far as the group of the elect attain felicity and reappear from time to time to exhort others to the quest of the same happiness.

or in man) Aristotle is not a mystic. But history plainly shows that from him the later mystics of east and west have borrowed the whole of their doctrine; though they may carry it into heights (or depths) of self-loss and nihilism where he certainly could not have followed them.

Morals, only Episodic and Provisional.—It is not hard to see what place *morals* will occupy in such a system, or again political life and society. At the two ends of his scale of mankind Aristotle places the 'beast' and the 'god' (*θηρίον*, *θεός*). Intermediate is the average man, the citizen who must lean on convention, established laws and current examples around him, who is not strong enough to stand alone; even as the 'great-souled hero' of the *Ethics* stands in need of popular approval, and lives a somewhat artificial, indeed precarious, life as Triton among minnows. The *materies virtutis* of the *μεγαλόψυχος* (as of Mr. Dorrit in the Marshalsea Prison) is an admiring community, willing to acknowledge his superiority and allow him to patronize and benefit them. The peripatetic school was always haunted with this dependence on *externals*; and the next age is occupied with the old problem of the happy slave or martyr on the rack, to whose bliss outward circumstances and the goodwill of his fellows contribute absolutely nothing, as they can take nothing away. Aristotle's morals are then provisional and propædeutic: social life is all very well for the average greek citizen and the philosopher will never kick down the ladder on which he has mounted to serenity: he is never an antinomian. *Moral* virtue is a prerequisite and a permanent condition of intellectual freedom, but it is hardly an end-in-itself: it is not the sum or series of detached good acts but a habit (*ἕξις*) which renders possible the use and enjoyment of man's peculiar activity, on which pleasure follows in the very highest and most divine form. It is in the *dianoëtic* virtues that man rises into communion with Active Intellect, to view things not as finite and struggling particulars but as a coherent and organic whole. When reason (like Martha) is fussily active over the business or rather businesses of life, it is engrossed in that which is not its proper sphere and is diverted from its real end. At rare moments of infinite satisfaction the soul is admitted to share the same bliss that God enjoys for ever. In passages which describe the divine felicity and man's infrequent glimpses of it, Aristotle, creator of intellectualism, be-

comes almost a mystic of the emotions and creates for all later time, the aim and the phrases which express it. This ultimate interest in the subjective feeling of the single soul saves Aristotle from platonic Realism : whereby the individual seems to be swallowed and absorbed in the collective state-life. When he calls such social life man's highest good (*τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν par excellence*) he is hardly sincere : though it is never wholly displaced or forgotten, this stage must be transcended by any one who wishes to be perfect as God is perfect.

Proper Goal of Man Guaranteed by the Cosmos : Union with God.—This perfection is really within the reach of one who gives pains and takes trouble about the task.[1] The test of proper[1] adjustment to one's cosmic surroundings is *pleasure* (*ἡδονή*). He does not shrink from using this word, although as implying to most ears a flitting satisfaction of a single moment, it is not the best possible term : *happiness* he prefers (*εὐδαιμονία*), a word which implies a uniform and continuously blissful state of mind. This state is not merely a subjective feeling (which might be hallucination or an opium-trance) but a lasting condition judged to be *good* as well as pleasant by competent experts, and well nigh inalienable. Man's proper work is also his proper happiness (*Eth.* i 6, x 7) ; the greek mind, not yet impenitently pessimist and ironical, still believes that Nature provides for man's perfection and happiness and respects it when won. The deeper and sadder problems of life it had not as yet confronted, and in Aristotle there is little of Job. As the life of *theory* is the highest, so he cannot allow that the state's paramount duty is to train its citizens for war. War, like the lower athletic training of morality, is only a means to an end ;—just as the motion of the spheres and the restless process of earth-life is only a means toward repose in the good, in contemplation,—in that which men will later call the Beatific Vision. Therefore we find constant reference (both in Nature by metaphor, and in man) to *will* and *desire*, to the life-impulse which has not yet quite become unhealthy and morbid and turned in upon itself in introspective pessimism, or penitence. The perfection of God stirred appetites which in the end could be satisfied ; the universe as a system

[1] With the pretensions of the slothful and ignorant mystic who believes himself at once and without effort *en rapport* with Central Being, he had as little sympathy as Hegel himself. Cf. Divis. B 503, 4.

corresponds with man's hopes and aspirations.[1] Aristotle tried to preserve the creature and the sovereign distinct and separate even in the supreme moment of 'union'. He admits no neoplatonic theory of *emanation*, no *creation*, no progressive *deterioration*, no 'overflow from a full cup' (as in Plotinus); only the magnetism which the perfect must exert over an inferior world, conscious of its dearth and longing to fill up its emptiness.

Aristotle seeks to Overcome Hellenic Dualism and Reconcile the Unit with Objectives.—From one point of view then, Aristotle desired to cure the ungrateful aloofness (ἀδημονία) which orphism had introduced into Greece; which Plato, in very much of his writing, had sanctioned both by argument and appeal to emotion. His pupil takes up the sophistic problem. Man is to restate the world *in his own terms*, and accept it *on his own terms*: he need not travel far abroad for this; there was a good deal of 'home-work' to be done in examining his concepts and making acquaintance with the obvious facts of the rich life around him.[2] The sophistic movement showed that reflecting man, the *subject*, felt dominated or overshadowed by *objectives*. These he could neither understand nor accept without reserve. He believed them (like Rousseau or the anarchists) to be not wholly *rational* from the 'private member's point of view'. Socrates had put forward a very protestant and individualist solution, while Plato had tried to reconcile man once again with the State and the Universe. Aristotle undertook to show how far and by what method, the *unit* could (as it were) appropriate the *whole*, and 'win out' to freedom. He did not approve of Plato's half-militant, half monastic State, with its truly catholic and realist implication, that the member must be submissive and dutiful to the society. Though he concedes that the State is prior to the individual, he does not allow this titular dignity and precedence to interfere with the latter's rights and franchise. This liberty or deliverance was the basal problem for his greek successors; it was the

[1] *Pol.* i 2, 9, he uses βούλεσθαι of φύσις, *Phys.* i 10, 7, *matter* ὕλη ὀρέγεται (yearns after) *form*, *Met.* xii 6, 15: 7, 3 matter desires God: not to be merged in the same nature but rather to enjoy the same delight, the contemplation of an ideal world, which is intermittent with us but for Him eternal, xii, 7, 11.

[2] In so far Aristotle is the 'absolute empiric' as he is the father of all later inductive science: but equally, he is nothing of the kind, as no single designation can ever exhaust the thought and work of a true philosopher.

sole aim of the subjective schools, as it had been of some notable socratic pupils. Antisthenes had sought to set the unit, the single life, free from the limits which culture or society (even convention, etiquette and common decency) could impose. The hedonist of Cyrene also showed his profound dislike of the State (for which he substituted the voluntary bond of friendship), his profound distrust in the Universe : his actual pursuit of particular pleasures quickly subsided into the settled temper of mind which expects nothing from the world ; it cannot understand it and it entrenches itself behind an innermost citadel. His aim was not a series of pleasures but a negative absence of wants, and the goal, just as in the sternest ascetic, is only won by renouncing and suppressing : in the uncertain journey of life one's baggage should be reduced to a *minimum* by every prudent traveller. In an age which had not forgotten the victory of a few freemen over the million slaves of persian autocracy, the demand of thought was that man be not sacrificed for a purpose which he cannot make his own.

He Rationalizes Universe from Humanist Standpoint : Felicity within our Reach.—Aristotle tried to *rationalize* the whole universe from the humanist standpoint : to prove to man that the highest attainable pleasure, the highest intelligent substance, was within his reach. He found, in his half-mystical and religious conclusion, that these two are one. God Himself is the aim and goal of man. The unfolding of Active Intellect allows us to behold and even to touch the truth. We gain by it an inlet into the pure thought which forms the inmost essence of the divine. Here (like God Himself) without further willing or end in view, we enjoy the chief good for its own sake and timelessly ; and ' will-less absorption in the perception of truth ' which, both for God and mortals is the most blessed life of all.[1] But the final *salto mortale* Aristotle never takes : he leaves to others to deduce the obvious conclusion, that *man only attains the completeness of his nature when he ceases to be man and has already passed into the divine.*

[1] Erdmann *Gesch. Phil.* § 87 can say with truth ' the Deity is both ' *object* and *subject* of the philosopher's contemplation : so in Plato, the ' good is not only the highest being and object of knowledge but that, ' in which partaking, our mind can alone perceive it, and in its light every- ' thing else in the world '.

APPENDIX A

Greek Demonology and King-Worship

'Demon'—our own Character or a Divine Grace?—Empedocles is the standing instance of a man claiming to have been a deity. Hesiod (*Op.* 122, 251) certainly believed that the demons were the souls of those who lived in the Age of Gold, who might well be the Titans or subjects of Cronus before Zeus usurped the throne; to Æschylus, Darius is a demon after death, to Euripides, Alcestis.[1] The philosophers used the term often; for Thales everything was full of demons; Pythagoras held them to be souls of the dead who sent dreams to men; Heraclitus and Epicharmus say almost in the same words, that character (ἦθος) is each man's real demon or guardian spirit; Democritus says that happiness dwells not in things without, but the soul is the abode of a blessed being οἰκητήριον δαίμονος. To Plato the souls of the dead were δαίμονες that is, δαήμονες, because when released from the body they became wise in that lore which our flesh hides from us; every man has his guardian demon *Phædo* 107; *Rep.* 617; so also in *Tim.* 90 where God allotted to each man as guiding genius a supreme form of soul[2], within the rational faculty which dwells in the summit of our body and lifts us to the higher region of thought—an important passage noticed elsewhere. Aristotle (*fragment* 193 Rose) held also that each man had a spirit-guardian (φύλαξ) and Xenocrates, a successor of Plato, only repeats his master's teaching in the *Timæus* 89, 90. So Aristotle reports (*Topics* ii 112). Hence Menander in the well-known lines popularizes a philosophic belief, which was something more than a superstition: he calls the attendant demon, 'one who conducts us or initiates us into life's mysteries' (μυστάγωγος τοῦ βίου), like the attendant and guide at a freemasonic initiation. Now in all this usage (popular, mythical or symbolic) it is hard to decide if a separate angelic being is meant or merely the highest point in our own nature, our own personal character: it is certainly unsafe to rule out the former sense altogether and we should introduce a wholly irrelevant scepticism. For the great materialists and monists of the stoic school (at least in the Middle Period)[3] were among the warmest adherents of *demonology*. Posidonius held that our disembodied souls congregated with other spirits in the sublunar region; for soul-stuff is not dissipated but has an element of permanence and an allotted habitation beneath the moon. Our indwelling soul may strictly be called 'the demon born with us'.

The Belief Coalesced with the Notion of Mana—or temporary Divine Possession.—This view, common it would seem to the vulgar and to philosophers alike, met and coalesced with another, and perhaps earlier, belief

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[1] Nero styled himself *Corp. Ins. Gr.* iii 4699 ἀγαθοδαίμων of the whole world!

[2] Here the true derivation δαίομαι is clear.

[3] Cf. Schmekel, *Phil. of the Middle Stoa*, Berlin 1892.

which lies at the root of kingship and priesthood,—the incarnation of a deity in a mortal body, during which time (for the union is often not for the duration of life) he is identified with the God whose name he bears and whose form and power he assumes. Thus Bacchus became actually incarnate in his initiates ; there is no doubt that Aphrodite was something conceived as a force which acts like demoniac possession (as conceived in the New Testament). It is also said that Hermes was held to become embodied in the Cave of Trophonius near Lebadea. Pausanias ix 39 certainly says that the two boy-attendants who acted as guides to the consultant of the oracle were called by the god's name (οὓς Ἑρμεῖς ἐπονομάζουσι). We have seen in Hinduism that Sitala, the goddess of cholera, is supposed to be actually *incarnate* in the sufferer. These two beliefs—(1) that soul-substance comes from the heavens, (2) that a deity is a *mana* or electric force entering a human (or animal) body, or again merely a *fetich*-object—have certainly united.

APPENDIX B

Platonic Soul-Theory (as *Demon*)

There cannot be a doubt that *Aristotle's soul-theory* is in great measure taken from a passage in Plato (*Tim.* 90) which deserves close attention. Plato begins as a dualist who finds his disparate substances somehow working together to form a συνθετὸν or κοινὸν ζῷον. Man being formed of soul and body united, his guide is the former, and to its welfare he must diligently take heed. Of the three parts that which is most fully exercised will be the strongest ; therefore let him give freest play to the part which is most divine, his guiding genius which lifts him up towards his birthplace and true home in heaven—the κυριώτατον παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἶδος . . δαίμονα θεὸς ἑκάστῳ δέδωκεν . . οἰκεῖν ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν, ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλ' οὐράνιον.

The later interpreters, when the self-help of the subjective school seemed to fail, placed this entirely *outside* man as a real spirit sent to guide him ; οἱ πολλοὶ says Plutarch in his tract on the *Socratic Demon*, νοῦν καλοῦντες ἐντὸς εἶναι νομίζουσι . . οἱ δ' ὀρθῶς ὑπονοοῦντες ὡς ἐκτὸς ὄντα δαίμονα. On the *Tim.* passage Archer Hind says (not without truth but with some little over-emphasis) ' in Plato νοῦς is simply ψυχὴ exercising her own ' unimpeded functions . . . the true δαίμων is our own mind ; we are ' to look for guidance not to any *external* source but to ourselves, to the ' divinest part of our nature '. But a somewhat mystical doctrine of grace and illumination is latent even in the most convinced preachers of self-sufficiency in pelagian antiquity : and we cannot in fairness exclude one marked side of human thought.

Now he who so exerts his highest faculties must have thoughts which are immortal and divine (φρονεῖν ἀθάνατα κ. θεῖα) that is, if he grasp or lay hold of truth (τῆς ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται) ; and so far as our nature can share in immortality (μετασχεῖν ἀθανασίας), no portion of this privilege is lacking to him. He must needs be blessed beyond all others (διαφερόντως

εὐδαίμων) since he ever cherishes the divine in him and keeps duly attended and adorned the demon which abides with him (ἔχειν εὖ κεκοσμημένον τὸν δαίμονα σύνοικον ἐν αὐτῷ).

This, like much of Plato's mystical language, may be merely suggestive and intended to explain the greek word for *happiness* as opposed to mere *enjoyment*; the εὐδαίμων is he to whom his deity within, his ideal standard that is, is propitious and well content with his pupil:—but it is easy to see how a single turn of phrase or meaning, a single forced accent on the metaphor, will set in motion the long series of gnostical solutions for the problem of our being. This sentiment Aristotle echoes in Eth. x 1177 where the divine life for man is *mental* life (κατὰ νοῦν βίος) because this is the more divine portion; therefore duty is clear, not to listen to those who restrain us from high thoughts (παραινοῦντες ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν) but aim, so far as we are able, at things immortal (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν) and do all we can to live according to the most noble faculty within us.

PART II. ORPHISM AND CHALDEISM, OR ASTRAL THEORY

SECTION I. MYSTIC AND EMPIRIC PSYCHOLOGY AMONG THE GREEKS

Empiric and Mystic Elements in Solution or Antagonism.—It is now quite clear that in Aristotle, the chief influence on thinkers in east and west alike during our period, there coexisted two tendencies; the *empiric* or materialist which advances by way of tested science, and the *mystic* which supplements the former method when at a certain point it becomes powerless. In his system at the most critical moment there is a sudden break and a new force is admitted from another world. At least that is one way of interpreting his language; his direct successors took the other view and put the emphasis on the purely empirical element. The neo-platonists, and Christian Commentators,[1] neglected the former and *inductive* part and saw in him chiefly a *mystical* and religious writer who could be reconciled to his master Plato in every detail. As there was a fissure in the socratics, so there was in the peripatetic school; neither party from its schismatic basis presented the master in the entirety of his teaching. It is just possible that Aristotle may have intended Active Intellect in the complete philosopher to be only a *natural* faculty raised to its highest power by untiring personal effort; but he did not always say this and at times most distinctly contradicts pure pelagianism.

Orphic Teaching: Man as a Fallen Angel.—We must now inquire if there was any counterpart in previous greek thought to this curious doctrine of grace or Divine Illumination which in Aristotle's text cannot be wholly explained away. None of the Ionians had ever denied the existence of demons even in their most scientific moments; and the atomic school (like their later exponent Epicurus) acknowledged them. From the year *600* B.C. onwards there arose, from origins which are to-day

[1] To some extent the arabians also.

absolutely unknown, a peculiar personal religion called *Orphism*. Time must not here be spent in a survey of proofs or problems. We do not know if the new doctrine was the uprising of an earlier racial element ; or the invasion of savage thraco-phrygian orgies and myths, so tempered and modified as to suit a civilized society and meet the demands of the heart ; or an indigenous product of that hybrid race we call the Greeks ; or lastly, an introduction from the Far East. Much good work has been done recently in making this ' revivalist ' movement a little clearer, but we are by no means as yet fully acquainted with its true origins and import. About the same time that the saco-thracian Gautama founded the school of godless personalist ethics (since strangely transformed into a religion of comfort for one-fourth of our race), anonymous teachers were spreading a new soul-theory among the Hellenes. The soul was a demon exiled from a better world by its own fault ; in order that it may expiate in the living death of bodily life those sins for which it was expelled from ' paradise '. It was not the ghostly breath of our physical being—hovering around the theatre of death or near its sepulchre, acquiring a fitful life and even a certain agency among survivors, by means of food and drink placed by the grave or by occasional draughts of blood. It was an independent being from another world with a history stretching far back into the past ;—of which its present lot and conduct was the lawful issue as it would be the condition of its future state. This demon was immortal and brought with him into a mortal frame memories and visions of a better world. It might be said rather to exist side by side with our soul-proper,[1] the sum of the faculties which rise out of the use of our bodily organs and the needs of intercourse with a tangible world. The ancients, savages as well as sages in Egypt, had faced the problem of a *dual* or a *multiple* personality : the *ka* was not the *ba*. It must be noted that the *ka* as demon or guardian-angel is *semitic* in origin and is not an indigenous belief of Egypt. The well-known hyksos sovereign Khyan begins the practice of inscribing his cartouche with the words ' *beloved by his ka* '. Later this singular being was expressly deified ; at Panahemisis we read on a tomb ' Thy *ka* is thy god, he parted ' not from thee and so thy soul liveth eternally ' (Bissing *Versuch*

[1] This is curiously like the hindu *Soul non-agent* which we found in Sankhya and the Vedantists.

etc. 1911)—a curious parallel to the doctrine of our period on the divinity of a certain part of the soul, and the independent (*χωριστὸν*) existence of the *Active Intellect*. Here, says Flinders Petrie with great truth, *ka* has become a divine principle, indwelling, and saving the soul.[1] The Spirit which could leave the body and wander far afield, as in Herodotus' story of marvel, was, and yet again was not, the chief factor, the real person. It was from one point of view the *very man himself*, again a mere *passing guest* from the divine world who took up his abode in a human body, *deus*, says Seneca, *hospitans in corpore humano*. There was always a tendency to regard it as a stranger who was not our real self.[2] It is clear that such a doctrine would become at once popular with a *crowd* swayed by emotion or sense of mystery. What is surprising is that it was held besides by inductive philosophers who at least started out with the aim of rationalizing the world and man.[3] Until the last dire necessity, they admitted nothing but what senses could attest and reason ratify.[4]

[1] It must be remembered that, as mostly elsewhere, religion in Egypt began, not strictly with a formal theology or even a fixed worship of gods, but with a firm hold on immortality, rather a burning desire to secure it—which may very well exist in a community as yet (to our notions) godless.

[2] See my *Marcus Aurelius and Later Stoicism* Edin. 1910, pp. 202–211; he represents our true spiritual worship or 'reasonable service' as a cult of a deity in the innermost shrine of the soul—certainly at times an entity distinct from our own individuality (ii 17 *τὸν ἐνδὸν* δ. iii 3, 4, 5, 16) with repeated refer. to *ἐνδὸν ἱδρυμένος*: *νοῦν κ. δαίμονα* often v 27 with evident refer. to *Timæus προστάτην κ. ἡγέμονα Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν . . . ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ*: the aim of life is xii 3 *ἵλεως τῷ σαυτοῦ δαιμόνι διαβιῶναι*; xii 26 is clearest statement of *ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς θεὸς κ. ἐκεῖθεν ἐῤῥύηκεν* (cf. xii 2).

[3] Democritus also called soul a dwelling-place of deity (*οἰκητήριον δαίμονος*): after the Stars man's soul was by the chief thinkers held to be the most divine object: sometimes the two were united, soul was an efflux (*ἀπόῤῥοια τῶν ἄστρων*) and in Diels' *Doxographi* (651) we have *τινὲς τὴν ψυχὴν δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων ῥέουσαν* (*οἴονται*), which may refer explicitly to a semi-christian gnostic sect but also fairly represents much earlier conviction as to the source of rational life.

[4] This is not wholly true: as a fact every greek school was *rationalist* and not in any strict sense *empiric*: the evidence of sense was distrusted by all the most divergent thinkers, and even Democritus is fabled (but the fable is highly significant) to have blinded himself, that he might muse undisturbed by sense-impressions and discover truth by intercourse with the 'deity within'.

Possibly a revolt against Olympianism : The Two Worlds, Real and Unreal.—The belief might be said to betoken, even among philosophers, a titanic revolt against the new aryan dynasty of Zeus and Olympus, against the upstart families of intruding deities which Homer and Hesiod had arrayed with a very artificial symmetry and coherence. The new doctors were assuredly followers of Prometheus who was one day destined to overthrow the hated aryan gods. Orphic mysteries taught the esoteric faith that men were of the seed of the Titans, tormented by the gods and kept from the bliss that was their right. Or again, even if the titanic strain in our blood was evil, that which gave promise of redemption was a certain kinship with Dionysus : but Dionysus is no homeric deity [1] but a god who comes very much closer to man (for good or ill) than any denizen of Olympus. Wise men (above all in Italy) helped on the notion of the strangeness of this life, the foreignness to our better nature of this earth which is not our true home—by a formal system of ' two worlds ', one visible and sensible, the other descried only by the eye of pure *reason*.[2] The natural trend of the *hellenic* mind to dualism was much more noticeable than in the *medieval*—while the most ascetic and saintly monk tried to trace a consistent harmony or correlation between *outward* and *inward* by a luxuriance of allegory and symbolism [3] the greek desired release from a region where he could not feel at home. Pythagoras had, I believe, started that curious *local* division of the world which Aristotle adopted and handed on to our own times. The two worlds were those of heaven and earth ; the distinction was not between a *sensible* and a *rational* system, but between a higher and a lower in space.[4] We should find it hard to exaggerate the importance of this *spatial* dualism, both in the strictly medieval period and in the later age down to Kepler and Copernicus. Parmenides

[1] In true orphism the introduction of Zeus is obviously an afterthought of syncretism.

[2] Which in this context takes the place of *faith* in the Christian system, of the immediate intuition of Spinoza, Hegel, and the Vedantists.

[3] Founded it must be confessed on very slender knowledge of our beautiful and complex world ; cf. Taylor's entertaining study of *The Medieval Mind* 2 vols. Macmillan 1911.

[4] Hence in great part our modern ideas of heaven as a region somewhere aloft, from which notion, as from the use of terms like sunset, sunrise, we find it impossible to get free.

tells of two absolutely distinct worlds, of *one* and *many*, which have nothing in common; the laws of the one realm exactly contradict the system prevailing in the other. Democritus too sets in complete antithesis the world as revealed by the senses and as disclosed to the reflecting mind by thought.

Socrates Reinforces with Strong Ethical Vein.—This scientific manicheism (as it might be termed) met in Socrates a very strong ethical and emotional interest. He was a convinced member of the orphic brotherhood or community, as Plato's myths prove.[1] He had passed through a stage of genuine scientific inquiry. Aristophanes' burlesque in the *Clouds* is by no means pure caricature; there was an academy at Athens, with students, a laboratory and apparatus for experiments. But he found the scientific view of the world quite unsatisfying, because it only regarded man as a late, meaningless, and perhaps unhappy, product of a necessitarian system. He therefore, as we may say, was converted and took to religion. Like Joan of Arc he believed in divine voices, and (what must have seemed a singular dogma at that date) thought that each individual had somehow a sacred mission to perform, a sentinel's post to fill, and that God had time to attend to every unit and to take a personal interest in him. With this was of course united a firm belief in the hereafter [2] and in the rewards and penalties which were part of the new teaching [3] and found a prominent place in the Platonic Myth. Plato's philosophy [4], whatever else it taught or did not teach, at least set the world of Forms in abrupt antithesis to our own. He urged the 'flight hence' as the supreme

[1] See the very able vindication of Plato's *mystical* side as due to the genuine historic Socrates, Burnet *Gr. Phil.* Part i. *Thales to Plato* Macmillan 1914.

[2] Burnet is justified in blaming those who doubt the convictions of Socrates (and Plato) on this matter: their whole philosophy seems to issue from belief in a continuous soul-life, the only doctrine which could reconcile man to the trivial interests and happenings of our world: it will be noted that Plato's sense of the 'paltriness' and futility of human concerns deepened as he grew older and his hold on a personal hereafter weaker.

[3] And as we see were liable to much abuse and exploitation by charlatans after the likeness of Tetzel and his indulgences (Plato *Republic*).

[4] Which has been almost re-interpreted *de novo* and set in a completely different light in recent years.

duty of man, in at least one group of dialogues whose teaching he never expressly repudiated. We have seen how Aristotle did justice to both worlds and tried to bring them into closer union: in the end without effect.

Mystical Psychology confronted by Facts of Science and Savage Beliefs.—As far as the new theory of Soul went—that man was in his inmost essence a *demon* or (as we should say) a '*fallen angel*'—it was of course confronted and challenged by the teaching of empiric science that even if man was 'a little lower than the angels' he was in nearly every salient feature only little more than a brute. The primitive world fixed no impassable gulf between man and the animals: the æsopic fable and ubiquitous folk-story of every savage race, exhibit him as on friendly and equal terms with his kindred, who indeed at times are both more virtuous and more powerful.[1] Belief in *transmigration* is very constant and primitive: children born to-day are either ancestors reëmbodied (the number of souls being limited), or else animal spirits who have won their way upwards. Pythagoras (we know) took over this belief from archaic sources, as his aryan cousins may have done in India. Neither in Italy nor the East was it the result of profound thought; rather an ineradicable instinctive concept, which must somehow be fitted into a *rational* cosmology and was in the end found to give it moral sanction. Both these theories, that soul is a demon, that it is a spirit in turn animating *different* bodies, were crossed by yet another—that man's psychic side is merely the resultant of his own *particular* body.[2] Many philosophers were also men of religious emotion, and the same person might very well without being insincere hold two divergent views about the same thing, when a

[1] Celsus in *True Discourse* (*apud* Origen *c. C.*) (*c.* 150 A.D.) seriously believes that birds are θεοφιλέστερον γένο. I do not suppose that even Tacitus found the german respect for horses, as *confidantes* of the gods, altogether strange (*Germania* § 10).

[2] A belief which as we know from Plato's *Phædo* was familiar enough to the pythagorists and (like later averroisms) seems to have been held by otherwise orthodox members of the school—at least for purposes of argument and discussion. No doubt, so far as it was seriously held, *survival*, or further discipline of anything personal, was strictly out of the question; yet, as in buddhism, this want of logic did not trouble the professors in their moralizing moments.

purely *speculative* interest came into conflict with a *practical* and *personal* one. Empedocles is a good instance.[1]

Psychology in Plato's later stage and in his Successors: negative.—Plato found it hard to establish the survival of *character*, as the resultant of moral discipline and life's experience, which for the strictly religious consciousness is the chief practical interest. While he never denied or rewrote his retributive eschatology, he seems in *Timæus* to make only the *reason* of a man immortal; that is, that side of his nature in which he is least *personal* and *idiosyncratic*. Therefore morality in itself has no value and little meaning except as making peace in the soul for meditation on truth: there is no continuous subject left, for discipline and development. As in Lessing's *Education of the Human Race*, or in Gautama's teaching, the whole moral aspect is an elaborate (if necessary) fraud—at least fiction. These problems were never cleared up. After Aristotle, philosophy (as such) took no further interest in personal immortality. Ethics (whether in sceptic, stoic[2] or epicurean schools) were regarded simply and solely as a means to obtain such satisfaction as this present span of life could guarantee to man. Needless to say

[1] R. D. Hicks in Hastings' *Encycl. Rel. and Eth.* seems to doubt that the same man could write the *Purifications* and also the works on evolutionary science; or he inclines to think that the adept and mystical works are earlier and youthful productions superseded by the common-sense view of a more mature thought. Yet the phenomenon of the 'Double Truth' must be familiar enough to any student of human thought; antithesis of the spheres of *reason* or philosophy and of *revelation* was clearly a doctrine widely held by men who knew that cosmic experience cannot be covered by a single set of axioms or formulæ. It was neither irony nor fear of the State nor craven hypocrisy that made men from Simon of Tournai down to Pomponatius hold two irreconcilable views at the same time; simply the needs of our complex nature. Such dualism which mightily offends the pure logician is very common in English thinkers, of whom Locke, *impressionalist* and *pietist*, may be taken as a typical example of the national temper, which never pushes logic to extremes.

[2] This is strictly true: the preachers of the Porch are not moralists in any sense intelligible to-day; they are *eudæmonists* who ask, by what process of quieting the will-to-live can a man be happy? That which in one sage is a state of holiness and absorbed contemplation becomes in his caricature, the cynic or gnostical libertine, a rejection of all law and decency. But (as has often been observed) all the rudiments of complete ethical adiaphory are to be found in the earliest and the most serious doctors of the school.

this was conceived under purely negative terms and the golden visions of another and better world were revived in the east as a reaction against a similar nihilism. It is not too much to say that post-aristotelian thought has had no influence on later developments. The revival of stoic views or even epicurean (with Gassendi) was something of a pose or a challenge; and although we read to-day Epictetus and Aurelius as we read Thomas à Kempis, we do so for the sake of the eternal religious truths, or rather hopes, underlying and at every turn contradicting a pessimistic positivism which forms the dogmatic basis.

Section II. Babylon and Star-worship

East and West: Early Religion in Chaldea.—It is idle to seek to relate the thought of east and west or to form a table of comparative influences—as well might one refuse to believe japanese history because 'it could not have been written except by men who knew and studied constitutions and limited monarchy in the west'. The human mind is everywhere akin and in the same circumstances will produce the same thoughts and ideals.[1] It is enough to say that very similar views on the origin and destiny of soul prevailed in the east, and that at whatever precise date teachers of both regions met, their views were found to agree in the main points.

There is no subject so obscure as the *theology* of Babylon; apart from the obvious worship of *local* gods, who assumed imperial proportions with their city's growth like Marduk, we have the strange contrast of deep personal piety, sense of sin, divine wrath or forgiveness, with a sheer astrologic fatalism. It is with this latter that I am now mainly concerned; because it is clear that this coalesced with Aristotle's views on the starry spheres and in blending formed that peculiar product—the so-called arabian philosophy. Here once again we are forced to return to origins.[2]

[1] My friend Mr. J. E. C. Bodley reminds me (very justly I think) that the mechanical age has now profoundly altered this; that we can never again depend on the validity of lessons from the past, that history can never recur with the same order and uniformity again, and that the mind of man is really changing and losing every trace of idealism.

[2] The labour is however not lost or superfluous since nearly all later thought is but a comment upon ancient doctrines or a rearrangement of old material.

Star-Worship : not a Primitive Cult.—The two chief religions of the nearer east are, *first*, the amalgam of sumerian and semitic creeds which we may call *chaldean*; *next*, the doctrine of Zoroaster, which may be termed *parsism*.[1] In the ultimate form of the *chaldean* faith the important element is the 'astral strain'; yet it is clear that this is but late and secondary, though it is more than likely that it represents the emergence of a primitive sumerian belief. That the star-connexion of the various gods was *secondary* is the view of Winckler and Zimmern of Leipzig; no doubt Sin (Moon) and Shamash (Sun) were in origin heavenly powers, but the greater number of deities preside over vegetation and are certainly at first earth-spirits of fertility.[2] This primitive people also handed down a conception, not common in old time, of the cosmic unity; all phenomena being interdependent, laced and interwoven the one part with the other, mutually corresponding; it is from this conviction that the babylonian pseudo-science of astrology arose, the art of the *mathematici* or casters of horoscopes.

Priestly Ingenuity at Work in Relating the Gods to Each Other and Heaven to Earth.—Out of the medley of tribal gods or city-tutelars attempts were made at an early age to co-ordinate and to relate the mythical figures, even to establish family connexions between them. An early trinity is formed by *Anu*, *Enlil*, *Ea*, gods of *heaven*, *earth* and *water*; whilst, like Osiris, Marduk of the new metropolis at Babel comes by degrees into prominence with its political supremacy, supplanting, like Zeus, an older dynasty or divine cycle. In the end he succeeds in

[1] I use these two terms chiefly for convenience and brevity; attaching to the first—the dogmas and practices called as a rule *babylonian* (a title somewhat too exclusive), and to the latter—the aryan religion of militant effort which began with Zarathustra (a historic character with date varying from 1000 to 600 B.C.) and is known by the name Mazdeism, or the worship of Ahura Mazda or Ormuzd: if the two qualifying adjectives suggest that in the main the former is *sumero-semitic*, the latter chiefly *aryan*, they will have served their purpose.

[2] *Sin* is a specially beneficent and kindly god, and *Shamash* is his son; as in Tacitus, *nox ducere diem videtur*. (*Germ* 11); in Norse myth sun is *feminine*, as in south Arabia in early times, but in Chaldea is *male*. Already under Hammurabi (*c.* 2200 to 2000 B.C.) there is a kind of *solar monotheism* making for morality; Sun is supreme judge, legislator, and patron of oracles.

absorbing the others just as *Ishtar* becomes a general designation for a goddess and she herself remains, as Great Mother of Nature, the one distinct female figure in the pantheon. *Marduk* is allied with, or represents, the temperate sun in spring time who brings with him a new life-impulse; but he is before that, a god of vegetation. *Nabu* (the Nebo of scripture) is also a god of fertility; so too was *Nergal*, god of fields and the chase but also of deadly plague and fever; so too was *Ninib*. Now while the last-named was raised to heaven to be the mild sun in spring or early morning, Nergal became the dread and over-potent force of noon and midsummer, also taking over the infernal kingdom of the dead in his fierce and relentless character. Both these again were connected with the planets Saturn or Mars, and Ninib is also the constellation Orion (an artificial grouping of stars which dates from very early times). In all this we can plainly trace (as in Egypt) the somewhat misleading syncretism of a reflective priesthood. The sacerdotal gilds at Babel composed at their leisure a highly sophisticated *astral mythology*, which as the result of a purely imaginative ingenuity would have little interest for the philosopher were it not for the serious results that ensued. It was priestly speculation that united these primary gods of earth with some heavenly body and made out that our earthly happenings were but the pale copy of celestial patterns, controlled in every detail by the influence of the stars and planets.

Development of Myth of Ishtar and her Descent: the Hereafter.—An important place in development must be assigned to Ishtar, first a goddess of fertility on earth, closely tied with visible nature and human needs, next the Queen of Heaven, who dared also to invade Hell. This *descensus ad inferos* forms the starting-point for a long mythical evolution. At the gates of the Inferno she asks the janitor for admission and at each of the Seven Portals has to take off one of her garments, arriving naked in the courts of the Mistress of Hell who puts her in a dungeon. As in the story of Demeter's sorrow for lost Persephone, our Earth, losing the goddess of fertility, decays and perishes, until Ea sends an envoy commanding her release. Sprinkled with life-water she is let go and at each portal recovers one of her forfeited garments. With her is associated Tammuz: like Dionysus he is never numbered among the great or heavenly gods but is a youthful favourite of Ishtar, and god of the shortlived spring-

vegetation, doomed to shrivel under the parching drought of summer ;—at whose death men weep and at whose resurrection, expressed in rite and symbol, they rejoice because the life-impulse again returns to our world. Chaldean notions of this nether-world and of soul-life hereafter were gloomy and distressing,—though perhaps the story of the release of Ishtar and of Tammuz may (as in the nature-mysteries of Eleusis) have encouraged some men to hope for a better fate. Dust and darkness were the chief features of this abode of the dead, as hopeless as the homeric *hades* or hebrew *sheol*. So far as we can trace, there was no sign of a general resurrection or recall of mankind, no doctrine of transmigration.[1] There was however in this purely secular religion a genuine strain of *piety* and deep feeling of penitence and submission,—found side by side with a frigid astral *fatalism* and a gloomy *demonology*. That the chaldean religion was a blend of several divergent elements is clear : that the most primitive or sumerian form was a *nature-cult* seems likely, while (we may rest assured) the semites brought in a more personal and *humanistic* concept of the divine.[2]

[1] As in Egypt kings were deified in this life and raised to heaven, but we do not find that the king's privileges hereafter were extended to the common man ; who, as democracy advanced in Mizraim, was made to personate Osiris and attained through this identification immortality.

[2] We cannot wholly dismiss the theory which connects China with the Land of Sumer and Accad as a colony : China has, it is true, never developed a complex astrology, but ' heaven ' (*tien*) is the highest figure in their conception of the world and the *active* agent upon the lower or *passive* region.

DIVISION C

Greek Thought and Chaldeism : the Nearer East and Christian Heresy

B. Zoroaster's Creed and its Development

PART III. PARSI RELIGION AND ITS KINDRED ; THE GNOSTICS AND MANI

Section I. Zoroaster's Dualism

Zoroaster's Militant and Theistic Creed : no 'Drowsy Croon' of Monism.—Whatever may be the truth about the religious schism of the aryan people in Asia, it is certain that Zoroaster's reform, the *ethical monotheism* which we call *parsism*, was aimed in part against the *astral fatalism* of Chaldea. We know that names of deities (good and bad) common to both persian and indian branches of the family, have been found in Asia Minor about the middle of cent. XV B.C. Certainly before the reformer arose the creeds of aryan and semite were in contact, if not in conflict. Now the later religion of Mid River Land which spread westwards was a blend of the two—a *moral* and *personal* deity being placed above an *evil* principle and the world he called into being. It is impossible to maintain that parsism is not dualistic : it is so in the strictest sense, for the origin and present condition of the world [1] ; though like judaism and our own faith it bids us look forward to a triumph of righteousness and the extinction of evil. This hypothesis in no way resembles such systems as the stoic which starts in a professed monism to become only more acutely conscious of an irreconcilable divorce between thought and things. The Avesta recognizes frankly the presence

[1] Amongst recent writers Casartelli justly points out to *parsis* (who wish to be thought 'philosophers' by renouncing the inherent dualism of their creed) that the Avesta is far more *dualistic* than the Christian faith or than any system where *soul* and *body*, spirit and matter, are contrasted as ultimate *antitheta*. Ahriman is not a rebel servant or a fallen angel ; he is an independent potentate, who creates (and does not merely mar) a world. He is the essence of unmitigated evil, and malignant will or rebel personality ; he is not an unconscious world-principle (like Plato's ἀνάγκη) which thwarts God's designs.

of active evil in the world but tells us that this influence will not last for ever. Man can and must help in its overthrow. This is the inspiriting and militant factor, in all religions which have a world-history or cosmic theory of an advance through conflict and failure to a promised goal. It is the mark of contrast between an *ethical* creed of action and a *naturalistic* surrender to world-powers which never alter their character or their policy, and have nothing in common with man's aspirations. They proclaim a Holy War against an evil principle which can be overcome in time : time is real and not an illusion : neither for ourselves nor for God Himself is there an everlasting *now* ; the world of particular happenings and personal experience is not a mirage (*maya*). Ahriman in this system arose from the abyss of darkness, being independent of Ormazd and perhaps even coeval : but he is not coeternal since in the restitution of all things he will one day be destroyed. When he comes to know that a good God exists he challenges Him and creates a countless host of demons (*devas*) and attempts to build a world on the borderland of the realm of light and darkness : in some not very clearly defined fashion man is in part his creature, in part God's. Though this is his world in great measure, he is the author of all pain, evil, and disease within it and of all bad and destructive life-forms. He does not take the wisest course to allure his subjects into allegiance. Man, whom he hopes in ignorance to make his slave and tool, is destined in the divine purpose to become the chief instrument of his defeat ; *God asks for, and in a sense needs, our help in the fight.* At the Resurrection, Ahriman will be found impotent and helpless and will be caught and at last annihilated in the earth he tried in vain to make his own.

A Dualistic Creed of Conflict and Hope : Optimism.—The ultimate triumph of the good is as well assured in parsism as in our own creed ; but meantime no attempt is made to gloze over the fact of the dangerous competition of evil in the present æon. There is no lulling repetition of ' God's in his heaven, All's well with the world ',—if such complacent monism is intended to release man from the need of strenuous battle against the wrong. Hence, like the norse religion,[1] it appeals to the generous and the combative instinct in men of spirit, to Plato's θυμοείδες. Unlike

[1] With which it has much in common, being no doubt akin.

it, it gives promise in the end of a complete victory and to each soldier a personal share in the triumph: whereas the odinic reign is only an interlude between two infinite periods of disorder,[1] and in the end the gods succumb to Surtur and Loki in the Ragnarok; the new heavens and new earth under the risen Saviour Balder being a pure Christian accretion and having no place in the original gloomy yet strenuous creed. Yet, whatever may be the result at the end of the world-order, for both cognate religions the immediate outlook is *optimistic*: 'it is better (says the norse *Havamsal*) 'to be alive than dead, to be blind than burnt on funeral pyre': a saying to be contrasted with the typical eastern axiom, 'Better to sit than to stand, to lie than to sit, to be dead than alive'.—A similar temper of bluff and unreflecting optimism was brought in by the norse Achæans of Homer's poems, into a culture already decadent and lethargic.[2]

APPENDIX C

Dr. Mills' Estimate of the Avesta

This eminent scholar has published, in his many works upon this subject, certain views which deserve attention and are not likely to be welcomed in all quarters (cf. *Our Own Religion in Persia*, Brockhaus Leipzig 1913). To the *Gathas*, most primitive element, he gives *900–700* B.C. for the date, although from their silence as to Mitra and Haoma, sun and moon, he believes they might be placed even earlier: indeed (*Study of Gathas*, Leipzig 1900, 1913) he gives *1200–700* B.C. as limit dates. He considers them unlike the rest of the Avesta and wholly dissimilar to 'apocryphal zoroastrianism'. The rest of the zend scripture he refers, in its origins at least, to the period of aryan supremacy *600–300* B.C., but admits many interpolations of much later date.—The original creed was purely *unitarian*, that is, in the realm of good; for the 'universe is divided into 2 immense 'departments'; Dualism is primitive and in later development this 'vital element' was extinguished; the belief that good in the end would overpower evil 'not being part of the original concept': (to decide this point every student must read Yasna 30 carefully for himself). He asks if we may not trace a certain dualism even amongst the Jews?—As to *immortality*, he says with great justice: 'The future existence of souls 'after death was as dim in the pre-exilic bible as in the older greek classics; 'in fact this latter view of immortality seems to show rather the more of

[1] Cf W.P. Ker's *Dark Ages*, Blackwood 1904, 'the human world is an 'enclosure defended against Chaos . . . through all his daily life the 'Northman hears the boom of the surges of chaos against the dykes of 'the world'.

[2] But this brief temper of a fighting noble caste has most strangely been accepted as the normal 'greek' mood.

' animation '. In the matter of *freewill*, the Avesta makes man the master of his fate by free moral choice: ' rewards and punishments are self-induced '. As to the ' Amshaspands ', he compares the notion with sabellian views of the Trinity—they are *attributes* or *aspects* of godhead which while unified are yet separate, and this separateness tends in turn to become more distinct. *Vohomana*, God's good mind, also alive within his saints, later becomes an archangel—something like Metatron among the jews. *Asha* is, like sanscrit *rta*, divine order, symmetry in the Law and the Ritual; but this too becomes an angel. *Khsathra* is the (personified) kingdom of righteousness upon earth. *Aramaiti* (from *aratrum* root) is active mind, God's ' inspiring energy ', which calls man to honest toil in contrast to the turkish raids. *Haurvatat* is God's perfection, in man ' wholesomeness ' or health. *Ameretatat* is God's eternity and man's ' deathlessness ' through His bounty. In sum, they are thoughts of God objectified in His people. These *seven spirits* (for Ormazd himself forms one of the number) were heard of in Greece at the time of Daniel as well as in jewry (cf. witness of Theopomp *c. 350* B.C. *apud* Plutarchum). Tobit xii 15 alludes to them at Rai the zoroastrian centre (Oesterley *Apocrypha* 366 dates this work *185–175* B.C.). So in Zechariah iv 10, the seven eyes of the Lord (on which the official court and ministers of the persian king were modelled). So down to Revel. v 6.—To these ' potencies ' of good hypostatized are opposed in the rival kingdom of Ahriman *Druj* or Lie, *Akem* or evil mind, *Dush-khshathra* or evil sovereigns, *Taromaiti* or insolence, the greek ὕβρις, *Avetat* or dejection, *Merethyu* or death.—In the religious attitude of the believer, he points to the ' astonishing subjectivity ' of the system. Here again we have the hypostasis created out of an abstract idea; a man's *conscience* meets him after death at the *Chinvat* or Judge's Bridge, as a female accompanied by dogs. ' The gathic Avesta has its peculiar claims ' as the first document of interior religion ' (117); yet it is not (121) therefore ' purely academic and of the cloister ' but its moral idea ' butts full ' upon real life at every turn '. It was never anchoritic, always national—God's order embodied in a *holy people*. A nation was not (*Yasna* 28) a horde of robbers but a vast religious brotherhood of industrious husbandmen. When the Ox-Soul complains (*Y.* 29) of the Spirit of Rapine, the prophet urges the people to energetic resistance. The community of believers are called ' adherents of Maga ' the good caus (whence, for some, the term *magian*). Like Plato, Zoroaster tried to see the virtues visibly embodied in certain castes of his half-warrior, half-agricultural, State. No mere ritual or magic was the end in view but ' good food-raising ' (134): membership was never otiose or relieved of positive duties.—Immortality was no physical continuance of the bodily frame as in Tao (China) or Egypt: it implied the identity of the interior life (137). There is therefore no belittling of the present: ' The converted soul breathes no contempt for ' this life, lost in long-distance dreams . . . it was sacred, every hour of it, ' even with all its evil contacts.' Here and now are the rewards of heaven constructed, by our least acts in our passing moments. This life is an integral part of the hereafter. ' We are builders not for time but for eternity—' nay, of eternity ' (138). So the earthly kingdom is prototype and rudi-

ment of the heavenly which shall be one day realized ; and princes and good rulers are copies of the heavenly sovereign : hence the later persian veneration for legitimate kingship. It was recognized that the (Turan) Raid had its political and religious organization complete : it had a propaganda (*Y.* 31) : did this instinctive hatred of a brigand-State rouse the later persians against Islam ? Compare the thoroughly Tory maxims of *Y.* 32, directed against Raid, communism, disrespect to nobles, and all the tendencies later concentrated in Mazdak and the Zendiks. The ideal king (*Y.* 33) is no pacifist or quaker ; but a bold protector of the husbandmen who are the nucleus of the State. Care of the poor is his chief duty (*Y.* 34, 53).—As to the indebtedness of the Jews, he firmly believes in an independent development, but maintains the strong influence of the Captivity in modifying or reinforcing jewish ideas : e.g. the Hebrews had found the temporal rewards of virtue quite illusory and in the overthrow of their visible kingdom turned to subjective consolation and hopes hereafter. The name *Pharisee* recalls this close connexion = *Farsees* or Persians (?). ' The ' long prior religion of the Mazda-worshippers was supremely useful in ' giving point and body to many loose conceptions among jewish teachers ' (p. 37).—As to the relations between Veda and Avesta he holds (79) the somewhat unusual theory that ' the influence of Avesta upon Veda is the ' more likely ' ; since the vedic people entered India from the N.W. where, no doubt, the vedic indians were once pre-avestic iranians.' He goes so far as to assert that iranian texts are three-parts Veda, so far at least as the ' tales they tell may tally '. Yet Ahura (Asura) is dethroned and made an evil being by the indians ! Indra is to smite and overthrow him. He believes the cause of this great estrangement and inversion of names to have been petty jealousy between shrine and shrine. The hated *Dasyus* of the Veda are (he thinks) iranians not dravidians.

Section II. Amalgam of Astrology and Mazdeism in the Greek World

Introduction of Astrology into Hellenic World.—Now in this created world, where two rival demiurges play a part, the planets are the creatures of the evil spirit, while God creates the more remote stars and constellations.[1] If Kant believed that the

[1] It cannot fairly be denied that the Jews attributed more influence to Satan after the lessons they had learnt from a mixed religion in Babel,—*Tiamat* had been connected with *Ahriman*, as spirit of evil who has to be overcome by a heavenly champion, in a world where all is not plain sailing. Later, the Rabbis, disliking this seeming challenge to pure monotheism and to the doctrine (also islamic) of God's sole agency, fulminated against the *Minim* who believed in *two* powers in the godhead,—perhaps a survival of Philo's subordinate dualism of the kingly or punitive, and the creative or kindly Powers in God. (Cf. Friedländer, *D. Relig. Beweg.* Berlin 1905, and Bergmann *Jud. Apol*, Berlin 1908.) Once again the Cabbala and mystics

most venerable things were the visible heaven and the human conscience, Aristotle held that from them came our chief intimations or imaginings about the divine (*fr.* 12). We have seen how both Plato and his pupils seek to unite the two,—the *apex mentis* is a spark of light from the stars, and man is a 'heavenly plant' and not of earthly origin. Still, the old question was debated whether his highest faculty was his own or an influx of divinity from above,—whether, that is, there is something after all higher and more infallible than *reason* in the ordinary sense. Meantime into the now wider and hellenistic world, in the days of Alexander himself, came chaldean Star-worship. Berosus started a school of astrology in Cos and brought into a world of thought which esteemed itself *free* [1] the doctrine of astral *fatalism*. Always held in honour and respected for their aloofness, their brilliance and regular motion,[2] the heavenly bodies now become stern taskmasters and gaolers. The chaldean pseudo-science taught that 'chief among the Seven Planets is Saturn, and all are interpreters '(ἑρμηνεῖς) of the divine mind and purpose'. Their changes, in colour or in movement, enable us to foretell great happenings in the natural world (storms, drought, earthquakes) and the destiny of regions, rulers and even private persons. Beneath are thirty stars called Gods of Counsel (*βουλαίους θεοὺς*), overseers, fifteen of regions below and fifteen of regions above our earth. Once in ten days a messenger-star (*καθάπερ ἄγγελον*) passes aloft from below and another descends from above. Amongst the gods the twelve Masters (*κύριοι*) are the zodiac signs and each planet passes through all the Houses of these twelve. Such is the report of Diodorus Siculus.[3]

Welcome given to Astralism in the Stoic School : *Monism* somewhat Modified.—While the ultra-enlightened scoffed, the

of the Middle Ages assimilated Satan to Ahriman—but always of course in a more dependent attitude.

[1] Or at least tried to become so by wholesale jettison.

[2] The epicurean god is really that type which secured the truest homage from the greek mind : a being, perfect by nature, not *made* perfect by suffering (like Hercules or our Saviour) and wholly careless of any existence outside his own—in no real sense a Providence.

[3] Writing under Julius and Augustus Cæsar two centuries later than Berosus (ii 30) he lays stress on their belief in the *world's eternity* : *τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἀΐδιον . . μήτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν ἐσχηκέναι μήθ' ὕστερον φθορᾶν ἐπιδέξεσθαι.*

stoics gave an eager welcome to a doctrine which united the world in such a manner that each part rang responsive to every other and the most trivial event affected the whole,—a doctrine which, though it denied freedom, enabled men to know their future destiny by divining and thus supported a vague theory of Providence.[1] Chrysippus (*fr. 1076* ed. Arnim) giving a list of deities puts first 'Sun, Moon, Stars and Law (clearly the divine λόγος of Heraclitus), last men who have been converted into 'gods'. It is curious to note the anger of Cleanthes when Aristarch the Samian (about *250* B.C.) tried to correct the geocentric hypothesis, a premature Copernicus. He accused him (as the orthodox athenian might accuse Anaxagoras) of sacrilege, of disturbing the central hearth of the 'world-order'. Cleanthes also held the universal order to be a sacred dance, in which the stars were the performers, the sun the ritual torch-bearer (δᾴδουχος). The first school did not perhaps hold the divinity of man's soul; but in the middle and later periods (especially in the platonizing syncretism of Seneca and Aurelius) the soul is part of the divine life (*divinæ particula auræ*) and comes no doubt from that purer element (πεμπτὸν σῶμα); which is the most rarefied and refined nature admitted in a system that never got beyond body. The more 'religious' ages of stoic materialism held besides (as Plato so often suggested, perhaps half playfully) that there was a faculty in man above reason, by virtue of which man transcends himself and becomes suffused (like the priestess at the oracle) with the divine spirit (ἔνθεος). The stoics already believed in Fate (εἱμαρμένη) and in certain recognized channels by which destiny might be disclosed, interpreted, and even adjusted to practical needs. It is worth notice that at this time, in spite of great professions of love towards the Universal or Absolute, of willing surrender to an undefined common good, no religion had any chance that was not avowedly *individualist.* 'Private persons who consult the chaldeans' says Diodorus, 'deem their wisdom 'truly wonderful and above normal human capacity'; so Theophrastus speaks of them foretelling not merely 'public events 'but even the life and death of individuals'. The doctrine of the stars was not then presented as an iron band of fate but, to the unit, rather as a token of a gracious interest in him as a person;

[1] Which, as Maimonides and Spinoza rightly remind us, cannot legitimately find a place in any *monistic* system.

by which, though he was predestinate, God gave him timely warning and perhaps 'made a way of escape'.

Fear of the Planets: Gnostics Promise Redemption in World Above.—In spite of this, the general feeling was one of distrust and terror of these serene and for the most part inscrutable tyrants. First, magical formulæ are invented, whereby their potencies can be eluded or diverted. The seven greek vowels [1] sometimes represent the planets, 'immortal Lords of the World', and are used as charms. The gnostic sects were much concerned, like the divines of ancient Egypt, in devising incantations for the soul to utter in each successive planet-sphere so that, like Ishtar herself, it may emerge whole and unscathed into the realm above.[2] Hippolytus writing under the syro-african emperors *c. 220* A.D. speaks of the Naassene (v 7) belief in stellar influences, 'Nature 'has seven garments (φύσις ἑπτάστολος) of ethereal texture', that is the planet-spheres, hence 'the just man shall fall seven 'times and rise again' (ἑπτάκις πεσεῖται κ. ἀναστήσεται): [3] these 'falls' are the changes of the stars, but clearly also the spheres down which souls descend from the blessed 'Primal Man Adam as above, into the muddy vesture of decay' (πλάσμα τὸ πήλινον) that they may be slaves to the creator of this world. Ialdabaoth the fiery god is in number fourth (θεῷ πυρίνῳ ἀριθμὸν τετάρτῳ), the planet Saturn.

Section III. Soul-Ascent and Doctrine of Deliverance (Gnostics)

Salvation to be found Above the Realm of Planets.—It seems likely *that every gnostic sect professed the creed which we saw created by syncretizing the tenets of Babylon and of Zoroaster.* The planetary realm must be transcended and we can only find freedom beyond it: this freedom can be procured by those who are the

[1] στοιχεῖα obtains the meaning Demons; it was also the term used for the seven vowels, each of which was connected with one of the seven planets,—over which they have control.

[2] The later egyptian *Book of the Dead* shows to what a length this theory of the after-world terrors may lead.

[3] We may notice the imitation of St. Peter's question, how many times shall a brother's fault be forgiven? Is the Apostle, perhaps, reproducing a current esoteric theory?

children of the true god who dwells in ' unapproachable light '. Plato in his old age had been afraid that human life was but a trivial thing in the eyes of God, and that we were playthings of higher powers : it needed but a slight turn towards pessimism to show that all our striving is futile and that we are automata in the hands of malignant beings. Saturn the planet becomes the leader of this tyrannical choir, Ialdabaoth ; even identified with Jehovah of the Old Testament by that section of anti-semitic gnostics who show an unconquerable loathing for the Jews. Zoroaster had fought against the numbing fatalism of astral theology, and the movement towards liberty revived strongly in the Christian period. The sublunar sphere was well known to be the lees and dregs of the universe, the abode of the lower intelligences, of demons and of crass matter. Above the Seven Planets was the Pleroma or Ogdoad where God dwelt : there alone could man recover his proper nature and his birthright of freedom. Here man's soul may be again united with the Supreme God who gave it ; its highest faculty or true self disengaged from the ' appendages ' or foreign natures with which it has been ' clothed upon ' in its descent through the hostile planetary realm.[1] Meantime the final good of man—the vision of God—can be anticipated and enjoyed even in this life ; this is the *new birth*. Man's work is after all mainly negative or cathartic ; he can cleanse himself so as to become fit to receive the divine influx, to see the divine vision ; always there is the notion of the entrance at a certain stage of a fresh power from without (Aristotle's *θύραθεν*). When we find the Therapeuts speaking of the ' end or supreme ' good ' being the ' vision of the true Being '[2] we are reminded of the ancient mysteries. ' It is certain ' says a learned and competent judge ' that among the Jews of Alexandria there ' existed a system of mysteries imitating perhaps those of Demeter ' at Eleusis . . . lesser and greater ', wherein are learnt the secret doctrines of the soul's mystical union with the heavenly bridegroom.

[1] Here (as in the later greek church) the frank aim was *deification* (*θέωσις*) in the fullest sense ; ' I am your fellow-wanderer-star ' (*σύμπλανος ἀστὴρ*) says the initiate of Mitra ; the orphist carried to the sepulchre an amulet bearing the words, ' I am offspring of earth and of the starry ' Heaven . . . I too have become god '.

[2] Conybeare's *Philo*, 303, Clarendon Press 1895.

Common Doctrine of All Gnostic Sects : Soul's Ascent through Seven Spheres.—It is not my purpose to review in detail the doctrine of those gnostic sects which, already existing before Christ, borrowed something from His teaching and became the ancestors of the medieval heresies. But certain general statements may be made as to their main tendencies. The *gnosis* which was their aim was not an intellectual form of Christian theology,—a transmutation of faith into reason. It was (in Theodotus' words) 'the knowledge, who we were, what we have 'become, where we were and into what place we have been 'thrown, whither we are hastening and whence we are redeemed ; 'what is birth, what is rebirth'. The chief tenet had changed it would seem very little from the days of Empedocles ; man in his true form is a demon or angel exiled for some pre-natal offence into the lower world. This *gnosis* (Irenaeus i 23, 5) gives us power to overcome the very angels or Archontes who made the world.[1] When we have thus escaped from the realm of Fate, we enter into union with the highest God and understand His innermost nature : as Valentine said,[2] 'He who has a heart sanctified 'and shining with light is blest with the Vision of God'. A Naassene hymn (Hippolytus v 5) represents the Saviour asking to be sent down to earth to help man who 'seeks to escape the 'bitter chaos but knows not how to flee. With the seal of power 'I will descend, travel through all the Æons and impart the 'sacred mysteries of the Holy Path'. In all its essential features gnostic doctrine was already fixed some time before our era, in the same syncretizing movement which followed Alexander's establishment of a world-empire, and threw open the east to western thinkers in search of redemption. The central idea, common to the most widely divergent sections, was the Soul's Ascent through stages of being until it found rest in the true God.[3] This came to them direct from Chaldea, with its astral cult of spheres ruled by distinct gods,—'magical pass-words' take the place of the symbolic vestures given up or resumed by Ishtar in the myth of her Descent. The most important knowledge was

[1] As in Hindustan, it is *knowledge*, not *work*, that liberates.

[2] Clem. Alex. *Str.* ii § 114 when the Only Good Father looks at him ἡγίασται κ. φωτὶ διαλάμπει κ. οὕτω μακαρίζεται ὁ ἔχων τοιαύτην καρδίαν ὅτι [ὥστε] ὄψεται τὸν θεόν.

[3] Cf. Anz *Ursprung d. Gn.* Leipzig 1897.

the name of the demons and the formula which would rout them (cf. Origen *c. Cels.* vi 25). Sometimes the whole complex science of names was reduced to a single term, e.g., the *Caulacau* of Basilides ; by knowing this the fortunate soul could rise through all the hostile spheres (so Irenaeus i 29, 5). We may compare the *Sabda-Marga* of the hindus and the hybrid term *an-had*. But the planets are regarded (as we saw) under their mazdean aspect,—as evil tyrants, and malign influences : *parsism* is therefore the channel by which the astral theory was made popular and above the planet-spheres was the home of the god of light. Mitra-worship has also this Soul-ascent, won through complex rite, sacrament and formulæ.[1] While ' redemption ' was the sole aim (as *moksha* in Hindustan) deliverance comes by purging of *intellect* not by discipline of *will*,—as in Aristotle and later medieval intellectualism. It is spiritual enlightenment (by magical means) which relieves from bondage to the World-rulers ; the ethical aspect falls completely into the background. In certain antinomian branches *gnosis* was brought into conflict with the Catholic Church, both in the east and during our later period in the west. The present universe owes its origin to a mixture of two kingdoms which ought never to have taken place.[2] This forbidden mixture must be retrieved by the careful separation of the incompatible elements. A spiritual essence was held (like Simon's Helen) in bondage, in a sphere radically alien to it, by the Archons (whose collective power is εἱμαρμένη or Destiny : Iamblich's *Myst. Eg.* v 18).[3] The captive imprisoned in this world must

[1] Cf. Anz *Ursprung d. Gn.* Leipzig 1897. I do not exclude an influence from Egypt which may perhaps be detected (1) in the theory of the Pleroma ; (2) the emanation of Æons from a single source ; (3) their syzygies or couples (male and female) at Hermopolis, where cosmogonic pairs of elemental gods were recognized, *male* with froghead, *female* with snake-head ; the names are highly suggestive of gnostic *Abyss*, *Depth*, and *Silence* ; *Heh* is eternity, *Kaku* darkness, *Nu* ocean above the firmament, *Nenu* the flood :—it is clear that these ideas enter the Hermetic books e.g. *World's Eyeball* which, though not redacted in present form till our iii cent. represents an early phase of alexandrine syncretism.

[2] Though in some schools the lower world is only an empty space, a defect and not an evil and rival power—this ambiguity is truly platonic : e.g. Satornil, Menander's pupil, taught that the Supreme Deity created the world of angels—*seven* of whom (= the planet-spheres), no doubt in self-will or open rebellion, framed our world, their chief being identified with the Jehovah of the Hebrews.

[3] This very significant passage shows clearly the gnostic blend with

ascend and win his freedom through each successive sphere—the initiate was provided with mystic names and words of power (in Josephus ' titles of the angels ') as passports or talismans by which the evil powers could be reduced to impotence. The ritual of Mitra was highly complex and symbolized this ascent of the soul, as Dieterich has shown in *Mithrasliturgie*, Leipzig 1903.

Emanation : Imprisonment of the Great Mother.—Whilst the general theory was a *dualism* of two hostile principles and the entanglement of spirit in earthly coils,—*gnosis* often presented the theory, so familiar in later times, of orderly emanation (*πρόοδος*) from an unqualified ground : this passes out of itself, by an immanent law, in a series of beings which as in Plotinus bridge over the gulf between God and the visible world. Once again, a very common feature (suggested no doubt also in Genesis ii) attaches the Fall to a *feminine* principle—Helen is *Σελήνη* the moon-goddess in whose realm begin the troubles of our ' sublunar sphere '. Other mythical female figures are Barbelo, or (with Valentine and others) Sophia or Achamoth. This is no doubt a memory of the ancient female Earth-and-Mother-goddess of the primitive east and the ægean area, which was ousted by the male deity of the aryan family : she is Ishtar, Atergatis, Isis, Cybele, Demeter. She becomes through her imprudent curiosity a fallen deity, immersing her light in a world of gloom ; she also acts as a medium by which her children (likewise held captive) can regain freedom ; often the Creator is represented as her son, e.g. Ialdabaoth.[2] Her correlate is the Saviour who (as we saw) descends to rescue the spiritual element and gather the scattered

Plotinus' system : ' Most men are subordinate to Nature and look down-
' wards to her works and fulfil the ordering of Fate (*εἱμαρμένης διοίκησιν*)
' and represent *Practical Reason* (*πρακτικὸν λογισμὸν*) being concerned
' solely about natural things. But some few alone using a supernatural
' power (*ὑπερφυεῖ* in its strict sense) stand aloof from Nature and are led
' round (*περιάγονται* because circular movement is the holiest ?) to the
' Absolute Mind (*χωριστὸν κ. ἀμιγῆ νοῦν*), who at the same time become
' superior to the powers of Nature ' (*φυσικῶν δυνάμεων κρείττονες*). This last idea may either represent a mahatma's authority over natural laws, or a magician's command and control of spirits (or *djinns*), or (as with gnostics) the power to defeat and rise superior to the World-powers or Archons, or lastly (in the too obvious and ethical sense which was so little in favour then) the mastery over our own lower nature.

[1] A name which Hilgenfeld *Ketzergesch.* believes =' offspring of Chaos '.

seeds of divine light.[1] He is always regarded as distinct from the man Jesus, upon whom he descended only for a 'transient theophany', not for any permanent union of person or ethical penetration of will. Like *νοῦς*, which at death flits away to rejoin the reservoir of Active Intellect, the Æon leaves before the Passion the man whom he has used only as a prophetic medium or vehicle for his message of deliverance. Transmigration often plays a part in the purifying process by which the light-seeds are separated and winnowed from evil matter; and, though contact with the Further East is quite possible at a very early stage, there is no reason to infer a direct affiliation of a doctrine so natural in any scheme of theodicy.

Fall of Deity—Doctrine Common to All Schools : As Primal Man.—Thus we may say with assurance that one chief tenet of the *gnosis* is the Fall of Deity,—a doctrine which Schelling following the lead of Böhme revived in our own time. But this godhead is very closely akin to man—Primal Man in *Pistis Sophia*, or in the perhaps earlier *Poimandres*[2] or in Hippolytus v 7. This is the archetypal man who in the *Clementines*[3] passes through the ages in various human forms until he is finally revealed in Christ. The *Pistis* calls Primal Man *Ieu*, and gives him the significant title King of the *Luminaries*. In the kindred mandean system the figure *γνῶσις τῆς ζώης* or *manda d'hayye* seems to correspond. In the manichean system, says Bousset, 'the Primal Man again assumes the predominant place' (Baur, *Man. Rel.* 49 sq.). This masculine figure, like Sophia or Achamoth, may be differently presented, as a fallen captive or a saviour hero, who descending to do battle with Darkness (or serpent *Tiamat*), is in part vanquished and held to ransom. Now he has succeeded in freeing himself, and his members, becoming like him, can rise into the light-world again (*Poim.*) : now he is saved by the compassion of the higher powers from his dungeon and thus too all his race will in the end be saved (*manichee*); sometimes the lower Wisdom or *Sophia* is purged by suffering and finds her consort Soter, the Saviour, and is married to him—all gnostic souls in like manner becoming brides for His

[1] Conceived as we shall see in Mani's system in a very material way.

[2] Cf. Reitzenstein *Poim.* Leipzig 1904 who suggests a link with the mysteries of Attis and Cybele.

[3] *Homilies* iii 17, xviii 14; *Recognitions* i 16, 32, 45 sq., 52 : ii 47, also cf. Epiphanius' account of the Ebionites (*Hær.* xxx 3–16 liii 1).

angels. At any rate amid all variations we find the same doctrine ; *degradation of a divine particle in an alien world from whence it must seek deliverance ; for here it can never feel itself at home nor find fitting employment or interests.* Once again, this supernal spirit is at present under the tyranny of the Seven Spheres ;—whose angels are sometimes apostate ministers of God, sometimes purely devilish powers. In Mani's system these evil archons are fastened like nails to the firmament by Primal Man ; *Pistis Sophia* contains the stirring myth of their capture and punishment. There is no doubt of these figures ; they are the five planets who together with sun and moon form the true rulers of the lower region of Fate and Coercion. The Mandeans refer the seven to the union of the female-devil *Ruha* (or Namrus) and *Ur*, homonym of the ancient chaldean town ; when the light-god captures them, he forgives their sins, sets them in chariots of fire, and makes them world-rulers.

When greek met persian dualism (which had already incorporated the star-gods of Babylon as evil spirits) it was easy for gnosis to maintain that these seven demonic powers are the creators or rulers of the nether world ; either on sufferance or in direct rebellion against a sublime god of light from whose realm they are separated by an ineffable distance. In the *Bundahish* (iii 25, v i) when Satan strove against the world of light, seven hostile powers were captured and set as lights in the firmament of heaven,—where good star-potencies keep them from doing mischief ; the *parsi* of course exempting the beneficent Sun and moon and making a list of five malign influences only. Man, in sum, is a part of *God which has fallen into matter* ; by the use of his highest faculty, a capacity to receive enlightenment, he must reconquer his freedom and win his return to the heaven he has lost.

Section IV. Gnostic Sects leading to Manicheism

Marcion's Peculiar Form of Dualism—a Reaction.—As opposed to this *intellectualist* system of salvation by knowledge, Marcion and Mani appeared to revive emphasis on *faith* and the *moral* will. The former was far nearer to the Christian faith than any gnostic, and though he may have borrowed from the pagan esoteric sects he appealed to the world of Christian believers and did not despair of converting the whole church to his

view. Man is wholly a creature of the inferior god,—here he differs profoundly from the current view which referred his *spirit* at least to the Supreme God. The Superior (hitherto unknown) in compassion sent His son to earth, perhaps conceived as a sabellian phase of Himself; clothed in a docetic body He suddenly appeared in Tiberius' fifteenth year. The demiurge, to make amends for the crime of securing His death, has to deliver up the souls of those who were to be redeemed: they are 'purchased by the blood of Christ'. When He preached in Hell the patriarchs and prophets would not believe: only Paul understood the real meaning of the gospel. As in buddhism the true believer must lead a life of quietism and aloofness, not of strenuous ascetic practice: he must abstain from marriage: celibacy is the most precious offering to the God who comes to end this wicked world. The ambiguous position of the devil led to a correction of doctrine by Apelles Marcion's pupil: he was a fallen and rebellious angel—who in the end was made to subserve the purposes of the Most High by punishing unbelievers in hell. Marcion ranged his community under the authority of bishops and presbyters, though he avoided any highly organized system as *legality* and externalism. The sect lasted long, their palmy period was from *150–200*; 'wasps build combs and Marcionites 'build churches'. It is clear that a real danger to a catholic society lay in this heresy which split asunder the two revelations of God, as in the case of the Cathars afterwards in the west. It was significant that large numbers went over to the side of Mani—a system almost entirely independent of Christian belief. Yet the sect can be traced into cent. vii, when it must have met and fraternized with the Paulians; and thus through them Marcion is lineally connected with the great movement directed against the western church.[1]

Astrology in the Sect of Elkesai and Mughtasila, forerunners of Mani.—The Elkesaites (already mentioned in an earlier section) was in origin *jewish* and intended to be a reform in Judaism by the revival of the rite of baptism. The founder Elkesai in Trajan's third year (*100* A.D.) appeared with a message beyond Jordan and was accepted by *essene* and *ebionite* sectaries. He sanctioned marriage, bade his converts turn to Jerusalem (*not* the east) in prayer and to observe the law of Moses. He shared the current

[1] Cf. Foakes-Jackson's *Christ. Diffic. of cent. ii and xx.*

belief in various classes of angels or spiritual beings and identified the bad angels with the stars of the northern region—' in the ' days of their dominion no task should be begun '. He believed himself a complete astrologer and foretold a war among these ungodly angels of the north which would shake to their overthrow the kingdoms of the world. Certainly akin to this sect were the *Mughtasila* or ' baptists ', identified with the Sabians, residing in the swampy region of lower Euphrates ; to whom the Coran allowed free exercise of faith together with Jews and Christians. Their cosmology was now more certainly dualistic, the principle of *male* and *female* syzygies (so familiar in the Pseudo-Clementines) having been adopted. Al-nadim, who gives us this report, says that the father of Mani joined the sect and brought up his son in its tenets and practice : he in turn began to preach his own special form of *parsi* syncretism at the age of twenty-four. The manichee sect is therefore affiliated at least on one side to the Elkesaites of a century and a half earlier. If they pretend to worship one God in order to avoid muslim indignation, it is certain that in secret they had amongst them worshippers of the stars and must have derived their dualism from Parsis. It seems likely (to follow Brandt, that most patient inquirer into the chaldean sects) that their rite of immersion was not in any sense *jewish* but in fact originated in this region of the most archaic human culture : it certainly spread eastwards into Hindustan and formed a strong link with the cognate sect of Mandeans.[1]

APPENDIX D

The Fravashi (as guardian-angels, archetypes, and sphere-spirits)

The Fravashi and the Ego.—There cannot be any doubt that this doctrine or soul-theory as finally fixed was assisted by the avestan *fravashi*—a spiritual being conceived like the hellenic demon as part of a man's personality, yet preëxisting and independent of him,—something analogous to the *ka* of Egypt. Their prominence in certain later *Gathas* points clearly to a revival of the old nature-cult and belief in many gods, which Zoroaster had sought to replace by a pure monotheism. They had at first no definitely ethical character, which they seem to acquire only under the sassa-

[1] Besides the monumental and still authoritative work of Chwolsohn *Die Ssabier* Petrograd 1856, cf. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* Göttingen 1907 and Brandt *Elchasai* Leipzig 1912.

nids (after *226* A.D.) in the epoch of Mani's heretical restatement of mazdean orthodoxy. Zoroaster had made spirits *attributes* of the one God, not independent beings but parts of His single hypostasis; and in his stress on moral responsibility and endeavour he makes much of the *daena*, the *ego*, which really determines a man's lot by choice which is genuinely free. It was quite distinct from the *fravashi*, which was divine and, in the far greater mass of opinion, confined to believers only [1].

As Tribal Patrons and Ancestral Spirits.—In the plural they are the same as the good ancestral spirits, to whom homage is due and regularly paid at annual festivals, e.g. the *farvardigan* correspond to *sraddha* of the hindus. Though they have certain 'guardian' functions, no single spirit of the group is seen quite in the same close and personal relation as the guardian-angel in Christian belief. They had rather *tribal* and cosmic functions, brought rain and gave fruitful crops, promoted conception and birth—and, as nature-deities of growth and increase, replaced Anaitis (a form of Great Mother) who belongs to a pre-aryan age. They are also, like Castor and Pollux, powerful tribal allies in war; here again, like the hindu *pitri*, they act in concert for public ends. Such a belief may certainly be connected with the common primitive theory that a new birth is but the return of an ancestor, reincarnating for the welfare of the tribe. It is however to be noted that in the case of certain departed saints (*Yast* 13) their *fravashi* in each instance, is separately adored and for specific reasons. This leads on to a belief analogous to that of the roman *genius*—a spirit promoting birth and growth not merely in *collective* groups but in *individuals*.[2]

As part of a Man's Personality: as Guardian.—*Fravashi* is the highest of the 5 parts of the human soul (vitality, personality (*daenan*), sense, soul, (*urwan*), and *fravashi*). It was conceived as divine and immortal, pre-existing the human concrete being, dwelling with God during his life and at death uniting with his *soul*, saving it from extinction. 'The *fravashi*' says *Yast* 13, 17 'of the living faithful are mightier than those of the dead:' does this only imply that their interest in the nether world is keener and more direct? In the case of (as yet) sinless and innocent children 'their 'angels do always behold the face of the Father', Matth. xviii 10. When Rhoda says of St. Peter, 'it is his angel', she clearly believes that his double or *doppelganger* has for a time taken his place.

As Animae Motrices in Stars.—*Fravashis* controlled the orbits of sun, moon, and stars; just as the sphere-spirits in hellenic and arabian thought. God gave them choice of remaining serenely aloof in the spiritual world or becoming incarnate in order to combat the evil power: is their first embodiment (as with the Arabs) in certain of the good stars? This association with stars in *parsism* is always a compromise and an accom-

[1] Only at a late period do we find 'the *fravashi* of an unbeliever goes 'to hell with his soul and senses', *Sad-dar Bundahis*, ed. Spiegel, Vienna 1860.

[2] Here as Professor Moulton reminds us, there is connexion with the ancient belief in the External Soul of folklore, *Enc. Rel. Eth.* vi 117.

modation. It is probably due to early magian and ' chaldean ' theology. The *fravashi* are said (*Yast* 13) to *guard* the heavenly bodies, as the *yazatas* do ; but they are not *identified* with stars, till a much later date. This magian star-lore is conspicuously absent from the Avesta ; but clearly must supply the motive of the Magi's visit to our Lord :—a great soul just then born into our world would find a counterpart in a new stellar arrival. By the time that persian theories had blended with hellenic ideas so as to form ' arab philosophy ', it seems likely that these spirits were regarded (1) as a heavenly counterpart, type or exemplar, of the soul here, uniting at death and saving the personality ; (2) as in some way connected with the sphere-moving spirits or angels about whom all refined thought was then agreed. On earth all the concentric groups of Iran (house, family, clan, district) had their counterpart in heaven,—as in *Daniel*, nations, regarded as ' realistic ' corporations not atomic groups, have their *princes*, and churches in the Revelation have their angels.

Their Source in Primitive Ancestor Worship.—In sum ; it is clear that these spirits belong to one very primitive cult, *ancestor-worship*, with which Avesta monotheism was obliged to come to terms. It admits them in some of the later *Yasts* to share honours and even prayers with the one God. But they vary in character, and the group includes very different beings ; good kings and heroes, patrons and protectors of tribes and districts, guardians (sometimes) of individuals, lastly celestial powers or angels. Through them, as elemental forces of nature, Ormazd makes plants and herbs to spring and brings children to the birth : functions which *in pre-theistic days, the ancestors would have performed in their own right*; which, when reduced under a ' monarchy ', they only accomplish as lieutenants. To this earlier stage belongs the curious picture of these tribal tutelars quarrelling over the supply of water in the heavenly lake, which each is eager to monopolize for his ' family or village or tribe or country ' (*Yast* 13). They were certainly invoked (*Y.* 26) as souls of the dead kinsmen ; to these pious oblations ' they come flying like well-winged ' bird ' (*Y.* 13, 70). Those who fulfil this duty of gratitude to the returning ' Manes ' will have a house well stocked with blessings for the coming year. They are represented as returning to their old haunts in the middle decade of March, to ask for human friendliness and gifts ; ' who will bless ' us and accept us amongst his own ? will any one praise us or pay homage ? ' or receive us with a handful of meal and a garment and with sacred ' reverence ? ' (*Y.* 13, 49 sq). Elevation to the exalted post of stellar *genii* is certainly later, though we meet with it in *Yast* 13, the *locus classicus* of this perplexing cult (cf. *Mainog-i-khrat* xlix, 22).

Modern Analogies : Armenia, Chile.—Still in Armenia to-day is there a pious belief that at certain seasons the departed return and sojourn 3 days near their old home, flying back to heaven and leaving a blessing behind them if dutifully made welcome ; and the Armenian, no less than the Persian, believes that the soul of man is connected with the stars, It is not a little curious to find the same doctrines among the Araucans of Chile—a lesson to those who find in the normal development of theories all over the world irrefutable proof of direct contact or loan : they are *dualists*, the

benign *Menlen*, protector of our race, works with the help of the *gen* who have charge of things created, against the evil and malicious Guecebu, áuthor of all evils ; creation is the work of a lower divine hypostasy : female spirits of great holiness are men's familiars or guardians ; a successful Araucan will express it (as an egyptian king kept or worshipped his *ka*), ' I still keep my guardian spirit ' (*amchi-malghen*). Meantime it is certain that at one period they believed the Milky Way to be composed of the souls of departed heroes, before whose calm and beneficent radiance they were ashamed to do evil : but most souls follow the sun's flight to the twilight land of the west (âs in the archaic eschatology of many diverse regions).

I add here a few words on Moulton's *Early Zoroastrianism* (London 1913) to sum up the points in his brilliantly argued (and still disputed) hypothesis : (1) Z. lived in E. Bactria and had little influence in the W., Darius I (500 B.C.) being his first kingly disciple ; he elevated a clan-god (who *may* be connected with *Assur* and appears somewhere between 1700–1200) into a monotheistic Jehovah—a creed far beyond his time and soon forgotten. (2) The aboriginal *shamans* (magi) attempted a revolt against the small aryan dominant caste in 522 and, failing in this, managed to usurp the whole priestly functions—thus creating a peculiar nature- and devil-worship (based on primitive animism) which became wrongly known to the west as the religion of ' Zoroaster the Magian '. (3) The *Gathas* are authentic and represent Z.'s real opinions ; the *Yashts* were composed in the period of indigenous (*non*-aryan, *non*-semitic) reaction, before the fall of the monarchy (c. 350 B.C.) ; of this anti-aryan movement Artaxerxes II was, perhaps against his will, the patron, and it is under him that *Anaitis* the Mother Goddess and *Mitra* come prominently forward. (4) The *Yashts* represent not only the *magian*, but also the *proto-iranian*, nature-worship (against which Z. had protested, in favour of an ethical cult of a deity who encouraged and rewarded effort). (5) An immense interval separates the *Gathas* from the *Yashts*, and the Magi are real *dualists*, while Zoroaster's system is optimistic and challenges the powers of evil to a last contest before the Recompensing and the Judgment (in true chiliastic spirit). (6) the Magi show affinities to the peculiar cultural stages of the Bantu, Uganda, Baganda, Unyoro peoples in E. Central Africa and make the same use of *gomez* or cow's urine (=avertan *gaomaesa*) which may *possibly* prove connexion.

The worship of *Assara Mazas* (cf. 566) with 7 good and 7 evil spirits, may then date from c. 1500 B.C. : adopted and purified into monotheism by Z. it was debased and overlaid by magianism and only emerges into a late prominence under the archaizing Sassanids (225–650 A.D.) when the monistic zervanites and Mani represent opposite views. (A further note is added on p. 508 on early monotheism in Asia, connected with the names Assara, Asura, Assur and the primitive cult of China.)

PART IV. MITRAISM AS A POSSIBLE WORLD-RELIGION

Early Ethical Character of Mitra.—It seems that Mitra acquired very early, both in indian Veda and iranian Avesta, an *ethical* as well as a *natural*, function. In the one he is invoked together with Varuna, the Sky-god, as a light-deity, but also as guardian of truth and enemy of falsehood. In the iranian development which raised Ormazd to a unique eminence, Mitra is a lesser and intermediate god between the realms of Light and Darkness; indeed he is the *protoctist* or first created being, greatest of *yazatas*, and his chief duty is still the overthrow of evil (conceived physically as gloom) and his task is world-governance. Thus in both is he *god of truth and good faith*. Again, as light-bringer, he is a god of vegetation and of armies; he helped the hero and drove away evil spirits: above all (one chief source of his later influence) he is the protector of souls (like Hermes ψυχόπομπος) in their perilous journey to paradise: thus quite early he appears as a Redeemer. His votaries purified themselves by washing and whipping, like the later Flagellants.

Cult made Welcome in Babylon: by the Roman Empire.—Babylon gave to his worship a warm welcome, and the overthrow of the persian hegemony did not lessen the popular favour. When hellenism arrived, Mitra's chief features were clearly defined and his faith started on an adventurous career into the further west. By the Chaldeans he was identified with sungod *Shamash*, by the Greeks with *Helios*: but his worship never became popular in greek centres and was despised as barbarous by fastidious Hellenes. Its functions seemed already filled by the now spreading cults of Egypt for which (as the supposed cradle and hearth of human culture) Greece expressed a boundless respect. Even on roman soil the mitraic creed was little known before Augustus and our own era, and, however independent it showed itself later, seems to have arrived first in the retinue (or rather under the patronage) of the Great Mother. It became popular towards the end of cent. i (under Domitian) and in the

next spread rapidly amongst the mercantile class, the slaves, and the (increasingly) foreign soldiers of the legions. The german military frontier shows continuous traces of its thought and ritual; it flourished chiefly along military roads and trade-routes. Under the eclectic afro-syrian dynasty of Severus (*193–235* A.D.) it received distinct marks of imperial favour; but it had before been brought into notice by the patronage of Commodus (*180–192*) who was himself an initiate. Rome is full of its monuments.

Solar-Cult—a Soldier's Creed.—As in every *natural* worship the tendency was to absorb all the duties and prerogatives of natural deities in the sun, the *sol invictus:* with this Mitra was identified. As god of the divine right of kings (for which belief Persia was famous), as the god of loyalty and truth, he was popular in camps and among soldiers,—men who then formed whatever was left of the 'roman' type of character. From the chief home of Mitraism came the long line of Pannonian (or Danubian) Emperors, to whom for over three centuries is owed the preservation of the roman tradition *249–568* A.D. When Dacia under Aurelianus (*270–5*), himself a zealous devotee of the sun, ceased to be a roman province, the northern frontier lost this distinctive worship and its temples were overthrown. Constantine decided in favour of a rival creed and Julian's brief revival did not help to reinstate Mitraism. Though it lingered on in cent. v in certain Alpine cantons, its day of success in the west was over. In the east its scattered followers may be said to have taken service under the manichean banner.

Cultus of Mitraism in Caves: Symbolic Sculptures.—The temples of Mitra were artificial grottoes like the Mithræum hewn out of the capitoline tufa at Rome. It was a square or oblong building with apse and star-spangled roof in the fashion of a modern Masonic Temple. Along the sides were continuous benches of stone: altars to sun and moon stood before the choir-apse. None of the discovered temples are large; as if built for poor men and scanty congregations, they hold only from fifty to a hundred worshippers. The carving, or relief, of Mitra originated with artists from Pergamum in cent. ii B.C. and kept its features throughout: the God is seen as a youth in a conical cap slaying the Bull (of early ægean worship), while a scorpion attacks the side of the animal, a snake drinks its gore, and a dog springs towards the wound in the side.

Their Suggested Mythic Interpretation : Mitra as Creator.—In other sculpture there is (*a*) a theology or theogony, (*b*) further detail as to Mitra's own life (Cumont). To the latter belong pictures of his birth ; he is represented as cutting leaves from a fig-tree, discharging an arrow against a rock whence water flows ; —again, the bull is portrayed in a boat, or pursued by Mitra, or carried on his shoulders ; again, scenes are given representing Helios and Mitra clasping hands over an altar, banqueting together, or together mounting the chariot of the Sun and journeying across the ocean.

From this the myth must be reconstructed, since it is lost so far as literary evidence is concerned : the god is born naked on a rock and clothes himself with fig leaves, makes a treaty with the sun and sets up his kingdom upon earth : he seizes by the horns and subdues the sacred Bull of Ormazd, which he drags to a grotto and kills in sacrifice at Ormazd's own decree. The life of the world sprang from its dead body ; the Bull's spirit fled into heaven. Mitra is thus the creator of earth-life, in spite of Ahriman who tries to prevent it and, angry and baffled, sends a drought ; this Mitra dispels by drawing water from the rock. Then follows a *deluge*, from which one man only is able to escape : lastly, a *fire*, from which only Ormazd's creatures are saved. The work of Mitra, in creating, cleansing and saving the earth, is now over : the sun-chariot takes him to the abode of the immortal. All this is obscure and to a great extent hypothetical. The Bull-episode is certainly found in the early cretan religion ; but its relation to later Mitraism is quite uncertain. *All that appears clearly is the mediating position of Mitra between the worlds of light and darkness ; this present fabric he builds up in spite of Ahriman's repeated attacks.*

Divine Dynasties or Lieutenants (Cumont).—Cumont has also essayed to describe from mitraic reliefs a definite *theology*. Mitra, the most popular and active god, is, like Zeus, only a newcomer, a late arrival who makes men forget the older deities. First was *Zervan*, Boundless Time (Cronus and Saturn in the west) : *heaven* and *earth*, his offspring, correspond to Jupiter and Juno, who in turn produce *sea* (Neptune) : a third son of Time is *Ahriman* (Pluto). But Infinite Time is represented as handing to Ormazd (Jupiter ?) the symbol of plenary power, the thunderbolt ; and Mitra himself in turn became the lieutenant

of Ormazd, mediator between sinful and suffering mankind and a distant god of the ether.

Rites of Initiation : Chaldean.—The stages or degrees of the neophyte certainly betray the influence of Babylon. The soul in its upward progress always travels through *seven planetary* spheres and there are the same number of grades, the *Raven*, the *Veiled*, the *Soldier*, the *Lion*, the *Persian*, the *Sun-courier*, the *Father*. In the Lion degree, the proficient left the rank of *servitors* (ὑπηρετοῦντες) and became one of the *participants* (μετέχοντες). At this stage a eucharist (wine, water, and bread) was administered, no doubt representing Mitra's last banquet with the Sun before his ascension : the worshipper acquired thereby strength and wisdom and a share of his god's immortality. In the rite of initiation eyes were bandaged, lights suddenly shown, a running stream was leaped, a murder was simulated, strange oaths administered and a state of ecstasy induced ; thus in many points resembling the ceremonies of Freemasonry to-day.

Priests and Worship : Democratic and Corporate Character of the Lodges.—There were priests of the rank of *pater* ; the *pater patrum* (*Summus Pontifex* in Tertullian's *Præscr. Hær.* § 40) controlled all the initiates in one town and (like the Christian bishop) was not permitted to remarry. Others were vowed from the first to a celibate life. Fire was kept always burning on the altars, prayers were said to the sun at dawn, midday and twilight. There were numberless sacrifices, foals and sheep, oxen and goats, even swine, were offered. On each day of the week a certain planet was venerated ; and fixed festivals took place on the sixteenth day in each month—(of which custom the Parsis have a vestige to-day). The community formed a corporation, recognized by law and holding common property ; with its council, magistrates, treasurers, presidents and patrons (chosen from the wealthy class) ; all associates subscribed according to their means. A sense of brotherhood united the members ; distinctions of class were swept away by a common hope and a common rule of life. For its offices all brethren were eligible, even down to the slave : all partook of the same sacraments and awaited the same ' joyful resurrection '.

Its Optimistic Character and Personal Appeal.—The appeal made by the mitraic faith and cult was addressed to man's sense of sin, frailty and dependence, to his unquenchable desire

for personal happiness hereafter. Both the society and its teaching were aids to a moral and self-respecting life in an age of racial and religious disintegration: Mitra always helped his followers, if they waged a manful fight against evil. Hence no doubt his wide influence among the sober-minded, clean-living, pannonian soldiers. He it was who conducted (in his old function as escort of departed souls) the spirit of man through the *seven* realms of heaven, corresponding to the seven degrees of the proficient; while the unworthy went below to dwell with Ahriman. In *eschatology* the same optimism is to be seen as in Zoroaster's early faith: one day the struggle between good and bad would cease, the divine Bull (half god and half victim, like the *purusa* in Hindustan) descend again to earth: all men would then be summoned from the tomb in their own proper bodies and the Great Assize would separate the good from the bad. The unhappy Bull[1] was again to be sacrificed to Mitra; its fat was to be given to render the just immortal. Ahriman and his followers were to be reduced to ashes by Ormazd, while the regenerate world was to enjoy abiding happiness.[2] Here we have a private and democratic *cultus*, based on a personal hope in this life and the next, open like the greek Mysteries to all men, even to slaves. It was a mere restatement of the ideas and assurances of these Mysteries, whose practices and methods were only repeated under a new patron-god. Its appeal is based on the acute interest which individuals, in certain ages of finality or repletion, take in their private destiny—epochs which recur when the aims of society are met by governmental action of a mechanical and bureaucratic character. This was then one result of the imperial tutelage, to relieve men of immediate wants and of the old political anxieties, to allow them to cultivate their spiritual needs—or fancies. When the Church triumphed over this rival, the remnants passed over into manicheism.

[1] See Crooke's learned article "Bull-baiting," *Folk-Lore*, June, 1917.

[2] As to obvious points of sympathy and contact with Christian doctrine, Showerman very well says: 'At their root lay a common eastern origin rather than any borrowing' *Encyc. Brit.* s.v. The victory lay with the more concrete and uncompromising belief: the eminence of the defeated cult was largely based 'on dalliance with roman society: its weakness 'lay in having only a mythical character instead of a *personality* (as object 'of adoration), and in excluding women from its privileges'.

APPENDIX E: FURTHER DETAILS ON MITRA

Stuart Jones' article in *Enc. Rel. Eth.* only just accessible (April 1916), suggests a few additions to the foregoing. The conception of Mitra seems from the first to be *ethical*: both in sanscrit and avestan the word implies *compact* or *friendship*; and good faith or loyalty is always the underlying thought. If Varuna was the all-encompassing vault of heaven, Mitra is the light that issues from it; the god is guarantor of good faith between men as a witness who gazes on all. In Persia Ormazd succeeded to the place of Varuna; we find the name *mazdaku* as early as cent. viii B.C. and an assyrian list of gods gives *Assara Mazash*, *c. 650* B.C. (so Hommell *Soc. Bibl. Archæ.* 1899). Here the worship of Mitra attained an importance never reached in India. We find him as sponsor to a treaty of (aryan) chiefs among the Mitani (*c. 1400* B.C.). Under 'Sardanapalus' or Assurbanipal (*c. 660–620*) syncretism was already busy and Mitra was identified with sun-god Shamash. The names of persian nobles in classical time show clearly his prominent place in the aryo-iranian pantheon;—Mitradates, Mitrobates and the like. He is not named however in royal inscr. until the time of Artaxerxes II (*403–358*), who gives Ormazd and Mitra as his chief protectors, together with the goddess Anaitis.—It seems impossible to fix the date of Zoroaster; but, whenever he lived, he ignored Mitra—perhaps even regarded him as a *dæva* or demon. The very curious phrase put in the mouth of a false teacher, 'Ox and Sun are the worst things for 'mortal eyes to behold' may refer to the nighttime sacrifice of a bull to this deity (*Ys.* xxxii 10). The cult in later times certainly included elements abhorrent to the spirit of Zoroaster's reform and due no doubt to the *magian* revival, by which (as in India) much of the aboriginal superstition and shamanism was quietly brought back. In the *Mihir Yasht*, he is represented as a *yazata* and on a lower level than Ormazd's six Amshaspands. He is not the Sun himself nor a person or individual object,—rather the light of heaven in general, 'lord of wide pastures . . . driver of 'swift horses'. But the *ethical* and social side is also prominent: he is the 'truthspeaking one, eloquent in assemblies'. He is invoked against the wicked and faithless nomad of the steppes, 'the violator of promises' (*mithradruj*). He guards the poor and distressed, as well as good faith and truth. Unlike some gods whose power only lasts for this life, Mitra is invoked 'in either world, that of body and that of spirit'. For he is guider of souls in the hereafter (ψυχόπομπος), who 'bears them for atone-'ment and lays them down in the House of Praise'. No less is he a god of battle against the wrong; with his two vassals *Sraosha* (obedience) and *Rasnu* (justice) he strikes terror into the powers of darkness. For his use Ormazd fashions a beautiful abode on Mt. Elburz 'where is neither light 'nor darkness, chill wind nor feverblast, death-dealing sickness nor mists, 'neither defilement wrought by demons'. To him milk and *haoma* are offered; and 'beasts small and great with birds that fly' are sacrificed after due penitence and ritual ablutions.

Such is the conception as conveyed in the *Mihir Yasht*. But Babylon and chaldeism soon brought in novel features quite incompatible with

aryan views. The later Mitra, both in mythical person and prescribed cultus, is a composite figure. Astrolatry was never an iranian worship, whereas in chaldean or sumerian fatalism, a belief in their influence guided the whole of religious theory and practice. Iranian mazdeism had furnished by its dualism a solution to the cosmic problem and an answer to the soul's aspiration. The later magian development (under chaldee influence) had set Ormazd's realm far away from that of Ahriman, prince of darkness, ' as far beyond sun as sun is from earth ' : between the two kingdoms Mitra occupies the place and function of *mediator*. Soul too is a spark of light from the higher plane (as in the kindred doctrine of orphism), clothed as it passes downwards to earth with a material vesture and living here in perpetual conflict with evil both within and without. Mitra is the captain under whom the war is actually waged and the general who in the end rewards the loyal soldier : he is, as we saw elsewhere, (manichee fragment from Turfan) *boxtar ud xvabar* ' redeemer and bene-' factor '. The return of the released spirit to its true home was complicated by chaldee astrology and the doctrine of the spheres, which exert a baneful influence on the soul both in its downward and upward course. From Babylon came too that sense of an inflexible world-order and law, expressed in the steadfast movements of the heavenly bodies—a fatalism which, with happy want of logic, had no effect on Mitra's inspiriting gospel of endeavour. It was therefore well fitted to become the practical creed of loyal soldiers and it even possessed a distinct consecration of this attitude of personal loyalty. The ' glory or halo ' (*hvareno*), aureole of the heavenly light was forfeited by sin ; but it was supposed to survive in certain legitimist dynasties : when *Yast* xix deals with series of fortunate possessors, it starts with Ormazd and ends with Saoshyant, the future deliverer of mankind ; but the interval is filled up with a brief history of the iranian monarchy. (The word becomes *phern* in hellenic transliteration ; e.g. the familiar names of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus : Wilhelm has written on the conception (Bombay 1914) in Jamsetji Jejeebhoy's Jubilee Volume). It is a token of kingship and a talisman of success ; it is the necessary *mana* which mystical royalty must possess to ensure the confidence and obedience of its subjects ; it is ' divine right ' in visible form. The Seleucid Diadochi after Alexander, anxious to secure this mark of heavenly favour, approved the mitraic worship and on their coinage styled it ' the king's fortune ' (*τυχὴ βασίλεως*). Just before our era in Commagenè, Antiochus (*69–38* B.C.) left an inscription showing the completion of the syncretizing process ; Zeus is also *Ormazd*, Apollo-Helios-Hermes [1] (a composite figure) is also

[1] At Stockstadt an inscr. of the imperial age gives the title : ' Deo ' invicto Mithræ Mercurio ' (cf. Drexel's monograph, Heidelberg 1910) : under Commodus (180–192) we have in Dacia ' Sol invictus Mithras ' (*Corp. Inscr. Lat.* iii 1122): in the Antoninian Baths at Rome was discovered (1912) the legend ' Zeus-Helios-Sarapis-Mithras ', an identification due no doubt to the syncretism of that strange figure in the imperial line, Antoninus V., son of Severus (211–217), miscalled ' Caracalla '.

Mithras, Heracles-Ares is *Artagnes* (or victory) : two other statues represent the land of the ruling king of Commagenè. But Mitraism never became popular in hellenic lands, properly so called ; it is not found in Delos which gave a welcome to so many foreign cults ; it has left few vestiges in Syria or Egypt ; and Lucian writes of the god (just as Homer might have written of Dionysus) that he was a barbarian and could not speak good greek. Nor did mitraic monuments become common on roman soil until the time of the Antonines (*138–180* A.D.). Its diffusion (as we have seen) was largely the work of the imperial armies, recruited in great part (not merely then but in the later byzantine age) from the borderland of east and west—Pontus, Cappadocia, Commagenè, Armenia. This fact may be borne in mind not only when we consider the figure and policy of Leo the syrian or isaurian, the earliest iconoclast (*717–741* A.D.) but when we attempt to trace the lineage of the armenian paulicians and their half-military, half-quaker ideals. During the parthian wars of Claudius and Nero (*41–68* A.D.) the oriental element was much increased. The XV Legion brought the cultus to Carnuntum on the Danube in the early years of Vespasian (*71* A.D.). The Flavian House raised auxiliary troops in the east which gave it its sceptre and placed them all along the riparian frontiers (Rhine and Danube) and on the *vallum* in N. Britain. Nearly every trace of mitraic worship is found in legionary camps, both in Britain and in Germany, or in the forts along the *limes germanicus*. On the Danube nearly every important post is so signalized and in Africa, III Legion and other military settlements have furnished specimens ; in Spain the veteran colonies clearly kept up their old regimental worship (Merida). While 'roman society' (if the term can still be applied) had no religion or convictions of its own, the importance of slaves (public and private alike) is well marked in the dissemination of foreign cults. Many corresponded to the lower official ranks of a modern bureaucracy, or the employees in custom houses or state-owned mines : e.g. in Noricum. The growing tendencies to equalize rank and status under an autocracy—probably the only possible means—is seen in the list of mitraists at Sentinum, where the municipal slaves and freedmen are inscribed alongside of the freeborn. Along the great trade-routes both slaves and free merchants seem to have played an important part in spreading the cult (cf. maps in Cumont's *Textes et Monuments* etc., Brussels 1896–9 and *Les Mystères de M.* Paris 1913, also Toutain's section on M. in *Cultes païens dans l'empire romain*, Paris 1908–11).

The meaning of the obscure emblems, pictures and ritual is thus given by Stuart Jones : the Bull is Ormazd's first creature and although slain by his enemy Ahriman it gave life through its death to 55 kinds of grain and 12 of healing herbs. Part of the body, borne upwards to the moon produced the manifold classes of animals, and from its blood sprang the grapevine. In mitraism (as in ægean religion) the bull's death is the source of life : it takes the place of Giant Ymir in norse myth and other vast primitive beings who are hewn into pieces to form an entire world. But in the later worship, the slayer is not Ahriman but Mitra acting as deputy to Ormazd. While he is spreading life the evil animals made by Ahriman

try to prevent the dispersion of the vital fluids—scorpion, snake and perhaps dog, try to absorb it into the kingdom of evil. Here is a clear survival of an archaic fertility-rite of the usual sort. Certain emblems bear out the notion that Mitra is a vegetation-spirit, as when he is seen issuing, like a dryad from a tree or stripping it of leaves ; or, like the earth-goddess on greek vases, is represented as emerging from the rock 'petra genetrix' as πετρογενὴς of which word *cautes* and *cautopates* are translations into somewhat peculiar latin.—It is also certain that the chaldean astral strain is to be traced in the *seven* series of initiation-rites and grades of proficiency ; to this Origen refers (*c. Cels.* vi 22), citing from Celsus the ' ladder of seven ' portals ' made of the various metals allotted to the planets. Porphyry (*Grotto of the Nymphs* § 6) represents Zoroaster as teaching that the Cave is a symbol of the universe, ' emblems according to regular intervals ' of the cosmic elements and climes '.[1]

It may here be mentioned that the *taurobolium* belongs properly not to Mitra at all but to the cult of the Mother-goddess, with which it was closely linked in the great age of roman orientalism (*c. 100–400* A.D.) as many inscriptions attest. But even this connexion was the result of a reflective syncretism and the rite first belonged to the (semitic) worship of Anaitis, which somewhat reluctantly the persian sovereign admitted into his male and aryan pantheon. The greeks no doubt identified her with Ἄρτεμις Ταυρόπολος or the Tauric Artemis of the classical drama : possibly the whole rite may arise from a mistaken etymology. In the individualist days of the cultus the blood, shed from the animal, poured over the votary through orifices in the floor and gave him ' new birth '. It is perhaps needless to say that Anahita was identified in Asia Minor with the well-known anatolian figure of Cybele-Rhea, and that Mitra was in the same way identified with Attis : he is also held to be the same as the pontic *Mēn*. Cumont is certainly correct in believing that Mitraism borrowed the rite of *tauroboly* from the mysteries of the Great Mother.

APPENDIX F

Successive Modifications in Parsi Religion : Manicheism as Final Product

The Compromises of Monotheism : Angels, Guardians, Demons.—The Parsi Religion of Zoroaster before it entered as a potent factor into later development had been profoundly modified. Neither aryan creed, in Persia or in Hindustan, was proof against popular influences ; and as in Islam an austere simplicity was very soon overlaid by foreign accretions. Once more the old deities (demons in Zoroaster's eyes) came back into favour or were at least placated in fear : the vulgar faith demanded a sensuous and a concrete object of worship. The Angels (*yazata*), forming a new feature as the mediaries between man and Ahuramazda, begin to

[1] κλιμάτων : one wonders whether Celsus before him misinterpreted the word as κλιμάκων, but the ladder is a familiar symbol in freemasonry.

divert the reverence due to him only. The most primitive *Gathas* knew little of ' guardian angels ' (*fravashi*), the heavenly guide and companion which is reproduced in the *doppelganger* of the Cabbala : it is (according to one view) the ' confession of faith ' hypostatized and treated as a person.[1] More curious than this innocent belief in a guardian was the invasion of a comus-rout of old deities,—not only Mitra, but Verethragna, Anahita (Anaitis), Tishrya (Sirius) and others. Hence too arose a much more complex notion of the priesthood and its duties, with the minute system of ritual embodied in the *Vendidad*. While the Prophet preached (like Mani at Sapor's Court *241* A.D.) a swift judgment of the world, the ' continuance ' of things as they were led to a very much modified credence in a doom so long deferred. 3000 years after Zoroaster (it was then held) when a new *Saoshyant* is to be born of the Prophet's own family, the dead are to rise to a new and indestructible world.

Progress and Zenith of the Cult.—The wide expansion of this supra-national faith did not tell in favour of purity : Armenia and Cappadocia gave welcome to the persian creed and it spread over all the nearer east (Strabo xi 8, 4, 14, 76, xv 3, 14. After the Achæmenid dynasty, Arsacids and Indo-Scyths accepted the monotheism of Mazda (not without prejudice to the conception). The Parthians were but careless conformers to an official creed and ritual. Under the Sassanids the priesthood became a great State-influence, able to control the sovereign and enforce compliance with its law-book on the daily life of society. At Rai in Media lived the Pope (*zarashushtrotema*), next in rank to the king. The formation of sects at this time was not uncommon ; and of such is Manicheism.

Chaldean Rivalry : Syncretism under Achæmenids : Anaitis--But to return to the earlier stages. It is not easy to determine the relations of Babylon and Iran. There is no question that, in a later age, conscious antithesis between the two creeds lay behind much religious ferment and evolution of thought. When old gods and mythical figures reappeared as historic persons fighting on earth, Azhi Dahaka (*ashdahak*) or the evil serpent (or *Vrtra* killed by Verethragna or hindu Indra) was thought to have his abode in Babylon (*Bawri* of the Avesta) : a king in human form but with a dragon's head on each shoulder which devoured men's brains. In the popular faith (as we have just said) the old gods were never wholly thrust out by an uncompromising monotheism : was not Mahomet himself in later time willing to compromise by the admission of female deities side by side with Allah ? In Iran the goddess of fertility and vegetation, a river-goddess (the Oxus), Anaitis or *Ardvisura* : so Mitra [2], Haoma, and

[1] Just as ἦθος δαίμων ἑκάστῳ or Maimonides *Guide* ii 6 ' man's dis-' position is here called an angel ', quoting R. Jochanan's ' God caused the ' Angel of Lust to present himself to him ' (to Judah on seeing Tamar) *Berishit Rabba* lxxxv.

[2] Even to-day the unitarian parsis hold a festival (*sixteenth* day of *seventh* month) to *Mitra*, deity presiding over and directing the course of the sun. They name each day, not after a saint but after an angel of bliss who protects it. Farvardin, a god holding the place of the aged

(as we have seen) the dragon-slayer Verethragna. The earlier Achæmenids passed over these satellites with lofty disdain : Darius I only once names ' the gods of the clans ' : once ' the other gods that are '. Only under Artaxerxes II were Mitra and Anaitis received into the official worship. At a king's accession (Plutarch *Artax.* § 3) he is consecrated in the temple of the warrior-goddess at Pasargadae. The kings and upper circles were ardent professors of pure Mazdaic faith. There was even a strong tendency to proselytize, and persian settlers spread the creed as far as Lydia and the Lycian coasts. They might recognize the native gods as mere ministers and servants of Ormazd, but the foreign beliefs also reacted on the unitarian creed. In Cappadocia we find the local Bel recognizing the Mazda religion (*din-mazdayasnish*) as his sister and wife (Lidzbarski, *Eph. Semit. Epigr.* i 59, 1900). Anaitis (*Ardvisura*) [1] is identified with Ishtar of Babylon the strong bountiful mother with golden raiment and a diadem of stars. She is worshipped as the giver of life and the sustainer of men, even with the peculiar sacrifice of that which females hold most precious (Strabo xi 532 at Acilisene in Armenia, xii 559, at Zela in Cappadocia). At her side (corresponding with Attis in the legend further westwards) stands Mitra as a youth ' herald and propagator of the service of Light and mediator ' between man and Ormazd—who, like all primitive ' high gods ', tends to vanish before a younger and more strenuous generation.

It would appear then that Artaxerxes II (*404–359*) was the first king to accept a compromise with ' matriarchal ' pagans : to Anaitis he set up statues in all the capitals, Susa, Ecbatana, Babylon, Persepolis, Bactra, Damascus, Sardis. In his inscriptions from the two first cities he invokes not Ormazd alone, but Ormazd with this his consort and their son : Clement of Alexandria preserves the notice from Berosus (*Protrept.* i 5, 65). This was a most important step : a unitarian theism, unable to struggle against primitive traditions, accepts in effect defeat and admits a trinity of a very human kind. Just as Anaitis demands some sacrifice (of decency), so Mitra too expects that the king himself will drink to excess on his festival and dance the sacred measure, like King David of old to Michal's disgust, Ctesias *fr.* 55). The abstraction *good thought* (Vohumano ὠμανὸς) also

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Yima in the primitive faith, also receives honour (*eighth* month, *tenth* day). In another curious respect the present community (at Bombay) differs from earlier use : there can be no proselytism or admission of foreign converts, even in the case of a frankish wife of a parsi, willing to join the husband's creed. E. Meyer reminds us that parsism always bears a *syncretic* character ; the supreme God, in theory unique, yields place in practice to his own servants, the attendant deities, who both control the processes of nature and lead the initiated believer to salvation.

[1] Anahite's festival in Armenia, was dedicated anew to the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom for some time the more ignorant identified with the Mother Church. Near Antioch was a temple of Anait, whom the Greeks called the ' persian Artemis ' (who afterwards appears as Anaitis Bendis, a thracian goddess of war and hunting whose cult strangers brought from Thrace into Attica *c.* 450 B.C. (cf. Plato's *Rep.* I i.).

receives worship; and from Babylon the Sacæan feast is adopted (Beros. *fr.* 3 and Ctes. *fr.* 16).

Buddhism and Kaniska: Sassanids Arrest Decay and Persecute Heretics.—Under the greek dominion this now composite religion was never attacked. Indeed, this was its era of greatest expansion (*300–1* B.C.) not only into Cappadocia, Armenia[1] and Pontus, but even into remote Hindustan. The indo-scythic dynasty of the Kushana overcame Bactria about the date of our era and pressed southwards into Hindustan, being already found by the time of Vespasian in the Indus valley: it embraced Buddhism under Kaniska, held by many to be coeval with Emperor Hadrian. But on his currency the names of iranian deities are most prevalent: *Mihro* (cf. Mani's form Mihr), *Mah* (moon), *Athro* (whence 'athravan') 'fire', *Orthragno* (Indra or Verethragna), *Tiro* (= Sirius the Archer, Tistrya). It seems clear that buddhism was here officially blended with the archaic persian creed: perhaps it awoke in some aryan survivors memories of earlier centuries when their forefathers brought down the common names and beliefs of the indo-iranian stock. In Persia itself, after the Sassanid restoration and revival a much stricter theism came into vogue; one sovereign rules in heaven as on earth. Each district had a lord or president of the magian caste. At their head a supreme Mobed at Rai or Rhagæ was (as we saw) the pope and successor of Zoroaster: the hierarchy enjoyed a great measure of political power, like the priests of theban Egypt or of catholic Christendom. The Magi translated the sacred books into pahlavi for the use of the laity; and maintained the stern dualism which lay at the root of the zoroastrian faith and encouraged moral endeavour in persian manhood. They allowed a certain respect to the lesser gods but only as servitors of the Most High. But a monistic heresy now began to arise which represented both the conflicting parties God and the Devil as children of a common parent Zervan; and the contest of right and wrong to be merely a harmless play of divine forces (as in the peculiar system of the interpolator of Lactantius). Not till the reign of Chosroes I. was this (perhaps hindu) view laid under anathema, having long enjoyed the favour of the court and the learned world. Meantime, as in later Egypt, ritual prescription became still more formal and minute, with a parallel increase in sacerdotal power. The founder of the dynasty Ardashir I. (*226–241*) resumed the task of collating and canonizing the scriptures. The restored orthodox doctrines must be subscribed by all. Heretics were imprisoned for a year and, if still obstinate, put to death. In Armenia all idols and statues were thrown down—even those of the lesser gods of Iran—in a zeal for purity of worship: their shrines were converted into altars for the Sacred Fire. Meantime in the (now aramaic) valleys of Tigris and Euphrates a rival creed had appeared: Christian

[1] In Armenia the native religion was almost ousted by the various persian cults, Gelzer *Zür Armen. Gotterlehre* in Sächs. Gesch. d. Wissensch. 1895. The strange pagan survival of the *Kizil Bash* is found to-day in these untrodden districts of Asia Minor and merits more notice than it has yet received from the ethnologist and student of religion (cf. p. 365).

missioners, spread over the whole of Iran but found here a choicer field and acquired a firmer hold.

Mani's Eclectic System : from Mazdeism and Gnosis.—Side by side with an attitude of uncompromising exclusiveness and hostility, went a belief that all faiths contained a portion of the truth. *Hence Mani's syncretizing attempt to create a new world-religion from an amalgam* of gnostic and zoroastrian tenets.[1] But yet another source has to be searched before the position of Mani can be fully understood. It is now agreed that *gnosis* is an earlier phenomenon than the gospel. Gnostical theories were widely prevalent before Christianity. The two faiths exerted a ' magnetic attraction ' for each other (Harnack). Both were animated by the desire for *personal salvation*.[2] Round the historic figure of Christ were grouped strange gnostic ideas of redemption. As in the great thraco-hellenic movement (600 B.C.), ' the attainment of everlasting salvation ' by the soul was the supreme end. It was natural to see in a Redeemer-deity, who has trodden the path of deliverance before us, a central object of worship or a symbol pregnant with mystic meaning. Not *knowledge* or study, not any (fancied) reconcilement of *faith* and *reason*, ancient philosophy with the new gospel, but (as earlier in Hindustan) a practical means of avoiding evil. Hence the emphasis on magical rites, formulæ, initiation, sacraments, knowledge of the ' names of the Angels '. It is often repeated that the released soul finds its path stopped by malignant spirits and can only pursue its way unmolested, if it is armed with full name and titles together with the proper formula of address. The Redeemer Himself was supposed to have used these incantations against the demons, that He might descend and ascend again in safety.[3] It is certain that these secret talismans constituted the chief appeal of these curious systems. The later religious development in Egypt had immensely increased the terrors of the world beyond and the need of finding the ' words ' of power ' which would put to flight ' the armies of the aliens ' and act as

[1] Extirpated in Iran after his ' martyrdom ' Manicheism spread west and east, far into the roman empire and beyond Khorasan into central Asia : in eastern Turkestan fragments of Mani's works are found in *pahlavi* and in *sogdianese*—an east iranian dialect (K. Muller on the discoveries at Turfan *Abh. d. Berl. Akad.* 1904, and *Ber der Berl.* 1907). In certain versions of New Testament texts, God the Father is identified with *Zervan*, and the devil with *Ahriman*. It may be suggested that a certain section of Zervanites followed Mani's teaching.

[2] The motive of Gnosticism was not *knowledge* (as we saw above) : their ' knowledge ' was an esoteric doctrine or mystical illumination or magic formula : that is, *salvation*, escape from an evil world into happiness beyond, through a region beset with perils ; the soul's pilgrimage from the lower spheres into heaven was as terrible an ordeal as the hereafter of the *Book of the Dead*. Theosophy really played a secondary part and was a mere arbitrary or poetic mythology in its details.

[3] Anz, *Ursprung der Gnosticismus*, Texte etc. xv 4, sees in this the central doctrine of *gnosis*.

passport or safe conduct to heaven. In any case the desire for this posthumous aid was a genuine and widespread sentiment: and every analysis of a popular dogma must take account of the psychologic motive for its acceptance. In this respect *gnosis* and the gospel occupy exactly the same level of the heart.[1]

Factors in Gnosticism: A. Chaldean Star Cult.—Now the evil spirits, passage through whose sphere forms the perilous pilgrimage and ordeal of the soul, are the old planet-gods of Babylon. Seven world-creating powers (sun, moon and five planets) are the rulers of this earth and our tyrants and taskmasters. These powers are always of secondary rank. Sometimes malignant rebels, sometimes renegade deputies, they are the remotest emanations of inaccessible godhead, if not a wholly independent and inimical band. In Mandean belief, *Ruha* and her son and consort *Ur* produced the planets later fixed as captives[2] in the vault of heaven, and allowed as world-rulers in the present cycle to bear sway over man and nature. So in Mani's system the Spirit of Life, coming to aid Primal Man, captures these Archons and nails them to the heaven, in one account flays them to make the firmament from their skin! (We may compare the threats of the ancient Pharaoh to devour the stars.) In the gnostic treatise *Pistis Sophia* the tale is told of the capture of the 5 rebel Archons (cf. Origen *c. Celsum* vi 22). The Sabians of Mesopotamia worshipped the seven[3] planets, like the Babylonish ancestors. This planet-worship was then the sum and substance of the (later) native religion in Babylon and was handed on, not as the chief cult but as the appeasement of demons. Over it was the Mazdean light-religion, which found in them its own foil and antithesis. The gods of Babylon were thus degraded into demons who, either from pride or weakness or active rebellion, create our visible world at an almost infinite distance from Ormazd's light-world. The ascent of the soul then lies through this region of peril and ambush, through the seven spheres to the kingdom of light: knowledge of names (as we saw) played the chief part but the whole life of the Gnostic must be an ascetic denial of these realms and their rulers: he must have 'no fellowship with the unfruitful works 'of darkness'.

B. Mother Goddess: Distinctive Feature of Religion in Syria, Babylon, Persia.—Another, perhaps still more important, factor was the *Mother-Goddess* of Chaldea, Syria and West Asia. Whether this worship was a relic of gynæcocracy is uncertain, but it was without doubt the sign of an almost universal *naturalism* of which we found clear traces in Hindustan. Anaitis (once a local goddess of the Oxus stream) had enlarged her dominion and become identified with Ishtar or Beltis and the other kindred forms.

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[1] As we have traced in another section.

[2] When there was 'war in heaven' and Satan fought against the world of light, seven of his captains were seized and placed as constellations in the sky (*Bundahish* iii 25, v i): cf. p. 555.

[3] Sometimes the God of the Jews and of the Old Testament is represented as highest of the Seven, and then the dogma of the Seven Archons is given an anti-semitic complexion.

Among the Ophites, Archontics, Sethites and (in a less degree) the Naassenes, the Mother is a prominent figure in the world of light: she is the parent of the faithful and elect, raised above the Seven. Sometimes she appears as Sophia, the mother of the *hebdomad*, that is, the goddess of heaven is the parent of the planets. The chief figure in the Barbelo gnostic heaven, Barbelo (= παρθενος), is a virgin prototype—just as the unmated Artemis is also goddess of fertility. This mother-goddess descends[1] into the lower region and becomes the fallen Sophia so common in their systems: the most familiar figure being Valentine's Achamoth. As in the myth of Demeter and Cybele or Ishtar's *descensus*, the mother or light-goddess goes to the underworld and is there taken and kept a prisoner against her will: this story had already inspired the greek Mysteries. By her side and in a special relation stands Soter the Saviour, just as Mitra in the later persian phase, who is no other than the youthful deity of the spring, who yearly rises only to perish again while the Mother's life persists unchanged: he is Tammuz, Adonis, Attis. This element in gnostic theory is unmistakable: *Syria worships simply the natural forces immanent in the lower world, Babylon, more refined but more fatalistic, the planets of heaven, Persia a supreme God still more distant.* In the first there is no moral element at all, in the second very little; only in the anthropism of the Semites is it really found, except in Zoroaster's strictly *ethical* theology. These three religions met and confronted each other, though not exactly in conflict; still less was there a ready means of reconciling such very contrary attitudes to life. Neither was likely to give way and a syncretizing tendency (which saw some truth in every creed) was inclined to account for all. Hence *3 layers or strata, or at least 3 worlds, which can be traced in almost* every gnostical system: the perfect *light-world* (Persia), the *planet-world* sometimes quite evil, always dangerous (Babylon), and lastly the *nature-world* of our visible sphere where was confined the Mother. For all three there were suitable deities, and gnostics tried (like the priestly harmonists of Egypt or Chaldea) to make a working theory out of the entangled skeins.

C. Archetypal Man—a Gnostic Loan.—Another symbolic figure (as already noticed) is that of *Primal* or Archetypal *Man*; which lasts on through the jewish Cabbala down to the doctrine of the microcosm.

[1] So Simon's Helen was said to have been rescued by him from an evil house at Tyre (Epiphan. *Ancor.* § 104): the syrian Astarte was said to have lived in a like servitude for ten years; —by a grotesque elaboration of the idea, she did so to rob her lovers of the light-germs which they had stolen from the higher sphere: but having thus played Judith to their Holofernes she finds she cannot return and is kept in a degraded position by the wicked Archon. So for the 'gnostics' (properly so called) in Epiphanius; so with the Light-Maiden in Mani's own system (F. C. Baur, 219, 315, 321,—1831). The same figure appears in *Pistis Sophia*. Sometimes instead of turning below, she is seized with presumptuous love and longing for the Supreme God Himself Bythus, and so brings the fall into the once happy world of Æons—the realm of pure forms which should never know desire or appetency.

According to an ancient persian myth, world-evolution begins with the slaying of Primal Man, Gayomart, by Ahriman : an episode like the hindu comparison of creation to a sacrifice, the norse dissection of giant Ymir, the chinese cutting up (or possibly self-immolation) of Panchu. The Barbelo-gnostics spoke of Primal Man as *Adamas*, ' the true and perfect man ', who with *gnosis* formed one pair of æons : as in the Valentinians, *anthropos* is coupled with *ecclesia*. The *Pœmandres* and the Hermetic writings make man the most striking figure in the theory ; so also do the gnostics whom Plotinus refutes in *Enn.* ii 9. In the Attis-cult, then, a man was a god who died and rose again. The Manichees restored Primal Man to his commanding place in their system, as will presently appear. Now this figure is without doubt a masculine counterpart of the mother-goddess or light-maiden who descends, whether by a culpable fall or a praiseworthy attempt to rescue her captive children. He is a hero who makes war on the lower powers and (like sun and harvest) is partly vanquished by them ; descending into the darkness he begins the world's development, a long drama of deliverance for the shafts of light, entangled and held prisoner here. Just as the Primal Man has raised himself out of the nether world so shall his members also be set free by following him : as in Egypt the dead man at once assumes the name and character of a god. The method of redemption for this Archetypal Man varies in different sects : in *Pœmandres* he sank into matter, freed himself and, rising again triumphant, summons his members and followers to do the like ; sometimes he has been overcome and held captive by Darkness but the light-powers send and deliver him ; at another time it is the Mother-goddess who is the object of the rescue-party, like Andromeda or Ariadne in greek legend or Persephone in the Mysteries. The true ætiology of rite or myth refined and distorted by reflective analysis, is a difficult and dangerous task. The complexities of *gnosis* ought not however to blind one to certain general features which seem to-day beyond question : there are 3 tiers of being, and man who deserves the highest occupies the lowest ; the world in which he and his Mother are held prisoners is the evil creation of the midway stellar powers, who try to hinder the ascent of the Mother and her children, the light-particles, to their true home. These are the only constant elements ; all else is changed according to the vagaries of the imaginative myth. But this knowledge is all that is requisite to understand the position of Mani who merely simplifies the doctrine and clears it of excrescences.

APPENDIX G

The Magi : Dualism and Origin of Evil

Ys. xliv 5 seems to attribute to God the creation of both worlds ' well ' working, making both light and gloom ', just as Isaiah xlv 7 ' I the Lord ' form light and created the darkness ' : but there seems to be no doubt

that the two phrases are independent (cf. Stave, *Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum*, Haarlem 1898). The *Gathas* only mention ' darkness' once again (xxxi 20), where it is the blackness of hell. Although I fully believe dualism to have been fundamental in the earliest teaching, it is the younger Avesta that states it with greatest emphasis. I cannot for a moment allow that the monism (expressing itself in polar opposites, in xliv 5) is Zoroaster's protest against magian dualism, and that ' there is nothing ' really dualistic in Zoroaster's *Gathas* '. But Moulton is perfectly right in this sense that the magians, like their remnants the *yezidis* to-day, offered sacrifice to devil and God alike, and that Zoroaster (whatever his date) resisted this practice most strenuously in the interest of an undistracted monotheism. Certainly, it may be admitted (with Moulton) that *in this sense* ' one whose perpetual counsel was Resist the Devil and he will flee ' from you ' can never be called a dualist. I fully accept the hypothesis of Moulton and Prasek (*Hist. Medes and Pers.*, Gotha 1906–10) that the Medes are not *aryan* or *semitic*, and that the magians were the ' shamans ' or priests of this aboriginal people. Even if we allow the argument of aryo-iranian names in the district of the *Mada* (e.g. Mazdaku in Sargon's inscript. of *714* B.C. not to mention Indra, Aruna and Mitrî of the Boghaz Keui inscr. some 600 years earlier), this will not interfere with a well-founded belief that the magi were a pre-aryan hieratic caste of the usual shamanistic type, who by compromise and disguise managed to continue their ascendancy under the persian monotheists and so onwards into the latest days of the sasanian empire. This remarkable tenacity is displayed by them after the complete failure of their attempt to recover *political* power under Gomata or ' Smerdis '. The triumph of Darius (as Behistun clearly proves) was a final victory for a personal monotheism—although even he attributes his success to the aid of the ' other gods, all that there ' are '. But this cautious inclusion (analogous to roman usage) does not blind one to the fact that he is Aura-mazda's servant alone.—If (as by Jackson, *Zoroaster*, N. York 1899, and Sayce) the date of the Prophet be placed as late as cent. vi B.C., the ' Hystaspes ' of the sacred writings may well be Darius' father ; or Darius, whose lineage is perhaps a little artificial and urged with excessive warmth, may have adopted for his parent the name of the typical sovereign. This however is by no means certain and I prefer a much earlier time for the appearance of Zoroaster.

The magi then were *Dualists* in the strict sense, that they offered worship both to good and bad spirits, as shamans always do. They sought to appease or divert to their own use and profit the undifferentiated *mana* which is mere power or force apart from any moral connotation. The Rab Mag of Jeremiah xxxix (according to Winckler and Zimmern) is the head of a clan of professional exorcists, who still kept their place at court even under a purely monotheistic establishment. They might be called ' devil-worshippers ' and the name of their chief Nergal Sharezer (O Nergal, protect the king !) shows that they appealed to Nergal (a babylonian planet god) and identified him with evil Ahriman. It appears certain that this median or *mada* hierarchy gladly welcomed and appropriated the star-lore of Babylon—the astrology from which the Avesta is singularly free. The

magi were never able to determine with precision whether the planets were a bad or a good influence. Official parsism, which subordinated them as demons to the light-god, recognized them as malefic—the compromise of two separate creeds which, as we see throughout this volume, created so many syncretistic forms of religion. Sometimes the magi placed them in the creature-world of Ahriman because of their irregular motion, just as (in their eschatology) they smoothed away the mountains, as blots and excrescences, in the ' new heavens and new earth '. To Ahriman, we are assured by Plutarch, the magi offered sacrifice (*Isis* § 46) ' things of ' darkness to avert evil ' : from them the later mitraists borrowed the practice, *Deo Arimanio*.

Shahrastani, with his usual acuteness, says that ' all problems of the ' magians turn on two chief points—why Light mingled with Darkness ' and why it then cleansed itself from this contact : the blending they ' posit as the beginning, the cleansing as the aim or goal ' (i 275). Light (according to the Gayomarts) is uncreate, darkness created—they could not say whence or how, except by the ' lame solution ' (Louis Gray) that Ormazd unwisely wondered ' if I had an adversary, how would he be ' formed ? ' The Light gave men's souls the choice, before ever they were embodied, of going to hell with Ahriman or fighting him. These preëxisting spirits chose a bodily and earthly life of conflict, on condition that they shared in the ultimate triumph. The Zervanites held that from (impersonal) light there issued a multitude of shining beings, among whom Zervan (Time) prayed for a son for a myriad years save one and at last in his despondency thought (with the *mahayana* buddhists and the earlier hindu theologies) ' perchance the world is nothing after all '. From this evil thought sprang Ahriman, the spirit that denies. Some of this sect held the jewish-christian dogma that he was first an angel of light but meditating treachery he fell from heaven. The Mashites believed that a portion of light had (? voluntarily) changed itself into darkness ; Dion Chrysostom (*Oratio Borysthen.* xxxvi) seems to imply that Ormazd had to surrender much of his light in order to create at all (Dindorf ii 65). Meantime the true Zoroastrians rejected this imputation of evil to the foolishness of a divine thought and held firmly to two original and independent beings. God in His wisdom had allowed a mingling of light and darkness for a time, but evil powers must in the end be overcome.

The iranian mind was irresistibly attracted by the idea of *polarity*, the system of pairs of opposites (syzygies or systœchies) such as we find in Pythagoras. The worlds of *spirit* and *matter* were constantly distinguished ; also the two lives, present and hereafter. It is certain that we can here detect a transition from a savage and primitive religion, quite un-moral and utilitarian, to a form of personal worship which is strongly ethical. Both aborigines and perso-aryans held firmly to the existence of good and evil powers ; and are both dualist. But they differ profoundly in their treatment of the two. The shamanistic magi continued to appease, supplicate or exorcize the evil spirits, as occasion offered. The true iranian offered worship to God alone ; and in this sense Zoroaster is a strong monotheist, while his devotion to God is based on dualism, on his

hatred of evil which cannot be defeated without the strenuous aid of man. With Casartelli, we cannot help applying this term *dualism* to a system from the first recognizing two coeval and independent powers. Satan is not indeed coeternal with God, for in the end he will be annihilated; but he is not a creature, a fallen angel, as in Christian belief. The world of the creature is equally divided between his work and the divine; exact pairs of antitheta confront each other in every part of nature. There is a deliberate 'counter-creation' (*fra-keret*). It is this true dualism of primitive mazdeism which passed into the less strenuous gospel of Mani—who certainly believed himself a restorer of the old paths. The comments of modern parsis, who attempt to explain away the dualistic basis of their creed, leave us quite unmoved. The tendency of all leisurely reflexion is towards monism, towards 'subordinate dualism' (cf. my essay *Studia Biblica* vol. iv). The personalist asserts the perversion of an angel created good by the deity: the impersonalist (or 'philosopher') speaks of an undifferentiated ground whence, by an immanent law of polarity as in Hegel's *Logic*, there issue the antithetic pairs of good and evil and the like. The Zervanite sect was undeniably a philosophic refinement upon the uncompromising attitude of the early creed: *Zrvan Akarana*, unlimited time, begat both Ormazd and Ahriman. Therefore evil was not so very evil after all, being a necessary phase or complement of God (as in modern Absolutism); and the unpleasant heat of the ethical struggle was really needless. Nor was the final triumph of the good anything more than a metaphor for the ignorant and exoteric: perfection was no question of time or slow achievement and the universe could never be different from its present state. As in India the apparent conflict of opposite forces was only God's play (*lila*) and the wise see through the illusion. There is no need for moral effort because there is really no goal in view—either for unit or race. In the Gayomart heresy Ahriman seems to be the product of an evil thought, somehow admitted into the mind of Good Spirit. The modern parsis say that in the *Gathas* Ahriman is never opposed to God Himself but only to His spirit; and thus Ormazd is without peer or rival as 'sole creator and primordial spirit'. But He has two faculties—beneficent and destructive or corrective—just as in Philo's division of the divine powers 'creative and kingly', or as in the hindu triad, Brahma Visnu Siva. Indeed, hindu influence cannot possibly be excluded. The parsi dislikes the term *dualistic* as applied to his creed and refuses to admit *personality* to Ahriman, who is for them but a force—or even a (platonic) negation or defect. Professor Jackson (Columbia Univ., New York) notes that in the *Gathas* the antithesis is between Spenta Mainyu and Ahriman, while the Younger Avesta boldly represents the latter as independent rival of God Himself. But in any case we may be certain that, from the very earliest times of mazdeism and in all its later picturesque mythology, Ahriman is a vividly personified potentate of separate origin, leader of the demon crew, author of all evils and doomed in the end of time to utter overthrow. Loki in norse legend is less powerful but not more personal. We may note once again that the persian outlook is optimistic for all its dualism; the norse regards the reign of Odin and the Asa as a short and

doomed interlude between two infinite periods of chaos. The affectation of an impersonal monism (in modern parsi ' rationalism ') is but the attempt of an ancient and strenuous creed of action to bring itself into line with a modern thought-current of quietism—which again can be traced back to the earliest hindu speculation. It need not be said that, if this craven compromise is successful, parsism must lose its character, its nobility and its appeal. Nor are there wanting signs to-day that this jettison is proceeding apace. The proselytizing spirit is decaying; and to-day conversions are purely nominal. Leakage to western agnosticism is common: the parsi is not likely to become mussulman or Christian nor is he attracted by the formal hinduism whose theology has so radically modified his own. The age of marriage is rising, the birthrate is falling. ' The radical wing ' of the reforming party ' says Louis Gray in an admirable article (' Missions ' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* April 1916) ' rationalize the religion until it becomes a ' travesty of its real content.' (Cf. Dhalla *Zoro. Theol.* New York 1914 and Edulji's letter to Gray of July 1915 and his *Zarathustra*, Leipzig 1906).

To return for a moment to the magians, in whom we have seen the recognized priestly leaders of the aboriginal element subdued by the aryars. One difficulty for this view lies in the name; which seems aryan and cognate with gothic *magus* (servant), old irish *mug* (so Moulton; Carnoy suggests connexion with *μηχανή*, *μαχάων* and the notion of *healing* or *devising means* of escape from evil). That they were utterly opposed to the new ruler (however cleverly they adapted themselves after Gomata's failure) is quite certain from the following facts: (1) they exposed their dead to carrion birds and dogs whereas the persians buried the corpse encased in wax: (2) they extolled the merits of next-of-kin marriage, even between mother and son—a practice abhorrent to the iranian peoples, as indeed to nearly all savage stocks: (3) their magic and omens through dreams was utterly discountenanced by orthodox parsism throughout its history: (4) their star-lore, learnt in Babel, had no counterpart in the orthodox faith which accepted, only to degrade, the planet-gods of the conquered people: (5) they hated the mountains, which the persians venerated, offering on their summit their most solemn sacrifices: (6) the festival of the *μαγοφονία* kept in mind the failure of their bold bid for political power, making the survivors (like other wizards and soothsayers) resemble that class of men *quod semper vetabitur, semper retinebitur.*

Sayce is inclined to believe that Herodotus describes the real religion of the Mede, or *Mada* (? = Scythian *manda*) amongst whom the magi formed, as it were, a levitical priesthood. Against this arose the aryan religion of the persian nobility who found a champion in Darius (rather than in the very ambiguous Cyrus and Cambyses who were perhaps elamitic polytheists). The median beliefs, introduced when Cyrus conquered Istuvegu Astyages, received a severe check on Gomata's defeat, but soon regained their vogue, owing to their claim to appease evil spirits. Meantime (he opines) Zoroaster appeared in Media, built on existing notions and practices and attracted the magi to his side. But all these theories, however suggestive, are extremely doubtful and the late date of Zoroaster is unconvincing. The *Auestre* and earlier *Vedas* cannot be far apart.

APPENDIX H

Some Ambiguous Sects

(i) Essenes and Therapeuts

The worldliness and luxury with which ommiads and abbasids alike may fairly be taxed disgusted the simple and austere, and led to a lasting divorce (as in India) between the canon-law regulating private and social life and the mere arbitrary law of government. Islam had lost its veneration for its priest- (or rather prophet-) king and a new value was placed on a rigorous and ascetic seclusion which Mahomet himself had never intended. The same tendency was marked under the jewish Maccabees where the once spiritual power had become almost wholly secularized. The reaction took the form of *Essenism* ; and though issuing on jewish soil borrowed much from other creeds. The Pharisees called the Essenes fools who ' destroyed the world '. The sect was certainly not (as Kohler, *Jewish Encyc.*) simply the ' rigorists among the Pharisees ' ; their eclectic and syncretizing system is clear proof of another origin and of a defiant attitude to formal orthodoxy. At every point the difference of habit and temper becomes apparent. On the sabbath, the Pharisees abstained even from good works, the Essenes even from natural needs. The one ascribed *some* things, the latter *all*, to Fate ; the one washed before meat, the other bathed. So far we have only a tendency to exaggerate : but we can trace a definite opposition in their *denial of marriage*, which the Pharisees, of course, held in high honour ; in their *refusal to offer animals in sacrifice* ; in their view of oil (much used among Pharisees) as a defilement ; above all, in their strange sun-worship and peculiar dualistic hopes. Ritschl seems to overlook every characteristic feature of the sect when he says that Essenism was just an organized attempt to realize the ideal of a holy nation, a kingdom of priests. In so far, it would be a counterpart to Montanism (of which extreme nonconformity, calvinists, anabaptists, quakers, is always a reissue). But Montanism was not a gnostic heresy and the gnostical element in the Essenes is too obvious to be concealed.

The Essenes appear then as a *community of cœnobites* under the Maccabees (Jonathan *161–144*). Their name may mean *silent*, or *physicians*, or *devout* ; or again, may be derived from Essa, a place. The three authors who first mention them lived in or just before cent. i A.D. Philo (+*c. 42*), Plinius the Elder (+*68*) and Josephus ; but in Pliny's account (*N. H.* v. 17) he is certainly quoting from Alexander Polyhistor who flourished between *100* and *75* B.C. Whether the order were much older than the age of the Maccabees cannot be determined ; our authors certainly err in making them very ancient. They were a special school of which one became a member, not by birth or fate, but by free choice and after hard tests and lengthy apprenticeship (like the Dervishes in Islam). They had grades within the society and the most minute ritual program for everyday life. They were pure celibates like buddhist *bhiksus*, and pure *democrats* : first in the ancient world they wholly renounced slavery and

practised communism.[1] All offices were elective, priests and judges being chosen by and from the whole body. Philo says that they preferred the country to the corrupt town, but in his *Apology* for the Jews (Eusebius *Pr. Ev.* viii 11, 12) he represents them as forming separate communities in cities and prosperous towns. So Josephus: 'they had no single city 'but dwelt apart in all'. Both jewish writers agree in estimating the number of these primitive Quakers at about 4000. In Pliny they seem to form a permanent settlement on the western coast of the Dead Sea. They adopted children to secure a succession. Riches and pleasure they despised. At initiation the neophyte handed over his property to be merged in the common stock; in cities the wage-earner did the same with his weekly earnings: indeed, without the consent of their elected presidents, they could give no help even to a needy kinsman. They were distinctly averse from cleanliness, as they wore white (?) garments until they fell away or were torn in pieces. Before sunrise they spoke of nothing profane (βεβηλὸν) and offered to the rising orb certain ancient forms of prayers as if beseeching it to emerge from darkness. They then went about their business or trade till the 5th hour; when after washing and girding themselves with a white garment, they partook of a meal in the common refectory after a solemn grace and benediction. Before and after meat they gave thanks to God the giver (χορηγόν). They returned to their employment till sunset and the evening meal at which strangers were admitted. They had their own law-courts of 100 jurors whose verdict could not be set aside. Oaths were strictly forbidden; except at the rite of admitting a neophyte after 3 years' probation, when he swore an awful oath (φρικώδεις ὅρκους) to revere God, harm no man, do justice and be faithful to all, chiefly to rulers, seeing that all power is of God. As regards the society, the newly-admitted member took oaths to cherish the truth, make modest use of power when entrusted with it, keep himself pure from unfair gain, conceal nothing from the brethren nor divulge their secrets to the outside world, even at the cost of death; to transmit the doctrines unchanged, keep secret the books of the Order and the *names of the angels*. Within the Order were found grades, curiously like the hindu caste in one respect; one of a higher grade touching an inferior must cleanse himself by bathing: here again, the *mughtasilah* or Baptists (mandeans) are recalled to our mind. Practical virtue was their aim; logic they repudiated (Philo) and to speculate on divine mysteries they believed to be a flight beyond

[1] Communism always excited and will always excite the gravest suspicions in normal men: the hermetic *sermon on the Mount* opposes κοινωνία to personal greed and may well represent a survival of therapeut influence in Egypt (*c. 300* A.D.). The Mormons are said to put their daily wage into the common stock, like the Essenes. The Nicolaitans carried the brotherly practice of the primitive church into family life, and like the cynics recommended community of wives. The bold antinomian discourse of Appion in *Clem. Hom.* will remind one how genuine was the danger of a one-sided interpretation of a good rule (cf. Ménard *Trismegistus*, lxvi Paris, Didier 1866).

human reason. No less faithfully than the outcast Samaritans, they adhered to the Mosaic Law and held its author in high respect ; they kept the Sabbath and read scripture, but (to Philo's lasting admiration) explained it by symbol and allegory. They held body to be *mortal*, soul *immortal* : this latter coming from the most subtle ether is *cajoled* and *lured* by some *potent charm of Nature into the prison-house of clay* : at death, released from its bonds as from serfdom, it soars gladly aloft to its own true home. Beyond the ocean there is a happy Elysian Field for the good, where there is neither snow nor heat (cf. *Odyssey* iv 566) ; but for the wicked a place of torment in wintry gloom. The sect is, then, a *syncretizing order within Judaism*, adopting something from the pythagorist brotherhoods (themselves largely under eastern influence) and starting that community of goods and rooted objection to oath or military service which have since been marked features in our own extreme sectaries down to Tolstoy.

Soul enmeshed in Matter : Released flies Aloft or to Western Paradise : undoubted Parsi Influence : they herald Manicheism : Therapeuts—the Contemplative Side : Solar Cult and Allegory of Old Testament : ' Syssitia ' Pentecostal Dancing.—As with the Cabbala much later, it is hopeless to apportion the obligation of the Essenes to other creeds with any precision. Lipsius believes that the original syrian religion might account for their peculiar tenets : Zeller (certainly, but not exclusively, right) makes them an offshoot of the neo-pythagorist school ; just as Philo, the devout Jew, was at the same time a convinced platonist and stoic. Perhaps both ' Pythagoras ' and the Essenes drew from the same source—the persian or zoroastrian religion (Lightfoot). Analogies with St. James' canonical epistle are brought forward by those who see in them merely the primitive Christians. But the early communism, entertainment of visitors from other branches, obedience to the State and avoidance of light oaths, need only imply that Christians shared in the ideas, as well as the best ideals, of their age. However disguised by their allowance of marriage for the world, only abstaining themselves (like catholic priests), their religion is a form of dualism which foreshadows the great development of cent. iii. ' Escape ' from matter ' says Keim ' was the grand problem of essenism.'

It is probable that they imbibed, without conscious indebtedness to any specific school, most of the floating doctrines of their time—the hellenistic age. Zeller, ' Essener und Orphiker ' *Zeits. für wissens. Theol.* 1899, relates them with the new pythagorists who once more revived the old orphic beliefs : but the Essenes were not vegetarians and held no elaborate theories of the Soul's pilgrimage after death. It is impossible (with Moffatt *Enc. Rel. Eth.* v 401) to exclude the *parsi* element to which rightly Lightfoot and Cheyne refer ; nor can we safely belittle the witness to their sun-worship at dawn (cf. E. A. Abbott *Notes N. T. Criticism* 1907). Most certainly denial of marriage and ascetic practice did not belong to the original creed; but these features came from the universal prejudice of that world-renouncing yet cosmopolitan enlightenment after Alexander, and certainly reappear in Mani and his kindred. Of hellenistic theories there is ample proof: Hertzfeld (1847, 57), Friedländer (1894), Pfleiderer (transl. 1906), Conybeare

(1898), Hönnicke (1908). Buddhist influence, (a hypothesis once held and then abandoned by Hildgenfeld (1886 *sq.*)), is now believed to be probable by many students.—Among minor points may be noted that they did not send out missioners ; there is no trace of propaganda in Asia Minor or Italy. Their dislike of women has been attributed by D. Plooij (in monographs on Essenes 1902 and 1905) to be an interpolation of Eusebius and not to be found in Philo's original text ; but it is clear that some of the lower grades were permitted to marry, and of these Josephus (*B. J.* viii § 13) makes a separate order. They were indifferent to chiliasm and messianic hopes. They were not a hereditary body like the Rechabites nor is their *ascesis* similar. They were a gild or corporation spiritually recruited, and concealing under a formal observance of Mosaism a world-renouncing theory which was in effect a complete repudiation. Moffatt is right in detecting in the sect ' elements which point to a palestinian ' syncretism, enriched from some foreign and possibly oriental sources '.

Philo is the sole author to whom we can appeal for the similar Order of *Therapeuts* in Egypt, without a doubt the precursors of later eremitism there. These to him represent the *contemplative* life as the Essenes the *practical*. Their headquarters were on the Mareotic Lake ; he does not know if their name meant *physicians* or *servants*. Prayer and meditation seem to have been their whole business. They lived in a sort of village of mean huts, each having a chamber set apart for study and orison, into which nothing was brought but the Law, Prophets and Psalms. Like the Essenes, they prayed at sunrise and sunset ; devoting the interval to an allegorizing study of Scripture, on which subject some of their leaders had written books. They only gave attention to the body and its needs during the hours of darkness ; some ate every second day only, for others a weekly meal sufficed. The Sabbath they kept both as holy day and holiday ; indulging then in rye bread flavoured with salt and hyssop, and meeting in common assembly to listen to the discourse of an elder. Their women, as in some Druze churches, were screened off from the men. Their great festival was Pentecost, when they met in white robes and, after raising eyes and hands to heaven in prayer, sat down in the order of their admission, men to the right, women to the left : they ate served by the youngest members of the Order,—for they held slavery in abhorrence—but before meat they listened to a devout discourse on the symbolic meaning and spiritual truth of the Law. This they applauded and then sang hymns both new and old, for they had amongst them skilled writers of hymnody. After the simple meal, there was kept an all-night ' watch-service ' (or *pervigilium*) with antiphonal chanting and choral dancing, like that of Moses and Miriam at the Red Sea. At sunrise, turning to the east and praying that truth might enlighten them, they returned to their private studies.

Egyptian Influence : Parents of Modern Non-Gnostical Dissent.—Chæremon the stoic (in Porphyry, *de Abstin.* iv 6) seems to have seen the survival of this school or ' system ' (σύστημα) for the resemblances in his account are worthy of note (as to gait, posture and eating hyssop with bread). Strabo's account (xi 29) of the large priestly college at On for astronomy and other

studies refers, of course, to a purely egyptian foundation. The new creed may well have gained adherents among the Order of Therapeuts and certainly borrowed from its semi-monastic and recluse tendencies. A *general* likeness to the Essenes will be noted, but the two branches, no doubt, arose separately and from quite different needs. If Persia exerted influence on the one sect, Egypt was assuredly the parent and guide of the other; so far as a common establishment was a feature, directed to the ends of study, mutual help and edifying discourse. The allegorism of mystics who defied usage and disparaged the letter is a feature common to the Sapiential Books down to Philo. Still more plainly than in the sister-sect we trace the well-known features of modern nonconformity; the Pentecostal Dancers are indeed lineal descendants.

(ii) Nazarenes and Ebionites: the Earlier Form of the 'Clementines'.

(A). Nazarenes (Ναζωραῖοι) are said by Epiphanius (*370* A.D.) to be a jewish-christian sect in Cœle-Syria and Decapolis, dating their settlement there (near Pella) from the flight of the community before the siege of Jerusalem: (it is not a little curious that Plinius the Elder, writing at this same time, should speak of the *Nazirenorum Tetrarchia*, which we now identify with the *Nosairi* or ansariyeh sect already mentioned). By Epiphanius' account we learn that they were simple Jews accepting our Saviour's divine sonship and resurrection; we cannot gather if they held cerinthian views. Jerome writing to St. Austin (*Ep.* 79) speaks of them as orthodox in regard to the Virgin-birth, the Passion and the resurrection; and seems to limit their nonconformity to a close adherence to jewish rite and tradition in respect of meats, Sabbath observance and circumcision; but they allowed the apostolate of St. Paul and the independent rites of heathen-Christians. It is now maintained by most scholars that the body thus described must be identified with the *Ebionites*, who had become more orthodox by lapse of time.

(B) *Irenæus* says clearly that the Ebionites held cerinthian views upon Christ's person and rejected Paul as an apostate (*adv. Hær.* i 26). *Origen* (*c. Cels.* v 61 and in Matt. xvi 12) divides them into two classes, saying that all alike reject St. Paul's apostolate, while some accept and some reject the Virgin-birth. Eusebius adds that even the former do not hold the preëxistence of our Lord as the λόγος and σοφία of God. Amongst them extreme chiliastic views were popular and Jerusalem was destined by the sect to be the capital of a new messianic kingdom. It seems likely that, while some may have fled to Syria in *70* A.D. another great exodus took place in *135* after Hadrian's final edict of expulsion. These represent the more conservative judaizing sect, who called themselves the *Poor Brethren* (compare *Beghards* and others in the west), and looked for a literal accomplishment of the promises made in the Sermon on the Mount. They were not speculative theologians but rather rejected dogma, holding fast instead to custom and pharisaic tradition

(C) About *200* A.D., at a time of much thought-ferment (in pagan as well as Christian world, cf. works of Philostratus and the solar cult of the

imperial syrian house at Rome), a blend of essene and Christian doctrine arose in the *Elkesaites* who accepted the *Book of Elkesai*, brought to Rome by Alcibiades of Syrian Apamea. 'Christ was an angel born of human 'parents and had appeared before, as Adam and Moses' (kinship with the *Clementines* is obvious); 'he was merely prophet and instructor: he 'could not annul the Mosaic Law, and Paul was mistaken. Baptism is to be 'repeated as a (magical) purging from sin and a prophylactic against 'disease: the sinner is immersed in water in the name of the most High 'God and invokes the seven witnesses, the holy spirits, the angels of 'prayer, together with sky water earth salt and oil.' They abstained from meat and borrowing perhaps from Babylon and the gnostics entertained many fancies from astrology interwoven with their tenets. Ebionites lingered east of the Jordan, along with traces of a frankly pagan rationalism, until the tide of Islam swept over the country in cent. vii. Whether absorbed by Islam or not, it is certain that the ebionite-nazarean tradition helped in no small degree the peculiar incarnationist theories of the muslim sects,—the Shiites, Ismailians, and Druzes.

(D) From this same centre too emanated the *Clementine Homilies* and *Recognitions*; the first edition of which may fairly be fixed at the reign of Valerian's son Gallienus (*c. 265* A.D.) about 45 years later than Alcibiades' visit to Rome. The two extant works, clearly the product of a judaizing syncretism, are revisions of a lost original,—a pleasing romance by Clement of Rome, telling how he travelled with St. Peter and found his own family by whom he had been lost in childhood—a typical ἀναγνωρισμὸς of attic comedy. Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxx 15) says that the essene or ebionite Christians use the 'Circuits (περιόδοι) of Peter', written by Clement's hand but so falsified by them that only a few genuine parts are left. He shows how far their interpolations are from true clementine teaching; they favour marriage even in apostles and think lightly of the prophets between Moses and Christ, who is the 'true Prophet'. But Clement on the other hand praised and enjoined celibacy, holding in honour Samson, Elijah and David. St. Peter, he complains, was misrepresented in many ways, as being baptized every day (cf. the Sabians) and as carefully abstaining from all animal food. This book, the *Circuits of Peter*, contained then a record of Peter's journey and discussions from Cæsarea northward to Antioch along the syrian coast, wherein he met and refuted various typical phases of thought,—Simon Magus, Appion the Alexandrine philosopher, and Faustus the astrologer and fatalist (who turns out to be Clement's own father). Eusebius clearly believed it to be a recent and impudent forgery. Its standpoint is that of a judaizing Christian sect, still holding to essene practices; and the Essenes (as we saw) were Jews who showed traces of alien and exotic influence though claiming to be pure Mosaists. They held a doubtful place on the fringe or confines of Judaism and their descendants the gnostic Elkesaites, were in the same plight: syncretists, like Alcibiades and the teacher named by Origen as appearing about *245* in Cæsarea (Eusebius, *Chron.* vi 38). We are now aware how much in future development depended upon this revival of religious activity in Syria about this time. A local cult had enjoyed a short and inglorious

triumph in Rome itself under 'Elagabal' (*218–222*), but traces of its syncretism are found in later Islam and its influence is by no means confined to the eastern world. Now the *Circuits* do not represent a flat and defiant sectarian creed: Harnack even believes that the work was of Catholic origin: it knew no baptism distinct from the usual Christian rite; was it not then rather a later and modified Essenism approaching the orthodox standpoint? As to its date it would not be (with Hort) written about *200* but *after 250* (at which time the syrian *Didascalia* is quite silent about any romantic visit of Simon Magus to Cæsarea). The *Circuits* suggest as their place of origin one of the cities south of Antioch, perhaps Laodicea, where the story reaches its *dénouement*: it is no longer possible with Waitz and Harnack to believe it written in Rome or indeed in any region outside Syria. But even this is a composite document: it had an archetype in the *Preachings of Peter* (*c. 200* A.D.), containing no reference to Christ, but strong ebionitic features and a distinct hatred for St. Paul. We may feel some surprise that these were not modified in the later works: but the atmosphere was still similar, jewish-christian sentiment prevailing in eastern Syria. The *Preachings* betrayed one feature of profound significance: the dualism of the two kingdoms, the present world (as in Lactantius' interpolator) being wholly surrendered to the Devil and the millennium being given over to the Angel, Christ. The *Circuits* aimed to present the true faith of Christians in a broad and favourable light, as the final form of God's self-revealing process through His chief prophets Moses and Christ. It was written in a liberal and tolerant spirit to win over Jews and philosophers, the latter being mainly pagans of a high culture who in that neoplatonic age (under Emperors Valerian and Gallienus), desired a means of intercourse with God. The religious pagan world was restless and disquieted: a new 'apologetic' was prepared and such a book in the hands of catechumens might win favour by its pleasing element of romance, while deeper doctrines could be added later. The two profoundly heterodox abridgements of the earlier and longer volume are each written from a different standpoint; the *Homilies* are more dogmatic; the *Recognitions* pay most heed to a romantic and edifying narrative which will interest and attract. They arose independently in different semi-pagan circles widely separated in religious belief: but both are products of Syria.

(iii) Further Note on Ebionism

Beveridge (Ebionism: *Enc. Rel. Eth.*) has marshalled very clearly the discrepant accounts and judgements of this obscure movement. One or two points may here be brought out. Ebionism was an *impersonal* movement, as it were, on the part of those who wished to exalt the Law and depreciate Christ. For the sect, He derives His value and significance *only* as *republishing* the True Law. It is thus analogous to movements in buddhism (where the meaning of the historic prophet was overlooked); in *Islam* (where the Coran was regarded as external and uncreate); in english and foreign *deism* of a much later date wherein Christ is held in honour merely as teacher of a simple Law of Nature now forgotten by mankind. Within the body thus wishing to reinstate Law and disparage

the work of the Redeemer, there were of course grades of antipathy to Christian dogma: some acknowledging the Virgin-birth (like primitive socinians in a later age), others with Cerinth believing our Lord to be Joseph and Mary's son (φιλὸς ἄνθρωπος). If the former school be termed *Nazarene*, the latter are the *Ebionites*, distinctively so-called. They are termed by scholars *Pharisaic Ebionites* who accepted some gnostic ideas and held Christ in honour merely because He observed and punctually fulfilled the Law. In them we find the germs of later Adoptionism, and indeed of the peculiar tenets connected (perhaps unfairly) with the name of Nestorius: Christ became worthy by His holy life to receive the spirit at His baptism —His birthday as Messiah. The power, descending on Him from heaven, was a preëxisting hypostasis, akin to the *wisdom* or even the philonian λόγος at that time perfectly familiar to all. The office of this mediating being was merely *prophetic* and in no sense *redemptive*: before the Passion the spiritual power abandoned its victim or its instrument.

A *third* division is that in which, far more clearly than in pharisaic ebionism, a gnostic and essene heterodoxy is to be detected. From Epiph. xxx 2, 4 etc. we gather that while the Ebionites agreed with the former judaizing sect, they also held the peculiar Incarnationism that we must so often notice. Some believed Adam and Christ were one and the same: others, that the great second god, created before the angels, descended successively as the Recurrent Prophet, until at His last coming He suffered death, clothed in Adam's body, to rise again in glory. This Christ is only the 'Prophet of Truth', republisher of the Mosaic Law; and Jesus on account of his merits deserved to be united to him. They were ascetic vegetarians like the disciples of Buddha, but their once strict views in regard to marriage had been seemingly modified by the time of Epiphanius. For the further development in Ebionism, Beveridge is clear that *Essenism* must be held responsible. This 'gnostic Judaism' shows such an emphatic repudiation of the ideals and beliefs of the normal jew that outside influence must be invoked for its proper understanding—whether *pythagorist* (Zeller), *parsi* (Lightfoot), or both (Schürer).

The Recurrent Prophet in the Elkesaite sect is of course a further extension of the dogma; and the report of Hippolytus is fully borne out by Origen, his younger contemporary and by Epiphanius at a much later date. The *Clementines* presuppose the book and dogma of the Elkesaites and to this view all scholars (except perhaps Ritschl) seem to agree. The *latin* 'Recognitions' may be the earlier form and the version less utterly abhorrent to catholic orthodoxy. The doctrine is simply this; the Gospel offers a genuine and purified Mosaism, and Adam and Christ are one. He is the True Prophet—for it is *knowledge* not *redemption* that man wants in order to lead a happy life and attain the chief good (cf. besides passages quoted elsewhere from 'Homilies' the *greek* and most heretical version *Recogn.* i 16, 40, 41, 45). To accept Moses or Christ is the same thing. The Christology of this wider Judaism is purely Arian; Christ is not in any true sense divine (*Homil.* xvi 15). If Harnack can see in this treatise 'a '*catholic* revision of a *heterodox* original' we can only say *aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus*.

APPENDIX I

Further Notes on the Sources and Affinities of Gnosis

(i) The Systems of Valentine and Basilides

A. Basilides *c. 125–150* A.D. : **His Sources** (*a*) **Iranian.**—The two principal names in *gnosis* are Basilides and Valentine, both coevals,[1] both gathering older tradition into a system : one, an advanced and consistent *dualist* (with scarcely any relation to the gospel) ; the other, the nearest to the Christian church in spirit and doctrine of all heathen gnostical thinkers. There is no doubt of the iranian affinities of *Basilides* ; before he came to Egypt he is said (*Acta Archelai et Manetis* § 55) to have preached among the Persians, and he appealed to Bar-kabbas and Bar-Koph as eastern prophets (Agrippa *apud* Eusebium *H. E.* iv 7). Indeed, upon the prophecy of the latter, his son Isidore wrote comments, and also referred to Cham, that is, Nimrod or Zoroaster (Clem. Alex. *Str.* vi 6 § 53)[2]. Basilides lays claim to the wisdom of the Barbarians and sets out a scheme of pure *iranian dualism*, which has lost the happy confidence and enterprise of the older mazdean faith. The name of the persian god Mitra, or Mithras, is represented by the numeral 365 ; hence Basilides' heavens are of the same number, ' daily aspects of the sky ' (Irenæ. i 24). The 5 (Irenæ. *l.c.*) or 7 (Clem. *Str.* iv 25 § 164) Hypostases round the throne of the Most High recall the Amshaspands (Ameshas-spentas) round Ormazd : an obvious counterpart to the 5 or 7 malignant sphere-spirits. Our physical world is no longer even in part the creation of a good God, but solely the work of evil powers who steal some straying light-fragments to give it life. Light and Darkness, long existing separate, ' at one moment suddenly 'perceived each other,—the one did but look and turn away, but the other

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[1] Euseb. *Chron.* dates Basilides' appearance in Alexandria at *133* A.D. under Hadrian, but Agrippa Castor (Eus. *H.E.* iv 7) wrote under the same emperor a work against the heresiarch ; he would then be slightly earlier than Valentine who lived in Rome under Popes Hyginus, Pius and Anicetus =*135–160* (Harnack *Chronol.* etc. i, 291). Justin Martyr (*c. 150*) says in his *Apology* that in the *Syntagma* he had already attacked Valentine, whose appearing may thus be placed *c. 140*. It has however been supposed by some (e.g. by Schwartz *über den Tod der Söhne Zebedæi* 1904) that the true date for Basilides (as for Satornil) must be placed *earlier*—in Trajan's reign (*98–117*) or possibly even before that. It is certain that Basilides claimed to possess a tradition from St. Matthew through a single mediant, Glaucias (Clem. *Str.* vii § 106).

[2] *Clem. Recogn.* iv 27, 28 says that, after Noah's marvellous escape from the Flood, Cham, one of his children, handed on to Mizraim, his son, the art of magic, and from him ' *Ægyptiorum et Babyloniorum et Persarum ducitur genus : hunc gentes quæ tum erant Zoroastrem appellaverunt.* Thus the secret doctrine was entrusted to Noah and through him passed in a long tradition to (1) the persian syncretists (2) the jewish cabbalists. Cf. also *Homilies* ix 3–5 (198, 9 ed. Dressel).

' seized upon the fleeting vision and from the reflection of the Light formed ' this world '.

(β) **Hellenic.**—This iranian view was now blended with the greek dualism of body and soul; hence the pure ascetism of his teaching and Isidore's emphasis on celibacy (Clem. *Str.* iii 1); again, the Saviour's mission (*Str.* ii 8 § 36) begins the process of separating the sexes, which when complete is the Restitution of all things. Salvation is found then in this; that a composite which never should have been united, *body* and *soul*, falls apart into discrete elements; *spirit* and *life* returning to its own transcendent sphere, *matter* falling once again into the nothingness from which it ought never to have been aroused. As in the Cabbala, *transmigration* of the spiritual essence was taught (Origen *Rom.* lib. v: Clem. *Exc. Theod.* 28, *Str.* iv, 12 § 85, v 11 § 75). Isidore also held a belief in *two* souls good and bad (*Str.* ii 20 § 113) which finds a parallel in Mani and the *Pistis Sophia*.

(γ) **Chaldean.**—To these iranian and hellenic elements, Babylon added her planetary gods or angels (the seven world-creators), once perhaps divine, but now demonic agencies of Fate (εἱμαρμένη), overcome by the Light-religion of Zoroaster. When this perso-babylonian syncretism comes into contact with Hebraism, the God of the Old Testament is seen in the highest angel amongst these seven Archons. In the same late, perfunctory and artificial way, the historic Christ is somehow adapted to his system. Basilides knows of Him but denies that His human nature was sinless (Clem. *Str.* iv 12 § 83): the real Saviour was a docetic phantasm which descended at His baptism. Basilides was among the first to connect the mythical figure of a divine Redeemer, Soter, with the *historic* Christ. ' The ' purely mythical figure of a god-saviour ἥρως was connected first by Basilides ' with Jesus of Nazareth ' says Bousset. As with other gnostics, his real interest lay not so much in dogmatic theosophy as in the safe ascent of the soul hereafter to its true home; hence in the later school a profusion of charms, amulets, talismans and engraved gems.[1]

The *names* of the 7 world-rulers are a secret of potency, as Josephus tells us of the Essenes who on initiation swear not to disclose these titles συντηρήσειν τά τε βιβλία τῆς αἱρέσεως κ. τὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων ὀνόματα (*B.J.* ii 8 § 7). Armed with these, the soul ascends fearlessly through the several spheres of his enemies; the Æon Christ had used the potent name *Caulacau* as a passport down to earth and up to heaven again.

(δ) **Egypt.**—This *magical* tendency may be a later development of the school, just as the theurgy of Iamblich in Platonism. In any case it bears a

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[1] *Abraxas* or *Abrasax*: see L. W. King's valuable works on gnostic art: many critics however doubt the connexion of these gems with Basilidianism. Harnack (*Altchrist. Liter.* i 161): ' It is doubtful whether even a single ' Abraxas gem is Basilidian.' Peake (*Enc. Rel. Eth.* ii 429): ' It is now ' generally agreed that if any connexion existed it was of the slightest ' kind, most of the gems being of pagan origin '. Like the greek words for *Mitra* and *Nile* it was equivalent to the number 365—the number of heavens in the somewhat ambiguous Basilidian system, expounded by Irenæus (cf. Hieronymus *in Amos* 3, Vallarsi VI i, 157).

close resemblance to egyptian practice under the later Empire (*1500–1300* B.C.). One chapter of the Coffin Texts is 'On ascending to the sky where 'Re is' (Lacau vi *Rec.* 26, 225), 'On becoming one revered by the King' sungod (the chapter being a magical formula for ascending to the sky xv 27, 53). In the seventeenth chapter of the *Book of the Dead* the deceased man identifies himself with the sungod: 'I am Atum, I am Re . . . I was 'yesterday, I know to-morrow, *I know the name* of the great God'. This notion, that to know the *name* of a god acts as passport and safe-conduct through his realm, is at least as old as King Pepy of Dyn. vi in Egypt (*2500* B.C. at the latest, according to the modern Berlin computation): if the four curly-haired guards of the ferryboat delay at the king's summons he threatens them thus: 'This king Pepy will *publish* this your name to 'the people' (*Pyram. Utter.* § 1223). Pharaoh raising himself like 'an elemental colossus' (Breasted) confronts the gods fearlessly—even the Sungod himself: 'I know thy name; Limitless is thy name; of this 'name I am not ignorant . . . the birth of Limitless shall be prevented, 'if thou dost hinder King Pepy from coming where thou art' (§ 1434). The new emphasis on the hereafter as a place of ordeals and perils created the Coffin Texts and the Book of the Dead (which is merely an authorized collection of them); in them we find little beyond a series of charms against spiritual foes on the borderland, 'dwellers on the threshold'. The priests devised a chart for the soul's future journey; through the fire-gate at the outset and thence by two possible routes, by land or water, with a fiery lake between: the dead are to be careful not to enter the 'place of execution of the gods' lxiii. *Rec.* 31, 20, and there is a chapter of caution about 'not walking head downwards', xliv, *Rec.* 30, 193. There were many charms which enabled the happy possessor to reach the hereafter intact and whole: he is taught how to avoid losing his mouth, head, heart; how to remember his own name, to breathe, eat and drink; how to ward off demon-snakes and keep his drinking water from vanishing in flame. The efficacy of such magic in the world beyond was the chief solvent of a true religious spirit in Egypt and paved the way for an exceedingly secular theocracy in the next period.

Precursor of Manicheism.—Basilides, then, represents a pre-Christian development of iranian belief which is closely akin to Satornil's theories. It is marked by the absence of the Mother-Goddess Sophia, the fallen female round whom other gnostic systems collect their romantic legends. Nor is there any trace of a 'fall within the Absolute' and all movement takes place from below until the Saviour is sent. It is impossible not to see in this apostle an immediate precursor of Mani, whose creed merely carries on the Basilidian[1] tenets.

[1] It is worthy of notice, in support of the *dualistic* interpretation of Basilides, that the keen critic Jerome states that there were followers of this sect in Spain in his days. Technically he is wrong; the school never seems to have passed beyond Egypt where Epiphanius (xxiv 1) believed it to be still existing in *c. 390–400* A.D. But there were Manichees in Spain then

It has been thought well to set forth the hypothesis of the persian origin of Basilides—such as Bousset prefers, following the *Acta Archelai et Manetis* and denying to the accounts or references of the Fathers (Irenæus, Hippolytus, Origen) any authentic value.[1] We have thus been able to show this heretic as a step onwards towards Mani, as gathering together the fragments of *parsi* dualism into a coherent system. But it need scarcely be said that no subject is more doubtful than the precise teaching of Basilides. A whole library of polemic has been composed as to the version to be followed, whether that of Irenæus or Hippolytus (*Philosoph.* ed. princ. 1851). To present clearness in a matter so obscure, we will consider in contrast to the *parsi* dualism just expounded the *buddhist* monism as we find it in this latter author. Here once again we must repeat the caution as to surmises on *oriental* influences ; and we use the term *buddhist* only to emphasize kindred doctrine not to dogmatize on loans and sources. Yet the positive indebtedness to the hindu philosophy is warmly maintained by Pfleiderer (*Urchristentum* 1902).[2] It is enough for us to point the coincidences as we find the system portrayed in Hippolytus. First, there is no abrupt *parsi* dualism, but a *monism* which posits an Absolute nothing, beyond all predicates, yet at the same time source of all being. In this deity arises *will* (as in the Vedas, *kama*), will to create a world. God deposits a non-existent seed containing all future potencies : the doctrine of Emanation is most explicitly rejected. In this fact some students see the ' fundamental difference ' between Basilides and other gnostics. His scheme (as will be seen) works upwards—the natural tendency of all being ; it is an evolution from Anaxagoras ' πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ or confusion to an orderly arrangement of ranks. This is the ' goal of history ' (Peake). It is suggested that his theory was ' consciously elaborated ' in antagonism to the emanatist views then prevailing at Alexandria—a theory of which Valentine may have been the coryphæus. The *triple sonship* contained in the cosmic seed corresponds to the 3 grades—*pneumatic, psychic, hylic*—of other systems and there is therefore the same *necessitarian* ethics : for our destiny is but the working out of an original nature. (Herein Basilides cannot be said to follow the spirit of *buddhism* with fidelity.) The Great Archon bursts from the seed to become world-ruler, believing himself the highest being and residing in the highest firmament : he, with his son fairer and wiser than himself in the Ogdoad, creates the upper world down to the moon ; below this a second Archon, emerging from the seed and residing in the Hebdomad, moulds the lowest creation, with the help and advice of his son, also fairer and wiser than himself. Meantime 2 orders

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(as we know by the later phenomenon of priscillianism) and in this doctrine were gnostic elements (Hieron. *Epist* 75 ; *ad Vigil.* 6).

[1] Krüger also (article Herzog-Hauck) dismisses Hippolytus' witness and bases his view on *Acta Arch.* and Clement's references—treating Irenæus as secondary.

[2] Cf. the discussion by Kennedy (*Journ. Roy. Asi. Soc. 1902* ' Buddhist Gnosticisms ') : Watson's *Philos. Basis of Rel.* 1907, also Clemen, *Religiongesch. Erklärung* 1909.

of the *triple sonship* had already fled aloft to the god who is no-thing (μὴ ὤν quite frankly) : and the firmament, where First Archon was arrested in his flight and established his empire, is none other than Holy Spirit which having assisted Second Sonship to rise is yet unable to follow it into the abyss of deity. It will be noted that there is *no descent* either in compassion or through sin of a celestial being. ' Ascent, not descent, is the ' law of the Universe ' : the natural tendency of all things is upwards. The process is thus one of *evolution*, not, as in platonism and before it in other gnostic schools, of *degeneracy*. All this is but a *metaphysical* prelude to the *practical* problem—rescue of the sonship yet entangled in the lower world. The First Archon learnt the secret that he was not highest in the scale of being and reverently accepted the humiliating truth. It was revealed to him by his wiser son who had himself (as naptha) caught the irradiating flash from the pure Sonship aloft. The truth descended from the Ogdoad to the Hebdomad where all the 365 heavens hailed it with gladness ; so it passed to the Son of Mary who became its prophet in the lowest world. It was his part to sort out the various grades of being, lying tangled together in the world, and to range them in proper classes. All these kinds were combined in him,—so that he becomes (as for Irenæus) the ' recapitulator ' of all the creatures ; like the microcosm or Primal Man (with some reserve). Like Ishtar he ascends to the highest heaven, leaving at each stage in the journey the part fitted to abide there. The Third Sonship followed him, undergoing the same spiritual cleansing ; and *spiritual* men still left on earth must follow its example if they desire release. When all who can have passed to the non-existent god, the Great Ignorance will come and hide from the eyes of each rank the knowledge of its Superiors. For all pain comes from longing for that which is unattainable ; and to pass into a region for which a creature is unsuited is death for it. With ignorance comes contentment, the happiness of all orders and the Restitution of all things. This Third Sonship, which since Christ's ascension has passed into heaven, may stand for the spiritual or *noëric* principle still blended with matter. It is a ' pilgrim and sojourner ' in this world because in its very nature it belongs to the supramundane, like the νοῦς of Aristotle. ' That portion of mankind ' says Peake ' which is chosen [or predestinate] to rise ' to the highest sphere cannot properly belong to the world from which ' it is destined to escape '. The *ethics* of the founder (as revealed by Clement) are not difficult to adjust to this theory of ' deliverance '. Basilides seems to take seriously the old savage doctrine of the *multiple soul* : the reasonable soul has ' appendages ' or rather spirit companions in its passions—qualities of animals, of plants, even of things without life. These foreign elements adhere to the central soul—a leibnizian sovereign-monad—and allow it no rest. Isidore (the son) wrote a treatise on the *Parasitic Soul* (cf. a chapter in Drummond's once popular *Natural Law* etc.). In the interests of the moral will he urged that we must not throw the blame upon these appendages (περιαρτήματα) for our sins. Fully accepting the dogma, he insists that the rational soul must be master in its own house. From Origen (*in Ep. Roman.*) we may gather that this belief formed a basis for a theory of *metempsychosis* : the soul brings with it various inferior elements

from the several incarnations in which it has been associated with them. Pfleiderer sees in this theory of the *parasitic* passions yet another proof of buddhist origin. The quintessence of hindu ethics seems to him to be comprised in the maxims: 'one should love all since all are related to the 'whole' and 'desire nothing, hate nothing' (Clem. *Str.* iv 12). We may note here that Pfl. in order to effect a certain compromise between the conflicting accounts, traces 2 distinct stages in development; a syrian period, represented by Iren. and Epiph.; an alexandrine, to which Hippolytus, Clement, and Origen bear testimony.

Students, anxious to examine further into the controversy as to Hippolytus' trustworthiness, must be referred to the great encyclopedias and more recent monographs—e.g. Hort in *Dict. Christ. Biogr.*; and Hilgenfeld's writings (since 1856), who sums up, in his latest work on the history of heresy, his almost vindictive attack on the 'uncritical bishop'. He is followed by Lipsius, Harnack and Bousset. Salmon started the idea (in 1885) that the difficult *monistic* version was a forgery: Zahn and Stähelin, Schmidt and Krüger, followed him. To-day, this belief seems losing ground: Harnack seems to doubt his former judgment, and Anz and Drummond, Bousset and Bardenhewer believe it to be an authentic document. Bousset believes Hipp. version to be a *monistic* transformation of an original system (under what influence he does not clearly say). It is clear that the determining factor in the mind of the student is largely his preconception of what a gnostic system *ought* to be: an *à priori* judgment which perhaps unconsciously colours his deliberate theory. Schmidt, who thinks that *emanation* is the core of *gnosis* rejects Hipp. *monism* because it has no trace of a divine explication; because evolution from below is a hypothesis wholly wanting from the schools (*Gnost. Schrift.* etc. 1892). On the other hand Bousset entirely denies the relevance of the doctrine: 'it is 'found only in a few systems and in none as in the basilidian': he has, since his *Hauptprobleme*, somewhat modified the latter view. 'Everywhere 'else the stress lies not on the thought of a gradual emanation and degener-'ation of the Æons but on the sudden Fall of one of them. The question 'as to the origin of the idea of emanation is *fairly irrelevant* for the proper 'understanding of *gnosis*' (H. 329).

I refrain from further details of the version of Irenæus: I wholly agree with Peake's judgment: 'the system as so presented goes on very 'conventional lines: it is quite a *commonplace presentation* of ordinary 'gnostic beliefs, and it is not easy to understand why Basilides gained his 'immense reputation, if he were capable of nothing better. . . . We are 'probably justified in treating Iren. as a *secondary authority*, who employed 'a source describing a degenerate development, far removed alike in 'speculative power and ethical elevation from the founder'.

B. Valentine: his Christian Affinities.—Valentine the Egyptian is perhaps the only gnostic—if we except the earnest commentator Basilides—who betrays a firsthand acquaintance and sympathy with the church, Tertullian (*adv. Val.* 4) even calls him a disappointed candidate for the see of Rome and in consequence the leader of a schismatic party; but this story is told of many other heresiarchs. He did not, like Marcion, break

with the Catholics at the outset, but endeavoured to maintain himself and his tenets within the pale. Of all the sectarians he effected the nearest approach to Christian dogma; and for a long time avoided any open breach. He modified the acute *dualism* of other (oriental) schools with a *monistic* tendency, adopted johannine names for the Æons, passed a favourable verdict on the Demiurge (the God of Old Testament Scripture) made his famous three-fold division of mankind in the interest of the catholic *psychics*, used Christian baptism, and had far more respect than is to be found in other systems for the historic personage of our Saviour in his *Christlehre*. His followers certainly used the Four Gospels and the Pauline Epistles; of these, both Ptolemy and Heracleon wrote comments or introductions to St. John's Gospel. They held also the Old Testament in veneration and did not subscribe to Marcion's abuse. Ptolemy in his *Letter to Flora* (Epiph. *Hær.* xxxiii 3) is shocked that the Old Testament should be attributed to the devil; and believes that he can detect a triple strain in its texture—laws directly given by God Himself, Moses' own additions, and the tradition (interpolated) of the elders. So much for this spirited attempt at a compromise with catholic doctrine.

Central Point: Doctrine of the Mother-Goddess.—As to the actual theory of the founder of the school, it is not easy to speak with any certainty, for the Valentinian disciples are at least as important as Valentine. Secundus, we know, was the author of the division of Sophia into mother and daughter; Colorbases was another and a teacher of Marcus (Irenæus ii 2; i 14); Ptolemy and Marcus both had a numerous train of pupils; Heracleon, with Ptolemy, represents the *italian* as opposed to the *anatolian* branch of this sect. We may perhaps recover Valentine's own authentic teaching from Iren. i 11 where it is explicitly connected with the *gnostics* 'falsely so-called', who made an exclusive claim to the title. These were worshippers of the Mother-goddess of Syria, sometimes the stern and austere dweller in heaven like Artemis, sometimes as a goddess of love. In her celestial form she dwells in the 8th or furthest heaven (*ogdoad*) next to the Unknown and Nameless Father; below are the Seven World Creators or planetary angels, each with his distinct sphere, of whom the chief is Ialdabaoth. The true gnostics claim to be children of this heavenly Mother, whose divine spark is somehow entrapped in the gross material of this world.[1] Their cult, sacraments and symbols were means to secure the return journey upwards after death. She was (at least in part of her divine nature) a fallen goddess immersed in the material world and set free by a Redeemer, as the gnostics, her children, must be. This is a strictly Osirian feature, for that somewhat impassive God falls into the underworld and is rescued by Horus his son; every pious worshipper becomes, not merely *like* Osiris, but an Osiris himself. Kindred myths are found in greek legend (Andromeda and Ariadne) and in world-wide folk-stories of the imprisoned Princess or the Sleeping Beauty who waits

[1] Joseph. *B.J.* ii 8, 11, Essenes believe ψυχὰς ἐκ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου φοιτώσας αἰθέρος συμπλέκεσθαι ὥσπερ εἱρκταῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, ἴυγγί τινι φυσικῇ καταδεθείσας (cf. 583).

for her deliverer. Cognate too is the Jewish 'Spirit of God' which 'moved 'upon the face of the waters'. In another form this heavenly Goddess *Sophia*, is considered as herself a demiurge or world-creating power and the highest Angel of the Spheres, Ialdabaoth being her son. Finally by her side stands a male redemptive deity, her heavenly consort, as Eros to Psyche, whose spiritual marriage with the fallen goddess is itself the climax of the deliverance. They are expressly called 'bride and bridegroom'. With this myth the descent of an Æon upon Jesus of Nazareth at His Baptism is very loosely and externally combined.

Other Mythic Figures: Achamoth, Anthropos, Horus, Ialdabaoth.—Such in general was the primitive *gnosis*, and Valentine follows it closely. The Mother-Goddess stands always at the centre. In the early form of the theosophy it was a *male* Æon who fell 'ruining down the illimitable inane' from heaven and the Pleroma to begin the drama of world-development (Iren. i 11, *Exc. Theod.* § 31, and Hippol. *Syntagma*). But Secundus introduces a refined distinction: the higher Wisdom still remains in the upper world even after her presumptuous craving to know the Abyss of deity?; but her abortive offspring (ὥσπερ ἔκτρωμα) is a new and independent being Sophia Achamoth, whose sighs and tears beget the visible world. Meantime '*Anthropos*, a leading figure in primitive gnosticism but now half 'forgotten, moves back into the centre of the system and the direct vicinity 'of the fallen goddess' (W. Bousset of Göttingen). This is the Primal Man, Osiris, who in the early mythology had sunk into matter and raised himself again; the community of the faithful attach themselves closely to him and secure the very same deliverance. Another strongly egyptian trait, part of the founder's authentic doctrine, is *Horus*, the Limiter (as the Hellenists interpreted the name). His office is to keep the fallen Æons separate from the light-world; in the later phases he is to be seen shaping the disorderly chaos which marked the passage of Achamoth into a visible world: he is also called *Stauros*—no doubt in the Platonic sense of a world-soul stretched like X across and again across the universe, not with any definite Christian meaning. Another point worthy of remark is the acquittal of the world-teacher Ialdabaoth. This *demiurge* (Iren. i 29 etc.) is at first an evil and malicious spirit of a fallen mother-goddess already deprived of light. In later Valentinian systems (and no doubt in his own teaching as well) he is rather the offspring of her praiseworthy tears of remorse and repentance. He loses his name of evil import and becomes the Platonic world-builder, the God of Old Testament, the First Person of the Christian Trinity. (His precise relation to Horus the world-orderer does not appear.)

The Sacred Wedlock.—The *redemption* comes about by means of the heavenly marriage; for the Goddess, by becoming Soter's bride. This *Saviour* is the most ambiguous, if the most indispensable, figure in Valentine's soteriology: in Iren. i 30 he is the heavenly *Christus* who turns to help his fallen and penitent sister. In Valentine's own early system he is sometimes connected with the Æon *Christus*, sometimes with *Anthropos* (Primal Man), sometimes again with Horus (ὅρος). In Ptolemy's mythology, he is a curious joint product of the whole Pleroma, each of the Æons (like a fairy godmother in a folk-story) lavishing its best gift upon

him until (like the babylonian Marduk) he becomes the epitome of all divinities. Such is the bridegroom, whose coming in the guise of the fairy prince sets the captive free. The aim of their pious practice is to repeat mystically in themselves the experience of this spiritual union between Soter and Sophia. The heavenly escort of the groomsmen are the spouses of the believers' souls : every gnostic has his angel (*fravashi* of *later* zoroastrian belief) standing in God's presence. The final eschatology or completion of the great drama of deliverance is thus conceived : the Soter bears off his bride Sophia into the Pleroma [1] and the gnostics with their angelic spouses follow in their train ; the *demiurge* with his *psychic* believers ascends into the Ogdoad or Achamoth's heaven ; and the world of matter, as in the norse *ragnarok* or stoic ἐκπύρωσις, sinks into flames.

The Heavenly Bridegroom or Divine Comrade.—Their chief sacrament (as in greek nature-mysteries) was the rite of the Bridal-chamber : ' a ' few prepare (Iren. i 21) a *thalamon* and go through a form of consecration ' with certain set phrases, repeated over the candidate also, which state ' that a spiritual union is to be consummated on the model of the higher ' Syzygy '. A fragment of the former actually survives : ' I will confer ' my favour upon thee, for the Father of All beholds thine angel ever before ' His face . . . it is meet that we become as one . . . deck thyself as ' bride for *bridegroom* that thou mayest become as I am and I as thou art . . . ' receive the bridegroom and give place to him, open thine arms to embrace ' him '. Here once again we have a further witness to Valentine's egyptian origin : the *ka*, as we saw in an earlier section, is not really a factor in the personality but a genius or comrade allotted by the god, as in the well known greek verse μυστάγωγος τοῦ βίου, guiding the fortune of his *double* in the lower world but chiefly in the world beyond ; there he abode and there he awaited the coming of his companion. Certainly in *3000–2500* B.C. this phrase was familiar as a euphemism for death, ' he goeth to his *ka* ' ; and the dead are ' those who have gone to their kas ' : sometimes ' to the ' sky ' is added. ' Call on thy ka ' it is said, ' like Osiris, that he may protect ' thee from all wrath of the dead ' (*Pyramid Texts* § 63). ' How beautiful ' it is for thee in thy ka's company for ever ! ' § 2028. He speaks to God on behalf of the dead man, introduces him to *Re* and brings him food, he is the protective genius, a tutelar. At first an exclusive privilege of the king, this *fravashi* or ' guardian angel ' became the possession of all when the cult was democratized. This is at least one source of Valentine's eclectic theory (cf. p. 557 f.).

Rite of Baptism : The New Name.—The Sacrament of *Baptism* was also important because of the magical import attached to the *new name* : the giving of this was termed deliverance or redemption (ἀπολύτρωσις). The heavenly angels (*doubles* or *kas*) have to be baptized in the same mysterious name as Jesus was, that themselves and their earthly partners may find salvation (*exc. Theod.* § 22). The last words of the rite are a

[1] To this with a curiously frank materialism, their exegesis referred the Old Testament phrase πᾶν ἄρρεν διανοῖγον μήτραν. Pan(!) the universal Saviour is male element, etc.

benediction : ' peace be over all upon whom the (sacred) Name rests ' (Iren. *l.c.*). This name will protect the Soul as it mounts aloft through the hostile potencies to the lower heaven, where Horus will give it admittance, frightening back the pursuing demon by his *magic word* (*exc. Theod.* ibid.). Before this name is invoked over the neophyte, the demonic forces (of nature) have power over him, and are summarized as Destiny (εἱμαρμένη), from which baptism only can release him (ib. § 77). A baptismal confession of faith is found (*Iren.* l.c.). ' In the name of the Unknown Father of ' All, by Alethea the Mother of All, by the name which descended upon ' Jesus '. Another formula (aramæan) began : ' In the name of Acha- ' moth ', who is the *kyrios* (or lord and hero) to the faithful, while Jesus is Soter but not Lord.

Extreme Unction : Other Talismans for the Upward Journey.—A dying man had a form of Extreme Unction, being anointed with oil and water : the object being to render the soul invisible and intangible to the Powers of the Air (Iren. i 21). The soul, just as in the formulas of the *Book of the Dead*, is entrusted with magical sentences to pronounce on the perilous upward way : ' I am a son of the Father Who was before the whole world— ' I came down to see all things, that which is strange as well as that which ' is my own ; and deep down there is nothing strange but only that which ' belongeth to Achamoth, who is the female Æon and hath created all ' things '. After the invocation the mother-goddess is said to cast the ' mantle of invisibility ', (the helmet of Homer and the folk-tales), over the now redeemed soul. The mother-goddess is always at the centre of the cult and foremost in the worshipper's mind. She may be presented in various guises (as fallen Achamoth, as the higher Sophia, as Alethea, the Eternal Father's consort), but it is always upon the Mother that the fervent piety of the gnostic is fixed.

As in Egypt, A Magical Sacramentalism : Unethical Character.—It is clear then that Valentinian pietism became, for many converts, mere *magical sacramentalism* like the later Egyptian religion. The attitude is not merely selfish and utilitarian, but tends to become distinctly sensuous and unmoral. ' All kinds of attempts ' says Bousset, ' are made actually ' to assimilate to oneself the divine through external means '. To the more refined natures this externalism was abhorrent. Some gnostics, says Irenæus, admit the value of no outward rite or practice ; *deliverance* ' being ' attained through actual *knowledge* of God's majesty, for all faultiness ' and suffering arise from ignorance . . . knowledge therefore is the true ' perfecting of the inner man '. So *Exc. Theod.* § 78, already cited :— ' But it is not Baptism alone which sets us free but knowledge (γνῶσις), ' who we were, what we have become, whither we have sunk, whither ' we hasten, whence we are redeemed, what is birth and what is rebirth '. The truest piety is to contemplate the perfection of God : man's soul is like a tavern frequented by many brawlers and evil spirits (Clem. *Str.* ii 20, 114) ' but when the Father (Who alone is good) looks down, the Soul ' is hallowed and lies in full radiance, and he who has such a heart is to be ' called happy, for he shall see God '. Further light is thrown upon a practical faith which is by no means mere magic or pessimistic quietism :

Valentine (*Str.* iv 13, 91) thus addresses the elect souls: 'Ye are from the 'beginning immortal and children of everlasting life: ye desire to divide 'Death amongst you as a prey . . . that this Death may die in you and 'through you; for if ye dissolve the world and are not yourselves dissolved 'then are ye lords over creation and over all that hasteth away'. It is easy to see that this spiritual victory may be transformed into a *superstitious* desire to work on matter for one's own profit (magic), or again, into a *scientific* interest in nature. In conclusion Valentine was a true son of Egypt, a mystic and pietist, who tried to bring his archaic system, already existing quite independently of Christian influence, into a very mechanical connexion with the Gospel.

(ii) Anti-Semitism and the Judaizers: Ophites, Cainites and Others

Snake-cult: the Old Testament Read Backwards.—On the other hand the Ophites or Naassenes (Iren. and Hippol. *Phil* v. Origen *c. C.* vi 25 and Epiph. *Hær.* xxvi) represent a purely hostile attitude to hebrew monotheism. The honour paid to the Snake (very offensive both to Jews and Christians) is a survival of primitive religion in Egypt and Babylon, and later in Hither Asia and Greece. Primal Man here appears as identical with the supreme God: his thought (ἔννοια) is *second man*: and third in this strange trinity, we find Holy Spirit (female), who gave birth to the *third man*, Christ. As son and mother flew upward to the abode of the Primal Man, a spark of light fell on the waters as Sophia, like Secundus' Achamoth. From this seed sprang Ialdabaoth (creator of the *seven* spheres of heaven) and six powers, who acting in concert made man. But the newly created being gave thanks for life not to these powers but to Primal Man: and Ialdabaoth in a rage sent Eve to destroy him. We may compare the hindu belief that the gods send female demons of great beauty to tempt man from ascetic practices which will make them equal to the gods, or even superior. Then Sophia in pity for man sends the Snake to persuade Adam and Eve to eat of the tree of knowledge; this breaks their allegiance to Ialdabaoth and a long war (recounted by the hostile party in the Old Testament) ensues. At last Sophia sends Christ and His sister Prunikos to proclaim the gospel of redemption by means of Jesus, Who is deserted by them in the moment of crucifixion. But His body is raised again and for 18 months Christ expounds, to a small circle of the elect, the secret doctrine. Then (somewhat strangely) He ascends to Ialdabaoth's right hand, and deprives him of his power and glory and receives the souls that follow Him.

Problems of this Exegesis: the Cainites.—The myth bristles with inconsistency. Ialdabaoth is said himself to create a serpent (νοῦς) from whom come evil and death as well as spirit and soul: is this what the Ophites would call the carnal wisdom of the Old Testament? Again, the serpent who brings knowledge is sometimes identified with Prunikos. The syncretism is of the familiar type: a hostile religion, the jewish, is accepted as true in its way, but as a low and evil creed—just as other gnostics superadded the purer Mazdeism to the planet-cult and magic of Babylon; or as Valentine, remaining an archaic egyptian at heart, completed his system

by a thoroughly sincere, but erroneous, welcome of Christian dogma. As in Marcion's gospel, the protest of our Lord against jewish formalism and worldliness was accepted as a complete repudiation of the Old Testament and the Deity who inspired it. The *Cainites* of cent. ii followed the same practice of reading Scripture *à rebours*. Cain was the messenger endowed with power from the higher regions, Abel representing the lower powers; the sinners of Scripture (Esau, Korah, the men of Sodom, Judas Iscariot) become their saints. The *Cerdonians* (after the syrian *Cerdo* who came to Rome like most other heresiarchs of the time, in *138*), opposed a *docetic* Christology to the whole religious development of the Jews; the Saviour's birth and sufferings were mere appearance. They were sincere in their *dualism*, forbidding marriage and the use of wine or meat: they were an ascetic sect and from them sprang Marcionism.

The Judaizing Party: Cerinthus: Chiliasm.—A syncretism quite outside the line of development was the half-judaizing doctrine of Cerinthus the judaizer, said by Hippolytus (*Phil.* vii 33) to have been trained, like Valentine, in Egypt. Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxviii 4) tells a story, which cannot well be true, that he led the opposition to the new Pauline liberalism: that St. John refused to bathe under the same roof is probable so far as the date is concerned (Iren. iii 3 records it from Polycarp, and Eusebius mentions it twice). He strictly observed the Sabbath and laid stress on circumcision; but at the same time he believed that the world was created by inferior potencies or angels; one of which (the God of the Jews) had given us only an imperfect Law. On Jesus (a mere man) the Christ descended from above to impart the true religion of the Unknown Father, deserting him before the Passion. Cerinthus is said by Gaius of Rome (in the time of Diocletian) and Denys of Alexandria (in the Nicene period) to hold a crude and materialistic form of Chiliasm. Another variant of *Gnosis* is found in the alexandrine Jew, Carpocrates, who seized upon the communistic element in the early Christian church, but based his own theories mainly on Plato's *Republic*. Like Severus Alexander the Emperor, he was a pure eclectic pagan and not a Christian at all: he paid honour to Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle as well as to Christ. With all the others he held the present world-fabric to be the work of secondary and inferior angels, as in Plato's *Timæus*: salvation comes through knowledge of the Supreme Unity. If Souls (which existed before their bodies) can remember their former state, they can rise again (as in Plato and Empedocles) to a contemplation of Unity and Truth. Jesus, a mere man, had this wonderful and intuitive faculty. The things of this world are so absolutely indifferent (ἀδιάφορα) that no outward act is of the least importance. The orthodox held this to mean that the sect indulged in every kind of licence, and that Cerinthus' clever son, Epiphanes, died from the effects of his practical antinomianism. Here, as in Hindustan or Irak, we note the suspicions—no doubt sometimes justified—which were directed against creeds of over-refined intellectualism or of a strained repudiation of the present world.

APPENDIX J

Further Notes on the Mandeans, Sabians and the Star-worship of Harran

(i) The Mandean Survival in Chaldea

Surviving Sect in Chaldea : Its Sacred Books.—The *Mandeans* (followers after knowledge, γνῶσις) are a survival of the wreck of these speculative systems whose fortunes we have followed in the early Christian age. There is undoubted connexion with the early jewish-christian Nazarenes (ναζωραῖοι). The Arabs called this sect *Nasara* ; and in the present community the title *Nazoraye* is reserved as a term of honour for those who are most proficient in ' knowledge ' (Petermann, *Reisen in Orient* ii 447).[1] They live to-day in southern Chaldea, near Basra, and in Khusistan ; in 1882 some were seeking a new home on the Tigris. They speak arabic and zend (persian), but their sacred books are in an aramaic dialect most cognate to the babylonish Targum. This scripture seems to be made up of fragments of various ages, survivals of an older and more extensive literature.[2] Their chief treatise is *Sidra Rabba*, ' great book ', otherwise *Genza* ' treasure '.[3] This is obscure, diffuse and often inconsistent, being a congeries of disconnected sections by various authors in different ages : the oldest part (at the end of the Right-hand portion) may be dated between *700* and *900* A.D.

The Trinity : Succession of Gnostic Dynasties.—This is their theogony. *Pera* (or *Pera Rabba*, the ' great Abyss ', or possibly, from hebrew Peri, the great fruit) is the ground and origin of all things, but he forms a trinity with the primal æons *Ayar ziva* ' shining æther ' and *Mana d'ekara* ' Spirit of glory ' often called *Mana Rabba*. From this last member of

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[1] Their frequent washings and deference to John the Baptist led to the inaccurate name *Christians of St. John* : the name *Sabians* is assumed by the sect in their dealings with the muslim world because the Coran (*Sura* 2, 5, 22) includes the *sabiuna* (the baptizer) along with jewish and Christian creeds as a *religio licita* : see below (pp. 607, 8).

[2] Mandean MSS. are found in the Brit. Museum, at Oxford, Rome, Paris, Berlin, Weimar. Poynon (Paris 1898, 9) brought to light inscriptions bearing on belief and superstition : also Lidzbarski (*Ephemeris* Giessen 1900) : W. Brandt wrote on *Mand. Relig.* Leipzig 1889.

[3] First printed and translated under the false title *Liber Adami* by Norberg, 1815, 16 at Copenhagen ; next by Peterman 1867 at Berlin and Leipzig ; Brandt has produced about a quarter, Göttingen 1893. There is also the *Book of John* or ' Discourses of the Kings ', not yet printed as a whole. The *kolasta* or ' quintessence ', containing hymns and discourses on Baptism and the *Ascent*, deals with the *state of the soul after death* like the *Book of the Dead* in Egypt. The *Diwan* (unpublished) contains the ritual for the atonement ; *Asfar Malwaske*, ' book of the Zodiac ' treats of astrology, and many shorter pieces have a purely magical value as charms or amulets.

the triad, the king of light, all creation emanates. first in the great ethereal Jordan which (as soul of the higher world) permeates the air, Ayar's special domain. By Mana's side is D'mutha, a feminine principle such as we find in the Syzygies of pythagorizing gnostics. Mana called into being the highest æons (of subordinate rank) *Hayye Kadmeye* (cf. Adam *Kadmon*) ' Primitive life '. But after this, like Plato's demiurge, Mana withdrew into the most profound secrecy, yet manifesting himself to pious Mandeans after their soul leaves the body. This Trinity, then, only prepares for an active and efficient world-ruler ; *Hayye* is surrounded by a paradise of light—as in earlier manichean beliefs : ' he sits in the far north in might ' and glory ', unfolding himself by five branches ' light, wind, harmony, ' voice and beauty of the æons ', all personified abstractions like the zend *amshåspands*. Out of them arise 360 æons, divided into classes and bearing proper names recalling the complex angelology of the persians : the number at once reminds us of the basilidian heavens. Hayye's first emanation is *Yoshemin*, ' Jehovah of the heavens ', the jewish God of the Old Testament ; who wishing to raise himself above his father was exiled from the pure æther to the lower realm.

Younger Son set over the Elder.—A second-born son is *Manda d'hayye*, ' knowledge of the Life ', the mediator and redeemer, the λόγος of the system ; he is always loyal, and stays with Hayye (and even *Mana Rabba*) as *beloved son*, *first born* (the elder being disinherited), *high priest*, *word of life*. Another power, *Abathur*, ' father of the *Uthre* or splendours, of uncertain parentage, also called the ' Ancient ', *Atigua* or the ' deeply ' hidden and guarded ', stands on the confines of the hereafter. Like Osiris, Abathur is a god of the dead, sitting on the furthest verge of light and weighing the acts of the departed souls in a balance.

Beginnings of Material Creation : the Impotent Demiurge.—Below him was once a black stream of murky water ; in which his image being constantly reflected became *Ptahil* his son, who is partly material and therefore imperfect in nature. Only at this point after these endless celestial myths have we reached our own world. The *demiurge* and creator frames the world at the request of his father Abathur the Ancient. With the usual feebleness of gnostic creators, he cannot make Adam and Eve stand upright on their feet. Mana Rabba therefore, in compassion, sends *Hibel* (Abel), *Sithil* (Seth) and *Anosh* (Enoch) to infuse true life into these crawling ' Frankenstein ' monsters : they are ' guardians of souls ' (like the *fravashi*) from the higher world. *Hibil* teaches man about the æons and their world of light, and tells them that *Ptahil* is not their god or true creator but that the ' great king of light ' stands immensely above him. This King however enjoins them to marry and to replenish the earth. The unfortunate *Ptahil* having forfeited his power over men is driven away by *Abathur*, angry at his son's failure, into a place of darkness ; whence at the judgement he will be summoned to baptism and permitted to receive a kingdom among the Æons or ' splendours ', with all the honours due to a god.

The Nether World : Descent of Man into Hell to Overcome Evil.—In the world below are 4 vestibules and 3 halls : in the former Zartay and

Zartenay, Hag and Mag, Gaf and Gafan, Anatan and Kin, bear sway; in the latter *Shdum* the warrior, *Giv* the great, and lastly *Krun* or *Karkum*, eldest and most terrible of all the demons. The rule in this Inferno is progressive drought and emptiness; for while there is foul water in the vestibules and scorching fire in the two upper hells, *Krun* has nothing to rule but dust and ashes. Hibil (or Abel) carries his propaganda and evangel of light down even into these gloomy abodes: as in Mani's system a Primal Man descends to fight the devil in his own palace. He lets himself be half-swallowed by the monster *Krun*; but forces him to recognize Mana Rabba and reveal the hidden and mystical *name* of darkness. *Armed with this talisman he passes upwards*, through these halls of Eblis laying bare the secret and ending the power of the several rulers. Over the 4 vestibules he set a female devil, daughter of Kin, 'mother of falsehood, poison and fornication',—a blasphemous parody of the *Ruha d'Qudsha* (Holy Spirit) in the syriac church.[1] Her son *Ur* ('fire of hell' conceived as a person), launches an attack, like the titans or men of Babel, against the world of light: but he is suppressed by Hibil and enchained in the 'black water' by seven chains of iron and seven of gold. This attack seems to have occurred at an early stage during Ptahil's brief creative activity.

Demons placed as Planets in Heaven, Authors of Evil.—To her son and consort *Ruha* bore 3 broods whom Ptahil placed in the firmament, the first litter forming the planets and the next the zodiac. The names of the planets are clearly derived from Babylon, *Estera*, *Enba*, *Sin*, *Kewan*, *Bil* and *Nirig* = Venus, Mercury, Moon, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars.[2] To the sun is given the Old Testament name *Adonai*, or *Adunay*: he is lord of the spheres and planet-spirits. All evil and all temptation arise from the hellish brood, so strangely transported into heaven.[3] In the sky above, the stars and (evil) planets sail as upon a crystalline vault. The Pole Star is the central sun round which all heavenly bodies turn; he is the door-keeper with jewelled diadem, standing sentinel before Abathur's palace on the verge of the kingdom of light: all prayer is addressed to the north. Our earth is a circular disk with a lofty rampart of turquoise to the north where like the Hyperboreans are the blessed departed. Here in a blessed

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[1] Or rather the Mother-Goddess supplanted and degraded (like the Planets) in the new light-cult.

[2] Here again is another reading of this wholesale 'catasterism' which makes the planets less evil and hostile: with mother *Ruha* (or *Namrus*) and father *Ur* (N.B. the son, as in the Great-Mother worship, impregnating or violating his parent), the seven planets belong wholly to the dark world; they are made captives by Hibil for the god of light, who pardons them, sets them in celestial chariots (like the planet spirits in Averroism) and makes them world-rulers (the older κοσμοκράτορες): cf. the *Genza*, *Tract* 6 and 8: Brandt, *Mand. Schrift.* 125 and 137, *Mand. Relig.* 34.

[3] Can we read here a coalition of feminine *Naturalism* and an astral cult? The earth- or hell-powers are raised to the firmament and credited with all the evil that happens in the lower sphere.

region live the forefathers of the sect—the Egyptians, saved from drowning in the Red Sea, under their king Pharaoh (who was the first king and high priest of the Mandeans). Ever since this catastrophe they have kept the supreme pontifical rank, *rish amma*, in abeyance: only once since the Pharaoh of the Exodus has the office been filled.

Planetary World-Periods: Hatred of Jews and Christians.—As for the earth's history: its duration is 400,000 years, each (evil) planet bearing sway for 70,000: in this vast space of time our race has thrice been totally destroyed, in each case a single couple survives. All the Old Testament worthies are impostors, such as *Abraham*, *Misha* and *Shlimun* (who, as is usual in the east, figures as lord of all *djinns* and demons). The people of Egypt (!) followed the true religion; and in later times *Yahya* (John the son of Zachariah) was an *incarnation* of the all-conquering Hibil or Abel: he baptized Jesus by mistake, and after an illusory death at the hands of Herod went back to the world of light. Hibil now sent his younger brother Anosh to oppose the false magicians and prophet Yishu, that is our Lord; he wrought healing, raised the dead to life, caused the false Messiah to be crucified, and brought about the siege and overthrow of *Urashlam*, the devil's city, Jerusalem (built to the honour of the (evil) sungod *Adunay*). 240[1] years later 60,000 reincarnate saints from Pharaoh's paradise were sent to reinforce the almost extinct community of Mandeans who still kept the true faith. Mahomet was the last impostor and false prophet, but Anosh protected his own people and gave them a new home in Chaldea, near Wasil and latterly in Khusistan. At the end of all things, the devil Ur, like the norse Wolf Fenris, will devour the earth and higher visible worlds: but overtaxing his capacity he will burst asunder and fall into the dark abyss, where, together with all other powers of darkness, he will be annihilated. The world (after this futile and costly interlude of a material creation) will be once again transformed into a pure realm of light.

Hierarchy and Sacraments: Monastic Life Abhorred.—As with the Druze *Akils*, great honour is paid to the priesthood: it is divided into 3 grades, *Shkanda* 'deacon', chosen at the age of 19 after 12 years' training; *Tarmida* 'initiated', a priest ordained by bishop and two other priests, after painful and trying ordeals; *Ganzivra* 'treasurer' chosen from the whole body of *Tarmida* by democratic vote, after which he enjoys absolute power over them. As with the Druzes, women are also admitted to priestly rank. *Baptism* is the most important rite, repeated on many occasions by total immersion; also a parody of the Eucharist, bread and wine being received, as having unfailing efficacy:[2] it is forbidden to touch the 'Host' with the finger. The 'churches' are built only for the clergy, and are small and bare: the people remain in the forecourt: there is no altar. At a dedication of the small sanctuary a dove, Ishtar's sacred bird, is sacrificed.

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[1] If there is any value in this date, it is curious to remember that exactly at that time Emperor Aurelian (274 A.D.) conquered Palmyra, if we reckon from our Lord's death; did refugees pass eastwards?

[2] Hence the *magical* powers of sacramental bread among the western Cathars.

Besides certain festivals there are fast days in which no living thing may be killed and no flesh meat eaten; otherwise fasting (with celibacy) is strictly forbidden owing to the intense abhorrence felt for any vestige of jewish or Christian practice; chiefly do the mandeans hate the monastic and anchorite life of the latter. The *Sidra Rabba* lays emphasis on the duty of parentage, and marriage is a matter of obligation; yet in spite of this encouragement, the community has dwindled to 1200 persons from the flourishing state in which the earliest missioners found it.[1]

The Basis of the Mandean Religion.—This last surviving phase of dualism was reared and grew in its present home: Babylonia is its cradle and will be its grave. The sect did not come from Palestine, nor does it show any trace of jewish or Christian sympathies. It does not spring from the disciples of John the Baptist, who is only introduced adventitiously. In this again it is easy to recognize the ancient faith of Babylon. It holds a place apart from all the great creeds, and is clearly *gnostical*, of the *intransigeant* and anti-Christian type otherwise known as Ophite or Naassene. The ophite-babylonian nucleus is however overlaid by the clearest process of syncretizing from *talmudic* Judaism, *syriac* Christianity and *parsi* Dualism. They appropriate, to pour scorn upon, the whole drama and *personnel* of biblical history: *Abel* indeed is their chief hero. The *Peratæ* (whose name according to one account is derived from πέραν on further side) have the same oddly perverse views on Pharaoh and the Red Sea; as the Sethians gave all eminence to Seth, Cainites to Cain, so do the Mandeans to Abel. The old babylonian planet-gods (no less than jewish worthies and Christian saints) are degraded into demons. It is clear that Ophites, Perates, and Manichees as well, have their common origin in Mesopotamia. The old triad of Anu, Bel, Ea finds its counterpart in *Pira*, *Ayar*, and *Mana Rabba*,—the wife of the latter is Ea's female consort Damkina (or Δαύκη in Damascius the platonist). Hibil stands in place of Marduk, mediator and redeemer in the older religion, who descended to fight Tiamat as Hibil strove with Hell and Darkness; Tiamat also half swallows Marduk. Ishtar's descent supplies other features and a dove, as we saw, is the *kirk-grim* of a dedicated 'church' (Cf. Siouffi's *Études sur la Religion des Soubbas* Paris 1880). The basis of all this gnostic cosmosophy lay in a convinced oriental *dualism*: in sharp contrast and conflict are two worlds of good and evil, light and darkness. In many systems there is no pretence of deriving one from the other; Basilides (in one account at least), Satornil and Bardaisan were frank dualists. The system now considered stands, together with its later development manicheism, on a *dualistic* basis. In parsi or zoroastrian theory, the good and evil powers are at war within the material world and the region beneath the moon is by no means under the sole influence of evil.[2] It seems likely

[1] There were 20,000 households (it is said) in cent. xvii, when the mission began with Ignatius and Angelus: the former published his latin work at Rome in 1652: cf. Pietro della Valle (Geneva 1674), Thévenot (Paris, 1664).

[2] Greeks, like Hindus, saw in bodily existence the source of all evil,

that later babylonian worship centred upon the seven planetary deities (so in the *Pistis-Sophia*). But how are these once holy beings—regarded (in Mandean and other creeds) as evil and hostile ? Bousset of Göttingen (as we have seen) suggests the answer : another faith has entered the lists and overcome without extirpating its rival ; the earlier stellar powers are degraded into demons or servitors. This new faith is not the Gospel ; gnosticism is older than Christianity.

A System of Parsi Gnosticism.—Nor does hebrew monotheism account for this change ; nowhere is Judaism treated with even common courtesy. There is but one religion left, the zoroastrian or persian. Already under Alexander this was the chief religion in the great plain of Babylon (Cumont, *Textes* etc. *de Mithra* i, 5, 8, 14, 223, 233). Its chief tenet, as we know, is a belief in a deity of light, *Ahura-mazda*, either confronted and opposed, or else grudgingly obeyed, by the powers of darkness, but loyally served by his own angelic band. Now most ancient religions are syncretist, that is, do not expel other gods with hatred and violence but degrade those of a conquered race or lower culture into servitors or deputies. The visible gods are half demonic beings, infinitely far from the supreme God. When hellenic thought came into vogue with its scornful survey of this lower world, the seven demonic powers become world-creators of a universe, infinitely remote from the divine realm. Greek and persian dualism meet in gnostical theories ; and the iranian religion is the chief factor. In the *Bundahish* iii 25 we learn that (as in the Mandean creed) seven hostile powers were captured and set as lights in the firmament, where the *good* star-powers kept them from doing mischief. It is the one principal aim of every devout gnostic to find his way past the lower planetary spheres into the kingdom of his true sovereign. The female principle prominent in gnostic systems is not iranian, but belongs to ' great mother ' worship (Astarte, Atergatis, Beltis, Cybele, Aphrodite, Lucian's syrian goddess) : Sophia is represented as the *Mother* of the Hebdomad. Prostitution (as a means of rescuing the light-particles) becomes a sacred duty and a religious rite : before, it had been a piece of sympathetic magic, or a personal surrender of what is held most dear in honour of the goddess. Or again, the mother inflames the Archons so as to steal from them their share of light. The mother standing in close and intimate relation with her young boy-lover and son, Tammuz, Adonis, Attis (the spring) finds a parallel in Sophia's connexion with Soter in some systems, and in the Mandean marriage of Ur the devil with his mother Namrus, janitress of the vestibules of Hell.[1]

Gnostical Character of chief Mandean Concepts.—Another feature common to almost all gnostic sects is Primitive or Archetypal Man. In the Naassene system (with which our Mandeans are closely connected) the

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and therefore the true hellenizing gnostics are thorough-going pessimists and, where not *indifferent* in morals, tend to become convinced *ascetics* and *renunciants*.

[1] The magian ' sacred marriage ' (ἱερὸς γάμος) between mother and son has not yet been disproved.

dogma has a central place. Both in the *Clementines* (*Hom.* iii, 20 (Dressel) and xviii 14 ; *Recogn.* i, 16, 32, 45, 52 : ii 47) and in the *Ebionite* sect (Epiph. xxx 3–16 and liii, 1) we have the mysterious figure of the Man who was before the world, the Eternal Prophet who takes various forms as the ages roll on, and is at length fully revealed in Christ. Salvation for the gnostics (rarely a *historical* process) is figured as the Return of Primal Man to his first home : he sank into matter and can only be released by degrees, either by his own efforts or the compassion of the Light-World. This figure forms a male counterpart to the feminine principle Sophia or *Achamoth* who like Psyche is only permitted after long wandering and distress to rejoin her heavenly spouse. It cannot be denied that this notion has penetrated into the christian mind and given an impulse to an erotic religiosity sometimes discovered in orthodox mystics.[1] Bousset (following Reitzenstein on *Pœmandres*) suggests that the Naassenes drew on a purely pagan source, the cult of Attis, the power which dies and rises again in the year and courses through all physical nature. In our Mandean system *Manda d'hayye* (' knowledge of life ') corresponds to the Primal Man, who (as Baur shows) regains among the Manichees once more a predominant place. Now in old persian myths the world-development does not begin until Ahriman has evilly slain Gayomart the Primal Man. But the connexion is not altogether clear between the descent of Primal Man into Hell and the sungod, who also descends ' into the lower parts of the earth ' to rise again in triumph. Another myth of chaldean origin (Hippol. *Philos.* v 7), as the Naassenes expressly stated, is the belief in the demonic creation of man's body, afterwards vivified in pity by the Supreme God : this is held by Satornil and Valentine, the Mandeans (as we have just seen) and their followers, the Manichees.

(ii) The Sabians—Genuine and Pseudonymous

Name acts as Disguise for the Astrology of Harran.—The *Sabians* or baptists (first named in the Coran 2, 5, 22) were by no means identical with the purely gnostical and dualist Mandeans but were a jewish-Christian sect of Babylonia, to whom the name *elkesaite* is sometimes applied. Mahomet names them as people having a written religion and classes them with Jews and Christians. From them he may well have borrowed (in his syncretic unitarianism) the practice of frequent ablutions, which made his aristocratic and pagan foes at Mecca call him *Sabian*. From these true Sabians we must carefully distinguish the Harranians, who took the name in *830* under Caliph Mamun, because it was a *religio licita* in the Coran ; under this vague title they could maintain their ancient belief and practice in the very heart of the muslim world. Harran, a day's journey south of Edessa, was a great centre of pagan and hellenistic culture since the days of Alexan-

[1] For Primal Man in pagan thought, cf. Zosimus *Poimandres* and Plotin's famous refutation of the (dualistic) gnostics ii. 9 :—the *Poimandres*, translated by Ménard among *asclepian* writings is a different version, and has much in common with the *Clementines*—embodied spirits, king-worship, seven spheres, etc.

der. It was the birthplace of Abraham,[1] a cross-road centre from Damascus to Nineveh and Carchemish, a strategic position under the first empire of Assur (*1100* B.C.) a great commercial city, and the home of Sin the Moon-god (and also of Nusku). Herodianus the historian writing *c. 240* A.D. speaks of its lunar temple as still sacred and well attended. Here Crassus was killed *53* B.C. : here 270 years later was murdered Antoninus, son of Severus, called ' Caracalla '. It did not lose its importance even under arab ascendancy ; but had fallen into decay by the time of Abufeda.

Harranian Syncretism and Culture under Caliphs.—Its people were like the Druzes and Nosairis, syrian heathens, worshippers of Nature and the stars, addicted to magic and astrology. The (evil) planetary powers were appeased by offerings of blood : the Druzes' hilltops saw animals sacrificed : even human victims were from time to time offered at Harran, as late (it is said) as cent. ix of our era. Again like the Druzes, the more enlightened part held aloof from the popular rites and put together a syncretic system with Christian and neoplatonic elements. Their scholars and men of science handed on to the muslim in the abbasid age or under the liberal caliphate, the beliefs of Babylon and the culture of Greece : their favour at the caliph's court secured tolerance for the other (and truer) Sabians. Chwolsohn's volume on *Ssabismus* 1856 is still the best guide; but Dozy and de Goeje have now published new matter for the Harranian religion (in the *Acts of the Sixth Oriental Congress*, Leiden 1885). Of the *pagan* literature of Harran no vestige remains ; we know that the city was a centre of stubborn resistance not only to Christian but also to muslim influence. Barhebraeus quotes the words of a native, Thabit ibn Kurra, speaking thus of this steadfast resistance ; ' whilst many were subdued to error through ' persecution, our fathers under God's grace were firm and stood out man- ' fully ; *this blessed city has never been defiled by the error of Nazareth* '. Of Thabit's *syriac* works (most being still extant cent. xiii) all are lost : of the 150 *arabic* treatises some few survive, see Brockelmann's history, It seems clear that the Sabians, offshoot of the stock of old Babylon. worshipped chiefly the seven planets.

(iii) The Mandeans (Brandt's Latest Account).

The belated appearance of Hastings' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* vol. 8 (April 1916) has made it impossible to embody *Brandt's Latest Pronouncement* in the text : but some points in this learned and difficult article may be briefly noticed here (cf. also his *Elkasai* Leipzig 1912). This semitic people seem to have dwelt formerly much further north, nearer the sources of the great rivers, beyond which could be seen ' huge mountains towering to the sky ' (§ 20) : driven southwards to lead a wretched life in the low plains, they tried by frequent immersion to appropriate the virtues flowing with the streams from the holy north where was the kingdom of Light. However fanciful and inconsistent their theology, the aim of their religion is purely practical : to justify the ways of Providence to the pious, to explain their distressful lot in this world, and provide them with assurance of a blissful hereafter.

[1] The home of Laban in the story of Jacob is not here but in the Lebanon district of Hauran.

(Their creed then is one of deliverance, redemption (*moksa*), and it is hard to agree with Brandt in excluding *dualism* ' a thing quite unknown in the M. documents ' § 38.) Their faith, passing through various stages and incorporating divers foreign elements, is utterly lacking in any consistent unity : it is indeed a congeries of unreconciled strata. The earliest of these is certainly quite free from jewish or Christian influence. In *Genza* (or *Sidra Rabba*) we can trace *polytheistic* beliefs, only later coordinated under a ' light ' monotheism (parsi) and somehow attached to the planet-worship or detestation whence springs the pre-christian *gnosis* (chaldean). There is ' great fruit ', an impersonal reservoir or substance of deity whence the several deities emanate ; only late there appear ' Great Mana of Glory ' as a personal divine being. Besides this we have ' ether ' (a primitive being or an emanation) ' first life ', and ' hidden first drop '—all very early powers issuing from a mysterious first ground or conceived as existing together in their own right. To this same class belongs ' Jordan ', as the heavenly stream of lustrous water, encircling the realm of ' ether ' (*ayar* which Brandt derives from greek ἀήρ). These beings seem at first to enjoy no regular precedence : later text represents Wisdom asking to be enlightened as to the grades of this hierarchy (cf. Brandt's *Mand. Schrift* 202 Göttingen 1893). Life expands or emanates (in true gnostic fashion) into more concrete and less perfect forms : so ' life ' calls ' second life ' into being by a ' request to itself '. This builds its own world and its spirits think of creating yet a third realm, our earth, whose inmates should only worship them. Great Mana then calls into being *Manda d'hayye* to make known the first kingdom and provide for its recognition and worship by men. This *Archaic Polytheism* has now given place to the single worship of ' life ', in the character of the parsi light-god, reigning beyond the region of the (babylonian) planet-gods. They have therefore become *monotheists* instead of gnostic *polytheists*. The creative spirits of the second world neither merit nor receive respect ; Ptahil and the evil spirits complete the creation of earth and attempt that of man (how can B. deny a *dualistic* element ?). This demiurge sometimes (1) emerges from the black water or realm of darkness, (2) acts by permission of ' life ' and oversteps his limited mandate, (3) acts in creation as colleague of evil beings, (4) boldly defies them and makes a good world into which only later evil enters by their guile. Man's true soul is brought down by Manda (in compassion) into the Frankenstein monster which Ptahil could alone produce. Hence, like the orphists, the Mandean soul in its hymns ' asserts its heritage ' in the world of light ' I am a *mana* ' (vessel or instrument, cf. S. Paul's σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς) ' of the great life '. Thus was the design of the spirits defeated ; man was from the first enlightened in Adam as to the worship of the true god and the soul's destiny. The spirits now disappear and evil beings seem to take their place, introducing evils into our world, mingling them with Ptahil's good creation. These evil beings are the Seven Planets, sons of *Ruha*, and the twelve zodiac signs—whom She bore to the devil *Ur*, laid under bonds in the nether world before ever the earth could be created. These two names are not *mandean* but *hebrew* ; the gnostic adapter of the story in Genesis could not use the narrative

fully since knowledge of the true god was imparted to the protoplasts at the very outset. While the Mandeans claim to possess the true faith, other religions were invented by the evil planetary spirits; Judaism by *Sames* (Shamash) the Sun, 'whom some call Adonai; Islam by *nirig* (Nergal) or the planet Mars who is called the arab 'abdala' (Mahomet). The Christian Messiah is without doubt regarded as an impostor and his disciples as liars, accusing each other of error and deceit. He is described as leader of the evil spirits who induce mankind to give up the true faith. Enos (Enoch) comes forth again to withstand this deceiving prophet who works false miracles; he carries away 365 pious disciples to the light-world and in the form of a white eagle destroys Jerusalem. Enos (like Buddha in the *Mahayana*) sends on earth semblances of himself made out of a cloud—an idea no doubt derived from passages in O. and N.T. (e.g. Daniel vii, 13, Matth. xvii, 5, 26, 64). But our Lord belongs (in their perverting syncretism) to the ranks of evil as *Isu Msiha*, and *Ruha* (Holy Spirit) is already familiar as the mother of evil, parent and consort of *Ur* the devil. He is the impostor who tries to usurp the rôle of Manda and Enos. Where the chaldean star-element survives, He is identified with planet Mercury, as Jehovah with Sun and Ruha with Venus. In the baptism of Christ in Jordan, John is at first unwilling to perform the rite, until he receives a written mandate 'Yahya, baptize the Liar in Jordan'. Yet in two tractates of the *Genza*, Christ is actually identified with the holy Manda d'hayye from the light-realm, appearing in Judea in company with Johanna, to republish the true doctrine and select the true believers!

Brandt believes that the *Parsi Monotheism* was adopted in place of a very archaic and naturalistic *gnosis c. 300–500* A.D. by the leaders of the sect. The 'source of all good and creator of all forms' dwells in the lofty north, and round him stand kings or angels who tasting of the milk-white heavenly Jordan do not know death. In the black waters below his counterpart abides, the devil (of the manichees) with serpent's body, eagle's wings and lion's head. Once with his demons he projected an attack (? in the tower of Babel) on the lord of light; but, coming to the confines of the two worlds, found no way of access. The Creator now is Gabriel, obeying the commands of the light-god. This conception is certainly parsi or even (with Brandt) jewish-christian. The distinctively mandean belief remains to the end a blend of early *gnosis* (with its chaldean basis) and the doctrine of the light-world and salvation to be therein attained. The priests of this obscure and isolated sect advanced, in the 200 years of their literary activity, from wondering and bewildered students of foreign treatises to redactors, editors and adjusters; lastly they girded themselves, very imperfectly equipped, to the task of independent composition. The *Main Features of their Creed* are often eclipsed or confused in this method; but they may be stated as follows. Above the heaven of the planets is a world of light and happiness, where dwell various heavenly beings (polytheism) or the king of light with his hosts of angels (parsi monotheism). Hence comes man's soul or spiritual essence—at least within the mandean community. Beneath is the realm of gloom and watery chaos, part being solidified to form an abode for man by different agencies (who cannot by

any means be reconciled in a consistent system). On the south of our world is the ' black water ', to the north ' the city of the Great King ' or light-realm : the faithful maintain their connexion or citizenship by bathing in the streams which flow from this region. The devout dwell here as in a foreign land, as ' pilgrims and sojourners '. Evil spirits reign over this region (as in scottish theology) in sympathy with the powers of hell once put in bondage ; they are the deities of other religions and take delight in afflicting the faithful Mandeans. With ' earnest looking forward ' the believer awaits the hour of release—from an alien world, not from sin. At death an angelic ' liberator ' descends (perhaps the *fravashi* of the parsis) to separate soul from body and bear it upwards through the heavenly spheres to the abode of light where Life reigns. To this *Happy Deliverance* the survivors contribute in the rite *massekta* ' ascension '—a solemn recitation of hymns aiding the Soul in its upward flight, past the demonic terrors or snares which are so familiar to us in ancient Egypt and later *gnosis*. Each station (or planet-sphere) is the dungeon of believers in a false religion—*matra* or prisonhouse where they are kept in ward. These correspond to the mitraic ' gates ' placed one above the other in tiers, of which Origen makes mention (*c. Cels.* vi 22). The devout soul passes through all without molestation, because they can give the magic token or ' sign ' that they have received from the holy waters of earthly Jordan. It is to be remarked, however, that the *Genza* hymns lay stress rather on the efficacy of good works and moral conduct during life on earth : ' I ' loved the life and Manda d'Hayye dwelt in my heart '. These hymns are carefully modelled upon parsi litanies, although the peculiar creed of the Mandeans is apparent. ' How I rejoice ' says the Soul ' on the day ' when my conflict is dissolved and I go to the region of the Life. At the ' ward of the Sun (*sames*) I arrive and utter a call : who will take me past ' this ward ? Thy merit, thy works and almsgiving take thee past the ' ward of Sames '. The conflict is the *Effort to Release Soul from Entanglement* in the body as with Essenes and Manichees. Heaven is thus depicted, the true home of the soul : ' I arrived at the waterbrooks, the radiant ' beam came forth to meet me ; he took me by my right hand. The holy ' ones brought their splendour and clothed me with it as with a garment. ' Life reclined upon life and found its own life '. How closely this resembles the attitude of egyptian eschatologists, how nearly akin it is to the revival of archaic chaldean and parsi beliefs in *gnosis*, need not here be further insisted upon.

Note : Brandt (*Elkasai* 1912) has noted the resemblances of Mandean and manichee doctrine : if this obscure, distressed and ignorant sect produced the parent of Mani, it is certain that in return Mani's own writings and doctrine impressed the Mandeans. Their *Genza* is certainly an imitation of the *Kanz-al-Ihya* or treasure of lifegiving ascribed to Mani and called θησαυρὸς ζώης by Epiphanius and in the *Abjuration Formula*. Titus of Bostra names it in his work against the Manichees (iii § 9, ed. Lag. Berlin 1859).

APPENDIX K

Further Remarks on the System of Mani

Mani: Life and Writings.—Mani combined magianism with a peculiar form of *gnostic* Christianity. He was born of good persian stock about *215–6* A.D. in Ecbatana, his father (afterwards a *baptist*) being Patak.[1] It thus appears that Mani was brought into contact with those gnostical sects which we know as Elkesaites and Mandeans: with any pure form of catholic doctrine he does not seem to be familiar. His father Patak was a restless syncretizer. His son kept silence for 25 years and then propounded his theory before Sapor I of Persia, on the somewhat unsuitable day of the royal enthronement. Then he travelled widely, chiefly into western China, northern India and all the lands beyond the Oxus: at a later date the manichean pope lived at Samarcand. He announced himself (like Mahomet) as the last and truest prophet, his evangel as the ultimate revelation. Allowing to other religions only a relative value, he preached the absolute, perfect and final form of faith. Sapor's heir Hormisdas V was inclined to favour him; but Sassanid royalty was the puppet of the hostile magian hierarchy. Mani suffered martyrdom under Bahram or Varanes I in *276*. His chief works, written in *syriac* (six) and *persian* (one), comprise a list with titles very similar to the divisions of the jewish Zohar (just 1000 years later): (a) the *Book of Secrets* or discussion on the followers of Marcion and Bardaisan and their view of the Bible; (b) *Book of the Giants* (or Demons); (c) *Book of Precepts for Hearers*, the most widely known of all, with summary of chief dogmata; (d) *Shahpurakam* or address to King Sapor, no doubt a later recasting of the inopportune eschatology addressed to the sovereign in *241*; (e) the *Book of Quickening*, the 'Thesaurus' of *Acta Archelai*; (f) Πραγματεία, contents unknown; (g) the sole writing of importance in persian—the 'Holy Gospel' which he wrote in opposition to the New Testament.

A System of Physical Redemption: Present World a Refining House.—Manicheism is a religion of *physical redemption*. Light and darkness, matter and spirit [2], good and evil, are the same pairs under different names. The kingdom of light has a *personal* ruler—God: but the *impersonal* realm of darkness produces Satan and his angels. It might even be said that this

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[1] So muslim tradition; possibly more worthy of credence than *Acta Archelai et Manetis*, from which Kessler opines that he was a semite—Shuravik or in latin Cubricus—and took his faith from *semitic* and *chaldean* rather than *parsi* sources.

[2] This antithesis is not quite exact and needs a certain qualification: pure platonic dualism is foreign to Mani; some elements even of earthly texture are good, as the *west-wind*, the *cooling* (northerly ?) *breeze*, *light*, *fire*, and *clear water*. The five evil elements are *mist*, *heat*, *burning wind* (Sirocco), *darkness*, *vapour*. Nor is this world-structure wholly evil or the work of evil demons or very inferior angels; *it is the beginning of deliverance*.

kingdom of evil is a *feminine* personification of the Lie : thus the two stand opposed, as in the primitive transition from Nature-worship and the matriarchate to a moral and masculine cult. Long unaware of each other the two began to mingle ; and Satan made an inroad upon light ; and *God with his consort begat Primal Man* (here again a prominent figure in the myth) *to be His champion.* But Primal Man was overcome (as in the case of Adam). God Himself took the field, vanquished evil and set the captive free ; but the divine rays were enmeshed in the darkness and the light was confused with the five evil elements. Primal Man could descend into the abyss and strike at the roots of evil, so as to hinder further increase (as Cybele castrates Attis in Emperor Julian's Discourse) ; but he cannot rescue the particles of light already entangled. These imprisoned elements have to be released and for this purpose the *present world is created and formed to be a means of deliverance.* Sun and moon are almost pure of evil elements and are reservoirs in which the rescued particles can be stored up safely. In the sun dwells Primal Man himself (quite probably identical with Mitra or Mihr) ; in the moon is the Mother of Life ; here we have a *female* element conceived in a good sense. The twelve signs of the Zodiac, like dredging-buckets on a revolving wheel, are constantly raising rescued light-particles into sun and moon. Here, purified (as in Plutarch's idea of a lunar purgatory), they finally reach their first and true home.

World Fabric Divine, but Man Demonic : The Series of Prophets.—While this world-fabric is a creature of the Good, man himself (as in gnostic systems) is a formation of the Evil Power. The first earthly man Adam was engendered by Satan who placed in him all the stolen particles he could amass, so that he might altogether control them : already man then is a ' house divided against itself '. But from the first the Light-Spirits took the protoplasts under their care. Cain and Abel were born to Satan by Eve ; only Seth is Adam's genuine offspring : Eve has very little of the light element and females are throughout inferior to man in this respect (as in Gautama's cognate system). Demons seek to bind men to them by false religion, *of which the Mosaic is the worst* ; meantime the angels are carrying on their beneficent process of distillation. Deliverance (the indian *moksa*) is gained through *knowledge* ; and preachers and prophets are sent to impart it. Adam, Noah, Abraham (? Zoroaster and Buddha also) were true envoys from the light-world ; also the phantom Christ Who made use of the diabolical Messiah of the Jews (for which historical figure Mani had no feeling but abhorrence).[1] Mani, last and greatest of the series, takes up the work of this heavenly Christ and of Paul (who is also admitted to a place of honour) : he is ' leader ', ' ambassador ' and ' Paraclete '. When all the light particles are released from their imprisonment (as far as possible) the consummation of all things is at hand. God Himself appears with His retinue of angels and of ' just men made perfect '. The good Angels who play the part of Atlas to this present universe withdraw their support, and it falls into ruins and flame. Henceforward, the realms of light and darkness are once more quite separate and distinct.

[1] Some believed this phantom to be Primal Man himself.

Dualism in a very Modified Form : Yet a Cultus of Ascetics.—As against the pure *negative* quietism of earlier dualists, Mani has much *positive* and energetic teaching, such as well becomes a pupil of Zoroaster. He stands to the abstentionist or suicidal school as Hartmann to Schopenhauer ; not to *extinguish* life but to *preserve* it is his aim. Man must cherish and strengthen the light-particles. But if the end is not pure buddhic nihilism it is to be won only by the austere ascetic. Wine, meat, marriage are prohibited ; fasting became a regular system. Prayer was used four times a day ; addressed to the God of Light or his whole kingdom, to the glorious Angels, *even to Mani himself*, the great tree which is all ' salvation '. So strict and rigorous was the life of the saint, that a lower standard was allowed to the brethren ' of the outer court '. As in the days of Montanus and the puritan rigorists, the society had to decide between *catholicity*, in which wheat and tares grew together, and the narrow exclusiveness of a small perfect group. Thus there were lay-brethren (*auditors*), like franciscan tertiaries, who could not live up to the standard of the *elect* or *perfect*. With a novel trait[1] the saint was held to be himself a *redeemer* of others, not merely one of the ransomed flock of Christ : hence unbounded veneration was paid to those pale and ascetic solitaries who followed his example. For the ' hearers ' they prayed and interceded ; they blessed their food and condescended to share it ; they alone had knowledge of the mysteries of the faith. This small hierarchy of *elect* included *teachers* or ' sons of meekness ', *governors* or overseers, ' sons of knowledge ', *elders* ' sons of understanding '. St. Austin says that there were 12 of the highest rank of teachers and 72 bishops or overseers. There was even then a Pope (*c. 400*) and we know that the office continued until a much later date in Asia (*Fihrist*). The worship (which, through the influence of the western sectaries, has set the example for all modern nonconformists) was simple, chiefly prayers and hymns and reading of scripture. The chief festival was the *Bema* or *Teacher's Chair*, in memory of Mani's martyrdom in March. Later Manichees imitated baptism and the eucharist ; the charges of abominable mysteries were facile and too prevalent (in the case of any esoteric sect) to merit our serious notice.

His Chief Source—Avesta : some Jewish Names.—The chief affinity of Mani's religion is with the *Avesta*, from which primitive doctrine he believed the magian church of the sassanid epoch to be a deterioration. The untiring Cumont has laboured to show (*Revue d'histoire religieuse*, 1907) that Mani borrows from the Avesta the notion of the Light-maiden collecting the captive particles by exciting the unholy desires of the Angels of Darkness.[2] Az in Avesta is a demon-snake who kills ' primal man ' Gayomart and is an ally of Ahriman. After he is struck down, the pious man is led up to sun and moon and to the very presence of Ahuramazda. Again, Mani

[1] For which Mani was surely indebted to jains and buddhists in India.

[2] But the story also forms the basis of earlier gnostic sects, and the date of this curious mythologeme of Prunikos cannot be determined from the composite magian scripture which was not finally redacted till the sassanid age.

describes himself as ' son of Zarvan ', Time or Destiny (cf. also the mitraic system which is much anterior to Mani). Again, the God Mihir is invoked, the ' compassionate liberator ' of men ; ' Fredon the good ' also finds his counterpart in *Feridoun* the slayer of Azi Dahaka. The (true) Jesus is identified with Ormazd's Good Thought, *Voho mano : Naresaf* and *Zrosch* the mighty ' redeemer of souls ' are both known in the Avesta, where Sraosha protects the world at night from demons. Mitra (in fragment 38 from Turfan) is invoked as ' great messenger of the gods, interpreter ' of the faith, and of the Elect One Jesus . . . Mar Mani, Jesu, Virgin of ' Light ! Do thou make peace in me O Light-bringer ! Mayest thou ' redeem my soul from this death in life '.[1] Of the mazdean basis of Mani's speculation there is no concealment (fragm. 543). ' Thou new ' teacher of Khorasan, ladder of the faith of Mazda, promoter of all those ' that have the true creed ! : thou wast born under a glittering star in the ' family of Rulers. Elect are these, Jesus and *Vahman* ' (= ἀγαθὴ ἔννοια as above). Judaic (or babylonish ?) ' names of angels ' are also adopted (fr. 4). After a prayer that *Zarvan* may have new victories over the Angels and Glories (? demons) comes an ascription to the ' Strong ones ' *Raphael, Michael, Gabriel* and *Sarael* . . . ' who shall set us free from the evil ' Ahriman '.[2]

A Reaction of a Moral Dualism against a Pantheizing Monism.—It seems quite clear that Mani believed himself a restorer of the ancient (*dualistic*) faith against the feeble compromise of the Zarvanites, who held that the Supreme Sovereign Zarvan created both Ormazd and Ahriman who are thus brothers, both being needed for a world-process which is becoming monistic and peaceful.[3] This reconciliation with Satan Mani called an abominable heresy (fr. 28) : ' They that adore the fire, by this they recog- ' nize that their end shall be in fire : and they say that Ormazd and ' Ahriman are brethren; wherefore for this saying shall they come to annihilation '. It was a breach of the old iranian loyalty to come to terms with the evil things, with ' spiritual wickedness in high places ', with the ' Prince ' of this world '.

Hatred of Jew and Christian Doctrine (later modified in West).—Mani accepts (from the extreme sectaries) such dogmas and phrases of Christian faith as suit his purpose ; he even calls himself ' Mani the apostle of Jesus ' the Friend, in the love of the Father '. He uses also the trinitarian formula : ' Praise and glory be to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit '. He seems to employ the *Gospel of Peter* : references to the *Shepherd* of Hermas and reminiscences of several syriac hymns argue that these

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[1] = the existence of one born dead.

[2] To these very orthodox angelic figures, Turfan *fr.* 20 adds some strange beings from a necromantic *grimoire* :—the Lord Bar Simus, Qaftinus the mighty, and Nastikus—who may be a relation of the mandean Devil : of this motley group Jacob is said to be ' mighty angel and captain '.

[3] We have the same modified dualism in Lactantius' interpolator and something very much like it in the author himself; also in the *Clementines* ; cf. my ' Subordinate Dualism,' *Studia Biblica* Series iv. Clarendon Press.

Manichees of Chinese Turkestan had got Christian letters from their master.[1] No doubt Mani rejected Judaism and Catholicism with equal bitterness; both were religions of the Devil. But a good spirit made use of the Jewish Messiah, and he thought that heretical sects (like those of Elkesai and Bardaisan) had the truth. There were two Christs: one side or factor in this divided figure belonged to either world. But this pure dualism of magian doctrine and discipline only lasted in the east. In the west it altered its whole tone and adopted much from its hated rival, the Catholic Church: in cent. iv–v (*330–500*) it became far more like the Gospel. It drew proselytes from the discontented and decaying sects, and built its appeal upon the same ultra-refinement that tended rather to platonism than towards Christian dogma. It abolished the Old Testament and denied a really divine incarnation and so pleased the *intelligenzia*. While Manicheism remained pure in Syria, that seed-plot and hot-house of sects, it was thoroughly corrupted past recognition by Christian influence in the west. In northern Africa, the clergy were secret converts; St. Austin[2] remained in the 'outer circle' as an *auditor* for nearly ten years; and Faustus was a learned and fashionable preacher of this simple Theodicy and Gospel of Release. Thus for many centuries it was a world-religion; a standing menace in the west not only to *papacy* but to *catholicism*, until the albigensian heresy (its latest form) was stamped out with cruel necessity.[4] It won the sterner minds by a simple and rational worship and a moral theory of the universe which makes God the author of good only and revolts from a wholly unethical absolutism. It supplied the urgent needs of a revealed message, a system of redemption, an emphasis on moral virtue and courage, an assurance of a personal hereafter in the complete triumph of the right. Meantime it adroitly catered for a variety of characters; the seven ranks attracted men of very different calibre, and to the intellectual was promised (as never in the roman church) that he need not submit his reason to Authority. In some ways it has the directness of Islam; Mani is God's prophet and there is no redeemer to worship; there is only a 'physical process of redemption' (Harnack) within the compass of any man of virtuous life, which relieves God of all moral responsibility. The doctrine gives a simple solution to the problem of Evil and for the average mind answers perhaps better than any other hypothesis (except Buddhism) the actual experiences of life.[3]

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[1] All above 'fragments' are cited from Grünwedel and Huth's discoveries in Turfan, in part translated by F. W. Müller, Berlin 1904.

[2] Bousset: 'Though desperately combating the *dualism* of Mani, he 'yet introduced into western thought a number of dualist ideas only 'distinguished from Manicheism by a very keen eye and then with great 'difficulty'.

[3] Kessler (*Mani* Berlin vol ii, 1903) lays too much stress on *chaldean* elements which are really less apparent in this school than in any other gnostic sect (but cf. Aphraates' view on p. 617).

[4] A 'happy victory of the Catholic Church, it has been called: the sectarian faith was a 'sacramentalism (magic) degenerating into wild

The careful and erudite article of Bevan in *Enc. Rel. Eth.* (April 1916) gives an excellent account of *Mani and his School.* He disparages the *Acta Archelai*, notes the paucity of real knowledge in *parsi* and other texts, the utter want of sympathy in the *greek* Christians who attacked the sect ; and is tempted to pin his faith to St. Austin's somewhat vague accounts. But he doubts if even the learned Faustus had complete acquaintance with the true doctrine or with the original texts. The muslim historians alone give a calm and impartial account e.g. ibn *Wadih* in his ' World-history ' (+*c. 891* A.D.), ibn *Ishak*, a century later, in the *Fihrist* or ' Catalogue ', *Al-Biruni* (+ *1048*) in his ' Chronology ', *Shahrastani* (+ *1153*) in his great work on sects and schools : these last two were of *persian* race.

It is clear that *Mani is not a Rationalist*, any more than the gnostics : it is no longer fashionable to call these the first Christian philosophers of religion, anticipators of the scholastics, harmonists of faith and reason. He claimed a special revelation, a mysterious and esoteric knowledge of the constitution of the world : the visible universe, not a creation of the evil powers, is a vast and complex mechanism devised by God to enable the light-elements to effect their escape. Mani recognizes three authorized teachers besides himself, Zoroaster, Buddha (of whose genuine tenets he knew little) and our Lord. He himself was the Paraclete announced by Christ ; yet it does not appear that he laid claim to divinity. He places earlier prophets on the same *human* level as Christ ; therefore in Austin and Titus of Bostra we wonder at the *docetic* doctrine, confidently imputed to Mani ; still more to the violent hatred shown in *Fihrist* where he is said to call Jesus a devil (*Shaitan*) ! One of the earliest notices of Mani (by the syriac Aphraates *c. 425* A.D.) identifies the sect with a chaldean revival : ' Children ' of darkness, dwelling in gloom like snakes and practising chaldean rites ' (astrology), the doctrine of Babel ', (in *Homily* 3 ed. Parisot, Paris 1894).

The practical teaching of Mani is the *Duty of Separating the Light-Particles* from the lower realm wherein they are entangled. Evil and gloom, producing powers or beings capable of will and thought, wrest these from the upper kingdom : the notion (in Shahrastani) that the mingling of light and darkness took place ' blindly and by accident ' is certainly a later theory. In this redemptive work all men, in their several measures, ought to take a share : the highest rank, the elect, lived a life of the greatest value for furthering this process. As in the Mandeans, there is no conception of sin or the need of divine forgiveness : evil is something purely material, though matter is by no means identical with evil (note 612).

Bevan, holding Mani in his *Boldness and Originality* to be a genius ' of the first order ', deprecates the view that his system is a mere patchwork of archaic creeds : ' the fundamental principles are neither zoroastrian nor ' buddhist nor babylonian '—even the affinity to Christian belief is closer, though it would be absurd to call the school a Christian heresy. The link with the Gospel he finds in the syro-Christian Bardaisan. That he aimed chiefly at restating a now corrupted *parsism* is undoubted. Towards the

' superstition and a weak dualism wavering between ascetic and libertinism.'

worldly Jews he entertained the same hatred as is shown in Schopenhauer; world-enjoyment must give place wholly to world-surrender. He detested Moses, largely perhaps because of his sanction of animal sacrifice. The ascetic element in primitive Christians was far more to his taste than any dogma of Christology. His belief that mankind have a satanic, and not a divine origin, marked him off from the orthodox, and his peculiar physical basis made his real theory almost unintelligible to the hellenizing eastern church.

Bevan does not care to apply the term *manichean* to the western heretics of our period, and seems to disapprove strongly when a modern russian sect, molokanye, is termed a 'modified form' of Manicheism. We do not question that dualism and the doctrine of deliverance or *moksa* (cf. Oldenberg *Buddha* edit. 3 Berlin 1897) spring up independently all over the world: but the affiliation of 'paulians', bogomils, and albigenses to the sect of Mani seems quite undeniable, and the russian sectaries are direct descendants of the balkan heretics. But the chief scene of their triumphs was central Asia, where the Taghazghaz community with their prince accepted their tenets as the established religion (*c. 850–950* A.D.). We can only surmise how far this doctrine affected or coalesced with buddhism, and helped to transmute the religion of Tibet: it may however be safely asserted that either in imitation or hostility, the austere and bigoted muslim of Turkestan learnt much from the manichee sectaries. The mongol invasion of cent. xiii swept away the remains of a once flourishing 'church'.

NOTE: the remains lately found in central Asia are of great interest and difficulty: they are treated by F. W. Müller in various articles republished in Berlin 1913, by von le Coq in similar articles bearing date 1908, 9, 11, by Salemann in the same printed at Petrograd 1904, 8, 12, by Chavannes 'a manichee treatise found in China' Paris 1911 and 1912 in *Journal Asiatique*. It is clear that Bevan regards Kessler (the authority, as he believes, for Harnack's and Conybeare's articles, *Enc. Brit.*) with great suspicion as a fantastic theorist equipped with poor linguistic knowledge. He has great confidence in the *Recherches sur le Manichéisme* of Cumont and Kugener (Brussels 1908–1912). It is in Salemann's *Manichee Studies*, Petrograd 1908 that we have *Mitra* or Mithra, invoked by the sectarian writer (of a Turfan fragment) as *boxtar ud xvabar* 'redeemer and benefactor' (cf. also Hoernle's latest work, Clarendon Press, 1916).

ANARCHIC DUALISM: MAZDAK AND BABEK

Mazdak, son of Bambad, a persian of Susiana, was a disciple of Zaradusht and spread his strange views of *Religious Communism* among the people; and on becoming leader of the movement himself, gave a much greater impulse to the doctrines. The part played by Cabades (already mentioned) was dictated by political reasons, and the shah used the revolution against nobles and priests. Even after his restoration the sect intrigued to secure the succession to a son who favoured them: the massacre of the sectaries took place under the orders of Chosroes, the magian nominee and successful candidate (*528* A.D.). This bold measure, carried out several years before Cabad's death, gave his son the title Nushirvan 'he of the

' deathless spirit '. It is certain that the sect was not extirpated by this terrorism and that it continued its secret propaganda, to find vent once more in the communistic revolt of Babek, just 300 years later. Tabari, the arab historian (*838–923* A.D.) says that Mazdak enjoined on the people 'that ' they should possess their estate and families in common, this being an act ' of piety acceptable to God ; the good works which pleased Him lay ' chiefly in such social copartnership ' (ed. de Goeje, Leiden 1879–1901). The sect asserted that ' God placed the means of livelihood in the world ' that His servants might freely share them, but men had wronged each ' other and done injury to the poor. They desired to take from the rich ' to give to their less favoured neighbours ; he who possessed more than a ' due share of riches, women and estate had no better right to these goods ' than any other man. The mob gladly hailed this message and the ' followers of Mazdak would enter a man's house and spoil him of his dwell- ' ing, his women and other property, since he could offer no resistance ' (the same author vol. i 885). It is certain that this violent socialism included in its program the abolition of marriage and private ownership, the equalizing of all ranks and the denial of all civil authority. Chosroes, addressing his nobles and priests at his crowning, speaks of the ruin and havoc wrought among the wealthy by these sectaries. The upper classes bore the brunt of the revolution ; compensation had to be given and the doubtful parentage of the children of common marriages had to be settled. In spite of its rejection of normal morality the movement, like other social reforms in the east, had a religious basis (cf. Nöldeke on *Orient. Sozial.* in *Deutsche Rundschau* 1879 (Feb.). Mazdak was himself an ascetic and forbade the slaughter of animals for food. He believed his dogmas of equality and brotherhood were the revival of true zoroastrian teaching. Firdusi (*Shahnamah*) represents him saying : ' Five things—jealousy, wrath, vengeance, need ' and covetousness—turn a man from right conduct . . . because of these ' five we possess women and riches, which have destroyed the good creed ' of the world. If thou desirest that the good creed be not harmed, women ' and wealth must be in common '. Whatever the excesses of his followers, he appeared to have sincerely believed that the triumph of his communistic anarchy meant the defeat of the evil powers—the task which long ago Zoroaster had set before the nation.

This cannot be said of Babek and his reign in Tabaristan as a successful robber chieftain. His genealogy is peculiar. On Mazdak's death, Hurramah his wife fled to this region south of the Caspian (called also Mazandaran), where Islam had received a very cold welcome. Here she spread his tenets as Hurram-din. In course of time, an oil-seller from Ctesiphon migrated thither and marrying a one-eyed woman became the father of Babek. This lad entered the service of one *hurrami* chieftain at war with another and afterwards married his master's wife. This adroit lady spread the news that Javidan (her late husband) had willed to die in the flesh and transmit his spirit to Babek : all existing rulers were to be slain and the tenets of Mazdak restored. Babek became acknowledged leader and claimed to be God incarnate. He is thus a true representative of the Divine Incarnationism which is the salient feature in Shiism and other

anarchic movements of the muslim east. He held those doctrines of *hulul* (God's assumption of human form), *rijah* (reëmbodiment), *tanasuh* (soul's passage from one body to another), which marked the shiite extremists and certainly came over from Hindustan. He openly expressed the hatred of the arabian creed lurking in the entire movement however cautiously disguised ; and ordered all mosques to be overthrown and every trace of Islam to be removed (Isfandiyar's *Hist. of Tabaristan*, ed. Browne, London 1905). Yet strangely enough he does not seem to have been of pure persian origin : he spoke himself an ' outlandish tongue ' and his father sang songs in *nabatean* dialect. It was currently reported and believed that his followers, the *Babakiyah*, practised the ' extinction of the ' lamp ' at their nightly festivals. Isfaraini (+*1078*, thus more than two centuries later) says that by night they assemble in the mountains and ' agree upon all kinds of depravity with women and fluteplaying . . . ' lamps and fires are put out and each rises up to seize the female who sits ' nearest. . . . They assert that they had a king named Sharvin in the ' days of Ignorance, who was greater than the Prophet ; and in his name ' and to his honour they pay tears and lamentations ', as the Shiites still continue to do to Ali and his sons. The *Gathas* inveigh against these nocturnal assemblies (*Ys.* 32 and 48) as Bartholomæ (on the *Gathas*, Strasburg 1905) and Moulton point out (*Early Zoro.* London 1913). As in the case of the early Christians, it is a vague charge levelled against all secret meetings of a suspected sect.

We may trace certain *Cognate Movements of Anarchic Character* in the west : the Eonites were breton fanatics, disciples of a local nobleman (+ *1148* A.D.) who claimed divinity and was expected to return after death to judge the world ; they were certainly political Communists.— Perfectibilists held, like Buddha, the doctrine of complete redemption *in this life* ; mystical devotion can lead to so intimate a union with God that all base and sinful elements are annihilated. This same belief, starting with the pseudo-Denys, handed down to the Hesychasts, to the western Franciscans, Molinists and Jansenists, has passed on into some phases of english methodism. In this the doctrine wavers curiously between a high ideal of piety and unworldliness and an antinomian theory that Sin is not sin to the elect. Fraticelli, Beghards and Brethren of the Free Spirit certainly concluded that what was wrong in another was not sin for them.— The Familists were charged with very similar views ; they entertained a belief much like that of later buddhists (cf. appendix on *Mahayana*). ' Christ was not a *person* but a *quality* whereof many are partakers : ' to be raised from sin was to be born anew and endued with this same quality. Being sinless they could commit acts which in another would be heinous. William Penn (*Journal of Fox*) said that this wing of the Anabaptists fell into ' gross and enormous practices '. Baxter calls them ' infidels ' ; many doubted if there were any heaven or hell beyond the pleasures and pains of the present life—a tenet we have found among hindus and muslim.— The french branch of Familists in Picardy were styled *Illuminati* and in *1634* combined with the followers of Peter Guérin. They claimed a special revelation as to the proper means whereby to attain Christian

perfection. This perfection resulted in ' deificatio ', the θέωσις so often recurring in the greek Fathers. The outcome was antinomian, for ' no act ' was sinful in the case of the deified '. They were exterminated by Louis XIII, or rather by his ministers : the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes may be due in part to the fear of any form of ' protestant ' individualism in religion.—Reiner includes as a waldensian sect a curious branch called Runcari, who believed that as sin is of the heart, no part of the body below the waist can commit sin.—Lastly in our own days, the Perfectionists of Oneida (under the lead of Noyes) believed that (1) all the members of the community were fully reconciled to God, (2) and are so saved from all sin ; (3) man and woman are equal and (4) all goods should be held in common. Besides undoubted licence (approaching to regulated promiscuity), it seems certain that they dispensed, as being already perfect, with any form of religious worship. In England, Prince in 1840 claimed to be a new Messiah or rather a fresh dispensation of the Spirit : he assumed flesh to redeem the *body*, left in its estrangement from God by our Lord, who had suffered to redeem the *soul* of man only. The quite recent revelations of the Agapemone under Smyth-Pigott show how faithfully and with how little originality the ancient features are reproduced to-day.

APPENDIX L

Historic Origins of Christian Pantheism

Hellenizing Tendencies and their Culmination

Negative Theology in the Greek Church : No Social Interests.—All the world over mystical theory and practice are much the same. Almost in every case the latter creates the former ; that is, the need of personal religion and a closer communion with the heart of things, reacts upon the current philosophy and interprets anew (but always on the ancient lines) God's relations to His creatures. The practical pietism of the mystic is not here our subject but the speculative creed on which it is made to rest. We have to trace the *concept* of the *Divine Being* in East and West at the close of the patristic period. Our point of departure is the Christian neoplatonism of the false Areopagite who cannot have lived before Proclus and must be referred to the latter part of the fifth century. After the problems of Christology had been (in some degree) settled or compromised, religious interest again turned to theology proper, under the guidance of the alexandrine schools of Philo and Plotinus. The ' ante-Christian con- ' ception of God ' (as Dorner calls it) was revived : He is an inaccessible unity beyond human thought or speech. No revelation, not even the embodiment of the Logos, really discloses Him to men ; He remains always *deus absconditus*, οἰκῶν εἰς τὸ φῶς ἀπρόσιτον. In the parallel course of pagan thought during the first four centuries there was a tendency to deny that He ever came into relation at all, either with the world or with men (so long as they continued to be men). Both gnostic and pythagorizing platonist laid great stress upon God's transcendence, and believed that

His essence could not be known except by denying or 'thinking away' all particular determination. The temper of the time did not allow them to turn for consolation to the actual world. Very little interest was taken in social life and politics. Not that men were wholly mystical or abstentionist; or that the pessimistic *gnosis* really practised its world-renouncing tenets. Rather the serious need of reform was but little felt, and an air of finality and achievement hung heavily about the imperial system. This was the more felt since its claims had been canonized by alliance with its only possible rival, the Christian church, under Constantine. The chief interest in the east, whether for the devout or the learned, remained still theology, already falling into its scholastic age. The conflict on the doctrine of man (or *anthropology*) which engrossed the more practical western minds, failed to turn attention to actual problems in daily life or church discipline. Strongly intellectualist, borrowing all its language and ideas from classical philosophers, the greek church elevated the monastic ideal and the 'theoretic life'.

'Recovery of Original Nature': how Conceived.—It is clear that the Church came to consider the chief aim of the Saviour to be the restoration *of an original nature* which man once possessed but forfeited by the Fall. Christ came to enable us to realize our idea, to clear the divine image from its defilement and disguises, to lay bare the primitive essence, which (though inamissible) had become wholly unrecognizable in most men. This essence is divine (θεουδής), not that man is consubstantial with God (ὁμοούσιος is vehemently denied by Clement and Origen) but that man was created in His likeness. Man is the *potentially* divine, and the religious teacher has to remind his convert (in the gnostic formula preserved by Clement) from what high dignity we have been reduced, τίνες ἐσμὲν, τί γεγόναμεν. This primitive nature was immortal and man lost this right to deathless life by sin and by the Fall—a theme variously expounded and never reduced to an entirely harmonious doctrine. The aim of the ubiquitous mystic in every age is to recover this affinity with God, to be transformed into this likeness: so to 'simplify' the incoherent parts of his isolated and unreal *individuality* in time (ἁπλωσις) that he may become a true *person* and enjoy the undivided and eternal. The methods to be adopted for this spiritual renewal or new birth vary very greatly. We have discussed the claims of vedantine 'autotheism' to acquire this deathless unity, hidden but never lost, by an instantaneous flash of thought: no stages are needed in this process; man pronounces himself to be immediately divine—indeed God Himself. This *immediacy* has been the fruitful parent of the heresies which it is our business to chronicle. Against this over-facile divinity of the soul, two chief protests had been made; by those who demand arduous and consistent effort for reviving the divine likeness by a discipline of will and by exercise of the moral virtues; and by those who (in their humility or their ignorance) reject even this modified 'inwardness' and accept salvation or immortality purely as a gift imparted from without.

In Mysteries and Orphism.—The former school will be found to include the thraco-hellenic Mysteries and the Orphic Sect into whose origins and

primitive teaching this is not the place to inquire. These points may however be taken for granted; there were grades of initiation which disposed of any belief in immediacy of achievement; there were (as in all savage analogues) strict rules of ritual *tabu* which without doubt were expanded into the demand for a high ethical standard; there was a disclosure of symbols (to which mystical import was attached) rather than any set preaching or doctrine; it was taught that the devout participant received a measure of the divine *mana* (created by the group-worship) and in the spirit of the hellenic development actually became united to the (now personal) object of the cultus; a meal, gradually modified from the wild cannibalism of a vegetation-rite into a harmless *agapè*, associated the adept with the god and with his fellow-worshippers. The union was also symbolized by a 'sacred marriage' with the god—a ritual in historic times wholly free (it would seem) from objectionable or suggestive features—although doubtless descended in unbroken lineage from a fertilizing rite, founded on belief in sympathetic magic. This symbolic transfusion of divinity into mortals started the long course of erotic imagery in Christian writers: Christ being represented as the soul's bridegroom, not merely in greek commentators on *Song of Solomon* (as Origen) but in sedate legalists of the west, like Ambrose, Jerome and Austin. But this union is only the last stage in a course of gradual initiation, and in spite of some abuses in the private methods of orphic hierophants (Plato's *Republic*) the tendency is clearly marked to move away from pure external and ceremonial towards a highly moral creed. On the whole, we may say that among the 'mystics' and orphists it was held that a man contributed by ritual and ethical purity towards the ennobling and consecration of his personality by the divine presence.

Magical Externalism in Salvation.—The other conception is purely external and almost wholly magical,—that is, grace is conveyed, in realistic fashion, by contact with symbols or objects containing *mana* and by the use of compelling phrase and formula. The moral attitude of the recipient is matter of indifference; the charm works *ex opere operato*. The divine likeness is believed to be wholly lost or so obscured that nothing but a *fiat* from without can replace it. The weak individual cannot himself either deserve or procure the divine gift and it must be mediated by duly qualified men and institutions. To this class belongs the extreme sacramentalism which can only be attributed to a surviving belief in magic, and to a very archaic religious attitude for which the divine powers have no connexion with human standards of goodness. A variant of this externalism is seen in the purely legal or juristic conception of *substitution* and *imputation*; wherein man, utterly unable of himself to find, to satisfy, or to follow God, is content to receive the credit of an *opus operatum*, by a transfer of merit which can only be called a legal fiction. These two forms of a purely external or fictitious relation between divine and human do not now so closely concern us; we are examining those conceptions of the redemptive process which bore fruit in the later *pantheism* of the east and the still later *realism* of the west.

Competence of Individual Without Mediation.—We may now classify

four theories ; the *legal* by which a wholly foreign righteousness is ' im- ' puted ' by a divine judge to a criminal ; the purely ' *sacramental* ', by which power is appropriated by the recipient through magical means ; the *ethical*, which teaches a gradual approach by moral effort to a divine standard or exemplar ; the *mystical* in which, either summarily or after due initiation, an original essence is laid bare and a lost or suspended divinity is again energized in us. Now in these latter forms there will arise the further question, is the unit sufficient of himself to attain this blessedness and perfection, or must the gifts and graces be mediated through visible rites and by a corporate institution ? This touches at once upon the radical problem and peril of the mystic in every age. The extremist claims like the hindu autotheist, to stand entirely alone and aloof and to be a law—indeed a deity—to himself. This attitude is too familiar to need further instances ; we may note in the west the admonitions of Victorinus and St. Austin. The stages laid down for the mystical ascent to perfection are without doubt intended to restrain the over ardent. From the Mysteries we have the 3 grades of proficiency, which seem roughly to correspond with *baptism*, *confirmation*, *communion*, in the normal Christian's life. Later these steps in textbooks of mystical theory will be expanded into *seven*—in deference to the universal instinct of mankind, even among those races least affected by astralism.[1]

Ethical Imitation or Mystical Union.—Another division may perhaps help us to understand the various theories of redemption and introduce us to the pantheist conceptions. A. The Christian may try to follow closely the Saviour's human example—regarding this function as that of Prophet and Pattern. This would correspond to the early followers of Buddha, the *theravadins*, who saw in him only a man gifted with a high degree of spiritual insight and ethical purity. It lay within the power of his disciples to imitate him, by their own persevering efforts and without any aid from without. In the western church this became a purely *pelagian* doctrine and was condemned not only from the point of view of theology but in the light of notorious facts in human experience. Man could not save himself. B. Hence there was inculcated a more mystical relation to Christ, not as exemplar but as indwelling force or spirit—to which St. Paul might seem to allude when he speaks of knowing Christ no longer according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα). Very early indeed the metaphor had been used of the ' birth of Christ in the believer's soul '.[2] Methodius held that each man must be born as a Christ ; our spiritual nature

[1] St. Austin, *Quant. Animæ* § 30, is one of the earliest to adopt the *sevenfold* ascent ; cf. ' Who dost Thy sevenfold gifts impart ' (*Veni Creator*). Just after the close of our period Chancellor Gerson (1363–1429) tried ' to reduce Mysticism to an exact science tabulating and classifying . . . ' with arbitrary schematism ' the earlier doctrines (Inge). These ' means ' are seven : (1) the call of God ; (2) one's own assurance of the call ; (3) freedom from worldly encumbrances ; (4) exclusive concentration on the thought of God ; (5) perseverance ; (6) ascetic practice ; (7) resolute closing of the eye to sense perceptions.

[2] Theophilus *ad Autolycum*.

being consubstantial, not indeed with God, but with the Universal Reason Who became incarnate in Christ Jesus. We have already noted that the Alexandrines, Clement and Origen, rejected explicitly the view that man was in essence ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρί. But in the Logos-doctrine the human aspect of Christ was already giving way before the conception of a cosmic principle; the impersonal was superseding the person; an abstract idea was obscuring a concrete and historic individual (cf. Div.A. App. 212).

The Logos as Immanent Cosmic Principle.—There is no need to trace here the effect of hellenic thought from Heraclitus onwards in this effective depersonalizing of the Saviour. In an extreme form the historic Christ becomes either a mythical type or else a 'rational substratum' of soul common to every reasonable being. The Stoics represented this universal Logos as trying to convert the human mind into an organ of itself, though they never formulated the dogma in precise terms and were constantly baffled by the very different ideals set in the outer *nature* and by human *conscience* in the inner world. They never explained why the world-spirit on becoming conscious in man suddenly reversed its methods—a puzzle which Huxley stated clearly enough to the shallow and complacent mind of our day but was entirely unable to solve. The peripatetic school had no such problem before it: though the stoic talked of *reason* he was really interested only in *morals*, but the disciple of Aristotle had little concern except with the 'dianoëtic virtues'. Hence the mystical turn so often given to the conception of νοῦς, rather a heavenly grace, a sudden infusion of divinity, than a human faculty raised by exercise to its highest point. Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Caria) had given the former interpretation as we have already seen in the section on averroism: his περὶ ψυχῆς maintains that man's 'hylic reason' (νοῦς ὑλικὸς) is material and cannot be separated from the body: that which *actualizes* the *potential* reason is God: there is therefore no survival of a personal soul. It is of interest to note that this mystical doctrine crowns a system of *naturistic nominalism* (somewhat in the manner of Gerson or Alliacus). The *individual* is more substantive and even earlier φύσει than the *universal*; for general concepts and class-names exist only in the mind and the real objects of our thought are the separate members of the group or instances of the type. In spite of Zeller I cannot help seeing a certain kinship in the dogma (Active Intellect = God) with Aristotle's views a little earlier (apud Euseb.): the whole world is the abode of divine spirit (νοῦς) which operated within it, but νοῦς becomes an individual human spirit wherever it found an organism adapted to receive it. These writers lived under Commodus and Septimius Severus (*c. 180–210* A.D.) and well represent the mystical pantheizing strain which was needed to give to the crude materialism of the Porch a religious and devout flavour. From different standpoints both pagan and Christian agreed that the intellect at its best is equivalent to an influx of deity.

Christian Doctrine Modified.—We can trace a gradual and serious change in the Christian outlook owing to the wide prevalence of these views. The adoption of the forms of pagan philosophy and culture without doubt modified the earlier standards. The primitive Church was a simple

community or congregation of equals, waiting in hourly expectancy for the return of Christ. It was organized only by the agreement and good will of its members and although ' authority ' was not wanting its exercise was kept in the background. The ' Apostles' doctrine and fellowship ' implied the close association of these members in daily life. Jewish apocalyptic hopes—or Messianic chiliasm—kept these small companies of believers at a high pitch of spiritual exaltation. Time brought several great changes : grades of officials, closer and more authoritative organization, less congregational autonomy, differing standards of life and conduct, and, among studious apologists seeking to justify their creed before pagan culture, a sense of personal isolation and of discontent with literalism and bigotry. The alexandrine school desired not to exasperate, but to appease, earnest and reflecting heathens ; to prove that greek philosophy was the work of God, not of the devil ; to adopt current phrases and ideas from the richest dialect and thought known to mankind.

Alexandrine Intellectualism and Allegory.—Clement and Origen (not to mention the Apologists) are disciples of Philo in their efforts to recommend their own faith and to appropriate what is best in other creeds. Hence the idea of *reason* outweighs that of *redemption*.[1] Now although reason is a universal faculty and in exercising it man surrenders his private feelings and hopes, the reasoner is a solitary person among men ; he cannot remain one of a crowd, his real affinities and associates are elsewhere. Beyond the life and standard of churchly routine or scriptural ' letter ', there is a higher life, in which the ' gnostic ' becomes the citizen of an ideal world. *Gnosis* was in origin utterly independent of the church and existed indeed before the coming of our Lord : it was not (as once was maintained) an attempt to rationalize the *credenda* nor did it show the way to frame a ' scientific theology '. But it did suggest to the studious believer that the ' knowledge ', caricatured by the mystery and magic of these professors, might find a true counterpart in a more personal Christian science. That is, *faith* was to be lifted up into the higher sphere of *knowledge* ; subjective conviction was to replace obedience to external authority ; and, above all, the edifying moral lurking behind the historic ' letter ' of scripture, was to be extracted by allegory. This was a great change from congregational chiliasm or communism. Already, quite unawares, the leaders of this movement of thought have offered a certain defiance, or at least an alternative, to the *disciplina vitæ* and the *regula fidei* : and, without for a moment denying the competence of the church and its hierarchy, have found out for themselves a better way.

Redemption Imparted, not Imputed.—Hence an increased emphasis on subjectivity ; the purely external view of a mediated redemption must be done away : Christ must be born anew in the soul of each believer. A historic event, an *opus operatum*, did not suffice : the merit and virtue of the Passion must be personally appropriated. There must be no legally

[1] Already the transition can be marked in the Pauline Epistles ; compare the prominent eschatology of the early *Thessalonian* letters with the doctrine of *Corinthians*, *Ephesians*, *Colossians*.

imputed righteousness, but a 'new creature': no substitution, but the divine Mind actually born afresh in us. It will be noted that this theory does not imply the laying bare of primitive essence but the influx of a new influence. Life was not *imputed* but *imparted*.[1] We are saved and delivered *inside* ourselves, not *without* or from without.

A More Daring Conception of Union.—But there is (as we saw) a yet further stage for some daring speculators, in which God Himself takes the place of our personality. It is not Christ (or the Christ-spirit) that is born anew or repeats His Passion within us, but pure deity is found to be the residuum in the void created by our surrender of all creatureliness. But after Philo all theology had been abstract and apophatic; God, the Father 'dwelling in unapproachable light' (εἰς τὸ φῶς ἀπρόσιτον) has no attributes or qualities. The true being of the universe was *no-thing*, and as in the *Sunya Vadi* development in buddhism this was soon taken as equivalent to *nothing*. The aim of the mystic is always to become, not merely like, but one with his God; and the extremists in east and west believed that this was attained, not as in the previous method, by the culture, but by the denial and extinction, of reason.

'Man becomes God': Alexandria and Cappadocia.—It is not a little strange that Christian writers should so readily have adopted the pagan phrase of 'becoming God'.[2] The doctrine of divine transcendence then held by all thinkers (in protest against stoic immanence) might, it would seem, have prevented this borrowing. It is adopted by latin as well as by greek Fathers and no disguise is attempted. Yet the Alexandrines, who employ these terms or comment upon the *Song of Songs*, are not themselves extremists. 'Clement' says Bigg (*Christ. Plat.* Oxford 1886) 'shrank 'from his own conclusions; though the father of all mystics himself . . . 'The gnostic's prayer even when speechless is still conscious and active; 'it is far removed from the blank vacuity of the soul which lies dead and 'buried, asleep in Nothingness (Molinos) . . . Of ecstasy there is not a

[1] 'For the gnostic, Christ in us is far more important than Christ for 'us'. Inge ('Alex. Theol.' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* i 318). He is speaking of Origen who certainly did not regard the historic work of the Saviour as 'mere appear-'ance or exhibition'. Macarius *Hom.* iv 8: 'in each believer a Christ is born': Methodius 'Christ must be born in every individual νοητῶς' Long before the writer of *Ep. ad Diognetum* had said of Christ the Logos πάντοτε νέος ἐν ἁγίων καρδίαις γεννώμενος. St. Austin later wrote, (*in Johannem*, treatise 21): 'let us congratulate ourselves and give thanks that we have been made *non solum Christianos sed Christum . . . Christus facti sumus*'. We shall see that the medieval heretics (e.g. Bogomils and their russian kindred) say instead of this 'I have become a Christ'.

[2] Cf. Clement *Str.* vi 13 μελετᾷ εἶναι θεός. I am here giving only a summary of the development before our period and need not prove by formal evidence a result which is not in dispute: Harnack's *History* must be consulted and the instances given by Inge in *Bampton Lect.* Methuen 1899 'Deification', as well as in articles in *Enc. Rel. Eth.*, 'Alexandrian Theology,' 'Logos'.

'trace in Clement . . . Yet he laid the fuel ready for kindling. The spark 'that was needed was the allegorical interpretation of the *Song*. This 'was supplied, strange to say, by Origen, least mystical of all divines' (p. 98 sq.). The link between the Alexandrines and the pseudo-Denys and Sudaili is supplied by Gregory of Nyss.[1] Basil holds that Christ came to reveal to us the image of God and restore it within ourselves (*Epist.* 38, 8; 236, 3; *Spir. Sanc.* ix 23); the one goal set before man is 'likeness to God'. Gregory of Nazianzus adopts the expressions θέωσις, θεὸς γενέσθαι, like Clement or Hippolytus a century and a half earlier (*Orat.* i 5, xxix 17, xl 45). Both Gregories also employ the terms μῖξις, κρᾶσις for the union of the two natures in Christ; the human nature is transmuted or *deified*. Gregory of Nyss believes this process was a long one, ending only at the Ascension when the human element was fused and blended with the Deity as a drop of vinegar is lost in the ocean (*Antirhet.* 42, *Ep. ad Theoph.*). But neither approached the later (and indefensible) standpoint of a denial of personality to Christ's human soul; they say explicitly, if Christ had no human soul, the soul of man is not redeemed (*Antirh.* 11, 17; Greg. Naz. *Epp.* i *ad Cled.* 7 and ii). They rejected Origen's theory of preëxistence and prenatal fall, wherein the world is regarded as a penitentiary built to reclaim fallen spirits. But they held a very lofty view of man's original state, now forfeited through sin. Though the school lays the usual greek emphasis on Free-Will, Gregory of Nyss speaks much of the evil effects of the Fall and comes very near the later teaching of St. Austin. He regards the sacraments as an extension of the Incarnation: mankind as a whole are deified in Christ, first by the union of the humanity to Christ, next by the application to believers of this result progressively. A theory of transsubstantiation follows, the first of its kind (*Catech. Or.* § 33–37). Nyss appeals to a theory of divine immanence to support his sacramental doctrine; but he lays stress on the divine promise to be present and to operate through the means of grace; it is not then a *magical* necessity. Yet from the mystical and pantheistic suggestions in Nyss were developed the late teaching of the Monophysites and the daring theories of the false 'Areopagite'. He became indeed the source not only of a highly spiritual theory of religion but of the *realistic materialism* which has since been a marked feature in the eastern church.

Summary.—It will be remembered that the aim of this section is to survey rapidly the general results both in church-society and in dogma, of the centuries preceding our starting point. With the data supplied in the foregoing sections we are equipped and prepared for an inquiry into the final development of thought in Christian Hellenism. We can now put together the several conclusions advanced in clearer outline. First, the transition from chiliasm to intellectualism has to be noted, and from autonomous communities of expectant believers to an hierarchy organized on the imperial model, making welcome all sorts and conditions of men under obedience

[1] Cf. Diekamp *Gotteslehre d. G. von N.* 1896, Hall *Amphil. von Ikon.*; this latter writer seems to have popularized the Cappadocian divines without assenting to the Origenism which they revived.

to its orders. And at the same time, a passage from simple and subjective pietism to the need for presenting the *credenda* to a not wholly indifferent world and for laying stress on points of contact with pagan thought. There were thus 3 parties ; those who (like the followers of Montanus and Donatus) believed in a small and exclusive church of the perfect ; those who (like Cyprian, and the anonymous statesmen of the roman see) maintained the ' Catholic ' policy of a world-wide and inclusive church-state ; those who (like the alexandrines and eastern Christians in general) tolerated a visible organization and mediated gifts of grace but who set up the higher ideal—a personal appropriation by intellect of scripture and dogma—a process which sometimes transmuted the historic and personal into the mythical and abstract. Redemption of the first class implied Christ's abiding presence in a small community aloof from the world ; for the second, a grace and a discipline of life mediated by the church and its authorized ministers ; for the third, the liberation of the intellect for the free study of the world and history and then for its perfect union with the ' mind of Christ '. Without undervaluing the actual work of redemption or the human life and example of the Saviour, the alexandrine writers certainly diverted chief attention elsewhere. They adopted (like the Apologists before them) the notion of an immanent Reason and cosmic Principle which had taken flesh for a final revelation of the divine. This then tended in the case of the more sober minds towards intellectualism and allegoric exegesis ; but in more ardent temperaments it developed a pantheizing mysticism of which the results are very striking.

An established church might interpret its duties as the purest externalism : members were assured of a share in its benefit, by legal imputation or by sacramental mediation, without reference to their state of mind or motive. Individualism might protest against this brahmanic and unmoral subservience and (with Buddha and Pelagius) lay emphasis on the need for ethical endeavour and self-help : to such the human example of Christ was of the utmost value. The more devout and mystical, also resenting tutelage, might insist on individual capacity not merely to imitate Christ's human pattern but to appropriate His divine nature. It was this direct access to the Saviour that formed the common tenet of *mystic* and *intellectualist*. For both beliefs—though for the latter in larger measure—the current stoic-platonic doctrine of world-*reason* or world-*soul* was a chief constituent. It is well to remember that this theory was never expressly formulated or reduced to clearness. But in it an impersonal and cosmic principle always tended to supersede a historic and human figure. Aristotle's 'Active Intellect ' was being interpreted as an influx of deity, and we may fairly say that the alexandrines (without disparaging the moral life) regarded the exercise of the theoretic reason as the most divine level attainable by man.

It needed only a less cultured and less patient mind to give this belief a wholly mystical and anti-rational turn. The divine life is not the framing of a systematic complex of related thought, but a return into will-less nothingness. How far this extreme form of mysticism is indebted to India we cannot say. But we know that the texts and the methods arose

in Alexandria among those who never carried them to their logical conclusion; and that Cappadocian divinity in cent. iv formed the link between them and the syrian pantheists whose principles we must now discuss.

'Dionysius' or Churchly Mysticism.—Of this the pseudo-Dionysius was the most notable expounder and in any account of the western Middle Ages must occupy the chief place. The monotheists extolled these spurious writings, products of the monks of Syria. They explain the later growth of *monotheletism* and disclose the tendency to pantheism which underlay the movement. *Whether man and the creature are absolutely as nothing over against God, or are in substance almost wholly divine, the effect is the same.* The special forms of being have in themselves no meaning or value, except so far as they 'become God'; which must imply the loss and surrender of their own finiteness. Stephen Barsudaili of Edessa (*c. 490* A.D.) maintained that every creature was *consubstantial* with the Godhead, and that God would one day be all in all. In Egypt the 'Isochrist' monks held that every believer must attain divinity after the manner of Christ who is only our *examplar*, not a unique *medium* of grace. If we can trust Barhebræus (Abul Faraj), Sudaili is the Hierotheus of the pseudo-Denys;[1] in any case they lived about the same time, in the closing quarter of the fifth century and represent the last infiltration of the monistic universalism of Alexandria into Christian philosophy. 'Dionysius' strongly upholds the church and the institutional, *objective* or sacramental side of religion, while he elevates the speculative and *subjective* element: like Cabasilas (as we shall see later), or like St. Austin in the west, he tries to satisfy the instinct for *personal* and private piety without seeming to discard or disparage the *official* means of grace. In his *theology*, he gave a decided impetus to that *realistic* bias by which medieval orthodoxy, no less than sectarian heresy, was hurried along toward pantheism.

Its Realistic Basis: God Immanent yet Transcendent.—The Godhead of Jesus (*Div. Nom.* § 2 (10) is like Philo's Logos, cause of all things. It fills and maintains all things in unity; is neither *part* nor *whole*, yet again *is* both *part* and *whole*. *Perfect* in the imperfect, it is *imperfect* in the perfect, for it transcends the perfection of its creatures: that is, it is not a wholly immanent *anima mundi* which cannot be conceived as having existence out and apart from finite things. It is form and principle of form in all things; but it is also above form and destitute of it (ἀνείδεος). It is the being which dwells completely and untarnished in all things, yet at the same time is exalted far beyond all. Every principle ἀρχὴ and ordinance τάξις it determines, yet stands above them; it is the measure and time of all things, yet is above measure and prior to time. In needy things it is full; in full it overflows; it is beyond speech or names, above understanding, life, substance, nature.

This chapter *Div. Nom.* ii 10 is a supposed extract from Hierotheus' (?Barsudaili) *Elements of Theology*: ἡ πάντων αἰτία κ. ἀποπληρωτικὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ θεότης . . . πᾶν κ. μέρος κ. ὅλον ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνειληφυῖα κ. ὑπερέχουσα

[1] Barhebr, *Assem.* ii 293.

κ. προέχουσα, τελεία μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀτέλεσιν ἀτελὴς δὲ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις . . . εἶδος ἐιδοποιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀνειδέοις . . . ὡς ὑπὲρ εἶδος . . . οὐσία ταῖς ὕλαις οὐσίαις ἀχράντως ἐπιβατεύουσα. κ. ὑπερούσιος ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἐξῃρημένη . . ἀρχὰς κ. τάξεις ἀφορίζουσα . . κ. ὑπεριδρυμένη . . . μέτρον τῶν ὄντων κ. αἰῶν . . . πλήρης ἐν τοῖς ἐνδέεσιν ὑπερπλήρης δὲ ἐν τοῖς πλήρεσιν, ἄῤῥητος ἄφθεγκτος, ὑπὲρ νοῦν, ὑπὲρ ζωὴν, ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν.

Variations of this paradox (that God is *in* all yet far *above* all) form in truth the sole theme of Dionysius: with the genial platonic optimism of Plotinus and his pupils, he wishes to preserve God's *immanent* presence in the world as root and being of all finite things, yet to assure His *transcendence*. Hence He is that which defines and qualifies each individual thing while in His own essence He is above all things, and has no name, is no-thing. (*D.N.* i § 6 ἐν νόοις εἶναί φασι κ. ψυχαῖς κ. σώμασι κ. ἐν οὐρανῷ κ. γῇ κ. ἅμα ἐν ταὐτῷ τὸν αὐτὸν, ἐγκόσμιον περικόσμιον ὑπερκόσμιον, ὑπερουράνιον ὑπερούσιον, ἥλιον ἀστέρα πῦρ ὕδωρ πνεῦμα δρόσον νεφέλην αὐτόλιθον κ. πέτραν—πάντα τὰ ὄντα κ. οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων. Here we are not far from David of Dinant's materialistic pantheism, nor again from the later development of buddhism and the doctrine of the eternal body of Buddha. Hence symbolic (or positive) theology can speak of His nature dimly and in parables by looking at His works; but of His true being there is only ignorance. Though (as in Plato, Plotinus and Emperor Julian) similes from sun and light occur on almost everypage, the Divine Darkness (θεῖος γνόφος) is the truest term. (*Myst. Theol.* i 1, 3; ii; iii). He uses the words ἀλογία ἀνοησία ἀνωνυμία (*D.N.*i § 1), ἀβλεψία ἀγνωσία (*M. Th.* ii).

For its relation to things he uses a technical word from Proclus the Platonist (which very clearly establishes the date of the writings) ἀμεθεξία (*D. N.* ii. § 5) there is to its participants no ἐπαφὴ, no κοινωνία. Yet § 7 these alone give us any clue as to its nature, πάντα γὰρ τὰ θεῖα ταῖς μετοχαῖς μόναις γινώσκεται, § 8 οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν ἀκρίβης ἐμφέρεια τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς κ. τοῖς αἰτίοις so that we are left (it would seem) without any certain knowledge of Being, as in the case of Spencer's Infinite but Unknowable Energy: ἔχει μὲν τὰ αἰτιατὰ τὰς τῶν αἰτίων ἐνδεχομένας εἰκόνας αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ αἴτια . . ἐξῄρηται κ. ὑπερίδρυται. Pleasures and pains (he says) give us pleasure and pain but do not themselves feel those sensations; fire warms and burns but is not itself warmed or burnt. All we can say is that περισσῶς κ. οὐσιωδῶς προέγεστι τὰ τῶν αἰτιατῶν τοῖς αἰτίοις; but the adverbs prevent us from assuming any real likeness or analogy between *cause* and *caused*. He uses the familiar sun-metaphor (iv § 1) οὐ λογιζόμενος ἢ προαιρούμενος ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι φωτίζει πάντα τὰ μετέχειν φωτὸς . . . δυνάμενα and almost seems to exclude purpose and providence like Spinoza: this essential element of religion he however restores by his stress on Christ's φιλανθρωπία—the human advent of our Saviour adapting itself very ill with the rest of his abstract neoplatonism. His idea that God is ἔρως (*D.N.* iv §§ 10, 11, 12, in which fatally, for his own claims of authorship, he quotes St. Ignatius!) to some extent also repairs this: ὁ ἀγαθοῦργος τῶν ὄντων ἔρως οὐκ εἴασεν αὐτὸν ἄγονον ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένειν § 13 τῶν πάντων ἐρωτι ἐξω ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται. The advance into creation from *essence* into *existence* is called § 14 τῆς ἐξῃρημένης ἑνώσεως πρόοδος: by it all things (even at the

extreme verge of life and being) are connected with their source and in a measure reunited thereto iv § 17; the Good αὐτός ἐστι τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσι v. § 4. In vi § 8 he says summarily πάντα ἐστιν ὡς πάντων αἴτιος . . κ. ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα ἐ. All things then are reverberations or echoes (ἀπηχήματα viii § 2) of the central power and § 3 there is nothing which has not some share in it ἡ ἀπειροδύναμος τοῦ θεοῦ διάδοσις εἰς πάντα τὰ ὄντα χωρεῖ κ. οὐδέν ἐ. τῶν ὄντων ὃ παντελῶς ἀφῄρηται τὸ ἔχειν τινα δύναμιν (of *intellect*, or *reason*, or *sense*, or only *vitality*, or mere *being*, οὐσιώδης δύναμις) xii § 4 ὑπερίδρυται πάντων . . τῶν μετεχόντων κ. τῶν μετοχῶν (feminine) ὁ ἀμέθεκτος αἴτιος. Of Him (*M.Th.* i) all predicates must be both *affirmed* and *denied* δεῖ ἐπ' αὐτῇ, πάσας τὰς τῶν ὄντων τιθέναι κ. καταφάσκειν θέσεις ὡς πάντων αἰτίᾳ, κ. πάσας κυριώτερον ἀποφάσκειν ὡς ὑπὲρ πάντα: in v, οὐδ' ἐστ' αὐτῆς καθόλου θέσις οὔτ' ἀφαίρεσις. In sum, the Divine Power is all things and no-thing, and the world expresses the *existence* of God but gives no clue to His *essence*. Hence in Him all distinctions are cancelled, swept away and abolished: αἱ κοινωνίαι τῶν ἐναντίων (iv § 7): like Malebranche, θεωρῆσαι πάντα ἐν τῶν πάντων αἰτίῳ κ. τὰ ἀλλήλοις ἐνάντια μονοειδῶς κ. ἡνωμένως like any absolutist of Hegel's school to-day (v § 7). He is at once both greatest and least and His darkness is dark with 'excess of light' (*Epist.* 5). He is love which acts as bond and philtre to all things and turns them back to their source. Of Him all things partake 'according to the measure' or proportion of grace and fitness', just as Leibnitz' monads mirror the same universe but in diverse ways. Hence a place is left for *individuality*, —which, forgotten in Scotus Erigena, comes again to the front in Cusa's nominalism in deference to the new subjective claims of man.

Return to Source: Ultimate Pantheism.—Dionysius really adds nothing to Proclus' teaching but he attempts to find a place for the Incarnation: in the end his text is the divine *transcendence* and its correlative doctrine, the deification (θέωσις) of man beyond knowledge and speech if he is truly to know God. Mysticism is an *experience*, not a *knowledge* at all in the strict sense (*D.N.* ii § 9, οὐ μόνον μαθὼν ἀλλὰ κ. παθὼν τὰ θεῖα. In the mystical *unio* ('Ενωσις which is equivalent to θέωσις) he follows the phrases and usage of all such eutychian writers (on the abolition of the creature in God) and has nothing original. The sum of God's relations to man, is contained in *Eccles. Hier.* i § 2. Ἀληθῶς δ' εἰπεῖν ἔν μέν ἐστιν οὗ πάντες οἱ θεοει δεῖς ἐφίενται μετέχουσι δ' οὐχ ἑνιαίως ταὐτοῦ τε κ. ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἑκάστῳ τὰ θεῖα ζυγὰ διανέμει κατ' ἀξίαν τὴν ἀποκλήρωσιν. The same sun shines over all, but all things do not feel, receive, or benefit by it in the same manner. God is equally good to all nations but only the Hebrews knew how to use His goodness. His main text may be called, *hierarchical* series; in a caste-fettered society he was true to the principle; the orders of being in regular gradation form a continuum, and the *differentia* of each is divinely allotted. The limitation ὡς ἐφικτὸν, κατὰ τὸ θεμιτὸν (*Cæl. Hier.* x § 2) recurs with significant frequency: God is always the same, the difficulty lies in us, the weakness in things; even the voluptuary is seeking *peace* and (so far as he knows it) the *Good* (*D.N.* iv § 20). If anything does not so partake § 4 τοῦτ' οὐ τῆς ἀδρανείας ἐ. τῆς φωτιστικῆς αὐτοῦ διαδόσεως ἀλλα τῶν (διὰ φωτοληψίας ἀνεπιτηδειότητα) μὴ ἀναπ[ληρ]ουμένων εἰς τὴν

φωτός μετουσίαν (*text. recept* = *sese explicantium*). So § 33 ὡς Πρόνοια . . . τῶν ὅλων κ. τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἰκείως ὅλῳ κ. ἑκάστῳ (προνοεῖ) καθ' ὅσον ἡ τῶν προνοουμένων φύσις ἐπιδέχεται. In xi § 3 he raises an interesting objection that all things do not love peace but may rejoice in ἑτερότητι κ. διακρίσει and supposes the objector to believe that this otherness is the *differentia* (or distinctive mark) of the individual (ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἰδιότης . .). In answer to this heraclitanplea he finds no difficulty in showing that even the restless man of pleasure is on the look-out for peace—as in Aristotle πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. Hence man knows God, not by exercise of his highest faculty but only by *ignorance*, and becomes like, not by moral effort and patient endeavour but by merging his human nature altogether in the divine.

PART V. FINAL RESULT OF EASTERN MYSTICISM

Union with God Immediate : it cannot be Gradual.—Man cannot argue from the *caused* effects (*αἰτιατὰ*) to the nature or essence of the *Cause*. Dionysius is already on the lines which lead to Scotism and the doctrine of pure arbitary will in God (Occam and Descartes) or pure physical, at least non-moral, necessity (Spinoza). With regard to the finite and known, God is completely transcendent and stands in a relation of exclusiveness : between God and man there is no resemblance. Hence, with the monophysites, the *human* element must vanish and be wholly swallowed up in the *divine* ; the two antitheses cannot exist together nor can one grow by endeavour and show progress into the likeness of the other, as Antioch and Nestorius had hoped to show. Nor has the universe any real or substantive existence, save in so far as God exists in it. Since it depends on Him, He must be called the *unity* of the manifold and divided, *life* of the living, essential *being* of all that is, the single *power* in all its various activities. Yet the close relation of the world of things to God is really withdrawn at every moment by the emphasis on His transcendence. Here Dionysius follows the philonian agnosticism and makes regress to a pre-Christian conception of God. Neither Trinity nor Incarnation can seriously be adjusted to such a theory, for, *ex hypothesi*, God is the ' place of the union of opposites' and in Him all distinctions subside. The *ethical* interest in theology is here quite subservient to the *speculative* : the ' philanthropy ' of the Redeemer in coming into the world is extolled and no doubt earnestly believed by the writer ; but it cannot be explained.

The Creature Lost or Burnt up in the Deity.—Hence there is but a single step to the extreme antithesis ; a denial of the transcendent Deity of whom we can have here no knowledge and form no idea. The visible world, instinct even to the Areopagite with divine life, replaces in interest the formal categories of mere Being, empty and poverty-stricken. That which God has not been pleased to reveal to men can be ignored, both by piety and secularism. There are then, dimly to be seen below the ground all the roots of later *nominalism*, which directs man to the realm of attainable knowledge ; *cultivons notre jardin*. On the other hand the main emphasis leads on to unadulterated *realism*, that is, *pantheism*. As in Aristotle, that which is most real in man, indeed his very self, is God. Realism transfers this doctrine to every finite thing ; so far as it exists at all, it is not *itself* but its *type* or universal. Hence God is the being and substance of everything and the real personality of each man. Orthodox ' realism ' in the scholastic age did not of course draw this conclusion ; but it trembled on the very verge of the pantheism of Amalric and David. Hence the creaturely and ' divided ' life of finite things is merely provisional and lasts but for a certain season. The single divine *essence* at their root must sooner or later burst out into flames and reduce all this world of semblance and partiality to nothingness : or in a more favourite simile, that portion of the divine which is in each thing must in the end convert it to its source and centre, and by assimilating each to its higher order once more make unity out of difference,—that God may be all in all.

The Doctrine Wholly Neoplatonic : Problem of Adjusting Orthodox Christology.—This ' return of the prodigal ' is expressed quite in the manner of Proclus. The divine nature is diffused in varying forms and proportions through the ranks of existence ; not (as we saw) that it can vary in itself, but the ' measure of faith ', proportion of capacity, differs in each case : it descends from higher to lower stages and thus seems to become partial and disintegrated. But the philtre of love is still effective and reverses this process so that out of the *multiple* the universe comes back to its parent *Unity*. This overflowing of Godhead into a somewhat regrettable world-process is quite as hard to understand, quite as unsatisfying to man's ethical sense, as the crude dualism of Mani or the gnostic theory of a secondary and imper-

fect creator. The Godhead still remains impersonal and incommunicable (ἀμέθεκτος); there is no genuine revelation and certainly no ethical end for it. Julian's ingenious allegorizing of the Attis-myth is on the same speculative level: in both, creation wholly divorced from any *moral* purpose becomes a mere *physical* process; the 'self-emptying' of Godhead for the sake of redemption becomes a phrase to signify the gradual weakening of divine potence till it fades into nothingness on the extreme verge of the universe. We cannot in this system attach any unique value to the historic Christ. All beings are in a sense *god-men*, and where the two natures are in the last resort incommensurable the question of degree can scarcely enter. Christ is a type of a universal process whereby (in unspeakable fashion) the Incommunicable communicates Itself. On the churchly side Dionysius holds that *magical* powers are given to church-members through the graduated hierarchy.[1] The ardent mystical temperament (no less than the speculative and therefore unitary and monistic) could not remain satisfied with an absolute antithesis of the divine and human natures. Yet God must be both prototype and final goal of human striving—an axiom in which churchmen were not likely to fall behind neoplatonic theosophy. But redemption (conceived after all on a purely physical level) means that *man's nature can be perfected only by abolishing it.* The *deificatio* is the passage of man from his own natural condition into something inexpressibly higher, through union with God (ἕνωσις, θέωσις). The highest aim of man is not to accord perfectly with his type or idea, but to become something else. Hence, above the *practical* virtues, the *intellectual*; above active life, 'theory' (as in the hellenic mysticism which began with Aristotle): hence a magical conception of sacramental grace, attachment to monachism, belief in supererogation, wherein

[1] It is difficult to avoid using Dorner's somewhat invidious term, if only for the sake of clearness:—we need not imply the more sinister meaning of *magical*, but only the idea of unintelligent passivity, formalism, *ex opere operato*. That this was the popular attitude, in eastern and western churches alike, cannot for a moment be denied, whatever safeguards enlightened thought may have provided for itself. The two epithets in which Dorner sums up the Middle Ages, as partly *magical* and partly *pelagian*, are most useful and suggestive for the student as a clue to a difficult phase of thought: indeed, it is not possible to dispense with them. Yet we must use them with some mental reserve.

from seeming humility there issued a thoroughly pelagian notion of human merit.

Maximus' Attempt to Find a Place for the Unit.—Maximus the Confessor continues, corrects and supplements the monistic (yet in the end dualistic) doctrine of the false Dionysius. He stoutly defends dyotheletism; and gives more weight than the earlier writers to the principle of *duality*. He wishes to restore real being to the world without giving it self-subsistence; it was not to be pure illusion (*Maya*), nor again permitted to exist in its own right, God being banished from it as in later deism. With him everything tends to become a *symbol* of something else; church and world, symbols of God; God and the world, symbols of the church: man represents church in symbol, and church man. Between the two terms there is therefore affinity, and also *distinction*: he has seen the importance of safeguarding the *difference*. He follows Dionysius, by justifying from the *mystical* standpoint the externalism of church-cultus and ritual; through these outward means power and grace descend from God and man is raised to Him.[1] On *negative* theology he does not lay so much stress; he feels the danger of a philonian Incommunicable: (but while he tends to regard God as μεθεκτὸς and the world as full of Him, he sometimes speaks as if it were but a mere shadow of an unknowable Being beyond all predicates). With all its obvious perils and disadvantages, the employment of the term ἔρως brought in an *ethical* character into a relation hitherto chiefly *physical*; as Dionysius says of religious experience οὐ μαθὼν ἀλλὰ παθὼν τὰ θεῖα so Maximus speaks of πάσχειν ἔκστασιν πρὸς τὸ ἐρατόν. Lover and loved *interchange* their inmost natures; God becomes man and man becomes God: he uses the term γάμος for the spiritual wedlock of God and humanity.

Incarnation Mystically Repeated in the Soul.—In such a system the features of the historic Christ tend to fade into a universal type. In Christ, the imparting process of the Godhead was complete, by which He was incarnate in the world. All Christians may be *deified*; for this very end Christ came: fulness of Godhead, in Christ by *nature*, is in us by *grace*:—so far as we are severally capable of receiving it. The Incarnation cannot strictly be called a single and unique event: it is continually being renewed, when Christ is mystically reborn in the heart

[1] Cf. the very similar thoughts on hindu sacrifice.

of the believer.[1] The whole is a comment and an expansion of Athanasius' momentous utterance, *ἵνα θεοποιηθῶμεν*. The Logos again becomes incarnate in and through the redeemed, but also takes flesh in everything; for everything is a *symbol* of God and each brings one aspect of God into view for a brief space (just as the later monads mirror, severally, a different aspect of the universe). Christ, as God-Man is precursor, forerunner, example of the (universal) *deification*; of which from His purely divine side He is the cause. The will must by degrees surrender all props and external aids; must give up the finite manifold which distracts and pulls asunder a nature which should tend to a complete unity (a common tenet of the Platonists). The letter of scripture must be transcended, even the flesh or humanity of Christ. Love presses on beyond the dualism of personality, beyond the human nature of Christ as Redeemer to the naked Logos as He was before the world was (*γυμνὸς λόγος*). Maximus' *διαδρὰς τὸ ποικίλον* is Plotinus' *τὰ πολλὰ ἀφίεις εἰς ἕν σπεύδειν* and Hegel's resolution of all manifold and all antinomies (see Wallace's Introduction to the *Logic*). Love leads to complete blindness to every vision but that of God the Beloved. In God we see only the Monad (undifferentiated Godhead), to which the monachism of our soul is correlative. If discipleship (*μαθητεία*) begins *πρὸς σάρκα* it must not so continue (quoting 2 Cor. v 16); 'faith's journey ends' in *ἁπλῆ πρὸς τὸν Λόγον χωρίς . . . καλυμμάτων τοῦ νόος προσβολή*. The humanity is rather a hindrance to full knowledge of God and complete absorption in His love. Maximus certainly tried to bring out the element of *freedom* and *individuality*,—which implies the need of man's co-operation in the redemptive work. But how can man freely love a God who is inaccessible and incommunicable? God, as in Spinoza's system, must not be expected to 'love back': in Dorner's excellent phrase He only *absorbs*, He does not return our affection.

[1] *ἀεὶ θέλων γεννᾶται Χριστὸς μυστικῶς διὰ τῶν σωζομένων* (notice the *present* tense employed agreeably to his view on *freedom*) *κ. μήτερα πάρθενον ἀπεργαζόμενος τὴν γεννῶσαν ψυχήν in Or. Domin.* i. 354). The Soul is the Virgin Mother who bears the Saviour. He is said to be born anew in us, when the soul expresses itself in the higher virtues. The *will* of the Christian conditions this *rebirth* of the Logos and His continuous descent into the world of men. This will is *νοῦς ὀρεκτικὸς* wherein intellect, emotion (love) and steadfast will are *at* one or *as* one.

General Character of Hellenistic Mysticism : Historic Christ in the Background.—By the side of these *churchly* and *speculative* Mystics, there are traces of a pure mystical and ascetic pietism in the east which by no means exalted the external means of grace or the visible organism of an ecclesiastical society. These too employed the ' dionysiac ' similes (like the Sufis of Islam) and spoke of the ἕνωσις as γάμος, γεῦσις, συγκρᾶσις, ἁφὴ, μέθη even συμφύρεσθαι θεῷ. With the platonists they looked upon the practice of ordinary virtues and obedience to church rules and creed as the *rudiments*,—as a mere negative or cleansing process. The true end is (as with Philo) a *subjective* frame of mind, of which *objective* sacraments were only symbols. Thus they had something in common with the paulicians and much with modern Dissent. The supporters of the Church, opposing this *pelagian* merit and capacity, preferred to lay stress on man's complete ignorance of God : let us suppress thought and discourse and articulate prayer ; let us show our unquestioning devotion to the Church and her sacred *cultus*, those (magical) rites, which veil, while they image forth, Deity. Even the orthodox Christology was imperfect and Christ was regarded by them rather as example and pioneer in an achievement open to every man (Macarius, Marcius the Hermit, John of the Ladder).

APPENDIX M

Pantheism in Edessa : Bar-Sudaili

Edessene Syncretism.—The movement of which ' Dionysius ' was chief expositor has a curious history. Whatever may be the truth about the conversion of King Abgar of Edessa, it is certain that this town became the centre of a very peculiar syncretism, which had a strong influence upon Christian sects and philosophy within the church, as well as upon that singular development ' arabian thought '. Here there still survived traces of the old planetary religion of Babel and Christian converts in this region by no means forgot the older traditions and myths.[1] On the site of Edessa, a hellenistic centre, there had been an ancient city where aryan influence and indo-iranian gods are found at an early date. About cent. xv and

[1] In any exhaustive account of origins it would be needful to refer again to the peculiar forms of syro-Christian speculation, as shown in the clementine *Homilies* and *Recognitions*, certainly emanating from this district in cent. iii : but space does not allow and the two names here treated will be proof enough.

xiv B.C. we know that the Mitani brought into chaldean star-cult a creed still celestial and 'atmospheric' but much more human and personal. There were also Hittites there in still earlier days, *c. 2000* B.C. or the age of Hammurabi. The people were chiefly aramaic; under Esarhaddon and his successor to the fall of Assur (*c. 660–600*) Jews were settled there (Schiffer). Restored and called Edessa by Seleucus I (after the town in Macedon *c. 300* B.C.) it became a centre of greek learning, though the popular tongue would still be aramaic. On the decline of the seleucids house, arab influence passed in from the desert: a native 'bedouin' dynasty of *toparchs* is set up *c. 130* B.C. under Antiochus VII (von Gutschmid)—with names in the main *arabic*, though parthian influence brought it some *persian* forms. This State lasted (with varying fortunes and extent) for 350 years on the confines of the two world-empires. Including Harran, Nisibis, Tigranocerta, Samosata, Melitene, it must have been the meeting-place of every human culture and religion. One edessene prince seems to worship Atergatis, to judge from an inscription on a tall pillar (as in Lucian's *Dea Syria*) in front of a temple equipped with her sacred fish-ponds. Rendel Harris believes that these pillars were sacred also to the Dioscuri under greek influence—'twin brethren' who become with facile syncretism *Jesus* and *Judas—Thomas—Addai* (apocr. *Acta Thomæ*). At Edessa (or Adiabenè) the Old Testament was rendered into *syriac*; revised and adopted by the church it survived the shipwreck of all early syriac writings. The Gospel may have begun here in the Jews' community—about the time of Bardaisan's birth (*154* A.D.) of pagan parents of harranian type.

Bardaisan and Emanation.—Among gnostic leaders no one is more interesting than this Bardaisan of Edessa (*c. 154–220* A.D.); priest in the temple of Mabug (Hierapolis), foster brother of an Abgarid (who reigned (*212–217*); first, a follower of Valentine's heresy but in later life an orthodox convert;[1] apologist under Antoninus son of Severus ('Caracalla' *211–217*); missioner in Armenia after *212*; writer of a great *corpus* of christian hymnody; lastly, learned disputer on religion with indian envoys to the court of Rome; dying in the same year as his fellow-countryman, Emperor Elagabal—who had by a strange accident carried to Rome one of the peculiar religions of that prolific syrian district. As to the conversion of his foster-brother Abgar IX bar Manu there is great doubt (cf. Gomperz *Arch. Epigr. Mittheil.* Austr. Hung. xix 154: in *216* after great damage done to the buildings of the city by flood we find 'temple of 'the Christians' entered as a sect, not as a religion of the court). Very few other figures even of that remarkable period (*c. 130–250*) give us a richer idea of the intellectual ferment and variety then prevailing in the east. But he is named here, in an episode upon pantheism, because he wrote against Marcion's dualism and held that creation was a process whereby the world emanated from God, 'father of all living'. His pupil,

[1] I here prefer the witness of Eusebius and Moses of Chorenè: Epiphanius and Abul Faraj reverse this; 'at first a churchman' he became, like Tertullian, his western contemporary, corrupted by sectarian doctrines (cf. Haase *Zur Bardesanischen Gnosis*).

cited by Eusebius,[1] holds that nations and men lie under the stars and planets, in the true spirit of ancient Babel; and he allows to these luminaries a deputed authority from God. This belief rises later (as we have seen) into prominence in the 'arabs' like Avicenna and Averroes who, mingling this astrology with peripatetic and platonic dogma, were at once forgotten and proscribed in the muslim world; though they were able to hand on the system in the west and to rouse the second great movement in Scholasticism.[2] Man's spirit can however attain freedom when it emerges from the material sphere. This doctrine may represent the Right (or more orthodox) Wing of Bardaisan's disciples; a Left Wing certainly moved toward the abrupt dualism of early Parsism which Mani revived in later time (F. C. Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*).

Ferment of Nestorians and Monophysites.—Here (after *363*) settled Ephrem Syrus,[3] and here and at Nisibis a cordial welcome was extended to expelled *nestorians*. Under Justinian the opposite school of *monophysites* began to raise their heads: a century later (*638*) Edessa passed under muslim dominion and became the channel by which Plato and Aristotle were introduced to the small circle of liberal culture in Islam and so indirectly to the west.

Sudaili's Nihilistic Pantheism.—One of Edessa's most typical products was Barsudaili, who lived under the reigns of Leo, Zeno, and Anastasius I (*c. 460–520* A.D.). He is the most extreme member of the *pantheizing* or eutychian section who opposed the nestorian distinction of Two Natures. He held that *all nature is consubstantial with God, has emanated from Him and must in the end return to Him by absorption*. He is therefore, like Origen, a universalist; in the end the worst sinner and holiest saint will be at one and equal in God;—had not Bardaisan talked with indian pantheists and held tenets which resembled this emanatist theory? First there is [4] posited Absolute Being, or the Universal Essence, (quite in the fashion of Schelling and Hegel); the twin and parallel emanations, of *spirit* and *matter*: next, the ethical side is dwelt upon, the soul's personal experience as it seeks a perfect life here, and is afterwards gradually united with the divine element. The aim is to be so completely identified with the (spiritual) Christ that when He resigns all power to the Father our particular life and consciousness shall be lost in the abyss of Godhead.

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[1] Nau has edited *ivre des Lois des Pays* (Paris 1899).

[2] After 1200 in the writings of Albert and Aquinas.

[3] The barbarian Emperor Zeno preceded Justinian's acts of 529–532 in closing forcibly Ephrem's 'persian' school in 489.

[4] Frothingham's ed. Leiden 1886.

[5] After a study of I, The Absolute Being we have II, Various species of movement and ascent of *mind* to *God* in which process it must endure Christ's sufferings III, Resurrection of *mind*, struggles with evil powers and final identification with Christ IV, The mind becomes one, first with Christ, next with the Spirit, then with the Father and is finally absorbed; V, All nature becomes confounded with the Father, all distinct existence and even God Himself passes away; Essence alone remains.

Frothingham (l.c. 49) calls ' his system openly pantheistic ' or rather ' pan-nihilistic ; all nature down to the lowest forms of animal life simply ' emanating from the Divinity or Chaos and in the end returning to it : ' when the consummation is complete God Himself passes away and every- ' thing is swallowed up in indefinite Chaos,—which he thinks the *first* ' principle and *end* of being, admitting of no distinction '.[1] It has been held that this work of syriac pantheism (not without distinct indian influence) is the source of all the pseudo-dionysian writings. Others again suppose that in his *Book of Hierotheus on Secret Mysteries of God's House*, Barsudaili wrote a pendant and logical conclusion for them.[2]

Importance of this Doctrine for Heresy and for Orthodox Realism.—Whatever may be the exact relation to the dionysian writings, it cannot well be doubted that in these two lie the spur and incentive to pantheism in our own Middle Age. We are not then at fault in laying stress upon the influence of this peculiar thought-form, not only upon Islam shortly after but also on the Christian west. No doubt mysticism is everywhere the same and needs not to borrow ; but affiliation can clearly be traced in this case. First through Erigena, then through Averroes, the syrian doctrine was made familiar to the western mind, to issue at last in a defiant and heretical form ; whilst the *Hierarchies* (still reputed orthodox) form the text-book of the new churchly mysticism of cent. xiii. It is plainly origenist and so far gnostical as Origen had used the stolen weapons of *gnosis* against itself ; its universalism is that of the sect of ἰσόχριστοι among the origenizing hermits of Egypt (*Evagr.* iv 38). It follows Origen in being not an *immediate* pantheism but a *process of pantheizing*, by which in the end all things will be transfused into God. He therefore retains the notion of development through history towards a goal not yet realized.[3] The present world-age ' which Christ called the evil period '[4] corresponds to the sixth day of the week ; and the sabbatic period (' on the third day I shall cease ') is a chiliastic interval before God becomes all in all and everything is of a single nature. Thus, although he does not assume actual divinity for things, yet *potentially* they are of like substance (even the demons).[5] In its development from monophysite views, it is not

[1] Yet on this work Theodosius, Patriarch of Antioch (887–896), comments with marked sympathy and approval.

[2] The name *Hierotheus* is familiar enough in the dionysian treatises ; did he write them all and add a last ratification of the doctrine under his own name ? Cf. *Div. Nom.* § 3 where Hierotheus is professedly Dionysius' teacher. Cf. Frothingham and Ryssel (*Zeitsch. für Kirch. Gesch.*).

[3] Whereas eastern pantheism (with its kindred or copies as a rule) is quite timeless and recognizes no purpose that is not realized at this moment here and now : cf. the absolutist writers in modern english philosophy.

[4] Curiously resembling the indian *kali-yuga*.

[5] Xenaias wrote a letter warning the people of Edessa against him : he had denied eternal punishment, abolished baptism and the sacraments, written in his cell ' All nature is consubstantial with God ' and in a panic

difficult to see an emphasis on this tenet: 'divine and human natures' were brought to harmony and sameness in Christ, because *humanity* in general is in essence divine'.[1] Now the Areopagite kept closely to the church and its symbols 'of heavenly things': just as in St. Austin the strong mystical and personal element is forced into partnership with outward catholicity and churchly observance.[2] But Barsudaili goes much further: there is no need of a church at all. 'All Scotus Erigena is in Barsudaili', says Harnack with truth. The heterodox mystics who alarmed Authority about *1200* were pupils of the Syrians rather than of Dionysius, who with some little ingenuity can be adjusted with orthodoxy. Now the orthodox church had already accepted a very personal mysticism and its basal dogma was a realism which blurred the distinct outlines of *singulars* and denied their worth unless they became wholly *typical*. This was a part of their hellenistic heritage in the first period as well as in the second—that is from Erigena (*850*) to Abelard, and again after the invasion of arabian and peripatetic doctrine. It is therefore not in the least surprising that the vague monistic sects of Amalric and David excited no less horror and alarm than did the frank paulician dualism of the Albigenses.

APPENDIX N

The Euchite Sect

This sect seems to be an offshoot of syrian monachism in cent. iv, aiming perhaps at a purely spiritual worship in days when the influence of the secular State was keenly felt upon the church after the alliance of Constantine. It cannot be denied, however, that in them there emerge again to light very ancient features already seen in Essenes and Therapeuts and certain societies of the further east. The Euchites, besides their most familiar name (from εὐχὴ and their doctrine of unceasing prayer), were called *Messalians* (*aramaic* for to pray), *Choreutæ* from their mystical dances, *Enthusiasts* from their claim to inspiration as the direct vehicles of the Holy Ghost. The names of certain prominent leaders also gave them the titles Adelphians, Eustathians, Marcianists, Lampetians. In *390* Flavianus, bishop of Antioch, induced the aged *Adelphius* of Edessa by pretending sympathy, to disclose to him all the secret teaching of the sect. He then chastised, excommunicated and drove into exile the heretics, convicted on their own avowal. They took refuge in Pamphylia and were again condemned by the Synod of Sidè. Some found a home in Armenia

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erased it again; cf. Barhebræus (= Abul Faraj) *Assem. Bibl. Orient.* ii, 30, 32.

[1] It is noted that, unlike Bardaisan and Origen, he made no point of liberty and human free-will, but rather taught a form of fatalism.

[2] All medieval development comes from one or other side of St. Austin: he is at once the founder of the *Catholic* Church of the Middle Age and of its rival, mystical and *protestant* individualism.

(where Christian belief was always of a peculiar kind) and others caused some excitement in the eastern capital itself. Emperor Theodosius issued decrees against them (cf. *Cod. Theod.* xvi *de hær.* vi 187) and the Council of Ephesus condemned their chief work *Asceticus*.[1] *Lampetius*, another secret leader, was a catholic priest in the diocese of (Cappadocian) Cæsarea ; his bishop Alypius cited him to answer to the charge of immorality and contempt of the use of church-music as ' legal bondage '. He wrote the *Testament* to which the reply of Severus the Monophysite is still extant. Under Justinian a roman pontiff is said to have expressed himself satisfied with the orthodoxy of *Marcian*, then the leader of the sect. After a long silence or oblivion, their memory was revived when the kindred sect of bogomils appeared on the scene.

They held a singular belief, the converse of the comforting *parsi* theory of a *fravashi* or the guardian-angel of Christians. ' Every one is from his ' birth possessed by a devil who prompts him to sin '. Baptism cannot expel it : it may wash away former offences but leaves the source of evil untouched. The only remedy is intense prayerfulness ; after which the demon may be visibly seen to pass out as a sow with her young ones (St. Augustin, *Hær.* 57). Full of this idea of conflict with the unclean powers, they danced to subdue the flesh and to trample on demons. ' When ' the devil is gone out ', they believe that a union with the Holy Spirit ensues ; the euchite becomes ' partaker in the divine nature ' in the most literal sense. They repeat the similes of the heavenly Bridegroom and the blissful marriage of the converted soul. Epiphanius (*Hær.* 80) says that on hearing mention of an angel or patriarch or prophet—even of our Saviour Himself—they say ' That am I myself '. They claimed to see visions denied to others, to prophesy, to read the hearts of men, and to know the condition of the departed. They regarded Baptism and the Eucharist with complete indifference and despised the ' legal bondage ' of fixed liturgy and monastic discipline. Like the Apostolics in medieval Italy or Germany, they refused to work, insisting that their whole time was spent in ceaseless prayer. They brought into vogue the (buddhist) ideal of the mendicant life and renouncing the world and its cares roamed about like the Circumcellions. They slept in the open streets and begged their way along. It was said by their foes that their perfection was *inamissible* as with the gnostics; that is, that outward acts of sin were quite indifferent to their inward virtue.

It is clear that they carried on a tradition which was by no means wholly Christian and imparted their long subterranean teaching to the ' paulitz- ' ians ' and bogomils of later times. They are therefore an interesting link between the period just dismissed and the medieval church which we are about to treat in the Fourth Division of our work.

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[1] It is from this still extant volume that John of Damascus gleaned the summary of their chief tenets, for purposes of refutation in later time.

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DIVISION D

Authority and Free Thought in the Middle Ages

PART I

The Monistic Church

CHAPTER I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PERIOD.

Section I. Powers and Competence of the Church

Gregory I. as Starting Point for Western Development.—The period to be now briefly reviewed is held to extend from Gregory I (*c. 600*) to the catastrophe of the Papacy under Boniface VIII: though a glance may be given at the issues and developments in a yet later age, and we may have to include (for some purposes) the period ending with the settlement of the Turks in Europe (*1453*). All dates are arbitrary and all periods artificial, —each being a tract or segment cut off at will from a continuous and unbroken history, each moment deeply laden with the past and pregnant of the future. Every writer within such a given area seeks to justify his choice of starting-point and close; and this course may well be expected from the writer of a monograph. Pope Gregory is last of roman officials and first of medieval popes and in him the moment of transition from the old to the new order is most conspicuous. Both in politics, in church system and in moral teaching, he sets a precedent and example which later times did their best to follow. He almost broke with the byzantine Cæsar: he looked north and west for new fields of mission enterprise; he supported and defended the roman duchy and fed its poor; he made accessible the doctrines

and discipline of St. Austin and popularized a system of faith and morals which was never seriously questioned for several centuries. In him every feature and every aim of the western church becomes at once clearly marked. His successors had nothing to do but to apply his principles and methods to a new crisis or a novel material. In him the canon of the roman church was, as it were, finally closed and sealed.[1]

Collapse of East Rome : Futility of Heraclius' wars.—Scarcely less important was the date (*600*) for the Empire itself : I have elsewhere pointed out the serious *momentum* which the murder of Maurice gave to its decline.[2] Under an ignorant and brutal centurion, suddenly raised by mutiny to power, the entire tradition of Rome was lost, just as her armies were well nigh annihilated. Persia, lately the friend and ally of the Empire, became her deadly foe in avenging the death of Maurice, the benefactor and restorer of Chosroes. Heraclius inherited a futile quarrel and used up the resources of both empires in his persian wars, leaving exhausted and disaffected countries as an easy prey to the muslim. The regions which remained roman were reorganized on wholly different lines by the heraclian dynasty, and byzantine culture entered on its dark ages.

Barbarism in Gaul : Brief Reaction under Charles.—In the further west this era marks (certainly for Gaul) the victory of barbarism, the triumph of feudal self-will over uniform control, the beginning of that period of steady decentralization and particularism. Against this tendency Charles' monarchy was but the brief and unsuccessful reaction of one strong and persevering man. Therefore in the appearance of new elements and principles, in the vanishing of old traditions and landmarks, the year *600* is a suitable starting point for our inquiry.

End of the Medieval World and its Ideals (in *1453*).—Nor is the second arbitrary date (*1453*) selected without good reason. That year saw the end of english pretensions to the french throne, the return of our policy homewards to insular concerns. It proved the absolute decay of chivalry and the crusading ideal, for no Christian power went to help the last defenders of New

[1] I need not again refer to the admirable monograph of Dr. Dudden, 2 vols, Longmans, 1905.

[2] *Constitut. Hist. R. Emp.* 2 vols, Longmans, 1912.

Rome. The hopeless failure of the constitutional or conciliar movement in the western church was then made plain ; and the popes decided to abandon ideal claims or duties and instead to create a profitable italian princedom out of a visionary world-empire. About that time Nicolas of Cusa was writing those works which display him as last of the Scholastics and first of modern speculators. Kingship was busy divesting itself of its knightly and romantic character, to model its policy on the selfish italian 'tyrant'. The unscrupulous and competitive aims of the modern State came into full view and were pursued without disguise. The 'Holy Roman Empire' under Frederick III became a laughing-stock and its claims to represent and supervise Christendom were entirely laid aside. Once more, on the far eastern frontier, the sons of Russia were preparing to throw off the tartar yoke of the Golden Horde, to create as the new bulwark against the yellow peoples a curious blend of monarchy, half-mongolian, half-byzantine. In the field of thought and culture, fresh notions and principles were being propounded, and in the social fabric chief power was already passing to the trading class who made the new kingship their instrument. All the aims of our modern society—competitive, egoistic and utilitarian—came into the foreground ; and the archaic ideals and sanctions were forgotten or discarded. The last check upon self-seeking secularism, an ecumenical but poor and spiritual papacy, was transformed (as we shall see) into a small and ambitious kingdom of this world.

Conflict of the Old and New Ideals.—Few students of history or of religion can doubt that the interval thus marked out is one of the most interesting periods in the records of mankind. The following five centuries only show, even in their most complex results and issues, the logical deduction of a very few rudimentary principles,—the duty (for the new State-organism as well as for the unit) of survival and self-preservation, the aim of enjoyment and profit, the supreme laws of competition and self-interest. But in the centuries under review the old and the new are blended or shown in violent antithesis : the passion for peace and unity (at least as an ideal) even in the most selfish and violent breasts, the recognition by all of a universal law,[1] the deference (though it be merely titular) to a central power wholly without

[1] Even by men who never respected it themselves.

active means of defence or coercion, the general acknowledgment of an all-embracing church-state whose discipline and doctrine would last as long as the world. Yet from the minds of a society, in theory so homogeneous and harmonious, there arise from time to time cautious questionings as to the truth and finality of the tenets or the system. Few desired the break-up of a crystalline unity, either in dogma or society, even in their most wanton moments of rebellion; just as few reformers in cent. xv and xvi really wished to overthrow the papacy, or the feudal baron to abolish the monarchy.

Rupture into Fragmentary Life of Modern Times.—But little by little economic facts worked with these sceptical critics to transform Christendom into a group of hostile powers which did not recognize a common creed or a common umpire for their quarrels, whose truces were only suspended hostilities. The average citizen or subject again, instead of finding his place in life as member of a gild or tenant with certified rights under a manor, began to confront directly a central power with ever-augmented claims and means to enforce them. *Status* or the caste-system (it is said) gives way before free *contract*, and individuals covenant with each other. But in the case of nine-tenths of mankind freedom of contract is a pure mockery and there is no choice at all. All these developments are seen in the welter of medieval ideals and practice, so often wholly at variance. By degrees, out of the unnatural unity of an impossible ideal, the divers elements emerge more definite and more hostile; and at last succeed in breaking up human life into the irreconcilable, complex and separate departments in which we find it to-day.

Meaning of Authority: Not Coercive.—Our first duty is to define Authority and ask what was this power under which the helpless remnants of classical society as well as the new invading races were glad to shelter themselves. First, it was not a civil or a political power and (for a long time at least) it had no real coercive force behind it. It is hard for us to-day to conceive of any law or authority which is not at once *coercive* and *compulsory*, to many of its victims, *arbitrary* and even *unjust*. The accidental congeries, entitled States or nations to-day, have been built up by force, by kingly ambition, or by mercantile adventure. The favourite modern definitions of Law have divested it of every shred of moral meaning or appeal: it is the command of a

superior (whether *de facto* is also *de jure* does not matter). It is a uniform procrustean norm applied without respect of persons to every one living within certain arbitrary lines or frontiers. The extra-territorial or consular jurisdictions, soon to vanish, are the last relics of a time, when (as in most parts of our epoch) law was *personal* and each man carried about with him his own code as an inalienable birthright : violence might disregard this in act, but no one ever challenged the theory.

Modern Conception of Law as (non-moral) Force.—In the background of our law is *coercive* force which leaves no alternative but submission ; for the unit, one of a multitude of disconnected atoms, cannot question or defy it. In spite of some play of sentiment at times of crisis, there is no feeling of loyalty to law *as such*, because it makes no appeal to any emotion but fear or the instinct of self-interest. It is not strictly a moral force because, being universal and uniform, it only prescribes a *minimum* of social observance and confines itself (like the decalogue) mainly to *negatives* and prohibition. For positive ethical duties it leaves the subject to other influences, which it will not seek to control unless they threaten its supremacy in its own province. It provides a framework within which the unit is safeguarded and enabled (by securing other guidance) to work out his life. But the area over which it claims autocratic power is so wide that it cannot please or satisfy every section within it, and it sometimes fetters as much as it sets free. Meantime, having left out of reckoning all appeal to motive (except its own, State-utility or the ' common good ') it has nothing to fall back upon in case of criticism or defiance except *force*. *Force* has now become the most striking characteristic in the conception of *Law*.

Church Supplied the Place of the State after *600* : Its Respect for the Individual.—After the fall of the roman bureaucracy, of the official and legal system, Law (in most of these centuries) was rarely strengthened by the physical arm or by the sanction of immediate penalty. It was a matter not of autocratic ordinance for a vast dominion, but a birthright of race or even family. The State (as Romans conceived it and as the modern mind again conceives it) had disappeared in the west. A man must be strong enough to enforce his birthright in person ; otherwise his titular ' rights ' would not be respected. Hence a strange scene

of lawlessness, anarchy and violence—depicted in too black colours by historians equipped with very imperfect knowledge and very strong prejudices. But the uncertainty at least was bad enough; no man could be sure of winning respect for his personal rights, which to him appeared vested in the very nature of things. Alone in this precarious society, the Church of Rome upheld the idea of equity and uniform treatment, in all matters wherein uniformity was good and wholesome. Alone it maintained a perfectly coherent system of social duty and guidance. It might modify or correct, but it never challenged, the special laws of race and tribe: it only embraced those petty 'taboos' or regulations in its own directive framework. It never sought to carry out sweeping reforms on idealistic lines; and like St. Paul it publicly and officially upheld slavery as an institution, while in private it softened its worst features. It is no paradox to say that its strength lay not so much in its *catholicity* as in its provision for *individualism*. It became 'catholic' because its real aim was to bring home general truths to the unit and make 'universals' intelligible to the lay-mind of very ignorant converts.

St. Augustin and Ecclesiastical Opportunism: Catholicity of the Church.—The aim of the church was *opportunist*. The day was past when the Christian message and promise might seem to belong only to an 'assembly of the perfected', as the followers of Montanus, Novatus and Donatus had taught. Its part was to let the tares and wheat grow up together 'until the 'harvest'. St. Austin, who sets the tone and gives the dogmatic basis for the whole period, may be best known as the writer of the *City of God*, in which *ecclesia* and *seculum* are sternly contrasted. But he is no less remarkable (and far more important in influence) for his careful adjustment of church-law to the needs and capacity of the unit. Alliance with the Empire had fixed once and for all ecclesiastical policy; the church must make the best of the world as a whole and nothing must be left outside its competence or its kindly control. The ideal of a perfect spiritual community was surrendered (we cannot doubt it) with sighs and regrets. But henceforward her rulers had no option; by every permissible means the world must be kept within the net of the church. Hence accommodation, compromise, special permission, licences and indulgences for the individual

(on which the modern mind looks with comparative favour); hence on the other hand, persecution, suppression of free thought, religious wars, sanguinary crusades against muslim and heretics, the stake, the rack and the Inquisition. All these features are logical deductions from the momentous change of policy under Constantine. Then, in place of a group of convinced and converted believers (a group standing out in contrast and conflict with a naughty world), there arose the ideal of a single community, conterminous with human society, an ark from which no one was either to be excluded or allowed to escape to perdition. Civil and churchly, secular and spiritual, were but different sides of the same State. From one point of view religion made an irretrievable sacrifice of completeness and perfection; from another, in a very real sense it 'gained the whole world'.

The Monk and the Confessor: Radical Distinction of Two Lives.—The church then in *theory* maintained a most lofty and exacting code; in *practice* it modified this rigour to suit times, seasons and persons. Hence two institutions which have most excited unmerited blame—the *directorate* and the *conventual celibate life*. In the monastic system a place was left for a 'church' of the perfect'—to which lofty ideal it was not supposed that every believer could attain. But provision was made for this exceptional spirituality, while a lower standard was required from average men. In the absence of civil law or central authority, the laymen could not safely be left to themselves; like the Jesuits in Paraguay, or the exponents of modern Socialism, the church believed that its subjects stood in hourly need of particular guidance. While its permanent rules were severe, the daily exercise or application was tender and considerate. Allowance might be made for ignorance, and by means of *penance* every law could be so modified as to press not unduly on the sinner. If the church is accused of maintaining its own sovereignty only by undermining its basis, it must also be remembered that it was the only force that could exert sovereignty at all. Both before rulers and in dealing with the great ignorant mass, it was bound to be 'time-serving' and opportunist. Neither from the powerful nor the humble could it exact the highest standard: hence the radical distinction of cleric and layman, of the two orders; hence the carefully defined grades of sanctity

and merit,[1] works of supererogation, and the 'tariff' of penance (which later writers compared with unjust contempt to the barbaric *wergeld*).

Church as All-Inclusive Ark : Schism Most Heinous Sin.—This Authority then, the only one acknowledged by all men in western Europe, was neither autocratic nor (in its essence) coercive. No doubt St. Austin had set a perilous precedent by his welcome of civil force to crush the Donatists, and had shown against critics how wise and right and scriptural it was to 'compel them to come in'.[2] But it is important to remember that even when it had coercion at hand or in reserve, the church used it with reluctance and regret. If an individual was in dogmatic error, or open sin, it preferred to plead, to convert, to convince. The western branch never had that hatred of speculative heterodoxy which was the platonic heritage of the eastern—there heresy, the 'lie in the soul', was the chief crime. Rome, more social and less intellectual[3] held schism or open rebellion against the powers that be as the deadliest sin : the spiritual Ark was not the invisible church of correct orthodoxy, but the visible society outside of which there could be no salvation.

Freedom and Coercion under Roman Empire : Church Succeeds to Its Duties.—Effective coercion is a means of government which only of very late years has passed into the hands of rulers : autocracy is quite a modern discovery. Ancient times had no such forces at their disposal. In the primitive tribe (it is true) public opinion was despotic and denied progress or free thought to its members : all wisdom and all power to conciliate the gods were lodged in the council of the elders or more rarely in the priest-king. Monarchy and empire brought detachment from the group, that is freedom. It is curious to contrast the state-ridden citizen of ostracizing Athens or censorious Rome with the

[1] Even in a church which clung loyally to St. Austin's doctrines of universal sinfulness.

[2] In the african Church, *Tertullian* stood for exclusiveness and a 'Church of the elect', like modern Calvinism ; but Austin's master was in truth *Cyprian*, before whose eyes there first unrolled a definite scheme of universalism and comprehension.

[3] The extraordinary dearth of reflection or theology in the Capital of Christendom during this age must strike every student : the entire energy of Rome (when the papacy was free from feudal clutches) was absorbed in applying accepted dogma, in organizing and in administration.

travelling Hellenist under the Diadochi or St. Paul under Nero. Lucan is right in saying *cum domino pax ista venit*, that is, social stability can only exist under a strong central government which allows no ' private wars ' and no privileged caste. But he might in fairness have added : culture, trade, progress, enlightenment, even liberty (in any true sense) seem to need the same strong and irresponsible protector. The roman world had now lost its centre and pivot ; Emperor Maurice sent money to Gregory I instead of troops, begging him to buy off the Lombards as he could not spare soldiers to defend Rome :—this moment was the *gran rifiuto*, the great abdication of imperial Rome. The Heraclíads treated the west as a conquered province ; the Iconoclasts as a hostile nation of disloyal sectaries : but (as in Britain) the real hour of divorce and rupture sounded when the centre refused any longer to defend its subjects. The claim for the fullest autonomy was a mere matter of time. A searching autocracy, a power in some respects not less interfering than a modern ' Absolute State ', had really administered the people since perhaps the time of Hadrian (*c. 130*). Like modern bureaucracy, it had been a costly and oppressive contrivance in its later years. Since Diocletian (*c. 300*) the emperor had counted for less and less ; except Constantine and Theodosius (both called forth by a crisis), all his successors were the secluded and ignorant puppets of a court clique.[1] The impersonal machine continued grinding until the original force or *momentum* failed, when the civil and official class was no longer forthcoming. Into its place the Roman Church was called, without any of the old means for enforcing its will. It must persuade if it could not coerce. It had a divine mission to keep the *seculum* in something like order until the End. That it succeeded even so well as it did, in a heroic and almost hopeless task, is a striking proof of the Divine favour.

Papacy Forced to Assume Secular Dominion : Secularism and Feudal Seizure.—The church was unable to reject any of the

[1] I have pointed out elsewhere that even Justinian (whom Agathias called ' first real autocrat in deed as well as name ') was by no means an absolute monarch—in the sense in which Louis XI or XIV or Cromwel' and Napoleon were absolute. The whole aim of Diocletian was to eliminate chance in the succession, or outside control of the prince's government. But he only succeeded in creating a Frankenstein's monster, over which the emperor's personal will could exert but little influence, where his efforts at reform were thwarted, derided and quietly ignored by vested interests.

earthly means of influence. Gregory I might be termed the first ' pope-king ', because he really fed the roman poor from his own estates and the vast areas left by the pious to church uses. Secular dominion was thrust upon him. If ever the title-deeds to temporal authority are unblemished it was the case with the papacy. A modern king lineally represents the captain of a sworn band of brigands ; and the longer his title, the worse his original claim is likely to be on purely moral grounds.[1] But temporal power and estate came by popular consent and approval to the papacy, much as some of its most loyal sons have regretted this entanglement. One result was a wealthy church among a poor people ; a pride and pomp, dislike of which was a chief lever in the paulician attack (in cent. xi and xii). Another was a still more serious drawback ; the seizure of spiritual office by feudal families, on account of its attendant worldly gods. Under the Merwings the Gallican Church was feudalized, and its benefices filled by cadets of noble lineage. So the papacy itself from the time of Theophylact (*900*) and his house, to the last vestiges of Tusculan influence (*1050*).[2] In later times french and german bishoprics, often carrying temporal power with the see, became hereditary appanages ; and on the eve of revolution (*1789*) the church in France was cleft into two parts, an aristocratic clique, monopolizing the profits, and a very democratic and plebeian priesthood, performing the duties. Yet the influence of Rome on the whole made decidedly against such a perversion of sacred funds. The church provided the sole avenue for merit and the only career for ability; now that the titular monarchy was surrounded by feudal nobles with hereditary office, who prevented the king from choosing his servitors or instructing his ministers.

Church's Basis Democratic : or, the Unit is of Value.—In spite of its wealth, the church was *democratic* ; that is, it regarded

[1] Exception must be made in the case of *free election* as in Norway of a *foreign* prince ; of Holland, Montenegro, or Serbia, where a *native* family is raised for public services ; of Belgium, Greece and some Balkan States, where an alien ruler, nominally chosen by the people he is to rule, is really imposed by foreign chancelleries.

[2] It was in reaction from this second enslavement to feudalism that Hildebrand set up his ideal of a purely spiritual monarchy and a celibate priesthood—equal units under a despotic centre, the tenets of worldly *democracy* to-day (in its modern and paradoxic meaning, see note p. 656).

all its units as immortal beings with an eternal destiny hereafter, inherent rights and duties in this world. In an age, sometimes dismissed as 'realistic', the *value of the individual* was a primary axiom.[1] He is not the naked unit of later times, tricked out with nominal 'natural rights', which neither the State nor circumstance can afford to recognize; but he is the 'brother for whom Christ died'. In the church, both militant and triumphant, there was an open career; a serf's son could become a saint or a pope here, and enjoy the Beatific Vision hereafter. Facts were often adverse to this recognition of equality, but no medieval student can afford to ignore the *democratic* principle which lay throughout at the very roots of the church-system.

Section II. Character and Aims of the Enlightened Opposition

Summary: Permanent Tutelage: Claims of the Subordinate Sciences.—We have seen then that the church was the successor of the Empire as the sole control and self-conscious authority, that it professed to give guidance to all its members in this life and salvation in the next, that in the great powers exerted in this function—rather forced upon it than usurped—it did not at once claim to be autocratic or coercive, but indeed persuasive and conciliatory, and that it did not disparage the unit as such, or his worth and freedom. There were intervals when bishops and popes were wholly ignorant of this tutelary mission, times when its wealth was seized and made subservient to secular interests;[2] but at no time was the sacred tradition allowed to become wholly extinct. But the weakness of any *tutelary* system which claims permanent tenure is obvious: also the inadequacy of any one single power to control the whole of life. At first the

[1] I need not here do more than refer the reader to Gierke's *Politics in the Middle Ages*, ed. F. W. Maitland, and my own Bampton Lectures 1905.

[2] Less excusable was the feudal and royal spoliation of the Reforming Age (e.g. the scottish nobles or the new aristocracy created by Henry VIII): more striking is the contrast between ideal and actual in the papacy, when we reach the small selfish italian principality of the Renaissance (which is surely worse than the tusculan period because far more self-conscious and enlightened). I cannot however believe (as J. A. Symonds seems to do) that Leo X ever boasted of the profits which the 'gospel-fable' brought him.

church enjoyed a clear monopoly of culture and science as well as of religion and humane morals. By degrees the daughter-departments claimed liberty in the matter of government, policy, science, justice, even morality. The very crusades to which the popes gave sanction as a distraction from brothers' quarrels, brought in new ideals of life, new economics and a new respect for men of a different faith. Politics and ethics made tentative efforts to become independent sciences; and a basis other than religious was sought for the authority of a magistrate or a judge. The revived studies of roman Law, following close on the Wars of Investiture, gave to the civil power a novel character of *democratic absolutism*.[1]

Protests of Commerce and Enlightenment: Narrow Circle of Opponents.—The needs of commerce and public order gave fresh powers to officials who enforced public order and the observance of law; who put an end to private wars, *vendetta*, and barbarous ordeals of battle. Thought and science, hitherto practised under the church's shadow and protection, brought a few of the more enlightened minds into opposition. One of the most notable and fertile theories of the time was the Double Truth,—an accommodation or compromise, which marked out, in a complete and seemingly honest dualism, the two realms of faith and knowledge, dogma and philosophy, and kept them rigidly apart.[2] It must be noted that the mutineers belong almost entirely to the old privileged classes or to the new middle class just acquiring privilege. The church never counted the masses amongst her enemies. Movements towards reform, even if originating in honest doubt or righteous indignation, were always adroitly seized and manipulated by interested parties. Selfish motives, economic temptations, sectional interests, account for the success of such movements; the noble and the burgher were at one in desiring freedom from a control now becoming irksome and a

[1] From the point of view of strict definition or of political science a plain contradiction in terms; for democracy (if it means anything at all) implies self-government, and very limited powers allowed to any central rulers: yet democracy has never yet failed in history to lead on to the Absolute State, to the suppression of all local franchises and autonomy, to the abolition of individual freedom.

[2] The old saying will recur to mind: 'When he entered his oratory 'he shut the door of his laboratory, and when he worked in his laboratory 'he shut the door of his oratory'.

share in the church's somewhat stationary wealth.[1] Again, in the world of letters or science the pioneers of progress belonged wholly to an exclusive circle of *Intelligenzia* who, like the later Whigs, were content to believe that all the world was free and happy when they found themselves without superiors.

Purely Selfish Aim of Free-Thought : Individualism and Contempt of the Masses.—It has truly been said that by *liberty* both the classical and the medieval world implied an exclusive franchise, a valuable right or privilege which marked its owner off from his fellows. There is no sign that aristocratic thought desired any general emancipation, but only its own relief from fetters ; and it is abundantly clear that rationalists like Averroes were only too anxious to uphold positive belief and church-authority on the same grounds as Voltaire or Bolingbroke—to keep the ignorant in check.[2] It is therefore important to remember that Free Thought meant only the claim to liberty made by a select and enlightened class, not any general demand for relaxing the laws of order, police, or church-discipline. Certainly this is true in the time of the Renaissance, when scholars[3] and thinkers demanded for their own behoof a suspension of ordinary moral laws, which nevertheless they felt ought to be applied in other cases. But before this age of selfish individualism, often concealing itself under a seemingly generous demand for liberty, there was a time when men were still willing to submit their theses for the *imprimatur* of the church and were surprised when charged with heresy and sedition. To the end of the chapter Free Thought (in its technical sense) never wished to quarrel with the established order, or challenge a system by which, on whatever fantasies constructed, social peace and order seems to depend. Quite early there appeared the real want of

[1] Too often it must be confessed a wealth leaving its own kingdoms to accumulate in Rome ; or estates and benefices lavished on foreigners and absentees.

[2] Averroes thinks with the Inquisition that heretics should be killed as a public nuisance and danger. Voltaire and the Deists in cent. xvii were at one in doubting the stability of a State of atheists ; and perhaps Bayle was the earliest to defend such a community, and to believe that social honesty and virtue might survive the collapse of belief in God and the hereafter.

[3] Like the ' tyrants ' whom they admired and extolled while they lived and succeeded, no less than their assassins after their death.

sympathy with the poor, the struggling and the ignorant, which has always marked *intellectualist* movements.[1]

Common People Always Supporters of the Church.—The fact must then be kept in mind throughout that the people at large were in favour of the existing order. They joined willingly (like the Spaniards under Philip II and III) in the pursuit and execution of heretics and regarded with aversion and distrust the leaders of independent thought. It can of course be said that the ignorant mob were too well dragooned and infected by the obscurantists to know or appreciate truth, but it remains certain that down to very late times medieval Authority has found its chief supporters among the lower classes. It would therefore be unfair to class these medieval movements with more modern mutinies of an oppressed or disfranchised order against an inefficient despot, feudal landlords, aggressive capitalism, or a bureaucratic State. On the whole we must say that, with very few exceptions, the challengers of Authority come from an instructed class who wanted no public revolution, only private liberty to write and think ; or else from a commercial order whose economic theories and interest ran counter to the obsolete methods of church-monopoly in land, in industry and in usury.

Popular Expression of Dissent in Heresy.—From the above summary of mutinous tendencies, it will be objected, I have omitted all mention of *religious* reform : but I have in passing remarked how unwilling were the pioneers of Free Thought to undermine a system which, even if falsely founded, was of conspicuous practical value. But, that besides these scattered instances of exceptional talent there were genuinely popular movements of dissent, it would be impossible to deny. Few subjects are so interesting or so obscure as the real support and significance of the popular heretical movements, cent. xi–xiii. We can perhaps now for the first time fairly estimate the secret influences and indistinct lineage of the sects of southern France, which created a greater panic in spiritual and civil rulers alike

[1] I do not forget the generous and notable innovation of the russian *Intelligenzia* which issued from the universities to propagate anarchism among the rural *moujik* ; that they were bitterly disappointed goes without saying. In the partial reaction at the Elections of 1910, 1911 our 'free and enlightened electorate' were called by their friends 'beer-'swilling numskulls'.

than did the menace of Islam itself. Perhaps in connexion, but possibly quite apart from this movement, we must trace the sporadic outbursts against a worldly hierarchy ; which, starting in a demand for purity and inwardness in religion, sometimes seemed to degenerate into licence.[1]

Was Persecution of Heresy Justified ? Dissent did not Imply Freedom.—Was this nonconformity a danger to society as then constituted, and in the extirpation of the Albigenses was a public service rendered to civilization ? This is a matter which asks for careful and impartial inquiry and the task must not be shirked. At this point it need only be said that other motives were at work besides a desire for a more spiritual church and for purer conceptions of personal religion. That the new temper shown by these dissenters would have been more tolerant and propitious than the church, to the cause of enlightenment and progress, is a thesis in support of which little proof is forthcoming. It is clear that in a later age the puritans desired to form a church-state ruled by a clericalism still more potent and inquisitive than that of Rome, without those opportunist modifications of rigid law to suit the special case which made the roman supremacy tolerable. It may be permitted to doubt if the policy of the new sects was less obscurantist than the roman system ; and to believe that the policy and success of the civil and religious power in suppressing the movement are justified at the bar of history. Still, whatever the subversive or even antinomian tendencies of the sectaries may have been, they aimed like the later Independents at congregational freedom and attacked only an authoritative church-establishment supported (at that time) by coercive methods and the civil arm. This is, of course, judged by modern standards, a step in the right direction. But here once again any sure evidence is lacking. It must not be forgotten that Law is made for the ignorant and the criminal ; yet in the interests of the whole, the virtuous and enlightened must needs bow to restrictions which are not invented for his sake. ' Rules are made ' says Captain Aubertin [2] ' for fools, but the enlightened

[1] Like the objects of St. Paul's censure or certain of the followers of *gnosis* : down to the most modern times, with some temperaments, the relaxation of *ceremonial* law always seems to imply the abolition of the *moral* as well.

[2] In a despatch from the front August 1915.

are also bound by them, although they may not need them.'[1] Law is for the most part regarded as a limit and *restraint*, not as a *stimulant*; this is St. Paul's plain meaning; and the State is the agent or executive of a corrective only needed because men are ignorant or vicious. Hence the danger of a *coercive* State[2] assuming the direction of positive moral guidance,—as we find advocated by some political writers of a 'realistic' tendency. Anything corrective armed with 'compulsory powers' can but be a 'schoolmaster' (Gal. iii 24) to bring into a new order; where there shall be no further coercion but only stimulant, and expression rather than compression or suppression.

Conflict summed up in Terms, Realist and Nominalist.—Last, in the purely speculative sphere, we shall find intricate or abstract problems of logic discussed with an intensity and bitterness which show plainly that their import extends far beyond a logical interest. The very name 'Middle Ages' suggests at once the 'Schoolmen' and this again, the unending debate on 'Universals' carried on by 'realist' and 'nominalist'. This subject demands the closest attention not because of its verbal dialectic but for its underlying meaning. The *realist* is the extreme authoritarian who can only conceive the *whole* as prior to the *part*, *State* to *citizen*, and *church* to *believer*.[3] The *nominalist* is anxious to justify and account for the severally existing instances of a type. Pushed by the needs of controversy and inexorable logic he will insist that the *part* is of course prior to the *whole*, which comes only gradually into being (like the 'heap' in *sorites*), built up slowly by the aggregation of atoms one by one: at what exact point it becomes a mystical unity rather than a mere 'group-name' it is not easy to decide. It is again the assent of the concourse of citizens that gives State and officials their corporate capacity. There is no 'divine right' to start

[1] Cf. Romans xiii 3, 'Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to 'the evil . . . do that which is good and thou shalt have praise of the 'same'. It is inth is restrictive and punitive sense of *law* that he says 'we are delivered from the Law . . . I had not known sin but by the 'Law' (vii 6, 7)—which is capable of two senses: 'the commandment 'ordained to life I found to be unto death' (10). So that, although in one aspect 'the Law is holy . . . and just and good' (12) aye and spiritual (14) it was in another, 'added because of offences', παραβάσεων ἕνεκα.

[2] Still more than of a coercive church.

[3] In the realm of theology, *Godhead* to *Person*.

with, in an *individual* or a *collective* centre ; but the members of a community ' pool ' their fragments of natural right or actual power and so create an artificial and resoluble State by ' social contract '. Once again (say the nominalists) it is the holiness of believers that makes a church holy ; it is holy only by the actual sum of their collective holiness : it is not the church that makes the members holy.[1] What is the aim of the Christian message ? to establish a church or a visible kingdom of God, because of the intrinsic value and beauty of such a type or species ? or to meet the needs of individuals and bring redemption and salvation within their reach ? In the end we shall see that the ' Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath.' It was the *nominalist* principle that at last won the day ; and it is not without suggestiveness that Alliacus and Gerson, the mystics, hold this doctrine and prefer the *part* to the *whole*.

[1] On this distinction perhaps the whole of Church History will be found to turn : St. Paul (Eph. iv 16) has a very peculiar sentence which might well form the *nominalist* text : ' The whole body, fitly joined together and compacted by that which *every joint* supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase.' But even this passage, and many others in St. Paul, bears no less witness to the *realist* argument.

CHAPTER II. AUSTIN AND PELAGIUS: THE WHOLE AND THE PART

Section I. The Donatists and Pelagian Individualism

Career of St. Austin.—The correct attitude of the church to the old and the new world (roman and teutonic) was dictated by St. Austin, who is merely recapitulated and simplified by Pope Gregory two centuries later. His final conception of things or his cosmic system is of first-rate importance as a prelude and guide to medieval studies. In his case, as in St. Paul's, a purely personal development is seen to exert the strongest influence on history. Austin (*354–430*) started with a *rationalist* theory of the world, with *Manicheism*; which, with *Buddhism* perhaps, alone satisfies the demands of ordinary reason as a complete cosmodicy.[1] His next stadium was *Platonism*; a monism which, without actually denying evil or matter, explains them away by placing the one at the extreme end of a long development from the Good, and the other as the inseparable defect (ἔλλειψις, στέρησις) of such remoteness from perfection. Austin thus substitutes for the *material* redemption of Mani, belief in the admission to an *ideal world* of whose perfect forms all earthly things are imperfect copies. At the age of thirty-three (*386*) he was suddenly converted under a fig-tree, as Buddha attained enlightenment under the *bo-tree*.

His Combats with Ghosts of His Old Self.—The first part of his life had been spent in unceasing conflict against himself: when he became a Christian, other 'antagonists stepped into his place' in whom a part of the original Augustin himself seems always 'incarnate' (Professor Kruger). To some extent the heresies he combatted were ghosts of his former speculations, somehow embodied in tangible form. *Donatus* and *Pelagius* stood for a

[1] It will be observed that both are *dualist* in one sense or other, and both *optimist*, inasmuch as Mani promised a final triumph of the right for the whole world, Buddha a final achievement of happiness by the single soul (either now or in a later life).

theory of *personal merit* and achievement, to which in the humility of a sincere penitent he could not assent. A brand plucked from the burning, he was the ' child of miracle ', his conversion a direct divine interposition. Strongly set as his mind was towards personal religion of a spiritual and ' protestant ' type, he could allow nothing to the soul's initiative : the Christian owed everything to God and mediately to His church. In both heresies he saw reviving his own condemned spirit of self-sufficiency, and his animosity was sharpened by shame and remorse. A certain section of the african church had always held that *personal* holiness in the ministry was required for the efficacy of sacraments, that character made sacerdotal acts valid or invalid, —in short that a priest must be a good man. Upholders of churchly ' realism ' would reply that however desirable, this was hardly indispensable ; else the churchly order and discipline might be constantly vitiated or interrupted, either by defect of will or intention or by actual sinfulness. No social system could be allowed to depend upon such untrustworthy agents. Hence in the verdict against Donatists we have only the sentence against Novatus repeated : both, like Wiclif, see a true priest only in a good man, attribute little or nothing to the church, and in the end convey back the true agency to God Himself of Whose grace the minister is but a channel.

Donatus and Spiritual Pride.—Were the *traditores* who betrayed copies of scripture in the last persecution (*305*) eligible for the priesthood ? The sterner rigorists were condemned in *313*, *314* and *316* and Constantine did not scruple to employ force to suppress the defeated party. From being heretics and schismatics they became rebels against the civil order : their goods were declared confiscate, their citizen-rights forfeit. Donatus Magnus succeeded Majorinus as bishop of Carthage, for the rigorists (*315*) and Circumcellions, runaway slaves and peasants, attached themselves to the party. A phenomenon arose in N. Africa very much resembling the Bagauds of Spain and Gaul during the period of anarchy before *285*, and the new monarchy of Diocletian and his colleagues. Now began that association of heresy and treason which led in after times to the policy of savage repression. Debtors and malcontents, under cover of religious conviction, seemed to threaten the social order. The interference of the civil power was bitterly resented ; the phrase

of Tertullian *quid imperatori cum ecclesiâ*—was revived with a new emphasis. It is to be noted that Constantine himself, who had only just issued the Edict of Toleration in *313*, did not willingly give up his neutral position as universal umpire. In *321* he restored to the Donatists their rights of worship and liberty of conscience : the points in dispute should be left to God's judgment. Constans I (*337–350*) his son and successor, desired to end a dangerous schism first by gifts and conciliation, only later by threats and force. As in earlier persecutions the civil power (always secretly animated by Gallio's spirit) was with reluctance forced to interfere. Julian (*361*) restored the rights of the schismatics while the orthodox Valentinian again withdrew them (*364–375*) : their churches were closed, their assemblies forbidden. Towards the end of the century a moderate party arose in protest against the puritan bigotry of the extremists. Honorius in *405* commanded them to return to the catholic fold. At the great conference of *411*, a nearly equal number of donatist bishops confronted the prelates of the orthodox State-church, the numbers being 279 to 286.

Two different Conceptions of the Christian Church Involved.—The real question at issue was the nature and extent of the Christian church ; whether it lost its purity and forfeited its divine grace by tolerating unworthy members within the pale. The Donatists held it to be a church of the elect, the conviction of the later Puritans : it must ' exclude all members guilty of mortal ' sin in order to safeguard its own corporate holiness '. The Catholics held that the holiness of the church was not the sum of individual virtues gathered from its constituent members, but came from God its founder Who sent His Spirit to consecrate it and through His ordained priests gave sacramental grace to the humble : the presence of unworthy members could not discount or annul the promises (*χαρίσματα ἀμεταμέλητα*). In the words of Optatus, *sanctitas de sacramentis colligitur, non de superbia personarum.* The church, in virtue of a new and imperial mission only bounded by the frontiers of the empire, could not fail to put forward this claim : if it depended on the goodness of its *parts*, it started without authority, depended wholly on a precarious human proficiency, and was not catholic. Marcellinus acting for Honorius decided in favour of the catholic claims : in *414* (just a century after their first defeat) the Donatists were denied civil

rights and next year their meetings were forbidden under penalty of death. But like most other fierce edicts of repression this statute was not very severely enforced and the schismatics were only extinguished by the saracen invasion (*c. 700*).

Realism Confronted by Nominalism, as Self-Sufficiency.—Here it will be noted we have a clear expression of the later principles of Authority and of 'realism'. It is significant that Austin, with his strong sense of individual frailty, should have taken up the cause of the *mystical* corporation: this is holy in itself and the channel of grace, even though all its ministers be sinful men. His own experience had taught him how hazardous it was to stake the value and efficacy of a corporate body on the personal virtue of its units. About the same time he was confronted by another version of exactly the same problem in the controversy with Pelagius. In this we see, as in the nestorian heresy, the effect of logic, argument, and opposition upon a one-sided yet correct opinion: it is driven into an extreme form and forced to deny all truth to the complementary doctrine. Truth being composed of opposites in equilibrium, the victory of one part to the total exclusion of the other is to be regretted: so also is the over precise formulation of dogma which naturally results from such a dispute.[1]

Morgan Pelagius in Rome: Attempt to Revive Spiritual Effort.—The cymric Morgan (*360–425*) like Erigena 400 years later, was either an Irishman or a 'Scot', '*Stolidissimus*', says the bitter Jerome, '*et Scotorum pultibus prægravatus*'.[2] A

[1] Pope Leo I's *Tome* gives us after all the *dualistic* form in which Christian dogma must always fall: it juxtaposes reverently the *divine* and the *human*, the *Infinite* and the *finite*, without any serious attempt to reconcile them: all such attempts turn out in the end to be formal, empty, and dialectical. Reason can never dispense with the need for Faith.

[2] The heavy diet of porridge was a stock sarcasm in the mouths of Morgan's and Erigena's opponents. It is not too much to say that this northerly corner (Antrim and Galloway) produced the two chief doctrines round which medieval thought revolved interminably: the contribution of the *unit* to the *whole* (Pelagius) and the comprehension and final absorption by the *whole* of the *unit* (John Scotus Erigena). Morgan is remarkable as being the pioneer of that great movement of reaction which brought back to the continent from Ireland the doctrines and mission-zeal which it had received. The close connexion of the british and eastern churches is well established. Celtic convents held intercourse with very

man of strict life to whom restraint and self-denial was easy, he was scandalized on visiting Rome about *400* to find how low was the prevailing standard of Christian life and practice. His own religious development had been equable and uninterrupted ; there was nothing in it of Austin's meteoric flights or volcanic crises. The apologists for an idle capital pleaded human weakness and the need of including as large a proportion as possible in church membership : Rome was after all a city where pagan belief was by no means as yet extinct.

Such arguments (Morgan thought) would cut away all motive for personal effort or perseverance, and would throw the whole blame on God in a thoroughly fatalistic spirit. He produced a formula which Kant in modified form repeated : *' If I ought, I ' can '*. In Africa the bishop of Carthage charged him with holding the error that the *whole human race does not die* because of Adam's default and consequent death, nor will the whole *human race* rise again *as a whole* because of Christ's resurrection. Here we have a new phase of ' realism ' : humanity is conceived not as a collective term for an aggregate of individuals, but as a corporation and a ' person ' (under roman law) with its own nature, development and continuous history.[1] Hence a judaic tendency to make very little of the unit, provided that the corporation or community has a prosperous life.[2] But the church also promised safety and easy terms to subscribing members because of its own assured position : their contribution mattered so little.

remote sects of learning and theology : Morgan (like Erigena) was quite familiar with the greek language and divinity, and at Rome joined the circle of Rufinus who desired to introduce these studies into the western empire, always backward in theological refinement and in greek learning.

[1] Lotze's very interesting strictures should be consulted, against the vague and loose talk of Lessing's *Education of the Human Race* : it is only by an unwarrantable and misleading metaphor that we speak of education or development where the *subject* is not the same throughout (*Microcosmus*).

[2] Even to-day (when there is abroad a good deal of insincere sentiment) we are not wholly reconciled to our present troubles by the thought that one day, if the planet is spared, the human race may perhaps enjoy a perfect social order. After all, if *justice* looks at the common welfare, *equity* seeks to accommodate justice to the individual case where it is harsh or unfeeling : to disregard or disparage the concrete individual here and now because of a nebulous future is quite out of keeping with the Gospel of Christ.

Hence such a system, seemingly autocratic and scornful of the particular, is in fact dangerously attractive to the vulgar. Morgan spent the years *410–415* in Palestine where the Council of Lydda absolved him from the condemnation of Carthage. The African Church, Pope Innocent and Emperor Honorius (*418*) already occupied with the last efforts of Donatus' schism, fulminated against this laxity and against the pelagian tenets. The eastern church, at that time confronting another phase of the same doctrine in Nestorius, joined in the censure (*431*).

Section II. Relations of the Divine and the Human Elements (Christology, Anthropology)

Apostles of Self-Sufficiency.—It is quite clear that Montanus, Novatian, Nestorius, together with the movements connected with the names of Donatus and Pelagius, represent a reaction against over-emphasis on the *divine* and a stirring of the *human* element in religion (whether in theology or practice) : in Montanus we have a protest against the decay of holiness and personal effort in a society now supervised from above by the bishops, to the detriment (as it seemed to him) of ethical achievement. The church, even in the reign of the two Antonines, was becoming secularized and insensibly lowered its standard. In place of dead official routine and liturgy, personal and uncovenanted 'prophecy' was the mark of the new sect : celibacy, fasting, courting of martyrdom, waiting for the *parousia*, were also features. In Novatian the real point at issue was, shall the personal merit of martyrs and confessors supersede the normal official organs of authority ? Shall the sacrificers to idols during stress of persecution be readmitted to communion ? His followers became the Pure Sect (*καθαροὶ*) which, though nominally extinct about the middle of cent. v, seems to have revived in the cathars of the Middle Age.

Genuine Teaching of Nestorius.—In Nestorius we have the chief tenets of the Antiochene School forced into unnatural prominence and logical exclusiveness,—literal exegesis, the sure fact of Christ's *human* life on earth, His 'growth in grace', His genuine human consciousness (against Eutyches' absorptionism). Recent studies [1] and Bedjan's text of his *Apologia* (Leipzig

[1] Cf. Bethune-Baker's *N. and his teaching*, Cambridge 1908.

1910) reveal his true character and meaning: 'I have had but 'one end in view that no one should call the Word a creature, or 'the Manhood which He assumed *incomplete*' . . . 'to maintain 'the continuance of the two natures in one person'. Leo's *Letter to Flavian* excited his admiration: 'I gave thanks to 'God that the roman church was rightly making a blameless 'confession, though it was prejudiced against me in person'. The union of the natures lay not in the suppression or absorption of the human element [1] but in the harmony of wills. 'The man-'hood' it has been said, 'was safeguarded as distinct from the '*godhead*: the union was left an ineffable mystery'. In any case the ideas of Nestorius and the School of Antioch won the day, although the leaders were condemned; and the great mission-church in Asia (which remoulded buddhism in its very furthest retreats) must be acknowledged to be *orthodox*. Without doubt greek orthodoxy saw kinship in Pelagius' theory to their own somewhat garbled and distorted view of nestorian tenets; and it was known that Celestin, the pelagian lawyer from Rome, had sought Nestorius' help and support.

Denial of Original Sin by Pelagians: Compromise of Synergism.—Putting together the exaggerated statement of enemies and the modified assertions of the 'heretics' themselves, we see that in the issue these latter tend to deny 'original sin'. They teach that, except in the example of weakness set to us by Adam, we are uninjured by his sin; we are not portions of a single *massa peccatrix*, from which only a miracle of divine predestination detaches us to be passive vehicles of grace. The mischief is done *non propagine sed exemplo*. Pelagius is quite willing to refer to God's grace all subsequent steps in Christian development, but not the first moment of turning to Him. He remembers the individual conversions of the Gospel-story, their unfettered freedom of choice; also the words that 'Christ could do no mighty 'works there because of their unbelief'. It is said that the extreme austinian (like the later calvinist) doctrine exerted a bad effect on certain african monks; who began to display either intense pride and assurance, or despair and 'wretchlessness of most unclean 'living'. In the end, whether officially recognized or no, a modified form of Pelagius' teaching entered the church; for an absolute fatalism is, of all doctrines, least in keeping with the Christian

[1] A conception leading in the end to a purely *physical* mysticism.

message. Semi-pelagians allowed that our nature was injured by the Fall, but insisted on *synergism* :—that (as in Nestorius) the divine and human wills must be *coefficients* ; so that neither in Christ's own nature nor in our own is the human factor to be overwhelmed or annihilated. In theory the Church felt bound to condemn them, e.g. at the Council of Valence in *529* where the belief that men have some ability to will good was held up to obloquy ; it could not be allowed that the beginning of salvation may lie with the sinner himself. But the real interest of the Church was to exclude *reprobation*, or the belief that God predestined to doom and would not allow the reprobate to find peace, even if they longed for salvation.[1]

Verdict Justified : Ethical Individualism Unsuited to Society.—Yet however harmless Morgan's insistence on freedom may appear, the catholic church could hardly do otherwise than condemn him; not for his tenets so much as for possible deductions therefrom. His view tended to *naturalism* which left man able of his own will to turn to the light and dispensed with Atonement and a scheme of redemption, through Christ's unique offering and the church's sacramental grace. Wherever stress has to be laid on personal effort, or the proper use of God-given faculties, there must emerge a ' broad church ' conviction that man in himself is ' self-sufficient ' unto salvation. Such a belief seemed like a revival of the pagan philosophy of stoics of the school of Aurelius or Epictetus : the Buddha's last words to his disciples are a strong insistence on ' self-help ', on the fact that man's sole saviour or destroyer is himself. How utterly inapplicable such ethical individualism was to moribund roman society, Austin saw clearly. Like Cyprian, he taught, with an ever increasing emphasis, that outside the church there was no safety ; that apart from the divinely-appointed means of grace there was no virtue ; that man himself contributed nothing to a spiritual development, which was all the work of the constraining spirit of God, assisted by humble and passive faith and the church's sacraments. This visible community, these duly appointed officials, these half-magical means of grace—implied the complete dependence of the lay element, the autocratic power of the church as a corporation with an earthly head, the exaltation of the priestly mediants able

[1] For holding this quite logical corollary of Austin's doctrine Gottes-chalk, 400 years afterwards, was flogged, degraded, and imprisoned.

to withhold or grant the sacraments which alone gave man strength for the journey.

Austin's Determined Realism and Denial of Human Merit.—Just as Pelagius was forced by controversy to over-exalt our capacity, so Austin was in duty bound to suppress and disparage it. The one was an active reformer who wished to stir sloth and supineness into new and responsible activity ; he was full of confidence in native human impulses to which he preferred to make a direct appeal. But Austin begins to despair of the world and, judging from his own miraculous experience, can allow nothing to human merit or initiative. The Eastern Church,[1] intent in truly platonic spirit on an objective world of truth, had brought out the supernatural character of the gospel, as a *fact* and a *system* : it was reserved for the western, under Austin's influence, to emphasize its relations to man in the doctrines of sin and grace, as an agency in the *subjective* world.

Here then are the chief lines of thought and church-discipline marked out already for the west at the opening of cent. v. Government was to be a persuasive and benevolent despotism, because the unit was not able to stand alone. Theory and ideal standard were to be very exalted ; but practical requirements were to be softened and modified to suit an evil and ignorant world. Hence a dualism of the *minimum* and the *maximum* : the perfect life was monastic and unworldly, but no one was to be totally excluded because he could not undertake ' a counsel of perfection '. The denial of human merit, the ensuing allowance for human frailty, was very comforting to the lukewarm Christian. Thus the life-work of St. Austin ended in a firm establishment of a great catholic state-church, which found place and duties for each several member. Though as yet unformulated, ' realism ' was

[1] It must be remembered that the greek church had to conciliate two opposite legacies ; the *ethical* self-sufficiency and individualism of classical thought, and the *intellectual* ' realism ' which (both in Plato and Aristotle) subordinated the single mind to an impersonal realm of absolute truth : hence it tended at once to be ' nominalist ' and mystical or absorptionist. The strong emphasis on Free-Will in the early Apologists and greek Fathers down to Origen (with its tolerance for pagan virtue and searchings after the truth) gives way to a depreciation of daily virtue, moving step by step towards gradually realized perfection, to a desire for complete instantaneous θέωσις : of whose sometimes nihilistic forms later greek writers—as we have just seen in Sudaili—show curious traces.

the dogmatic principle on which its authority and efficacy depended. Confronting each other were seen, the world or *seculum*, the *massa peccatrix* considered as a substantial and continuous reality, involved in Adam's default and penalty,—and the City of God, the church; inside which the chosen units of the *massa* might find rest and safety, where too the tares might undisturbed grow together with the wheat until the harvest, if haply even amongst them God's special mercy might find vessels of grace.

CHAPTER III

TRIUMPHANT REALISM

Section I. The Dogmatics and Logical Conclusion of Realism: John Scotus Erigena

Further Suppression of Units in Erigena's Pantheism.—The next *stadium* is seen in Erigena's explicit neoplatonic realism.[1] This, scarcely attracting notice in its own day, became an undercurrent issuing into the light, some three or four centuries later, in systems both orthodox and the reverse. As we saw in Austin and Gregory a distrust of singulars and units displayed in the exaltation of the church, so now we find the world of individuals gathered up and in the end suppressed in the goal to which cosmical evolution is tending. The chief feature of the platonism popular under the Empire and handed on to the Church is a deference to the type or idea, impatience of the particular instances. While the New Testament speaks only of *persons* (*Peter, John, Paul*) and arrests attention upon certain characters, this decadent platonism is careless of everything but types (*genera* and *species*) and the Scholastics, following it, speak of *Socrates* and *Plato* as (unhappily ?) differentiated instances of typical manhood. This curious attitude, so abhorrent from our modern induction and love of the concrete, is both *oriental* and *hellenic*.

Radical Dualism of Hellenic World-Conceptions.—While greek thought is, on one side, marked by the individual's claims to worth and free development (e.g. in sophistic and the ethical individualism of Socrates); on the other, it rules out the special, the relative and idiosyncratic, to make room for the Idea. So in *ethics* the greek schools are at first sight purely *subjective*: they scarcely recognize anything outside the single agent and the law within his breast. Yet in the higher life of thought (which

[1] A reader of this western section only, should here consult the short Appendix on the intermediate influences (at the close of Division C: on 'Dionysius' and Bar Sudaili).

transcends the ethical standpoint, though it takes it for granted or uses it as a ladder) the *objective* alone is admitted; man, putting aside his special and private imaginings, must let the stream of universal reason permeate his being and take the place of his consciousness and his mind. Hence, there is in every school of greek philosophy a palpable tendency towards *mysticism*—from the moment that intellectual interest replaces the sober but prosaic social virtues and common morality. It is impossible to free ethics from this sense of detached and unconnected happenings in a series (leading nowhither): its motto is 'do the next thing'. The life of *action* (πρᾶξις) is an illogical compromise between one's own principle and a quite alien material which seldom yields to our purpose. It is only in the life of thought (θεωρία) that man is really freed in the highest and best part of his nature. Dualism is from the first implicit in this hellenic view of the world, before ever the problem of morals became urgent. Parmenides and Democritus, on the two extreme frontiers in the greek world, set in contrast the *sensible* and the *rational* conceptions of the cosmos which are wholly distinct and irreconcilable. Later, the antithesis lay between the 'passing show' which gives us a struggle or welter of separate things and events, and the untroubled and motionless depths of unity which lie beneath this restless surface. After Alexander's conquests, the subjective schools drew away the busybody citizen of a quarrelsome little state into the serene heights of cosmopolitanism (which had no daily duties); and, while laying all possible stress on personal morality, gave no guidance for this or that action but talked only of character. Not to *do* but to *be* was the rule; and morals instead of being an activity or ἐνέργεια became synonymous with Quietism, just as in the far east.

The Two Orders in the Church: 'to *be* or to *do*': Monkish Repose and Contemplatism.—The eastern church accepted this *dualism* in ideals and accommodated it to her two orders of *laymen* and *monks*. An all-inclusive system cannot help having a graded hierarchy and unequal ranks, each with its special set of caste rules. To diversity which was not openly flagrant or rebellious, the church has always had a fixed policy of indulgence. The layman who lived in a flickering world of particulars must be guided to 'do the next thing' properly: but the monkish ideal was to 'do nothing at all'. Doing, according to all the received

axioms, is the lot of the imperfect, striving after perfection. When this is attained search and the restless action which subserves it are at an end. Readers of Austin's *Confessions* will recall his emphasis on repose in God as the object of the soul's pursuit: the old scottish catechism says that the end of man is 'to know God and to enjoy Him for ever'. Action in society and the practice of the work-a-day virtues (honesty, temperance, kindness) is all very well for average men; but in their pursuit of a quite vague and indefinite ideal, there could be no finality or achievement. The true could not be found in an ethical world of compromise where a leaden and inaccurate plumb-rule was in use (Aristotle's μολυβδινὸς κανών). Only in the field of pure thought were there to be found stable and determinate forms. Hence, God Whose Word summed up and embraced this Ideal Universe, was the sole Object in Which the soul could rest. Therefore for the contemplative or monastic life, detachment from variety was the first requirement. The course upwards was a progressive putting-off of the multiple, a gathering up of the many into a few ultimate forms, the losing of these again in the single dazzling Vision of God.

Erigena Conveys Greek Learning into the West.—Like other scoto-irish monks Erigena[1] (*800–877*) had a competent knowledge of greek, a language soon to be only obscurely known through distorting translations; Bacon in cent. xiii expressly exempts him from the deserved indictment of scholastic ignorance on this score. He is found at the court of Charles the Bald about the time of the treaty of Verdun (*843*) as head of the Palatine School. His *first* work seems to have been a (lost) treatise on the Lord's Supper which he regarded in a purely commemorative or symbolic light, like Berengar or Zwingli. Yet the very orthodox Hincmar of Rheims chose him to defend the cause of human free-will against Gotteschalk's mahometan fatalism.[2] In this essay appeared tenets so peculiar that after a formal indict-

[1] John the Scot's own pseudonym *Eriugena* certainly implies an *irish* origin, the form *Hierugena* being a punning allusion to the Isle of Saints (cf. Hierusalem for Jerusalem). Malmesbury calls him oddly *Heruligena* and his birthplace is given variously as in Ayrshire (the most likely spot), near St. Davids, or in the county of Hereford at Eriuvan.

[2] Which, as we saw above, passed beyond any comforting doctrine of assurance into a certainty of reprobation (669 n.).

ment by Drepanius Florus (canon of Lyons) Erigena was condemned by the Councils of Valence (*855*) and of Langres four years later.[1] Still protected by his powerful kingly patron, he translated the false Dionysius at his request ; thereby annoying Pope Nicholas I who insisted that the work should have been submitted for Rome's approval before publication. The king was asked to dismiss his over-learned courtier, but does not appear to have complied. Nothing further is known of his life ; he seems never to have left France and to have been living until the year *877* (Hauréau).[2]

A Convinced Scholastic : Identity of Religion and Philosophy.—He belongs to the pure neoplatonic type of mystical theologian, very much rarer in the western than in the eastern church. Yet he is also a pure Scholastic. He states in the clearest terms the harmony of *faith* and *reason*, the identity of true theology and true philosophy :—that is, in him (during the dark night of cent. ix) free-thought believes itself to be in complete accord with the dictates of Revelation and Authority.[3] But he has no doubt that it is *philosophy* or reason which is primary and superior, whilst *authority* is derived. Like Lessing or the arab speculators, he seems to believe that Authority only imposes on the ignorant and unleisured doctrines already patent to the wise : hence (*Divis. Nat.* i 71) *Ratio nequaquem ex Auctoritate pendet* (else it would be infirm if unapproved by *vera ratio*) . . . *Vera autem Ratio quum virtutibus suis rata atq. immutabilis munitur, nullius Auctoritatis astipulatione roborari indiget.* Revealed religion then sets before the vulgar, in a popular and pictorial guise, truths which the philosopher forestalls and recognizes in a refined form by the light of natural reason.[4]

Yet Philosophy (Monism) is Beyond Religion.—Now the fundamental thought of this *philosophy*, which is beyond *religion*, is the neoplatonic theory of the One which expands into the

[1] It was the former assembly which revived the gibe of Jerome on the porridge-loving Scot.

[2] The story of his visit to England, appointment by Alfred as Abbot of Malmesbury, and death at the hand of enraged students in 882 A.D. seems to be a series of later figments.

[3] *Conficitur inde veram esse philosophiam veram religionem conversimque* (de Euch.)

[4] Hence as with Maimonides and Averroes, Spinoza and Hegel, philosophy is a superior phase of religion which is only a form of truth specially prepared for the average mind.

Manifold in virtue of an inherent necessity. It is a monism which, like Spinoza's, will not admit the concept of divine *purpose* or *will*. All creatures are necessary parts of this whole and cannot be otherwise than they are; the *part* (as in every realist system) can only be explained in reference to the *whole*, only understood when its place in the Universe can be rightly assigned.[1] As in Hegel, *religion* (revelation accepted on faith) is but one stage, one element or factor, in the *explication* of the divine; but above it is the exercise of man's highest faculty (*intellectualis visio*) which enables him to transcend the realm of particular things. At this stage of human development, when our reason comes very close to the Divine Spirit, the philosopher is content with nothing individual or partial. He now grasps the whole as a whole, prior to its parts and comprehends (or absorbs) these in the entirety. At this stage, the union of divine and human is complete; God thinks in man who is no longer himself (*νοῦς ἕκαστος*). *Thought* and *being* are now identical because the *logical* series is also the *ontological*, and the course of *logic* is also the order of *creation*.

The Divine Expansion and Concentration: ? A Temporal Process.—In the *Divisio Naturæ* Erigena represents the Universe as a process, issuing out from God and returning to Him again. In the school of Proclus (*410–480*) two distinct movements were recognized, one downwards, the other up:—the *ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω* of Heraclitus or the vision of angels ascending and descending on Jacob's Ladder. It is never quite clear, when Christian divines borrow this thought, whether the double movement is timeless and eternal or had a temporal beginning and will one day have a climax in time. In pre-Christian faiths it is only mazdeism, besides the hebrew religion, that condescends to accept a real development in time and a distinct goal or 'far-off divine event', to which human society rather than creation moves. There are three factors in Scot's cosmology, or rather stages, *God*, *idea*, *matter*; the first *explicatio* of the divine *One* is into the Word, or world of forms, that is, the *one-many*. Afterwards, by a still further declension from primal unity, arises the *manifold* of

[1] This is pure and original platonism—a thing *is* only in so far as it *is good* and does its work: Dialectic, the master-science, is nothing but the power to classify, to assign a thing's right place and function in the scale or hierarchy of beings.

visible particulars. This is the accepted *schema* of the neoplatonic school and calls for no special comment. Although the existence of our world is hardly explained or justified (for why should the *one-many* be discerpted into the many ?), it is a genuine *theophany*. In this process of *outflow* (πρόοδος) and *return* to source (ἄνοδος, κάθοδος) we seem to distinguish *beginning, middle, end*. But in truth these three are one ; it is a defect of our finite understanding to conceive them as *stadia*, separated in time (and perhaps in place). It is our default that makes us conceive the real forms under conditions of *time, space, manifoldness*.[1] Created things, modelled after the primordial ideas or archetypes and their effects, have no independent being : each is a brief apparition of the divine nature and in so far has a measure of reality.

Erigena's Conception of the Trinity : Incarnation, Eternal.— God alone *is*, yet again He is really beyond *essence, truth, goodness* and *wisdom*, none of which predicates can with strictness be applied to Him. All true theology therefore is negative. But the world as His *theophany* allows us to understand something of Him : He *is* (or exists) in the being of all things, is *wise* in their own rational order and coherence, and *lives* in their ceaseless motion.[2] It is on the Holy Spirit or Third Person (as in the later Joachimites) that the principal emphasis rests. The First Person cannot be distinguished from universal substance[3]; the Word is the ideal realm of Philo and Plotinus ; but it is the Holy Ghost which as life or motive force awakens movement within the system, first introducing *individuality* and the *multiple* and at last drawing all this outflow back again into the abyss of the divine unity. The gnostics who represent the visible cosmic process as an error and default, as a regrettable lapse from the Pleroma, would say that this demiurgic power was either an

[1] Deussen would make us add, *causality* (cf. Div. A).

[2] This goes a great deal further in the direction of *pantheism* than the tenets of Sabellius ; to Scotus the Father = οὐσία, Son = δύναμις, Spirit = ἐνέργεια : hence the deity, as it were, develops into activity and self-consciousness through the evolution of the world : the advance is from *lower* to *higher* categories, from the indeterminate to the self-determined, and therefore we may say that, to Scotus, deity is a process : the modern schools would be tempted to add ' which has not yet attained its ' final phase ' (cf. Bergson's theory of a Universe still ' in the making ').

[3] Which revivers of Erigena's doctrine in cent. xiii conceived in a purely *material* sense.

inferior god, a rival deity, or a lesser spirit like Achamoth (in Valentine's system). In any case for both, that which discerpts the ideal realm into the *manifold of time and space* cannot be the perfect God ;. hence the reluctance to recognize the rights of the *individual* unless he allows himself to be wholly absorbed in his *type*. Man in such a system is no longer the head or centre of creation ; no doubt the Trinity finds its analogy in our nature, but God is not realized in man only but in everything created. The Incarnation of Deity is not a *single historical event of unique significance*, but is an *eternal process*.

No Purpose or Consummation in the World-Process.—The highest idea is *goodness* (as in original platonism), *being* is next, for that which is good *is* ; *life* is a kind of essence, and wisdom again a kind of life. The Spirit guides the Ideas (in themselves without movement or impulse) to objectify themselves as eternal causes upon matter. It is not divine *purpose* or *will* but the divine *nature* which needs must manifest itself in the world : *God cannot be conceived without the world*. It will be seen later that this is the main point at issue between philosophy (as monistic spinozism) and the religious conception of the world. Jew and Christian are alike convinced that God *purposed* and *willed* in calling a universe out of nothing, and that this purpose is closely connected, and in a very special sense, with man and his destiny : —philosophy (if it regards the world as anything better than a mirage (*maya*) only sees it as a timeless rational system from which purpose or design is *ex hypothesi* excluded.[1]

Scripture Wholly Allegorized.—The letter of Old and New Testament Erigena takes only as symbol of an esoteric meaning. Moses' account only faintly shadows forth the timeless creation or emanative process ; paradise has no spatial or local existence ; the Fall is an allegory.[2] But sin and evil have no true or substantial being, and God does not know of them ! For *knowledge* and *being* are one. Sin is only the illusion of the individual believing something to be good which is not ; it is only the evil

[1] Cf. Maimonides *Guide of the Perplexed* Part III § xiii ed. Friedländer 1910, 272–277. In this *whole* the perfection or happiness of a part cannot possibly be the aim of the process. What is *necessary* cannot be *purposive*.

[2] The division into sex is the truth lying behind this fable as Scotus conceives it : Eve is the embodiment of *sense* which perverts *reason* and makes it forget its true nature and birthright : in the end the distinction will vanish and a purely spiritual body will be restored.

will, misdirected by its own desires, which is unhappy and dissatisfied. Hence beyond its own misery and emptiness there is no objective punishment: there is no special judge or law. Only, a personal mistake brings its own nemesis as in buddhism: God recks nothing either of the sin or the penalty of the sinner. Hell is a state of mind not a place; in the end the sinner will see his error and turn towards the light; *redemption* (in Erigena's own peculiar sense) is for all without exception: in his universalism the devil himself will be saved.

All Things Return at Last into their Source.—The 'restoration' of all things' or ἀποκατάστασις [1] is conceived in a singularly unspiritual way. The stages of final return into God follow precisely the primitive *stadia* of *explicatio* and exactly correspond: each set of particular things are gathered up and absorbed in their *species*, these again into their *genus*, these into the unique one-manifold of the Ideal World, this again into God that He may be all in all. In this very *logical* mysticism, the aim of the single soul is frankly *deificatio* or θέωσις, resumption into God. It is raised into full knowledge of God and here, once again, *knowing* and *being* are one. After all creatures have been thus reconciled and restored to deity there will be no further creation: it is the sabbath-rest of the seventh day when God exists only as *Natura quæ nec creatur nec creat.* The troubled interlude of the world-process is an uneasy period of wakefulness between two eternities of silence, repose and unconsciousness.[2]

Section II. Mysticism and Philosophy

This 'Platonism' Remains Unaltered to Present Day.—We have now examined this typical writer as one who presents us with a clear exposition of a universal system. Later thinkers

[1] Though clearly for man depending on this conversion of will to the choice of true good.

[2] Among more recent works on Erigena may be named Maurice *Mor. and Metaph. Phil.*; Kaulich's study in his scholastic *History* (Prague 1860); Stöckl's monograph 1867, Noack's (Leipzig 1876), Poole's (London 1884). Wotschke institutes a suggestive parallel between Fichte and Erigena (Halle 1896). Articles in Welzer's *Church-Lexicon* (1897) by Baumgartner, and in Herzog's *Realencycl.* vol xvii (1906) by Deutsch; Alice Gardner's *Stud. in J. Sc.* London 1900 and Dräseke's monograph (Leipzig 1902) may be consulted with profit.

can show us very few novel features; both for arab, jew and Christian the 'canon of philosophy' was really closed with Proclus and the numberless later exponents only reproduce and comment. The last great 'medieval' mystic, Spinoza, only repeats the familiar tenets in a somewhat different and more frigid manner. The attitude of Schelling or Hegel (or even Bradley) to philosophy and religion is not in essentials to be distinguished from that of Erigena, of Averroes or of 'Ramdan', the son of Maimon. Free-Thought in the age under our survey offers this interpretation of the world, at first (without sense of antagonism) as a *supplement* or better version of the pictorial religious view,—but later, when conscious of its hostility, as a *substitute*. It is therefore well to inquire further into the nature of this higher phase (as the enlightened believed it to be) in which one's intellect, united with divine reason attained first-hand knowledge of truths concealed by pictures and metaphors from the vulgar eye.

In Origin, Aristotelian : Its Transit from East to West.—It is a system of *mystic rationalism based*, not so much on Plato or the later alexandrine expositors as, *on a few texts of Aristotle*. These doctrines passed through heterodox syrian translators into a small and select group of 'arab' or rather persian philosophers, who, though nominal muslim, were entirely estranged from the spirit and dogma of Islam and represented an insurgence of pre-islamic beliefs. To these *peripatism* came as a revelation; and without suspecting that they could not at one and the same moment be followers of Aristotle and Mahomet, they began to formulate a coherent system of the universe which afterwards in the west passed current as *Averroism*.[1] At the same time that Erigena translated the false Denys in the west, the first muslim commentators were writing in the east under the patronage of the abbasid caliphs at Bagdad. To the one, the impulse came from a writer very far removed from the original classic source; to the other, almost direct from the first authority. This latter way of interpreting the world passed along the african coast into

[1] It is clear, as is shown in our last Division, that Averroes was no innovator and that he merely handed on a system already completed by his forerunners: only by degrees did the name and renown of this formidable heretic throw into the shade all earlier 'arab' philosophers and monopolize almost the sole attention of later scholastics.

Spain, where the tradition of the old school was maintained from *c. 950–1200*; when orthodox bigotry put an end to a movement of the muslim intellect which the public had never ceased to regard with the gravest suspicion.[1] It was carried into France by hebrews and was made familiar to the scholastic world both by its public translation and by its secret and heretical influence. The opening years of cent. xiii were marked by an outburst of heresy which alarmed the civil as well as the clerical power. Its chief tenets were fathered on Erigena of whom many of the new teachers were avowed followers. But it also depended upon the very similar doctrines which had passed from Irak to Spain and Egypt, and from thence to France. Of this tradition Aristotle was the chief and perhaps the only master,—but it was Aristotle interpreted by the platonizing Syncretists of Alexandria.

Its Contrast to the 'Humanism' of Religion.—This 'philosophy' suffers very little change from its earliest phase to the present day, and is marked by features strongly contrasting with the tenets on which depends any system deserving the name of religion. For religion is frankly *humanistic*. In early magic and efforts to appease unseen powers or spirits, man may not yet recognize that he and his destinies form the central motive or theme of a world-process :—which, no doubt, he did not yet contemplate either as unity or system. But he aims to make himself such a centre and theme : he wants to make friends of the unseen powers and use them for his own purposes. Now among later religious developments only four creeds[2] are humanist and historic—that is regard *man as the central actor* in a drama which has a beginning, a purpose and a climax. Zoroaster held this view and the Old Testament is throughout a continuous vindication of it. The Gospel gives it a new import and wider meaning and stirred up a society, sunk in moral or hedonistic quietism, to take sides and fight for the good cause.

[1] Arab philosophy was wholly *unpopular* : its exponents were foreigners (even Averroes was supposed by some to be a crypto-jew) upon whom the mantle of Islam sat very lightly : it depended on a few great names and was tolerated only under a few liberal or inquisitive rulers : outside the court it never flourished, and, with the death of Averroes, perished absolutely from the world of Islam scarcely leaving a vestige behind.

[2] Strictly only three ; for Islam is only a restatement of certain truths taken from the Old and New Testament by an able and unscrupulous Syncretist.

The Essentials of Religion: Militant, Personal, Historic.—All three systems are militant and (in a sense) strongly *dualistic*. A favoured race is entrusted with the task of maintaining against gentile enemies the true worship of God, or of founding a *City of God* to last as a witness in an evil world till Christ comes again. This conception of an army or militant society did not, however, overshadow the individual destiny of the soldiers. The general, who in the end would be judge either to reward loyalty or punish failure, knew each of his men and took a personal interest in them. He did not estimate them according to the influence of their bodily or mental equipment but according to the zeal of their service, their faith in his justice, their unswerving will and purpose to do their best for him. This devotion was never (except by an innocent paradox) dissociated from a strong instinct of personal interest. Man serves God (like St. Christopher in the legend) because He is assumed to be the strongest power in the world; because it is only folly to throw away one's work on inferior masters. But it is to be noticed that both jew and Christian learnt to pay homage for quite other than selfish or personal motives: the spectacle of a suffering deity reinforces by an emotional appeal the allegiance owed to power.[1] Even here and in the last act of self-surrender *the eternal worth of the individual soul* is never forgotten. The Christian, whose whole creed is self-denial, is yet never called upon to *sacrifice his self*. Whatever he may be called on to suffer, he always feels that he is safe. This belief is not confined to the ignorant and humble; even the mystic—for all his indifference to selfish interests and complaints of his 'creaturehood'—wishes to *enjoy* God's presence and believes that this will be his portion through all eternity.[2]

Timeless Emanation of Philosophy: Contradicts Religion.—Now Free Thought as expressed in medieval 'philosophy' or arabian *peripatism* destroys the whole structure so carefully built up upon this refined self-love. God or the

[1] Which, as in Islam, may very likely become pure *fatalism* and indifference,—all things, being under God's arbitrary control, lie beyond the reach or estimate of human judgment.

[2] When St. Paul is willing to become *anathema* for his jewish brethren, it is doubtful if he could mean total deprivation of the sense that he had willingly made this sacrifice on behalf of others; he would be 'happy even in hell' with such a consciousness.

ultimate being expands, not because he *wills*, but because he *must*: it is *nature*, not conscious *purpose*, that is at work; there is no creation at a given moment for a particular end but a timeless outflow or emanation. Man in this system of reason and necessity is just a *part* or member in a *whole*, of which he can understand the *laws* but never the *purpose*. That is, he can never understand it in the only acceptable sense. His *will* (as in Aristotle, the *moral* comes much below the *rational*, life) is quite a secondary matter and is only occupied with tiresome choices in the manifold world. Only a few can see that the highest aim of man is to rise above all particular details, above any need for action, and to contemplate the system or machine as a rational whole, necessary in all its parts.

Its Fatalism and Denial of the Part or Unit.—Free Thought then teaches the 'reign of law' and of necessity. This lesson will not satisfy normal man, who is always seeking a loophole for personal escape, hoping that an exception will be made in his case, even that a miracle may occur to save him, that inexorable law will pass him by.[1] In religion he depends on the promise of divine forgiveness, and regards grace as something which lifts him above the realm of law: he believes, like Austin, that God takes a direct interest in his welfare and salvation and has predestined him to eternal life. Now rationalism *is nothing but the exchange of this hopeful uncertainty for a fixed system which allows no exception*. It removes far afield the constant intervention of the divine or reduces it to a single action or impulse at the beginning of the universe.[2] It does not however leave the field open for the free activity of man. It rather confines and coerces him. It shares the distrust of the pious mystic for the lower world of daily happenings and believes that knowledge alone sets free. Above this restless scene is a home of peace in which the mind can forget the detail in the whole, the instance in the formal type. At the last mind can become a

[1] It is this wager or spirit of adventure which carries men through life: uncertainty and hazard form the only basis of optimism; the soldier (though I do not exclude the heroic pleasure of a forlorn hope) as a rule goes into battle with cheerful courage, not because he knows he will be killed but because he hopes that he will not.

[2] The former is the single text of Lecky and Buckle, the latter the chief religious tenet of the english deists.

'spectator of all time and all being' with Plato, with Spinoza gaze at all things *sub specie æternitatis*.

Desire to Become Divine in Greek Thought.—It was only the vision of the whole that attracted the greek thinkers after the classic age. Even in Plato and Aristotle there are distinct signs of lagging interest in the particulars. Plato's 'guardians' are not really politicians, but monks who have to leave their prayers or rosary and go back into the Cave because normal man is either a knave or a fool. His pupil from Stagira describes various States with all the carefulness of a student of universal science, but he finds the truest life elsewhere.[1] Neither social life nor inductive science had any value for the subjective schools. The philosopher wanted in a single grasp to seize the real being and import of the world. The aim was no longer to be perfect, as *man* (ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι) but to *become God*.[2]

Rationalism Ends in Superseding Reason.—Action was to cease and discursive thought as well; for in possession of the real secret of the universe the goal is found and in perfect rest no further motion is needed. The new school of platonists were complete *rationalists* until the final and crowning moment of union (ἕνωσις, συναφή). They assumed that reason could map out the whole territory of the rational. But at the end of the whole process the mystical act or experience formed the complement or climax, and alone admitted to the secret. When the pioneers threw discredit on reason in the last resort, it is not matter for surprise if their later followers rejected the theoretic groundwork or scaffolding, and pressed on with impatience towards the goal. If we are to reach the soul of the world we can only do so by becoming like it, dropping one by one the properties and qualities or predicates which make us distinct and several beings. God is nameless and beyond thought and being, to be reached only by a *theology of denial* (ἀποφατική). So the soul must surrender not merely creaturely idiosyncrasies but *reason* itself.

[1] One is tired of repeating that the greek temper is not blithe and optimistic, that greek ethics (in the self-conscious age) is not civic but distinctly anti-social, and that the subjective movement after Alexander is only the logical conclusion of tendencies easily to be traced in the earliest inquirers.

[2] This, in very different senses, may be said to be the text of epicurean and stoic as well as of neoplatonist and Christian mystic.

Feud between Philosophy and Religion in Spite of Scholastic.—Now when this doctrine was transported to the west and found a home in a scoto-irish brain, it was assumed that there was and could be no antithesis between the church's *faith* and this human *philosophy*. But the church's creed was a given material of truth, external to the mind, independent of rational grounds. The aim of scholastic is to prove the two identical, to show that reason can only endorse; but the aim of philosophy is to show that the more perfect and personal way was reached by a private and (in the end) mystical process. Hence the feud between the two methods. Scholastic was to the end assured that reason could do nothing more than repeat or codify what faith dictated; 'philosophy' believed that it could give an entirely novel interpretation of the doctrine. Hence both forms of Mysticism, orthodox and heretical, set themselves against the frigid formalism which transformed and summarized, yet never really appropriated, the articles of the *credenda*.

Two Forms of Mystical Philosophy: Emergence of Pietism as Personal Religion.—Here we have reached the parting of the ways, the divergence of the mystical tendency into two branches, that of the *intellect* and that of the *emotions*; to use a pair of later terms, *rationalism* and *pietism*. Now the latter stoutly resisted the apotheosis of Reason which marked both the divines and the philosophers. It tried to exclude the play of subtle and controversial dialectic upon the mysteries of the faith; it protested that *experience* and not *argument* was the true guide in theology. That which brought us near to God and to the right understanding of the *credenda* was not a universal faculty but a private emotion; the attitude of the redeemed and converted sinner who is conscious that in saving him God has performed a special act of mercy. In such a context ratiocination and logic are out of place—the *universal* element is not in the foreground but the *personal*. It is easy to see what will be the corollaries of an extremist in *pietism*: the *external* is *nothing* (whether as authority or formal rite or liturgy or even virtuous conduct); *inwardness* on which no judge can pass sentence from outside, is alone of worth. The visible external society or church, with its roots and interests firmly fixed among things of this dying world, is neither the source of comfort and grace nor in itself holy and spiritual: its very stress on externality condemns it. In matters touching the

soul's experience the only test or rather witness is the soul itself.

Or, Platonic and Aristotelian Theology.—Philosophy had long held that the work of the discerning reason [1] was only *propædeutic* : it prepared the way for its own destruction or denial. It was not by reason that man came near to God, but by some other and better faculty ; for God is love. In this common doctrine of all pietism they were only appealing to Plato past Aristotle. In his theology, the former put *goodness* as a cosmic principle before *mind* and *being*.[2] Now although Aristotle speaks of God as *loveable* and object of desire to all the restless striving of creatures [3] he still leaves him as pure self-contemplating Mind : which, intent on the axioms of its own self-consistency, takes no thought for, is not even aware of, that world which is stirred into life and endeavour by its perfection. In Plato, to be sure, there is only an initial act of benevolence ; goodness does not condescend to perform the details of the creative task which are deputed to lesser powers. Still the distinction will hold that the master held *love* to be the chief divine attribute, the pupil, *intelligence*.

Reason and Emotion as Means of Approaching God.—Hence the divergence of which we speak : on the one hand, a mystical religion which appeals to the emotions and finds its test and sanction only in the soul's experience ; on the other hand, a philosophy aiming through logic and dialectic at union with an impersonal Reason.[4]

These then are the chief attitudes assumed by serious and reflective minds in the eleventh century of our era, in the first epoch of Scholastic. It remains to ascertain in detail the motives

[1] Still involving a certain dualism of *subject* and *object* though this object is no longer many but one the *νοητὸν* or *νοῦς*—though no doubt it has here passed beyond the stage of the discursive understanding with its inductive and separating tendency and its hindu love of classifying and arranging in stages and series.

[2] *Ἐπέκεινα νοῦ τε κ. οὐσίας* in *Republic*, *ἀγαθὸς ἦν* in the well known passage in *Timæus* where he speaks not of Form of Good but of an actively Good Creator.

[3] In language quite as full of unction and emotion as is e.g. Plato's *Banquet*.

[4] Whose rules and truths and methods are the same for all rational beings ; the individual therefore, far from being satisfied or perfected in his original nature, is altogether suppressed.

which were stirring in the conflicts of Abelard and Bernard,—in the dogmatic reconstruction of Anselm, in the 'heretical' movements which alarmed Authority and produced a fatal rift between the church as a coercive corporation and the private conscience of its members.

CHAPTER IV

FIRST STAGE OF INTERROGATION

Section I. The Age of Abelard and Bernard

Suggested Divisions of Scholastic.—The periods and divisions of the Scholastic Age are well marked. Omitting the wholly unique and anomalous figure of Erigena, we have after *1050* the first tentative questionings of the *data* or *formulas* of theology (Berengar, Roslin, Abelard) answered by the two different methods of Anselm and Bernard. Then, after a long interval of silence and fatigue or mere repetition, we see a systematic attempt after *1200* to formulate the harmony of *theology* and *logic* in the light of the new knowledge of greek thought. Lastly, there is the epoch of 'nominalism' in which the assumption that the two 'Sciences' are in harmony is either tacitly surrendered or flatly denied. Cousin has suggested as titles for these divisions (A) Philosophy in *subordination* to theology, (B) in *alliance*, (C) in *estrangement* and conscious opposition. But strictly, if we include Erigena, a still prior stage has to be recognized: Philosophy as *identical* with religion or, in the last resort, *superior*.

Logic and Theology Identified: Supremacy of Reason.—The 'philosophy' which the early scholastic mind applied with confidence to the dogmatic problem was chiefly *logic*. For it *logic* or the laws and order of thought is in a sense *theology*; for if these laws are valid for all rational beings they must also be part of God's mind. Only a few points in logic were applied but the single aim was generally allowed—to *rationalize* the content of faith: when the whole of Aristotle was in their hand this object was achieved; revelation was narrowly confined to the duty of imparting a very few mysteries which transcended human understanding. But this period of accord and equilibrium was very brief. No sooner was the work complete than, from two very different quarters, piety and secular wisdom raised protest against an unholy alliance. No sooner had Aquinas

finished his monumental work than Duns began his negative criticism of the elaborate structure of Reason. Even in the early epoch when logic was first applied, the effects were unhappy in the case of Berengar and others. Anselm insisted on the due subordination of logic at the outset, though he fully believed that it would be found in the end harmonious. Bernard disliked the use of dialectic in matters of belief; and more than one dogma was withdrawn from the purview of reason as resting solely on divine revelation.

The Universals : as Creative Forces.—The ' forbidden fruit ', a term applied by Kant to the Absolute, was to the medieval mind, the *universal* or class-name. Porphyry (*230–303*), in a work known through Boëthius' translation, had put aside the question as too difficult for a primary text-book. What relation had the *universal* to the *particular* concrete instance? If classes and types rather than individuals are the proper objects of science, what value have the latter except (very imperfectly) to illustrate an already complete form of truth? In this academic problem we see the radical divergence of minds, attracted by *pantheism* on one hand, by atomic *individualism* on the other. Even if Erigena's neoplatonism had little influence in his day, it put forward the tenet on which medieval development seems to hinge; that thought-forms and thought-order, rules of logic satisfied by dialectic discourse, were also creative forces in *our* world, and disclosed the thoughts of God in the *divine*.[1]

Realism or ' Single Substance ' : Nominalism At Once Suppressed.—In cent. xi realism found in Remi of Auxerre a frank spokesman. He held that there is ' one *genus* (*οὐσία* or *essentia*), ' beyond which intellect cannot rise, which embraces all natures ; ' everything that is being a portion of this essence, by partaking ' in which everything that is has its existence '. This is not platonism but the view of a brahman, or of Parmenides. Such a theory is by no means unknown in the later development of the eastern church which, through ' Denys ' and Maximus Confessor, so strongly impressed Erigena. Berengar (*999–1088*) without doubt desired (in opposition) to show the importance of the *parts* as making up the *whole* : there could not be a change in the *substance* of the sacrament unless there was also a change in the

[1] It is for this reason that Hegel is called the ' last of the schoolmen ', as we shall have occasion to notice later.

accidents. Roscellinus or Roslin (*c. 1050–1125*) esteemed nothing real but the *individual*; a universal substance being but a *flatus vocis*, and *trinitarian* dogma implying rather three separate and distinct Deities than a single impersonal Godhead.[1] Anselm (*1033–1109*) and William of Champeaux (*1070–1121*), in consequence of this premature nominalism, set up *realism* as the only orthodox view, its rival having proved thus early fatal to the two chief mysteries of religion. Anselm's trust in *reason* and *philosophy* is wonderful: not merely God's Being but the Trinity and Incarnation can be proved—these were later withdrawn into the sphere of mysteries, not obvious or accessible to the unaided reason. William was the pupil of Roslin and the master of Abelard (on whose account of him we depend). His doctrine falls into two phases; the former, a realism so extreme and uncompromising that it denies any real being or worth to the part or instance. Individuals are only accidents of a single identical Substance; the same *Substance* is present in its entire essence in each *individual*; *individuals* differ not in essence but only in the variety of their accidents: *socratitas* or socrates-hood is only an accident of substance *humanitas*: man is a species (*res una essentialiter*) which receives certain forms.[2] Except in these accidental variants (which make up a *personality*), humanity is at bottom one and the same.[3]

Latent Pantheism of Orthodox Church Dogma.—This is

[1] We know Roslin's views only from the reports of his enemies; as in the case of all heresies, too much stress on either of the complementary sides of a truth must lead both parties to stubborn and angry exaggeration. He held that *parts* of a thing were mere aspects under which we choose to regard it, the *individual* is in essence ἓν κ. ἀμέριστον: it exists in *its own right* and apart from other individuals. Thus we cannot truly speak of real relations, for we cannot compare them unless we are certain of the *general* character which puts them under the same class-name. This view of existence is wholly *atomic*; in theology the effect was startling: 'if we are not prepared to say three Persons are one thing, then we ought 'in strict logic to speak of three Gods'. Roslin, so far from attacking orthodoxy, believed that Lanfranc and Anselm agreed with him.

[2] We should rather expect—'is subject to certain accidents which 'make it now Socrates, now Plato'.

[3] To this very uncritical realism can be made the retort of Parmenides (in Plato's dial.) that if the *idea* or universal is wholly present in Socrates, it is entirely absorbed and used up in him; it is nowhere else found. We have seen the same difficulty in the hindu identification *atman* = *brahman*.

precisely the doctrine summed up in later times under the title *Averroism* and rejected with emphasis by the church. The pantheistic tendency of orthodox church doctrine after *1100* was not at once disclosed. When still clearer statements were brought in by the arabizing heretics (after *1200*) the church stood at bay and in Albert and Aquinas endeavours to prove its innocence. But it is not difficult to detect even in these writers a certain 'spinozism' which suppresses the unit. Hence, as we have seen, the very brief interval of complacence and equilibrium and the rapid success of the movement which, from franciscans and secularists alike, restored the individual to his rights and freedom. But in so doing it shattered into fragments the crystal orb of medieval thought. Just as the universal was pulverized into its constituent atoms, so the unitary body of human knowledge was broken up into the several and often hostile departments in which we find it to-day.[1]

Conception of Pure or Abstract Being : Chartres.—Abelard of Bath writing *de eodem et universo* (between *c. 1105* and *1115*) tries to reconcile the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on *ideal* and *real* : 'Aristotle was right in holding that *universals* exist only 'in sensible things : Plato held besides that they existed and 'could be beheld within the divine mind'. He tried to show that the two views were the same. Bernard of Chartres also

[1] With William's *second* position, we cannot be detained here : it is even uncertain what it was ; instead of *essentialiter* he put either *individualiter* (Prantl and Hauréau), or *indifferenter* (Cousin and Rémusat). In the former he seems (like Plotinus) to demand a separate *universal* for each individual, or perhaps he desired to imply that while the *universal* was not multiplied, the individual was rather reduced to unity—this is of course the ordinary belief as to *univ.* and *indiv.*, but what is required since the time of Parmenides and Plato is to show, how it is possible and how it comes about ? The french interpreters who in such a matter are entitled to all respect, seem to imply not identity of *univ.* in each *indiv.* but indistinguishable *similarity*—a concession clearly on the road to nominalism : *univ.* consists of certain elements or attributes in the several *indiv.*, which are identical or *indifferent* in every instance of the type. But then the *univ.* so far from being the *substance* is merely the sum of the *attributes* classified and held together (as it were) by a common name : true being belongs only to the *indiv.* So, by a not infrequent turn in Dialectic, the opposite term is transformed or passes into its other, the *indiv.* becomes for us the *species* or *genus*, as in the phrase *nihil est omnino nisi* individuum ; *sed et illud, aliter et aliter attentum*, species *et* genus *et* generalissimum *est.*

took up this emphasis on platonic Ideas in God's mind: the actual exemplars exist in the supersensible world of the divine thought.[1] Gilbert de la Porrée, also(*1070–1154*) a pupil of Bernard of Chartres, denies that *genera* and *species* exist in their own right as *substances*: 'a thing *substat*, for it is that which *is*, *quod est*: a *universal*, is that by which a thing *is* (*quo est*), and it *subsistit*. Therefore the universal *est*, *sed non substat*, while particular things not merely *sunt* but *substant*, being subjects of accidents which can inhere in a *substance*'. Gilbert carried realism to the length of an *impersonal* theology. Commenting on Boëthius' *Trinity*, he starts from the notion that pure or *abstract* being is prior to that which is *actually*. This is God or rather the Godhead (something akin to Böhme's hidden abyss or non-explicit *gottheit*): this is incomprehensible and to be distinguished from the Triune God which is revealed to us: this pure form of being by which God is God must be kept separate from the Three Persons who are God by partaking in this Form: this is One while the Persons or Substances are Three. This distinction between *deitas* and *deus* (quite in keeping with realism) led to his condemnation by the Synod of Reims and the Pope in *1148*. To the Godhead (τὸ θεῖον) we cannot apply the categories (so in Denys' *negative* theology). Between this pure Being and Substances stand the Ideas or Forms (essences of things, *formæ nativæ*, having no relation to a thing's accidents).

The Compromise of Abelard.—Abelard now comes forward with his compromise of *conceptualism* and, like every proposer of a compromise, is claimed by either side.[2] *Genera* and *species* which are predicated of *individuals* cannot be treated as things

[1] This belief, once dismissed with scorn, as a neoplatonic perversion and thoroughly alien to Plato's doctrine of Forms, is now believed by some competent students to be the 'second manner' of the platonic development, where instead of a *republic* of wholly independent and unrelated Ideas there is a *monarchy* in the spiritual world and all the lesser ideas subsist within the Highest Soul (which is God) as His thoughts: in a measure this corresponds to Berkeleian Idealism—wherein there must be central intelligence always thinking the Forms and always viewing the objects of sense which proceed from them.

[2] To Cousin, Rémusat and Hauréau, he is a *nominalist* in more prudent fashion than Roslin (and Uberweg agrees); to Ritter and Erdmann he is a moderate *realist*: but in a question where a very slight change, or over emphasis, in one factor makes it pass over into its opposite, a prudent nominalist and a moderate realist must be much the same.

or substances, for *res de re non prædicatur*. We saw clearly that an 'indifferent' *universal* led directly to a pantheistic doctrine that all beings were in the end identical in a single substance. The universal gave not *forms* to things but only an indeterminate and indifferent substrate; how then was it the form-giver? This monism then is either spinozan or averroist, in any case pantheistic, in the sense implied by Amalric and David about *1200*. Abelard's basal tenet was 'only the individual exists 'in its own right'; whereas the system of Indifference seems to acknowledge a *universal* or generic substance as the true being or core of individual things—a dogma already familiar to us in the greek church. Yet as supporting a *via media* Abelard will not offend the convinced realist by calling universals *flatus vocis*, even if it be true that 'only individuals exist and in them nothing 'but the individual'. The distinctions of *genera* and *species* are not arbitrary nor a matter of convention or again of personal fancy. To our logical order and classifying process there was a genuine objective counterpart in the world outside. But he cannot accept the view which hypostatizes [1] these qualities found alike in the particulars, in virtue of which they are called identical. He is reaching forward to the theory which sees the individual as the only true and indivisible substance. While then he tends to an Aristotelian position about *universals*, he does not reject Plato's *universalia ante rem*.

Abelard, Sabellian and Rationalist.—In his *theology*, strictly so called, there is no doubt that Abelard tends to a sabellian theory of the Trinity in his desire to combat the tritheism latent in Roslin's views: the Persons are different *aspects* or *attributes* of Godhead (Power, Wisdom, Love). He revived too the *rationalism* of Erigena; a dogma is not true because God has said it (as e.g. Tertullian held and the scotists will hold) but because it agrees with right Reason and because our private reason accepts and ratifies it. This of course implies that *above* God is the realm of intelligibles, just as (in one construing of the myth) beyond the demiurge in *Timæus* is the ideal pattern after which he models the sensible world. God is therefore not strictly the creator of forms; and it is not His will that ordains truth: the *rational* is that system under and within which He works. Abelard's *reason*, which is to be the final test, is not private judgment

[1] Gives real substance, actual being.

but the laws or forms of this world-system, into which both God and man have access : there is then room in his doctrine for what we should term *mysticism.*

Against Slothful Surrender to Authority : Inwardness.— Against an unintelligent surrender to the voice of Authority he protests in his *Sic et Non* : which may possibly be a text-book of bold scepticism, but is more likely a treatise meant to show that even the Fathers disagreed and that their consent does not excuse us from the duty of making careful inquiry on our own account. If, by showing the antinomies and discords left in the patristic exposition of dogma, we find that truth has not yet been visibly fixed, it remains for us to start afresh and try to reconcile these conflicting statements in a *via media.* But the effect of the compilation is clearly to throw discredit on patristic authority and to raise a general feeling of distrust. Hence arise (in the interests of church discipline and assurance) the long series of *Summists,* beginning with the respectable name of Peter the Lombard, his pupil. Nearly all medieval writings are *commentaries* on works and authors of assured credit ; and the Summists give the views of the Fathers on contested points of doctrine.[1] In all his long quarrel with Bernard, Abelard [2] had this much in common : that he laid emphasis on *inwardness* (will, purpose, intention) : it is (as with the greek moralists) the subjective intent that decides the ethical value of an act. But the scholastic age, as we shall see in the section devoted to its practical side, betrayed a very slight interest in ethics and, except for

[1] The list includes Robert Pulleyn (*c.* 1090–1150), Peter Lombard (1100–1164), *magister sententiarum* (on whose text-book several hundreds of commentaries were written), Peter of Poitiers his pupil (1130–1180), Robert of Melun, Hugo of Amiens, Stephen Langton, William of Auxerre, Alan de Lille or *de Insulis* (1130–1203).

[2] Abælardus (formed from boyish nickname *bajolardus* ? pig-carrier) belonged to a noble breton house and may have had iberian blood and kinship with the scoto-irish races whence came Erigena and Duns : pupil of William of Champeaux 1100, has school of his own at Melun 1102 afterwards at St. Geneviéve, Canon in 1115 ; after his fall into sin, becomes monk in 1120, is condemned for sabellian teaching at Council of Soissons 1121 ; builds a humble cell of turfs and reeds as hermit at Nogent ; invited to breton religious house ; returns to Paris 1136 (John of Sarum heard him at this date) ; again condemned owing to the zeal of Bernard (Council of Sens 1141) ; arraigned for heresy, he appeals to Rome which ratifies the sentence ; + Cluny 1142.

monastic virtues, went for guidance rather to Aristotle than to the Bible or the Church.

Section II. Reaction of Pietism and Close of First Scholastic Period

Reaction against Dialectic : Emotional Self-Loss.—As we have already said, Bernard of Clairvaux (*1091–1153*) marks a decided protest against dialectic as applied to articles of faith and church-dogma. The scholastic movement represented by Abelard's lectures meant the unsettlement of faith for a large number of believers. The orthodox defence of Anselm appealed to just the same faculty of reason ; which, however in fact universal and impersonal, seemed to Authority very much like irresponsible private judgment. What Bernard condemns is Abelard's passion for distinctions and antithesis in matters where he *preferred to affirm and to unite*. The practical end of religion is to know God, to love and to enjoy Him. He begins with man's natural instinct of self-*love* and shows how faith transmutes this into an absorbing love of God which denies and is even unconscious of self. ' Self-loss is the final end : to lose thyself, to be emptied of self, to have no consciousness of self, this is to walk as a citizen of heaven ; as a waterdrop loses self in wine-cask, as iron heated red-hot becomes pure fire rather than metal, as air filled with sunlight is transformed into its brightness ' . . . So must all self be dissolved and wholly transformed into the will of God. ' If anything of man remain, how shall God be all in all ? ' By the year *1125* there was prevalent a great distrust of human Reason, a reaction towards Faith, a desire to apprehend truth by some other means than critical intelligence. Bernard, no doubt with widespread approval, began or rather renewed *orthodox* mysticism ; a personal religion which made dogma its own, not by weighing arguments but by allowing free play of feeling and emotion. Yet he constitutes himself the church's great detective for heresy, and arraigns not merely Abelard the semi-nominalist but Gilbert the realist (Council of Reims, *1148*). In place of a rational apprehension of *credenda*, he devised a systematic advance through faith and feeling to the objects of desire, still conceived in a somewhat scholastic and formal manner.

The Victorine Pietists : Decay of Speculative Interest.— He was supported by the Victorines of the Augustinian Order, of whom Hugh of St. Victor [1] maintained that reasoning could not discover the uncorrupt truth of things. He did not altogether reject the design of setting forth in methodical form the content of faith and the opinion of the Fathers : he has even been called the first of the Summists. But his design was clearly rather to guard against error than to give to doctrines any formal fixity. The two Priors of St. Victor, Richard (*1162–1173*)[2] and Walter (*1173–1185*), became more and more opposed to the rationalizing activity of the age. The latter pointed out that a *Summa* is a veritable storehouse of arguments against the faith ; that in its eagerness to forestall and answer all possible objections it only suggests doubt and does not cure it. ' Summists have as ' much to say *against* as in *favour of* God's existence : Abelard ' and Peter Lombard his pupil, Gilbert and Peter of Poitiers ' are the four Labyrinths of France '. Hence by the middle of cent. xii., logical studies had fallen into discredit and even orthodox apologists were looked on with suspicion. The speculative interest, which had arisen parallel to the reforms of Clugny and of Hildebrand and to the Wars of Investiture, now died down : logic became, not a serious inquiry into the laws of thought, but the exercise of that peculiar dialectic subtlety in dispute which we associate with the term *scholastic*. Meantime the Summists were

[1] Hugo (1078–1141) born in Saxony, and so a forerunner of the german mystics rather than follower of the french ' enlightenment ' : sojourned in two victorine abbeys (Marseilles and Paris) ; canon and perhaps prior from 1130 : renown as preacher exceeded St. Bernard's ; started the victorine reactions to *pietism* (which dominated 1150–1200) ; his mystic language free from ' perilous temerities ' (Langlois) ; though he believed dialectic to be both hazardous and inadequate in matters of faith, had not the scorn of secular science which marks later victorine obscurantism ; ' knowledge ' is not the *end* of the mystical life, but only the *vestibule* ' ; he admitted *reason* as aid to help us to understand revealed truths ; a true scholastic in his curious formalism of the mystic's progress, threefold eye of the soul in *cogitatio, meditatio, contemplatio* : among recent works (besides Hauréau's *History* etc. 2nd edit. Paris 1886 and de Wulf's, Louvain 1900) there are monographs by Mignon, *Origines* etc. Paris 1895, and Kilgenstein's *Gotteslehre*, etc. 1896.

[2] Richard opposed the scholastic tenet that objects of private and mystical contemplation are in part *above* reason and in part *contrary* to reason (as e.g. the intuition of the Trinity).

here codifiers of Authority. The mystics deplored the errors of both and devoted themselves to personal piety or even to active enterprise in missions.

Sceptical Humanism : the English Temper.—There is therefore room in this exhaustion of original thought for the impartial survey of the historian, who records the progress of a movement without himself becoming a partizan. John of Sarum (educated in France during the time of Bernard's zeal against heresy *1136–48*) sees clearly that the intellect of the age is no longer a unity but a medley of undigested fragments : he is a critic and practical man of the world rather than a divine or philosopher. He detests the vain and trivial sophistries which had become the staple of scholastic disputes, and, joining no party, taking no side, dubbing himself academic, (that is, anti-dogmatist) he is the first notable name and pioneer in the sceptical movement which was later to find in Montaigne and the french Enlightenment. With a temper thoroughly english he regards religion as a *practical* matter—'love is the fulfilling of the law'—rather than a complex of dogmatic intricacies. Where doubt is permissible to wise men, that is in matters not yet defined and fixed by Authority, 'I follow in their footsteps and suspend my judgment'.[1] If the scoto-irish race gave Britain the renown of Erigena and Duns Scotus, the name of the saxon John is no less typical of the sound practical purpose and dogmatic caution of the english. His teaching in many ways reminds us of the tenets of later *utilita-*

[1] John was of saxon or english, not norman, descent and has no particular sympathy with the ingenious refinement of Lanfranc and Anselm ; he crossed to France 1136 and for two years studied at St. Geneviéve, both under Abelard and under two pupils of Bernard of Chartres (cf. Clerval's monograph on *École de Ch. au M. Age*, Paris, 1895), and after 1140 under Gilbert de la P. and Robert Pulleyn ; was present at Council of Reims at which Pope Eugenius III presided. In 1159 he composed his great work *Polycraticus* (de nugis curialium et de vestigiis philosophorum) and his *Metalogica*, or account of methods used in scholastic education. He is remarkable among men of his time for good latin and strongly practical and liberal tendencies; he may be called the forerunner of *humanism*. He became secretary to Thomas à Becket (in 1170) and bishop of Chartres 1176. He attended Council of Lateran 1179 and died in 1180 (see C. J. Webbs' *Polycr.*, 2 vols Oxford 1909). Except for an article in *Dict. Nat. Biog.*, he is neglected by his countrymen and even in Germany there seems to be no new monograph after C. Schaarschmidt's in 1862.

rianism; he opposes common sense to the profitless conflicts of realism and its foes; he is more of a ciceronian (both in polished style and sceptical outlook) than an aristotelian.[1]

[1] Of Aristotle he knew (it would appear) solely the *Organon* in latin and no other writing at all.

PART II

The Dualistic Opposition

CHAPTER V. DUALISM TRAVELS WESTWARDS

SECTION I. VITALITY OF ADOPTIANISM IN THE EAST: THE PAULICIAN SECTARIES

Emergence of Divers Elements in Alliance against Church (*1200*).—The *second* period of scholastic opens soon after *1200* with the introduction of *peripatism* by the medium of arabian and jewish purveyors. After an interval of stagnation and fatigue in which the reaction of the pious had repressed dialectical refinements, a new stimulus was given to thought, a new alarm to orthodoxy, by the Pantheists. These had learnt something from the received churchly dogma of realism, something from Spain and southern France, something from the now revived platonism of Erigena. The thirteenth century is the age of the new monkish Orders, of Frederick II (more sympathetic with muslim than Christian culture), of the Inquisition, of the Brethren of the Free Spirit, of the fall of the Empire and the approaching catastrophe of the Papacy. Opposition to Authority is not now merely a tentative questioning by the learned, but shows something of a popular movement. It is in part a continuation of Bernard's pietism and the victorine mystical doctrine; because it claims direct intercourse, even immediate union, with the divine. But it is also affiliated to the long movement of paulician dualism, strongly antagonistic to churchly authority and in its world-theory showing so marked a contrast to Islam. The new anti-hierarchical revolt took to itself a *monism*, which it learnt from philosophy, and a *personal religion*, without *media*, which had been the teaching of pietism. The grades of this heresy varied from the spiritual doctrine of Joachim's Eternal Gospel, through stages of pure

theoretic pantheism in Amalric and David, into the open antinomianism or moral 'indifference' of their extreme followers.

Effect of Crusades: Unscrupulous Savagery of New Age: Communism.—The Crusades had borne their fruit in condemning western exclusiveness and the unique claims of Christendom to a true and final form of faith. Zeal for the church had evaporated and the Holy War of *1204* was perverted into a freebooting expedition against the wealthiest town in Europe, which had stood for centuries as a sentinel against infidelity. The disguise and restraint which the church had thrown round primitive savagery was now torn off: at a time of growing knowledge and increasing apparatus of life and art, naked instincts came to the front. The first modern States were founded subject to no law but that of self-preservation. The poorer class gladly availed themselves of the new doctrines of professors that man was in the depths of his nature one with God. They readily interpreted their own vague passions or desires as the actual stirrings and intimations of the Spirit, and their emotions ran the whole gamut from highest to lowest. There is no doubt that the social structure was seriously threatened by these claims: we have only to remember the panic aroused in later times by the Peasants' War and the Anabaptist Kingdom of Munster. The movement, in origin purely *individual*, became *communist* as a natural result of the weakness of units taken severally. Yet on the whole there was little solidifying into regular communities; and the sole region where a religious feudalism menaced the civil and papal autocracy was in the favoured country of Provence and Languedoc.

Tenets of Paul of Samosata.—It appears likely that the *Paulician* heretics (and sometimes rebels) in the east-roman empire were remains of an early adoptianist sect. There is no doubt that Paul of Samosata[1] represented this ebionitic christology which, as in the later antiochene school, laid emphasis rather on the *human* nature than the divinity of Christ. In his *Treatise to Sabinus* he says: 'in fixity and resoluteness of 'character He *likened himself to God*; and having *kept Himself* '*free from sin* was united to God and was enabled to grasp the 'power to work wonders. These miracles show that over and

[1] Patriarch of Antioch, dethroned by the pagan Emperor Aurelian (272) because he did not accept the dogmatic standpoint of Rome.

'above the will, He possessed one and the same activity with God; 'He thus *won the title* of Redeemer and Saviour'. Again he repeats this in somewhat different phrase 'By struggle and hard 'work He overcame the sins of our forefathers: He *succeeded in* '*perfecting Himself* and through His *moral excellence was united* '*to God*, having attained to unity and sameness of *will and activity* 'through advances on the path of good works. . . . Thus He 'inherited the name which is above all names, the prize of love 'and affection vouchsafed to Him in grace. . . . We do not allot 'praise to those who obey merely in virtue of their nature; but 'to those in good measure who submit because their attitude is 'one of love. . . . It was in virtue of love that the Saviour 'coalesced with God, so as to suffer no divorce from Him but to 'retain for all ages to come one and the same will and activity 'with Him. . . . As *nature* manifests the substance of the 'manifold to subsist as one and the same, so the attitude of *love* 'produces in many persons unity and sameness of *will*'.

Human Effort and Adoptianism.—Our Saviour was therefore (in Paul's eyes) a man who became God, rather than God who became man: this is the dogma corresponding to Pelagius' theory in the sphere of human conduct.[1] It is the tendency of such theories to deprive the Gospel of its unique value as a revelation from above, by making Christ's life and human person typical of an advance upwards, accessible to all men. It is a symbol of the rebirth and resurrection of every believer. That which Christ *became*, viz. the Son of God, can be won by each Christian who like Him suffers and overcomes. A vulgar construction of Nestorius might easily relegate the Saviour into the same class as Hercules, Castor and Pollux, heroes who for their personal merits and achievement were made divine.[2] God does not actively help or favour His best servants, but He sets a prize and gives an example

[1] Firmicus Maternus *Math.* ii 28 (Sittl. Teubner 1894 p. 74) has a curious parallel when he exhorts the astrologer to be a good man; *ad imaginem te Divinitatis similitudinemque formo ut sis semper præconio bonitatis ornatus; oportet enim eum qui quotidie de Diis et cum Diis loquitur animum suum ita formare atque instruere, ut ad imitationem Divinitatis semper accedat . . . si purgatum animum et memorem divini seminis geris, aggredere hoc opus.*

[2] Horace, *Hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules Enisus arces attigit igneas, Quos inter Augustus recumbens purpureo bibit ore nectar: arte* is of course ἀρετῇ personal heroism.

and all are free to follow the one and attain the other. The imperial *apotheosis* at Rome left the verdict to a popular *post-mortem* judgment of which the Senate were the spokesmen: in any case it was believed that by merit and endeavour men could become 'as gods'. The emphasis then was wholly on personal effort and sanctity, not on outward means of grace.

Doctrines of the Thonraki: Denial of Means of Grace and Frank Dualism.—Gregory Magistros, an armenian, duke of Mesopotamia under Constantine X (*1042–1054*) represents the Thonraki as saying: 'we do not worship matter but God; cross, 'church, priestly vestments, sacrifice of the mass,—all this we 'reckon for naught and lay stress only on the inner sense'. The Paulitzians or Paulians have obvious affinity with the followers of Mani (though they execrate him): the Father in heaven rules not this world but the world to come, and the present system lies under an evil Creator who made flesh while the good deity created angels only: the phrase 'Moses saw not God but the devil', puts them on a level with Marcion the dualist and other more strictly gnostic sects of cent. ii. Therefore they do not honour the Virgin; they allegorize the Eucharist, and assail the cross as a cursed instrument; these are to them as carnal things under the sway of the world-ruler. They show great dislike to the Apostle Peter.[1] 'We love Paul and execrate Peter', said the Thonraki, according to the Magistros. They abhorred monks and the monastic garb; so apparelled the evil world-ruler said to Peter at Christ's baptism 'This is my beloved Son'. They denied the sanctity of catholic structures of stone or wood and the efficacy of the baptismal 'bath-water': yet they baptized in water or in river and their modern followers continue the practice. In cent. xi they told the Magistros that he did not understand the mystery; 'we are in no haste to be baptized 'for baptism is death': hence it was clearly used as a rite *in extremis*, just as in the case of Constantine I (it being held that subsequent sin could not be forgiven). Like most of the gnostic

[1] Though this does not appear conspicuously in the *Key of Truth* ed. F. C. Conybeare, Oxford 1898, where it is said that not Peter alone but all the apostles constitute the church; the reader, when elected and confirmed, assumes the ritual name of Peter: this practice is found also amongst the Cathars of 1100–1200 and in the celtic church of Gildas, where every presbyter was a *Peter*.

sects (to whom outward acts were indifferent) they allowed and even counselled conformity to catholic usage; but they rejected the clerical orders of the church. Their own ministers were called by the very un-priestly names of *συνέκδημοι* (itinerant *'colporteurs'* of the type of George Borrow) and *νοτάριοι* (copyists). They dressed like laymen, dislike of sacerdotal vestments being a constant trait of the sect to this hour.

Their Gnostical Theology: Half Docetic, Half Adoptianist.—In dogma they held that God summoned an angel and bade him go to earth to be born of a woman and endure insults, suffering, and death, bestowing on him the name 'Son of God'. He was taken up into heaven and obtained the further title Christ in the time of Cæsar Augustus, 'by way of grace, and as a reward for fulfilling the commandment'. The *Key* lays more emphasis on the moment of Christ's baptism: 'then it was that He became Saviour of us sinners, and was filled with Godhead; *then* was He sealed, anointed, called by the Voice, addressed as the Beloved One'. It was at His baptism that Christ 'put on that first raiment of light which after his sin Adam forfeited in the garden'.[1] As to *dualism*, the Paulicians seem to follow the New Testament very literally; the tenet is most conspicuous in the Greek accounts. They laid stress on the pauline contrast of *law* and *grace*, a Satan's *bondage* and the *freedom* of the Spirit. Our Lord was new creature, a fresh beginning; and therefore they denied all honour to His Mother, limiting true kinship with Him to those who *do God's will*.

Saint-Worship.—Therefore the fully initiated become in like manner *christs*; they cease to be mere hearers of the word, (the *audientes* of the western sects) and become complete vehicles of the Holy Spirit. Gregory of Nark attacks their *man-worshipping* apostasy; and it is clear that their claims to die and rise again with Christ were interpreted by foes to include physical resurrection after being put to death. In a MS. at Vienna referring to the Bogomils of cent. x., we hear of Peter 'founder of sect of Messalians or Lycopetrians, of Fundaitæ and Bogomils who called himself Christ and promised *to rise again after death*'. These Perfect or Elect were regularly adored as *christs*, anointed by the Spirit: this practice was conveyed westwards, but it is

[1] Even orthodox armenian writers held that Christ had incorruptible flesh, made of fire and ether.

also found in the so-called Celtic Church, where a stranger venerating St. Columba ' worshipped christ in his holy person ' and St. Baithene after delivering a discourse received homage from the assembled brethren : who, still kneeling and with hands outstretched to heaven, venerated ' Christ in the Saint '.[1] A modern russian sect, of undoubted lineage from the armenian thonraki, uses the same practice ; in *1837* an Elect could say to his followers without giving offence : ' I am the Cross, light two tapers on my ' hands and *give me worship*, for I am able to give you salvation ' as much as the cross and the saints '. Among Cathars of the west, the Elect, being ' consoled ' and having become a Paraclete in the flesh, stands in prayer with arms extended in form of a cross, and the *audientes* adore the mystical Christ in him. The sectaries of Mount Mardin, syriac-speaking shepherds, also to this day have their *christs*, as the persian interpreters of Islam had their semi-divine *imams*, as the Tibetans their *lamas*.[2] The paulicians (it is thought) encouraged this cult of a *living cross* to correct the materialistic ' fetish-worship ' of the *Symbol*. There is no doubt that they represented a reaction against a gross presentment of salvation through purely sensible means and channels, and believed that man (in virtue, not of his nature, but of his will) is, when perfected, the only suitable vehicle of the divine. Hence with earlier manichees[3] and later bogomils or cathars they refuse the name *church* to material structures, finding it only in a spiritual assembly of the Elect. Neither paulician nor thonraki would allow marriage to be a sacrament, or a state consecrated by any religious ritual. So the later cathars repudiated it in the west, undoubtedly giving the great impetus to *celibacy* which the Roman Church was (in cent. xi) compelled to adopt, on pain of forfeiting the popular esteem and the influence it conferred..,

[1] Adamn. *Life of St. Col.* i 44 and 37.

[2] To-day in Russia there is a bogomil sect in which one member is regularly adored by the rest of the congregation.

[3] It is not proposed to inquire closely here into the kinship and relations of the sect of Mani (on the fringe of the Christian Church like many other gnostic heresies) and the party of *paulians* or *paulitzians* : it may however be said that there was certainly a fusion in Armenia between two sects of *independent* but *kindred* beliefs.

APPENDIX A

Further Details in the History of the Paulicians

They are first mentioned by an armenian patriarch, Narses II, *c. 553* in Justinian's reign, and significantly classed with Nestorians ' in belief and prayer '. In spite of the bishop's attack they continued to work in Armenia and were reinforced by iconoclasts from Albania (in Caucasus) : the united sects had a settlement near Lake Van. Patriarch John IV in the reign of the syrian iconoclast Leo III (*c. 730*) identifies them with *Messalians*. An anonymous account in *greek* (' escorial ') was written about the middle of cent. ix (when Iconoclasm as a State-policy was nearing its downfall) ; George the Monk incorporated it into his *Chronicle*. Photius writing under the now orthodox (if disreputable) Michael III uses this freely for his *History of the Manichees*, adding certain details from his own experience of the sect ; Peter of Sicily also used it, an envoy sent by Basil I (himself of *armenian* descent) to treat for exchange of captives at *Tephricé*, the paulician citadel. Peter wrote his summary of their dogma and history for use by church-authorities in Bulgaria, whither the paulician and remaining iconoclast ' ironsides ' were sending a mission—later destined to have serious effects in west Europe. All these writers absolutely identify their teachingwith that of Mani. Paul of Samosata (says ' escorial ') was the son of a manichee woman Callinicé ; he and his brother John were despatched as missioners to Armenia (*c. 250*) in this mythical account.

In *684* Constantine IV an Heracliad, sent to suppress the sect but the officer in charge was himself converted and suffered martyrdom in *690*. A son of the chief sectary, Paul the Armenian, is said to have ' converted ' Leo III, the syrian iconoclast in *722* ; there is no doubt whatever that their tenets and aims were very similar. His successor Joseph (*745–775*) securely evangelized Phrygia and died near Pisidian Antioch under the patronage of the reforming empire. Constantine V (Leo's son), *mangeur des moines*, transferred from the eastern frontier (*752*) many sectaries, simple and warlike in character like Cromwell's ' new army ', to Thrace where Alexius I found many steadfast schismatics more than three centuries later. Remains (e.g. at Philippopolis) were discovered not only by Frederic Barbarossa in *1189* but by travellers even in cent. xix.[1]

Annoyed at the very anomalous attack of Leo V (*813–820*), himself an *armenian* and *iconoclast*, the schismatics now enter upon a fifty years' open warfare with the empire. Sergius, their spiritual chief, condemned a policy of resistance or retaliation (like Tolstoy), but few enemies wrought more mischief to Byzantium than Carbeas and Chrysochir. Theodora, Regent for Michael III and the restorer of orthodox image-cult, gave her mind to the overthrow of the sect, but not until the reign of Basil I was Tephricé captured (*873*). Another branch, remaining in Armenia came under the protection of the great Bagratid family and in the centuries

[1] John Zimisces, an *armenian* regent or coadjutor for Basil II, settled a fresh colony at Philippopolis in 969.

between *821–1040* were ruled by seven leaders or 'patriarchs', as the Magistros tell us, Duke of Mesopotamia under Constantine X (*c. 1050*). Gregory of Nark had occasion to write against them *c. 950* and in cent. xi, four armenian writers attacked their tenets, the two Narses, Aristaces and Paul the Taronite. About *1100* they were numerous on the borderland of Christendom and Islam (Cilicia and Syria). The crusaders found them on all sides and called them *Publicani*. A long silence of 600 years by no means implied their extinction as a sect: in *1828* a branch-colony settled in russian Armenia bringing with them the *Key of Truth*.[1]

Section II. Priscillianists and Balkan Schismatics

Converging Streams of Heresy in the West. The Sect of Priscillian.—The factors resisting a visible and autocratic church were too widespread to allow us to trace a single movement developing from any certain centre. It is indeed likely that *gnostic* and ultra-pietistic elements survived in every part of Christendom. We can trace the paulician colonies in Thrace, the connected bogomil movement in Bulgaria, and the affiliation of the western cathars in cent. xi. The manichees had long joined forces with the 'paulians' in the east; and the cathar church of the west is most plainly the product of composite influences. But for the special form of heresy against which the church raged furiously in cent. xiii, it would be unfair to overlook a latent survival of *Priscillianism*. Here as in other displays of *individualist* ethics, appeal was made for a church of the perfect consecrated by the personal holiness of its members (e.g. in abstinence and celibacy) rather than by the virtues of an official hierarchy.

Priscillian, a rich spanish layman, believed that the true life for every believer was unbroken intercourse with God. He laid emphasis (like the paulicians a little later) upon man as a fit abode for the divine, 'Know ye not that ye are the temple of God?' (1 Cor. iii 16). To become such a habitation for the divine mere acceptance by faith is not enough; hard present effort and ascetic practice is needed: marriage is to be shunned as quite incompatible with the higher life. His disciples were called *spiritales* and *abstinentes*. The movement towards *celibacy* was of course strongly supported by Jerome: in *384* there had been a popular outburst in Rome against the 'hindu' *gymnosophists*, monks who declaimed against the married state. Pope

[1] Edited at Oxford by F. C. Conybeare, whose patient research has thrown a flood of light upon an obscure and important subject.

Siricius speaks of these puritan extremists with great scorn. The church, now for more than half a century closely allied with the empire, became a bulwark of the social order, and was rejecting all who (like Donatus) wished to create a small group of 'montanist' elect instead of recognizing a world-wide and inclusive organization. It is difficult to-day to impute definite heresy to Priscillian, since the publishing of eleven treatises by Schepss (Vienna 1885). But he was accused of 'over-goodness', said to have been used as a cloke for magic and libertinage. The first charge is true; he was addicted to occult sciences: the second is the vulgar indictment levelled at all secret or select societies.

The Civil Arm and Condign Penalty for Heresiarch.—Emperor Gratian at first threatened to banish the sectaries (*380*), but on Priscillian's appeal withdrew the ban: his murderer and successor Maximus III (*383–388*) became the first imperial persecutor to the death. Appealing against the sentence of the Synod of Bordeaux (*384*) the leader of the sect was suddenly seized and with six companions burnt alive at Trêves (*385*). The terrible precedent of the stake for heresy had now been set. Though the founder suffered condign punishment (to the grief of Ambrose and Martin of Tours), his views spread in the south of France where the later cathars became dominant: in *412* the bishops of Arles and of Aix in Provence were deposed as 'manichees'. Proclus of Marseilles and the two archbishops of Narbonne and Vienne were also regarded with suspicion as heretical rigorists.[1] The ascetic spirit of the heresy passed, under due churchly supervision, into celibacy and the conventual or strictly monastic system. But the Catholic Church no doubt wisely refused to consider this buddhistic ideal as the duty of every believer and, when it revived again in a schismatic sect, it was never strictly followed except by a very few.

Bogomils in Bulgaria: their 'Paulician' Tenets and Dualism.—Whilst early western 'heresy' had prepared the ground in south-eastern France and left here and there memories and

[1] Besides the first synod of Saragossa in 380 those of Astorga 446 and Toledo 447 condemned this exclusive ideal of Christian life, but the tenets of the sect continued in open practice until the second synod of Braga in 563. Fifteen years after his execution the charges against Pr. were reviewed by the Council of Toledo 400: the most serious *dogmatic* error was said to be his rendering of *innascibilis* for ἀγέννητος: did this imply that he held only a *docetic* or mystical Christ?

perhaps even secret members, the chief influx of anti-hieratic dualism came from the east, across the Adriatic or overland along the Alps. The bogomils of Bulgaria were identified both with the euchites (or massalians) and the later *Pavlikeni* in slavonic writings of cent. xiii. But they rose long before, the connecting link between the sects of east and west : in the latter region they were known as *Bulgari* (or ' bougres ') in cent. xii and xiii.[1] Like the paulicians (of whom they may be held an offshoot) the bogomils combined *adoptianist* with *manichean* tenets : Paul of Samosata, their real founder, they often mistook for the apostle. They seemed to deny Christ's supernatural birth and His prior coëxistence with Father and Spirit ; to refuse value to sacraments, outward rites and ordinances ; to interpret miracles in a mystical or allegoric sense, not regarding them as actual events ; to confer baptism on adults only, sometimes withholding all physical signs (water and unction with oil) ; to hold their assemblies, not in special edifices but in private houses, like our ' prayer-meetings ' ; to elect no priests or ministers in authority, but only ' teachers ' from among their own members, on whom the congregation at large laid hands ; to reject marriage as a sacrament, monachism, fasting on special days, images, crosses and ' idolatrous ' reverence paid to saints and relics. The congregation was composed of the ' elect ' and (as with the paulians) *each member could win the same perfection as Christ* and become like Him a vehicle of the Holy Spirit. For Christ was only Son of God through grace as were the prophets of old ; and they refused to believe that the elements were converted in the Eucharist into His flesh and blood. Both in the original and in its russian branches to the present day, the old *gnostic dualism* is a conspicuous feature.[2] There existed among them

[1] In 1207 the *Bulgarorum hæresis* is named ; in 1223 the Albigenses are identified with the ' Bougres ' of that provençal district, and the Pope of the Albigenses is said to reside within the confines of Bulgaria. From this kingdom went forth, after the destruction of its independence by Basil II (completed by 1020), the missioners into Russia who founded sects (existing to the present hour) like the Strigolniki, Molokani and Doukhobors. The whole slavonic temper is charged with ardent self-sacrifice, indeed love of pain and martyrdom for its own sake ; of which Tolstoy is the most remarkable literary exponent, and the present war of idealism and self-denial (1916) the plainest evidence.

[2] Partly from marcionite influence (shown in the anti-semitic tone of

apocryphal writings, referred to the authorship of notable 'popes' as Bogomil himself or Jeremiah; they contained accounts of the origin of the world and of man, the causes of sin, a scheme of redemption, disputes between fictitious characters (body and soul, good and evil, heaven and hell).[1] Their dualistic theology is of a very primitive gnostic stamp.

Their Gnostical Mythology and Hatred of Church.— God had two sons, Satanail the elder and Michael: the former rebelled and became the Spirit of evil, creating the lower heavens and earth, but unable to complete the creation of man. Therefore on his humble request the spirit of life is breathed in from above. Adam (like a feudal serf) was bound by regular covenant to the fallen ruler and allowed on conditions to till the soil. Michael (the Holy Ghost), in order to save this unhappy race from serfdom, assumes human shape; or is united at baptism as dove with the man Jesus, whom for his goodness God had elected and consecrated. Our Lord had now received power to break the clay-tablet by which Adam and his seed were 'fast bound' to slavery. Satanail is vanquished and obliged to drop the last syllable of his name, the syllable *il* or *el* in which all his virtue and power resided. But he was still able to execute his vengeance and bring Christ to the death of the Cross. The so-called 'catholic and orthodox' Church is the invention of Satan—with its monks, priests, churches, vestments, rites, fastings and sacraments. The true church must therefore keep aloof from an evil world, the work of Lucifer or Satan, the fallen elder son of God; but it does not appear that they carried *ascesis* to extremes. Each community chose its own twelve apostles, women being also eligible for the number of *elect*. There was much magic formula and conjuring of the bad spirits: their travelling priests went about professing to heal the sick, and expel demons: also to spread secretly copies of the curious cryptic writings which (as good catholics said) 'no orthodox person might read'.

Progress and Fortunes of the Sect in Bulgaria and Bosnia.— Bogomilism clung to the mountain-chain of central and southern Europe and radiated from Hæmus along the Carpathians and

the early MSS.), partly from the definite *duplicity* of the light and dark worlds in Mani's system.

[1] These were set forth in the *Paleya* (historic Bible) or in dialogues between Christ and the Apostles or church-teachers.

westward along the Alps and Pyrenees. The two great paulician settlements already named [1] made of the region about Philippopolis the centre of a great propaganda. These long-settled schismatics fraternized with the Bulgars across the border, and converted a bulgarian prince. Bogomil, their eponymous hero, is said to have lived under Czar Simeon (*927–968*) and, both in his case and that of Jeremiah, the slavonic sources plainly insist on their *manichean* doctrine. Missioners were sent into Russia to dispute with the church newly founded there (*1004*) : Adrian a priest was found teaching bogomil, that is, dualistic tenets and was imprisoned by the bishop of Kieff. More than 100 years later Demetrius became preacher of heresy in southern Russia. Spreading to the west, the sect gained ground in Serbia ; Stepan Nemanya tried to expel them about *1185*. Refugees arrived in Bosnia [2] and there gained a hearing under the name of *Patarenes* ; from thence they penetrated into Piedmont. The Hungarians tried to oust the bogomils from Bosnia and did not cease their efforts until the turkish conquest brought tolerance of these peculiar tenets ; indeed, many noble bosnian families accepted Islam with alacrity : there is no vestige of the heresy now to be found in the land, except perhaps in current folk-lore. But in its most ancient strongholds (Philippopolis and Nicopolis) the sectaries remained unmolested until most of them accepted the

[1] Of Constantine V *c.* 750 and of John I Zimisces 2 centuries later.

[2] Their converts included many bosnian nobles or *bolyars* (βοΐλαδες) and even the Ban Kulin 1180–1204 (whose reign covered the interval between the fall of the Comneni and the taking of Byzantium by the 'latin' freebooters) : it is thought that Kulin, who much increased the wealth and commerce of his country, saw in the new faith a valuable barrier against Hungary. But its king Bela III, acting on pope Innocent's suggestion, compelled him to recant. Yet the magnates nearly three years later dethroned the orthodox Stepan to place Matthew Ninoslav, a professed bogomil, in power. Forced by Gregory IX to accept Christian baptism he abjured the detested faith of the church in 1233. He resisted Hungary and orthodoxy for many years ; but was treated with distinct favour by the pope till his death in 1250 owing to the importance of his kingdom during the mongol panic. Then followed 50 years of orthodoxy under direct hungarian suzerainty ; and nationalism came once more to the front with the bogomil candidate for the banate (1322) when Stepan Kotromanic came to power. When the Turks appeared, they were aided by renegade Slavs who were undoubtedly bogomils. (Among bogomil remains in Bosnia may be named the cemeteries of the sect at Foca on the Drina.)

roman faith in *1650*.[1] In Bulgaria the bogomil disputes certainly assisted letters and imagination : under Czar Simeon, John the Exarch wrote an account of a creation (no doubt orthodox) called *Shestodner* or ἑξαήμερον, Cosmas and Athanasius of Jerusalem attacked the growing sect which had just produced the Questions of Saint Ivan Bogoslav on the origin and end of the world. Together with gnostical cosmogonies there also appeared romantic tales and works of fiction, stories of Alexander, of Troy, and of *Barlaam* and *Josaphat* (founded on Buddha's biography.)

The Western Cathars : The World of Fallen Angels.—The Cathars appear in the west about the opening of cent. xi. Plainly affiliated to the bulgarian sects and through them to the paulician communities of Armenia, they held to the *dualism* which marks the doctrine of Marcion and Mani. There was war in heaven and Satan was cast out with his rebel angels, to be imprisoned in material bodies as a punishment.[2] Others held that Satan himself made them ' coats of skins ' for their duties in the new world created by him as a rival to heaven. There are left behind in the upper world the unfallen angel-frames, ' houses not made with ' hands, everlasting tunics '. The evil god Satan is lord of this world and inspired the harsher parts of the Old Testament : he has power over the *outward* man, over flesh and the body of decay. The world is the only purgatory or hell, standing in complete contrast and antithesis to the eternal world, to the *inward* man, and to Christ's kingdom which ' is not of this world '. Our souls here long to regain their celestial tunics, to be clothed upon by the habitation left in heaven at the moment of their expulsion : while ' at home here in the body they are absent ' from the Lord ' (cf. Phil. i 23). Flesh cannot inherit the higher kingdom, and there is no resurrection : the lower nature is irredeemable and must be wholly surrendered.

Deliverance of the Spirit.—Man can however overcome the

[1] Fourteen villages of Pavlikeni near Nicopolis accepted it and one near Bucharest. To-day there are nearly 2,000 roman catholics under two bishops, nearly all descendants of the medieval *Pavlikeni*, chiefly in the neighbourhood of Philippopolis and Sistova.

[2] This belief, slightly differing from the bogomil, is a remnant of the ancient orphic doctrine or at least strongly resembles it : men are ' the ' brood of Titans ' but, inspired by a heavenly strain in them, can overcome their lower and brutal nature and suffer the divine to emerge.

fatal effects of the Fall and leave his prison-house of clay; not by death, for, dying without reconcilement to God through Christ, a soul passes into a new cycle of birth,[1] sometimes being even degraded into the form of a beast. As in Egypt, the sect held that frightful demons, 'dwellers on the threshold', pursue the soul just escaped from the body and force it to take refuge in the nearest body as an asylum. A man must be made a new creature, receive the gift of Spirit as did Christ our example, and become a vehicle for the Paraclete. Christ was a lifegiving Spirit and the *boni homines* (or *bons hommes*) are His envoys upon earth. They alone have the true baptism of the Spirit, which has nothing in common with the Johannine rite of water-immersion: this belongs to the outer world of fleeting show which is throughout hostile to the kingdom of God.

The Two Ranks or Orders: Worship of the Perfect.—There were two classes, the *credentes* and the *perfecti*: the latter formed the ruling class (both men and women), the ordained ministry (as it were) who had received the fullest ritual of *consolamentum*. They had supreme control and exacted not merely unquestioning obedience but actual worship from the faithful, who prostrated themselves when asking for their prayers.[2] They were chosen vessels of election in whom already the Paraclete dwelt; in their hearts was the spirit of God's son, enabling them to cry with assurance 'Abba Father'. They alone were sons 'by adoption' and grace', and alone might use the Lord's Prayer. In curious contrast to the bogomils who rejected church fasting, the cathars abstained on Monday, Wednesday and Friday (using a diet of bread and water only), and kept three lenten periods in the year. The *credens*, under probation for the higher stage, fasted continuously for a year or eighteen months. So rigorous was the life of the *perfectus* that most deferred the final rite which admitted to it until their death-bed. At this point strict celibacy was demanded and the husband separated from his wife. All increase of the human family is in itself evil; the 'forbidden' fruit' was Adam's marriage with Eve.[3] In God's kingdom there

[1] The hindu *samsara*, the orphic doctrine (sanctioned by Empedocles, Pythagoras and Plato) of τροχὸς or κύκλος γενέσεως.

[2] The *credens*, as yet unreconciled to God, could only invoke the living saint and use his powerful intercession to mediate on his behalf.

[3] The *Patarenes* of Milan were specially anxious to impose celibacy on the clergy, about the middle of cent. xi, and no doubt popular clamour,

is no marrying or giving in marriage. Where Scripture seems to sanction and even praise the nuptial state, a mystical meaning was given, referring to Christ and the church. The *perfectus* must leave family and household, which are hindrances to the divine kinship. He may eat no fleshmeat except fish: cheese, eggs and milk were forbidden him. Like the buddhist, jain, or pythagorist he could not eat an animal, because within it a human soul might be serving its term of probation or penalty. He might kill nothing and (as with the Quakers) might not take an oath.

Complete Initiation in Rite of Consolamentum.—The central rite (*consolamentum*) was a spiritual baptism by fire and the Spirit, which Christ promised to send from the Father: it removes original sin, retrieving the evil effect of the Fall, restoring the heavenly habitation, the tunics of immortality with which the soul yearns to be clothed. A *perfectus* after 'consolation' is an angel walking in a dissolving fleshly body and ready to meet the Saviour. In the rite of full initiation the Perfect (who admits the novice like the Master of a Freemason's Lodge) delivers an address calling him (as in Armenia) by the name *Peter*, and explaining the adoption and indwelling of the Spirit in the elect. He repeats and comments on the Lord's Prayer clause by clause. Then comes the Renouncement, not only of Satan and his kingdom on earth but of his babylonish church, its magical rites, carnal baptism, and the sign of the cross impressed on the forehead. A true spiritual baptism follows, with a book of the Gospels laid on the head by the *perfects'* hands; and, while passages of Scripture are recited, the newly admitted brother receives the apostolic power to bind and loose.[1] The ideal standard of a holy life is now set before him; and great stress is laid on non-resistance to evil. Not only shall he love his enemies in the abstract but pardon all severally who do him injury, pray for his calumniators, give mantle or cheek to the violent and refrain from judging or condemning any man. Here once again is an integral factor in the Quakers' practice and probably a permanent element in russian 'heresy' (though we know it chiefly in the west as an eccentricity of Tolstoy). The postulant now demands forgive-

quite as much as the needs of church discipline and policy, obliged Hildebrand to enforce it over Christendom.

[1] Which formed the base of the new hierarchic *clericalism* of the presbytery in Scotland or Geneva.

ness for all his past sins (according to the formula of the primitive church) from God and from the congregation : ' I come for par-'don to God, to the church and to you all '. The closing act is the *consolamentum* in the strictest sense ; the volumes of the Gospel are taken from the white cloth on the table and laid on the head, while all the *boni homines* present place on him their right hand and pray ' Holy Father, welcome this Thy servant and send upon him Thy grace and Holy Spirit ' ; the Lord's prayer and the first seventeen verses of St. John's Gospel conclude the ceremony. The new *perfectus* is girt about the paps with the sacred thread (probably a following of brahman usage), robed in a black gown (afterwards a symbol of anti-hierarchic and protestant ritual), and receives from all present the kiss of peace. The ceremony [1] bears the strongest resemblance to the primitive rite of Ordination.[2]

The Lord's Supper and the Blessed Bread.—As to the Lord's Supper it was rather a blessing of bread than a Mass or Eucharist ; the consecrating prayer was the ' Our Father '. The eldest present says ' Thanks be to the God of Jesus Christ, may the Spirit be with us all ', and distributes to every one ' no one believ-' ing that out of it the body of Christ is made '.[3] This service was held once a month and the *credentes* were present, probably as partakers : the table covered with a white cloth and bearing the Gospels gave it the name *apparellamentum* : the *perfecti* were adored and the kiss of peace imparted. In spite of their distrust of matter and symbols, great efficacy was attached to the *pain béni* ; it was sometimes kept for years, and sent into distant parts whither the *perfecti* could not go themselves : it was tied in white bags and worn round the neck, and on a deathbed might even take the place of the ritual of *consolamentum*.[4]

[1] As Abbé Guirard and F. C. Conybeare very justly remark.

[2] The Bible is still laid on the head of Bachelors admitted to the degree of Master of Arts in our older universities, together with a like invocation of the Trinity by the Vice-Chancellor.

[3] These words are from a contemporary writer in cent. xiii (MS. in Milan Library). The next phrase is curious : ' The *Albanenses* however ' even deny that the bread can be blessed ; or sanctified, because it is ' material ' :—that is, the Albigeois carried to the farthest extreme the *dualism* and *docetism* which looked on the whole world with aversion as a work of Satan.

[4] It is said that Extreme Unction was invented by the catholics to take the place of this final rite,—just as *celibacy* and the *mendicant orders*

PART II

The Dualistic Opposition

CHAPTER VI. DOUBT AND DUALISM INVADE THE THOUGHT OF MONISTIC CHRISTENDOM

Absence of Dualism : but no Direct Recourse to Nature.— If late classical society suffered from ' failure of nerve ' (as Professors Bury and Murray suggest) the new races also, confronted with the still imposing fabric of Rome, certainly grew less self-reliant and assured. They did not admire *individuals* in the decadent empire so much as *institutions*; and medieval realism may well have derived some stimulus from this genuine if unwilling homage to the majesty of Church or State. But the units, who made up the collective group and inherited the tradition, were in themselves often feeble and contemptible. Hence an unlimited respect for the past and a need to lean upon Authority. The world was quite unprepared to betake itself to Nature or to remodel conventions upon its laws and suggestions. There was a general lack of interest in concrete facts; and the eyes of the truest Christians seemed resolutely closed against the charm of the external world.[1] It would however be extremely unjust to dismiss patristic sentiment as *dualist* or manichee. In its estimate of the visible world, it is singularly free from that brooding melancholy which marks the devout stoics and wholly defeats their academic thesis of monism. Whilst it is marked by credulity or a ready welcome for the marvellous, it exhibits nothing of that later *satanism* which in some enlight-

were imitated ; the ban on the reading of Scripture is said by some (e.g. Conybeare) to be a direct result of the ' constant polemic of the cathar ' teachers ' against the character of Jehovah in the Old Testament.

[1] I must here acknowledge my debt to Taylor's interesting and comprehensive work *The Medieval Mind*, Macmillan 1911, which displays great patience, research and sympathy : no doubt, no single author is capable of doing justice to every aspect of a many-sided age, but on the whole his book is a safe guide for the student of an obscure period.

ened countries down to a late date surrendered the world around us to the Prince of Evil.[1] Universal belief in symbolism and allegory enabled the gulf between two worlds to be bridged with success. Every physical or historic event might have a spiritual meaning or counterpart, and divinity shone through the whole texture of the natural universe. The greek Fathers never doubted that, while God is in His essence unattainable, He shows Himself to us in His Creation. In nature He has translated His benevolent energies into a language which we can understand (cf. St. Basil *Against Eunomius* ii 32 and *Epistle* 234). Our world exists only to manifest its Creator; we are led to grasp, by analogy with its wise and beautiful order, the heavenly wisdom and the uncreated beauty (St. Gregory of Nyss, *de infantibus* Patr. Gr. xlvi 181, *Epist.* 20 ib. 1079). Plato and Origen united to teach that between the higher and the lower, the ideal and real, existed the closest affinities and resemblances. Things of sense were used as sign-posts to guide to truth. Some of the best expressions of admiration for the visible world and natural scenery can be found in the greek writers (Basil *Hexa.* iii 10, vi 1; Gregory of Nazianzus *Oratio* xxviii, Greg. Nyss. l.c.). The genial side of platonism—not its most prominent feature—was in St. Austin quite submerged by his manicheism, which infected all his later thought (and so all medieval theology) with a profound sense of sin and estrangement. Hence, here again, he upholds two sides of an antitheton which can in no wise be brought into harmony: God is the sole cause yet man is somehow free and defiant. Though there is but one real potentate, yet the present order is in a sense under the dominion of Satan; yet he is but a rebel servant who even by his rebellion helps to fulfil the everlasting decrees.

Monarchianism: God in Nature and History.—Therefore in nature, all proceeds from God and happens with His consent. In Ambrose *Hexaemeron* (i 6) Creation springs from the direct operation of God's inscrutable will. As in the school of orthodox muslim atomism, this will is the sole cause of all things. No doubt there was a tendency to look beyond the actual to the spiritual of which it was symbol and vaticination. The Fathers did not believe the age of miracles past and so accurate know-

[1] Cf. the remarkable chapters in Buckle—a work wherein the prejudices of rationalism are seen to turn against itself.

ledge of natural law had little interest for them. They were content when such facts confirmed or illustrated Holy Writ, and they accepted the fabulous as readily as the well attested. Certain myths of strange animals or odd events with an edifying moral, were never questioned through the whole period. This belief in the visible as vesture and symbol of the divine had a strong influence also upon politics. Man and the universe were made by God; it was a creation out of nothing and therefore miraculous, depending on no law and arising from no cause except His unsearchable will. God never ceases to direct creation towards the accomplishment of His purpose. In Scripture, this purpose was as fully set forth as man's weakness could permit; and in the last resort the scheme was individualistic and rested upon the individual worth of each immortal soul. This conviction (which Gierke has so well set forth in his *Political Theory* &c. ed. Maitland) forms the complement and the corrective of the speculative realism which placed value in the group (or idea) and not in the units composing it. From these premises the theory of one in *many* proceeds; the unity of Christendom gained by co-ordinating, not suppressing, the varying local usage and franchise. In *history*, as in '*nature*', God's hand was always to be traced. Austin and Orosius are both apologetic historians who desire to show the gradual working out of the divine purpose in the rise and fall of empires. Both nature and man fulfil these designs—the first willingly, the latter whether he will or no. The feebleness or imperfection of nature is not due to failure of loyalty: in his *Anticlaudian*, the fleming Alan of Lille[1] speaks of Nature's anxious care in bestowing her gifts so that the finished work may appear harmonious in every detail. When she desires to invest this work with qualities beyond her power to bestow, she has to appeal to her sisters, who form a heavenly council. Prudence discourses on man's dual constitution, soul and body: Nature and her ministers can create and sustain his mortal part but the soul demands a heavenly Artificer. If we compare this attitude with Plato's, we shall see that there is far less dualism; the notion of an evil world-soul, thwarting God's designs, is entirely absent; nature errs only from defect, not defiance. It is curious to trace the growth of superstition and a belief in a satanic administration of the world: we shall see that bishops of the Caroline Age are far

[1] *Patrol. Lat.*, vol. ccx and *Rolls Series*, vol lix.

more enlightened than the persecutors of the Albigensian Crusade who gave the signal for a terrified attack on witchcraft and heresy.

Monism : in Thought and Politics.—The results of this convinced *monism* are seen in the world of *politics* (as we have already said) and also in the world *of thought*. It was held impossible (in spite of monkish ideals and *external ascesis*) that any divorce could exist between the parts of man's nature. There was one truth only, and revelation (as in Lessing's *Education*) only forestalls the action of reason and gives to *faith* the dogmas which *intellect* can later appropriate—a passage from πίστις to γνῶσις, as in the theory of Clement of Alexandria. The world, thus pronounced *one*, could have but one truth. It is significant that amid all the austinian doctrines of the Fall, inherent taint, weakness of human will and understanding, very little emphasis was in theoretic matters allowed to this disability. How much in the medieval temper is naïvely pelagian and optimistic ! As mankind is really one, so each man is a unity and there can be only an illusory conflict between his faculties. An ultimate antithesis of *faith* and *reason* seemed inconceivable ; this doctrine was reserved for the nominalism which heralds the modern agnostic spirit and its division of life into distinct and separate segments. No doubt it was always felt (even by Roger Bacon) that an interest in the outer world must lead up to higher truths and all study should be ancillary to salvation. But science and religion could not contradict one another ; they were complementary, and Nature around us was full of subtle analogies and allegories which sought to stir us to understand the truth they shadowed forth. Roger's attitude is utterly different from that of his later namesake, who being equally sincere in both realms of religion and inductive knowledge, urges men not to confuse or to attempt to reconcile them but to keep each free from contamination with the other. Of the ultimate unity of *faith* and *knowledge* Scholastic is the proof. It starts from the conviction that only a little trouble is needed to exhibit true philosophy as identical with true religion—Erigena's proposition. Hence the emphasis on logic and dialectic and the notional presentation of dogma, with which modern religion is so little concerned.[1] Hence also the abhorrence felt and expressed

[1] In spite of the plentiful crop of ' harmonies ' of science and faith

for the inevitable compromise of the Double Truth at the close of our period,—a heresy combated with almost as much warmth as antisocial dualism, which in great measure was its natural companion.

Society, as Universe, Continuous.—The whole world was good and belonged to one sovereign ; though, as in society, there were grades and stages of higher and lower. In the hierarchy (which to modern liberty and atomic equality appears so unjust and 'feudal') each member was proud of his rank—not ashamed, as in the case of inferior social status to-day. Peasant risings demanded only the restoration of old rights and privileges, wrongfully suppressed within the memory of man. Only a small section of wild religious communists from time to time shocked the law-abiding spirit of the great mass by inopportune demands for abstract equality. The system of *gradation* was very generally accepted, a principle both Christian and neoplatonic—for Plotinus' emanatism shows that all things issue from God though at different intervals. Of permanent antithesis there is no trace, either between social classes or branches of knowledge, or political ideals, or between the faith and the fullest exercise of reason.

Abhorrence of the Two-fold Truth.—It does not at all appear that the schoolman in attacking the Double Truth of averroism was merely showing a horror of hypocrisy, a hatred of heresy concealed under ironical deference. The medieval spirit, feeling no doubt the certainty of coming rupture between the great political heads of Christendom, was thrown into a genuine alarm by the sudden cleavage between the realms of secular and divine knowledge. Human nature, made one by its Creator and readjusted to itself as well as to God by the work of Christ, was again 'split asunder' as with a hatchet (Anaxagoras). It is idle to repeat the old fallacy that the upholders of Double Truth were foes of faith and the established religion. It is only in a logical theory (quite useless for the practical work of life) that man can to-day contemplate human experience, a unit or a race, as a harmonious unity. Only mysticism can give this immediate assurance ; the practical faith is content to defer attainment of unity, and to work towards it in the various pro-

and the interest shown in some quarters in formal accuracy and dogmatic statement.

vinces of life with different sets of axioms suitable for each. From Protagoras onwards to Francis Bacon and Locke, the 'agnostic', who would rather not examine dogma by reason or analyse his piety too carefully, has been unfairly set down as a hypocrite. The Middle Ages held to the doctrine of unity through stages of proficiency in an unbroken series—each grade or group (as each unit in it) being of value just in its place and because of its special equipment. Averroes (as we saw) had most certainly upheld both the value of religion and its relative truth: of which however philosophy was the final expression. He was no wanton iconoclast and like all serious thinkers at that time would have put obstinate heretics and nonconformists to death. His dual attitude to ultimate matters was perfectly sincere. Siger of Brabant startled the Christian world by his advocacy of the same compromise.[1] Yet we find Aquinas (*c. Gent.* ii 4) asserting the view *quod aliter considerat de creaturis Philosophus et aliter Theologus*. The latter considers them 'so far as there may be 'in them some resemblance to God' . . . 'not after their own 'kind, fire as fire, but rather as representing the divine altitude'. But the former considers what belongs to them according to their own nature. The 'Science of the faith' must not be held incomplete because it passes over many properties of things, as the shape of the heaven or the quality of motion. Philosophy regards creatures *in themselves* and devises its divisions so as to correspond with the different *genera* of things—that is, its supreme task, as in dialectic, is to classify; and although it draws us on from them into a knowledge of God, this thought and interest is last. Faith views the creatures solely *in ordine ad Deum* and from the outset confines itself to this aspect,—or rather first considers them in their relation to God and only afterwards in their own nature.

Confident Rationalism: Logic identified with Ontology.—It was part of this singular assurance that they held *logic* and *ontology* to be one. Reason was fully competent to classify the world of creatures and even the spiritual realm, because the rules and

[1] Mandonnet, *Siger de B. et l'averroisme latin au xiii siècle*, Fribourg 1899 (sec. ed. at Louvain). Dante who seems to hint that he committed suicide (or languished in prison for long before execution *Parad.* x 134) very oddly places him in Paradise side by side with his bitter foe, Aquinas. His death may be placed in 1283–4. Cf. also de Wulf's *Hist. Med. Phil.* Longmans 1909.

procedure of *thought* were also the rules and procedure of *being*. Rather should we say that our thoughts, through Christ, were also the divine thoughts. In them we enjoyed an inlet, not only into the divine categories, but into God's purpose. The astonishing treatise of Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, replaces by daring speculation the obsequious compiling of patristic judgments such as we find in the Caroline Age. In truth, Anselm is even a bolder rationalist than his opponent Abelard: he no longer culls from the 'meads' or 'pantries' of the Fathers but claims (like many other rationalists) a direct revelation 'as God disclosed it to me'. But it was a disclosure to the intellect, not a mystical intuition: Anselm never felt himself to be a purely passive instrument or vehicle of a message. It may be said that logic does not ask if its contents represent *realities*, but only seeks to secure proper conclusions from *assumed* premises. But it never retained this purely formal post as guardian of accuracy in discussion. It was always inclined to pass over or beyond its proper sphere into *ontology* or *metaphysics*. Like the Greeks the schoolmen certainly believed in a correspondence between the necessities of thought or the conclusions of logic and the ultimate truths or realities. Before nominalism arose they did not doubt that the veritable nature of things could be expressed by our thought after patient efforts at precision of statement and definition. 'Anselm' says Kaftan (*Truth Christ. Rel.* Div. i ch. 2) 'on the ground of 'his realism and austinian platonism, overcame all the misgivings 'aroused against dialectic, and just because of this attitude cher-'ished such strong confidence that rational research would and 'must lead to the same results as the faith that rests upon 'Authority'.

Growth of Scepticism during the Period: Protest against Intellectualism.—We can trace towards the end of our period a gradual weakening of this belief. Anselm still ventures to prove the whole of dogma true on speculative lines; but Aquinas has learnt to discern dogmas capable of rational proof from such as depend on a special divine revelation. The being and unity of God philosophy could recognize and prove by the light of natural reason, but trinitarian dogma surpasses human powers to conceive or understand (*c. Gent.* i 3, *Summa* I i 1). Nor can the Incarnation, creation in time, the Sacraments, eschatology, be divined by the unaided mind of man—that is by the mind of

Aristotle as representing the highest non-prophetic development of human faculties. Duns Scotus, though a titular realist, forms a link of connexion between these already diffident theologians and later nominalism. He already announced the principle of the Twofold Truth. He doubted if theology could properly be called a science. He held it in any case to repose on principles of its own, valid only within its province ; and believed it to be *practical* rather than *speculative* in aim and character. Hence Duns' emphasis on the primacy of the will as against thomist intellectualism. Aquinas, the pious aristotelian, never doubted that *theoria* stood above *praxis* : the knowledge of God is the true end of all men (*c. Gent.* iii 25) and therefore the chief good ; not even moral acts and virtues ought to be mistaken for it—the only *summum bonum* is to know God (26–37). It is not the dim and confused knowledge of average men, nor that attained by demonstration, nor that won by faith. It is in the end a gift of God and our full happiness is only secured hereafter by the *visio dei*. But while there is thus surrender to the divine grace and acceptance of the divine bounty, the whole tone is philosophic. For Aristotle, his guide, *dianoetic* virtues enjoy the highest honour, and contemplation is man's chief purpose as it is his chief good. Like the absolutists of our own time (Bradley and A. E. Taylor in his earlier manner) Aquinas believes that our end and happiness cannot possibly lie in a series of moral actions, because this has in itself no completeness and points to a purpose outside themselves (*c. Gent.* iii 34). He gives Aristotle as his authority (i 5) for the statement that man must aspire to the divine through knowledge.

Nominalism Atomic and Disruptive.—Not only then is the true end of man put out of the reach of the great mass of mankind, but it does not occur to schoolmen like Aquinas to consider the proof of religion chiefly in relation to the believer's *personal* faith. Agreeably to the current realism (however tender in

[1] Kaftan very justly says that ' Such principles as that of the Twofold ' Truth signify nothing but the bankruptcy of scientific theology '—that is, Christian faith ratified and confirmed by the speculative arguments of hellenic wisdom. But he does not say that it implies *either* the falsity of a religious creed that will not submit to categories only suited for positive knowledge *or* the hypocrisy of all who use, for different departments of life, different sets of axioms and postulates.

practice towards individuals), God is believed to deal with the unity only through the church, the divinely commissioned collective group: which gives holiness to its members, is not made holy by the sum of their virtues. It is then important only that the church's authority should be justified in the sight of reason-in-general, not brought home to the inmost heart of each constituent. Protestantism, as we know, went to the other extreme and opposed personal faith and the direct accessibility of divine revelation to all outward dogmatic or discipline of an ecclesiastical system. In concluding this section it is well to remark that unlike eastern tendencies the catholic church never surrendered or disparaged its hold on ethical conduct: it never condoned an antinomian who pleaded that works were not really included in the scheme of salvation. No doubt to the active moral life was assigned a lower position than to the monastic and contemplative: no doubt a practical solicitude for their converts prevented the pastors from preaching a liberty which could only become licence. To-day we must recognize that on the whole the catholic church has preserved a control over the general behaviour of the laity to which no protestant communion can lay claim—in spite of the efforts of the presbyterian hierarchs in Scotland and Geneva. Still it remains true that in theory the Christian's supernatural aim does not lie in the plane of simple morality, but in knowledge.[1]

New Antitheses in Law and Politics.—The same gradually increasing rift, the same emergence of *antitheta* not to be reconciled, is seen in the domain of politics and law. No true medieval thinker or reformer until the very close of our period doubted that there existed a *natural law*, lying behind all human convention and positive enactment and having its source in the very

[1] Kaftan l.c, Div. I. ch. iii exaggerates somewhat when he roundly asserts: 'Nothing is known of the truth that to fulfil the divine precepts 'is itself a factor of man's blessedness, and directly promotes growth in 'the knowledge of God': he implies of course that all moral acts (like acts of penance) are hard external conditions of obtaining a quite different kind of reward, and that there can be no pleasure or finality in their performance. 'Obedience is an indispensable condition of blessedness', but by no means the blessedness itself. Hence Kant is nearer to the catholic position than he could have imagined possible, in his rationalist moralism and his (quite medieval) postponement of the recompense of virtue to another life.

nature of God Himself. According as He was conceived either as a magnified earthly monarch or as eternal thought, it was held to emanate from His will (as in Judaism and Islam) or from His reason. But the latter view is far the more prevalent. A knowledge of this law is implanted in the mind of all men because they partake of reason (λογικὰ ζῶα). Of it actual codes are the extended application or paraphrase, sometimes the perversion. By comparison with it their commands must be tested. That it existed nowhere in accessible form did not diminish the devoutness of the stoic, the roman jurist or the Christian. It was best seen in those precepts of universal validity, approved by the agreement of mankind (*consensus hominum*) or law of nations (*jus gentium*). This latter was held to be *jus naturale*, adapted to the circumstances of fallen man, and recognizing unwillingly certain new and evil factors (like war or slavery) which might be modified but not wholly expelled. *Jus divinum* formed yet a third class which was revealed not to secure earthly happiness or social welfare but to further the transcendental end of man. Gratianus believed that *natural law* was to be found in the Law and Gospel, no doubt allowing that much therein contained was beyond it. Roman jurists had developed a rough sketch of a universal ethics, based on the needs of the peregrine prætor and the provincial governors, but also upon a real humanitarian feeling, clearly to be seen as early as the time of Cæsar and Cicero. The *jus gentium* as containing the broadest principles of justice and expediency—no roman could ever become a pure idealist—was held to correspond to the *law of nature*. In Christian times the law and gospel succeeded to this code, inductively reached by dealing with and comparing specific cases between foreign litigants. Pagan ethics were summed up in the two rules, for *personal* and *social* conduct; *honeste vivere, neminem lædere*. Gratian interprets the *jus naturæ* (as contained in Law and Gospel) as the command 'to do as one would be done by', the prohibition 'to do to another what one would not wish to 'happen to oneself'. In *Decretum* I ix (II) he desires to judge all other positive codes by this standard both *natural* and *divine*: 'Nothing is commanded, nothing forbidden by *natural* 'law except what God wills or prohibits; nothing again is 'found in Scripture Canon except what is in the divine laws; 'therefore the divine laws will rest in nature' *divinæ leges natura*

consistent.[1] 'Whatsoever constitutions, whether in church or 'State, are contrary to natural law must be excluded'. It never troubled the minds of these advocates that the greatest problem would be to discover (1) an authorized copy of pure *natural-divine* law, (2) a judge who would interpret and apply it to existing codes. How kindred and harmonious the two spheres of sacred and profane were believed to be is seen in Justinian's words (in *Digest*, ch. i) where jurisprudence is called a science of *divine* as well as *human* matters.

Various Sources of Law: *Democratic* Theory.—But notions about the origin and author of Law had become hopelessly confused by the time of Gregory's pontificate (*600* A.D.). There were three acknowledged sources—God Himself, a people's custom and the ruler's will. However autocratic and purely imperial roman law seems to us, the basis of popular consent and sanction was never forgotten. When in rare moments a ruler or his advisers asked 'By what authority I do these things?' the theoretical answer would be 'because I have received a 'mandate from the people to be their executive and legislative 'magistrate'. Justinian allowed (I 3, 32) that he was bound to recognize not only the edicts of princes but customs and usages approved by the people: the question of possible conflict of the two (as in Sophocles' *Antigone*) did not seem to arise. No doubt an emperor would have pronounced the ἄγραφα νόμιμα—so antique that 'the memory of man runneth not to the contrary' —superior to the provisional statutes of one of his predecessors, which quite probably he might feel called upon to revoke. But while jurists and princes bowed with deference to the confessedly democratic basis of all law, in effect by the time of the Theodosian Code (*438*) both classical citizens and teutonic invaders of the empire were prepared to accept law instead as the edict of a superior, as the *ukase* of a nearly irresponsible sovereign. To this tame surrender of the exercise of unquestioned rights the supineness of the people contributed far more than the tyrannical policy of autocrats. Neither on roman nor teutonic soil did 'peoples' exist, 'folks' each with a tradition and usage of their own. Augustus had ended the discord of Rome and the provinces by allowing civic autonomy (and, in consequence, isolation and

[1] Others read *divine* but the adverb is not so suitable here as the adjective.

exclusiveness), while for imperial matters the master of legions was supreme in his council or camp, after due debate with his staff. No small independent city could understand or visualize the vast questions with which the emperor and his advisers dealt. No body of cosmopolitan nominees had taken the place of the *fæx Romuli* as the 'Roman People'. The idea remained a generous fiction, flattering after the enfranchisement of Atonninus V (*211*) to the feelings of men from Carlisle to the Tigris, but quite harmless as a restraint upon those masterful and laborious rulers whose policy and self-devotion kept culture alive and made social intercourse possible. The teutonic groups again were no longer tribes and families but atomic aggregates of 'kin-shattered men', united for booty or permanent settlement under a chosen leader—who only in later times was transformed into a legitimate king. In neither race was there any longer a body of citizens agreeing on definite points of law or procedure or social aims, or a *corpus* of public opinion coextensive with any area of political power.

In Practice, Monarchical.—As in the present day, democracy was either a regretful retrospect, or an ideal in some few minds, or (far more effectively) a convenient legal fiction to cover autocracy —but actually it did not exist at all. The barbarian nomads knew law only as the express command of their military captain, the royal lawgiver. All his civil power was later based upon his right to allot conquered land to his soldiers—in which practice the teutonic 'feudalism' of the *comitatus* (there were no more pure *gentes*) met and coalesced with the roman autonomy of great provincial nobles. So in the roman empire forty years before the retirement of Romulus 'Augustulus' (in *476*) the code was chiefly thought of as a ruler's mandate.[1] The *Codex* and the *Novels* belonged to this order; they are professedly the command of a sovereign and superior, issuing them without the smallest doubts of his own competency. They were accepted by an age which had become wholly monarchical in its outlook and ideal.

Unity of Christendom under Non-Coercive Leaders.—In spite of the silence, isolation and parochialism of the petty communities

[1] It is noted that Justinian's *Digest* fell still-born just a century later; men could not understand it because it was not the definite order of a prince.

or 'manors' into which Europe was breaking up, some notion of unity was maintained by the church. Belief in Christendom was never quite extinct. The papal monarchy took the place of the abdicated successors of Justinian. The theory was widely held[1] that mankind was an *organism*, an animated body, *corpus mysticum*—like man the unit, of dual nature, soul and body; it needed therefore two kinds of rulers, working in harmony for its double end, the welfare of man in this world and his eternal happiness hereafter. These rulers were not regarded as needing coercive powers for their ecumenical jurisdiction. It was a general belief that secular authority was based only on the evil result of the Fall, that coercive government was due only to sin. St. Austin reviewing all past history—as then known to students—calls the series of world-empires *magna latrocinia*, though he finds some excuse for the roman power which had recently become the patron of the church. Unable to create (even in theory) a consistent political system, men upheld, or rather gave exclusive emphasis to, one of two notions. Two thoughts met and conflicted; in the New Testament the origin of secular power is *Divine*, that is, exists and is justified by God's permission, whereas in imperial theory its source is in the last resort *popular*. In neither theory was it regarded as *unlimited*: God could dispose at pleasure of the kingdoms of the world and the secular ruler was in any case held accountable to the *natural law*, of which his own constitutions like the prætorian edicts were but comments and expansion. There was never wanting an opinion which limited, while it consecrated the kingly power—that a ruler was the people's nominee and representative. It was always held that by the *jus gentium* each nation had a right to choose its own prince, or indeed, its own form of government.

Double Aspect of Civil Power: Divine and Representative.—Kings thus had a dual aspect—whether as the elect of heaven, trustees of a divine estate, pastors of God's flock, or as chosen magistrates of a free community. In the one case the Church, in the other the Estates—an outcome in part of roman *collegia*—watched jealously over the executive power and its possible encroachments. Law, both in making and application, long remained the property of the people, even when roman tradition

[1] An attempt which has been revived in our time by Herbert Spencer and by certain upholders of the State, as ethical and spiritual.

(never quite obsolete) invested the new kings with something like the absolutism of Cæsar (e.g. under the Merwings). For the Anglo-Saxons law was not a royal duty but rather a matter for the popular courts (cf. Taylor *Med. Mind*, I 142). Almost the sole aim of early barbarian codes is to check the blood-feud and its wasting effects on a spirited community; its unique object was to keep the peace, which only by degrees came to be looked on as the king's. A fixed table of values (*wergeld*) and the intervention of the State withdrew the right of private vengeance and retaliation from the *sippe* or pledged brotherhood (whether of kinship or association). This makes for order and a pacific settlement of disputes, such as guarantees greater freedom for the unit: order and liberty go hand in hand. But the old tribal sanctions are dissolved; the close mutual dependence of kinsmen is a thing of the past. The average man (as in our own day) is free, but only to choose a new master. The ultimate gainer will be the new monarchy and the new State which, having broken up the intermediate groups and burst the fetters of tribal and local custom, binds the now incoherent mass of the subjects to itself by indissoluble ties.

Compact as Basis of Authority.—Christendom was a unity in multiplicity, for no attempt was made to make government and constitution uniform by any of the princes who brought some method and central control into the conflicting and overlapping polities. In spite of its theory, the practice of the western world was centrifugal down to the last century in our period. The realm of Charles was 'misjoined and unrelated . . . galvanized' into a temporary activity', relapsing into chaos when the purposeful will was removed. 'No single Government' says Taylor with truth, 'save when temporarily energized by some extraordinary 'ruler, could control such enormous and widely spread regions'. Instincts were in general purely parochial or manorial; and the closing of facilities for intercourse created purely local societies in place of a large cosmopolitan culture under the roman empire. Here once again the church and chivalry were more effective than government in bringing men into some kind of sympathy. In these tiny communities, in spite of occasional brutalities, manorial government rested on some contract of which 'custom' was the outcome. The Middle Age is the great period of *elective kingship*, although as under the roman empire there was a

natural tendency to crystallize into dynasties and close the avenues of democratic ambition, quite as much for the public good as for the selfish purpose of the great families already in possession. Compact with a ruler was a widely accepted notion and found its authority in the book of Samuel. No family claimed an absolute or irrevocable plenitude of power until the Hohenstaufen; everywhere else people or overlord or church had rights of restraint or deposition over a governor who exceeded or abused his mandate. The duties of an executive were confined, it must be remembered, within very narrow limits; and we may (without fear of denial) pronounce medieval society, down to a very humble stratum, to be essentially *self-governing*, to an extent quite inconceivable to the bureaucrat or the subject of the modern State. Government was in fact a court of last appeal, only to be invoked when all normal means of usage, tradition, arbitrage had been exhausted.

Absolute 'Monarchies' at close of Period: Influence on the Modern State.—This period however witnesses (chiefly towards its close) a steady increase in the claims put forward for absolute monarchy—whether of papal or secular autocracy. For a brief space perhaps under Frederic Barbarossa it was believed that the empire might provide the unique commonwealth under a single head; but it lacked machinery and officials, it was without tact or conciliation—it was not even master in its own house. The failure of the emperor to overpower the Lombard League or come to terms with the new industrial movement, sounded the knell of idealistic imperialism and gave presages of all our modern problems. His son and grandson renounced dreams for reality and confined their interest to a definite region. They were kings within an 'impersonal' district whose resources they developed to the best of their power; they were not leaders of men and the close personal tie between ruler and subject disappears. In spite of the theatrical prominence of certain royal figures, the real success of the centralizing movement is due to anonymous forces. As to-day, the sovereign became the stalking-horse either of ambitious trade-interests, discontented but powerful classes, or political adventurers. The people at large, no doubt saved in some cases from petty tyrants, were in most others deprived of their natural friends and protectors. Their franchises were curtailed and their burdens increased: the

manor dues and royal subsidies had before been settled on the principle *ne varietur*, but the greed of the new State was as insatiate as its needs were urgent. It assumed functions to which nothing but a central and unlimited autocracy could do justice; and it has to the present hour followed a consistent policy of expelling all competitors and counterchecks by which its unique initiative was thwarted. Ignorant historians have been pleased to see in the 'constitutional' movement a victory of freedom over personal tyranny; future chroniclers will probably see in this nothing but the tightening of fetters and the substitution of a genuine for a feeble and apologetic autocracy. We have at the present hour no doubt a conflict between right and wrong, between the frankly un-moral State and the State which still feels bound by certain ethical restraints. But the two ideals which are fighting are in effect the same; both are forms of *militant efficiency*. The industrialism of Germany has invoked the medieval caste of feudalism under an emperor who last of all european monarchs has come into his prerogative. But the Socialist State has the same ends in view, even if it pursue them in a more scrupulous spirit. It is pathetic to read two motions at a recent meeting of trade-unionists,—that Prussian militarism must be crushed; that the State must in future control this and that department of human life. Is it really supposed that autocracy in any form can be other than evil or that its methods will perceptibly differ? To no class of men can unlimited authority be safely permitted; history clearly proves that it has been best administered by kings who are responsible with their persons than by committees or bureaucrats who are not. But the active monarch is an exception in history, and power usually falls into the hands of the anonymous cliques and whig oligarchies. Of these results the Angevins and Hohenstaufens were the earliest sources and examples. They were aided by those who hated or distrusted the Church, by the commercial class who chafed against the restraints of feudal customhouses and the wastefulness and disorder of petty wars, by the supporters of an idealized roman autocracy, by the admirers of the petty municipal franchises of the greek cities, by democratic writers like Marsilius who upheld, as against any limiting power, the absolute supremacy of the secular State. All these parties joined in heaping power upon the ruler; law, once an edict of God imparted to the

reason of mankind, became the command of a sovereign and the interest of the stronger; and society as a whole moved slowly away from an ethical mooring and advanced to the position in which we find it to-day.

Summary.—We have attempted in this chapter to examine the medieval tendencies towards theoretical unity and the opposite currents which submerged them. The chief problem for their statesmen and thinkers was to arrange all the departments of life under a single set of axioms, themselves derived from the Christian faith,—to subordinate all activities to a single aim, the eternal welfare of men. It was never doubted that this was the duty of all pastors and governors in church and civil life; hence both the neglect of worldly injustice and the painful persecution of heresy which startles our sensitive modern conscience. Hence too that abhorrence of dualism which brought into the platonic continuity of the world-process a crude antithesis, — that fear and suspicion of the Twofold Truth which is a commonplace to the modern mind. It has been seen that without any direct or inductive 'interrogation of nature' the world outside was regarded as a divine creation and symbol; and the natural reason, while needing divine grace for its final perfection, was adequate of itself to discover God and understand His mysteries. No ultimate antithesis was conceived between *faith* and *reason*, any more than between the *spiritual* and *civil* heads of Christendom. The present life was a prelude and necessary discipline for the life of true blessedness in heaven. In every department there is seen what may be termed a *monarchianism* in *duality*. Society like the Universe was a continuous whole: a graded hierarchy of class and station presented no real difficulties, when each order (even the humblest) had both rights and duties of which it was proud. Into this ideal (for it was never realized in actual life) came the disintegrating forces whose influence we have to trace. Into the assured intellectualism of the Schoolmen there creeps a note of doubt—not so much of the dogma of the creed, but of the human arguments which were used to support it. The period ends in the victory of doubt, pious or otherwise, over a complacent rationalism based on a platonic 'theory of 'Forms'. Nominalism is seen to be a necessary outcome of an age discontented with a premature unification of life. It was atomic and disruptive, corresponding to the small regional auto-

cracies which rose on the dissolution of the old Christian monarchy. It confined man in effect to his own personal experience and advantage—whether of soul or body. It might be intensely devout, it might develop into a wholly anarchic and iconoclast temper. But it no longer believed in the objectives. Morality ceased to be a concern of the new secular government—a fact to which we have persistently closed our eyes of recent years, only to suffer a rude awakening. In place of a law of nature, really in its origin divine, is the conception of law as the will of a master, the interest of the stronger (whether one or many); in place of an ethical ideal the modern State obeys only the adage *Salus Reipublicæ Suprema Lex.* Meantime, the judgment of what constitutes this salvation of the community rests on no general opinion of the subject class but is confined to the competence of a ruling group, growing with every extension of science more irresponsible and coercive. In the matter of the helplessness of the people, naturally ethical, against such rulers, the transference of supreme power from one to many and from many to one brings no respite or consolation. Of the beginnings of this new commonwealth, of its aims and policy, the close of our period gives us authentic details.

APPENDIX B

Waldenses

The Waldenses are first met with in southern France after the middle of cent. xii (*c. 1170*) and in the reign of Emperor Frederic I. We know of them chiefly from reports of enemies or the records of prejudiced tribunals. They had few documents of their own and no confidence can be placed in their later attempts (cent. xvi) to create a literature claiming to be early and authentic. The church and people tended to 'syncretize' heresy and to thrust together various sects under a single sentence of condemnation. But even allowing for this we cannot divorce the Waldenses who have happened to survive till to-day, from the medieval *dualists* of the school of Cathars or Manichees. Here once again it may be stated that the basal doctrines of this chief heresy are *inwardness* founded on dogmatic *dualism*, strong protest against all *outward* or official authority and a rich and secularized church, a severe ascetic ideal which (as in the gnostical sects) easily passed over for most men into antinomian indifference and left the work of maintaining a standard, too lofty for most converts, to a very small and highly venerated body of elect. It is not doubtful that this movement spread along trade-routes and by means of commercial relations, that it appealed chiefly to the burgess class at the moment

when the *Commune* was regaining its franchises in France and Italy (*c. 1025–1100*). Catharism 'forms the abiding background of medieval 'heresy' says Bishop Creighton with truth. The 'outer ring' of *credentes* were no doubt ignorant of the extreme views held by the *perfecti*. Ordinary hearers must have regarded their public preaching and example as a reforming agency, as the true ideal of Christian life, not as the overthrow of Christian dogma or as a menace to morality. Wherever discontent formed against a worldly church and unworthy ministers, it was forced to ally itself with this widespread dualism. All sects in the end were driven to borrow something from the Cathars.[1] 1099–1118

Almost at the same moment that Pascal II was suggesting the surrender of church estates, a monk of Zeeland (*1110*) asserted, with Novatian and the Donatists of old, that a 'sacrament was only valid if the minister was 'holy'. Peter de Bruys at Embrun denied the change of substance in the elements, rejected the use of churches, infant baptism, and prayers and masses for the departed: the Henricians (followers of Henry of Lausanne, his disciple) collected at Tours, whence Berengar had come a century before, to propound the purely symbolic and spiritual character of the Eucharist. The reforms of Gregory VII had not produced the expected results; the church was more deeply attached to the world than before, and thinking men demanded as guides men of holy lives rather than of authentic credentials and official commission. Peter Waldo was a rich Lyons merchant who gave up his goods, as Pope Pascal II had not been allowed to do, and went forth to preach that apostolic *poverty* which was later to become the watchword of the stricter Franciscans. He expounded Scripture somewhat freely, was forbidden to continue by Alexander IV and excommunicated by Lucius III (*1184*). Some of his followers became reconciled to the church and others were swept away in the Albigensian Wars. The sect bearing the founder's name was expressly banned in the great Council of the Lateran (*1215*). Driven from the busy centres of traffic the sectaries took refuge in the secluded fastnesses of Piedmont.

According to Sacconi's account of their opinions (*1250*) the Waldenses were of two groups, of which the *lombard* was the more extreme: the *alpine* and french branch held that oaths and capital punishment were unlawful, that the Roman Church is not Christ's Church, and that any layman without commission may consecrate the Sacrament. The lombard section (following the monk of Zeeland in *1110*) denied that any priest guilty of mortal sin could consecrate, held as naught all fast days and festivals, and identified Rome with Babylon and the Scarlet Woman in the Revelation. At the Bergamo Conference (*1218*) this branch showed more hostility to an organized priesthood than the ultramontane division. They were therefore more *democratic* than the Cathars. For there was no official priesthood and all were allowed to preach without distinction of age or sex. Each member of a congregation might sit to judge the works and conversation of the acting ministers; on their collective approval

[1] Hildebrand did not scruple to enlist the puritanism of Milan and the zeal of Patarene sectaries against simony and a married clergy.

depended the value of the Sacraments. Therefore with complete logic they withdrew from the ministry of the church and chose ministers whose merits the faithful recognized: '*election* took the place of *ordination*' (Creighton); in place of a magic faculty transferred by apostolic succession, a public vote decided who was the best spokesman of the congregation and the best example before their eyes of a holy life.

In *1530* a letter to Œcolampadius (on the question of union with the swiss and german reformers) contains certain details which show that a very simple community had grown up entirely surrendering the 'esoteric' and dualistic tenets which had marked the primitive phase. In a measure reconciled to the church of Rome, they accepted the Sacraments from the regular priesthood, but held to their own private discipline and had their own meetings for edification.[1] The *barba* (or ministers) were labouring men, set apart at the age of 20 and receiving instruction during the winter months for 3 or 4 years, finally serving as menials in a waldense nunnery for 2 years. Ordained by the laying-on of hands, they went forth in pairs like the evangelists of the gospel. Celibacy was the rule but it was allowed to be the cause of some abuses and scandals. They visited all within their district, heard confession and gave spiritual advice, in return receiving food and raiment. According to apostolic example, they also worked with their own hands. The sect by this time acknowledged seven sacraments but allegorized their import: they prayed to the Blessed Virgin and the Saints and admitted (as we saw) auricular confession. On the other hand they denied the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist and the doctrine of purgatory; they refused to observe Catholic fasts and festivals. They show that Luther's teaching on God's *foreknowledge* and *human freewill* much perturbed them; true to the archaic connexion of all such sects with Adoptianism, they held that *men did good works through natural virtue* with Pelagius, and added (as an afterthought) *stirred and assisted by divine grace.* 'Thus the Vaudois' says the bishop 'ceased to be 'relics of the past and became absorbed in the general movement 'of Protestantism'. Yet they still continued to excite among Catholics the same vindictive and resentful terror which attached in our period to an esoteric creed.

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[1] It is to be noted that Œcolampadius highly disapproved of the outward conformity and partial submission to the priesthood which they had inherited from their earliest gnostic forefathers in cent. ii: 'God is a 'jealous God and suffereth not His Elect to put their necks under the yoke 'of Antichrist'.

CHAPTER VII. HISTORY OF CATHARS AND ALBIGENSES

Section I. Struggle of Authority and the Sects to 1330

The earliest Cathars who suffered at the hands of Authority appeared at Limousin in the second decade of cent. xi *c. 1012–1020*: some were put to death at Toulouse in *1022*, where also their doctrine was formally condemned by a church council *1056*. In *1101* Raoul Ardent, and in *1114* Robert of Arbrissel, were invited to this district to preach against Catharism. But, as in Bulgaria and Bosnia, the sect had already found noble patrons and protectors, such as William IX Duke of Aquitaine, and a *second* Council of Toulouse *1119* demanded the aid of the secular arm in vain. Meantime two zealous evangelists, Peter of Bruys (hence Petrobrusians) and Henry of Lausanne (whence Henricians), had further excited popular feeling in Perigord, Languedoc and Provence against the Church. There can be no doubt that the masses entertained genuine respect for the simple and ascetic enthusiasts, the *bons hommes*, who attacked the wealth, abuses and formalism of the establishment. An older stratum of the populace may well have contained latent seeds of old gnostic sects and remnants of the Priscillians. The temper of the south in culture, social intercourse and religion, was wholly alien to the less refined but more docile frankish kingdom of the north; and between the two there exists even to-day a total lack of sympathy. The southern courts were the centre of a brilliant and in some respects pagan society, and it was here that the first distinct protests against Rome were clearly heard. Very different reasons urged noble and peasant to favour the new or revived sect of Cathars. The one resented the supervision and envied the riches of churchmen; the other contrasted the earnestness of the 'colporteurs' with the worldliness of time-serving priests. If the peasant demanded a purer creed and worship, the noble wished to be relieved from all restraint, as can

be proved from the annals of Troubadours. The begging itinerant gospellers (to whom the Mendicants stood both as a reaction and a copy) were exactly to their taste ; they asked for no earthly recompense and kept the people quiet. It is however likely that there was another side to this quakerlike submissiveness. The chief 'anarchist doctrine' of the Cathars may have been their refusal to take oath ; but it is certain that, by large sections of the people as well as by the authorities, they were regarded as conducting an anti-social propaganda. Any secret society is suspected in an ignorant and yet earnest age : there is no doubt that the crime of Philip the Fair against the Templars was largely condoned even by moderate men. The church and civil power merely carried on the apprehensive policy of the roman empire against unrecognized forms of faith and usage. The preachers made no pretence of conciliation ; and in denouncing the Catholic Church were not careful of their language. The result was not merely a long smouldering quarrel, as between papists and orangemen to-day ; but a serious civil war in which religion played only a restricted part and the ultimate prizes fell, not to Rome but to french monarchy and the new central State. In the last scenes of the Albigensian Crusade a crushing blow was dealt, not only at a highly refined culture and at a curious survival of anti-christian teaching, but at the whole feudal system of local franchise and autonomy.

In *1147* Eugenius III sent his friend and counsellor St. Bernard on a second mission of remonstrance and conciliation, of which the success was trivial. Nearly twenty years later (in *1165*) we find catharist teachers and catholic priests meeting on equal terms at Lombers to discuss points of doctrine and practice,—just as Catholics and Donatists met and disputed in Africa. The zenith of power was reached by the sect or community in *1167*, when at St. Felix Caraman (near Toulouse) a great synod was held undisturbed, in which deputies sat from Languedoc, Italy and the remote mother-land, Bulgaria. Cardinal Peter (once bishop of Meaux) tried in vain to refute the tolosan heresy in *1178* ; Cardinal Henry (formerly abbot of Clairvaux) laboured in vain in *1180–81*, but he attempted the first armed attack on a sectarian citadel at Lavaur. The stronghold fell and the viscount of Béziers, the patron of the sectaries, was forced to submit and make his peace with the church : but this defect had but

slight consequence. Meantime Councils had thundered in vain, at Tours (*1163*) and at the Lateran (*1179*). Innocent III decided to extirpate the movement, first by sending a *third* mission into the plague-stricken district under two cistercians Guido and Regnier (*1198–99*) and a *fourth* in *1203* under Raoul and Peter de Castelnau and (somewhat later) under Arnold, abbot of the Cistercians.

Now appeared another and perhaps unexpected factor in the opposition to Authority. Besides nobles and people, the diocesan prelates strongly resented the claims and the methods of these exceptional commissioners and papal plenipotentiaries. In *1204* the pope, in order to leave the field free for his own envoys, suspended the southern bishops from their functions. In *1207* Peter excommunicated Raymond VI, count of Toulouse, as aiding and abetting the heretics and in *1209* was murdered. At this Innocent bade the Cistercians preach the Holy War against infidels no less dangerous to faith and society than the muslim. This was waged for twenty years (*1200–1220*) and ended (as we have said) in the overthrow of provençal culture and the end of feudal independence for Béziers and Toulouse. Even then the heretics [1] found asylum under the new count of Toulouse (Raymond VII) and the count of Foix ; like the ' mass-priests ' under Elizabeth, the *bons hommes*, now proscribed by the law (*faidits*), found shelter both in castle and hut. It must be remembered that the number of these *perfecti* was relatively small ; the *credentes* or proselytes and novices formed far the greater part and were probably ignorant of the *gnostic dualism* which underlay the catharist theology : these were allowed (like sectaries under the pagan empire) to conform and compromise but under promise and covenant (*convenanza*) to become heretics and receive the *consolamentum* sometime before their death. Thus the ascetic rigorists who sought to escape this evil life by

[1] Who after 1180 seem to have been generally styled *Albigeois* or *Albigenses* ; the name first occurs in the chronicles of Geoffrey de Vigeois. But in spite of this title connecting the sect with Albi (*Albiga*) the head-quarters always continued at Toulouse which is nearly 50 miles south-west. The Viscounty of Albi was a fief of Toulouse ; but there was a duel for supremacy between viscount and bishop, in which the latter won. The lay-lord's estates were given to Simon de Montfort and later passed to the french crown. The convention of 1264 gave to the ' prince-bishop ' of Albi the chief secular power within the city.

starvation and the *endura* were at all times few in number; but they were the objects of an adoring reverence from the people and one cause (by steadfast example and unceasing protest) of the special reforms in the Catholic Church between *1050–1250*. The Inquisition continued its work during the whole of cent. xiii with central offices at Toulouse, Carcassone and Albi. The nobles of Languedoc rose in revolt against these strenuous measures (*1240–42*) and the burghers of Narbonne (*1234*) and of Toulouse (*1235*) tried in vain to expel the papal officers. In *1245* the officers and troops of the French king seized Montségur and burned 200 Cathars in a single day. Severe reprisals were threatened against all laymen suspected of sympathy with the sect (Council of Narbonne, *1235*); Papal Bull *Ad extirpanda*, *1252*). In *1298–99* the preaching of Peter Authier for a moment revived the zeal and drooping fortunes of the Cathars; and a revolt more political than religious broke out against the french tyranny[1] under the two Bernards and Almeric (or Amaury) of Narbonne (*c. 1301*). This outbreak was followed by fresh and untiring activities on the part of the Inquisitors, Bernard of Caux and others. With such success were their efforts crowned that after *1330* there are few notices of proceedings against Cathars in the archives of the Holy Inquisition.

Section II. Growth in Theory and Practice of Religious Persecution

The Tolerant Roman Empire set the Example.—Having now reached this central event in the medieval conflict of Authority and Free-Thought, it is time to inquire into the motives and causes of persecution for matters of conscience and belief.[2] It

[1] The strongly political and 'nationalist' character of the movement is seen in this saying: 'Clergy and French, they are one and the same thing'; the priests were regarded as emissaries rather of french absolutism than as servitors of the papacy. We are reminded of the complaint of the Trasteverini in Rome (not long after 1870): when the new monarchy increased taxation, these heirs or remnants of the ancient Romans believed it was the work of the French; and declined to distinguish between the Piedmontese and the nation which for so many years had upheld the temporal power against the attacks of Piedmont.

[2] Only of late years has it been possible to review the past with an unbiassed survey, to transport our mind without undue rancour and prejudice into an atmosphere so unfamiliar: Buckle and Lecky are quite

is now clear that it was not the Roman Church which hurried reluctant civil officers and a humane populace into a policy of savage repression, but that the first move came from the nervous apprehension of the secular authority and the panic of a mob. The roman emperors had been much in earnest (at least by edict and ordinance) in stamping out *manicheism*, whether because of the awful blasphemy that identifies God and the devil, or because of the secret anti-social aims suspected in all such world-renouncing sects.[1] The Manichees were specially singled out for capital penalties in the laws against heresy or schism, and the usual humanity of the most tolerant princes was suspended in their single case. Until the pagan attack ceased, Christian opinion shows no trace of a desire to compel faith by violent means. Constantine was clearly reluctant to interfere by means of the civil arm in the matter of Donatism. The savage and orthodox Valentinian I was perhaps the earliest prince to begin a coercive policy [2] which Theodosius and his son Honorius found it advisable to continue. In little more than half a century there were sixty-eight enactments against heresy, with penalty of exile, loss of property, and in the case of the followers of Mani and Donatus [3] of death. But these sanctions only applied to overt acts, not to private opinion and belief. Yet how laxly these laws were applied may be seen in Austin's case: the manichees were certainly not hunted and punished in fact, however fierce the laws which had been registered in the statute book.[4] Against

right in referring our modern *tolerance* in matters of conscience and religion to a growth of doubt or indifference,—and (we may add) to a comparative unconcern for other individuals and their welfare, which can exist side by side with (and is perhaps indirectly fostered by) a great interest in *classes* and a humanitarian dislike of punishing or inflicting pain on *persons*.

[1] Innocent III found adequate ground for suspicion of heresy in 'leading a solitary life, refusal to conform to prevailing habits and manners' and frequenting unauthorized assemblies'. This is a good instance of the fear of over holiness or 'unco' guidness' which was a leading motive throughout.

[2] Though Constans and Constantius I are not wholly free from blame, and by this time the arian dispute had embittered men's minds.

[3] This latter sect were treated more severely on grounds of active sedition and riotous conduct.

[4] Austin (as we saw) recognized the need of *temperata severitas* (fine, exile or whipping) for the turbulent donatists: Optatus of Milevi is the only catholic writer who approves of their repression by every means (*De Schism. D.* iii 3).

Emperor Maximus' hasty sentence upon Priscillian, a protest was raised both by Martin of Tours and Ambrose of Milan which found an echo even in Rome itself (*385*). In the east, John Chrysostom held it 'an inexpiable crime' to put to death for heresy, though he thought that heretics should not be allowed freedom of meeting or speech. During the so-called Dark Ages (*c. 550–1000*) we do not find any traces of coercive policy; and the tolerance of the foremost Caroline bishops throws light on an age often misunderstood.

Rare Precedents for Severity: Violence of the Mob and Protests of the Episcopate—Towards the year *1000* the disciples of a certain Vilgard of Ravenna, supposed to hold manichean tenets, were destroyed in Italy and Sardinia by 'fire and sword' (Raoul Glaber). It is very possible that this gave a precedent for the memorable *auto da fé* in Orleans (*1022*) under orders from Robert the Pious, king of France. After this date examples of burning and strangling criminous heretics are not wanting in Germany and Italy, France and England: but it is always the civil power that intervenes, and the part played by churchmen is ambiguous right up to the year *1200*. While the cathar *bons hommes* won the hearty liking and respect of one section of the people, they undoubtedly managed to rouse the most furious panic and hatred in another. As under the pagan empire, it was largely the mob that forced action upon rulers: at Orleans it was the people who were directly responsible (though the king gave his sanction), as also thirty years later at Goslar (*1051*) in Germany; in neither case is the part played by the bishops at all clear, except that they made inquiry into doctrine upon the demand of the State. At Asti (Italy) in *1034*, the bishop's name is found among the rulers who attacked the Cathars, but he certainly did not take the foremost part in the proceedings: at Milan the magistrates—against the will of the archbishop—gave heretics the single option to adore the Cross or die. Theodosius, bishop of Liège, is noted as the only churchman who affirmed that the duty of the secular arm was to punish heretics severely (*c. 1050*); and his predecessor, Wazo, had expressly condemned any capital punishment and urged his brother of Châlons to be content with peaceful methods of conversion. In the next century Peter the Cantor, afterwards bishop of Paris (+ *1197*) protested against the death sentence. The Councils were equally cautious and reserved in calling in the

aid of the civil power: at Reims (*1049*) the obstinate heretic is to be excommunicated; at Reims again a century later (*1148*), at Toulouse (*1119*) and the Lateran (*1139*), the need of *potestates exteræ* is acknowledged and secular princes are forbidden to give heretics asylum, but there is no mention of the capital penalty. In *1163* the Council of Tours suggested the definite penalties of prison and confiscation. At Soissons (*1114*) it is expressly stated that the mob were afraid of the tenderness or indulgence of the clergy, and burnt heretics during the bishop's absence: and in *1149* it was again the infuriated mob who burnt the iconoclast Peter of Bruys. Earlier at Liège (*1144*) the bishop saved certain heretics from imminent death at the people's hands; at Cologne (*1163*) the archbishop tried to do so in vain, the mob insisting on execution before trial. In *1155* occurred the case of Arnold of Brescia who, although 'delated' by the untiring Bernard of Clairvaux to the civil power, was executed as a political offender and a traitor. Even against this act of imperial justice the Abbot Gero of Reichersperg (+*1169*) issued a remonstrance suggesting prison or exile as a more fitting penalty; and St. Bernard himself in dealing with northern heresy at Cologne never suggested or approved the extreme rigour of the law.

Reluctant and Late Adoption of Rigorous Policy.—A vigorous policy on the part of churchmen seems to begin at Vézelay where (*1167*) for the first time perhaps heretics were burnt after a clerical sentence pronounced by abbot and bishops. In the last twenty years of cent. xi, savage measures of repression were taken in the diocese of Auxerre and of Reims: in the one, Bishop Hugh (*1183–1206*) took on himself very wide powers indeed, and in the latter, William the archbishop, acting in concert with the court of Flanders, burned heretics without scruple or pity. But the definite recognition of rigorism may be referred to the opening years of cent. xiii and the pontificate of Innocent III: henceforward trials and sentences were to follow a strict policy of 'canonic and legitimate sanctions'. Justinian's severe clause against the manichees was repeated word for word by Anselm of Lucca and Ivo of Chartres.[1] While Gratian in his *Decretum* limits the penalties (with St. Austin) to exile or mulct, his commentators declare boldly that impenitent heretics ought to be punished with death. Lucius III took measures with

[1] If he is, as is averred, the author of *Panormia*.

Emperor Frederic I to stamp out heterodoxy, first excommunicating and then handing culprits over to the secular arm for such civil penalties as was judged fitting : the emperor laid them under the imperial ban (exile, loss of property and of all civil rights). It is said that in *1194* Raymond V of Toulouse enacted [1] the death-penalty against the unwelcome heretic refugees who had made his country their headquarters. It is likely that Peter II of Aragon, first of western sovereigns, decreed death by burning (*1197*) against those heretics who did not leave his kingdom by a certain date. In the next year (*1198*) Innocent III began his serious and deliberate policy of extermination. His juristic mind could assimilate heresy to high treason (with its appropriate sanctions) and he urged the secular rulers to the severest measures (*1199* and *1207*). Laymen and clerics acted together in Paris under the command of Philip Augustus, in sentencing to the fire the disciples of Amalric (*1209*). By this time the civil and ecclesiastical mind was thoroughly roused either by panic, righteous indignation or a sincere desire to save souls hereafter, by meting out the extreme punishments here. Henceforward but rare and timid voices are raised against the most condign punishment of heretics.

Influence of the Hohenstaufens : Frederick, Innocent, and the Inquisition.—Yet even in the Council of Toulouse (at the end of the long Albigensian wars, *1229*) we find no defined policy or organization, while the due procedure was still uncertain and varied in different regions. In the first quarter of cent. xiii besides the fiery death of disciples of Amalric in Paris, executions took place at Strasburg and Cambrai, at Troyes and Besançon, after *ecclesiastical* trials.[2] It was the 'free-thinker' Frederick II who in the clearest and most incontestable manner enacted *death*, banishment and confiscation against heretics within the Empire (*1220–1230*). There is every reason to believe that he influenced Honorius III and Gregory IX in the direction of harshness. The dominican bishop of Brescia—on this point

[1] But some competent critics have denied that the law is genuine.

[2] This assumption (or at least control) of *secular* power was based on a vague permission in decrees of Louis VIII and IX (1223–1272) *animadversione debita* or *quod debebunt*, where discretion was certainly given to the *baillis* and (perhaps) the death-sentence was not contemplated in the lesser courts without further authority from above.

a sound wibelline—subjected his see-town to the fullest rigour of Frederic's decree. It was Gregory who under these influences was finally induced to organize that great lever of orthodoxy—the monkish Inquisition, chiefly recruited from the dominican order as more learned and austere, as more familiar with corporate discipline. In *1232* the monk Alberic made a tour of Lombardy in the character of *inquisitor hæreticæ pravitatis*: about the same time Conrad of Marburg [1] received a like commission, and Gregory in *1233* wrote to the bishops of southern France, announcing his purpose of employing in future only members of the preaching orders for the repression of heresy. With these regular troops and sworn henchmen the papacy could now apply a uniform policy from the centre: the semi-feudal independence of the bishop within his diocese was a thing of the past.

CHAPTER VIII. THE STATE-CHURCH RETALIATES

Section I. The Inquisition

Reign of Terror in Southern France.—Such then was the new power which entered southern France to destroy heresy. For a century Languedoc was laid waste by a reign of terror, long after heresy had lost religious, political, and even social importance. Inquisitors like Arnaud, Cella, Bernard of Caux, Foulques and Nicolas of Abbeville, acted as absolute military dictators in a land of rebels, burning, confiscating, attacking the

[1] The Inquisition was never so uniformly exercised in *teutonic* as in *latin* countries: there can be no doubt that a dim tradition of imperial autocracy and the maxim *Salus Reipublicæ Suprema Lex* went far to reconcile the Romance peoples to a tightening of bonds which (in that age at least!) Germans would not tolerate: still the Waldenses and followers of Ortlieb of Strassburg were hunted down *c.* 1200. Thirty years later Conrad was resisted by the nobles and died by an assassin's hand; the Council of Mainz (1234) dealt tenderly with his murderers. The german prelates always tried to limit the Pope's authority, in this as in other matters. The 'custom of the country' both in north and south was against clerical courts; Sachsen- and Schwaben-*Spiegel* seem either to limit or to ignore any special ecclesiastical claims. The Beghards of cent. xiv were held in check by the ordinary jurisdiction of the bishops, and Marsilius of Padua gave to the *secular* power the sole right to judge and condemn, the priest's duty being merely to advise. Both in Frederic II and Marsilius we see clearly that apostles of 'free-thought' and of a strong secular State were by no means inclined to mercy or toleration. The later history of *persecution* in Germany does not here concern us.

good name of the dead and the peace of mind of the living. Royal officials lent willing aid to a system which brought great wealth to the crown. Several times the terrified people retaliated; and the murder of the whole body of the Inquisitors at Avignonet in *1292* led to a long series of reprisals until *1300*. When the franciscan Bernard Délicieux sought to moderate inquisitorial frenzy and official greed, as the champion of a wrongly oppressed people, king and pope (*c. 1300*) both seemed inclined at first to support him and withdraw a commission from agents who had abused it. But the *political* side was uppermost in the mind of Philip the Fair,[1] and Languedoc had displayed *separatist* tendencies which alarmed him on behalf of the new realm of France.[2] Persecution redoubled its intensity during the years *1308–1323* and the new monarchy, now reinforced by the spoils of the Temple, showed itself merciless. A similar increase in laws of savage repression against poor vagrants and in execution of nobles marks the Tudor period in England: here once again 'reform' and enlightenment so far from softening the code created a deliberate barbarism. Cathar heresy was practically extinct after *1350*.

Spasmodic Violence in the North.—In the north of France unorthodox belief was far less common and victims of the State were few; but there is the curious episode of Robert le Bougre's brief tyranny. A renegade cathar with all the vindictiveness of a pervert, he allied with bishops and count Theobald of Champagne against his old associates (*1233–39*) in Burgundy, Flanders and Champagne. At last the pope himself checked his ferocity and imprisoned him for life. About *1300* the flemish and german heresies found their way into France under the name of the Free Spirit: two pantheistic and visionary females were burnt in this

[1] Or his advisers; this pioneer of the centralized and secular State of modern times being a very ambiguous and obscure character: it is doubtful if the whole movement was not under the control of his middle-class advisers, who were, like Richelieu and others in later times, *plus royalistes que le roi*.

[2] To the same cause (and not to a love of barbarity for its own sake) we must refer the severe treatment of Huguenots by the french crown and its advisers; long after they had ceased to be a dangerous movement of *republican separatism*, with anarchical views somewhat analogous to those of our Long Parliament.

century; Margaret Porette in *1310*, Jean Daubentan in *1373*.[1]

Sorcery and Witchcraft in France.—Meantime, apart from dualistic ingratitude to the Creator and anti-social tendencies, there occurred from time to time outbreaks of the 'old religion' (as Italians call it): magic and sorcery and a professed cult of evil powers. It is quite impossible to say how far this has any connexion with manichean heresy: it is also useless to deny the real panic which its suspicions produced in the normal mind, even in the most phlegmatic and patient of european races.[2] Sorcery came into fashion (perhaps after the inquiry into the Templar's heterodoxy) about the beginning of cent. xiv and John xxii handed over the cognizance of witchcraft and similar charges to the Inquisition. The Holy Office, in such crises during the Middle Age, seems at once to recover all its forfeited popularity. In France the Vauderie at Arras (*1459*) produced a dozen victims for the stake; Dauphiny and Gascony were also scenes of execution.[3] But in France after the end of catharism (*c. 1350*) the Inquisition was no longer so conspicuous; the secular arm claimed through the *Parlement* of Paris this jurisdiction over magicians (*1374*); and in *1378* even the University is found settling a case of demonology. It may be noted that the civil power always exacted the extreme penalty of death. When reform movements began in France in cent. xvi, it fell to these two native bodies to deal with heresy and not to the roman Inquisition.

Persecution as Result of Genuine Panic.—It is obvious to our mature judgment to-day that this repression of Free-Thought was rather a movement of panic than an outburst of primitive savagery: at least this is true of the churchmen's attitude. They steeled themselves to a hateful task[4] by the thought of a supreme duty, not merely towards an outraged God but towards a church-state menaced by the most insidious poison within. Savage tribes show in very early stages of development the greatest jealousy in matters of magic and religion: private appeal

[1] This latter started the curious sect of Turlupins, which reappears at Arras and Douai so late as 1421.

[2] For this epidemic of terror and (on the other hand) manifest self-delusion, consult Lecky and Buckle.

[3] The great epoch of witchcraft (between 1450 and 1700) falls however outside our period.

[4] There are of course a few cases in which it was pursued *con amore*; as in that of Robert le Bougre, the converted cathar.

to the gods or potencies on behalf of individual welfare is always resented and punished. Until a very late period the old roman principle is everywhere upheld; *nemo privatim habessit deos*. The church-state of the Middle Age adopted, not without praiseworthy reticence and regret, the very severe attitude of hebrew law on sorcery and unbelief, together with the pagan and imperial insistence on uniformity. With both was mingled the dread of offending God by neglect of His honour and (as already said) a genuine acceptance of the hard function of 'brother's keeper', of the difficult task of saving him even against his will, 'yet so as by fire'. Thus the *social* end was reinforced by a distinct *moral* and benevolent motive. From this sense of duty, both to an organism and to its unhealthy members, arose all the worst features which overrode every rule of fair trial and impartial procedure. The tribunal was secret and arbitrary, the judges were themselves the accusers; their object, to ascertain and extirpate dangerous tendencies, not to punish individual offences or proved crimes. All other heinous sins gave way before the one terrible indictment of heresy. Peter Martyr's assassins were not tried for murder, but for blasphemy. The culprit was taken unawares and put in gaol on mere suspicion; little value was attached to his palinodes or professions of orthodox faith; none to his external actions of formal piety. Herein the church was wholly justified; from cent. ii onwards heresy had always claimed the right to lurk under conformity and the spanish treatment of 'new Christians' (whether of moorish or hebrew race) was neither unfair nor illogical.

Peculiar Methods and Aims of the Tribunal.—The accused person did not know who had denounced him or the names of the witnesses. He was earnestly implored to turn king's evidence and to disclose accomplices, as fellow-conspirators against the existing order. As in the United States to the present hour, ingenious devices were used to weaken his moral and bodily strength and entrap him unawares into some avowal of guilt. Torture formed part of this system, not at first with church sanction:[1] it must be confessed that it was a loan from the imperial example of Frederic II who formally ordered its use in his Sicilian

[1] Innocent IV 1252 in *Ad Extirpanda* and Urban IV were the first pontiffs to *approve* its use in cases of heresy.

Constitution (*1231*).[1] 'There was never' says Dr. Lea[2] 'any 'case of an acquittal pure and simple'; the judges, that is, would never allow that they had been misinformed; but of course upon a very large number only nominal penances were imposed and the penitent was formally 'reconciled' to the church. Only a small proportion of the accused were committed to the flames. Bernard Guy who will not readily be charged with over-tenderness handed over to the secular power only forty-two out of 930 (between *1308* and *1323*)—a proportion of less than half per cent.[3]

Section II. The Holy Office and Secular Statecraft

Precedent for State Confiscations.—Quite apart from the genuine terror felt towards wrong doctrine and its consequences on the social order and God's favour towards the community, it cannot be denied that the modern State, then growing into a consciousness of its full power, looked on enviously at the Inquisitors' work and girded itself for the great acts of sweeping confiscation at a later day. The new autocratic commonwealth desired by the trading class and dimly preferred by the people at large to feudal particularism, was determined to get rich at all costs and by any means. Even the best kings of France regarded a share in the spoils of the Inquisition as a legitimate source of crown-revenues.[4] A special class of civil official (*procureur des encours*) was created to collect the forfeited property and annex the estates to the domain-lands. Under Alfonso, Count of Poitiers, great abuses arose in Languedoc owing to their grasping and tyrannous conduct. The papacy also claimed its portion of the spoils and the Inquisitors after *1252* had a direct interest in giving an adverse

[1] Here once again we remark the refined cruelty, egoistic statecraft and contempt of Christian ideals which came from the Saracen south and by means of the italian tyrants passed into general favour.

[2] *Hist. Inquis. Spain*, 5 vols. London, 1905–8.

[3] It was Bernard who waxed indignant when Clement V ordered inquiry into the prisons of Languedoc (where the figures of mortality had been rising) on the ground that it would interfere with the repute of the Inquisition: his *Liber Sentt. Inquis.* contains posthumous verdicts passed after death on 89 persons.

[4] Besides Emperor Frederic I (decree of Verona) we have the case of Louis VIII 1226 and St. Louis IX 1234, also Raymund VII of Toulouse.

verdict.[1] In France, Italy and Germany the two forces shared in the proceeds of confiscation; in secularist Venice the whole amount went to the State; while in Spain only the property of heretical vassals of the church and recreant clerics went to ecclesiastical purposes.

Fiscal Temptations.—Clement V tried earnestly to reform the whole procedure of a tribunal which had long passed out of control: he made careful inquiries into the financial and economic aspect of the Inquisition *1337–38*. Charles V of France prevailed on Gregory XI in *1378*, to abolish any restriction on the civil powers. The example had been set early in the century: the facility with which the wealth of a strong corporation had been quietly transferred to the State formed a precedent for augmenting the revenue which no ruler could afford to overlook in future. It is to be feared that, when convictions decayed and a period of italian unbelief and statecraft set in, secular rulers upheld the obsolete powers of the Inquisition merely from motives of gain.[2]

Lombard Heresy and its Suppression.—Italian heresy was often in large measure *political* in character, as we see plainly in the case of Arnold of Brescia. Sometimes it was anti-clerical because wibelline and imperialist; sometimes the movement was communal and republican. Lombardy, on the high road of the bulgarian evangelists, was a veritable focus of sects and the cathars had many companions. Under Innocent III stronger methods were employed by John of Vicenza, Sacchoni, and Roland of Cremona, who found at Milan a hotbed of sectarian zeal. Peter Martyr met his death in *1252*, and four years later Alexander IV doubled the number of Inquisitors acting in Lombardy. Brother Ruggieri took up the orthodox campaign at Florence, and throughout Tuscany indulgences were promised to those who would aid the church to extirpate heretics. As in Provence, the threatened faction defended itself by open and secret resistance: Brother Conrad was killed in the Valtelline in *1277* and in *1279* the mob of Parma rose against the Inquisitors. At Ferrara, the people venerated the remains and adored the memory of a

[1] Like the *delatores* under the roman empire.

[2] A great uncertainty in the value of contracts, conveyances, and agreements to purchase is to be noted as a natural result of the precarious tenure of all property.

certain ascetic, Ponzilupo, who had been executed: the church had hard work to suppress the new hero-cult. Still more exciting was the struggle against Legarelli and Dolcigno who founded a sect of *Apostolics*. As elsewhere, the noble families were not behindhand in support of a pietistic movement which opposed priestcraft; and the *Messianist* sect of Guglielma numbered many powerful adherents.

Comparative Immunity of Southern Italy: Papal States.—It is not a little curious that while the north submitted to the Inquisition (its power reaching a zenith under Ugolini), southern Italy was almost immune. The 'Two Sicilies', even under the ruthless Charles of Anjou, never gave a sincere welcome to the tribunal and refugees found ready and safe asylum in his dominions. Moreover Sicily itself, in passing under the rule of Aragon, became a thoroughly anti-papal region and offered a home to exiled heretics. In the 'Papal States' charges of heresy were intermingled with political rancour and personal animosity. Like *majestas* under the pagan empire, an indictment for heresy was the decisive *complementum omnium accusationum*: Boniface VIII on the eve of the great Jubilee declared the Colonna *heretics*. Confusion reigned between the loyalty owed by a Christian to the head of the church, and the fealty of a subject towards a territorial prince: the spiritual side of the papacy of course suffered. Rienzi when raising the question of the pope's sovereignty over Rome, was conveniently accused of heresy: so too the Venetians, who in *1309* protested against Clement V's annexation of Ferrara. Savonarola in later times might have escaped papal censure on religious grounds, if he had not interfered with Alexander VI's policy at Florence.

Papal Attempts in Bosnia: Bohemia.—Across the Adriatic, Catharism was a strong and firmly compacted society or federation towards *1200*; Innocent III and Honorius III sent dominican friars, to convert or terrorize; they were by no means amiably received. Gregory IX preached a crusade against bosnian heresy in *1234* and only added fuel to the ardour of the sects. Boniface VIII tried in vain to set up the Inquisition there in the closing years of the century (*1298*); John XXII fared little better when after five and twenty years he renewed the effort. Persecution only welded the sectaries into closer union and prepared the slavonic communities to hail the muslim as their deliverers from

an intolerable oppression. As we have already seen, their hatred of the foreign yoke of Rome inclined them to open apostasy from any and every form of Christian belief; and large numbers willingly accepted Islam. Further north, the Waldenses had settled themselves firmly in Bohemia *1200–1250*: Innocent IV *1245* and Alexander IV *1257* ordered their indictment and established the Inquisition there. For nearly a century, until *1535* the solicitude of the papacy was constant and unavailing. Luciferians and Brethren of the Free Spirit joined the Waldenses, and the active campaigns of the bohemian and silesian prelates bore no result. Already the way was prepared for a joyful welcome to hussite teaching; wherein, as in so many decisive movements of thought in the Middle Age, the original impulse had come from the British Isles.

Fanatic Outbreaks in Germany.—In Germany itself the mystical pietism which heralded the reform of Luther demands a special notice which we cannot here bestow. Here, to complete the survey of inquisitorial coercion, the effort of Innocent V *1353*, of Urban V *1362* (supported by Emperor Charles IV) and of Gregory XI *1372* may be named; only the last of which was in any measure successful. Beghards and Beguines were to be suppressed and their communities scattered, and the mystical epidemics of wild dancing or self-torture sternly put down. Here Gregory found himself unable to set up an independent tribunal: after angry protests from both magistrates and bishops against the dictatorial powers claimed by his envoys, he consented to allow the diocesan to control his officers.

Late Arrival of Inquisition in Spain.—Spain not only remained for long exempt from the attentions of the Holy Office, but, like Germany, in the end maintained state-control over it. Edicts against heretics had been issued by Alfonso II and Peter II towards the close of cent. xii, but the Cathars never gained much footing in the peninsula and the chief danger lay in crypto-jews and muslim renegades. Not till Gregory IX was the Inquisition sent over into Aragon *1232* and *1237–8* and already in *1233* James I had by a civil edict of great sternness assumed the initiative in suppressing heretics and relegated the Office to a second place. The people showed the greatest dislike to the foreign tribunal, and (as in France, Germany and Italy) an Inquisitor was murdered. In *1235* the Cortes forbad the use of

torture with James' consent. The king-emperor Alfonso X of Castile also took steps *c. 1255* to secularize inquiries into heresy and put a veto upon the use of torture—which means of extracting confession afterwards became very general in Spain and Portugal. In *1300* Spain had no real Inquisition. It was not against heresy or indeed 'free thought' that Spain had to direct her energies, and the real scope of her long persecuting activity does not strictly fall within our period.

Pantheism in Spain.—But though the main business of the spanish Office dealt with *Marranos* and *Conversos* that is, Jews and Moors, who had become catholics under pressure, there were not wanting analogues to the old pantheist sects which frightened the sovereigns of the further east at an earlier date. Mystics of every species were regarded with suspicion and furnished a due *quota* of victims. The *Alumbrados* (illuminati) were akin to medieval sectaries like the Beghards and the Brethren of the Free Spirit. This charge was often levelled against the most zealous supporters of the church, the papacy and orthodox belief. Loyola was twice sent to prison; Theresa was more than once formally denounced and her *Conceptos del Amor Divino* was prohibited; Molinos was arrested and condemned *1683* and *1687* and his followers, real or supposed, were intermittently attacked up to *1781*.[1]

National and Anti-Papal Character of Spanish Office.—It will be enough to say that the Holy Office in Spain assumed a peculiar character; it was a *national*, that is both a *royal* and a *popular* institution: it was a stern engine of political unity by means of enforced uniformity of creed. The Spaniards looked upon heresy as a national plague; upon the Inquisition as an indispensable agent of the public welfare. Here again the most serious economic paralysis was seen to result from the precarious value of

[1] Salomon Reinach bears welcome (but unexpected) testimony to the humanity and merciful character of the spanish Office (*Revue Critique*, art. on H. C. Lea's *Inquisition*. All kinds of civil offences were attracted to this tribunal: 'though it may have been indiscreet in meddling with 'affairs which did not concern it, it was not cruel and *men always preferred* '*to fall into the hands of the Inquisition* rather than appear before the 'secular judges or even the roman Inquisitors'. Pursuit of sorcery was very common in the spanish colonies (as Mexico and the Philippines), yet it is notable that catholic Spain was never disgraced by any systematic massacre of witches.

property and the uncertain character of covenants. The Crown and the Inquisition were all-powerful against the pope, and appeals to Rome were expressly forbidden. Yet the Holy Office was by no means a mere organ of despotism: it was by a 'co-'incidence' (H. C. Lea) only that 'central absolutism grew up 'alongside of it'. Like the Spartans, the old spanish Christians, whose fathers had for centuries battled against the miscreants, lived as conquerors in a country by no means wholly subdued. An early tolerance gave way, under the strain of active warfare, and secret suspicion, before a quiet but merciless policy of suppression. In this matter royalty may have been a prime mover, but in this function it acted solely as the interpreter of the people's will.

APPENDIX C

Long Persecution of Heresy and Witchcraft: its Motives

Heresy as a Gangrene and Public Peril.—A modern mind—sensitive in bearing or witnessing pain, humane because compassionate of misery in the brief span of life, and tolerant because indifferent to dogma and uncertain of penalty or comfort in the hereafter—cannot fail to view the long annals of persecution with abhorrence and disgust. Yet, while we deplore the distress caused by a mistaken policy, we are not justified in passing a hasty verdict on its perpetrators. St. Cyprian was perhaps the first to propound the basal theory that heretics are *ipso facto* schismatics and that outside the church[1] there was no salvation. As an organism and institution the church has to defend itself against foes within and without and her first duty is self-preservation. False doctrine secretly invading the faithful was a plague-spot, a gangrene: '*ense recidendum* 'est'. We have already noted the universal distrust shown by primitive man towards *private* religion. 'Public opinion' says Jevons *Introd. Hist. Rel.* 'does not approve of the worship paid by an individual member of a 'Gold Coast tribe to a *suhman* or *private tutelar* deity; his dealings with 'it are regarded in the nature of "black art", as it is not a god of the 'community'. The Chinese have never ceased to regard buddhism as *sie* a heterodox cult, contrasted with the two *religiones licitæ*, the Confucian ethic and Tao. The muslim world in its ages of independent thought has constantly been agitated by such feelings; and the triumphant party always persecutes for the good of the community, the purity of the faith and the maintenance of the divine favour. Secrecy of worship or eccentric conduct alarms the conventionalism of any narrow and earnest society;

[1] Soon to become the visible church-state of Constantine and the Middle Ages.

humanity is a virtue which flourishes best when cynicism and doubt have ousted any sincere convictions.

Conflict between Two Sides of the Austinian System.—Authority, sure of its mission, felt itself bound to save society and its members from corruption at all costs. After all, catharism in its esoteric circles involved a total repudiation of the Bible and the God which it reveals. Openly hostile to the Hebrew Deity, it presents us with a theology which is certainly not Christian and adopts a portion of the New Testament only to pervert it ingeniously for its own ends. On the ground of *discipline* again it is hard to see what alternative policy lay before the church in its attitude to the Vaudois or to the disciples of Wiclif or Hus. These puritan sectaries could indeed appeal to one side of the system handed down by St. Austin. They objected to the hierarchy of office which placed all power either in a personal autocracy or a small number of noble officials, not elected by any popular vote and often closely united with worldly families and interests. They felt that a divine decree, predestinating the individual to God's favour and guaranteed by an inalienable personal experience, must be of far greater value than visible membership of a fallible church and conformity to its often superstitious ritual. They claimed to examine the personal fitness of ministers for sacred office, before entrusting them with the power of the keys. But the church as being the ordained vehicle of truth and salvation could not accept these suggestions: it could appeal to another side of austinian doctrine, no less important. Against predestination and personal experience, it was obliged to set up a simpler and more universal test. Recognizing (with Austin) man's frail and sinful nature, it refused to regard merit in the minister as implying of itself alone any sacramental validity. The church in short was a society with a regular civil service and a standing army; it could not allow its chief duties to be performed by enthusiasts or knights errant.[1]

Luther strengthens the Hands of the Secular State.—Protestant churches can say little against their 'erring sister' in the matter of persecution. Without doubt Luther wished and intended to keep inward religion, faith and conscience, outside the reach of foreign interference. He wished to confine the civil government and its coercive regimen to the sphere of the secular and outward life. His very first principle was the sacredness of the interior life which was accountable to no earthly power but to God alone. 'How could the Emperor', he asks, with Tertullian and Donatus, 'acquire the right to rule my faith?' In theory at least he disapproved of violent measures for the repression of heresy: 'it is a spiritual thing which 'cannot be hewn, or burned, or drowned: God's Word alone can heal it'. Yet his new exaltation of the civil power and his terror of mob-law drove him into an attitude quite incompatible with these lofty professions of tolerance. Lutherans as well as catholics accepted the Peace of Augsburg and the dangerous principle *cujus regio ejus religio*; the ruler's choice bound the resident within his dominions and the licence to emigrate was

[1] The writings of Cyprian, the acknowledged master of the last latin Father, show very clearly the importance of this distinction.

often a mockery. Luther himself was by no means of a tolerant or inclusive spirit: he would not accept Zwingli's friendship or proffered hand (at the Marburg Colloquy): the Swiss (he said) were of another spirit and he expressed surprise that men of such views should even desire brotherly relations with the reformers of Wittenberg.

New Clericalism of the Presbytery (a Cathar Doctrine).—When protestant churches were formally organized it was seen that *clericalism* had not been an exclusive feature of the older system. Calvin indeed allowed the *Consistory* to impose spiritual penalties alone; but the old idea survived intact, that the State was bound in duty to help the church in maintaining purity of life and doctrine. In Geneva, as for a time in Scotland, the presbytery really became the chief civil power and the church and State were actually conterminous. On the ground of the extreme danger of anti-trinitarian dogma Calvin consented to Servetus'[1] death, and as a whole the body of the reformed churches believed that he had done right. The dutch Synod of Dort exiled the Arminians as well as condemned their beliefs, and when the Edict of Nantes was revoked the still dominant party in protestantism could not in equity plead unfair treatment of the Huguenots. It must not be forgotten that its cruel repression of witchcraft stands on exactly the same level as the extinction of heresy by fire.

In Period *600–1300* Steady Decline in Humanity; Carolingian Enlightenment.—In the treatment of witches the culture of our period shows a unique instance of a steady decline in humanity and intelligence—a striking contrast to the development marked in other departments. We leave it not only in its last and worst stages (*1300*) but with promise (unhappily fully realized) of a still further deterioration. In this matter alone. enlightenment, art, science and the revival of classical studies brought no sort of relief. The state of popular practice and opinion in the days of Agobard (*c. 780–845* A.D.) and Cotton Mather (*c. 1691–2*) can only be compared (and contrasted) with feelings of shame and amazement. For 900 years the movement of thought and the procedure of justice were steadily retrograde. It is true that the Old Testament lends unqualified support to the belief in witches' abnormal power; and 'witchcraft' is included by St. Paul in a notable list of crimes. Again, popular practice and beliefs, poetic allusion and the statute-book prove beyond question

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[1] There can be no doubt that pantheism was rightly detected in his *Christi Restitu* (1553). Now all such dogma was dreaded by the Middle Age and the period of Reform, the more because realism (on which it is based) had been for so long the accepted philosophy of the orthodox. It is plain *that Calvin attempted to modify the form of the penalty at the stake and wished him to be beheaded:* but the sentence itself he fully approved. The execution may even be said to have had with it 'the general voice of 'Christendom' as well as that of the Reformed Churches. On Oct. 14 1554 Melancthon wrote to Calvin *tuo judicio prorsus assentior; affirmo etiam vestros magistratus juste fecisse quod hominem blasphemum (re ordine judicata) interfecerunt.*

the prevalence of such notions under the pagan empire of Rome.[1] The Christian attitude is never quite defined: does man ally with an actual power of evil? or does he delude himself while robbing God of His due honour? is it *idolatry* or *superstition*? The Church finally decided for the former and the Council of Elvira (*306*) regarded witchcraft as apostasy from God and a genuine compact with devils; even in death the last Sacrament could not be given to the guilty persons. A century later St. Austin has no doubt that there is (as in the persistent Faust-myth) a covenant with a real and objective power: at Worms (*829*) the frankish bishops expressed their belief in genuine diabolic aid for love-potions, raising storms, and stealing milk or fruit.

Hallucination, not Covenant with Evil.—Against this credulity may be set the anathema of an Irish Synod (*c. 800*) upon any Christian who is foolish enough to believe in *strigæ* (or vampires) and the Wild Hunt or Witches' Sabbath through the air. Just a year earlier (*799*) the Synod of Reisbach demands that the witch be put to penance in church but inflicts no earthly punishment in a case where the eternal doom is so certain: the sceptical Tiberius might have said, *deorum injurias dis curæ*. Agobard of Lyons (coadjutor in *813*, archbishop *816–840*) conducted a polemic against such theories as had been accepted by his brethren at Worms: he denounced trial by ordeal of fire and water, belief in witchcraft, and ascription of tempests to art magic.[2] He also questioned the dogma of literal inspiration, the cult of images and the adoration of departed saints. Somewhat later Regius of Prum (*c. 900*) asserts that the nocturnal flight with 'Diana'[3] is pure delusion, but that the devil suggests it to the hallucinant. Burchard of Worms in *1025* thinks a course of two years' penance a wholesome discipline for any one believing in *strigæ*.[4] Stephen of Hungary (king *997–1038*) also holds the *strigæ* to be a myth, though he had no doubt that some witches could concoct poisons and were *maleficæ* or workers of black magic. Meantime the civil law regarded such 'ill wishing' or mixture of venomous drugs as an offence against the safety of others. Both frank and alemann codes of cent. vi (under the Merwings from Clovis to Clotaire) recognize the *maleficæ*, but dismiss the vampire and night-rider as a delusion: the latter code (in *600*) even expressly forbad private torture of

[1] One of the most curious episodes in the early Christian empire is found in Ammianus; Valens creates a reign of terror in Antioch in the very futile attempt to kill his successor, whose initial letter had been revealed by the *chaldæus* or *mathematicus* to some inquisitive, if not seditious, person.

[2] The *immissores tempestatum* who were believed in and feared down to cent. xvii: Lecky narrates a singular instance in the eastern counties resulting in the death of the person suspected, on unimpeachable evidence (as it was then held).

[3] Or Frau Holde, which common to all northern myths developed into the Witches' Sabbath and the festival of the Brocken.

[4] These *Unholde* were believed to extract the heart of sleepers, cook and eat it, replacing it by a piece of wood: this is of course a variant of the 'changeling' myth and the 'separable soul' which are ubiquitous.

women suspected of malice and *strigism*. Rothar forbade the judges to sentence the *strigæ* to death; Charles the Great (like Burchard later) even punished belief in this superstition.

Steady Increase of Superstition.—With the panic-stricken period of cent. xiii a new epoch of credulity and attendant cruelty begins. Superstition, gathering momentum and conviction from the very number of its victims, reigns supreme until the close of cent. xvii in the most enlightened and humane regions of the old and new worlds. The *striga* is now solemnly invested with actuality and the natural fears of the ignorant receive sanction from the approval of the learned and from scholastic ingenuity. Cæsar of Heisterbach (*c. 1225*) believes in female monsters (like ogres in folk tales) who kill and eat children. William of Paris, a few years later, agrees with this, but denies that they are real women and attributes this cannibalism to Frau Holde's revel-rout. But very soon *a priori* argument disposed of objections to *human* riders through the air, and the Witches' Sabbath became an acknowledged article of popular belief. The old norse myth of disembodied spirits hunting under the leadership of 'Diana' or Herodias (!) becomes an assembly of females on *terra firma* to pay homage to their master, Satan. Kurtz rightly speaks of *heresy* and *sorcery* (*Ch. Hist.* ii 195) as two correlated agencies, resting on demonic powers and highly pleasing to the world of evil. In the Mendicant Orders, the usual antithesis was seen, the followers of Dominic showing the utmost zeal and credulity and the humaner franciscans rejecting the belief. It is certain that the catholics retorted on the half-pagan cathars the old charges levelled against the secret assemblies of early Christians, that their worship was the cult of demons. The dualists retaliated in the style of Marcion; either side taunted the other with adoring the Devil.[1]

The Witches' Sabbath.—In *1250* certain bishops gave a detailed description of the Witches' Sabbath to the dominican monk, Stephen de Bourbon, and in *1275* the Holy Office held its first inquiry into such a case. Magic is now considered to be an integral part of *heresy*, that all-embracing indictment of cent. xiii. Thomas Aquinas steadfastly upholds the reality of the crime, and from *1258* the Inquisition took cognizance of witchcraft. The great increase in the number of charges and executions is found after the year *1320*. In Paris the Parlement in *1391* transferred jurisdiction to the secular Courts. Elsewhere the Inquisitors maintained their control and the great witch-hunt of the years *1434* to *1447* was a clerical as well as a secular movement.

Cruel Treatment under the Renaissance. Late Survival of Death Penalty.—When the papacy was italianized and undermined by luxury and unbelief, Innocent VIII (*1484*) issued his Bull against witchcraft, *Summis desiderantes*, and the *Malleus Maleficarum* (*1489*) provided a textbook which

[1] It is quite impossible to avoid connecting the *Sabbath* with *Sabazios* (rather than with Sabaoth), a title of the thracian beer-god, who afterwards became the wine-god Dionysus with his train of Mænads or *female* votaries: the incidents of this actual nocturnal cult by ecstasy seem faithfully reproduced in medieval and later portrayals of satanic worship.

actually spread superstition among the masses from above. This is perhaps a unique instance of a vulgar belief fostered, a popular panic sedulously increased, by learning and culture. The later chapters of this terrible persecution do not belong to our period: it must suffice to say that the last english trial took place in *1712*, the last execution in Scotland in *1722*, the last outburst in America (under Cotton Mather) in *1691*. But in latin countries we find a witch-burning at Seville by the Holy Office in *1781*, in South America and Mexico as late as *1850*, Peru giving a final instance of death at the stake in *1888*. In the half-civilized 'prussian' region of Germany a capital sentence was carried out at Posen in *1793*.[1] Meantime in cent. xvi attempts were made to restore the theory of *delusion* and *hallucination*; Weier in *1563* wrote *De Præstigiis dæmonum*, Reginald Scott in *1584 Discovery of Witchcraft*, King James VI his reply to such scepticism in *1597*, *Demonology*. Spee's *Cautio Criminalis* in *1631* had some effect in restraining pursuit, and Bekker's famous work on the *Enchanted World* (*Betooverde Wereld*) appeared in *1691*, the same year that Mather began his campaign in New England. It is worth notice that Bodin, the great french publicist, demanded that John Uvier, the *rationalizer* of witchcraft, should be sent to the stake for his presumption in denying it. The *dualist* belief in the joint government of the universe lasted longest in Scotland, for although the last sentence was carried out in *1722*, the statutes were not repealed until *1736*; the Associate Presbytery in *1743* registering a solemn protest against this leniency 'as contrary to the 'express law of God, for which a holy God may be provoked in a way of 'righteous judgment'. Thus to the end is contained the notion of danger to society; first, through the welcome given to evil agencies, and next through the vengeance of an offended deity who visits on the entire community the blasphemous apostasy of a few.

APPENDIX D

Free Thought in the Courts of Southern France

Humanistic Satirists of the Church: Goliards.—It is easy to exaggerate the pagan and anti-clerical tendencies of Goliards and Troubadours, but there is proof enough that both parties aimed at enfranchising thought and its expression, possibly, the conscience and moral conduct as well, from tutelage and restraint. In Ireland there had been a serious struggle. between the *bards* and the *clergy*. Southern France was the scene of a kindred movement, only this time the aggressors are the new poets of

[1] It is said that Benedict Carpzov 1595–1666 condemned 20,000 victims! This accomplished man belonged to a saxon and protestant family eminent in law, politics, and theology: he was privy councillor at Dresden in 1653. He did much to reduce german law to system and his latin works (from 1638–1657) had a wide influence outside Saxony. He perused the Bible 53 times and made copious notes which have been allowed to remain in MS.

humanism and naturalism.[1] We may first dismiss the vagrant students or Goliards, who between the years *1100–1300* gained an unenviable name for a careless and dissolute life; Villon, born out of due season, belongs to this class.[2] It is not easy to believe that there was a regular 'Order', with rites of initiation, oaths, secrecy and ranks of honour; nor that there was a founder or 'archpoet' (as Spiegel believes) in Burgundy and Saltzburg (*c. 1180–1250*).[3] Was there a gild with definite rules? Certainly church-synods strongly objected to their imitation of ecclesiastical 'orders', in which the Goliards seemed to deride the new ascetism and poverty of the mendicants. Trier in *1227* forbade them to help in chanting the liturgy; two years later they are accused of fomenting disturbances in Paris University; in *1289* clerks were told not to be 'junglers, goliards, or buffoons'; in *1300* (at Cologne) they were expressly inhibited from selling Boniface VIII's indulgences. There is no doubt that they directed their satire against abuses in the church, the evil lives of the clergy, even the papacy itself. They were critics from a *humanistic* standpoint, not, as the Albigenses, from that of *puritanism*. Their motto might be 'Why all this hypocrisy?' They certainly did not set up a higher standard of life than the clergy, but with the thoughtlessness of poor and youthful students believed enjoyment to be a chief aim of man. It was no reflective protest against a fictitious 'otherworldliness' (with which the Middle Age has too often been charged). They find their true counterpart in the lighter french critics of the church in cent. xviii, whose views were really epicurean and individualist.[4] A selection of their poems has been published as *Carmina Burana* and discloses somewhat the same attitude to life as the rules of Thelema, Medmenham, Newstead, and the (largely apocryphal) Hell-fire Clubs.[5]

The Englishman Walter Map as Critic of Clerical Life.—In England such satire reached its climax in Walter Mapes, or Map, who studied in Paris (*1150–1160*) and wrote *de Nugis Curialium*, perhaps at the court of Henry II. Clerk of the royal household and a travelling justice, he went also to attend the Lateran Council of *1179*; he was a prebend of St. Paul's,[6]

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[1] This is to be accepted only with reserve: the *docta poemata* and complex rules of the troubadours show that it is only a 'court-naturalism' after all, like the mimicry of arcadian manners at Versailles in the Little Trianon or in the pictures of Watteau.

[2] Origin of name is doubtful: *gula* (gluttony), bishop *Golias*, an imaginary hero-eponymus, *Goliath* (term applied in opprobrium by Bernard to Abelard when writing to Pope Innocent II) *gailliard* (Giesebrecht)—the last is certainly the most likely and the bringing in of the same sounding name Goliath is a sort of medieval pun (cf. Waldenses = quasi *in valle densa*).

[3] *Die Vaganten und ihr Orden*, Spires 1892: cf. Häzner's *Goliardendichtung*, Leipzig 1905.

[4] Voltaire e.g. was not, like most professed sceptics or 'free thinkers' to-day, a positivist of Comte's type.

[5] They were found in a convent in Bavaria, ed. Schmeller 1895.

[6] Like Sydney Smith, his modern parallel.

canon and precentor of Lincoln, and rector of Westbury (Glos.) ; in *1199* he was a candidate for the see of Hereford. He died before *1210*.[1] In his undoubted work *de Nugis*, he satirized the loose or idle life of the average cleric with all the complacence of a well-endowed pluralist.[2] It is quite clear that he came under the influence of a french feudal court at Champagne, where the feeling of resentment against irksome restraint might well arise.

A. **Trouvères of Northern France.**—The bards of these northern courts are known by the name *trouvères*, composers of a peculiar kind of unimpassioned erotic poetry, ' pedants and attorneys of a fantastic tribunal of ' sentiment ' (Gosse), ' enveloping in the fewest lines the largest number of ' ideas, or rather commonplaces of the most frigid and impersonal type ' (Jeanroy). Eleanor of Aquitaine, granddaughter of a famous troubadour William IX, introduced the southern fashion of artificial poesy into the french court on her marriage with Louis VII (*1137*). The Crusades brought the art of north and south into connexion ; and although the northern is not entirely beholden in its origin, yet its handlers are less ingenious, graceful and delicate. What is certainly a direct imitation of the south is court-patronage. Marie was Regent of Champagne in the last twenty years of cent. xii (*1180–1197*)—a court where Walter Mapes had been made welcome on his way to the Lateran (*1179*) : under her favour wrote and sang Barbezieu Brulé and Christian of Troyes. At the court of Blois her sister extended protection to Walter of Arras and de Couci. A sister-in-law, Alice (second wife of Louis VII in *1160*) gave a welcome to Béthune, perhaps the most famous and original of the *trouvères*. Some were named tutors to princes like William III of Macon and Philip Augustus of France. Thibaut IV of Navarre, John of Jerusalem, and Louis of Blois were rulers who indulged in poesy as a noble pastime. These courtly minstrels rose to fame in the last quarter of the century and cultivated their refined lyrics till *1240*, especially during the Albigensian Wars. About *1230* the burgher circles of Flanders, Picardy, and Artois adopted the fashion from the feudal courts. The latest scenes of their successes were Arras and Reims. With the decay of feudal centres in the north the art declined ; about *1280* the school suddenly disappeared and oblivion overtook the names of the court-lyrists.[3] Their songs were no ' wood-notes wild ' of unstudied feeling, but like poetry in the Fujiwara epoch of japanese culture, efforts of intelligence, ' pieces of wilful and elaborate casuistry '. (Gosse). The strictest rules were laid down for the platonic courtship of some idealized (and always married) lady : love ' became a science and a cult and was practised ' according to the laws of precise etiquette '.

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[1] When Giraldus Cambrensis utters a prayer for his soul in a *second* edition of his *Hibernica*.

[2] Ed. T. Wright for Camden Society London 1847. Latest edit. *Anecd. Oxon.* ed. M. R. James, Clarendon Press 1914.

[3] It is interesting to compare with this decay of a refined art the extinction of the many small feudal centres of teutonic culture in cent. xviii before the new autocratic secularism of the german empire.

B. **Troubadours in Provence.**—The *troubadour* of Provence was the earlier counterpart,—an inventive improvist who discovered new forms for his brief lyrical stanza charged with meaning. The origin of the school is princely, if we accept William IX, Duke of Aquitaine and Count of Poitiers,[1] as their founder: twenty-three ruling princes followed his example (including our Richard I.) and the larger number belonged to a noble class. But the wanderers of humbler origin were well received and enjoyed the same freedom of speech, being allowed (like court jesters) to treat questions of political interest with impunity.[2] The *joglar* or *jongleur* who arranged the words to music, attended the itinerant troubadour,—the two were separated by a caste-barrier, though the *jongleur* could rise by merit into the superior rank. A curious career is noted in Folquet of Marseilles, born in Genoa; he took orders some time after *1192*. became a cistercian abbot in Provence and in *1205* Bishop of Toulouse (+ *1231*); he was noted for his hatred of the Albigenses of whom it is said that he slew 500,000! So Bertram de Born, Viscount of Hautefort (Perigord) became devout (or perhaps bigoted) in his old age (+ *1205*). The anonymous 'Prior of Montaudon' satirized the formalism and complexity of these platonic amours, neglected the laws of a precise gallantry and held up ladies and their lovers to derision.

Rapid Decay together with the Feudal Courts.—The prosperous period of these courtly poets ended about *1210*: the south had long enjoyed peace, with its consequences—refinement, wealth, and corruption. The noble houses, plunged in extravagance, sank into decay, and the stern attack of king and pope against the albigenses completed the ruin of their patrons. The northern barons fell upon Béziers, and Carcassone in *1209*. Most of these generous protectors were unorthodox, and, though certainly not themselves ascetic, they gave warm support to the heretic puritans. They shared in their downfall. If William IX had desired to found an Order for the worship of Venus, Figuevia, son of a tailor in Toulouse, represented a fierce onslaught upon the papacy, declared himself openly a heretic and was supported by ct. Raymond. With the fall of the southern feudal courts the exotic poetry and its artists ceased to be: culture in Languedoc sank rapidly into barbarism again, or rather exchanged the

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[1] Ruler from 1087–1127 'type of medieval gallantry', violent, briiliant and impudent: a crusader in 1101 without success: as anxious as Frederic II of Prussia (in the matter of flute-playing) to be accounted an expert and not an amateur: according to William of Malmesbury projected a religious house *for the cult of Venus*.

[2] Chiefly in the *tenson*, in dialogue form, two persons discussing a point in formal erotic casuistry, at times, matters of *religious* or *satiric* import: the essence of these poems is *lyrical* and not *epic* or *dramatic* (Gosse). For *political* comments, Gerald de Bornel (named by Dante and compared with Arnold Bresc. *De Vulg. Eloq.*) may be mentioned; he lamented a brutal age and the oppression of feudal princes, like the Viscount of Limoges who burnt his house down.

poetic art of lyrical individualism [1] for a deeper interest in the jewish and arabian philosophy of the world.

APPENDIX E

Popular Dualism : Attested by Folklore

Balkan Folk Tales.—It seems likely in the light of recent inquiry by Moses Gaster and others [2] that an interesting side of folklore in eastern Europe may be traced to the influence of bogomil and catharist *colporteurs*. Gaster speaks (p. 11) of ' the all-pervading influence of religious sects ' stretching from far east to extreme west, embracing all the cultured ' nations of Europe and impressing them with the same seal '. Their legends and tales, containing a strong didactic and ethical strain, offered a *modified* form of Christian belief and propounded a novel solution for the world-problem suitable to the popular intellect. This teaching by fable sought to account for the existence of evil and to ward off its effects. It sank deeper into the peasants' mind than the official doctrine of the church, met and satisfied the questions of primitive pagan thought, and brought about ' that surprising *spiritual unification* in the religion of the masses ' which survives in folklore '.

Originated on E. Roman Soil.—This influence seems to radiate from a single centre, to last quite 200 or 300 years, and to leave behind indelible traces. It is not a primitive survival but a recent phase of thought. Treating the Æsopic beast-fables of Rumania, Gaster is convinced that they do not stand isolated (23) but form part of ' a group of tales and ' legends common to most of the surrounding nations in a more or less ' complete degree . . . they are so much akin that they must have reached ' these nations almost simultaneously '. Now the Gipsies (it is well known) dwelt long and peacefully in Rumania—a happy episode in the ' long-' drawn agony of suspicion and hatred '. Were they the channel ? But they are not ' likely carriers of folk tales '. Nor, in spite of buddhist ' transformations ' into animal-forms, is it probable that the Mongols are accountable. The centre is the east-roman empire—as he quaintly calls it

[1] A last figure is Riquier of Narbonne 1230–1294 who left his patroness, the viscountess of the town, and visited Louis IX and Alfonso X the ' king-emperor '. He found, like other troubadours, a welcome in this spanish court, where the patron was himself a poet in *galician*. Lyrics in *provençal* attributed to the king were written by his visitors. Riquier spent his latter days with Henry II, count of Rodez, the last feudal prince to patronize letters. Conscious of the coming eclipse of his art he expressed sorrow at having come into the world too late. Cf. Joseph Anglade ed. Paris 1905.

[2] Cf. M. Gaster's introd. to his spirited rendering of *Rumanian Bird and Beast Stories*, Folklore Soc. Publ. (Sidgwick and Jackson London 1915). The learned author is a vice-president of the Folklore Soc., of the Roy. Asiatic Soc. and of the Jewish Histor. Soc., and has served as president of the first and third.

'Byzance'—and the tales came in on the crest of the religious wave known either as manicheism, or as the heresy of the bogomils. This dualist heterodox teaching extended from the indian border far into southern France across central Europe. This popular literature followed the example of early gnostic pseudepigrapha and the rich stratum of apocryphal Gospels and Acts in the first days of the church.[1] The sectarian '*colporteurs*' alone, 'Paulitzians' and Bogomils, came into direct contact with the masses of the people, since they preached in preference to the poor and lowly.

Under Influence of Parsism and Egypt.—The cosmogonic tales, unlike Rig x 129 with its insistent monism, teach a *dualistic* origin of the world, as did iranian Zoroaster and (his possible pupils) the norsemen and goths of a later age. The same kind of dualist legends about creation are found on the outskirts of ancient Iran and in Russia. Avesta teaching certainly spread both north and west,—as well as south and east as we have had occasion to show. The norse creed, with its strenuous resistance to evil, may well be a somewhat pessimistic offshoot of this iranian dualism of light and gloom, the antithesis being accentuated by the rigours of a northern winter.[2] From Iran these notions passed through Asia Minor or even across the Euxine into Thrace and the Balkans—a district teeming with a medley of peoples,mostly at a low level of culture and (except in the orthodox church and the ever-dwindling official circle of really greek byzantines) quite lacking in a literature of their own. Though veiled in a decent Christian garb, the stories of the Evil One suggest Ahriman—God's opposite and negative, not (as in our Scriptures) merely an impertinent rebel. The Balkans seem to be the editing centre for the diffusion of these tales and a step further back we find the source in Asia Minor.[3] India is not the focus though it abounds in animal tales; but Egypt may well be one source the *Story of Ahikar* (Elephantine papyrus) must be dated in the very last years of the native monarchy and may come from Syria-Phenice or directly from Egypt itself.[4] There is no reason why such a story should not travel east as well as west to find a home in India—whose contact with western influence has been much underrated.

Their Heterodox and Anti-Clerical Aim.—The sectaries made clever use (it would seem) of these animal-tales, drawing morals, confirming dualist theory of word-origins and holding up the powers that be to contempt both in church and state.[5] In estimating the harsh policy of the authorities this insidious propaganda of *anti-social* (no less than *anti-dogmatic*) tenets must not be forgotten. The *popular* origin of the satir

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[1] It must be remembered that Gnosticism is *earlier* than Christianity.

[2] Cf. Dähnhardt *Natursagen*, Berlin 1907.

[3] I may refer to my *Constit. Hist. R.E.* (Longmans 1910, vol. ii, 13, 151, 173, 181, 325, 391, 469, 472) as well as to earlier pages of this work for the Paulicians and the imperial policy of transplanting whole tribes of eastern sectaries into the empty districts of Macedon and Thrace.

[4] Cf. edit. of *Wisdom of Ahiquar*, Rendel Harris & Conybeare.

[5] The parallel in the west would be 'Reineke Fuchs' (see p. 766)

is quite evident: the lower classes of Europe may justly say, with the latin critic, *satira quidem tota nostra est.* In it none are assailed more violently than the clergy. Moses Gaster believes in a 'deliberate attempt to lower 'and destroy the influence and authority of the Church in general and of 'its ministers in particular: only partizans of heterodox teaching could 'find pleasure and profit in applying beast-tales to break down the walls 'of the Church'. This outspoken criticism did not arise within the orthodox ramparts; it was imported wholesale from without. When under Innocent III the Church awoke to its danger (after spasmodic attempts at repression), when the Christian pantheists become an acknowledged sect of immoral tendency, when arab learning brought in a medley of undigested lore—Peter Cloot was burnt at Paris (*1208*) for heresy; he is believed to be a writer in the *Reynard* cycle and its connexion with heterodox views is not for a moment in dispute.

Carried About by Bogomil Dualists.—Thus the Rumanian tales owe their present shape (if not origin) to the dualistic preaching of manichee bogomils, and through their medium have come across from Syria and Asia Minor to the Balkans, from Tephrikè to Philippopolis. They were carried further west in the spread of heresy which alarmed all rulers alike after *1000*. From this school learnt Russians and Bulgars, Saxons and Huns. As these notions are modern so are the tales of relatively recent origin. They are not local survivals of primitive and pelasgic paganism but 'sparks from a great light that fell down from heaven' (Gaster), echoes of gnostic cosmogony. The lapse of angels and man's creation are blended together (as indeed in Origen's first scheme of Christian theology). Under many names this teaching is one, and in substance may be traced back to the orphists of *600* B.C.

Orphic and Gnostic Affinities.—There are two rival creators at work in the world, and the universe (as in norse myth) is parted out between the powers of light and darkness. The latter wishes to share in (or to steal) the virtue of the former.[1] This idea forms the basis of the Prometheus legend and of the orphic Titan story. The devil or lower demiurge thieves some of the empyrean fire and scatters it in sparks under the load of matter, that it may never escape: 'these sparks are the human soul deeply embed-'ded in clay, anxious always to be reunited with the ancient glory' (Gaster). These angelic scintillations become here glow-worms,[2] the heavenly

[1] See Story xv, 'Devil Stealing the Sun': when Peter, John, and Elias had left, 'the heathen gods stormed paradise and have taken away 'the moon, the stars, the sun and the throne of judgment: they have 'carried it all away into hell.' Elias or *Ilie* helps the angels and saints to recover it. Gaster well suggests that in this syncretism, the story and properties of the prophet Elijah have become mixed with the character of the sun-god Helios.

[2] Angels are sent (Story iv 74) to earth and one falls in love with an earth-maiden, as in Genesis; when the rest were turned into bright and happy stars 'to smile joyful and kindly upon the earth' (although unworthy to enter the courts of heaven and bearing tidings of the world's

light shining faintly through the vesture of decay. We hear of the Fall of Rebel Angels in these stories and of angelic rulers of the star spheres.

Ground Prepared by Gothic Arianism since *350*.—Lastly, we may ask how the sectaries were able to spread their doctrine westwards with such prompt and lasting effect? It may be replied briefly: they followed the track of the arian Goths and sowed their seed upon soil already well prepared to receive it. It is now held probable that the Goths migrated from the west shore of the Caspian—within the circle of Avesta and *parsi* influence—under pressure from mongolic disturbances in the seething cauldron of Central Asia. Thence they settled between Ural and Don and in cent. ii A.D. are found in the modern Rumania and the ancient Pannonia. Becoming arians (c. *300*) the bulk of the nation (so far as it survived) was never converted: they remained, even when gothic kings in Spain and Lombardy became orthodox, quite staunch to the peculiar arian compromise. Just 700 years before the Albigensian Crusade, Clovis the catholic attacked the heretics under King Alaric in the country north of the Pyrenees. Here too (as we saw) the priscillianist movement (a form of Mani's dualism) enjoyed a brief and stormy existence and was driven underground rather than extinguished. Meantime in the Balkans, Slavs under the leadership of Bulgars form kingdoms and these masters and organizers hail from the old home of the Goths near the Volga. When they are converted (after king Boris, the first Christian convert *c. 850*) the heresy of Bogomils and Cathars is found spreading to such an extent as to menace the very existence of the orthodox church. When Rome and the eastern church broke away from communion, the breach enabled the sectaries midway between them to win new influence through the mutual hate and reproaches of the two parties.

Sectarian Appeal to the Common People: Bible Translated.—Thus they reached the heart of the people, while the orthodox churches continued to maintain official tongues, a formal liturgy, and a fixed doctrinal system into which the unlearned could not enter. These preachers (like Ulfilas [1]

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evil ways) the angel who wanted to return was changed to a fiery and unsteady star. This in the end God hurled down to earth, bursting into a shower as it fell: 'The sparks never died out; the glow-worms carry them 'still'. It may here be noted that the very egyptian *soul-pilgrimage after death* (*Story* xviii 343) bids the soul pass on unharmed until 'in mercy thou 'hast gained the *seven heavy Toll-houses* ', analogous to the seven planetary spheres of the gnostics and of earlier chaldeism, through which the soul can only pass securely by the use of magic and words of power.

[1] *c.* 311–383 A.D.: of a cappadocian family taken prisoner in 264 by the gothic raiders: sent as envoy to Constantinople 332 he was ordained bishop and sent back to his own country in 341. With the sanction of Emperor Constance II 349 he led a great colony of his converts across the Danube to escape from the fury of the persecuting gothic king Athanaric. This was settled in Mœsia at the foot of Hæmus, near the modern Trnova, which developed into a peaceable and pastoral community; but, as we can see later, never lost the traces and prejudices of its heretical origin.

some centuries before) offered religion in a popular form ; Scriptures were translated and subsidiary legends written of an edifying character. It was Ulfilas' outstanding merit that he rendered the Bible into gothic. The use of the vernacular was a distinctive mark of both arians and later sectaries. In the Balkans so great was their dislike of the catholic establishment that on the arrival of muslim conquerors, prominent cathars in Dalmatia and Bosnia embraced islam with readiness.[1] It is thus clear that the medieval rulers had good reasons for believing the sectaries of Provence to be a muslim outpost in some sense ; for those evangelists who came westward to make proselytes and attack existing conditions had left behind kinsmen who were warm adherents of Islam. Even in gothic Spain the Council of Toledo (*589*), after the Court had abjured the arian creed, put under anathema ' the abominable treatises which we ' composed to seduce provincials into arianism '.[2] All the sectaries used popular writings in the vernacular ; their clergy disputed with success against catholic priests owing to their greater knowledge of Scripture.

The ' forbidden books ' [3] were preserved in slavonic and rumanian versions and some are to be discovered to-day held in high honour by russian sectaries. The oldest french rendering of the Bible was the work of Albigenses : the Church forbade the use of it at Toulouse in *1229*, and some time before, a translation had been publicly burnt as a work of the devil. Arius had (as we know) tried to popularize his views in rhythmical songs for sailors and artizans and had also enlisted the aid of popular melody. This religious minstrelsy made a deep impression on the ignorant and unlettered, as upon the welsh to-day. The Church knew of no such popular tunes or methods ; the service was conducted by, and was intelligible to, the clergy alone.[4] St. Ambrose may have tried to imitate the enemy ; *fas est et ab hoste doceri.*

Ebionism and Unfounded Charge of Devil Worship.—In theology the folk-stories are ebionistic—where our Lord is named (and this is by no means frequent) He is depicted as a *deified* human being : God Himself is more like Ialdabaoth of the Gnostics than the distant sovereign of the hebrews, Jehovah. But He is well meaning though not all powerful,

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[1] Not that this *unitarian* creed was strictly suitable to their tenets, but even this monism had been tempered by doctrines of Sheitan, Eblis and the djinns.

[2] King Recared, now a penitent convert, is speaking of his and his people's former misdeeds.

[3] The mass of sectarian *apocrypha* had outspoken *dualistic* views : the *Lucidaria*, as known in versions prepared for the west, had been thoroughly purged of extreme heterodoxy, that possible converts might not be frightened off.

[4] The former marks for distinguishing high and low church—surpliced choir in a confined chancel space as contrasted with a west-end gallery with epicene singers—bear witness to this : hymns are strictly illegal and the anthem alone is allowed, to be sung by professional and semi-clerical vicars-choral—not by the people at large.

and (as with Zoroaster or Priscillian) snakes, wolves and toads are made by the devil. The Bogomils do not *bring in* Christianity as evangelists: they rather *contaminate* it where it already exists by offering a specious world-theory for which some detached phrases of Scripture lend support. They made up a religion of their own 'clothing it' (says Gaster) 'in beautiful 'tales, answering the expectation and satisfying the curiosity of the rank 'and file, giving a glimpse of the moral-beauty which underlay the work of 'creation. They tended to purify the heart and elevate the soul by alle-'gories, parables, apologues' (*op. cit.* 52). The russian sectaries continue to this present hour to hold these tenets of Mani and to practise customs utterly repugnant to church theory and discipline. It is not a little singular that these foes of the Evil Principle should be regarded as devil-worshippers by the orthodox rabble. In heresy-hunts and witch-burning (reaching its zenith among protestant nations) this charge was the 'basic 'principle, chief head of accusation: it was clearly devised against the 'followers of the dualistic teaching' (Gaster). The *perfecti* (Story xxii, 123) were accused of being the devil's servants, able to turn themselves into cats and dogs at will—the cat being his special favourite. It was said that they enticed the world to his worship and almost succeeded in detaching whole nations. Any public distress might be ascribed to their machinations and people have always been ready to trace their own ills, troubles or losses, to such malevolent agency. By a curious irony it was the very dualism of the ascetic Cathars—together with the vague catholic belief that every effort is justified against the devil's (supposed) votaries —which led to the increase of superstition which we have remarked and, through terror of sorcery and witchcraft, to the Holy Office of the Inquisition.

NOTE: · Reineke Fuchs.

The latin form is perhaps oldest and *Reinardus* may date from cent. xi or even x: it was written by flemish priests. *Le Roman de Renart* (40,000 lines,) appears in France between *1150* and *1350* as a vehicle of satiric comment by burgher-poets on the vices of the great and the abuses of church and state. It was an alsatian or suabian monk, Glichezar, who based his version on the french (1180); hitherto the beast-epic was represented only by the latin *Ecbasis captivi* (ed. Vogt, Strassburg 1875). In *1498* appeared a low-saxon version of the flemish poem *Reinaert de Vos*. It is a parody of human life and the struggle for existence, written in a cynical spirit: it is the apotheosis of selfish craft: sly hits at medieval statecraft, manners, religion, are obvious. A danish version does not appear till the era of reform, *1555*. The Dutch had a version three centuries earlier by William the Minstrel. Richard Garnett calls the poem 'a 'genuine expression of the staid and homely teutonic mind'. The lively gallic spirit gave it sting and bitterness; even Philip IV is said to have annoyed Pope Boniface by representing Reynaud's Procession (Cf. Carlyle *For. Quart. Rev.* 1831.)

APPENDIX F

Manichee Revivalism in Modern Russia

The russian sectaries (*raskolniki*) are the direct descendants of the bogomil propagandists. In spite of their harmless quietism and innocent lives it requires only a turn of temperament to convert a schismatic into a dangerous mutineer; and to-day the Czardom had to face much the same problems that confronted church and state in cent. xiii. The religious, Christian, idealist basis of Anarchism is of course obvious. Like the French Revolution it gathered all its strength from a few disconnected axioms or promises in the New Testament. Here once again, 'quakers' have become practical destroyers of government and the social order; and although these violent reformers form a minority in the sects and disavow any religious influence, the powers of the State regard all schismatics with equal disfavour on their account.

While sects (or at least opinions and modes of life) similar to catharism have enjoyed an unbroken life among the slavonic peoples, it cannot be doubted that the western sympathies of the Czardom, antedating Peter's accession, brought out their antagonism. The Old Believers struggled against polish luxury and latin heresy from *1656* onwards, their conviction inspired the rising of the Strelitzi on more than one occasion against dangerous novelties. The new coercive and germanized State-system was held in abhorrence. Some extremists (the *Bez-popovtsi*) regard the orthodox church as the craven instrument of Antichrist (the heretic Czar) and reject the priest's ministry. They acknowledge only the rite of baptism, and elect proper persons (as they think) to administer it; they observe rigorous fasts and attach much value to outward acts of devotion, though some as the Deniers (*nyetovsti*) believe any common or formal worship to be superfluous. Some, like the gymnosophists of Hindustan, believe in self-immolation as the fitting end of the religious life.[1] Several sects reject legal marriage and do not settle in homes, as the Pilgrims (*stranniki*) and the Runners (*byeguni*).

Fanatical sects, perhaps not fairly to be traced to the Old Believers, are the Flagellants (*khlysti*), an eastern counterpart of a phenomenon familiar enough in the west. In *1645* God the Father descended on Mount Gorodim into the body of a peasant and chose another peasant as His Son, the Christ—a curious revival of the older incarnationist doctrines. Suslov as Christ chose 12 apostles and a Mother of God. Twice executed, he rose again and did not die till *1716*, after appointing a successor. The several communities have a Christ and a *theotokos*, who receive worship in virtue of the spirit of God dwelling in them. Believers; male and female, must take these as a model and subdue the flesh, which is the creation of the Evil One. As in buddhism and amongst early quakers, marriage and the use of meat and wine are forbidden. Their meetings are marked by

[1] These are named from a certain Philip who burned himself alive for the Redeemer's sake under Empress Anna in 1743.

solemn dances, becoming wild like the dervishes' ritual waltzes, ending in convulsions, catalepsy, or prophesying with tongues.

The *skoptsi* or self-mutilators go further in their hatred for the present world-order and imitate Origen; the sect is said to have been founded (*c. 1770*) by Selivanoff and Andrei Ivanoff, in an ascetic reaction against the libertine excesses of certain *khlysti*.[1] Sent to Siberia in *1775* Selivanoff returned as the Son of God, incarnate in the person of Peter III (!). This is a very curious analogue to the oriental Imamate and the devotion gathering round the memory of an unhappy monarch, who was believed to have suffered a violent death. He took the name *God of God* and *King of kings*, and lived 18 years in Petrograd in a disciple's house, receiving homage both as heavenly and earthly ruler. Arrested by another madman, Paul I, he was again confined (*1797*) but released under his amiable successor: in *1820* he was once more shut up in a *suzdal* convent, dying in *1832*, more than 60 years after the origin of the sect. This dualist and ascetic program induced nobles and bureaucrats, priests and traders to join the sect. In 20 years (*1847–66*) 755 members were transported to Siberia, and in *1874* the total membership was given at 5444, of whom 863 were actual self-mutilators; in *1876*, 130 were transported after a single trial. Some have escaped to Rumania. Marriage is not wholly rejected nor is the end of the species desired; but, as in the conventual system, the perfection of the *unit* is the true religious aim and not the welfare of a society or a church. They dance like the dervishes to induce spiritual exaltation; their meetings are held late at night and under oath of secrecy; a form of Eucharist invented by Selivanoff is also celebrated. They buy children from the poor to educate in the tenets of the sect: when it numbers a thousand gross (Rev. xiv) a Messiah shall arise and a reign of the saints will be set up on earth. It is said that their favourite trade is that of *moneychanger*, perhaps on account of the apocryphal saying of Christ, *ἐστὲ ἀγαθοὶ τραπεζῖται*.[2] Of the whole of this movement of resignation and celibacy, Tolstoy and Dostoieffsky are merely the literary exponents, in a gospel of pain and surrender.

The *molokani*, who continue to drink milk (*moloko*) even during fasts, are first heard of soon after Peter III's murder in *1762* (which handed over Russia to a german princess under the influence of french sceptical enlightenment, and certainly gave an impetus to religious, as later to political, discontent). They call themselves the 'truly spiritual', reject the sacraments, are careless of all external forms and interpret scripture by allegory and symbol. The Doukhobors (*dukhobortsi*) even set the Inner Light

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[1] Both these mystical sects deny the efficacy of minister and sacrament, but the *khlysti* hold their 'pentecostal' dances in secret and outwardly profess conformity: their affinity to the ancient Euchites or Messalians is obvious.

[2] K. K. Grass has published at Leipzig (1904–07) two monographs on the *skoptsi* scriptures and on the russian sects in general. Cf. N. Tsakni *Russie Sectaire* (1888) and Bonwetsch in Herzog-Hauck *Realenc.* on *Raskolniken* (ed. 3, vol xvi 436, 1905.)

above Scripture and, with the *Molokani*, deny civil authority and refuse military service—without which Russia would relapse into a mass of disconnected slavonic *mirs*. First heard of *c. 1750*, they became obnoxious to the russian church-state which began a severe repressive policy. They are dualists like their prototype, the bogomil sect, and hold the very ancient orphic belief that the soul of man, once on the divine plane (the gnostic *pleroma*), has fallen from grace and happiness into this carnal world. Incarnation of God in Christ is not a solitary historic event of immense moment but is again and again repeated in the faithful: each believer can be truly termed God (in a sense) when he has fully opened his heart to the indwelling Spirit. God's spirit is present in man's soul and directs his actions. Christ appeared in order to give an example of suffering for truth's sake. He still suffers when we do not live 'according to the spirit'. The visible Church and all outward or formal acts are to them as nothing. Though they assemble on fixed days, greeting each other as vehicles of the Holy Ghost, they only pray inwardly and in silence. Their notion of love, as sole virtue and method of social intercourse, their doctrine of the absolute equality of all living creatures [1], lead to collision with the bureaucracy and the laws of the State; though they profess willingness to obey in all matters where conscience is not wronged. Industrious and peaceable, they show a high standard of Christian living like the Quakers, and their emigrants to Canada (from *1899* onwards) bear the best moral character as useful and inoffensive citizens. The absolute agreement of this sect in life and doctrine with the ascetic dualists of our period is incontestable. We can even go further back and see in them the descendants both of Euchites and Essenes. The 'passive resister' and the 'conscientious objector' in our own country is likewise affiliated to these early despisers of militarism and the coercive State.

[1] This is a distinctly eastern trait.

CHAPTER IX (*a*) THE MENDICANT ORDERS

Section I. The Orthodox Franciscans

Heretical Influence on Church Reform.—Hildebrand and Cluny had opposed to the puritan dualists of cent. xi, a reform of the secularized church, very closely imitating many of the enemies' tactics and in fact complying with their chief demands. Again, in cent. xiii the Mendicant Orders were established to rival the unworldly poverty and missionary zeal of the non-conformists. Once started, this movement advanced with great speed. *Dominic* died in *1221*, *Francis of Assisi* five years later; but by the middle of the century the Orders had spread over Europe and Asia and numbered their friars by thousands. The great cities were no longer left to the free-thinking burghers and the chairs of the Universities were held by brethren. From their ranks came the chief divines and scholastics of the Constructive Age, and from them came the final effort to close up the breaches in medieval thought. About *1250* arose Carmelites, Austin Friars, and Servites; lesser societies sprang up with such luxuriance that the Council of Lyons (*1274*) suppressed all but five and refused leave for the creation of new brotherhoods. In close connexion with the Franciscans, also arose the lay Tertiaries whose example was followed by the *Humiliati*.

New Voluntary Associations.—This movement of *voluntary associations*, contrasted with the rigid ties of *status* or *political allegiance*, must have met and satisfied an earnest popular demand. The individual finds that membership of the two great objectives, church and state, does not respond to his subjective needs, whether earthly or spiritual. The State indeed was but just passing out of feudal compromise and counterpoise into its modern and unitary, that is autocratic, phase. Long established systems and institutions began to make conscious appeal to his loyalty or his intellect: dogma, having been challenged by heresy, was now reduced to a *corpus* of reasoned truth. For the zealous to be a churchman was not enough; they must of their

own choice and freewill take vows and come joyfully under a severe discipline. The Mendicant Orders mark the first impulses of *individualism*; like the Jesuits later, they aim (it is true) at *reaction*, but it is by new methods and from a fresh standpoint. The death knell of *caste* and *status* is sounding. The object of the new aggregations is the defence, by flying squadrons and guerilla warfare, of a religious monarchy, no longer able to depend on its slow-moving regular troops or militia. In a sense they mark (like the cluniac movement) a recognition of defeat: the heretics declaimed against a rich and worldly church and strove to revive the poverty of the early Christians.

Interest in the Neglected Classes.—The towns (as in our own day) had grown unwieldy and were no longer properly served with clergy; the italian cities were careless and secularist while at the same time willing to respect devotion and single-mindedness in others. The pendulum since cent. xi had begun to swing back from *rural* or *urban* communities: and the bishop and baron were left high and dry in their remote castles while the tide of the trading movement swept past them. The parochial system had broken down and the massed populace made light of the control or guidance of the church. The friars (like the dualist *colporteurs*) travelled about preaching. Or they set up in the poorest urban districts and worked by preference in the 'east end'.

Wide Sympathies: Democratic and Nominalist.—But though their supreme interest was directed towards a religious and social revival, all the new tendencies in reason and faith, in art and science, found a welcome with the mendicant friars. If monks were in this century the chief schoolmen and systematizers, they were also the first humanists. Many, turning from subtleties of dogma and fixing their thoughts on the practical needs of poor and sinful men, bring once more into prominence the human life and example of Christ. Hence the impetus to a movement known by the vague title of *democracy*, which is strictly only *nominalism* applied to society. In place of universal terms gathering up the component and contemptible atoms, interest began to centre round the experience of individuals—not merely in the mystical, but in the actual, world. This subjective interest found vent in the universities, where all things were discussed with a growing tendency towards a utilitarian standpoint;

and also in the busy urban communes where pioneers of democratic freedom knocked steadily at the doors of privilege.

Early Franciscan Poverty and Simple Life.—The ideal of apostolic poverty is the root-principle of Francis of Assisi, and he was followed by Dominic and other founders. He meant his brothers to work (as Vaudois ministers did) for their own living; they were to have recourse to the alms of the faithful only if other means of livelihood failed. But as spiritual duties and summons thickened, it was found difficult to follow the trade of a handicraftsman. Into a rigid system which tolerated no funds, no revenue and no lands, there crept the modifications and concessions to worldly circumstances, which caused serious troubles within the Franciscan Order and have to-day been generally accepted by monastic communities.

The Penitents of Assisi, or Minors (*c. 1210*) had no fixed abode but lived in huts of branches; they went about in couples [1] dressed in peasants' clothes; they did field work and mixed with labourers and outcasts, carrying the message of God's kingdom to the lowly and distressed. They put by nothing for the morrow and were forbidden to receive or store money. No ascetic practice was enjoined; they might eat whatever was set before them, even meat, and recognized no fast beyond the usual days of obligation. There was no formal noviciate, no attempt to organize. Missions were started to Moors and Saracens, and in the years *1217–1219* provinces under their own officials were set up in France, Germany, Spain, Hungary and Palestine. The first Chapters, as in other *democratic* societies were attended by the whole body, but after *1219* only by officials and provincial deputies.

Papal Recognition: and Schism of the Lax and the Rigorists.—In *1220* Francis found that he must have his 'Order' recognized and made authentic. Honorius III granted a Bull, which made the brethren an Order in the technical sense: the noviciate was to last a year and the vows then taken were to last for life. Francis died in *1226* and next year John Parenti succeeded, to be at once confronted with the question of poverty and its limits and its obligation. Gregory IX denied the binding character of Francis' Testament, as the general Chapter had not given its sanction;

[1] Like the Vaudois ministers in later times, *c.* 1530; no doubt in obedience to a very early Gospel tradition.

trustees were now allowed to hold money, and administer property on behalf of the Order. John and the rigorist party (zealots or spirituals) made protest, but he was displaced in *1232* and Elias of Cortona became head, under whom the Order increased and prospered. After seven years, Elias' worldly politics and (as it was said) his lax conduct provoked a reaction in which the Academics of Paris and of Oxford bore a leading part: he was deposed in the very presence of Gregory IX. The democratic extremists at this time disliked the conversion of a simple brotherhood into a papal Order, the learned studies and the attendance of members at Universities. They desired to return to the booths and the street preaching of the first members, to the arduous work amongst the very poor. Elias had persecuted them; some were beaten, several put in prison, and one killed while trying to escape. Into this voluntary system there had already entered the stern voice of autocracy and methods of coercion. Between them and the party of relaxed discipline, were the great bulk of Moderates, anxious to keep the distinctive marks of Francis' own spirit but approving a development by worldly influence, by learning, by science and by academic studies such as the other Orders allowed. This party included most friars in England, Germany and France and it was their persistence that expelled Elias.

Progress of Disaffection.—Under John of Parma (*1247–1257*) the Zealots (or 'intransigeant' element) came into power, while the whole Order became entangled with the mystical and prophetic views of Joachim of Floris and were accused of heresy and dangerous apocalyptic extravagance. John resigned and St. Bonaventura [1] ruled for the next seventeen years, a longer tenure than any preceding ruler. Belonging to the Moderates, he tried to hold the balance, but the Zealots were driven into open mutiny against this well-meant compromise. The latent puritan separatism (which Francis had for some time held at bay

[1] The attitude of the Moderates towards the abuses of a wealthy and feudalized church could not be better stated than in his words (*In Sentt.* IV xxxvii i, 3) in favour of clerical celibacy: 'If bishops and archbishops now 'had children, they would rob and plunder all the goods of the church, so 'that little or nothing would be left for the poor. For since they now heap 'up riches and endow nephews, albeit removed from them by wellnigh 'incalculable degrees of affinity, what would they do if they had legitimate 'children as their heirs?'

by his new brotherhood) now became overt. Several heretical sects were formed resembling the montanists of old and, like them, claiming a special and personal illumination. Even when the Council of Vienne decided in *1312* on a strict application of the rule (the *usus pauper et tenuis* of worldly goods), some formed a schism in Provence.[1] The Inquisition brought twenty-five before its tribunal and sent four to the stake at Marseilles in *1318*.

Observants, Strict but Orthodox.—The next movement towards internal reform was that of the *Observants* (*c. 1310*) who restored a moderate strictness of life, but allowed study. In *1517* Leo X wisely divided the Order into two sections, recognizing that the austere party must be satisfied without being permitted to assume sole control. The *Conventuals* were permitted under papal Bulls and dispensations to hold property in their corporate capacity like other Orders, while the strict *Observants* were allowed to follow Francis' own rule. It is worthy of notice that the english friars chiefly belonged to the moderate party but nobly upheld the idea of poverty down to the Visitation of the spoilers under Henry VIII. To the Order belonged Roger Bacon, Alexander of Hales, and those great renewers of the philosophic standpoint, Duns Scotus and William of Occam.

Section II. The False Franciscans or Little Brothers

Heretical and Revolutionary Development.—The name *Fraticelli* was given to a number of sects which attempted to lurk under the disguise of the franciscan mantle. Already in *1238* within twelve years of Francis' decease, Gregory IX denounces as forgers (*falsarii*) those who use the mendicant habit for private vanity or for unauthorized ends. Dolcigno (already mentioned as a puritan leader) was called *fratricello* ' being no brother of an ' Order under rule '.[2] In *1317* John XXII classes the fraticelli together with ' Brethren of the Poor Life, Bizocchi, Beguines ', as *profanæ multitudinis viri*. Next year he fulminates against the fraticelli of Sicily, gathered under Henry of Ceva, in the Bull *Gloriosam Ecclesiam*. Here a section of the Zealots or rigorists had been made welcome by Frederic of Sicily when expelled through the animosity of Boniface VIII. At first holding them-

[1] No doubt finding that the Albigenses had left traditions of austerity and unworldliness, as infallible tokens of membership of the true Church.

[2] John Villani in his contemp. *Chronicle*.

selves to be the only true followers of Francis, they advanced (as the Montanists) to the position that in them was to be found the only true Catholic Church. Excommunicated as rebels and schismatics, 'preachers of false and pestiferous doctrines', they elected a general and in *1313* a pope who took the name Celestine in memory of that truly spiritual pontiff whom Boniface had compelled to resign by artifice.

Cultus of Celestine V: his Brief Papacy.—Born of poor parents and *indoctus libris*, this simple benedictine hermit, Peter, had founded in the Abruzzi a small community of ascetics (*c. 1260*): there was little in common between the Order of Benedict and the new *Celestines*. After a long papal vacancy on Nicolas IV's death in *1294*, Charles of Naples insisted on a Conclave and the cardinals believed that they could rule in the name of the pious hermit Peter. His election as Celestine V was hailed by apocalyptic dreamers and followers of Joachim, no less than by earnest reformers who believed that only the unworldly and monastic ideal could regenerate the times. After ruling for six months he resigned in December, to enjoy relief from the burden of government and enjoy more leisure for devotion and ascetic practice. He died in *1296* and was canonized in *1313* by the Avignonese pontiff, Clement V. He had induced the ancient house of Benedictines on Monte Cassino to accept his novel system of ascetic rules and discipline; and fifty of his 'celestine hermits' were sent thither. But his nominees were expelled in the secular reaction which brought in Benedict Gaetano under the name Boniface VIII and ended in the ruin of the papacy and in the 'babylonian exile'. Peter (or Celestine V) was in close sympathy with the extreme party of Franciscans and tried to unite them with his own hermits in a single body. This union did not survive his downfall. But in the choice of a papal title in *1313* there is clearly a regretful look thrown back on the last spiritual pontiff for whom worldly influences had been too strong.[1]

[1] As to the views and character of his successor Boniface VIII much difference of opinion has prevailed; inquiry seems however to show (1) that the Bull of 1302 *Unam Sanctam* is authentic and in the main drafted by the pope himself, a man learned in civil and canon law and formerly advocate and notary at the papal court: in stating the prerogative he outdistances Hildebrand or Innocent III; (2) that the charges of heresy cannot be easily dismissed as an idle and prejudiced french calumny against the man whom the king was bent on ruining; Boniface may have held

Alarming Competition : Rival Pope.—Their brethren in Tuscany were vigorously attacked by the Inquisition : in Florence severe laws were made but as a whole the people prevented their application. Wibellines gave the new sect a warm welcome as a useful anti-papal engine. Puritans who desired to leave the church altogether were induced to join them and Rienzi at one time thought of becoming a member. More orthodox Franciscans sought by patient pleading to bring the Fraticelli back to the fold,—such as da Trinci, Stronconi and St. Bernardine of Siena in the years *1396–1400*. The popes were alarmed at the social influence no less than the dogmatic errors of the sect, and Martin V, after attacking them in two Bulls (*1418-1421*) entrusted legates with the duty of pursuit. In *1426* he proclaimed a special crusade against the heretics, with two Observants as inquisitors without limit of district, Capistrano and della Marca.

Difficult Suppression of the Fraticelli.—From the latter's account we learn [1] that, like the Cathars, they formed a rival church and a distinct and 'antinomian' society. They had an 'emperor' of the Christians' one Majoretto, and a pope Rinaldo (*1429*) and a successor called Gabriel ; he bore the title 'bishop of Philadelphia'—a mystical name for the true church. There were bishops of Florence, Venice and some sicilian towns ; and at Peniscola in *1423*, there lived a heretic pope with his college of cardinals, no attempt being made at concealment. The fiery attacks of the papacy lasted nearly a quarter of a century (*1425–1449*) before the sect could be finally crushed. The people, always a factor of importance in the growth or suppression of heresy, had transferred their respect and support to the *Observants*, in which body Capistrano had been already recognized as a worker of miracles. Executions took place between *1466–1471* and in the latter year Scarlino was sent to the Tuscan court to hunt out the

certain *averroist* doctrines and denied the personal survival of the soul after death. Among later works may be named Loserth *Gesch. des spätiren Mittelalters* (Munich 1903) ; H. Finke's *Aus den Tagen* B. viii (Münster 1902) and *Kirchen Lex.* xii. (1901) ; Schotz' work on the 'Publicists under 'Philip the Fair and B. viii' (Stuttgard 1903) ; Wenck's inquiry into his heretical opinions (von Sybel's *Hist. Zeitsch.* Munich 1905), Mirbt's *Quellen zur Gesch. des Papsttums* (Tübingen 1901),—to which Robinson's *Readings in Eur. Hist.* (vol i Boston 1904) may be added.

[1] *Dial. c. Fratic.* in Baluze and Mansi *Miscell.* iv.

last survivors. Thereafter the heretical name vanishes from the page of history.

(β) NEW MOVEMENTS AFTER *1200*

Section I. The New Apocalyptic: Joachim and his Followers

Various Influences upon the New Scholastic Age.—The division of scholastic efforts into two periods is well marked and indisputable. In John of Sarum we see a critical and in some sense ironical spirit, which ushers in a time of barrenness and exhaustion. An entirely new stimulus can be clearly detected in the opening years of cent. xiii. We have no right to assert that, apart from this novel and foreign impulse, the mind of western Christendom would have settled down into a stagnant and byzantine idleness. Nevertheless, its future departures and heroic achievements are due to an inrush of new ideas. To the Christian world Arabs and Jews made 'a rich but dangerous present'[1] in the complete works of Aristotle and his commentators. We have seen how, through jewish mediation and at first under such clerical patrons as Archbishop Raimund of Toledo (*c. 1130*), these writings passed northwards from Spain, then the chief hearth of culture, into the long disaffected districts of southern France. Amongst other works we have the jewish *Fons Vitæ* by Avicebron, the *Liber de Causis*, and the *Theology* of Aristotle—all three neoplatonic compilations, and the two latter passing as genuine writings of the Philosopher, esteemed amongst the muslim as the greatest of mankind. The basic principle was, perhaps, emanation of all creatures from God in ranks of ever decreasing perfection. On the other hand, a very distinct claim is put forward for the value and permanence of the physical universe. The reaction was natural: if God be remote and only in modified sense a providential ruler, both man and the world must come by their independent rights. This corresponds to the catholic vacillation in the church between *magical* and *pelagian* views of human nature and the use of the sacraments. Above and beyond reason in both religions was sometimes set a mystical faculty, a higher state of the conscious spirit, which is either man himself at his best or the influx and indwelling of God.

[1] This is Hauréau's expression *Hist. Phil. Scol.* vol. i 382 ed. 2, Paris 1870.

Dangers of Earlier Realism Disclosed : Sympathy with the Unit.—It is certain that later scholastics (like Aquinas) found that the current realism, adopted to safeguard *theology*, had introduced a very perilous conception into *anthropology*. The ' distinction ' of natures' as in the earlier epoch of *Christology* had to be carefully preserved. Against the purely intellectual character of this highest gift or development in man, arose a protest on the side of emotion and the heart. A novel sympathy was shown with the neglected poor disciple, on whose behalf the Church was now consciously exerting herself by means of the Mendicant Orders. The two chief doctrines fathered on Averroes—(1) the world's eternity : (2) unity of Intellect—seemed to destroy the peculiar meaning and value of average man and to pour contempt on his struggles after perfection. The great Summists of cent. xiii are, it is true, still *realists* ; even Duns Scotus has not yet broken away from the orthodox doctrine. But all writers of this second period are on their way to inductive and empirical science in the religious area. They are advancing steadily towards recognition of the finality and worth of the singulars, towards the adjustment to their several needs and welfare of every objective canon. We notice that when religion seems to become more accommodating and sympathetic, the Civil State, as if suddenly conscious of a new mission, becomes more exacting. Thus, while inward faith tends to be a matter of pure individual conviction and freedom, outward life and conduct has to submit to a regimentation, growing always more rigorous down to the present hour.

The Mystical Movement.—Unorthodox cosmic rationalism was by no means the chief result or lesson of the jewish and arabic teaching. We have seen that Averroes can display a *mystical* side with perfect sincerity. It is not only peripatetic science but platonic religiosity which Christendom has to accept. Thus in the first years of cent. xiii there is a revival of a daring pantheism in which the individual found a consecration of his own inward impulses and a release from any legal and clerical restraint. The ascetic leader of this development (which might clearly be either wholesome or pernicious) was Abbot Joachim of Floris. It is now well known that the forebodings of the advent of the Evil One upon earth and the Final Judgment of mankind must be transferred from the mythical date *1000* to more than

two centuries later.[1] It was Joachim's apocalyptic writings which produced the peculiar atmosphere of alarmed expectancy which enabled welf and wibelline to retort upon each other the name of Antichrist. The visionaries of the extreme Franciscan Left (if I may use the expression) regarded the pope as Antichrist[2] or his forerunner.

Abbot Joachim.—The calabrian abbot taught (*Expos. Magni Abbatis Ioach. in Apoc.*) that *Rome* is Babylon, the Beast rising from the sea *Islam*, the False Prophet the *heresies* then swarming; and that the present age would soon draw to its close, giving place to the Millennium. The chiliasm of the sectaries is always a mark of democratic claims and deep discontent; wherever it appears it betokens hatred of a secularized church and a foreign and selfish authority. Within the church itself this hope comforted the purer souls who longed to return to apostolic poverty and to the equal rights of all faithful people. It unites with, or is a salient feature of, *mysticism* when it ceases to be purely personal. It appears not merely among the pious and fervent but is seen even in practical and modern minds like Occam. Of this Chiliasm the 'Everlasting Gospel' of Joachim was the first semi-official pronouncement, a recognition within the church by one whose loyalty and faith were never doubted—at least in his lifetime.

Born in Calabria near Cosenza *c. 1145*, of noble parents, he served at the Court of Roger, duke of Apulia. He journeyed to Palestine and Byzantium, where he was 'converted' during a plague, in the reign of Manuel Comnenus. By *1177* he was cistercian abbot of Corazzo. He visited Lucius III in *1183*, and Urban III two years later. Clement III writing in *1188* names two of his works, the *Expositio* being one, and urges him to continue the useful task. Finding his monks lax and recalcitrant, he retired from Corazzo and founded an order of his own on Monte Nero,

[1] I do not forget Adso's work written in 954 for Queen Gerburga, *De Ortu et Tempore Antichristi*, but too much stress has been laid on the panic of the closing years of cent. x. Bernard, a thuringian hermit, was perhaps the most strenuous preacher of an imminent doom (+ 960). His views were combated as a dangerous error by one of the most learned clerics of the age, Abbot Abbo of Fleury sur Loire.

[2] To this period belong the *Ludus de A.* edited by Wilh. Meyer, and Milic of Kremsier's *Libellus de A.* By the time of Wiclif and his disciple Purvey the papacy was identified with Antichrist. This conviction upheld Hus and Luther in their struggle and thus one chief article of extreme protestantism can be traced back to Joachim.

the abbey 'of St. John in Fiore'. Favoured by the gifts and patronage of Frederic II and Constance his wife, he did not forfeit the approval of pope Innocent III (*1204*) who confirmed and recognized *Ordo Florensis* and Joachim's proposed rules for its guidance. He had submitted his writings to the Holy See in *1200*. He died in *1202* and did not live to witness the strange perversion of his views and teaching that soon followed. The Lateran Council of *1215* condemned a work on the Trinity emanating from Floris but once more approved the Order. Even as late as *1220* Honorius III issued a Bull recognizing Joachim as orthodox and ordering all men to respect his disciples. He exerted a good influence on the kings of England and France, Richard I and Philip Augustus. His genuine works are accounted to be *Concordia Vet. et Novi Test.* (Venice *1519*), *Psalterium Decem Chordarum* and *Expositio in Apocal.* (both Venice *1527*).

His Three Ages of the World : from Montanus.—It is hard to decide upon the genuine and spurious works of one so highly favoured by the Church and yet supposed in later times to be her bitterest foe. In his authentic works Joachim's views are simple and, to be candid, unoriginal. In the *Expositio* i 5 he defines the Three Ages [1] of Father (*Law*) Son (*Gospel*) and Holy Spirit : each is preceded by a time of brooding or incubation ; though God only revealed Himself fully to Abraham, the apprenticeship of our race began with Adam. St. Benedict of Nursia is the precursor for the last age which opens in *1260*. In the first Age the *Letter* ruled ; in second there was a blend of *Spirit* with *Letter* ; in the last *Spirit* will alone prevail. In the first period only obedience was needed to the law's requirements ; under the Son *study* and *wisdom* were enjoined, as men strove to attain mystical knowledge. The full liberty of the Spirit would arise in a purely monastic age, when contemplation would lead on to intuition and ecstasy : then the only worship would consist of *prayer* and song. Montanus had taught a very similar doctrine of the Three States, believing that revelation culminated in his sect ; Tertullian (as we know) held the same views. This doctrine represents an uprising of a greek-orthodox and hellenic

[1] The *triad*, as a key to the mysteries of theology, nature and thought, is of course familiar to hegelian students and readers of text-books on the history of philosophy : Fichte and Schlegel and Comte show the same feature. But more strange is Vico's adoption of this formula (*New Science*): *first* the Divine Age, when men in their social infancy are ruled by priestly authority, *second* the Heroic, when conquerors govern by brute force, *third* the Human or civilized period—which being ended the cycle begins anew.

ideal against the visible and secular latin church,—of Basil against Benedict, of the *theoretic* against the *practical* life. St. Peter's church will not be abolished, but only purged; and the spiritual monks will supersede an active pastoral hierarchy. In this sabbatic period the world becomes one great convent; Rachel—the practical life—effaces herself before Joseph, conceived as the *contemplative* ideal. Christ's own teaching and the value of external sacraments seem destined to pass away in the new Age; for men will have advanced from symbols (*significantia*) to their substance (*significata*) and faith is swallowed up in sight.

The Theory Adopted by Franciscan 'Spirituals'.—Vague expectation of a New Age or a Messiah may take several forms.[1] Franciscan rigorists believed that their founder was the initiator of this Third Age of the Spirit. Some of their religious houses became centres of an apocalyptic 'joachimism'. The Hermit Hugh of Digne at Hyères with his circle fully believed in the coming triumph of a purely ascetic ideal. John of Parma was elected general of the Order by joachimite partizans in *1247*; and when Alexander IV in the interests of peaceful compromise forced him to resign, they became frankly anti-papal.

Expected Triumph of Ascetic and Encratite Ideal: Condemned.—In *1254* appeared the *Introduction to the Eternal Gospel*, the work of Gerard of Borgo San Donnino, a franciscan 'spiritual'—teaching that the calabrian abbot had supplied the key to Holy Writ and that the eternal sense of Old and New Testament might now be extracted by the new Order in whom Joachim's ideal was already realized. The work was denounced by the Bishop of Paris to Innocent IV, and, under his successor Alexander IV, a Commission at Anagni[2] ordered its destruction (*1255*). The Council of Arles, five years later, condemned Joachim's writings and disciples. The *Expositio* on the Apocalypse was now greatly interpolated and made to include violent onslaughts on the papal system. Beside the Franciscan Order itself, the italian schisms under the Fraticelli and the followers of Segarelli and Dolcigno

[1] Paul D. Alphandéry, Sorbonne Professor of the History of Dogma, has written *Les Idées Morales chez les hétérodoxes latins au début du xiii^e Siècle.*

[2] See H. Denifle's monograph on the 'Eternal Gospel and Anagni 'commission' *Arch. für Liter. und Kirch. gesch. des Mittelalters I.*

were steeped in Joachim's ideas. Roger Bacon was consoled by these hopes of a reign of peace and justice; Dante held Joachim in high esteem (*Par.* xii. 140). Literature grew to vast proportions; the method of exegesis by allegory was adopted by Ubertin of Casale, Bartholomew of Pisa, Telesphorus the calabrian hermit, Seraphin of Fermo, Annius of Viterbo and Cælius Pannonius.[1]

Attack on the Secularized Church: Apostolics.—Various branches of the old buddhist or encratite ideal gathered under the shelter of this name and desired to break wholly with a secularized church. In ancient days the Apostolics had rejected marriage and property together with the use of wine and meat.[2] The Cathars of Cologne (*c. 1146*) formed a very similar Society within the church.[3] They forbade marriage, use of meat, baptism of children, cult of saints, ritual fasting, masses for the dead, and the accepted doctrine of the Eucharist. They attacked the priesthood and believed that the whole force of the church had been diverted into secular and profane ambitions. They may have been followers of Henry of Lausanne, and Bernard of Clairvaux does not know a collective title for this ascetic brotherhood.[4] In the environs of Périgueux he met some of Henry's

[1] Preger published in 1874 at Munich and Leipzig lengthy and learned works on this movement, as preparing the way for the german mystics of the following century: Renan treats it in *Nouv. Etudes d'Histoire Relig.* Paris 1884 and in the same year appeared Tocco's *Eresia nel medio evo* Florence 1884; Gebhardt published two years later (1886) 'new inquiries 'into the history of Joachimism' *Revue Hist.* xxxi, and Haupt preceded him very closely *Zur Gesch. des Joachimismus* (*Zeitsch. für Kirch. Gesch.* vii 1885). Among more recent appreciations are Fournier's works (Paris 1900) '*J. de F. ses doctrines son influence* and *Études sur J. de F. et ses doctrines* Paris 1909, Jones' *Studies in Mystical Religion* London 1909, and Workman's *Christian Thought to the Reformation* London 1911. But the article by Dr. Ehrle, Vatican Librarian, in Wetzer's *Kirchenlexikon* must not be overlooked.

[2] The sect was common in the old haunts of montanism (Phryg. Cilic. Pisid. Pamphyl. and central Asia Minor): they upheld a buddhist and essene standard of life and refused to readmit the lapsed, like other rigorist sects. St. Basil knew some but by St. Austin's latter days (*c.* 410) they had become extinct.

[3] The Provost of Steinfeld wrote to St. Bernard about them, Mabillon *V. An.* iii 452.

[4] *Quo nomine istos titulove consebis?* Serm. in *Cantica* lxvi.

disciples in 1146, who[1] condemned earthly riches, denied the value of sacraments, image-cult and good works, were vegetarian celibates and teetotallers. Some time after *1250* the *Apostolic Brethren* arose in Italy from a blend of franciscan and joachimite tenets. Gerard Segarelli was a parmese artizan of pious and earnest temperament whom the Franciscans had rejected for admission to their order. By minute details he strove to conform to the human life of Christ.[2] He walked the streets of Parma chanting *penitenz agite*, and formed a society of peasants and mechanics, living as beggars in chastity, poverty and complete idleness. The church was for some time indulgent; Bishop Opizo protected the sturdy rogues who played at asceticism. Only in *1286* did Pope Honorius IV desire them to enter some recognized Order. They refused and Segarelli was imprisoned: in Germany and England measures had to be taken against the Apostolics.[3] Nicolas IV persecuted the now rebel sect from the year *1291* onwards; Segarelli suffered the extreme penalty of the State in *1300* as a relapsed heretic.

Revolutionary Chiliasm of Dolcino.—Under Dolcino or Dolcigno of Novara, the sect assumed more precise outlines and a more decided anti-papal policy. He wrote a letter after *1300*, announcing that Joachim's Third Age began with the 'martyred' Segarelli and called himself an angel sent from God to explain scripture prophecies. Frederic of Sicily was the conqueror expected. He formed a sect of 4000 under four leaders, including himself and his spiritual Sister, Margaret Franck. In him a mystical antipathy to formal rites and secular business turned into a violent propaganda, communist and strongly anti-sacerdotal. He gave himself a messianic character and announced (like John of Leyden) a sort of millennial kingdom: the theocratic Anabaptists of Munster in cent. xvi could find in him their prototype. Clement V preached a crusade in *1305* against the heresy and the sectarian army entrenched in the Vercelli highlands long resisted the papal power. In March *1307* the ringleader Dolcino was captured and subjected to fearful torture

[1] According to the witness of Herbert the monk.

[2] i.e. he became as the syrian mystics ἰσόχριστος; he was circumcised, wrapped in swaddling clothes and laid in a manger. Cf. the rites of the hindu 'twice-born'.

[3] At Würzburg in 1287, Chichester in 1289.

throughout a whole spring day; Margaret was burnt to death by slow fire. But the sect spread northward into Languedoc and Germany and even westwards into Spain. Councils at Cologne *1306*, Trier *1310*, Spoleto *1311*, condemned them. At Avignon and Toulouse they were fiercely pursued and disappear after *1375*.[1] Villani (*Chron.* viii ch. 84) calls Dolcino 'no brother' of any ordered rule but a *fraticello* without an Order'. Angelo of Clarins in his *Seven Tribulations*, written to glorify the spiritual branch of the Franciscans, calls the Dolcinoists 'disciples of the 'Devil'.[2]

Section II. Fanatics and Puritans in Teutonic Lands

Northern Developments in France and Germany.—The Joachimite movement penetrated also into teutonic lands. Already there appear Beguins and Beghards from the end of cent. xii; associations both for men and women, free indeed from taint of heresy but too independent and unconventional to stand within the permanent favour of the church. Female piety had even before this date taken a free mystical turn, in Hildegard of Bingen and Elizabeth of Schönau with their apocalyptic visions. The next notable figure, Mechthild of Magdeburg, is a very distinct disciple of Joachim, and her work is the oldest of its kind in the german tongue.

Hildegard (*1098–1180*) born of noble parents, educated in the benedictine convent of Disibodenberg where she became abbess in *1136*. Urged to publish her visions she wrote *Scivias* in the years *1141–1151*: St. Bernard acknowledged her as a prophetess and procured her recognition by Eugenius III at Trier in *1148*. Anastasius IV and Adrian IV corresponded with her and Emperors Conrad III and Frederick Barbarossa did the same. She was the most vivid echo of the hopes and fears of an age of ferment and vague spiritual exaltation or expectancy: see Paul Franche's monograph in the series of *Les Saints*, Paris 1903. She has never been formally canonized but finds a place on Sept. 17 in the Roman Martyrology.

Elizabeth of Schönau follows a still earlier female visionary Helentrude

[1] In Germany, Inquisitor Eylard burnt two Apostolics in 1402 at Lubeck and at Wismar.

[2] It will be recalled that the Fraticelli were the latest survivals of this antipapal movement: from Martin V in 1448 down to 1471 Rome was constantly occupied in efforts to suppress them. For 23 years they were hunted down and died out as a sect after losing the favour of the common people: a valuable authority is Inquisitor Giacomo della Marca's *Dial. contra Fraticellos* (Baluze and Mansi *Miscell.* iv 595–610); here again Dr. Ehrle has done good service by his researches.

(a nun of Heerse near Paderborn, before *1050*), in recounting the exploits of the mythical St. Ursula and her companions. She revealed her *clairvoyant* account in a jargon of latin and german and her brother Egbert turned them into clerkly latin. She identified in a trance certain epitaphs found in *1156*, in the roman cemetery at Cologne ; the saintly spirit of St. Verena, Ursula's cousin, used her as a medium and disclosed the martyrdom as occurring under ' Maximus ' (probably Maximianus *305*) : but it is fair to say that Elizabeth did not always trust her own spiritualist disclosures.

In Amalric or Amaury of Bena who died only five years later than Joachim (*1207*) the long submerged views of Erigena came again to the surface and were blended with the theories of the calabrian abbot. As in creation, there is a progressive revelation of God in history also—conceived as Father, Son and Spirit.[1] As Mosaism and the ritual-law came to a term in Christ, so the Church's Sacraments (still savouring of the fleshly and external) were to lose value and efficiency in the light of the coming Dispensation of the Holy Ghost. In the Amalricans[2] God is once more incarnate ; He is, as it were, embodied in a collective group or corporation. The impulses and desires of the flesh are dictated by the Spirit, indeed are His express voice. Here, as in the east, pantheism was combined with an ethical *adiaphory*, which began in a pious reaction against magical forms and the *opus operatum* and ended in the licence of pure subjectivity. The Church was quite just in her theory of affiliation : Erigena's work was solemnly burnt in public in *1225*. The Brethren of the New or Free Spirit[2] spread into the north of France and found a ready welcome among swiss and teutons. Along the Rhine-valley they made numerous converts after *1280* and during the next century, and allied with the

[1] All this is found repeated by modern neo-*trinitarians* like Schelling and Hegel who see in this dogma a remedy against the barren *unitarian* deism of cent. xviii and indeed a key to every mystery of thought or the universe.

[2] These sectaries are accused of reviving the *adiaphory* of the Adamites who gave an antinomian turn to religion in northern Africa (between 150–230) and perhaps set a precedent for the circumcellions. A blend of *ascetic* and *gnostical* (perhaps ophite) views, the school professed to return to Adam's state of innocence before the Fall. They rejected marriage and lived ' without law '. As the eastern sects they held that actions were neither good nor bad, whatever they did. For the Brethren in the later age the hostile epithet ' libertines ' was invented during cent. xiii, and the usual charge of *free-living* was added to that of *free-thought*.

Beghards, corrupting both their doctrine and practice.[1] It is from this 'seed-ground' that Eckhart and the other german mystics sprang up—reactions no doubt wholly moral but only half-orthodox, leading on directly to the great movement of Luther and the purely personal and intimate religion—which, however seldom attained, is the ideal and aim of all protestant teaching.

NOTE.

Beghards and Beguines.

The Beghards and the Beguines are an institution of cent. xii. The now admitted founder was Lambert priest of Liège, + *1187*, called '*le 'bègue quia balbus erat*' Ægid. *Gesta Pontif. Leodens. c. 1251* (it is mere coincidence that the kindred Lollards bear a name connected with *lôllen* = *stammer*). In *1170* he started sisterhoods without vows, mainly for Crusaders' widows: the rules were chastity and good works: the members did not beg but worked with their hands and nursed the sick, leading a common life. Loosely organized, the various houses followed divers paths of development; some were converted to the rule of the tertiaries of Dominic, Francis and the Augustinians. Others fell under the influence of extreme communist mystics, gave up work for the more Christ-like mendicant life (as it was supposed to be), practised cruel tortures and fell away into dangerous heresies. The *male* communities are not mentioned till *1220* (Louvain) and *1228* (Antwerp); they were never so numerous and lapsed more quickly into discredit. Chiefly composed of flemish artizans and, like the *tisserands*, weavers by trade, they had at first an intimate connexion with craft-gilds, which disappeared when mendicancy was recognized as the true spiritual ideal. While some were embodied as tertiaries in the order of friars, the great part like the *circumcellions* (*c. 400* A.D.) in Africa formed groups of sturdy vagrants living on enforced charities; the word being imported into England as *beggar* during cent. xii. (No doubt the harsh repression of vagrancy under the Tudors was partly due to fear of a fanatical religious communism.) Religion was the cloke for their demands. At Trier in *1310* the Synod condemned men 'who under pretext of feigned religion and through hatred of manual 'labour go round begging, holding conventicles and posing before simple 'folk as interpreters of Holy Writ'. Clement V at Vienne next year (*1311*) recognized in them the chief promoters in the spread of heresy. The male communities did not survive cent. xiv, and the female almshouses of the common life were not formally reinstated until the reign of Eugenius IV (*1431–1447*).[2] Before Eckhart the Dominican began to

[1] It cannot be doubted that the extinction of the Universal Empire, the recognized abuses in church government and the constant vacancies in the Holy See had by this date destroyed the people's confidence in a *disinterested tutelary system*; on which confidence Authority must always depend for its chief moral support.

[2] Cf. *Realencycl.* Haupt's article 'Beginen'.

preach at Cologne (*1325*) it is certain that he had come in contact at Strassburg with the Beghards and Brethren of the Free Spirit : he may well have accepted and developed their doctrine while guarding against the abuses and perversions to which any pantheizing theory seems liable. In *1327* their opponents took hold of certain phrases in Eckhart's writing and summoned him before the Inquisitors at Cologne. He agreed to recant and disavow whatever could be proved erroneous and asked his judges to consult John xxii. Before *1329* he died and in that year certain statements and opinions were expressly censured, undoubtedly because of their presumed sympathy with a dangerous heresy.[1]

The Flagellants show another form of strictly personal religion which demands to suffer the *pains*, as well as to enjoy the raptures, of the mystic. Such an offering to divine beings is as old as religious sentiment itself.[2] In cent. xi Peter Damian (+ *1072*) warmly recommended, and himself employed, the lash as a substitute for the recitation of psalms as a penitential exercise—1000 strokes being held equal to 10 psalms, 15,000 to the whole psalter. The monk Dominic Loricatus (+ *1060*) also used the scourge as a penance. St. Dominic gave himself 300,000 strokes in 6 days. The Franciscans too adopted the practice and Antony of Padua sang the praises of flagellation. But the flagellants, properly so called, arose from a peculiar movement amongst the people themselves in northern Italy.[3] Raineri of Perugia was the leader of a brotherhood of penance in that district. Over Lombardy the communities were thickly spread by the year *1259* and the movement spread into Germany along the Rhine and into Bohemia. The town magistrates (like Pallavicino of Milan) tried to stop these grotesque excesses. Children of five years old joined the processions (*Chron. Mon. Patav.*). 'The flagellants came through 'the whole world' says Salimbene (*1220–1288*) : 'small and great, nobles 'and men of the people, scourged themselves through the streets, bishops 'and men of religion at their head. Peace was made of former enmities 'and men gave back what they had wrongfully taken. The priests had

[1] J. Bach in his monograph (1864) calls him 'father of german specu-'lation'; even if this be an overstatement, his great influence on later development is undoubted and owes much to the more spiritual tenets of the Brethren, cf. Delacroix *Le Myst. Specul. en Allem. au* xiv[e] siècle (Paris 1900) and Laudauer's edition of his writings (Berlin 1903), Buttner's (Leipzig 1903 and following years). Schopoff's monograph (Leipzig 1889) and Kramm's (Bonn 1889) are to be consulted : see on the general question R. M. Jones *Mystical Religion*, New York 1909 and Jundt's *Hist. du Panth. popul. au moyen age* (Paris 1875).

[2] Cf. priests of Baal ; ritual whipping in honour of Isis (Herod. ii 40, 61) : in Sparta of children at altar of Artemis Orthia (Plutarch *Instit. Spart.* § 40) : women at Alea (also in Pelop.) in Dionysus' temple (Pausanias *Arcad.* 23) : priests of Cybele and roman women at Lupercalia—as expiation of trespass or magical means to ensure fertility.

[3] For the excitable religious spirit of N. Italy, cf. Gebhardt's *Italie Mystique*.

'scarce time to eat, so anxious were folk to confess their sins.' Dying down for a time, the practice was revived in Germany after the Black Death (*1349*).[1] This revival seems to start from Hungary and became the cause of public disorders and an interruption to social life and security, being combined with *pogroms* against the Jews and against the monks. Letters from heaven were read which foretold terrible penalties if mankind refused this method of averting the divine anger. These companies spread from Poland into Holland and Flanders: 100 members visited Clement VI at Avignon where he condemned them; just as Cyprian had condemned the pardons and indulgences granted by the confessors, as a menace to the official priesthood and to the ordinary means of grace. Many leaders suffered death at the stake; only the spanish dominican Ferrer pleaded their cause at Constance (*1417*) and was sternly rebuked by Chancellor Gerson: the flagellants (he thought) betrayed a tendency to slight the Sacraments of Confession and Penance and refused to honour the martyrs venerated by the Church, professing themselves superior in merit through their self-inflicted sufferings.

In *1414* Conrad Schmidt was the leader of a band in Thuringia under the name 'Brethren of the Cross'. In this region the movement was allied with chiliastic expectancy: the leader believed himself to be Enoch re-incarnate and prophesied the downfall of Rome and the sacramental system, the imminent recognition by all mankind that salvation could only be attained by the whip. Joined by many of the vagrant Beghards, the united society suffered grievous persecution at the hands of Eylard Schöneveld and became nearly extinct. But the notion held its ground in the southern parts of France: King Henry III tried to revive it in Paris by his personal example, but his rationalist successor forbade these corybantic outbursts. It was again revived by some extreme jansenists in cent. xviii, and is not wholly unknown as a religious phenomenon in catholic lands to-day. This penitential movement was at the outset well organized and under control. A member promised due obedience to his captain, paid his own expenses, and was obliged to prove the sanction of his wife, and his friendly relations with all men. He was forbidden to speak to a woman or to beg for food or to enter any house uninvited; but he might accept victuals and two nights' lodging if willingly offered. Twice a day he lashed himself in public, believing that the blood thus shed would mingle with the Saviour's and would wash away all sin. The chanting of psalms and hymns became a marked feature in these penitential bands and exerted a striking influence upon the development of singing in the churches (cf. Bäumker *Kath. Deutsches Kirchenlied* ii 201 Freiburg 1883). The flagellants certainly believed that self-torture in its own right brought salvation and made man acceptable to God without the medium of Church or Sacraments. Some, in their hysterical exaltation, claimed to cure disease and expel demons, even to raise the dead. A letter from heaven, ordaining forgiveness to all who flogged themselves for thirty-three days

[1] But the flagellant revival began *before* the appearance of the plague, according to Höniger (*Der Schwartze Tod*, Berlin 1885).

and a half, was read aloud in many places and being accepted as authentic created a profound impression.[1] There is no doubt that the primitive discipline of the companies waned and gave way to the strangest subjective excesses and hallucinations.

Section III. Materialistic Pantheism: Amalric and David

Salvation by Knowledge of Oneness with God.—The peculiar tenets of Amalric, already named, merit a closer attention. He was born at Bena within the diocese of Chartres, a centre from much earlier times of vigorous and independent thought. He lectured in Paris on Aristotle and on Christian dogma and was much esteemed there for his dialectical skill. But in *1204* Innocent III ordered him to recant certain errors in his public teaching, in spite of a personal appeal and defence of his views addressed to the pope: he is said to have died of humiliation. In *1209* the methods employed in the Albigensian Crusade were also directed (as we saw) against his followers; ten were burnt and his body was exhumed to suffer a like fate. Only three axioms can with certainty be attributed to the Amalrican sect (if it deserves this title): *God is all*[2]*; every Christian must believe that he is a member of Christ's body* (such belief being (? alone) necessary for salvation); *he who remains in the love of God cannot sin.*

Innocent III (*Conc. Later.* iv cap. 2) says that 'Almaric's' mind has been so blinded by the Father of Lies *ut ejus doctrina non tam hæretica censenda sit quam* insana. Ostiensis says, that his *primus et summus error fuit quod* 'omnia sunt Deus' . . . *et sequitur non facile posse negari* 'Creatorem et creaturam idem esse.' The same author adds another error, clearly borrowed direct from Erigena 'quod primordiales causæ 'quæ vocantur ideæ, creant et creantur'. In the same style Amalric reëchoes the hibernian divine in his 'deus finis omnium quia omnia 'reversura sunt in ipsum ut in deo immutabiliter conquiescant ut unum 'individuum . . . deus est essentia omnium creaturarum et esse omnium.'

Affinity with hindu autotheism cannot fail to be recognized, although there is no need to postulate any direct influence. For Amalric merely brings to light the underlying peril, the legitimate deduction of medieval realism: *God as the true being of every individual thing*, in so far as it has any existence. Against this view the anthropomorphic legalism of the hebrews and the auto-

[1] Among more recent works may be named Cooper's *Flagellation* London 1908.

[2] God, *immanent* in all things, was in a special manner incarnate in the Amalricans: *omnia unum quia quicquid est est Deus.*

cratic sovereignty of muslim theology make effective protests ; the ' substances must not be confounded ' and there is an immense gulf between our nature and God. While some were contented to fill up the void with semi-divine and heroic mediaries,[1] others, more daring, insisted on emphasizing an *immediate* unity with the divine. Here again *union* with the divine was already achieved the moment the individual recognized it—as in the *atman*-doctrine : there were no tedious stages to surmount or series of ritual or moral acts to perform ; every one who felt himself to be divine was at once united with God. In Sudaili and Erigena, this unity of all things in God[2] was treated in a cosmic and speculative manner : now it was a personal protest against the claims of clerical mediators who had patently failed in their task. The stimulus was the need of the heart to find peace in its creator ; and in some few cases no doubt, the desire to justify human passions and greed by claiming for them a divine mandate. Here again the excesses of a few extremists compromised the fame of all such pretenders to inward illumination ; so the anabaptist libertinage for a long period prejudiced the popular view of that most harmless and exemplary of sects, the Quakers. But the social powers cannot be blamed for accepting the maxim, *ex uno disce omnes.*

[Besides Preger's work on the *German Mystics*, Leipzig 1874, and Hauréau's *Phil. Scolast.* Paris 1872, Schmidt's *Hist. de l'Egl. de l'Occ. pend. le Moyen Age* may be consulted Paris 1885 ; but the sect of Amalric is only known through the witness of its opponents and no fresh tidings about its fortunes and tenets can be expected. The acute work of Father Kleutgen (french transl. *La Phil. Schol.* Paris 1870) should be consulted on this pantheizing tendency in Realism : e.g. vol iv, 232 : ' To see in a ' thing nothing but an individuation of a universal Real ', *ce serait tomber dans ce faux* réalisme *dans lequel l'antiquité elle-même avait reconnu une grande affinité avec le* panthéisme. He is indignant when Günther accuses some of the schoolmen of holding that ' God is the form of the soul ' : it is certain however that this sect believed it. In i 407 he thus expresses the doctrine of Amaury of Chartres (as he calls him) *Dieu est lui-même ce qu'il y a d'idéal dans les choses ou qu'il est leur être ou essence propre.* He is sure that Scholastic avoided this error (368 and cf. also his *Theol. der Vorzeit* I ii ch. iii). He defends the early apologist Justin from pantheism (ii 360) : *Evidemment nous ne devons pas interpréter ces paroles* Apology ii 8 *dans un sens* panthéistique, *comme si la Raison primitive, le Logos*

[1] Or examples, as in ' nestorian ' and adoptianist sects.

[2] Which, in some form or other, must be the basis of every religion.

divin, se divisait ou se fractionnait dans toutes les âmes douées de l'intelligence, comme en autant de rayons.]

Materialistic Pantheism.—There is no doubt that David of Dinan (in Belgium) Amalric's disciple carried the theory of man's *deificatio* still further. His writing *Quaterni* was condemned and burnt at Paris in *1209* and he imperilled his life by his extreme claims to divinity: his views are known only by references in Albert and Thomas. The former renders by *de divisionibus* David's work *de tomis*. In it God was identified not merely (as in some phases of arab thought) as the indivisible spirit-substance or *νοῦς* but as the indivisible matter out of which the world is made. That is (as in Spinoza) God appears to us under the two forms *thought* and *extension*, and in Him all things are one and at rest; so waves rise from the sea into an appearance only of autonomous life and tumult which does not disturb the serene depths. David argued that if soul and body were diverse there must be some higher nature in which both together might coalesce and find their unity and this again would be God, either as *νοῦς* or as primal matter. It is likely that this dialectical pantheism—at first sight so loosely related to religious needs or emotion—arose from a general tendency of protest against the cathar *dualism*. It is not a little curious that Duns Scotus (who was technically a *realist*) inclined to a view not clearly distinct from David's, on the *materia prima*—a formless primitive substance which provided a substrate and common element for all finite things. In this respect, then, he was far nearer to *pantheism* than St. Thomas, whose aristotelian 'dualism' (as it might be called) preserved the sharp distinction. In another respect by the emphasis on *Will* rather than *Reason* (upon an *individual*, that is, rather than a *common*, property), Duns who lies in this respect under arab and muslim influence, amply atones for this seeming lapse into a *material* pantheism. The discovery among a few heretics of a *parsi* theory of two opposite powers would certainly lead 'harmonizing minds' to the other extreme of undifferentiated *monism*. Between two views equally fatal to freedom and the Christian conception of man, Authority maintained its attitude of terrified alarm and its policy of stern repression in both cases.

APPENDIX G

Antichrist and Christian Chiliasm

As opposed to the peripatetic and arabian 'eternity of the cosmos', there now appeared the protest of the historic consciousness which sees in the development of mankind a divine purpose working up to a climax or catastrophe. It had been a favourite task for some of the later Fathers to divide the history into periods, often from a *Sabbatic* standpoint—as Austin in *Civ. Dei* xxii § 30, reviewing the Seven World-Ages in the light of Genesis i. Orosius, his spanish admirer, follows this suggestion and writes his history in seven books. Bede adopted the same distribution and was perhaps the first to believe that the last and seventh age would close in the year *1000*. Abbot Adso (already named) spoke of the apostasy which would precede the final climax, and Abbo (as we saw) felt bound to deny the prophetic terrorism of the hermit Bernard. But before this Erigena (+ *c. 890*) had divided the first six ages preceding the sabbatical repose into three, distinguished by three priesthoods; the Christian order would be abolished in the future when all the faithful would serve as priests and see God face to face. While he referred, no doubt, to the everlasting life, his words were eagerly accepted by the enemies of the roman hierarchy as promising a change of regimen in this.

In his *de Concordia* book v § 84 Joachim illustrates his (montanist) theory of Three Ages in several ways: the successive phases are *knowledge, wisdom, perfect intuition:* slave's *bondage*, filial *submission, freedom: trial, action, contemplation: fear, faith, love: old men, youths, children: stars, dawn*, full *daylight: winter, spring, summer: nettles, thorns, wheat.* It is to be noted that Dante, his admirer, foretells God's vengeance upon the Dragon (the babylonish *Tiamat*) and announces the champion 510 = DVX who will kill the Giant (*comm.* Purgat. xxxiii 43).

An important stimulus for the development of a theory of *Antichrist* in our period was given by the (so-called) *Tiburtine Sibyl* (on which Sackurs, Kampers, Bousset have expended much care, 1896 and foll. years). This medieval pseudepigraph dates from cent. iv and *apparently* refers to Emperor Constans, son of Constantine the Great, who reigned *337–350* in the west. In it appears the belief that before the coming of Antichrist, a single ruler shall possess the whole world and shall surrender his crown to God upon Golgotha. This holy universal emperor became the champion against Islam when that menace to the Christian Church arose. He was to wake out of his slumbers, overcome the infidel and obtain the empire over all mankind. It is curious to note that the original of this now believing prince was Nero the persecutor, who was held to have departed safely to the parthian court in *68* A.D. whence he was to return and once more persecute the Christians. There is a byzantine prophecy attributed (obviously in error) to Emperor Leo VI the Wise (*886–911*), which predicts the fall of the Comneni and the rise from his grave of the slumbering prince who is to rule the world. Under the rule of the frankish raiders at Byzantium (*1204–1268*), such a prophecy was composed, foretelling the

revival of a greek empire (under the house of Palæologus). In the west, 'the legend' says Bousset 'even made history'. The *Tiburtine Sibyl* was now associated with the teutonic emperors. Chiliasm found more definite expression after *1000* and was intensified by the Crusades and the success of the Cluniac Reform. The title Antichrist, or the subordinate dignity of forerunner of Antichrist, was freely bestowed on all political opponents by every party. It was exchanged in the welf and wibelline conflict, and in the fatal struggle between the popes and Frederic II. The Franciscans (as we know) very strangely adopted the half-mussulman emperor as the faithful world-ruler because of his hatred of the papacy. The belief that Rome was Babylon, the pope Antichrist or his forerunner 'became of worldwide importance' (Bousset). The franciscan extremists no doubt handed on this pregnant prejudice to the reformers. The bohemian Milic, Matthias of Janow, Wiclif and Purvey, Hus and Luther, all held firmly to the belief, finding in it much comfort and encouragement in their struggles. That 'the Pope is Antichrist' was raised to the level of a dogma of faith in Luther's Articles of Schmalkald. Since then the belief is found chiefly in academic commentators on the *Apocalypse* and in certain ignorant circles where prejudices die slowly.

Section IV.—Great Scholastic Systems: Challenge of Nominalism

New Interest in Practical Questions.—We do not propose to follow scholastic development in its greatest age. We have only to trace very briefly the influence of Aristotle in his entirety on some points of dogma. We notice first, an interest in questions more vital than that of Universals: problems relating to the elements of substance, *principium individuationis*, origin of Ideas and ideas, how they exist in God's mind and then, derivatively, in our own. The ideal world is composed of exemplars which exist in the divine: so Bonaventura held in a sort of revived platonism which included a rejection of Aristotle's doctrine that the world is eternal: so too William of Auvergne (+*1249*) for whom this archetypal world is true God and Son of God.

Transcendence of God: the Double Truth.—But the greatest change wrought by this arabic hellenism was the distinction of truths demonstrable by reason and revealed truths. Aristotle stood for rational monotheism; and henceforth the existence of God as a concept attainable by the natural reason is set apart from other specially Christian doctrines. This simple religion[1] is accessible both to heathen greek and to infidel muslim, and the

[1] It will later be called *deism* or natural religion.

scholastics did not scruple to use their arguments. But the problems of the Trinity and of Christology are now detached from the sphere of rational inquiry. Patristic platonism had allowed of analogies in pagan thought for these doctrines, but with the employment of the entire works of Aristotle no farther appeals could be made; the *transcendence* of a single unique and necessary Being takes the place of a theory of *immanence*. There is a great gulf fixed between the Creator and His creatures. In the increasing mistrust of human faculties,[1] natural enough in an age of social disintegration and immoral revolt, sceptic nominalism still further withdrew dogma and its proofs from the competence of reason, but (as yet) without casting doubt on the truth of the doctrines themselves.

Theology (in Nominalism) becomes Practical Piety instead of Speculation.—To Occam theology is not a *science* in the strict sense nor is it concerned with the realm of knowledge and universal truth wherein man is least an individual. It is practical and indeed *utilitarian*, not a speculative inquiry but a means by which men attain happiness here and hereafter by obedience and faith. Already, under cover of religious needs, individualism and subjectivity had put forth its claims—soon destined to pass into inductive science and sensualism, into a love of the secular reality of the concrete world.[2] Thus philosophy and theology as reason and faith are finally sundered and indeed confronted as antitheta. The two-fold nature of Truth or the double set of axioms serving for two different provinces, now becomes, as in India, a familiar doctrine.[3] But Nominalism could ally itself with a truly devout and personal mysticism, as in Cardinal Alliacus (*1350–1425*) and Gerson (*1363–1429*), both chancellors of Paris and in high repute for orthodoxy. But we need not, at least at this point, overstep the limits which our period sets.

[1] Already beginning in John of Sarum.

[2] For which, unhappily, in this period, we are unable to employ the term *realism*.

[3] Simon of Tournay was censured in 1200 for holding this convenient and indeed inevitable compromise: John xxii forbids the theory in 1276: with Occam it became a necessary postulate for the double attitude which man has to take up towards the blended world of *fact* and of *hope*.

CHAPTER X. THE TEMPLARS

Section I. Their Wealth and Sudden Catastrophe

We have now and again crossed the proper frontiers of our period that a later development may throw light back upon the sources and exhibit their immanent tendency. But our real terminus is the pontificate of Boniface VIII, the reign of Philip the Fair and the destruction of the Templars. All these phenomena prove the decay of the medieval idealism and the perversion of institutions now grown archaic to the purely secular ends of modern times. The overthrow of the Templars shows plainly the exclusive and autocratic claims of the utilitarian centralized State. But it is also the last instance of that genuine or suspected heresy which alarmed Authority throughout our period.

Modest Beginnings : Rapid Growth.—In *1119* two knights, one from Burgundy one from northern France, undertook to defend pilgrims in the Holy Land ; a small company took an oath to the Patriarch of Jerusalem and bound themselves under authority both as a *religious* community and a *military* order. The members lived in chastity, poverty, obedience [1] ; and found their chief active duty in guarding the public roads in Palestine. Baldwin the king gave them the (so-called) Temple of Solomon in the Holy City and they derived their name from it. They devoted themselves to reclaiming and converting to penitence and sacred uses the rabble of excommunicate and stranded knights who had come to the Holy Land rather for plunder than holy ends. Later, the Templars were for this reason immune from sentences of excommunication pronounced by bishops and parochial ministers. Recommended by St. Bernard of Clairvaux, they obtained the sanction of the Council of Troyes in *1128*

[1] This implicit obedience, as in muslim sects and the later jesuits was of the essence of the Order : a knight must go instantly wherever a superior bade him ' as if it were God Himself Who commanded '.

where the rules of the Order were drawn up. With their constitution and history we are not now closely concerned; and a few details must suffice. By the date of Frederic II's death, they formed a wealthy and exempt body with their own clergy, immune from other clerical interference. A steady stream of endowments in the two centuries of the Order had converted it into the richest corporation in Christendom.

'Immunity' of the Order.—Its peculiar rules constituted it one of the most powerful governments of the time, not merely issuing orders within the territorial limits of their exempt estates but forming in every kingdom a separate State, a force to be reckoned with, an *imperium in imperio*.[1] Popes allowed them to have and control their own churches and churchyards, exempt from normal rules of interdicts and other church bans; they were relieved from payment of tithe and from the action of all papal censures or decrees, unless they were expressly named in them. Recognizing no metropolitan or diocesan authority, they formed a separate militant diocese with the pope at their head, scattered over all Western Europe and a large part of Nearer Asia.

Early Charges against Templars: Assassins their Vassals.—As to the repute of the Order, it must be noted that they became at an early hour a target for charges of treachery and muslim sympathies. When Emperor Conrad III failed before Damascus in *1149*, the Templars were believed to have a secret understanding with the garrison of that city. In *1153* William of Tyre implies that in invading Ascalon for the sake of booty the Templars met a well deserved disaster. In *1154*, they were said to have sold, for 60,000 gold pieces, a prince of Egypt who had wished to become Christian; he was taken home to suffer certain death at the hands of his fanatical family. In *1166* Amaury,[2] king of

[1] They had lands in Normandy before 1135, were settled in Castile 1129, Languedoc 1136, Rome 1138, Brittany 1141, across the Rhine about the same date. In Spain (it was said) Alfonso I of Aragon and Navarre gave them a third of his kingdom (Mariana); Louis VII in France allotted them the low-lying site of the Temple outside Paris. In 1279 King Philip ceded *high and low justice* in the whole fortified quarter on the right bank, allowed them right of castle-guard by their own men, and relieved them of the usual escheats and forfeitures to the Crown: he dispensed with feudal service within these precincts and undertook not to levy *taille* or tax there.

[2] This name is of course a form of *Amalric* which we have found also spelled *Almaric*; at the present day it is found usually as Almeric.

Jerusalem, hanged twelve members of the Order for betraying a fortress to Nureddin, and in *1168* the Templars repaid him by offering a firm resistance to his expedition against Cairo. But in *1170* they fought in alliance with Baldwin IV at the victory of Ascalon. During the Mastership of Odo de Saint Amand, the head of the Assassins offered to accept the Christian faith if relieved from the tribute paid by this redoubtable sectarian chief to the Templars for nearly twenty-five years. His envoy was murdered by them in *1172*, and Odo refused to yield the offenders to the royal justice.[1] It was a faction led by Gerard, Grand Master in *1186*, that led to a schism in the Christian camp and to the overthrow of the kingdom: when Jerusalem fell (*1187*), the Templars' treasures were used (perhaps for the last time) for their original aim—to redeem the poorer Christians from slavery. After a short tenure of Cyprus, they took up their headquarters at Acre and built the wonderful stronghold near, whence the Fifth Crusade started in *1218* against Egypt.

Their Hatred of Frederic II: Later Heroism.—To Frederic II they were opposed throughout, and once again were accused of informing the sultan of the emperor's pilgrimage to the river Jordan. They refused to attend his coronation and Frederic affronted the Grand Master in public and laid siege to their fortress at Acre. When he came home to Apulia, he gave the first signal for the intended attack by ordering the seizure of their estates in his dominions and the exile of all the members. When the Christian army was annihilated in *1244* at Gaza, the whole body of 300 knights (except eighteen) were killed, together with the Grand Master. In Egypt, six years later, the still wealthy remnants of the Order advanced the funds for the ransom of Louis IX. Sultan Bibars reduced the fortress of Safed in *1266* and of the Templar garrison of *600* knights, all preferred death to apostasy: Antioch fell in *1268* and the Templars then held nothing but the stronghold of Acre. But this citadel was reduced in *1291*, some few months after the capture of Tripoli: the Grand Master de Beaujeu lost his life in the assault. Cyprus

[1] Years later under Louis IX, the Grand Master rebuked the haughty language of the Assassin deputies in the king's presence. It cannot be disputed that they had long and important dealings with this 'extreme left' of muslim bigotry and were therefore suspected (not unfairly) of imbibing their precepts and following their principles.

now became their headquarters. But the period of their activity and usefulness in the East may be said to close with the century.

Their Surprising Wealth and Modern Methods of Finance.—In the west the Order had acquired the riches, influence and unpopularity which fall to the lot of all financiers and capitalists in a society only slowly passing into the usage of money currency. From them were chosen the Almoners of our own Henry III and Philip the Fair; a Grand Master was godfather to Louis IX's daughter; another stood sponsor to a child of the very king who wrought their overthrow. They were invited to take part in the Councils of the Lateran *1215* and of Lyons *1274*. When Frederic II attacked them (as we have seen) the papacy retorted on their behalf by excommunicating him, and before his death he was obliged to restore their forfeited estates. About that time their manors, scattered over all Europe from Denmark and Ireland to Spain and Cyprus, numbered 9000.[1] In *1200* they received 20,000 gold pieces as revenue from Armenia. Their Temples were royal treasuries; as in England under Henry III, who borrowed from the Order the purchase money of Oléron in *1235*. Edward I had borrowed 25,000 *livres* of which the Order freely remitted 20,000. Philip IV exacted from them the dowry of his daughter on her marriage with Edward II of England. The last Grand Master de Molay arrived in France with 150,000 gold florins and ten mules-burdens of unminted silver. Paris became the centre of a great financial business; for the treasures were not hoarded, but issued as loans on proper security. The Order was the chief and safest means of exchange; their citadels were impregnable banks and their convoys were protected both by religion and arms. They were the predecessors of the great secular italian financiers of later times. Their ruin was thus in large measure due to the jealousy and distrust of a feudal society; where the central authority, stricken with poverty and thwarted at every turn by lack of funds, was yet already confronted with all the imperious calls and novel duties of the modern State. The Templars, diffused in their commanderies over Europe, nominally subject to the civil power, never enjoyed the absolute sovereignty of the prussian knights or of the Order of

[1] So Matthew Paris: Alberic de Tribus Fontibus gives nearly 2000 less, but even then their estates are more than double the holdings of the Order of St. John.

St. John in Rhodes or Malta. But their wealth amply compensated for the lack of this formal autonomy, and in effect they were far more powerful than Orders confined within certain territorial limits on the confines of Christendom.

Close Alliance of Templars and Philip IV.—The advisers of Philip IV had from the first attempted to curtail their influence. In *1287* estates acquired by them since *1258* were declared confiscate. Two years later, the *Ordonnance de Ferrières* further curtailed their property and their rights of interference with the royal vassals. Next year (*1290*) the *Parlement* recognized the rights and privileges only of those who actually wore the habit. From *1293–1307* this policy was entirely remodelled and the needy king entered into a close alliance with the Templars against the pope. He revoked the restrictive measures, while extending and confirming their earlier privileges ; in *1297* he borrowed from them 2500 *livres* ; in *1303* he signed a formal treaty against the pope with their Visitor, Hugh Peraud, and next year appointed him receiver of royal revenues. A charter was issued during the campaign in Flanders exempting the Order from all disabilities (by *mortmain* or otherwise) in acquiring property In *1306* the king took refuge in the Temple from the fury of the mob and in the spring of *1307* was present at the installation of a new knight.

Sudden Change of Policy in France and Spain.—Six months later he arrested the members (October 13, *1307*) and forced them to confession of real or simulated guilt by the most cruel tortures. Besides the obvious motive of the State's necessity, which now began to recognize no scruples or moral restraint, the king had in view another aim—the union of the Military and Religious Orders under the French Crown. There was to be in future one single body, the knights of Jerusalem, of which the king was to be the head.[1] In *1305*, de Floyran of Béziers delated the society to King James of Aragon [2] who seems to have promised him a share of the spoils. He turned also to the french king who welcomed him gladly. Twelve spies gained admittance to the Order and the new french pope, Clement V, was approached with sug-

[1] An amalgamation had been proposed at Lyons in 1274 but the knights of the Temple and the Hospital rejected the scheme.

[2] Villani calls him Squin de Florian ; the informer claimed his reward in a letter dated Jan. 21, 1308.

gestions.[1] But he expressed his disbelief in the charges alleged and the king, disregarding his verdict, appealed directly to the Inquisition which could act without consulting the See of Rome. Thus the Crusade against the Albigenses and the special measures conceded by the papacy against heresy led at once to the overthrow of the Order by means which were perfectly legal.

Inquisition Subservient to Philip.—The Holy Office performed for the french king the same time-serving functions as the english parliament in the case of Henry VIII's confiscations. De Molay and sixty brethren were seized in Paris, and listened in a public session of the University to a catalogue of their crimes. Eloquent preachers inflamed the anger of the citizens against their secret wickedness—and (no doubt) their obvious wealth. Thirty-six of this number died under the torture; 123, out of 138 examined in the capital, admitted that on reception they had spat upon the Cross. Many, under fear or pain of torture, confessed to any and every charge alleged against them; the only respite from acute suffering was procured by such avowals. The Grand Master signed a letter (October 25) in which he told the knights that he had denied Christ and insulted His emblem; the grosser indictments freely levelled at the Templars and himself he indignantly denied.[2] Philip sent letters to Edward II of England, James of Aragon and the (now merely titular) Emperor Albert of Germany, asking them to cooperate in the overthrow of a sect no less pernicious than the heretics of Provence. He met with an opposition in England which does credit to an english sovereign who has never received his due from historians. Edward desired before taking action to hear the reports of his own officials at Agen, and in December wrote strongly to Castile and Portugal, to Sicily and Aragon, urging their sovereigns not to believe the indictment until clearly proved. James, while expressing his surprise and incredulity, promised to proceed

[1] Bertrand de Got, Archbishop of Bordeaux, pope June 5, 1305, elected through the influence and by the bribery of Philip IV.

[2] We have noted the connexion between unnatural sexual crime and savage shamanism, or medieval heresy: Cf. Westermarck *Origin and Development* etc. vol ii. The 'bulgarian' heretics or 'bougres' excited terror as well as disgust: the practices of which they were accused (no doubt as unjustly as primitive Christians) of incest and cannibalism, were always associated in public feeling with treason and blasphemy against God and a secret conspiracy to subvert the entire social order.

if required by the church. Clement V was annoyed at the french king's almost 'imperial' initiative, and saw in it encroachment on the rights and jurisdiction of Rome. He ordered a general arrest by kings and potentates that he might keep the matter in his own hands. The sovereigns of Europe obeyed, no doubt from divers motives, and by the month of May the strongholds and persons of the Templars were in the hands of the civil power from England to Cyprus.[1] In June, king and pope came to an agreement, Clement withdrawing his recent ban on the powers of the Holy Office in France (the king's chief lever) and Philip handing over to papal deputies the estates and persons of the Order. The Grand Master and the Preceptors of Cyprus, Normandy and Aquitaine were to be reserved for the cognisance of the pope himself; and diocesan bishops together with papal assessors were to examine the cases of the several knights. Escheated property was to be devoted to the needs of the Holy Land and a new Crusade, but (as in the english 'Reformation') the king through his adroit agents was able to divert the greater part to the uses of a gaping treasury. In August *1309* the Templars were invited to defend their Order; this was a mere ruse and those who, emboldened by this appeal, retracted the confessions before extorted by torture were burnt at the stake.[2] Forty-six now withdrew their recent defence in terror and the pope at the Council of Vienne (*1311*) refused to listen to their case, throwing seven Templars into prison who still offered an *apologia*. In *1312* (May 2) he transferred by Bull their estates to the Knights of St. John[3]: four days later (May 6) he expressly guards himself

[1] Where the surrender took place on May 27: in Aragon and Castile forcible resistance was shown, Monzon being captured after a long siege on May 17, and Castellat only falling in November. That the suspicion of their faith was not wholly unfounded is clear from this fact; many spanish Templars embraced Islam and joined Granada against Castile: the easy conversion of the bosnian nobility on the approach of the Turks will recur to mind. Others, in spite of the generous treatment of individual members after the disbanding of the Order in Spain, took service with the african Moors. Finke *Papstum* etc. i chap 10, Münster 1907.

[2] 54 retractors in Paris on May 12, 1310 by the sentence of archbishop of Sens, 4 at Senlis and 9 by order of the archbishop of Reims.

[3] Except in the case of lands in Spain, and Majorca. In Spain liberal pensions were granted; some continued to live in groups on their old estates but without official organization; many married as being absolved from their vows; others served the muslim on both sides of the Straits.

against a definite sentence of guilt.[1] De Molay, after his double retractation, was as brave as Cranmer in his last moments, and died at the stake (March 14, *1314*); had he persisted in his original confession he would have only suffered imprisonment for life.

Section II. Their Indictment and Apologists

Peculiar Charges against a Secret Society.—It is now time to consider the nature and grounds of the charges made against the Templars. Alone among the Orders they carried on their rites of initiation in secret and thus excited the curious or calumnious to evil comment and surmise. Chapters were held in guarded rooms with strictest privacy and at break of day; no participant might reveal what took place at each lodge-meeting *even* to a brother-member. Suspicious or prurient minds invented the usual tales about esoteric societies: at his reception, the postulant spat on the crucifix, denied Christ, and was required to bear sexual outrage without complaint. At the Mass the words *Hoc est Corpus Meum* were omitted, and on Good Friday the Cross was trampled under foot. A form of devil-worship was used—either of a black cat or a black idol called Baphomet.[2] Devils taking the form of women lent their aid to the Templars' orgies and boys were admitted to the Order to be corrupted.[3] It was

Their castles were however given to other Orders—but the king and *ricos hombres* (like Henry VIII and his new nobility) no doubt acquired a very large share.

[1] *Non per modum definitivæ sententiæ* (since we could not deliver such after the inquiries and processes held upon the Templars) *sed per viam provisionis et ordinationis apostolicæ*. The pope, not being a free agent and unable to withstand Philip's will, took care nevertheless to refrain from promising wholesale abolition or from allowing that the charges were proved beyond doubt. When the archbishop of Sens, de Marigny, a complete tool of the king, condemned the Templars, the papal commission replied with sympathy and regret; but could not interfere with the normal powers of a metropolitan.

[2] So two Templars, examined at Carcassone; a Templar at Florence however called it *Magomet* (thus like Buddha, Mahomet from a prophet had become an object of worship !) the two words are the same, *baffumerie* is the same as *mômerie* or mummery. Hammer-Purgstall in his *Myst. Baph. Revel.* (Vienna 1818) traces Templar belief and practice to a gnostic and ophite revival and derives the name from βαφὴ μητοῦς, or *baptism* of the *Supreme Wisdom*.

[3] In 1307 many young lads were found as members, being received

said that parents killed their children who had chanced to witness these sacred rites or had refused to submit to the brothers' outrages; in France it was believed that the Order roasted the children born of their amours and anointed their idol with the fat.

Heretical (?) Gnostic or Muslim Sympathies.—Modern critical research begins with Purgstall's ingenious affiliation to early gnostic heresy (*1818*) and nearly forty years later (*1855*) he replies to the doubters by producing *gnostic* emblems or caskets said to have been found on Temple sites.[1] Wilcke[2] criticizes this notion of an ophitic tendency and believes their secret doctrine to be merely the unitarian *deism* of Islam. Both Ranke and Weber adopted the suggestion. Prutz expanded Loiseleur's argument by a more careful scrutiny in his *Geheimlehre*. But (after an attack by Schottmuller *Untergang des T. Ordens*, 1887) he modified his views (*Entwicklung etc.* 1888). He denied that the Templars as a body had any fixed or precise 'secret 'doctrine', while still holding that to spit on the Cross and to deny Christ were required at initiation as a 'rough test of that 'unfaltering obedience' which these medieval knightly and religious Orders borrowed without doubt from the muslim. He suggests that these were interpreted in the light of later heresies, the aversion of the cathars to the Cross being notorious. Knowledge of eastern nations, arab chivalry and plighted faith, contact with new ideals and a richer culture,—all this had broken down exclusiveness and weakened the unique claims of the Gospel. The Holy War had been diverted into business channels or open buccaneering raids. Men's absolute belief in the Gospel message, and in a church which claimed a unique monopoly of salvation, had been much impaired. The apologue of the *Three Rings* conveyed a very widespread conception of religion and the pious were already searching for the mysterious author of the *Three Impostors*. It was the beginning of an age when a universal faith, a *natural* or *rational* religion, was urged against positive and dogmatic creeds.

without any sufficient noviciate; the tale is well known of children at play warning each other not to let Templars kiss them.

[1] No such symbols however were alleged against the Templars at the trials of 1309–1312.

[2] *Gesch. des Tempelherren ordens* 3 vols, Leipzig 1826, revised 1860.

Modern Pleas for a Complete Acquittal.—Meantime there had never been wanting apologists who protested their complete innocence on the count of heresy and perhaps also on the moral charges.[1] In *1654* du Puy, king's librarian at Paris, felt himself constrained by loyalty to the new absolute monarchy to prove their guilt against those who acquitted an Order only to convict a king. An editor of a later edition (Brussels, 1751) undoubtedly was a Freemason who tried to clear the indictment and affiliate to the condemned Order the new and rapidly increasing brotherhood of speculative *deism*.[2] The Benedictines (as Vaisséte and the Prior of Etival, Paris 1789) also appeared as champions of their innocence. After the Revolution Raynouard (*Monum. Hist.* etc., Paris 1813) followed up this tendency and urged the case for a complete acquittal. Havemann (*Gesch. des Ausganges d. T.*, Stuttgard 1846) writes to the same effect. German [3] and french scholars like Mignet, Guizot, Renan, Lavocat [4] joined the list of their champions. Michelet however withdrew from this favourable opinion in editing the *Procès;* Boutaric compromises: while rejecting the charge of heresy, he accepts (like Prutz) the charge of defiling the Cross and of giving a lewd parody of the 'kiss of peace'. Dollinger altogether rejected even this indictment and he was followed by the convinced apologists Wenck and Gmelin.[5] The english historian of the Holy Office, H. C. Lea (1885), believed the Templars innocent, and further research by Finke (1907) seems to corroborate the verdict of acquittal.

Many Countries Refused to Join in the Verdict.—It would appear that anything like a general *demoralization* of the Order is fairly disproved, nor can we doubt that most confessions were wrung out by torture and the answers to the question dictated by violence. In Spain, the Councils of Salamanca and Tarragona (*1312*) refused to believe in their guilt and acquitted them even

[1] In their own age by Dante, Villani and Antonino Archbishop of Padua.

[2] Direct connexion of course cannot be held—in spite of Jeremiah Cross's *Templars' Chart*, N. York 1845—but that the old Templars and the modern Freemasons are beholden to heretical and muslim analogies cannot be doubted.

[3] Cf. G. Schnürer *Die Urspringliche Templerregel*, 1903.

[4] Cf. *Procès des frères et de l'Ordre du Temple*, Paris 1888.

[5] *Schuld oder Unschuld*, 1893.

after they had resisted the royal forces as open rebels. In Portugal a commission reported that the charges were baseless. In Germany, Sicily, North Italy, Cyprus, their case was favourably considered: at Messina, Trier, Bologna and in the Romagna, no evidence against them was forthcoming; at Ravenna the bench decided strongly against using torture and the accused Templars, even those who had previously confessed guilt, were acquitted (June *1310*). In Florence the confession is suspected on account of its very detail and minuteness. In England only four out of eighty knights allowed that they had formally apostatized as novices. The gravest witness in our country comes from rivals or acknowledged foes of the Order—the friars of St. Francis or the Dominicans. It seems likely that to secure freedom with a mild penance it was only needful to confess to defiling the Cross: and it was the avowedly guilty who were favoured. The whole aim and policy of the State was to create irresistible public feeling against the Templars by what seemed overwhelming evidence.

Muslim Influence Undoubted: Popular Panic.—That the great bulk of the Order were pious Christians seems beyond all doubt. But there must have been some ground for the popular acquiescence in their harsh treatment, not wholly explained by the unscrupulous greed of the King's advisers, the greedy ministers of the Modern State. In the main this motive was fear of the unknown and concealed,—popular panic at the secret spread of esoteric doctrine and abnormal practice. The whole tendency of ranks and grades of initiation (with their respective *arcana*) is to dissolve any binding rules and beliefs, if utility demand and authority command. Autocracy or the un-moral dictate of public weal makes its appearance in the world with the half-bandit states of Islam. It is beyond question that the Templars had long and profitable dealings with the Assassins and they may have acquiesced in the moral *indifferentism* which marked the secret societies of the further east and (as we have shown) pervaded the muslim world.

Chief Cause of Overthrow: Urgent Needs of the Modern State.—It may have been accident that led their enemies to connect them with cathar and albigensian dualism; such members as had rejected positive Christian revelation were more likely to have been *unitarians* like their oriental models. That, like the Goliards or Troubadours, some knights held dogma lightly

and secretly sneered at the ascetic hypocrisy of pious catholics is more than probable. That some practised love of boys (now become an oriental vice) either as a rite or an appetite is not beyond credence ; what age or race has been wholly exempt from the vice itself or from a very facile suspicion of its prevalence ? The bond with esoteric gnosticism cannot be proved ; but we may safely assert that while the great majority were guiltless of the charges, it is likely that in certain of the higher grades moral lapses and unbelief, both borrowed from long contact with the east, were tolerated, if not encouraged. Certain rites or forms, at first innocent, may have later assumed a sinister meaning. Still, it cannot be denied that as in the english Reformation the chief cause of their overthrow was the need and the avarice of the central power in the first modern State. That the people at large, still mindful of the catharist panic, accepted the scandal which their rulers sedulously spread, is probable from a survey of any period of religious persecution or of the pursuit of witchcraft.[1]

The remaining chapters of this book aim at tracing the evolution of modern State-Sovereignty and the collapse of the idealistic standards and moral convictions to which the Middle Age has always (at least in theory) clung. They will be little more than a commentary or a paraphrase of texts or statements already familiar in these pages.

[1] Dollinger's words about the great *Dies Nefastus* of human history Oct. 13, 1307, are familiar : that the whole case gave immense impetus to the use of torture and the verdicts on mere suspicion cannot be denied : it is largely to blame for the terrors of later penal codes and the frenzied terror which carried along protestant no less than catholic communities into the most hideous excesses.

SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS

PREFACE TO SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS

In the preceding pages I have attempted to trace the development of religious beliefs all over the known world within certain limits of time. It has been impossible to avoid the search for sources and origins in a very remote past, with which modern students have but recently made us familiar. The evolution has been throughout *mental* and in great measure independent of social and political changes. Only in Islam have we had occasion to connect closely the rise and needs of a novel ideal of the State with modifications in religious dogma or moral practice. In the west (see Division D) the progress of thought has been traced by itself; though it has not been possible altogether to separate this evolution from references to parallel movements in politics. But in these supplementary essays I have tried to bring into prominence the *material* elements which without doubt exerted a deep influence on the tendencies of thought and religion.

In doing so the purely abstract and academic character of the previous discussions seems to vanish, and we are able (so at least I imagine) to trace the profound effect of these various thought-forms upon our modern life and society. I have elsewhere endeavoured to abate the illfounded complacence of the modern mind as to its convictions, ideals and achievements. Since I began this work the great european war has given a support and ratification to my fears or prophecies. The history of orthodox Authority and the unceasing challenge of heresy rests upon certain fundamental differences in social ideals which will last as long as the world. The dangers of the unlimited and autocratic State of our own time are not confined—as some fondly believe—to teutonic countries. What has once occurred may occur again, and the lesson of the war must be for many years to come greater preparedness and efficiency, further powers for the centralized executive to be won only by the wholesale surrender of individual freedom. Against this all the vague aspirations after liberty—socialism, anarchy, communism, millenarian hopes—must in the future be arrayed. My studies have not certainly empowered me to deliver any encouraging message: I have been contented to trace the facts and the origins of social movements which have jeopardized or extinguished some of the dearest ideals of mankind.

A. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF CHRISTENDOM AFTER *600*: CHIEF IMPULSES TO DEVELOPMENT

Section I. Under Theodoric and Charles the Great.

'Christendom' as Unitary Ideal: Universal Competence of the Monarchy (whether Papal or Imperial).—The period from Gregory I to Boniface VIII, forms a continuous whole in western development; it is dominated by a single spiritual ideal, 'Christendom'. It might be called the Epoch

of the Crusades. It begins with an avowal of its own weakness on the part of the secular and imperial power ; which had never shrunk so much in territory or pretension as under Phocas (*602–610* A.D.) or been so humble and apologetic in its claims as under Maurice his victim. The only coherent and unifying power lay in the western papacy ; it is this which initiates any other movements of consolidation. Charles' empire was religious and spiritual, but left a legacy of problems, on the exact relation of the secular arm and the pope, which ended in the overthrow of both. The dominant ideal was that of a unity, symbolized and guaranteed by the two powers, acting harmoniously but in different spheres. Gregory did not wish to become emperor, nor did Hildebrand. Neither Charles nor Otto nor even Frederic II wished to dethrone the papacy, but only to replace a bad by a good pope. The notion of a Christian commonwealth or republic on roman imperial lines prevailed throughout the entire period. A passionate craving for unity (if only in theory) was the chief note sounded amid all the restless and opportunist egoism of medieval practice. A concrete all-embracing unity confronted the militant and ambitious religion of Islam : it could not have survived the outcome of the Crusades, nor the dominance of modern individualism in an atmosphere where purely unselfish and objective ideals cannot survive. But it came to ruin chiefly by the internal struggles between its two rival ' consuls '. In the height of its vigour and success the Monarchy (whether papal or imperial) claimed to find a place and employment for each class and every unit ; it left no department of life or thought outside its competence and control.[1] It had long surrendered belief in a limited church of the Perfect, the Montanist ideal ; and recognized that ' the tares must grow together until the har-' vest ', that the church's net contained fish both bad and good. This absorbing passion for universalism sometimes gives its policy an air of fatal compromise : it was an offer to pare and whittle away the realistic universals to make them fit actual life and its uneven and anomalous particulars. The dominant philosophy in this period soars into cloudland, abhorring unique detail and the rough edges of individual things, wherein the modern eye finds its chief interest. The theology of the Schoolmen is inhuman, where it is not coldly rationalist ; and while we do not doubt that many of them were good pastors, advisers and consolers of their flock, there is very little trace of such sympathy in their treatises. Unless all particulars are purged away from the perfect and flawless type, nothing (it was thought) had been achieved : hence mysticism is the end and aim, however rarely attained : hence, in spite of the rich interest in art and the beauties as well as the duties of life, the real home is the Heavenly Jerusalem, *urbs beata sion illa*,—a corruption easily passing into a pure buddhic negative, in spite of the earthly colours and concrete features added by popular thought.[2]

[1] This does not of course imply the deliberate extinction of local autonomies or personal franchise ; nor the perpetual coercive interference of the modern absolute State.

[2] See Royce's *World & Individual*, 172, 3 (New York 1900).

Economic Environment : The Two Periods of Defence and Aggression.—It will not be out of place if, as we have to follow the course of spiritual and transcendental thought, we ask first in what economic surroundings will it be seen to arise ? Without wholly accepting a purely economic basis for the social and even mental development of man, it is idle to deny that material environment is a factor of the highest importance.[1] We can detect the *material* basis of the early monarchies and the source of early creeds in natural facts and fears : all the great early kingships (Egypt, China, Chaldea) depend on control of the water-supply. The break-up of the roman empire left the old economic life of the west suspended. The papacy alone had a true personality and a world-consciousness in these times ; it entertained an *à priori* policy. But still it depended largely upon the principles of a new economy struggling to emerge. It will be well to examine its chief features.[2] This long period can (like others) be variously divided into artificial sections ; but for our purpose we may count from *600–1050* as the *defensive* Age of Christendom just as *1050* to *1300* is *aggressive* and reconstructive. In the first we have tentative endeavours to form an organized polity by men exposed to serious danger from without : it is only in the middle of cent. xi that barbarous inundations cease and allow Europe to assume very nearly her modern outlines. The mongol panic nearly two hundred years later was but a faint echo of the days of muslim, norsemen, danes and huns. Even under Charles the Mediterranean might be called a ' mohammedan lake ' ; a hundred years later the normans received their first good title to estate as vassals and subjects (*910* or *911*) ; the slavonic monarchies were only converted towards the year *1000* ; the hungarian raiders settled down at that time and gave up their nomadic habits and savage religion ; and only with the conquest of England and southern Italy did the epoch of the ' Folk-wandering ' come to a final term.[3]

A New Departure in *1050* : Leading up to Climax of Cent. xiii.—The second division opens with Clugny, Hildebrand and the Crusades ; when Christendom, forced by the popes into a unity of purpose and policy, assumed the aggressive towards the infidel world. Meantime, economic

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[1] See Seligman's *Econ. Interpr. of Hist.* (New York 1902) for a very able plea.

[2] I am in the following pages much beholden to Archdeacon Cunningham's *Western Civilization*, vol. ii ; I express here my grateful thanks.

[3] About 1050, Europe settled, with the two great victories of normans in England and Italy, into its present outlines (the only notable change in later times occurring in 1453, when Asia, entering at Byzantium, was expelled in Russia) : from 600 there had been a slow and painful process of development, interrupted by constant inroads of muslim, danes, norsemen and magyars. The following division is, like the New Empire in ancient Egypt (*c.* 1580–1200 B.C.) a violent anti-semitic reaction which carried the wars of revenge into the heart of the enemy's country. The Middle Ages end only when this crusading and militant spirit is altogether extinct, and is used by hypocrites as a cloak for personal greed.

conditions are seen to expand and the commoners win freedom, while the central power is weakened by the struggle of its two representatives. With cent. xiii comes a flood of new ideas, new learning, new and secular ways of looking at the world and human life. These the old idealism, now much weakened in conviction and intensity, confronts in vain.[1] The rationalistic pantheism of Islam and the individualism of the selfish classical citizen begin to undermine the faith and convictions on which Christianity reposed. Henceforth, and chiefly after the revolt of the north from Rome, Europe is the cockpit of conflicting interests, sometimes genuinely *political* and *racial* but in the main purely *economic*.[2]

Great Services of Episcopate in Preserving Roman Culture.—In the first or *defensive* epoch, the bonds which knit men's lives together were largely derived from the fragmentary principles of classical society, from the 'ruins of the roman empire'. The tradition lingered on of a unifying and beneficent power which God had ratified; and from time to time gave impulse to reform or innovations which only proposed to restore the ancient system. In no province did the barbarians erase all tokens of roman occupation; even in Britain their scanty vestiges became models for future improvement; even in frankish Gaul of the north they were not obliterated. When order was once again secured there was ample material lying ready to hand; manual skill and mechanical art were but sleeping. In some measure then, institutions were restored which 'had decayed but 'were not extinct': and competent observers trace in the new revival a development 'closely following on the lines of the old'.

It is interesting to trace our debt to the *episcopate* in the years following the gradual ebbing of roman influence in the west. Justinian certainly recognized it in his *Pragmatic Sanction* for Italy on its reconquest. It was remembered how just after *450* Lupus of Troyes and Leo of Rome had appeased Attila, the scourge of God. In the same age we have the heroism of Anianus of Orleans and the firm and tactful policy of Apollinaris Sidonius of Clermont. It was mainly, perhaps only, in *episcopal* see-towns that continuous urban life kept alive, in an age which once again 'shifted the centre of gravity from the urban community to the rural district' (Guizot): Cologne, Trier, Metz, Mains, Spires, Worms, Strasburg are cases in point with an unbroken history both for town and church. As the pope was forced to be relieving-officer[3] for famine-stricken Rome, so bishops, protecting their flocks and sees from pillage, also helped to advance trading interests when occasion arose. They were indeed bound to regulate and

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[1] Cunningham (vol. ii 70) says well: 'This century was one of the 'great eras in the world's history, an age of remarkable artistic and poetic 'production, of unrivalled philosophic and legal acumen, of military 'expeditions and commercial enterprise . . . an age which left abundant 'proof of its material prosperity in the magnificent buildings which remain.'

[2] These words were written before the present war, which is the best argument for their truth (1916).

[3] See Dudden's excellent monograph on *Gregory the Great* (Longmans 1905)—an indispensable introduction to the study of the Middle Ages.

supervise industrial life in their diocese (*Cod. Just.* i 4, 26 § 2) even by the recognition of the absentee emperor. Patiens of Lyons feeds the starving Arvernians just before the close of the western dynasty (*474*); Synesius in Cyrene had already found his refined leisure of hunting and philosophy saddled with very similar duties. Bishops were set to watch and control the officers and deputies, whom the central government eyed with such strange suspicion and distrust; they were auditors of expenditure, supervised the sale of necessaries (*Dig.* i 4. 18 § 7) and controlled the excessive profits of middlemen and purveyors (*C. J.* i 4 i). It does not appear that any bishop actually filled the post of *defensor civitatis*, an office instituted by a merciful emperor as a counterpoise against his own fiscal agents.[1] But the prelate was expected, and indeed obliged, to take a share in every side of life; and wherever traces of the old administrative methods survive into later times, this survival seems due to their character and energy, to the continuous tradition and definite policy which were found in their persons alone.

Abortive Attempt of Theodoric the Arian: *Civilitas*.—Two secular rulers in this age entertained schemes no less definite than the church's aim: Theodoric and Charles the Frank. It was Theodoric's aim to preserve the mechanism and traditions of imperial Rome. So far as he could, he followed the ancient lines, in land-survey and assessment, in collecting the *census*, in the fiscal system. He kept up the postal and transit system, repaired walls, aqueducts and other public works. He made a serious (but futile) effort to give good and just government to two distinct and irreconciled races and creeds. He desired to maintain 'law and order', a notion embodied in the single word *civilitas*, so constantly recurring in the formal court dialect of Cassiodorus. Like Kublai Khan or the manchu emperors of the recent chinese dynasty, he did not wish to pose as a mere captain of mercenaries, leader of a cantonment of troops or an 'army of occupation'. He desired to appear as the emperor's deputy, as the impartial judge over Goth and Roman alike. The philosophic and stoic basis of Rome's jurisprudence is not forgotten: he appeals rather to this 'natural law' than to religion (*recta ratio* Cass. *Var.* ix 33). The main duty was rather to preserve peace than to maintain true religion—about which there was some dispute. He believed he could unite the gothic and roman races without losing or blurring their idiosyncrasy; he hoped, while keeping them distinct in character and occupation, to make them live as brethren.[2] Where a community could not pay its dues, taxes

[1] The authority which the emperors entrusted to the bishops was sometimes turned against themselves; Ambrose defied Theodosius at Milan (390) and put him to open penance; Agapetus resisted Justinian (530); Gregory I sometimes reproves Maurice as a superior, sometimes advises him as an equal.

[2] His sense of equity is seen in a sincere respect for vested interests, even when hard to justify: the aqueducts had been tapped and the stream diverted to private mills; the evil practice was forbidden (*Var.* iii 31) but compensation was paid to pleaders of thirty years' prescription.

were remitted ; as to Arles (*Var.* iii 39), Apulia (i 16) Venetia (xii 7), Liguria (xii 28). Rates were equitably revised from time to time (ix. 10). A more doubtful benefit to the subject-class was an attempt to fix maximum prices, as in Diocletian's Edict. The notion underlying this edict extended its scope and was reinforced by religious sentiment : an ideal Christian charity is supposed to govern the rules of trade, the conduct of business. The *curator* was to fix ' moderate rates of exchange ' (vii 12) and not allow the seller to get the best of the bargain ; a *defensor* was to fix prices according to ' the bad or good season ' (vii 11). *Forestalling* and *regrading* in times of scarcity were expressly condemned (ix 5). In the eastern world there had been legislation under Zeno (*474–491*) against trade-monopolies which enhanced prices for the consumer and also against trade-unions among artizans (*Cod. Just.* iv 59. 2 § 1–3).

Failure due to Want of Homogeneity in Race and Creed.—The good designs of Theodoric were frustrated by his Arianism. Catholic bishops were drawn into a confederacy, by their common need of resisting barbarian kings of heretical belief in Africa, Italy, Spain, Burgundy, lastly in Lombardy. The turning-point in this epoch is the conversion of Clovis ; on this all future development is seen to hinge. The papal power, forced into the arms of the Franks by the heresy of the kings and the iconoclasm of the armenian ' puritans ' at Byzantium, based its authority on a spiritual appeal : they asked obedience in God's name not as the natural right of a ruler or as a matter of contract. ' Right reason ' no longer appears as the ground, but God's will and the ruler's command as His lieutenant or vicegerent : only as a ruler speaks or holds office in the name of God, can he claim obedience from his subjects (this will be, in later time, Wiclif's novel and unwelcome doctrine). The church therefore is bound to ally herself in the end with an orthodox sovereign ; any other policy was but a provisional compromise. This alliance is pregnant with the future and until *1200* the history of Europe is only the attempt to formulate the terms of the compact.

The Frankish Merwings and Survivals of Tradition.—The merwing Franks (the most inferior royalty among all the barbarian States) tried to follow imperial methods ; not with the generous convictions of Ataul (Orosius vii 43) or with the farsighted policy of Theodoric, but merely from want of originality, as the line of least resistance. Over large districts not only in favoured towns, there prevailed an ' unbroken economic life '. The Franks collected taxes by roman methods, valued estates for assessment according to the old cadasters, and levied the land-tax by the same means. (Cf. Dahn on *Merwing Finance* and Pardessus.) This interest of the State favoured private property, the title to which was duly registered. Gaul was still a country of deeds and archives and public notaries. Even the life of joint-stock mercantile societies was not interrupted : the postal service was maintained at least in the first century of the new dominion : the sailors and butchers of Paris claimed in later time a continuous and privileged history. Much then of the heritage of roman life survived.

Manual Activity and Industrious Example in Convents.—We have seen then how Christian teaching and authority formed a powerful support of

law and order during the transition. On these two moral influences are seen to depend all the conditions of material progress. The barbarians were, as a rule, glad to avail themselves of such guidance and even to submit to control. Still more strictly economic was early conventual life in the 'Christian industrial colonies, moulding society rather by ex-'ample than precept'. Manual labour was a bounden duty undertaken as a godly discipline, not for reward nor as a drudgery to weary the rebel flesh.[1] Cunningham says with great truth 'There was neither greed of 'gain, nor the reluctant service of the slave, but simply a duty to be done 'diligently unto the Lord.' The acknowledged guide in conduct and belief, St. Austin, had urged the need of bodily labour (*de. op. mon.* § 35); the rule of St. Benedict (*cap.* 48) made it an indispensable part of a monk's daily routine. When copying and illuminating were regarded as substitutes, the example lost much of its efficacy of appeal with the working classes—who in any age can only be made to understand one form of exertion. In the wilds created by curial misgovernment, fiscal rapacity and foreign inroads, the Benedictines set up houses on the models of the roman villa.

Their Economic and Commercial Value.—Like the great noble's estate in the pages of Apollinaris Sidonius (*c. 450* A.D.), the convent was self-sufficing. The abbot, taking the *seigneur's* place, organized not only the tasks of husbandry but the crafts of artizans, each being set to work at his own trade for the common benefit. Under the last effective Merwing Dagobert I St. Eligius, the goldsmith, established his house at Solignac in *631* for 500 brothers, including craftsmen of divers trades. Surplus produce was sold and thus convents became manufactories and commercial centres of exchange, brought constantly into economic touch with the outer world. The *negociator ecclesiæ* was to be one 'who could rarely or never be 'overreached at a bargain and would himself never overreach another; 'or speak falsely in order to buy more cheaply or sell more dearly' (Rule of Peter de Honestis iii 29). The 'immunities' which from this time forward were lavishly issued to abbeys by the Ministers of the Crown, allowed them to buy and convey goods free of toll. With the Carlings this monkish trading was further developed; Louis I grants to the convent of Tours freedom from toll throughout his wide dominions. The monks were therefore interested in the bridges and highways, in their repair and maintenance: they also taught laymen that it was a pious labour to restore and keep them in order: hence the story of St. Christopher and his pious work as a ferryman. A regular transport system on Loire and Seine was owed to the abbeys, who required their serfs to provide oxen and carts or else permitted them (even at this early date) to pay a commutation instead of *corvée*. This traffic was extended in the orderly days of Charles the Great, and no doubt provoked the envy and greed of the danish invaders against these too opulent religious houses.

[1] The Celtic tradition (in St. Columban) is as strict in enjoining manual labour, like the hermits' basket-work in Egypt; and when the benedictine rule fell into elegant refinement and slackness the cistercian and carthusian orders again reverted to the ideal of honest toil.

Charlemagne : *utilitas*.—Transient though it was, the empire of the Carlings left more enduring traces than the compromise of Theodoric. Charles the Great tried to reorganize society through the influence of a single civil but consecrated authority, and his reign may be deemed a turning-point in the history of western Europe, the beginning of the modern world. His *capitula* had direct and lasting influence on the polities in France and Germany ; and most later kings (who were able to form a policy) took the first frankish emperor as a model. In his person centred the vague reverence held towards the pacific and idealized roman empire under which the Saviour was born ; down to the age of Dante the true type of a well-ordered Christian State was the empire of Augustus as remodelled by Charles. His very practical aim is constantly set forth ; where Theodoric aims at *civilitas*, Charles sets *utilitas* in the forefront. It was his deep regard for order and security which led him to subdue the Saxons and round off his south-eastern frontier by ending the Avar menace. He wished to develop, not merely to tax ; like our King Edward VII he made his own royal estate a model of skilful business-management. City-life was little developed ; the household was still the *economic* as well as the *military* unit : it was also the basis of justice and poor-relief. Its members were regarded, not as contracting parties for personal profit but as a natural social group : each member must take his share in mutual offices for the common good as a bounden duty.

The Royal Estates a Model : Economic Autonomy of the *Villa*.—The rules laid down for royal estates were meant to be copied on the ' benefices ' allotted to abbot and noble, that everywhere resources might be improved and enlarged. The great household was the *economic* and social unit under Charles. Whether under lay-proprietor or abbot, it was competent to deal with nearly every relation of life, justice, relief of the indigent, military service, fiscal dues. The emperor-king and his court bound together these insulated and self-sufficing communities ; and while he guided, or even dictated, the general rules of their policy, he had neither wish nor power to interfere in their daily routine or local autonomy. In that age the ' people ' [1] did not exist : every advance towards sympathy or consolidation depended on some movement from above. Large households were always increasing by the willing submission and surrender of small freeholders, whose interest it was rather to become members of a better organized whole than remain in poverty-stricken isolation. The King's *judices* were expected to keep accounts and survey inventories. Within the estate money did not circulate : Charles rejected the bullionism of the Merwings who, like later Spain, ignorantly placed the welfare of the State in idle and hoarded treasure.[2] Charles' great household, as an ideal and practical unit, was introduced by the Normans into England ; and at the present

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[1] In a sense the ' people ' never does exist, the modern aggregations which have but slowly acquired a common feeling of nationality, being the creations of royal caprice or policy, of conquest or of accident.

[2] See Dahn (*lib. cit.*) & Levasseur i 151.

moment accounts for a social supremacy in the country or county which has long survived its *economic* inferiority.

His Development of Foreign Trade.—Trading intercourse he also tried to develop: he secured from the muslim concessions by which Marseilles and Narbonne became ports for levantine commerce: his well-known treaty with Caliph Harun ensured protection for merchants as well as pilgrims—if indeed the two classes could be clearly discriminated. He sought to make a canal to join Danube and Main, no doubt chiefly for use in war but also for peaceful ends. Mainz became the startingpoint of a trade-route to the east, to Bohemia and Moravia and even to the wilder tribes along the Baltic; at that time Erfurt, Magdeburg, and Jumna rose into notice as centres for northern produce, like furs and amber. Ports were created or improved for sea-trading and maritime intercourse; Nantes, Bordeaux (for Ireland and Spain), Rouen and Boulogne; this last was the chief port on the Channel and already possessed a lighthouse. A fleet was kept in southern waters against the Moors, and in northern against the Norsemen. The ancient towns of the Rhine valley Cologne, Coblenz, Mainz and Strasburg became very rich; at Mainz Charles built a bridge at great cost (Eginhard's *Life* § 17). He also protected the small trader from the exactions of petty feudal particularism. He collected his own customs at recognized points but he would allow no other competitors to thwart trade. He suppressed the tolls of the local magnate, to the Revolution a hindrance and a discomfort to all parties concerned: he punished those who stretched a rope across a river to stop free traffic (*Capitul.* A.D. *805, 6*). But the active trade with foreign countries was still in foreign hands. Syrians had a settlement in Paris (Gregory of Tours, x 26) and had been the chief mediaries between east and west. The Jews now replaced them: they had an old colony at Cologne and factories at Aix, Magdeburg, Paris, Orleans, Clermont and Narbonne. But even for trading in the Levant there were found Christians bold enough to adventure: and we know that monastic commerce was well established. Charles sought to reform the currency and adopt a uniform standard in weights and measures; but he had little success: yet his unit of currency passed with the Normans into England and has displaced the saxon method of reckoning down to the present hour.

Religious Complexion of his Social System: Gospel to Regulate Commerce.—To all this development of *material* resources Charles sought to give a religious complexion. The *civil* power he used to uphold and supplement *spiritual* authority. He legislates against markets and fairs on Sunday (*Capit.* A.D. *813*); observance of the Lord's Day and payment of tithe were required from Saxons as well as Franks. He met the old evils of sturdy beggary (since the Bagauda rising *c. 275–290*) by giving the deserving poor local maintenance (*Capit.* A.D. *806*.)[1] This relief was deemed a special duty of religious houses. Charles was anxious to bring these privileged convents under better discipline; his son, Louis I (*Capit.*

[1] At the same date we hear of the growth of πτωχοτροφεῖα under the Amorian Dynasty at Byzantium.

A.D. *817*) gives detailed instruction even for internal affairs, directing that on fast-days bodily work should be light, that books from the Library should be lent to the monks for private study. Church property had to be protected against malversation (*Capit.* A.D. *806*), against the building schemes of ambitious abbots (A.D. *811*), against the prevailing interest taken by the monk in worldly business [1] (A.D. *789–794*). Lastly even among secular folk a high standard of commercial morality was enjoined. An attempt is made to define legitimate gain and distinguish what is merely mean or usurious; some forms of bargaining are censured (A.D. *809*); special enactments are made in case of famine (A.D. *805*); and on some occasions a *maximum* price is fixed by law (A.D. *794* and *808*). Here is an effort to secure unity and adapt every relation and department of life to the precepts of the Gospel and the rule of the Church. Such a scheme could not be achieved by Theodoric with his two distinct nations and two hostile creeds; with his precarious right of tenure and his semi-dependence on a distant suzerain. But Charles, however short-lived his polity, set the model of the Holy Roman Empire for the western mind in all its familiar and unchanging features.

Section II. Rise of the Communes: New Monetary Basis for Social Exchange.

The Towns.—In the next two centuries the State is purely on the defensive, and rulers have no time for new schemes of reconstruction. But we may question if the northern 'tumults' were as fatal to economic progress as has been thought: large areas in north, and afterwards in south, Germany were filled with yeomen settlers, a migration which (according to Lamprecht) began as early as the days of Charles himself. In cent. xi and xii there are tokens of vigorous urban life in Flanders, Rhineland and in France itself: new towns were founded in teutonic lands between *1100* and *1300*, after the historic example of Henry the Fowler in the saxon north. The revival of town life in the epoch of the *communes* is now the salient feature—a transition from something like a patriarchate, national or religious, to a tie, still in a sense religious, but in the main contractual and utilitarian. 'In the *household*' says Cunningham (ii 56) 'there is only one proprietor, 'who has power to control the resources of the establishment; the *town* 'is a social group in which there are *several* proprietors, and therefore '*several* households.' We have here the old contrast between the lord and father, absolute within the family circle, but only one among his peers when he walks abroad or meets his equals (e.g. in the Senate) for common counsel. Thus a monastery was never a town proper, because there were no separate proprietors with exclusive private rights and independence (so far) within the group. Whence came the new urban populace? In a society of households with men tied to the soil either by ownership or personal service, there could be little freedom of movement; it is not easy at first sight to decide whence the urban areas could have been recruited. Through-

[1] Under William the Lion in Scotland (some centuries later) convents and religious houses were charged with being mere 'trading corporations'.

out France, old roman cities seemed, even in days of the greatest poverty, to have continued to exist as *towns* (in the economic sense). The Abbeys would attract and employ, besides the head negotiator, a large number of 'outside agents' and other settlers who had craved right of asylum; pilgrims and foreign traders might also be taken into account. We know that one duty of the carolingian *missi* was to report upon the arrival of *advenæ* (alien immigrants) within their district. Another very obvious cause of settlement within town-walls was the need of protection during the inroads of the Danes; the town of cent. x was, before anything else, a *byrh*, a *burg* (*Perg*amus), a fortress.

As Privileged and Autonomous Corporations.—By the end of our period the town is not merely an accidental congeries of men seeking safety in asylum, but has become a corporate body. The inmates enjoy common rights and duties, and the group (even if an exclusive oligarchy) has some semblance of unity. There was the common town-land, market-rights open to all qualified citizens, a common obligation (as in the byzantine system of ἀλληλέγγυον) to discharge the fiscal dues or *fee-farm rent*, common duties of watch and ward and maintenance of the city walls. Lastly, there was the common interest in the struggle for autonomy against feudal lordship. Patrons in cent. xii and xiii were fully alive to the need of constituting towns with their civil privileges: kings and nobles are seen to plant and encourage such trading centres by a deliberate policy.[1] Between *1200–1300* several towns arose in Saxony from the mining industry; the english kings founded others in their french possessions at favourable points of the intersection of trade-routes. New towns and larger suburbs were laid out by french kings and by Edward I on french soil; Montpazier and Carcassone may be taken as examples.

The New Aristocracy of Traders: The Gilds.—At first the aristocracy of the town was formed of all who had proprietary rights in the town-land; but this exclusive caste gave way before the interests of the more active traders, who, as the leading factor in prosperity, claimed almost exclusive power and privilege. Landless men and wealthy settlers are received into gilds which can be traced to very early times. The *gild-merchant* was formed to enable townsmen to engage in passive trade at home on the best terms; all men great or small could buy in a collective bargain from travelling salesmen, afterward sharing the goods in proportion to their *quota*. *Craft-gilds* appear as early as cent. xii in the Cordubans or cord-wainers of Rouen, the weavers of London and other 'companies'. They bear close resemblance to roman *collegia*, and may possibly be a continuous survival with unbroken tradition. Civic life received its greatest impulse in the time of the Crusades, and its revival has been called the 'last stone' in the foundations of medieval Christendom': whereas in a study of

[1] Professor Pirenne of Ghent sees clearly that no one motive or fact will account for the birth of towns in this age: 'Les villes sont nées 'spontanément sous l'action des causes économiques qu'a suscitées en 'Europe la renaissance du commerce et de l'industrie'. *Rev. Hist.* lvii 68, 1895.

Phenice or of greco-roman culture it confronts us at the outset ready made. The tide of commercial prosperity (cent. xi and xii) flowed from south to north, from Italy, Septimania and Provence, then to the Rhine, Flanders and the north of France, lastly to England. As the towns became rich they could secure freedom: by fighting, or more often (like a roman slave) by purchase. In *1100–1200* the towns had outlived the tutelage of a patron: just as the Reform Bill of 1832 dislodged the technical and titular 'patron of the borough' who like the 'patron of the advowson' held a recognized, if somewhat anomalous, position. The freedom of Venice, Naples and Amalfi under Byzantium gave a model and set a standard: the imperial cities in Germany aimed at a like measure of autonomy. French townsmen formed themselves into sworn *communes* against the *seigneurs*; their success transferred power from a landed noble or a churchman to a moneyed 'aristocracy' within the city walls, branded by their opponents as 'usurers' (*Synod of Paris, 1213*). Here was repeated the old struggle of classical days between the landed *eupatrid* or patrician and the plebeian with money: a contest which still continues to the present moment. The demands of the townsmen however do not seem to be excessive: (1) their own courts and tribunals for cases of *law merchant*, (2) exemption from oppressive or arbitrary tolls.

Royal Patronage of the Communes.—While *seigneurs* and *clergy* opposed the communes, royalty were disposed to favour them, as it slowly mounted its steep and difficult path to absolute power. The subtle Capets gave support to the claims of boroughs standing on seigneurial land *outside* the king's own demesne. Some lords saw the advantage of strengthening their commercial centres: many had returned from the Holy Wars with depleted revenues and much altered views on trade. Each town that won its charter, its belfry, and its common seal, became an autonomous centre of municipal life; it raised its own funds for government and police, for the payment of the 'enfranchisement-fee' which ended its copyhold or villein-tenure. This was paid by taxes, sometimes levied on all houses and occupiers, sometimes on the mercantile gilds according to their wealth and standing. This democratic aristocracy who paid taxes and commuted fee-farm rent were very jealous of any intrusion or encroachments: the privileges of citizenship were never lavished to outsiders, and to the present moment a swiss canton will be found to retain traces of this genuinely republican exclusiveness. As citizens of a chartered town they had status, not only in their own country (or artificial State) but all over Europe. A creditor would get the mayor of his city to write to the chief officer of the town wherein his debtor resided. A merchant did not claim commercial status as of english or french birth but in virtue of citizenship in some privileged town. This status he derived from his municipal standing and it was recognized wherever merchants congregated. He carried his own *law merchant* about with him in his own person: this was valid nearly all over Christendom, which was thus, even for industrial and secular purposes, by no means an empty name: by it he rose above the petty local customs and dues, tolls and restrictions, by which later Europe fettered trade and hindered friendly intercourse. It was the *native* (or foreign) merchant

who, as possessing capital, found the money for the overlord's composition, led the *communes* in trade or conflict and acquired through money a dominating influence within the walls. The Papal Bankers and agents were also important and indeed ecumenical personages : in Florence cloth-importers, in London grocers, seemed to monopolize the chief civic dignities.

The Craft-Gilds and Freemasonry.—But besides these (private) organizations of moneyed men, were the *craft-gilds*. In the time of our Henry I there were weavers' gilds at Oxford, Marlborough and Beverley, of cord-wainers at Rouen, of drapers at Valenciennes, of tanners at Ghent. Paris in cent. xiii had a completely organized system of (probably very recent) gilds and industrial companies,[1] not less in number than one hundred. Although ' speculative ' masonry in our own time has no practical craft, yet there are many points in which its rules resemble the old methods of the ' operative ' craft : the three degrees of entered apprentice, fellow-craftsman or journeyman, master-mason (who was able to start business on his own account). Such a corporate society could enforce rules and bye-laws on its members ; it did not allow outsiders to practise the calling (hence the archaic gift to-day of the *freedom* of the city) ; it had common funds levied from all members and made gratuitous loans to needy brethren and grants to the sick or distressed.

New Monetary Basis of Society : Scutage and Commutation.—The thirteenth century, which heard the loftiest claims urged in turn by pope and emperor and witnessed the downfall of both, was the age in which this prosperity rose to a zenith. It was not merely a time of rapid transition but of ' economic revolution '. Commercial intercourse between distant centres destroyed barter in kind and personal services, diffusing money instead and bringing in the notion of separate legal covenants in place of permanent obligations of soil and person. All governments became keenly alive to the financial convenience of money payments (scutage). The new demands of fiscal agents forced owners of land to get a *solid*, and not as heretofore a *sentimental*, value from their land. They became indeed ' usurers ', the contumelious name by which the synod of Paris in *1213* branded the revolting *communes*. There grew up besides a bitter feeling against Jews as commanding a monopoly of this precious vehicle of exchange—a feeling which survives to-day in such communities of eastern Europe as are still at a similar level of culture. Without this easy means of exchange and a class of men suited by nature to control it, society must have stagnated or crystallized in a ' Stationary State ', in isolated and self-sufficing *household* groups. The same cause lies behind *constitutional* as behind *economic* development. When public burdens were assessed and collected in terms of money, the subject-class began to aim at controlling the power of the purse. In England *personal service* and *payment in kind* (surviving latest in church-tithes) [2] gave way, by the reign of Edward I, to a *money-revenue*.

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[1] Cf. Etienne Boileau's *Book of Crafts*.

[2] Let it be remembered, however, how very large a proportion dwelt

Taxation and Representation.—Effective central government became at last feasible, and the control of taxation was an object of desire for all. The subject had not claimed to supervise customs on imports, which did not seem to touch him very closely, nor had he complained of traditional dues, fixed like manorial quit-rents on the principle *ne varietur*, nor again had he greatly cared how the sums were spent. But now the appetite of the central power had grown with feeding ; the dues demanded by it were constantly shifting according (as it seemed) to a purely arbitrary caprice : hence those who felt and suffered by these changes were fully justified in demanding some control. How totally diverse this conception of control of finance through Parliament is from our present anomalous system of government by the untaxed multitude need not here be further remarked.

The Papacy as Tax-Gatherer, Forerunner of the Modern State.—It cannot be denied that in the making of the modern State (chiefly marked by this successive increase of taxation) the Papacy bore a large share. The needs of the papal court and the wide area whence its dues were drawn hastened the change to cash-payments. Pontifical bankers or agents were ubiquitous and transmitted dues which could never have been paid in kind. England was a principal sufferer, having been heavily burdened, since the conquest, with papal dues. But it was not in the present period that these demands reached a climax and provoked rebellion : it was during the age of the *secularized* papacy (cent. xiv and xv) that the worst exactions were seen. The popes then set the example of a pure money-revenue : it was imitated by kings. In cent. xii we have the *Scaccary Dialogue* of Bishop Richard : whence we can trace the analogy between regal and papal sources of income :—there is domain land, taxation and profits of jurisdiction in both. Details show that even in the early part of the century some part of the King's revenue had been gathered in kind (*D. de Scc.* i 7), and the fiscal system described in the treatise was clearly of recent origin. Even under Edward I the supplies voted by Parliament were transmitted in wool to Flanders and there sold.

Fiscal Finance in England.—Even after our period it would seem that English fiscal finance was not yet settled on a monetary basis. For this transition the aid of capital and capitalists was indispensable : the Monarchy henceforth dispenses with the support of its former friends and peers, the feudal nobility, and leans more and more completely on the help of the banker and the Jew. William I had desired to *monetize* his revenues and had brought over some Hebrews as necessary allies. The subject's wealth

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in the country : in cent. xiii *natural* economy was still dominant in rural districts, indeed for long after : in Scotland in cent. xviii a great part of farm rent was paid in kind. Serfs worked on their own and their masters' plots and were paid by rations (not money) and by the value of their own copy-holdings. Or (as in the *métayer* system) produce might be divided between master or landlord and actual cultivators. Proprietors dispensed with money-relations and organized their property on a self-sufficing basis. We can imagine how they resented the sudden and disconcerting demands for money on the part of fiscal agents of the Monarchy.

in land and goods was not directly accessible to the Crown ; the Jews could advance on security of taxes paid in kind ; or might lend to an impecunious taxpayer who pledged his acres. Neither in industry nor commerce did they materially assist the development of english resources, but without doubt they helped on these fiscal changes. Matters had indeed changed when Edward I found himself able to dispense with their services and banish them from the country. After the beginning of cent. xiii they were less important and conspicuous, and italian bankers (trained perhaps in the papal employment) broke down their monopoly.

The City Takes Place of Villa (or Manor) as Social Unit.—The city with its network of foreign and distant relations has thus in this age become the economic unit in place of the *household* ; and the future lies with the city and its mobile capital. Still the household is not yet obsolete. Land, as more than 1000 years before in the *villa*, was owned in blocks and tilled by dependents who gave personal service or paid their dues in kind. The household was a *productive* but it was also an *educational* centre. Each estate was meant to be self-sufficing and, since the Conqueror had adroitly separated the various holdings of his favourites, the noble, like an itinerant Merwing king, was often on progress, travelling to and fro between his several properties. The *service* dues from the copyholders were carefully set down, and this was the rule in cent. xiii : though even here, as in the military scutage, it was sometimes convenient both for lord and tenant to commute for a sum. By degrees every duty rendered was assessed in terms of *money*, a return, not for the value of his holding, but for the worth of his service ; hence the trivial amount to-day of *quit-rents* in considerable holdings of copy-land. In the next period in England, after the Black Death had disorganized the bond of labour and capital, of lord and vassal, money payment became everywhere the rule : and the competitive system and spirit, hitherto excluded both by sentiment and religious teaching, entered into the life of master and servant alike. The servant demanded that his wages should not be settled by old assessment rates but by *competition* ; while the former let out his estates, not for a nominal sum or an annual compliment, but frankly to the highest bidder ; hence in cent. xv and xvi the complaint that the small yeoman was ousted in favour of the sheep-farmer who could offer more rent. So great was the moral prejudice against this purely mercantile method of settling tenants that only in cent. xvii did it wholly lose its discredit—and then only when the new protestant nobility and gentry, enriched by abbey-lands, overpowered the regal prerogative and began the epoch of the Whig Oligarchy.

Section III. Influence of the Church : Commercial Morality and Slavery : Foreign Stimuli

Church Leads, and Attempts to Guide, New Social Changes.—This *economic* transition (of which some chief features have been surveyed) was conducted in a homogeneous Christendom and under priestly rule. As in India, only the common aims and institutions of a class analogous to brahmans gave even a semblance of unity to the congeries of races, to the

puzzling medley of independent, yet overlapping, States. Since Charles there was (in theory at least) a single social organism; but it was not in cent. xi a *military* empire but an *ecclesiastical* society. There was a common religious life and belief which placed spiritual weapons in the hands of the meanest clerk. There was a universal system of Canon Law dealing with many matters now accounted far remote from the sacred province—with trading morality, with marriage, and with testaments. There was the common duty of paying dues to Rome, a practice which created a vast fiscal system and, while its abuses caused the (largely) economic crisis of the Reformation, served as a model to kings and capitalists. A clerical framework then, *religious*, *legal*, and *financial* held society together, and the later voice of protest questioned the rights of the church in each department of tutelage or exploitation. But in its best days the church brought about (as nothing else could) the revival of society. Religion was not, as Montanism desired it to be, 'the mere sentiment of pious individuals, 'but a living force permeating all the remnants of civilization' (Cunningham ii 69). Hence the attempt to *moralize* trade, to 'proclaim unfalter-'ingly' according to the program of modern visionaries, 'that moral laws are superior to physical facts.' In cent. xiii economic problems were debated by metaphysicians who brought into a fluctuating region of exchange the notion of a fixed and ideal standard: they asked what was the *just price* of each thing. It need not be pointed out that the quest is futile: the laws of *supply and demand* form refutation enough. Value does not *inhere* in an object; is not *intrinsic* (like the *essence* in Realism). It rises from the wants, needs and preferences of men; it is *subjective*, relative and is constantly varying. There can be no just or ideal value which every article ought to possess: into such a matter '*ought*' cannot enter.

Moral Effort to Restrain Usury and Profits of Trade.—The medieval mind looked with suspicion and dislike upon the merchant who made good bargains, who acquired wealth by exchange of commodities: writers openly censured a man who bought articles to sell elsewhere at a profit, just as to-day a certain distrust is felt at transactions in shares. A *reasonable* price, they thought, should be fixed by calculating the cost of production; no exceptional value should be admitted, e.g. that arising from failure of crop or output elsewhere. In towns definite limits were fixed to prices; a *maximum* was common, a *minimum* much less frequent (but is sometimes found in the case of english wool destined for the continent). Here too as in the whole personal service and dues of a Manor, the aim was *ne varietur*—that is, to systematize a regular and unvarying payment with which competition or 'higher offers' could not interfere.

Power or Property a Trust: Clerical Teaching.—When we regard these traces of a Christian influence (however mistakenly applied to the world of hard facts) we cannot doubt that social progress was largely controlled by impartial moralists, by a clerical caste. The dream of Charles seemed almost a sober truth; a well-organized empire guided by a spiritual power and permeated by religious and moral sentiments. The great roman heritage had been recast by Charles, on the *political* and *municipal* side

and on the *economic* side as well. Its commercial and industrial life was settled according to a Christian standpoint in town and in country. Dominant throughout the realm were certain moral conceptions, wholly unfamiliar to the ancient world, whether in its zenith or decline. Institutions in the Middle Ages were formed under the impulse and stimulus of moral notions and religious principles which their forerunners would have expressly denied. All power and office was now held to be a sacred trust; all rulers were responsible to God for its exercise over the subjects entrusted to their keeping; the rich man must render a strict account of the use of his wealth, (and these uses were dictated by piety and sentiment, not always on the wisest lines). The medieval owner at his best felt (as Wiclif afterwards taught explicitly) that he was merely a trustee and a steward. If personal and private possession is not to become a social menace, it is clear that some such conviction must be upheld.

Labour Ennobled and Consecrated.—On the other hand, the necessary drudgery of the greater part of mankind was transfigured by the gospel-message; but there was no hurried 'abolitionism' for the basis of *slavery*. Greek life, aiming at the leisure and philosophy of a few, rested on a despicable basis of forced labour, which however in practice lost many of its worst features. But the Church taught the equality of men, but the difference of function: it held fast to the dignity of labour. Work became not a means to an end, but a discipline of character and a duty to be done, not to society but to God. Besides, the Church tried as we have seen to *moralize* industry and trade. If Greece improved on the phenician ideal of mere plenty and gross comfort, the Gospel remoulded the *economic* life from the standpoint of personal responsibilities. For Catholicism is founded upon individualism, upon a firm belief in the worth of the unit—without which conviction no group or community (as a realistic abstraction) can have any value. Realistic socialism or the Catholic Church in its social aspect, or any doctrine which appeals to us in the name of an abstraction, has to depend on this value, which only resides in the *whole* because each several *part* contributes its share. The basis of the medieval polity (even of papal aggrandisement in its most meddlesome and tyrannic forms) was a sense of the soul's immortal worth and destiny, coupled with a strong belief in democratic equality.

Respect for the Unit (typical of the Medieval Mind).—The papacy was the champion of liberty because it claimed to control rulers in virtue of its divine commission. It did not fetter individual freedom or make man work (in the fashion of industrialism or militarism) for an end that is not his: it carefully fostered independence, and even idiosyncrasy, and only used discipline and tutelage as means to an end. Hence the cleavage in the attitude to the *slave* and the *labourer*, on whom earlier economic society had depended. The result of the Crusades was to give a new impetus to slavery—such a recrudescence indeed, that the horrors of the ancient world were equalled and probably surpassed by the african slave-trade. In the following period the student can point out how the revival of classical studies led to an apotheosis of *tyranny*, not (as many people to-day idly suppose) to a vindication of *freedom*. The irresponsible State was on the

one hand unfettered by transcendental (or even moral) ideas; on the other, the subjects were but a flock of disintegrated atoms, ranging from the frankly servile class to the automaton working for wages. The failure of the humanitarian sentiment in the french enlightenment, the restoration of the absolute State and the servile proletariat, show how irresistible was the stream making against liberty.

Status of Labourer Raised: Captives and Slaves.—*Power as a trust not a patrimony* was a medieval commonplace:[1] its correlative doctrine was the *worth of the individual*. Economic causes and Christian sentiment had combined to raise the labourer's status. From St. Paul's day the Church had not declaimed against slavery or sought to interfere with it: it never asserted that man had an inherent right to be free.[2] But it followed up the roman juristic attempt to modify the servile lot: and, with a very different motive from the stoic impulse, urged the common brotherhood of men. The slave was protected from cruel treatment and the State stepped into the once reserved circle of home-life, under the absolute patriarch. Christian legislators or codifiers followed good pagan examples (*Cod. Theod.* ix 55. i § 5: *Cod. Just.* vii 15 § i). Freedom was an ideal which must be kept in view. With her shrewd theory of *supererogation* the Church made a special virtue, not a universal obligation, of enfranchisement: it was not wrong to keep slaves, to set them free was commendable. For captives of muslim masters beyond the seas there was the deepest pity. Christians who for profit sold their brothers in the faith to pagan masters, roused bitter indignation and loathing. The order of the Redemptionists (and of the Holy Trinity and St. Victor) was founded to aid in the release of such captives. In cent. xiii the followers of Dominic and Francis took an active part in this good work of ransom; Innocent III even recommended the pious duty to the sultan Almanzur, with whom he was then on friendly terms. The attitude to the slavery of pagans brought to serve in Christian lands was of course wholly different.[3] It

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[1] Oresme, bishop of Lisieux, in his treatise *de mutatione monetarum* is angry with John of France for his debasement of the coinage: the money of the realm belonged to the community at large; the king had no right to treat it as his own, to alter its form and value at his sole will and pleasure. If he did so for gain he was worse than a usurer; he was not *bargaining* but extorting from men who had never made a bargain at all. This is but one instance of such language; but it has special weight and meaning as coming from a class and a country only too anxious to remove the fetters from arbitrary power.

[2] Cf. the high praise bestowed on medieval society by Hilaire Belloc, *Servile State* § iii, 41–54.

[3] Columbus sent home 500 prisoners from the Caribs (1494) to be sold as slaves at Seville: Isabella, after a royal order had sanctioned this, felt uneasy and had a letter written to Bishop Fonseca to suspend the edict and to inquire into the causes for which they had been captured and the legality of the sale. The divines disagreed and Isabella sent the slaves back to their homes.

might even be held a pious work or act of mercy to bring the heathen within the reach of instruction.[1]

Improvement in Condition of Lowest Class : Deterioration later.—But in Europe throughout this period actual slavery decreased and the labourer's status improved. In roman times estates were worked by serfs, tied to their holdings quite as much on their own as on their masters' account ; and these holdings were allotted to them much as plots were given to slaves by the primitive Germans, who had no use for an elaborate system of domestic service. The medieval villein enjoyed a recognized legal status, and he acquired in time both right of proprietorship and fixed tenure. When *money* took the place of *kind* for payment of dues and in commuting personal service or corvée he was the gainer ; the *ascriptus glebæ* sold with the estate becomes the copyhold tenant safe from disturbance, so long as he pays his annual penny or half-penny and his fine or ' fee ' on ' institution to his benefice '. His time was now his own ; he enjoyed economic and personal freedom. There was little demand for hired labour ; and no occasion to import it into Europe. A large peasant-body cultivated small holdings (in which was arising a system of double ownership). In the reclaiming of new ground or intensive tilling of present areas there was little inducement for capital to show enterprise. There was therefore a very large free settled population, not a band of shifting hirelings and wage-earners (as we have to-day). There was no room for slaves from Africa ; it was the quite different character of plantations in the New World that introduced them there. Here Christian sentiment failed to make its protest and the example reacted upon the Old World : there, after a brief triumph of the worker after the Black Death, the position of the rural labouring class grew steadily worse until days well within present memory.[2]

Peculiar Position of Villein : How far the King's Subject ?—We may here briefly notice the position of the mediating class of *villeins* because of the light it throws on the policy of the centralizing kingship. The villein ' is assumed to be free by birth but holds (servile) land of which he cannot freely dispose ' (Vinogradoff). In saxon times in England the estate of the lord and the property of the peasant are clearly marked off ; but in the advance of Feudalism after Domesday, we see the kingship (as

[1] Columbus actually advocated it on this ground. The Spaniards in general disliked the trade but regarded it as a necessary evil ; that nation has always had a loftier and more genuine sense of human dignity than the italian.

[2] ' In cent. xiv ' says Cunningham ii 166 ' the labourer had won such ' freedom that he was able to bargain for higher wages and to insist on ' getting them.' But this was in the infant days of capitalism, which soon put an end to this vaunted independence except in the case of the really skilled craftsman, who can choose his trade at first and move from place to place to sell it at the best price. At first no doubt ' labour tended ' to follow capital because it was attracted, not because it was forced ' (*ibid.*) How long did this enviable state of affairs last ?

later in France) surrendering its power as between peasants and lords, while increasing it in other relations. The king's assize protected the free tenants (*liberi tenentes*) but did not protect villeins,[1] and the royal courts refused to entertain their suits against the lord. Henry of Bratton believes that intolerable cruelty may be cognized, but it is evidently proper for the Crown to take action only in extreme cases. Meantime on the rediscovery of roman law its teaching on slavery was applied to the villein. The relation to the lord was now regarded as *personal*, instead of *predial*; one born of villein stock belonged to his master and was bound to undertake whatever work was imposed. His independent rights as owner of individual property were denied as against the lord: *quicquid servo acquiritur domino acquiritur*. On the other hand villeins were still citizens; paying taxes, serving on inquests and in the militia (in times of crisis): except against their master they were free persons and could sue and be sued. Only tenants in 'ancient (royal) demesne' occupied a more favourable position; they could even appear as plaintiffs against the lord in his own manorial court. This clearly shows that the king in granting out 'ancient demesne' did not wish his former tenant to suffer by change of ownership, but that in saxon times the status of the villein was much better than in later times. Elsewhere, as *personal* dependents on the lord (so the law was now interpreted) native villeins could be sold; so Glastonbury Abbey sells Philip Harding for 20 shillings. It was in the next period (after *1300* A.D.) that a social system based on natural economy and feudal disruption is seen to give way. Instead of the tradition and custom of champion farming and the fetters of communistic procedure, private enterprise sought new outlets and found fresh avenues of freedom and adventure. The age of *cash-nexus* and commercial contract was at hand. The kingship repented of surrendering so large a proportion of its subjects to the tender mercies of a local magnate and resumed its staterights over all and sundry: judges went on circuit, the exchequer claimed its due without respect of persons or their technical status, the police interfered and manorial franchises gave way as effective wheels in the social machine. *Economic* and *political* causes worked together and each side reacted on the other. Government grew strong and kingship absolute, only because society was richer, more enterprising and more coherent as a whole. Social

[1] Not till cent. xv in the legal crisis did the Courts abolish that *denial* of protection to villeins which formed the basis of villeinage. Hence the recognition of copyhold tenure. The interference of chancellors in cent. xv cognizing the relations of peasants and lords, prepared the way for a great change; under copyhold tenure 'held at the will of the lord and by the 'custom of the manor'—the first part is titular and the second all-important. This formal enfranchisement of persons and holdings is of course not denied in the above remarks on the increase of practical servitude in later times: but the result seems to be that a merely formal independence has been purchased by a real tightening of bonds and by a loss of personal interest in the land.

ntercourse and trading venture increased because government was more competent and better able to protect them.

Foreign Pressure an Impulse to Development: the Norsemen.—The chief factors which introduced life and stir into the romano-germanic society were the muslim and the norse Vikings, and (in a less degree) the creation of slavonic and magyar kingdoms on the eastern frontier. Charles foresaw the danish menace to his political structure (*Mon. Sangall.* ii 14). Yet this dangerous element, when once absorbed, was the chief instrument for spreading his culture. Apart from the Norman it is difficult to see whence seafaring enterprise could have arisen. He was not a mere wanton raider; but an unscrupulous merchant who pillaged to resell. Already the Baltic (cent. ix, x, xi) was a scene of busy trading activities, long before the Hanse League. He could adapt himself not merely to shipboard life and vagrant trading but to colonizing and husbandry; he had more aptitude for urban life than his cousin the Teuton. Dublin, Cork, Waterford, owe their origin to a *norse* settlement; and the five towns of the Danelagh are cases in point. The Vikings traded (along the Elbe and Oder) with Byzantium and the Euxine, and their pathway and trade-routes are strewn with muslim coins. They reached Archangel and Iceland, Greenland and perhaps America. They changed their savage creed with surprising readiness and ceased to be a menace to Christian faith and society: instead they became their bulwark and assiduous promoters. The vigorous life of the Norsemen settled in the south and west, but lost its spirit in its ancient home where commerce passed into german hands, who in turn yielded to England and Russia in the control of the Baltic.

Their Aptitude for War, Commerce, Law.—'No people were ever more 'eager to borrow from other nations, to take into their service and friend-'ship men of skill and learning from any quarter' (Freeman). They did not invent, but they adopted and improved. When the new tongue, the new creed, the new social rule had taken root among them they were better fitted than the creditors, from whom they had borrowed, to act as pioneers; 'armed missionaries . . . with all the zeal of recent converts they set 'forth upon their new errand . . . in the spirit of their heathen fore-'fathers.' The Crusades (as a military enterprise) may be said to start in the sicilian *razzias* of Tancred and his house. Fond of war, they were also fond of law. 'If the Norman was a born soldier he was also a born lawyer' (Freeman). William's claim to the english crown was a triumph of technical art and special pleading: 'in the worst days of anarchy . . . the robber-baron could commonly give elaborate reasons for every act of wrong.' A 'strict observer of forms in all matters', the Norman was careful of religious formality, supported the papacy, and aided the reforming party of Clugny.

The Saracens.—Such was the new element from the north which stirred up a civilization, recent indeed but already decadent, and gave it (first through fear, and then by policy) a new cohesiveness and a common aim. The Saracens who formed the complement to the Vikings in the south had something of their nature; neither in Bagdad nor in Cordova did they originate; their science and art, even their architecture and (as we know)

their philosophy, are a loan. But they handed on and preserved, developed and improved. They brought together men of all creeds and aptitudes and they learned by comparing them. These two factors, norse and muslim pressed upon teutonic Europe with its disintegrating social fabric and (in quite different ways) each gave it an impulse towards unity. It would be impossible to over-estimate the effect of the norman conquest of England or of Sicily ; or of the religious fervour which on the outskirts of Europe seemed ever on the watch for its Christian prey. Against the Normans a weak society on the *defensive* felt bound to unite ; the Crusades were an act of *aggression*. The Normans were led by robber-captains ; Islam was represented by an efficient and highly organized State. In the north by the conversion of the Baltic Lands the Gospel expanded (as with the conversion of the Magyars) ; the muslim did not succumb to Christian influence even where he still remained in the country he had lost.

High Level of Arab Culture.—Arab culture in this age was on a much higher level than in Christendom. A refined and artificial court collected men of real attainment and became a centre of enlightenment : in no art did the caliph need Christian instructors. In another section we have traced arabian influence on thought and feeling in the south of Europe ; here we may mention the names of Averroes and Frederic II, and the whole anti-clerical movement of Provence. The Saracens fused several elements which had but little in common ; they blended hellenistic philosophy with a simple and devout Theism and accepted light and guidance from every quarter. Yet, unlike the Normans, this assimilative, tolerant and centralizing power was itself without vitality. A purely theistic creed does not consecrate life ; it either brings its routine into contempt or tries by mysticism to lift it wholly into the divine. Government as a theocracy was therefore unlimited and absolute even beyond the prerogative of a roman *princeps*. The concept of democratic immortality was of a sensuous type and held no real lesson for the present work-a-day world ; in the fatalism bred of God's omnipotence there was little room for the play of individual enterprise, or for the value of human work and personality. The Christian faith alone (it would seem) could ennoble common things, could bring noble motives and principles to bear on earthly concerns, could thereby remodel the life of citizens, commerce and country.

Analogy of the Punic Wars : Economic Issues Prominent.—In this new shock of semite and aryan, another chapter in the duel of east and west was opened and closed. It had many analogies with the struggle of Rome and Carthage : the conflict was, in both cases, largely coloured by *economic* issues. In many ways the Christian and muslim trader could work together : both agreed (an agreement notoriously broken by the Barbary Corsairs) that piracy on the high seas must be suppressed. The muslim gave sites for factories and allowed the merchants to fortify these strongholds. The rulers of Morocco were treating with France and the great italian republics at the most intense moments of the Crusades. The (norse) spirit of adventure awoke in the north ; religion, war, and trading instincts united. The effect on commerce and on thought was incalculable. First Genoa and then Venice (to its eternal shame) threw themselves

heartily into the struggle. The impulse given to trading centres like Pisa and Florence was imparted more or less rapidly to other cities : Augsburg and Nuremberg came to the fore ; Flanders prepares for her long and brilliant commercial history. It is in cent. xiv (just after our period closes) that we can see the full effect of the Crusades in the universal and organized intercourse between all parts of western Christendom and the countries of the east. But this cosmopolitan unity and harmony is on the surface only ; the old ideal of a kingdom of God upon earth has disappeared for ever. There is no more a single ruler or a common aim ; nationalism, particularism and egoism emerge into overt hostilities.

B. SOCIAL UNITS

(i) The Village

The Communal or Kindred Village : Land a Trust, not Personal Property.—Since this age witnesses the transition from *village* to *city*, from feudal *manor* as social unit to *commune* and *gild*, it will be well to consider further some of their several features. A typical teutonic instance of the *village* is given in the Ditmarschen portion of South Jutland where the autonomy of a peasant republic lasted till the Reformation (cent. xvi). It was then organized, as it had been in cent. x, as a group of kindred folk, of blood-relatives and cousins (real or artificial) who joined them ; each kindred is based on agnatic ties. *Households* are grouped into *brotherhoods*, these again into *clans* (roman *gentes*). The organization was never *monarchic* ; it was based, like nearly all *natural* government, on the rights of adult fighting-men who partook in the tribal affairs of war and peace, and set at the head of the whole federation a co-opted and responsible council of elders. In matters agrarian again, we are on a soil entirely free and independent ; there is no trace whatever of lordship or vassalage or any constraint from without to unify holdings : only *economic* causes prevented the endless subdivision (in *gavelkind*) of the family plot.[1] In Norway, a free peasantry, quite immune from any seigneurial or coercive influence, removes its superfluous heirs from the allod (*odalgaard*) by a money payment and hinders alienation into strange hands by giving the right of pre-emption to the kindred. There are many places to be found in England which by this sure witness prove the holding of a common family : here are not the estates of some great lord settling *coloni* or serfs on his domain, but genuine tribal settlements—the natural primitive republic based on clanship, the only true *democracy* that history can show. This sense of the *perpetuity of the family* is a very primitive and enduring

[1] I am treating here only the western development, but (since man is the same all the world over) the agrarian evolution in the same centuries in the east-roman empire may profitably be compared. For a brief notice see my *Constit. Hist. Rom. Emp.* Longmans 1910 (ii 144–149) where the agrarian reforms of Romanus I in cent. x show very clearly the existence of the *communal* type of village and the dangers to which such a miniature republic was exposed.

motive of social union. We find it fully developed in India even before the aryan invasion and surviving there to the present hour: Baden Powell[1] reminds us how strange to hindu sentiment is the notion of alienating any part of the sacred common holding to a foreigner. The individual, even if he be proprietor and not a mere member of a business joint-stock company, cannot estrange his portion, for he is only a trustee, who must pass on as he received. In the west we can trace during our period the varying influences which sought to banish this superstition. In old english law *folkland* cannot be sold away; it must pass under the conditions of customary law: as in India, it could not be disposed of outside the kindred group or without their consent.

The System Modified by Church, Roman Law and the New Manorial Lordship.—But the church fostered the growth of individualism and absolute ownership by insisting that a man may grant away his estate for the benefit of his soul. Kings give exemptions to this folk-right and create estates held by *book*, following the rules of *individualized* roman law. Private persons wished to break through custom to provide for daughters and to bequeath land by will, like any other form of property. By the end of the saxon period, transfer and sale outright are everywhere seen, while the Conquest placed at the head of every community of kinsmen (real or fictitious) a foreign lord, as guarantor, judge and protector. In place then of the tribal folkland (in which all members shared), without a monarchic superior but enslaved to custom and common tradition, we have now an estate burdened with service to a superior (Vinogradoff). At the same time the holding remains undivided by *gavelkind* as long as possible (the kentish custom is a singular exception and anticipates the equal sharing of modern french law). Before the military lordship demanded that the enjoyer of a holding under the manor should bear arms and follow his master, the need of *economic* efficiency had disposed of sons' equal rights and created something very like primogeniture; borough-english is only a variant of the same principle. We see then in the foregoing that *kinship*, as we might expect, guides the early *economic* or naturally defensive efforts of man: land is at first mainly owned in the strict sense by tribes and kindreds, individual members only enjoying rights of usufruct and possession according to custom, not any free power of alienation or bequest. As in the classical world, after the admittance of plebeians, neighbours take the place of kinsmen. In either case the tendency is to preserve undivided a normal holding (*bols* or *hides*), kept together by rules of united or single succession, just as manorial custom kept them integral for purposes of the new militarism.

The Seigneurial Manor, Artificial and Ubiquitous.—The Manor is non-natural and artificial: some analogue to its theory and structure is found all over the world at certain stages of social life. It represents the break-down of a primitive democracy; in which there is no authority but that of custom and the collective wisdom of the elders who represent it. In the normal village there is no monarch; the headman is only an executive

[1] *Indian Vill. Comm.* Longmans 1896: (cf. ch. v § 3, vi § 3.)

officer and a delegate without intrinsic powers of his own. The manor marks the beginning of an *aristocratic* period. Tribal notions and arrangements had proved inadequate for upholding the social fabric. The world was full of ' kin-shattered ' men who had ' broken caste ' and were without ties ; and into a peaceful society had come a fighting class of another race. But that this *foreign* element is by no means essential to the manor is clear from the roman empire. This polity began with two principles : the *autonomy of towns* : the *sharp distinction of slave and citizen.* Both features were modified in course of time. The centre, not from set purpose but unhappily by a natural law, interfered more and more and reduced all the pleasing varieties (e.g. of a german or indian empire) to a dull ' byzantine ' uniformity. Meantime slavery, (difficult to recruit when the epoch of wars was closed), and the *economic* system which exploited it, gave way to a blend of freedom and serfage. Nemesis overtakes the central power ; it has no longer any agents in whom it can trust ; it is the tool and dupe of its own bureaucracy. For the real business of government it comes to rely on private help, upon a *natural* not a *hierarchic* nobility.

Its Origins, in the Decadence of the Roman Empire.—In cent. iv and v, it appealed to the great landowners and made them responsible for their tenants' conduct, thus giving them the right of justice, coercion, and punishment. The great domain is now held to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the neighbouring city, and amenable solely to its owner in taxes and police. Here then are great estates subject to the political lordship of the owner, and to no other official short of the emperor himself. Even in smaller estates the owner is *representative* of the whole ; and for the military levy as for bringing the guilty to justice, he alone is now held responsible. The imperial power, fatigued by the pressure of its duties, prefers to confront a single person, who shall represent in its eyes his clients and dependents. This is a wholly new departure from the ideals of the early empire, of the stoics, or of the roman jurists. It by no means follows that it is a signal blow at freedom. It may open the way to petty tyranny but it also lays the basis of self-government. The equalization of all men before a single and central law is of course the slavery of all ; and servitude to an official bureaucracy is less tolerable than obedience to a local family.

Descent of Yeoman and Rise of Slave to Form a Single Type.—Meantime the slave becomes rather a villein, after the teutonic pattern as depicted in Tacitus' *Germania.* He receives plot and tenement and (to some extent) security of holding, but of course is burdened with dues and services of various kinds. While he improves his lot and rises upwards in the scale, the small yeoman-farmer sinks towards the same level, and in the end the joint class of tenants can hardly be distinguished. Though both are free in person, they fall to a like *economic* position, holding plots by custom or ' precariously ', ' ascribed to a glebe ' which was once their own. ' Ominous symptoms of growing political disruption ' says Vinogradoff, ' and of an aristocratic transformation of society were everywhere visible at the close of the empire.' But this aristocracy was home-made and largely one of wealth, sometimes even distinct from the one nobility recognized,

reckoned by place in the civil service. What prevented the advent of the full manorial type was the continuance of commerce. With the Teutons this trading intercourse between towns and *villæ* fell to pieces; and the newcomers reinforced the manorial features by their own analogous usages. The owner of house and enclosure was master there, and if in a sense responsible he was also all-powerful.

Village under Overlord becomes Social Unit.—Again the fighting men were the only true citizens and held aloof from the despised arts of peace. The german freeman was already used to allotting land and tenement to his slaves in return for payment in kind. On the soil of the empire after *500* A.D. the mechanism of government broke down: the labourer on his plot could no longer be effectively supervised and had to be left in something like autonomy. Even among the 'kin-shattered' men who largely composed these free-booting armies, *tribal* organization still deferred the coming triumph of the seigneurial *manor* under a lord. But under the Carlings (*c. 725–900* A.D.) the estate becomes more and more a *political* unit; once again the centre had to compromise with the feudal or aristocratic forces to secure any government or order at all. The *seniores* have to pick out their men for the war levy and lead them in the host: the exempt abbey (itself a religious manor) and the noble owner judged their own folk as well as the neighbours who had 'commended' themselves in vassalage. The Pepinid Mayors had amusingly threatened with condign penalties the *count* (their own official) who dared to put foot inside the privileged domains.[1] The struggle against norse and magyar inroads gave the finishing touch to this isolation of small local centres. Each group, flying to a common spot for protection, found its little world in the shadow of a tutelary castle, limited to a narrow horizon of purely village politics.

Effect of Crusades and Communes on the Manor.—The *aristocratic* constitution of society was complete, but such a society was already pregnant with the seeds of its own ruin. Every step removing this separatist concentration into terrified knots, every fresh facility for commerce or intercourse, every advance of kingship to recover more effective government for the centre, lessened the influence of the manorial system. The Crusades brought back, not only a decimated nobility to heavily mortgaged land, but new notions and standards and ideals. Meantime the *Commune* had already replaced the Manor as the typical social unit.[2]

(ii) Evolution of the Town and Borough

Section I. The Roman Type: German Free-Towns

Roman Municipia.—It seems certain that the roman terms *municipes*, *municipium* convey the idea rather of *duties* than *rights*—the performance

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[1] Cf. the works of Fustel de Coulanges on early french institutions.

[2] I may refer to three articles of mine in the *Economic Review* Jan. Apr. July, 1910 on (1) The Landlord, (2) Indian Land Tenure and the Manor, (3) Land Tenure and Political Development (Celtic Period).

of services toward Rome as the metropolis by citizens settled in distant parts. This is of course a novelty in the ancient world; for the greek daughter-state broke off all but sentimental ties with the mother. Of towns within the borders of Italy, some as *Fundi* had local autonomy limited in the matter of jurisdiction; others as *Anagnia* were ruled directly from Rome; both find analogies in the french towns of our period. All 'boroughs' had certain common features: the citizens paid the same dues and served in the legions as if they were roman *residents* with full civic rights, but they could not vote or hold office in the capital: the urban prætor seems to have sent out a deputy for jurisdiction. These 'rights' are then clearly burdens not privileges. But after the Second Punic War it became a coveted honour to receive *municipal* rank. In *200–100* B.C. the right of voting and of holding office (*jus suffragii . . . honorum*) was given to many towns. Their citizens, though technically enrolled in the roman tribes, can seldom have had leisure to exercise these rights: but one who benefited by this concession was no less a person than C. Marius, under whom first the old constitution definitely broke down before the new militarism. Indeed the Revolution had begun with the support given by the italian towns to Tiberius Gracchus (*133* B.C.) some five and twenty years earlier. After the legislation of *90* and *89* all distinction of rank and privilege was abolished. Sulla did much good work in organizing these 'boroughs' on a uniform plan, and he sent forth the earliest *municipes*, in citizen colonies beyond the italian frontier. Julius Cæsar 'enfranchised' all Hither Gaul, and its towns became *municipia*. Under the empire further advance to uniformity was made. The ancient towns of the east were incorporated in the system; while in the west, cities were for the most part roman creations, often marking the site of the legions' permanent camp.

As Autonomous Centres of Roman Culture.—By the reign of Trajan towns of this semi-corporate type are as numerous in west as in east, and everywhere form a network of roman influence and act as centres of roman culture. Their government is in the hands of magistrates, senate and general assembly, as in most medieval counterparts. It is (owing to the fundamental conception of the City-State) independent of the roman government, except in serious cases of jurisdiction reserved for the urban prætor. As in earlier time, the borough is bound to perform certain duties, levy men and horses for the army, maintain the imperial post, receive soldiers and entertain roman officials. Citizens might be *born* to that dignity, or *enfranchised*, or *naturalized*; a subordinate class of *incolæ* had partial rights only, based on domicile carrying with it a limited power of voting. But both classes shared in all civic burdens. While the powers of the assembly (*comitia*) were never expressly curtailed, the Senate or Town Council intervened more and more and the chief citizens became more and more reluctant to hold office: *popular* election became, as in Rome at an earlier date, a farce and a fiction. Rome, for her part, encouraged an *aristocratic* faction and gave special honours to natives of a province, as being *senators* of one of its towns. Three pairs of colleagues were elected yearly: *duoviri* (for jurisdiction), *ædiles* (in charge of high-

ways, buildings, police, games and food-supply)—this quartet sometimes called *I Vviri*—lastly, *quæstores* (for finance). Once in five years Censors, as in Rome before Sulla, took the place of the *duoviri*, and were entitled *quinquennales*. These municipal officers had no light task; from the public funds they fed the poorest citizens and brought in corn to be paid for at moderate and uniform rate by the rest. In cent. i at least, municipal schools were common; doctors were sometimes maintained at the public expense. The water supply was also in public hands. To meet these heavy charges large benefactions were forthcoming (at least until *200* A.D.) from wealthy citizens; resort was had later to direct *taxation* for municipal purposes. The town-council possessed funds, mines and quarries as well as landed estates, which dispensed with or lightened[1] the heavy rating. In the case of catastrophe there was always the safe asylum of the emperor's purse; Tiberius was generous to the asian towns stricken by an earthquake. The town was the *religious* centre of the district owing to the spontaneous growth of the imperial cult; the priests (*augustales*) held a dignified position as such in provincial society, and seem to have been chosen amongst the industrial classes. This development of a free and respected industrial and trading class was a feature of the empire, which might be called a triumph of the 'knights' or *equites* and a reaction of the provinces against feudalism. If the Gospel and monkish labour corrected the notion that manual tasks were degrading, the empire prepared the way for the change of feeling from classical prejudice against commerce and handicrafts (*βαναύσοι τεχναί*). Very early are to be seen traces of a free and thriving class of producers and craftsmen, proud of their calling and their small corporate life; even when liberals like Trajan looked with suspicion upon such gilds, forerunners of the medieval association.

The 'Concordia Ordinum.'—One feature in which roman social life set an inimitable example to later times lay in the *concordia ordinum* which without doubt existed. All classes lived together in contentment and peace; the rich performing without complaint or intimidation the 'liturgies' which in other democratic States have to be made compulsory.[2] Civic feeling or local patriotism was a genuine sentiment at least down to the age of Commodus (*180–192* A.D.): the letters of Pliny and the ruins and inscriptions of public edifices all over the roman world can testify to this. But the government of cent. iii seemed to extinguish genuine autonomy and local feeling by bringing the towns (as in a modern centralized state) more directly under the governor of the province; hence the distaste shown for office and the well-known 'prison-house' of the urban *curia*. Popular control ceased, owing to the natural sloth of a contented, nay, surfeited people, before the end of Trajan's reign; the Senate, who succeeded to the dignity and costs of office, were at first well pleased to have it so. But the new fiscal system of an impoverished empire, now on the defensive against the barbarian raiders, ruined this Curial Order and with it disappeared the welfare of the boroughs.

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[1] As in some favoured english boroughs, as Beccles to-day.

[2] One phase of the 'war against wealth' in which popular and despotic rule are so much alike.

Growth of Teutonic Municipalism.—During cent. x the bishop had been entrusted with justice and government within the old roman towns of the Rhine.[1] The Advocate (*vogt*) served as his acting deputy : for real duties and titular dignity seldom went together. The town had its own law, separate from that of the country, and shared in some of the *burgh* privileges, i.e. was accounted as a royal fortress enjoying the special ' peace ' of the king's palace. But new german towns in the interior were being built on the land of some lay or clerical patron, with market square and streets leading thither from the chief gates. They were established chiefly as trade-centres. Already round castle or abbey or cathedral-close there had been fairs ; but the new towns were markets under permanent charter and the settlers who received a special welcome sprang from the class of merchants and craftsmen. The older towns followed suit. Immigrants were of varying status, some being serfs who fled from their masters—cause of later legislation and much discontent in seigneurial circles. A *democratic* air was held to pervade the sacred urban area ; *Stadtluft macht frei*. The towns were no more favoured than the villages in having rights over such common interests, as lord or public courts did not condescend to cognize : this autonomy in detail was indeed the rule everywhere. By *1050* the claim was made by the trading towns to settle mercantile disputes according to a law of their own ; to the great indignation of the clerical mind. The Town-Council was the origin of this self-government, and increased its powers by use, making byelaws, fining for breach, punishing brawlers, and raising funds by excise. In the older towns the bishop made constant protest against this independence, and during cent. xiii[2] he was able to obtain imperial decrees suppressing the *Rat* or Council altogether, or else the right to nominate its members. The bishops also resented the enterprise and autonomy of the craft-gilds, in this case to little effect.

The Free Imperial Cities.—The cities took a deep interest and share in imperial politics. The *vogt* received the ban from the king directly, though he was the nominee of an episcopal patron. When the king held a diet in any see-town, all powers lapsed or reverted to him and his officers. The citizens preferred this regal and intermittent authority ; in *1073* Worms rose on behalf of Henry IV against its Bishop, Cologne in *1074*. Towns founded on imperial ground or on ducal Hohenstaufen demesne claimed to stand immediately beneath the sovereign. In *1256* a league of 100 cities (a chain extending along the Rhine but stretching from Bremen to Zurich) resolved to recognize no king unless elected unanimously. In the south, imperial cities were federated for their own interest and jointly attacked

[1] In England the last trace of this clerical government was suppressed a few years ago, when a corporation of the modern type succeeded the rule of High Steward and High Bailiff directly appointed by the Dean of Westminster. The story of palatinate rights at Durham (and Ely) is quite another matter.

[2] A reactionary period for german lands owing to seigneurial particularism and the collapse of the Monarchy.

the nobles and princes. Unable to compete in the new warfare of feudalism they lost their power of intervening with effect ; some were seized as 'unredeemed pledges ', others became members of the swiss league ; but a large number survived till *1803*, when their number was reduced to four, and this again to three after the fatal mistake of Frankfort in *1866*. Their former powers (prior to cent. xv) were due to the better government prevailing within the walls. But when the princely territories were more fully organized the towns could no longer claim exception or form alliances with each other of the Hanseatic type. Long superior to the princes' estates in the method of ruling, they fell behind in an age which raised the *tyrannis* (or control of a single efficient owner) to the highest pitch of perfection. The *mediate* towns were now brought into closer subjection by ducal houses, such as Austria and Brandenburg. Some lost ground in the rivalries of commerce ; and, to whatever cause we may trace the decline, the classical, ' democratic ', urban community ceased to have political influence or material importance.

Corporate Government in Germany.—The control of the city lay with the *town-council*, though in time the *craft-gilds* claimed a share in the business or profit of ruling. At first any inhabitant, holding a certain amount of land, was a full citizen (the clergy and the lord's *comitatus* being alone excepted as not liable to pay urban rates). This schedule did not include the artizans who, united in their trade-union, rebelled against the monopoly of a co-opted council. Against this rich oligarchy they alleged the usual charges of corrupt management and withholding of justice from inferior classes. In cent. xiv and xv (that is, the age directly following our period) the old classical precedents were strictly followed ; each party attacking its rival with slaughter and gaining a brief supremacy. Where the *democracy* succeeded, an overbearing policy abroad and a narrow protective system at home can be noted. The Suabian League came by its disasters in cent. xiv because its *democratic* towns took hasty measures in war (like Athens in the expedition to Sicily or the appointment of Cleon) and refused to keep faith in treaties when honesty was found inconvenient. Vexatious restrictions harassed and warned off foreign traders. Again, as in the strict and narrow basis of periclean citizenship at Athens, membership of craft-gilds became increasingly difficult. Like the venetian nobles in *1296*, these plebeian artizans practically closed the rolls of their benefit-societies, limiting admittance to sons, sons-in-law and widows' husbands. This *democracy* then, so far from extending to others the equal rights they had won for themselves only created in its turn a voiceless *proletariat* class of assistants who might never rise to gild-membership. Hence economic ruin followed when the town was exploited for the sole benefit of a new oligarchy. From the year *1500* many centres of once important trade sank into obscurity and lost in numbers owing to this ignorant *protective* policy.[1] But where the elder oligarchy held its own (as in Nuremberg and the northern parts) protection was modified and a more enlightened policy pursued. Still, heavy debts were incurred for public buildings and walls

[1] Inseparable from any popular system of government.

which could not serve their purpose in the new methods of warfare: in many towns, beginning from our own period (cent. xiii) annuities, pensions and sinecures had been lavishly sold—like court-offices under Justinian or juridical dignities in France—until they could no longer be paid by the impoverished exchequer of the borough.

SECTION II. MUNICIPAL LIFE IN MEDIEVAL ITALY.

Lombard Struggles Against Imperial Control.—Turning to Italy we notice two chief features; the towns were still *more independent* than the german, both in claim and fact, and recognized no living superior when the right of the emperor, always reluctantly admitted, had been shaken off (*c. 1200–1250*). Again the result of independence and autonomy was almost without exception a *tyrannis*: of which Zurich alone affords an instance in the north. In Lombardy the nobles (as a dangerous and inferior class) were compelled to live within the city walls, the citizens thus making protectors of possible enemies or at least disarming and keeping them under watch. The reverse was the case in Germany where the prince or knight had his castle and interests quite remote from the cities. Hence with this greater fusion of classes and ideals, municipal life in the south became more complex; nobles (great and small, or *capitani* and *valvassori*) living side by side with the commons (*popolo*). When the emperor withdrew from the scene, his deputy the bishop disappeared also. The struggle of the Lombard Cities for their rights is historic. Even under the lombard kings they had maintained in some measure their trade, their defences and their autonomy. King Aistulf distinguishes three classes of merchants, the first *majores et potentes*, the byzantine δυνατοί, keeping themselves equipped with horse and corslet, shield and lance. From Lombardy came the merchants, who at first employed (as we saw) as fiscal agents by the Papacy, gave rules and a name to later financiers. Henry V (for Cremona in *1114* for Mantua in *1116*) recognized some degree of self-government, and even sanctioned the revolt of the merchant class against a corrupt clergy. Nearly half a century later Frederick I found these new franchises grown into an intolerable abuse, with civil wars raging between rival cities. The Roncaglian Jurists (*1158*) decided in favour of the emperor, of central government and of peace: only rights of autonomy ratified by imperial charter were admitted and the emperor's claim to supreme jurisdiction was confirmed. Hated Milan was indeed destroyed in *1162* when it had led a general rising in protest against the german sovereign. But after Legnano in *1176* the imperial claims vanished into those of a merely titular and complimentary suzerain. Here and under Frederic II the Holy See stood for municipal franchise: and the cities in cent. xiii saw in an imperial or wibelline victory the loss of their liberties.

Form of Government in Italian Boroughs.—The precise form of government or its phases in an italian city is a matter of technical history: we may here briefly state that the three orders sent deputies to a common council, called *consules* though numbering as many as twelve. In practice however a much smaller body held the reins of power,—acting on the advice of the *credenza*, analogous to the roman senate, consulted according

to custom by all roman magistrates during their brief term of office. Underneath this small executive, and in effect the true sovereign (however rarely assembled), was the popular assembly (*parlamentum* or *concio*). It would be hard to name a single system that did not recognize these three orders of primary and ultimate government. In spite of the formal safeguards of liberty, factions and family influence often destroyed it : there were papal and wibelline partizans in every town and, like their classical forerunners, they were quite content to win their case at the cost of their city. Two expedients were attempted to avoid perpetual feud ; the well-known institution of a *foreign* magistrate with ample powers (*podesta*) who would have no bias as being an outsider, and the recognition of a *native* prince from some leading family (at Milan the *Visconti*, at Mantua the *Gonzaga*, at Verona the *Scala*, at Padua the *Carrara*).

Tuscany : Florence and the Medici.—*Tuscany* under its marquis was a centralized government of a type which for long excluded the cities from any prominent political *rôle*. But Pisa and Genoa throughout cent. xi waged war against the Saracens : the former provided ships to the Hohenstaufen to fight in Sicily ; both (in alliance with Venice) aided the kings of Jerusalem to reduce the coast towns of Syria. *Communes* under *consuls* were formed in Tuscany as elsewhere, but kept their freedom longer against the insidious attempts of the *podesta* to erect a tyranny : even the Medici bowed to republican usage till they assumed the ducal title in *1531*. In Florence towards the end of our period (*1250*) the *people* rose against the *nobles* and chose a *capitano* or tribune aided by 12 *anziani* as his Council. Somewhat later the craft-gilds attained supremacy and placed power (*1282*) in the Signory's hands, a body composed of their own *priori*. Nobles, if members of a craft, were also admitted, a privilege withdrawn in *1293* when the nobility were deprived of all power and the lower gilds accorded a much fuller share. Just after our period (cent. xiv) ' twelve good men ' were chosen from the city-wards, each set holding office for 2 months only.[1] Meantime, as in ancient Rome, the magisterial system was made of set purpose cumbrous and competitive ; 3 officers were called in from abroad to hold office for 6 months, *podesta*, *capitano* and the ' executor of justice '. The result was weakness without security. After the lowest orders had risen (in the wool-combers' revolt of *1378*) and been repressed, the wise and veiled monarchical guidance of Albizzi and Medici restored wealth and order with much needed peace.

Peculiar Development of the Venetian Commonwealth.—The development of Venice proceeded on other lines. The refugee communities from the mainland elected from very early days their own tribunes, but they

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[1] At the present day, the supreme power at San Marino resides in the General Assembly (*Arringo*) which is convoked twice yearly. The executive is lodged in 2 *Capitani Reggenti* selected twice a year from the sixty life-members of the Grand Council, in which the 3 orders—nobles, landowners, citizens—each appoint a third to represent them. A small committee assists the regents who remain in office too short a time (6 months) to secure any real initiative (Ricci *La Repubblica di S. M.* Bergamo 1903).

maintained a steadfast loyalty toward the eastern emperors. In commerce they treated, almost as equals, with the lombard kings. In the great tumult during the exile of Justinian II (*700*), they elected a *dux* of their own, having executive powers and the right to convene the people and appoint his officers. About the time of Charles' new monarchy (*c. 804*) the Rialto was chosen as the seat of the central government. Dukes, like roman emperors, attempted to convert an *elective* and popular into a *hereditary* office. Dominicus, Doge in *1022*, made it penal for the supreme ruler to appoint his successor or even secure his choice during his own lifetime, which had been the unvarying expedient of the emperors in founding a dynasty. The public meeting *en masse* was replaced by a Great Council of some 450 members in *1172*, after mob-violence and the murder of Duke Vitalis. The new body appointed most state-officers or their smaller boards of electors. An executive council of six was chosen from the six city-wards. The doge, henceforth named by a small electoral board of nobles, invited certain notable persons to help him before any measure was submitted to the Great Council (now the most *democratic* body). In very rare cases appeal was made to the *concio* or *parlamentum*, in which each citizen exercised political rights in person and not by deputy. This tendency to restrict all popular rights (a contrast to italian development elsewhere) culminated in the act of *1296* which closed the Great Council to all but a limited number of noble families. The executive was supervised (as in Sparta of old) by an 'Ephorate'; the well-known Council of Ten (dating from *1310*), henceforth in effect the chief power in the State. But this limiting of the popular voice was the work of an active and trading nobility, not of feudal lords. Here the ruling class was thrifty and businesslike and knew how to make timely concessions: this rich and hardworking governing body kept both titular *prince* and *people* in proper submission. Commercial interest was of course the keynote of policy, and the republic of traders decayed when it no longer held a vigorous monopoly. With Venice may be coupled the equally byzantine cities Naples, Gaeta and Amalfi; whose independent civil life ended with incorporation into the norman kingdom. Rome has strictly speaking no civic history, save perhaps the records of Arnold's and Rienzi's splendid futilities; for it had no merchant class, no trade and no manufactures. There was no middle rank of society and, except the clergy, there were no 'citizens': only nobles and a mob. clients willingly dependent upon the great houses of foreign birth.

SECTION III. THE FRENCH COMMUNES

Communes in Southern France.—Very similar to the neighbouring italian towns is the history and character of civic franchises in southern France. In these 'consular' towns, as in Lombardy, 12 consuls shared the government, elected for one year only and re-eligible after a due interval. The Municipal Council (*commune* or *magnum* or even *secretum concilium*) and a general Popular Assembly (*parlamentum* or *concio*)[1] were the other organs;

[1] But sometimes also called like the smaller body *commune concilium*.

the latter never embracing the entire free populace. Here, as in Italy, the native nobility did not retire to the castles but took a share in urban life; bishops and clergy also bore a part and their influence was not, as elsewhere, resented or in the end overthrown. But here again feud and dissension led to the appointment of a *podestat* like the greek *tyrant* or *æsymnete*.

In the North.—In the north of France however the condition was very different: even the creation of the civic *communes* was an act of violence and revolution directed against the bishops and the feudal nobles and clergy. These (unlike their brethren in the south) felt little sympathy for civic aspirations and were held to be the chief hindrance to mercantile development. The two superior classes were excluded from all membership or the active duties of citizens: those who dwelt in the walls had to take oath not to conspire against the *commune*. The *jurati* (our modern *jurats* in the Cinque Ports) were held together by a solemn undertaking to fight for urban liberties, though the title was sometimes restricted to the councillors (also called 'peers' or *échevins*). The number of actual governors varies curiously between 12 and 100; they could judge as well as administer. Retired officers (as in the roman senate) formed a reserve body which was consulted in a crisis. The president of this 'senate' was the mayor or provost (*maire, prévôt*).

Owing to Class-Bitterness Privileges Surrendered to Crown.—From the end of cent. xiii the craft-gilds forced their way upwards into the ruling body and their representatives were admitted there. But the people applied to the king for further rights and political freedom was soon at an end. This summoning of State-aid and interference stands in marked contrast to the conduct of german towns—where at least all classes were at one in desiring autonomy, and the aggrieved party did not think it honourable to call in support from without. Hence from their different racial character arises a quite different development on the two sides of the Rhine. Class-hatred [1] for the french people ended perforce in a state of despotism which gave the barren gift of equality, ensured order and respect for law, but destroyed self-government. German towns respected the local rights even of neighbours and rivals and did not unite to form a nation. So jealous was the french citizen-mind that towns never formed

[1] In the recent outburst of class-hatred in England (largely artificial though it was, and fostered by professional statesmen) we see glad welcome given by the 'people' to a great extension of State-authority: but the end of such appeals cannot be in doubt; *cum domino pax ista venit*. In our own country the nemesis has been rapid: the nobles and clergy have been vilified and discredited but the result is the 'Servile State', the definite recognition of an *inferior* body of citizens who must be coerced and scheduled for their good. The war, appealing at first to the volunteer principle, has created something of a reaction; but this must be only an interlude, and the organized efficiency (which the future will demand) must bring still further curtailment of local initiative and individual freedom.

leagues and confederacies, as across the Rhine and in Italy; and even to-day the epithet *bourgeois* has a peculiar and invidious meaning which is quite unknown elsewhere.

Seigneurial Boroughs by Charter.—But by far the larger number of french towns belonged to another class: the *villes franches* possessing a lord's charter which agreed to limit and define the services due to him. Their privileges therefore varied like the 'custom of the manor'; some were governed by an *elective* council which had rights of jurisdiction, others by councils *without* such rights and merely administering police duties, others ruled directly by the lord's officer.[1] To these *seigneurial* boroughs belonged some of the chief towns of France. Paris indeed was governed by a provost, but the Seine merchants had certain powers of autonomy and had another provost of their own. From *1296* (when Venice had first closed her Book of Nobles), the provost and *échevins* named 24 councillors. The craft-gilds had senior officers named by the provost (or by some great noble): between *1292–1300* nearly 450 craft-names appear, Boileau (writing in *1268*) names 101 bodies of traders and artizans. These divided the duties of the night-watch and thus had a certain military discipline and organization. When they rebelled, as under Stephen Marcel (one of the lesser provosts named above) and once again in *1382*, the city was only placed in the interests of order and trade more strictly under control of the royal officers.

The Towns of Flanders.—The flemish towns, Bruges, Ghent and Ypres rose under the shadow of the count's strongholds; when a new house succeeded (*1128*) their influence was felt, and the burghers soon held the counts in the toils of indebtedness. They made alliance with weavers and artizans against their master and employers. The three towns, though torn by faction, won a leading place in the politics of Flanders; hence friendly relations with England whose wool was required for their staple industry. In Spain, the land of a permanent crusade, the town did not win power as market or mistress of commerce but as a stronghold against the infidel. It was to stout defenders of New Castile, the outpost against the muslim, that spanish kings granted *fueros*, not to successful trading corporations. Barcelona, whose history and affinities are not spanish but french, stands on a different level: in *1068* Berenger the count gave it a spanish law based on custom and usage, while from *1300* its commercial code was recognized throughout the whole of southern Europe.

SECTION IV. GROWTH OF THE BOROUGH SYSTEM IN ENGLAND.

The Saxon *burh* (both *tribal* and *kingly*).—Whatever continuity may perhaps be established on the continent between roman *municipia* and

[1] E.g. in England the civil office of *portreeve* usually marks a *feudal* or *manorial* nominee: at Okehampton the two titles *mayor* and *reeve* existed side by side and sometimes were held by different people; in the neighbouring (feudal) borough of Hatherleigh the *portreeve* is always named at the lord's Court Leet and is still recognized as having civic powers (of a very limited kind no doubt): in Wales a certain family of Marchers still retains the right to nominate a mayor for a small municipal borough.

later borough-towns, none can be detected in England. No doubt a roman camp (as at Canterbury and Rochester) was often occupied by a tribal *burg*, in this case for the men of east and west Kent, but there was no connexion beyond one of site. The *burg* or *burh* was the king's home and the stronghold or asylum of the tribe : higher penalties were imposed for breaches of the peace within its precincts. It was encircled by an earthen rampart, repair of which was enforced both by royal edict and current anglo-saxon law. The boundaries were perambulated in yearly solemnity ; the peace of the borough, as a sacred place, must be always unbroken. Chiefly built for *national* (or rather ' *tribal* ') defence, they are found in sites otherwise unprotected. They drew commerce to themselves : for every reason traders sought to gain a footing ; the borough was court and palace, centre of government and of church life. It had its mint and its royal bankers ; these exchangers used the true standard of weights and measures. Transactions concluded in these *ports* enjoyed certain privileges : a *portreeve* watched the merchants, saw that the king had his dues and tolls, his fair-rents and customs, his share of fines for breaches of the peace. In cent. x under Edgar, *moot* or court is required to meet 3 times a year, that pleas might be heard on issues concerning life, liberty and land, that men might show their pledges and sureties answerable for their good conduct (cf. *view of frank-pledge*). Over this court the *portreeve* presided, supported by a group of assistants (*witan*, cf. french *prud'hommes*), in the Danelag by 12 ' *lawmen* ', in other towns by aldermen or senior burgesses holding police powers and some military duties. Division into wards, each with its own system of police and watch, can be traced to an early time ; a record of London describes it fully in *930–940*. Owing to the licence to ' commend ' one's person to some great owner, the boroughs became honeycombed with *sokes*, areas of seigneurial jurisdiction, which interfered sadly with the *portreeve's* authority, and so with the king's.

Norman Changes.—The Normans appear to have restricted municipal competence to the narrowest possible area and forced the outlying district under the control of the lord's castle, placed outside the borough limits. The king in saxon times granted leave to a village or demesne to hold its own distinct hundred court : his tenants or the greater lords followed his example and at Domesday such cases of incorporation were not uncommon. Every castle drew to itself by its own needs a group of privileged craftsmen and artizans encouraged to settle near it : the lord's charters confer the following rights : fixed rental, release from villein-dues, castle-jurisdiction and forced food-levy by the castellan : in addition they gave freedom from tallage at will, the right to sell and devise property, separate borough jurisdiction (with or without the right to choose their own officers). The lord or his reeve remained in close touch with all the citizens in this norman type of borough ; whereas there was a great variety of relations between saxon lords and their burgesses. Rural charters often expressly relieved the town from some feudal incidents. As in France, the king's right tended to take precedence of the mesne-lord's : the position of the latter was weakened and, in the direct relation of crown and borough, the rights which the lord forfeited were shared between the two parties.

Patronage of the Crown.—From the borough the king accepted a composition for dues: the borough took care to pay punctually and to keep the payment at the same figure. Sometimes money was raised within the town to buy a charter from the king, allowing the citizens to treat directly with the crown-officers instead of mediately through sheriffs. Thus Lincoln in *1130* bought the right to hold their burg *in capite*; the next year London acquired its own sheriffs; and in the same century many towns paid their dues to the Crown (*firma burgi*) by their own officers. At the beginning of cent. xiii fresh concessions were made; the burgesses were allowed to elect their own officers more freely and the royal power to dismiss was then expressly limited.

Under Richard and John (*c. 1200* A.D.) the french title *mayor* was adopted for London and Winchester. The king, in allowing the boroughs to collect and forward their own dues, handed over to them a valuable source of future revenue and the fixed and unvariable sum paid to the crown left over to these 'farmers' an increasing income. Under Henry II trade received a new impulse. The officers of the borough who treated with the exchequer, were rich and leading citizens who found it easy to find securities.

Long Exclusion of the Commonalty from Privilege.—Only in cent. xiii do we hear of the *vulgus*, or commonalty; who, in continental towns of the south especially, as *parlamentum* or *concio*, were recognized as the ultimate source of power. These took action through the gilds and craft-corporations and made effective protest when taxation was increased. Under Henry II the royal justices assessed the taxes, but if the borough offered a gift the re-partition was left in its hands, in the former case the richer citizens, in the latter the poorer felt the burden. This pressure led to demands by the commons to supervise borough expenditure. By the end of our period London had its Court of Common Council to represent the commonalty and the voice of the city-wards. A tendency may be observed to model borough-government on national lines; the new court formed a counterpart to the people and commons of England; the aldermen represented the lords; while the title 'sovereign' was sometimes given to the Mayor, a title found latest in the unreformed corporations of Ireland. Admittance to borough-privileges (or right to trade and appear in the court) was only given to duly qualified and proper persons: by inheriting, purchase or gift, sometimes by marriage and in London, after *1275*, by apprenticeship. The newcomers shared in all the municipal burdens. Personal service was sometimes dispensed with and hence there grew up the abuse, so common in later times, of non-resident freemen who entirely controlled the borough from outside. The Commons in many towns asserted their claim to vote in electing magistrates but, through turbulence, this right was gradually curtailed. As in Germany all classes were afraid of State interference and the annulling of their charters for riot or other misconduct. But in cent. xiii London was more than once subjected to heavy fines and placed under the control of the Tower. The later development of municipal institutions shows an irresistible tendency to *oligarchy*, which reached its height in the close corporations of cent. xviii.

C. FORCES AND NEEDS THAT PRODUCED THE MODERN SECULAR STATE: OR, THE TRIUMPH AND DEFEAT OF NOMINALISM

Section I. New Powers Succeed to the Heritage of the Incompetent Rulers: Royalty and Economics

The Sworn Companies in Islam and in the West.—Both the *Military* Orders and the *Mendicant* Friars are signs of the breakdown of feudal compromise: perhaps the chief impulse in both may be traced to the sworn brotherhoods and secret societies of Islam. It was the caliphs who brought into the world a real autocracy. When their hands grew feeble, when daring and unauthorized captains seized the power which they let slip, provinces became independent and satraps princes in their own right; or again, non-territorial companies like the Assassins formed everywhere an *imperium in imperio*. Despotism and its correlative, implicit obedience, were now found together as the double nexus of society: 'man born free' was everywhere busily forging and eagerly submitting to chains of his own making. For no man was born a member of a secret order; he was free to join as a volunteer, but having once become a member he was bound to obey. Society both in east and west began to frame itself upon the model of a pirate-band,—at least all its efficient organisms copy this exemplar. In the Crusades effective arms lay not with feudal levies or pious zealots but with special expert bodies under strict rules and discipline. Power lay with Hospitallers of Rhodes, Templars, Teutonic Knights; a little later with the Catalans and other companies of *condottieri*. The *fyrd* had given way to the feudal militia, and this in turn had collapsed while a definitely royal army was still in the making. It was in default of any real central power that these (to us) anomalous powers and jurisdictions grew up. When burgher society awoke to the menace of these unauthorized companies,[1] law and commerce and finance worked together to set up a representative centre. The result is the modern State—an autocracy never really personal (except in the rarest cases) but controlled and guided by the strongest influences in the kingdom. That these were economic and utilitarian will largely explain the new character which the State takes on after the fall of Empire and Papacy together, towards the close of our period.

Decadence of the Central Powers.—Over this development it is clear that *economic* causes exerted the most serious influence, and it is these which first demand inquiry. The unique medieval world had a different fate from that of the Roman Empire, its prototype: there the limbs fell into atrophy, here they waxed so vigorous that they threw off tutelage. The one fell to pieces after a long failure and decay in its economic resources; the other was becoming each year more wealthy and enterprising. The crusading era was an age of advancing prosperity, not to be interrupted by the civil feuds of italian trade-centres, the Black Death, or the Hundred Years' War with France. The vitality of the members (as in the towns of

[1] Of which that of the Jesuits is really the last survival.

Germany and Flanders) was in strange contrast with the numbness and feebleness of the central power. In this respect it was in truth ' a period ' of transition '. Both pope and emperor had ceased to be decisive factors and the ideal of united Christendom no longer made appeal : yet national States with strong government and well husbanded resources had not yet arisen. The discredit, first of the Captivity (or exile at Avignon *1309–1378*) and next of the long schism which followed it, fell not merely on the Head of the Church, but on an entire social system.

Church Fails to Meet its Official Obligations.—Throughout these centuries there was scarcely a moment when the Church and its rulers duly fulfilled the functions which Christendom was content to entrust to them. When the popes lost their old prestige and were sinking, first into parasites of the french king, next into petty and grasping italian princes, men began to question the finality of the whole fabric. The Church had demanded the right to control every department of human life ; no sphere of human life lay outside its cognizance. Hence churchmen had been granted the management of civil affairs ; not only because they were learned and adroit, but because they were trusted as honest men and could not found feudal dynasties.[1] Besides semi-religious matters (like marriage and testament) there came into clerical hands a large mass of fiscal, judicial and (above all) diplomatic business. The pious complained with good reason that the clergy were mere servers of tables distracted from their proper spiritual duties. The rise of the Mendicant Order early in cent. xiii had been a protest against secularism among churchmen. The Albigenses held the same views, proceeding, however, from a dualistic contempt for the evil world and a doomed society. In the next century Occam and others used this prejudice to control the papal claims. But even the reformers had fallen from popular favour ; the friars were held to be slothful beggars who lived on alms instead of working ; religious houses were not always (as they were normally in England) good landlords ; the papal merchants could not be called habitually honest. With this discontent abroad it is easy to see that the whole papal claim to supervise the world was challenged at every point. These opinions, long forming, even during the zenith of the papal monarchy, were unexpectedly reinforced by a great natural catastrophe.

The Black Death and a New Social Order.—The Black Death was perhaps the chief factor in the disintegration of society. Half of the population disappeared ; the features of town and rural districts were wholly altered and their landmarks obliterated. The monasteries never recovered their old position as economic examples and centres of genuine piety ; the supply of clergy for the parishes became inadequate ; heathenism, never quite extinct, again raised its head ; and (as in Boccaccio's tales) an epicurean secularism became the fashionable tone. Even the serious and faithful doubted the wisdom of diverting wealth to religious purposes which had had their day and no longer fulfilled a want. Princes and kings were clamorous that the endowments should serve more useful ends ; the legacies

[1] Cf. preface to *Dial. Scacc.*

of pious benefactors were in some cases set aside (as in similar movements of our own time); and men showed the greatest reluctance to pay the constant fees demanded by the papal officials. The Catholic Church (like the feudal militia) saw itself superseded in many of its most important functions; the 'king's peace', whereby the law could be summarily enforced against brawling and private quarrels, was a better safeguard than the sentiment of the *treuga Dei*. There arose an expert body of civilian administrators; and rulers dispensed with the services of clerical agents and chancellors, not without a feeling of relief. The religious houses, once pioneers in agriculture, were no longer a model to secular landlords; and as patrons of commerce had been entirely left behind by the towns. 'The Church', says Cunningham with justice (*West. Civil.* ii 145), 'had 'ceased to be a leader in the arts of practical life.'

The Intervention of the Secular State: New Utilitarian Spirit.—After the Black Death (*1348–1350*) the old institutions could not cope with the new situation. Many of the most urgent social duties which piety had once imposed were now neglected; when this neglect was repaired in cent. xvi the work was done under the eyes and by the authority of the new civilian State. In France the long dynastic wars had interrupted trade and broken down communication. In England many of the bridges, once erected by private persons as a meritorious Christian act, had vanished; the repair of roads had been a piece of pious philanthropy, like building a *caravanserai* in muslim countries. When the resources or the public spirit of the land-holding abbeys declined, the obvious public need shifted the burden on to other shoulders: under Philip and Mary (*1555*) a Statute provides for the appointment of road-surveyors. Again, with regard to pauperism, the old religious relief of the poor could no longer suffice to cope with the new and terrible conditions left behind by the Black Death. The convents met but imperfectly the duty of providing for the famine-stricken vagrants. They seem to have stood aside from the new organizations of charity, which in place of a Christian duty became a matter of civic or municipal expedience. We need not enlarge on the effect of the changed system on motive and sanction. An important sphere was withdrawn from a moral or emotional atmosphere and transferred to one purely secular and utilitarian. The poor were relieved, not because they were Christian brethren of the well-to-do, but because idle and unproductive vagrants are a menace to society. So in our own time costly education of the labouring class is justified, not as their right—for upon rights no one is to-day agreed—but because an ignorant proletariat is a revolutionary danger.[1]

New Conception of National Monarchy: Feudalism Decays: Rise of Bourgeois.—Two distinct forms of secular power were ready to take up the new responsibilities for which neither the spirit nor the institutions of the church sufficed; the *city* and the *kingdom*, republic and monarchy.

[1] Many apologists have cooled in their efforts since it has been proved in Russia that the most dangerous element of all is not a rough peasantry but an unbelieving middle-class, trained at the universities in secular science.

Both types were capable of organizing government action in spheres hitherto relegated to the church or to private piety. The advance of *royal* (that is *central*) authority was due to several causes; the towns or communes had been glad to assist in wrecking feudal particularism. During cent. xv the noble families, in spite of outward show, were becoming less important, in *politics* than the sovereign, in *economics* than the new plebeian wealthy. In Italy, Flanders and some german towns the *municipium* was strong enough to keep its freedom. In England and France the result of the long wars had been to decimate the nobles and to give the king (or his advisers) a more effective control, in town and country alike. It was therefore possible to regard a large continuous territory as a unit (like *household* in early, or *city* in later, medieval times). One object was kept steadily in view by the rulers and all resources were used (in this new competitive age) to strengthen the kingdom as an integral whole. The towns expanded their ideas in this period, took in wider districts and fields of enterprise, and allowed account of landed interests as well as of private mercantile gain: yet medieval urban life was scarcely an advance on the ancient classical type, and gave little novelty or impulse to economic progress. The aim of each several city was particularist and exclusive: like savage tribes they did not know how to combine and much labour and wealth was wasted in avoidable friction and needless rivalry. Germany and Italy were most conspicuous in local activity and keen zeal in trading. They outran the other countries of West Europe in commerce and energy (cent. xv); yet for this, like the Greeks before them, they sacrificed their independent political life.

Impulse towards Strong Organic National Unity.—It would seem that the question of moment for each country was how it could best attain a *national* unity. The more backward lands answered better the economic demand; the very greatness and freedom of rival centres in Germany and Italy made any step towards consolidation impossible. *National* unity arose from different causes in which sometimes pure economic factors played a secondary part, though they were never wholly absent. England, industrially far behind other parts of the continent in cent. xv, became *one*, partly because it was an island and largely because administrative monarchy had begun its work here early and with confidence. In Spain, a common religious foe pressed the survivors into a unity; so in the dutch provinces and the cantons of Switzerland. In France too, foreign pressure rallied patriots round the king as the centre of unity and the symbol and guarantor of freedom. Meantime, as Roman Law was more carefully studied, the advantage of a uniform autocracy became a commonplace both with lawyers and merchants. It was seen that a strong civil power had once charged itself (with the fullest consent of the governed) with the many duties now surrendered to the church or to pure ' knight-errantry '. The genius of the latin race led them towards this bureaucratic cæsarism under which for a time it remained acquiescent and grateful, content to expand its manifold resources.

Roman Law had revived in cent. xii and had justified the imperial claims. It was from the first a destructive agent in its attitude to the

spiritual powers : it could not conceive of a genuine *dyarchy* in which both parties respect the limits of the sacred and profane departments. As in philosophic theory, the practical mind pressed towards an absolute and final authority, each side no doubt hoping to influence it to their own profit. A new lettered class of laymen arose, primed with the doctrines of a *secular* absolutism (as it seemed to them) which was destined to supersede the canonists. The Church had early demanded a respect for property and the new law helped to define its titles and enforce its covenants. The rejection of usury by the Church (never upheld in practice) was now withdrawn ; and the prohibition was ingeniously explained away (but see on the *contractus trinus*, Ashley, *Introd. Econ. Hist.* I. ii 440). This not only removed prejudice against trading enterprise, but also restored the self-respect of the merchant community, now recognized as following an honourable and dignified calling.

The Monarch's Supporters : Sovereign as People's Delegate.—The Roman Law also aided economic progress by the support it gave to the new monarchy. The curious legal fiction, by which the roman people consciously surrendered all its rights into the hands of a single arbiter, became an accepted maxim. Therefore the prince's ruling was to have the force of law ; and the doctrines of modern absolutism were imbibed and expounded.

Kings are the natural (and perhaps the only) creators of nations ; and no better instance can be given than France. The revival after the fatal Hundred Years' War was due to Charles VII and Louis XI. The inert body, or congeries, came slowly to conscious life as an organism ; this life (with the approval of all) had its centre in the kingly brain. Monarch and advisers made economic uniformity by degrees out of hopeless tangle. The nation submitted to a permanent tax (*taille*) and with this regular income gave secure dignity to the crown and saved itself from mercenaries by providing for a standing army of natives. Charles VII owed much to Jacques Cœur who, enjoying this new peaceful order, revived the woollen industry at Bourges, traded with the east from Montpellier and settled his factories on the coast of Syria and Egypt. Money economy was now triumphant and the sovereigns who *wanted*, and the merchants or bankers who *possessed*, capital entered into a long and friendly alliance—e.g. Charles V and the Fuggers, Edward IV and the Hansards. Internal safety was improved ; the perhaps equal mischiefs of brigandage and feudal tolls were abolished.

Monarchic Integration. First Realized in France : Economic Basis.—The advisers of Louis XI were not nobles but *bourgeois*. He might claim, and exert, the right of interfering with the great industrial societies by naming his own members ; he might from his central position set aside local privilege and interest at Paris or at Rouen for the sake of general welfare : but in spite of his high-handedness he did not forfeit confidence or esteem. Thus he began the *nationalizing* process whereby not only the neglected duties of the church but the enterprises of private persons were taken over by royalty. To this policy was due the amazing recovery of France between the departure of the last english soldier and the brilliant

'summer tourney' of Charles VIII in Italy. The french kingdom became a centralized economic whole. Interrupted once more by the religious struggles of cent. xvi, the task was taken up anew by Henry IV, by Sully and by Colbert: and resulted in the crowned socialism of the *Ancien Régime*.[1] For its supplies in France and elsewhere the Crown (that is the nation) was consciously dependent on the goodwill and confidence of merchant and capitalist. Financiers were consulted on the royal policy: there was even a time when both in France and England[2] the *bourgeois* class was believed to have the sole and indefeasible right to control affairs, and reforms giving this class the franchise were believed (even by far-seeing statesmen) to be final. If money was required for the people's safety and the king's glory, it was not to be obtained except by methods ensuring its steady flow and untrammelled circulation (Lamond's edit. of *Discourse of Commonweal*): commercial interests were also royal interests. Food supply and the development of husbandry was a national concern. The old civic particularism had given way before a wider conception of the problem 'Who is my neighbour?' To this end Roman Law and the new monarchy, capital and the trading influence had all coöperated.

Religious Rupture and the New Secular Absolutism.—It must not be forgotten that just after the close of this period (*1300–1500*) another factor enters to assist in creating the new competitive nationalities,—the *religious* rupture. Steadily at work during these years a discontent which was largely economic came to a head in the next age and led to the dismemberment of Christendom. Nothing contributed so much to the exaltation of the civil power—just at that time under genuinely personal rulers, and not yet collapsed into an anonymous State-autocracy. The modern nation is really a novel social form. It is founded not on kinship as of old but on contiguity, in an artificial area, and on a common allegiance (often to a foreign dynasty). In cent. xvi (and xvii) attempt was made to give the arbitrary amalgam a certain coherence and solidarity by insisting also on a common belief. With the full sanction of the Reformers in the religious movement,[3] the princes were empowered to enforce their own religious creeds and practice on the subjects within their scattered or

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[1] The comparison will be called inaccurate because 'the resources were 'centralized by the Bourbons for dynastic ambition, for pensioning a now 'superfluous aristocracy, for the whims of the king's mistresses and 'favourites: whereas modern autocracy aims only at the good of the 'worker'. Time will show (if mankind is unhappy enough to give the scheme a trial) whether an unlimited centralized power can safely be entrusted to any body of men. Under an economic bureaucracy there might well be as little personal freedom or chance of expressing opinion as under the thoroughly frightened despotism of Naples under the Bourbons or Russia. Let those who are sceptical read Wells' *The Sleeper Awakes*.

[2] In France 1830–48, in our own country between the dates of the first two Reform Bills: 1832 and 1867.

[3] A movement, it need scarcely be said to-day, in truth reactionary.

contiguous estates ; and without their support (not wholly disinterested) the Reformation and the rupture of Christendom could not possibly have been achieved. In the last years of our period another influence began to work both on nations and rulers—colonial imperialism : it unified the nation at home, at least placed it under the management of a single board of directors, that it might compete with rivals abroad.

SECTION II. POLITICAL THEORY (*1300*) : DANTE AND MARSILIUS

Law of Nature and Equality of Man Supplant Medieval Franchises.—One chief and embracing question in our period was the doctrine of human *Equality according to Nature's Law*—which upset all the fabrics and objectives around and left the field open to the modern notions of *force* and *utility*. It will be seen that hitherto all political views had rested on some *positive recognition of rights*, whether personal or corporate. The turmoil of the Middle Ages was not a reign of pure licence and selfishness ; it was an honest attempt to adjust these conflicting rights and effect a working compromise. This end was almost everywhere pursued with sincerity. Until the italian tyrant, no king or ruler ever believed that he held power for selfish uses ; and in his most savage and unenlightened act could appeal to the greater good of the commonwealth which he could only secure by crushing its foes. To say that in the feudal period kingship was the acknowledged *vindex et assertor libertatis* is to utter a commonplace which has been tardily accepted even by the prejudiced idealists of our own times. The ruler had duties then, as he had rights, like everyone else. Every other class (each with its own laws, usages and code of honour) was in like position. To harmonize and to conciliate was the ruler's task. In every case there was some claim insoluble and impenetrable which was believed to rest on the real nature of things. The possession of a *personal* law, not to be set aside or overridden, largely helped, if not the theory, at least the practice of liberty. Rights inhered in a class or person and were not an artificial endowment or gift from outside. Finally (though the doctrinal mind in the Middle Age tended towards a realism which despised the particular) the last unshaken and root principle, to which in the end all other laws had to bow, was the *inalienable right of the immortal soul*.

Loss in Personal Liberty and Local Autonomy.—Now it cannot be denied that during the Enlightenment (from about *1300* to the Revolution *1800*) these very substantial and positive assets were bartered away for shadowy privileges of theory or for arbitrary gifts from strangers. Man (like Ishtar in her descent into the underworld) is seen to divest himself one by one of the rights he enjoyed as member of such a community or sworn retainer of such a prince. He loses pride in local characteristics and ceases to be a Gascon or Andalusian that he may become a Frenchman or a Spaniard. Until recently it has been supposed that this exchange told in favour of *freedom* ; the horizon and the chances of life were infinitely extended and the petty parochialist was on the way to become a citizen of the world, a member of the commonwealth of mankind. It is now suspected that this wider franchise has been purchased at much too high a price. It is said that the Church by fixing man's attention on the hereafter

taught him to neglect the tangible benefits and beauties of the present life. But what shall we say of reformers who belittle or ridicule the class, the habits, the ignorance, the rights of the majority in whom the sole ultimate control of government is vested ; who thus encourage discontent with their forefathers' interests and abodes : who teach them to abandon some measure of local autonomy in exchange for a worthless vote in an unwieldy centralized State ? At present however it is solely on the *negative* character of the new conception of man that we insist. Instead of a concrete and highly ' qualified ' personality, a colourless entity was set up as the ideal man. At first this figure was invested with every sort of splendid attribute by the eternal Law of Nature. The whole later history of social politics (the only politics deserving the name) is a long record of disillusionment. The earlier outlook might have been narrow ; the interests of clansman, peasant or burgess may have been paltry and trivial, and the rights enjoyed by persons under a feudalism highly precarious. But it is hard to see that the surrender of these has been compensated adequately. Here once again to proclaim a universal equality and, for that purpose, to divest each class and person of special rights is to prepare, not the reign of equal units, but the tyranny of new, anonymous and self-seeking forces.

Contrast of Ideals (Dante and Marsilius).—The two chief political treatises at the close of our period are Dante's *de Monarchiâ* (*1310–1313*) and the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsilius and John of Jandun (*1324*). The interval of thought between the two writings is astounding. Dante replaces a divine and autocratic papacy by a divine and autocratic imperialism ; under whose arbitrage each state and class and unit is to find its true sphere and proper work. He accepts the curious blend of religious thought and classical tradition when he believes that the roman people are God's chosen vessel for appointing the world-ruler : but he hastily compromises with existing custom by accepting the vii electors as the true channels of the divine choice. He would not have taken Charles IV to Rome to be crowned by the roman populace, nor regarded the revived republic of Rienzi as an improvement. As he is the highest exponent of medieval thought and theology at its best, so is he the clearest expounder of the spiritual monarchy and a united Christendom. Marsilius and Jandun are still medieval ; there is not yet to be observed the frank and unscrupulous particularism of later theory and practice. But the spiritual and moral element is much in the background. The *Defensor Pacis* wishes to restore peace and order to mankind. Law on which peace depends, is the will of the whole people or at least—an ominous reservation—of the majority (*pars valentior*) ; they should therefore elect their own ruler to carry out the laws and ensure peace, but should give him but a small army or police-force lest he be tempted to subvert the very laws he is chosen to defend : Dante, it will be remembered, did not condescend to ask if the moral umpire needed an armed body at all ! If he breaks the law he can be held to account like any other violator : for his office rests on tacit or explicit contract : if he is guilty of serious crime against the common weal, he *may be put to death*. The cause of the distress of Europe is the Papacy, a fictitious power which only rules by a series of adroit usurpations. In reforming the

church Marsilius goes far beyond Dante and, in effect, makes it a subordinate department of the State and not one independent body. No clergyman can exert coercive power or impose penalties or enforce submission to God's law: heretics should be punished by the civil tribunals of the State as bad citizens. The clergy should be forcibly restored to a holy and apostolic poverty; tithes should be suppressed and the excessive estates of churchmen resumed by the secular power. The State is to appoint to the chief benefices; and the emperor is to summon the General Council which was to enjoy supreme power in sacred matters. The pope, whose ancient dignity is not denied, is to have honour and titular precedence, but must concern himself with his spiritual duties alone. Like the emperor he is to be elected by the people, or by *the princes who represent them*, or again by the General Council: by these agencies he can be suspended or deprived.

Fictitious Democracy: Real Despotism.—If the theory of this work is pure democracy, the actual effect would be pure cæsarism; for it is a vindication of a strong central power like that of Frederic II without rival or counterpoise, either in nobles or churchmen. From the side of church-reform it is more daring than any proposal of Wiclif: for the hierarchy was to be set down, the clergy to be despoiled of any secular duties or privileges, and the Christian republic (or rather its chosen autocrat) was to reduce the pope to an honorary chairman without a vote. This is oddly imperialist and really recalls the pagan theory of the emperor's sovereignty as set forth by the lawyers, before his powers were limited by the church

Section III. Civilian Absolutism: The Cæsaro-papism of Frederic II

Sicilian King as Pioneer of the New Central Autocracy: Begins as a Welf.—Frederic II had passed his early years amid the anarchy of sicilian feudalism, but his abilities were good and his education was not neglected. The atmosphere of peril and lawlessness produced in him the same character that we find in ancient greek tyrants and their counterparts in medieval Italy. He is at the outset a papalist or welf of set policy: in *1213* he surrenders all lands claimed by the roman see since his father's death and his own right to interfere in the choice of bishops. He affirmed the papal supremacy over his island-kingdom, allowed the power of appeal to Rome and promised to lend secular aid to root out heresy.[1] After the victory of Bouvines in *1214* and his own crowning as king in the next year, he wrote to Innocent III that his son would be made king of Sicily and be placed under the papal suzerainty. There does not seem any reason to doubt that Frederic lied in stating that Henry's election as german king in *1220* was a step taken without his knowledge or consent; indeed, his manifold concessions to electors and princes at the time seem to show

[1] We have seen elsewhere that the earliest 'freethinking' monarch did much to promote the rigorous treatment of suspected heretics under torture (p. 742).

his eagerness to secure it. Crowned at Rome (in November of the same year) he renewed his promise to go on a crusade (made at Aix in *1215*), set the clergy free from taxes and lay jurisdiction, agreed that the imperial ban should follow the anathema of the Church and again repeated his detestation of heretics. But his pious designs were interrupted by the needs of his southern government; he spent five years in pacifying Sicily, where the feudal barons hindered orderly and uniform government and the wealthy towns gave trouble.

His Saracens and Crusade Estrange the Pope: Sicily Centralized.—He gathered round him a bodyguard of *condottieri* from his saracen captives, men without a country, whom he bound to himself by purely personal ties: they were settled on the mainland at Nocera. This step perhaps first aroused against him the papal suspicion which he never was afterwards able to allay. In *1225* he assumed the title King of Jerusalem and in *1227* in spite of Gregory IX's prohibition proceeded to fulfil his vow. Gregory denounced him and Frederic replied in a letter addressed to the princes of Europe which won him no little sympathy even in Rome. He crowned himself king in the Holy City in *1229*; and on his safe return came to terms with the pope by agreeing to allow free election to the sicilian clergy and to respect his rival's domains—in which matter the pope himself had not set a good example during the king's absence in Palestine. In *1231* he was once more engaged in crushing the disorderly elements in his own kingdom: the Laws of Melfi put an end to baronial ascendancy, lost estates were won back to the crown, royal officials were appointed, fortresses and castles were destroyed, self-government was granted to the towns and their deputies invited to sit in Diets. The Church was placed under the king's jurisdiction and further gifts or bequests to it were no longer allowed. That is to say, Frederic II set up the first successful instance of the modern centralized and secular State.

Opposite Policy in the Empire: Deliberate Abolition of Effective Kingship.—In Germany his policy was exactly the reverse. He willingly exchanged a tangible heritage in the rich and luxurious South for the visionary dreams of world-empire—such as Dante urged on his successor nearly a century later—or a precarious position as *primus inter pares*. Virtually he recognized the german princes as autonomous: in them was vested all jurisdiction and no imperial mints or tolls were to be set up on their estates. The privileges of the cities he fiercely attacked in the interests of the higher nobility: their justice was confined within their walls, they were forbidden to give shelter to the lord's men, their trade-gilds were abolished and the consent of the bishop was required for all appointments to civic office. He also attacked the franchises of the lombard cities, already assailed in *1226–27* at the Diet of Cremona; he was glad to accept the pope's mediation after failure to enforce his demands. Just 10 years later he was again embroiled (*1237*) and this time the cities refused to accept the kindly offices of Gregory IX, the terms offered by Frederic being held insulting. He seems to have deliberately torn to pieces, in his conflict with the papacy, the last relics of imperial power in the north. His enactments *in favorem principum* (*1220*, *1231*) put an end to the central

power in Germany and helped in a disintegration[1] of the realm which passed into a proverb. When the Mongols threatened Germany (*1241*) there was no central force to defend the State as under Henry I three centuries earlier; Frederic was content to issue futile directions for a campaign which he could not control or command. But the danger passed and next year he visited the kingdom merely to squander the last remnant of substantial prerogative in lavish grants of doles and privileges.

His Struggle with Rome and Failure.—Frederic's war with the Holy See lasted from *1239* to his death in *1250*; a bitter and truceless quarrel which ruined both combatants and estranged thoughtful and loyal men not only from the competing heads, but from the very ideal of Christendom. Frederic was charged with impiety, heresy and blasphemy: the pope urged the german princes to renounce fealty (as in the days of Henry IV) and despatched travelling friars to preach rebellion through the country. Innocent IV at the Council of Lyons (although an old wibelline before his election) pronounced sentence of excommunication and deposition on the ground of heresy, perfidy, oath-breaking and hostility to the Church. The king-emperor retorted by attacking the wealth, the pride, the bad faith of the clergy; and threatened to confiscate their estates in his italian dominions. Innocent was even more steadfast in his hatred than the foregoing pontiffs and stirred up sedition in Apulia, while Parma, a wibelline stronghold, was seized by his welf partizans (*1248*): the imperial treasures and insignia fell into their hands and the crown was bestowed in derision upon a hunchback. Peter de Vineis, his loyal and capable minister, now fell under his moody suspicion: having been charged with treason and deprived of sight, he took his own life by dashing his head against his dungeon wall. Enzio, the king's favourite son, was made captive, and all offers of ransom were refused by the Bolognese. Frederic died at Fiorentino in Dec. *1250*, perhaps of a broken heart, having witnessed the failure of all his plans. Yet, in spite of this disappointment, his career and policy became a model for the italian tyrants—of whom Eccelino da Romano, his friend and imitator, was amongst the first and Cæsar Borgia perhaps the last.

An Oriental Caliph, not a Medieval King: His Versatile Culture.—Versatile and unscrupulous, Frederic recalls rather a muslim caliph than a Christian sovereign. The contrast with his grandfather, the great Barbarossa, is most striking: an entirely new ideal of Christian monarchy and worldly ambition had replaced the older and nobler teutonic standards. It is one of the ironies of history that the younger Frederic became, after the fashion of Nero or the invisible Imams of the Fatimites, the expected Messiah of any and every party with a grievance.[2] His court and culture were imperially 'catholic': Jews and Muslim were made welcome and

[1] Of which today there are vestiges even under the iron hegemony of Prussia.

[2] The Germans long believed him to be still alive and about to return: it seems certain that it was only in later times that this legend was transferred to Frederic I who is said to wait in a cavern with his beard grown through the table, until the hour strikes for the Empire's Golden Age.

great impetus was given to learning.[1] He knew six tongues, founded the University of Naples in *1224*, and was a patron of the famous Medical School at Salerno. He kept a menagerie and studied natural history and architecture. He wrote on falconry [2] and proved himself a close and accurate observer. At his court italian poetry was born ; de Vineis [3] is said to have written the first sonnet and Frederic's own lyrics are still extant. His wives were kept in seclusion in muslim fashion and eunuch-chamberlains were employed to guard the harem at Lucera.

His Peculiar Religion : The Divine Imamate.—His religious views are wholly obscure or appear to us rather a medley of conflicting theories often changed and discarded. Political motives, rather than any clear conviction, made him persecute heretics and encourage mahommedans. The irreverent jests with which his enemies charged him do not prove more than a vague and scoffing indifference : he cannot be charged, any more than the byzantine Constantine V (*741–775*) with definite unbelief. At the same time it cannot be doubted that he gave much occasion for scandal by his open friendship with infidels and by his attacks on the papacy, which were yet in a large measure defensive or retaliatory. It is certain that he was acquainted with the eastern doctrine of the Divine Imamate and may at times have believed himself the prophet of God, a vehicle of the divine spirit, or even an actual incarnation of the Deity.[4] Frederic was certainly not always consistent in his opinions nor had he any precise religious creed, except fear and dislike of an aggressive papacy. But we cannot doubt that he excited the anger of the pious by claiming, like a caliph, to unite *spiritual* and *imperial* power : whether he himself believed in his full competence in these respects is perhaps doubtful.

His Cæsaro-papism : State Without a Rival.—In politics he set (as we saw) a model for the new centralized State, in which the whole resources of a clearly marked kingdom were to be turned to the glory of the sovereign and owner. He really brought about the end of anarchy in Sicily and gave the distressed country an era of contentment and prosperity. He was an able legislator : he strove to enhance his dignity and pomp after the manner of the caliphs or the roman and byzantine emperors—in which latter imitation he followed Otto III.

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[1] Under his advice our Michael Scot translated treatises of Aristotle and of Averroes. Leonard of Pisa introduced algebra and arabic numerals.

[2] *De arte venandi cum avibus*, lat. Augsburg 1596, germ. Berlin just 300 years later.

[3] 1190–1249, one of the earliest in the line of royal ministers and chancellors, not chosen within the circle of ecclesiastics : welf tradition accused him of abetting Frederic in his blasphemy and heresy and of writing the famous work (which nevertheless has never been produced) *De Tribus Impositoribus* : the fear of this destructive treatise was no doubt quite genuine among simple Christians.

[4] Huillard Bréholles (*Hist. Diplom. F. II* Paris *1852–1861* and *Vie et Correspondance de Pierre de la Vigne*, Paris 1865) is the principal exponent of this very plausible theory.

Embodiment of All Heresy : Founder of Modern Despotism.—It is not surprising that he seemed to the papacy the apotheosis of secular wickedness in high places, the very embodiment of all and sundry the heresies which distressed and alarmed that age of perplexity and transition. That he was accepted almost as prophet and martyr by the Fraticelli makes the hostile attitude of the Holy See natural and to some extent justifies it. Justinian has been called an ' empurpled nihilist ' and it is certain that to average catholics on the papal side Frederic represented the overthrow of every principle they held dear. He seemed to threaten the ruin not of the church and its chief pastor only but of Christian society itself. He turned resolutely away from idealism and achieved his ends in east or west by intrigue and money rather than by force of character or military strength. He marks the passage from a moral and spiritual Christendom, ruled by two consuls without earthly might and in God's name, to the utilitarian particularism and competition of modern States. He did much to promote a vague notion of human equality [1] which overturned the carefully graded hierarchy of feudalism and led straight to regal autocracy, to the absolute claims of the collective group and its spokesman over the freedom of the unit. It is not without reason that we call this appendix ' the triumph and the defeat of Nominalism ' ; for the particulars, reacting against a tutelage they had outgrown, became a mass of unrelated atoms. These, themselves incoherent and centrifugal, were united and consolidated only by the strong hand from outside, to become the pliant instruments of the central will.

Section IV. Democratic Absolutism aimed against Papal Claims

After Austin, Church not State the Ethical Community.—The feud between the secular and sacred powers only waxed acute and irremediable in the very last years of our period. It was only in cent. xiii that the two claimants could not be reconciled or exist side by side. Up to that time political theory (much modified by Scripture and the witness of the Fathers) had accepted both rulers while giving the complimentary primacy to St. Peter's vice-gerent. But in the post-austinian medieval mind there lurked a profound distrust of an earthly or civil ruler. The visible State was no longer, as in the classical ideal, a school for moral excellence, an arena for the development of the highest character, it was ' added because ' of offences ' and its rise marked the fall of a once perfect mankind. In the west after Gregory the Great (+ *604*) the Church arose to overshadow its claims upon human loyalty and confidence. The (coercive) State was the result of Adam's sin and but for the Fall would not have been called into being (Aust. *De. Civ. Dei* xix 15). The Church was now the only ethical community : the State, assuming a purely legal and judicial guise, was but a necessary evil, a preventive of greater ills, sometimes an executioner and agent of divine wrath. Some remnant of aristotelian text and

[1] Like Islam itself.

memories kept alive the notion of Law, to which the personal will was subservient, as a transient unit to the eternal Idea. Scripture too taught men to distinguish *tyrant* from *king*, *Saul* from *David*. Hincmar of Reims upholds limited monarchy. The Wars of Investiture and the novel claims of the hildebrandine papacy brought on a shower of 'welf' and 'wibelline' pamphlets (after *1076*) on the source and sanction of political power, *de lite imperatorum et pontificum*. Gregory VII (*Epist.* viii 21) led off the conflict with a daring statement: that kingship is the invention of those who, ignorant of God and instigated by the devil, have presumed to tyrannize over their fellow-creatures.

Distrust of Civil Sovereignty: Law Above the King.—John of Salisbury (*Polycraticus*) believed that *tyrannicide*, even attended by perfidy, *might* on occasion be justified. At the close of cent. xii, even before the full knowledge of classical texts and politics, it was agreed that *monarchy should be limited by law* and that the subject had a right to resist injustice: just as in the purely feudal aspect, a vassal might secede from a lord who could no longer protect him. Bratton (*c. 1200–1268*) in his *De Legibus* says: 'the king has for his superior God and the Law; if he does wrong 'the baronage and the assembly of the kingdom (*universitas regni*) have 'the duty and power of correcting and amending him.' The argument was clear: kingship was ordained for the common good; law was a rule of action to regulate this good; and to its pursuit in accordance with law the kingly power is restricted.

About *1264* a nameless friar of the franciscan order wrote in rhyming latin, a treatise on politics and a eulogy of Simon de Montfort. He sees the root of English distress in Henry III's roman axiom that the 'prince's 'will has the force of law'. Quite in the formula of Herodotus (*νόμος βασιλεὺς ἁπάντων*) he insists that the real king is not the changing and mutable person but the eternal law; *rex* is not *lex* but *lex* is and ought to be *rex*. Roger Bacon had been teaching at Oxford just after the death of Frederic II (*1250–1257*) that science and nature were regular and majestic. The study of law also belonged to this cent. xiii—a code not depending on royal pleasure or on a mere congeries of custom and usage but a logical unity. To this our author assents: *Dicitur vulgariter ut rex vult lex vadit: Veritas vult aliter, nam lex stat, rex cadit/ . . . . Ista lex sic loquitur, per me regnant reges/ per me jus obtenditur his qui condunt leges/. Istam legem stabilem nullus rex mutabit/ sed se variabilem per istam firmabit/ . . . Et rex nihil proprium præferat communi/ quia salus omnium sibi cessit uni/ Non enim præponitur sibimet victurus/ sed ut hic qui subditur populus securus/.*[1] He denies that his caprice is binding on subjects (*quod imperaret/ suomet arbitrio singulos ligaret*. Rebellion is lawful but in extreme cases only; normally the executive magistrate should be limited by a parliament which makes known the 'people's will.' *'Igitur communitas regni consulatur/ ut quid universitas sentiat sciatur.'* The pope (like the Jesuits in later times) was by no means averse from this doctrine. Manegold

[1] Understand *vivat*.

wrote that: 'The people exalts one man to govern and rule men justly. 'If he break the compact (*pactum*) under which he is chosen, his people 'are set free from their allegiance, since he first failed to keep faith.'

Constitutionalism in Aquinas: Papacy Superior to All Rulers.—St. Thomas of Aquin, true to his harmonizing aim, tries to combine the austinian theory of Church and State with Aristotle: '*Law* is *reason*, for it 'is the function of *reason* to order things to an end . . . this *end* is *happi-* '*ness*: so law contains rules for the *common happiness* (of all): so to make 'laws belongs either to the whole community or to some one man who 'carries the person of the whole community: . . . *unde optima ordinatio* '*principum est in aliquâ civitate vel regno in quo* unus præficitur *secundum* '*virtutem* qui omnibus præsit, *et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes sec. virt.*: '*et tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet, tum quia* ex omnibus eligi 'possunt, *tum quia etiam* ab omnibus eliguntur.' Here Thomas looks forward to a modern democratic bureaucracy in which men are compensated for loss of autonomy and official interference by the thought that in some measure they elect their rulers and supply them according to merit, out of their own body. He maintains that all have some share in sovereignty (*omnes aliquam partem habent in principatu*). 'The Commonalty both 'institutes and limits the prince' (*de Reg. Princ.*) 'if he uses his power as a 'tyrant he may be destroyed by the commons who have set him up or 'they may limit his prerogative.' Like Manegold, he believes in a contract (*pactum*) which conditions the ruler's power and is forfeit if he abuses it.[1] St. Thomas is an unqualified papalist: *papa utriusque potestatis apicem tenet* (*Comm.* in *Sentent.* Dist. xlv 67). Only the papal power is ordained directly by God; the princes of the earth receive their mandate from the pope and so from God mediately. It was against this view that Dante wrote: both powers were 'ordained of God'. In the *Summa* Aquinas argues that sedition is lawful against a bad government.

The First Theorist of the New Monarchy.—Ægidius Colonna (*1247–1316*)[2] wrote a treatise under the sane title *de Regimine Principum*, addressed to Philip IV of France: he was general of the Austin Friars, and won the title *Doctor Fundatissimus*. He also treads closely in the footprints of the classical philosophers, distinguishing king and tyrant as the ruler has before him a fatherly or a selfish aim and adding (as Aristotle ought to have done) one step more to the hierarchic grades; family, village, city, *kingdom*. He justifies this more comprehensive polity on grounds of expediency; it is a confederacy of districts and cities under a single prince,[3] who is of

[1] We may note here, as a result of blending Aristotle and the Church, the principle so prominent in Dante half a century later: man has two ends in time and eternity, and he is a member of a commonwealth both *civil* and *spiritual*: the one leads up to and prepares for the other; but the value of the latter through revealed religion is incommensurate with the former.

[2] In imitation of Ægidius but in the venetian dialect of italian the Minorite Fra Paolino wrote his *de Regimine Rectoris*.

[3] Thus he may well be a foreigner or an invited guardian from elsewhere,

service in making war against a common foe and in averting dangers menacing the lesser units, household, village, and town. Ægidius (it will be noted) is purely modern; he speaks no longer of the emperor; from the imperial and world-wide state he turns to France, the typical instance (before the Hundred Years' War) of successful integrating absolutism.[1]

Attempt to Found Imperial Claims on Democracy.—The future lay with such modest ideals, local and national, and not with a world-sovereignty. When Emperor Louis IV came to Rome to be crowned he found himself welcomed by franciscan malcontents eager for clerical poverty and papal disendowment, by jurists like Marsilius and Jandun who applied to the imperial case arguments already used with success in the recent conflict of Boniface and Philip the Fair. Marsilius in his *Defensor Pacis* (*1324*) raises the lay-state from its humble condition. He suggests the policy of receiving the crown not from an exile and a puppet of France at Avignon but from the roman people. Louis recognized a principle which Barbarossa had repelled with scorn—the citizens of medieval Rome were now asserted to be the true source and channel of authority. The *Defensor* aimed to restore peace to Christendom by settling the points at issue on the *origin* and *nature* of political power. He believes in the rule of the *stronger*; the *valentior pars*, as a body, are to make the law. The feeble executive, with but a very small armed force at its disposal, is named by the people; the magistrate is responsible to them and may be deposed or even put to death for default or abuse of power. The sole cause of the present distress is papal usurpation and encroachment into the civil realm. The church must retain no sort of coercive jurisdiction; heresy must be punished no doubt, but by a civil tribunal, as a crime against society. The excessive wealth of the clergy must be secularized and in future the State must nominate to all benefices. The pope's dignity is to be one of honorary precedence, without power to give wealthy office, interpret Holy Writ, or define dogma. All this was only realized after the Revolution of *1789* and then only for a brief space; but two Frenchmen had already set forth the outlines of this daring policy. It is *democratic* in theory but of course in practice *imperialist*; and the church is not made parallel

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like the ruricids in Russia, or the customary *podesta* in a jealous italian city.

[1] That Cæsar is the residuary legatee of democracy (in the sense of a free people) is seen not only in the roman absolutist adage but also in modern practice: with us the old notion that the land belonged primarily to the *people* gives way before the new theory that it belongs to the king,—this not merely by right of force and conquest, but as a legal convenience and a guarantee of peaceful enjoyment and certain title to the king's vassals. 'The king', said Professor E. Robertson, 'may be said to have 'become the universal successor of the people . . . where ancient common 'right has come to be a right of the Crown or the right held of the Crown 'by a vassal.' Hence to-day the absolute and unqualified claims made by some in favour of state-power over all private property.

and independent, but a subject and satellite to the civil State. The utopia of a roman commonwealth was realized.

Marsilius : Attempt to Revive Notion of State as Ethical Community.—But although this theory of *popular* sovereignty could in effect lead only to an imperial absolutism, it is not surprising that Louis IV saw in those bold collaborators Jandun and Marsilius, heretics quite as dangerous as the Albigenses : the doctrine that Cæsar was formally accountable to his people and might be arraigned and executed was unwelcome, though it is the single condition on which the roman autocracy was built. Soon received into favour, Marsilius followed Louis into Italy, where he preached against the absentee ' frankish ' pope and witnessed his ideal realized. The king was crowned emperor by the people's delegates (*1328*) ; the pope was deposed by this now fully authentic power, and, after a shadowy popular vote, Nicholas V was raised to the papacy by imperial decree. Marsilius was made imperial vicar and persecuted the non-juring clergy. He was also made archbishop of Milan and Jandun his colleague obtained as a reward the see of Ferrara.[1] Marsilius, who with Ægidius follows Aristotle in tracing politics up from the family or household, desires to *rehabilitate* the State, as the home of ethical life, in the ancient spirit of classical times. He seems also to follow him in dividing the six functions (three productive, three protective) : *husbandry*, *crafts*, and *banking* for the physical life ; the duties of *judge*, *soldier* and *priest*, for both natural and spiritual life. The priesthood is just another department of the State, set up and controlled by the people. His purpose, to demolish grounds for *clerical* interference in politics, was one which could not have occurred to Aristotle in whose time there was no such counterpoise to *secular* absolutism,—or rather the *divine king* Alexander united in his own person, the factors now contrasted and at feud.

Law Made by All Citizens to be Sovereign.—The Laws are for him ' universal judgments ' defining what is just and expedient in a State, enforced by means of temporal sanctions, properly made by all citizens or a majority (*universitas civium aut ejus valentior pars*)[2]. The *general*

[1] Marsilius (who died shortly after 1342), wrote also an oddly named treatise *De Translatione Imperii* which, closely following the lines of a work by Landulf Colonna, maintains the exclusive jurisdiction of emperor (or civil power) in matters of marriage : in spite of its wide and familiar title it is only a short *opuscule ad hoc* to justify the imperial right to annul a marriage. In Oxford there reposes (to the shame of medieval students) a *Defensor Minor* as yet in MS. dealing with indulgences, penances, crusades, pilgrimages, vows, relations of pope and council, marriage and divorce. Here he is even more clearly forced by his *democratic* axioms to push to extremes of *autocracy* the prerogative of the Emperor. It is needless to repeat here that this was the result of all abstract political theories aiming at liberty or popular control—to thrust all power upon a single ruler who became in effect irresponsible.

[2] Which is very much like the κρείττονος ξύμφερον of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic.

advantage will best (he argues with Aristotle) be seen by the *generality* of the citizens : the people will readily obey laws made by themselves and will be quick to resent statutes passed by a foreign authority : *quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur*. Marsilius seems to forget or absorb all other functions of a ruler in the *judicial*, i.e. the application to special cases of laws already agreed upon and presumably ancient and unalterable. Of course this was not the chief problem before the Middle Ages at all : it was an unimportant side or aspect of the real issue. Marsilius, in making *Law* (with Fortescue and Hooker) the ultimate authority, seems to uphold *popular sovereignty* in a very modern sense. But with Dante these writers are the last to press seriously the universal claims of a secular roman emperor.

D. THE PAPACY AND THE MODERN STATE

(A Study in Central and Secular Government)

Ideal of Non-coercive Unitary State : both in Welf and Wibelline.—Hildebrand's ideal for a european polity was theocracy, in a single church-state. The Wibellines, such as Dante, merely put the emperor as secular head (but still consecrated and divinely appointed) in the place of the pope. In the general conception the two factions scarcely differed at all. The final power was both worldly and spiritual, and though the parts or members, countries and towns, enjoyed freedom in local usage and law, the supreme moral power had at all times a right to intervene, with a decision or arbitrage that must not be challenged. This authority no one attempted to invest with force : it was believed, even amid the tumult and wrongdoing of the Middle Age, that all Christians would cheerfully obey a central power which exercised only a *moral*, never a *coercive*, jurisdiction. Only very late appears the claim of particular cities and provinces to be quite independent, to recognize no referee in a quarrel, to trust entirely to force and success in establishing itself as a paramount influence among its neighbours. A pope who was an exile, an emperor (somewhat later) who might be a bankrupt (and even at times under arrest), exercising a wide appellate jurisdiction, stood as continual reminders of the *spiritual* basis of society. God's vice-gerent (whether pope or emperor) was justice incarnate, whose verdict (needing no bailiffs or executive force behind it) would be accepted by all men as if it were the divine sentence itself. But while the two rival factions strove, other powers slowly grew into maturity, based on very different ideals of the world and of man. The period of the Crusades (*c. 1100–1272*) was interrupted by the Hundred Years' War between the rival leaders (*1155–1254*).

Rupture under the Hohenstaufens.—There had been imperious emperors and a closer copying of byzantine autocracy before this time ; but it was Frederic I who first strove to bring in a new and less spiritual conception of empire, its rights and duties, the absolutism, in effect secular, which Diocletian had set up. He fought 22 years with Popes Hadrian and Alexander ; he struggled with the League of Freedom in Lombardy ; he modelled his prerogative on the pagan law of Rome—in order to restore

in the west a byzantine centralism which teutonic feudalism had overthrown. He destroyed Milan (*1162*) after he had claimed at Roncaglia (*1158*) unbounded rights as emperor over clergy and laymen alike. He appealed to the roman code (known and studied in north Italy since *1100*) instead of acknowledging Canon Law. This code popes did not create and could not modify. It was the Hohenstaufens who first in the empire (*1150–1200*), and failing this in a provincial kingdom (Sicily *1200–1250*), drew the outlines of the modern State whose head is ' over all causes, as well ' ecclesiastical as temporal, throughout his dominions supreme '. This revival of the strictest imperial claims struck a blow at local urban autonomy and at papal rights ; Frederic could not tolerate self-governing cities, or a pope who refused to be his subject. Alexander III after giving support to the successful revolt of Lombardy, Rome and Venice, received homage from the emperor in *1177* at St. Mark's, a scene scarcely less memorable than the wintry incident of Canossa, just a century before (*1076*). Henceforth there was a truceless warfare for supremacy ; and if the pope won in the extinction of the detested dynasty, success only brought his complete ruin at the moment of his most splendid triumph : (to Boniface VIII soon after the great Jubilee *1300*.) In spite of the humiliation of the secular power in the fall of Frederic II and his family, the papal victory was really a defeat. A transition from sacerdotal tutelage and spiritual unity had been long preparing. The Conqueror and Henry II in England, the rival combatants for the sicilian prize, the franconian kaisers, had all fought for the freedom of the civil power without knowing it. Roman Law opened the eyes of the Hohenstaufens, who set before themselves a definite imperial aim in which they failed.

France, not the Teutonic Empire, Reaped the Profit.—It was french logic that carried into effect the vague imperial claims, to receive the obedience of all residents as subjects direct, to abolish all mediating groups and jurisdictions, and to hold this almost absolute crown without papal sanction—or even in defiance of it. Philip [1] then, succeeded where others had only found ruin ; and for the first time the pretensions of sovereignty and the modern State were clearly and frankly formulated (*1303*). The reign of force had begun—not brutal, capricious and apt to relapse into strange terror and penitence ; but the steady, regular and unscrupulous force of a man who has but one end in view, to be master in his own house.[2] France, a continual asylum in the past for exiled popes now became their prison-house (*1309–1377*). A papacy localized and fettered, no longer ' the pilgrim of eternity ', lost its powers and prestige and became the organ and instrument of its gaoler. The *nationalist* character of a french

[1] Philip of France or his ministers ? The king's personality is very obscure and fugitive and, as in many so-called autocratic reigns, he may well have been but the mouthpiece of a strong *nationalist* and *gallican* faction.

[2] Philip, like Henry VIII, marks his independent secular reign by confiscating the Templars' estate, another instance of regal war against mediating groups and corporations, against clerical immunities of every kind.

papacy was recognized ; it was no longer ecumenical. Nations and the claims of their local churches begin to be heard after *1300*.[1]

Protests Against Enslaved Papacy.—Hence the pope lost his character of impartial umpire ; and a prelude or rehearsal of the Reformation is seen when (*c. 1320–1350*) german, english and italian thought united to condemn his claims in favour of a purely civil power. A striking concourse of many different minds—Marsilius the republican at Paris, William of Occam a franciscan friar, and Michael the general of that Order, followed by the Fraticelli [2], the Crown lawyers of France, and the blunt german supporters of Louis the Bavarian—all combine, from radically different standpoints, to set up a powerful secular Emperor and reduce the Pope to a mendicant friar.[3] Michael of Cesena and Occam were in open revolt against papal claims ; the latter set the Bible over the church, and maintained that the pope was neither infallible as a *spiritual* ruler, nor by rights a *secular* ruler at all. The revolt was the uprising of the *secular* and (in the end) the *democratic* consciousness. Many might wish in theory to see a strong emperor whose will stood for law according to the new conceptions of authority—just as Hobbes or Machiavelli are quite content to obey a single strong ruler without having any special prejudice in favour of monarchy.

Program of Anti-Clerical Absolutism.—But Marsilius in his *Defensor* puts forth, without disguise and with plain indebtedness to roman tradition, the modern whig doctrine,—that all power comes from the people, and that the prince is but a limited magistrate. It is the whole community that makes the laws and alone can legislate and coerce ; the church must be content to persuade. Clergy are subject as other men to the civil courts and must be allowed no special immunities. The right to excommunicate (as in old city-states) rests with the body of citizens taken together, not with any single priest. The magistrate, appointed by the people, names and removes bishops : of heresy he must take no cognizance unless it threatens public order. Here is the prototype of all later secular absolutism—of Henry VIII and Elizabeth, of Erastus and Grotius, of Hobbes, Rousseau and Napoleon. The claims of a spiritual power had been abso-

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[1] Dante is a wibelline because he is a patriot and resents a gallican pope ; in different ways Petrarch and Rienzi protest against the evils of a popedom, as much chained to civil dictation as in the feudalized period of Theophylact and the Counts of Tusculum (882–964). The *moral* commonwealth passed away from human memory, when these idealists were dead, and in its place arose the *coercive* State of modern times.

[2] A catholic recrudescence of the agelong resistance to a secularized and greedy church, which appeared in the Paulicians and their western followers, Cathars and Albigenses.

[3] The hero of the franciscan extremists was Celestinus V, whom Boniface VIII the last ' pope-emperor ' had frightened into abdication ; their scriptures were the writings (some being apocryphal) of Abbot Joachim (+ 1202) ; and their chief tenets, the ' Eternal ' and spiritual ' Gospel ', the ending of Antichrist and the carnal church of Babylon, and belief in a new outpouring of the Holy Ghost. See pages 777 to 784.

lutely denied, but, so far from being abolished, were merely transferred intact to the new ruler—whether *prince* acting for people or *people* acting for themselves. In a moment the whole *spiritual* basis of authority vanished: in its place we have *utility*, or *common consent*, or the *will* of an unlimited sovereign—chosen by the people for this very purpose, to reduce all to a dead level of uniformity and rule, like his real model the greek tyrant, with stern impartiality.

Rienzi, the Black Death, the Golden Bull: Return from Avignon.—The Conciliar Period (which shows Marsilius' views in active operation) was hurried on, first by avignonese finance, next by the scandal of the Great Schism.[1] It must not be forgotten that the papacy (though now 'gallican') was still looked upon as the central treasury of Christendom and the war-chest against Islam. No believer felt as yet any right to refuse to contribute. It was still so far international and democratic, standing at the pinnacle of a hierarchy where the loftiest places were freely open to merit and ability. But it had now pushed this internationalism to extremes: absentee foreigners held, often in plurality, the best benefices of the northern and eastern kingdoms. The middle of cent. xiv was marked by the appearance of Rienzi and by the Black Death (*1347*, *1348*). The failure of the one, the colossal ravages of the other, did much to lower the moral temperature and administer a death-blow to idealism.[2] Rienzi was first and foremost an italian *nationalist* of the federal type; a Latin League, with an elected Latin Emperor, was his original scheme. So far had he progressed from Dante's *universal* and holy monarchy; the nearer and more concrete had replaced the older and wider visions. At the same moment the *Golden Bull* (*1355*) showed that Germany repented of her long imperialism; Charles IV seems implicitly to recognize the impassable frontier of the Alps and to resign the costly intervention in matters italian. While France and England were fighting to the death in the disastrous Hundred Years' War, the pope renounced his gallicanism and after a tentative visit (*1368*) to Rome, returned there finally to reside in *1377*. No general feeling that the papal estate was sacrosanct could have preserved it in that unscrupulous age of Hawkwood, the Visconti, the Free Companies.[3] It was necessary that the pope should visibly 'take

[1] John XXII was largely to blame for the oppressive system which already formed an economic grievance (to such countries as England and Germany) and was the real cause of the 'Reformation' after 1500.

[2] The contrast of the two governments of Rienzi is most remarkable; always vain and theatrical, he is yet in his first period a high-minded tribune, but in the latter, merely a variant or eccentric instance of the italian tyrant: his death was an early instance of the 'justifiable homicide' of an elected ruler, who according to the new doctrines (destined to bear such terrible fruit) had forfeited by abuse of power, not merely the rights of a *monarch* but even the rights of a *man*.

[3] It is notable that Florence (just as in Machiavelli's time) protested against the pope's return, so long demanded by Italians: 'it would destroy 'all hopes of italian freedom.'

seisin ' of his realm and capital. But with his return the character of the papacy once more undergoes change : the pope whose *spiritual* freedom has been seen to depend on *territorial* independence throughout the sojourn at Avignon, tends now to become an italian princeling of the usual pattern, anxious to establish a real authority instead of the old shadowy *dominium*, and secretly conspiring in a celibate church to found a dynasty.

Protests of Nationalism : Belief in Parliament.—The Great Schism (*1378*) was in part a protest of nationalities against a power which had long been a slave or a partizan. As France had entertained its own private pontiff for nearly 70 years, might not each principal division of Europe have its own separate head ? The ecumenical empire was in fact gone, why should not a supernatural papacy follow it ? But there prevailed, in this Conciliar Age, a *democratic* rather than a *monarchic* tendency. The Church was to have parliament as its chief organ ; General Councils were to rule rather than one man. It was clear that under such a system the laity would predominate. In the divided allegiance the divisions of peoples ran on *political* rather than on *religious* lines. In the early years of cent. xv, Europe had become tired of the papal conflict. In *1406*, the popes of Rome and Avignon agreed to resign but neither would take the irrevocable step before his rival. Just a quarter of a century before, Langenstein, a german at Paris, had written *Consilium Pacis* (*1381*) an impersonal title which points a real contrast to Occam's treatise. He showed that only a Convocation or Assembly could decide between rival claims in the papal *dyarchy* or appease the schism which had ruined the old exclusive and imperious *monarchy*. The cardinals in *1408* withdrew their allegiance from both popes and themselves summoned the Council of Pisa (*1409*).

Overt Denial of Monarchy : Victory of Constitutionalism.—This aristocratic convention was unique and revolutionary. It was not merely an act of rebellion against a pope, but a real denial of this monarchical principle altogether, a blow at centralized authority. Cardinals appeared with full powers to judge, accuse and condemn their popes : laymen joined with them in a final verdict depriving and deposing both claimants. Gerson reinforced the general thesis, put forward by Marsilius many years back, by maintaining that, while a pope was in any case subject to a General Council, the church could do without a pope altogether. This was distinctly a second rehearsal of the reformation. After the brief reign of Alexander V the Council made Baltazar Cossa pope as John XXIII. But the election was not a happy one for the party of reform, and in *1411* Emperor Sigismund decided to call a second Council at Constance. In this great assembly (*1414–15*), of pomp and numbers unparalleled, the voting was taken by nations, not by members present (in which case the roman bishops would have turned the scale). John XXIII escaped and Cardinal Zabarella carried Gerson's principle, that the Council was superior to the Pope. John was formally deposed *1415*, Gregory XII resigned ; Benedict XIII (Pedro di Luna) was quietly ignored till *1417*. The ' parliamentary ' movement issuing from Paris under Gerson and Alliacus had won its case : the papacy was now a constitutional monarchy : councils summoned every five years were to be the real governors of the church.

New Social Peril from Heresy : Hus and Jerome Condemned.—Such a liberal system could now turn with assurance against heretics and antinomians—both in England and Bohemia. It was one thing to fetter the arbitrary powers of a pope, another to allow the inroads of Wiclif and Hus, whose principles were represented as subverting the social order itself. The social aspect of heresy or of schism must never be forgotten in dealing with medieval persecution : the people were as timorous and suspicious of secret or unusual cults as the heathens of Rome and the provinces in the first three centuries. With the wild charges levelled impartially against early Christians, gnostics, cathars, albigenses, templars, we have nothing to do here. But it is fair to remind ourselves of the grounds of the panic and cruelty which (as in the case of later witchcraft) disgraced a civilized society. So long as the primitive notion of Church-State survives, such action will be not merely natural but justified.[1] Where this strong conviction waxes feebler, it is not hard to associate new doctrine with new social usage ; and the people are by nature staunch conservatives and, if they demand the most violent changes, do so in the name of the reform of recent abuses and a return to the ' good old days '. Lollards (it was thought) had menaced the whole social fabric under Richard II. They were implicated in all the agrarian tumults and disorder of the reign. They had formally denounced (*1395*) in a petition the doctrine of the mass, clerical celibacy, monkish vows, confession and prayers for the dead. Persecution came into fashion with the new century and the insecure dynasty of Henry IV purchased church support by allowing it. The College of Prague had caught the infection from refugees : all dogma, discipline and authority were threatened : Hus was condemned to death in *1415*, Jerome the next year.[2]

Parliament and the People having Won their Case Vanish : Demand for Absolutism.—Martin V, a Colonna and an italian prince as well as a pontiff, passed south into the charmed circle of the Renaissance, into an atmosphere where the rude blasts of teutonic grievance could not

[1] I cannot do better than quote Dr. Margoliouth : ' The better the ' order of the community, the less chance has a prophet. The execution ' of Socrates took place after a legal trial, in the most highly civilized and ' most tolerant State of antiquity. The charge was that Socrates did not ' worship the city's gods and shook other people's belief in them . . . ' Some citizens of Bagdad a few months ago (1914) clamoured for the ' execution of a man who preached the equalization of the sexes in defiance ' of the Coran. People suppose that the favour of the gods is necessary ' for the well-being of their communities : if the gods are offended, their ' vengeance falls, not upon the individual offender, but upon the community, ' taking the form of plague, famine or defeat in war. Hence it is with the ' view of self-preservation that the community defends the honour of its ' gods.'

[2] Dr. Barry, the learned and impartial historian of the papacy says : ' According to the judicial procedure which then prevailed, their trial was fair and their sentence merited.'

penetrate. The Reformation was not understood as a serious movement by the Romans until nearly a third of Europe was in schism, until the Sack of Rome (*1527*) sobered society and its rulers by a sudden and terrible shock. But the most curious feature of the ' parliamentary ' epoch, which the Councils had ushered in, was the disappearance of Parliament. No sooner had the rights of Christendom in council over the pope been established, than they were repudiated or forgotten or spurned with impunity. We find a striking analogy nearer our own age : after ' freedom ' was restored in the ' Glorious Revolution ' of *1689*, it was out of fashion for a century, and at no time in english history (it may safely be said) did the people at large exact so little influence or control over their governors as in cent. xviii. The victory of titular independence seemed in both cases a last expiring effort rather than the first step in a serious movement towards any real autonomy. Freedom of this or that group was both the pride and the disadvantage of the Middle Ages. Everywhere the central power was checked, not merely by its own financial weakness, but by every species of contract, franchise, charter, immunity, Diets, Estates. The period saw the culmination of constitutional counterpoises. Representation (of classes and interests rather than of heads) was the rule not the exception. But cent. xv which began with the conciliar triumph of ' parliament ' witnessed also the extinction of this form of government. In France, armagnac feuds and the national demand for a strong ruler produced the typical ' italian ' tyrant, Louis XI. The Lancastrian Parliament, which recovered its rights over a feeble and usurping house, lost all power or credit during the dynastic feuds under Henry VI and Edward IV : a ' tyrant's ' policy of confiscation enabled both York and Tudor sovereigns to avoid meeting their Commons with unwelcome demands for money. Parliament became a mere instrument of despotism. The most highly civilized towns of Italy were in the hands of ' tyrants '—Rimini, Bologna, Milan, Ferrara, Perugia, Florence (with some reserve).

Everywhere Democratic Claims Abandoned : Papacy an Italian Princedom.—Side by side with the culture and art of the Renaissance, there rose up a system of government which Machiavelli only codified but did not invent. He only drew a picture from life and passed it on a handbook of the ruler's art. The absolute defeat of constitutionalism is the feature of the century, at the very time when public knowledge, opinion, and interest in passing events were much increased in nearly every country. The notable triumph of secular government, untrammelled by moral or clerical restraint,[1] resulted in part from fear of the church and of feudalism: both systems were irksome checks upon the chief factor in social evolution, wealth and commerce. Principles of democracy seem everywhere abandoned, not least rapidly in the popedom itself. The church as an international system had been open to the very humblest class and until cent. xv the poorest monk had a chance of becoming head of Christendom. But we see now the continuous influence of certain papal families, exerted without any general scandal. Yet the Conciliar Age dragged out an un-

[1] Of which nothing but strength and success were demanded.

honoured existence. The Council of Basel sat for eighteen years (*1431–1449*), a democratic assembly, unwelcome survival in an age of a new and refined aristocracy.[1] Pius II (Æneas Sylvius) called it in contempt an assembly of cooks and stable-boys ; both in its claims, its length of tenure, its anachronism, and its futility, it resembled our own Long Parliament just two centuries later.[2] The Conciliar Movement died at the last sitting of Basel (*1449*) ; Constantinople[3] fell to the Turks four years later. At the same time (*1452*) the few traditions of roman ' freedom ' were extinguished in the execution of Porcaro the last municipal republican, and with Cardinal Nicolas of Brixen expired the last hopes of internal reform, the last moderate protest from the teutonic spirit north of the Alps. The papacy assumes more and more the features of an italian ' tyranny ' disguised by greek refinement. Yet freedom owes a real debt to the popes, who saved Rome from falling to France or Spain and permitted a liberty of thought and expression (as well as of morals) from which rationalism has since derived its chief weapons.[4] The great spiritual ideals, papacy and empire, are now to be seen as mere appendages to personal interests and without ecumenical significance. Charles V used for dynastic ends

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[1] It is clear that, in this and later times, *papal nepotism* was justified by popular opinion as providing at least some stability through trustworthy ministers—in an age when no one could believe another man's word. Nepotism not only enabled a pope to survive secret plots or poison, but gave respite from the baronial lawlessness of the earlier Middle Age which the Romans never forgot.

[2] We may here make clear one point of importance : that parliament and the puritans, so far from establishing principles current to-day, defended a cause already lost. Central government was perhaps unhappily entrusted to Charles I, to Laud and Strafford : but the puritans (like a feudal party of old) fought for a weak executive, and again wished to restore a clerical tyranny. Cromwell avenged Charles I as a king, though he executed him as a man and a rival. Parliament never afterwards regained either the confidence of the people or its own independence : and when reform in 1832 released it from subservience to a few noble families (amongst whom the central government and sovereignty were put in commission), the Ministers of the Crown soon began to look past a popular house to the people themselves. Nor is it difficult to-day to see that this people prefers a dictator to a council or a cabinet.

[3] The entrance of the Turks was in large measure due to *religious* feuds : the power and prestige of the byzantine monarchy had been shattered by the latin buccaneers in 1204 ; two and a half centuries later the Turks seized the headquarters of the Greek Church, which catholic Europe would not help in spite of some passionate appeals from the Renaissance popes, among whom Pius II calls for honourable mention.

[4] Dr. Barry does not utter a perverse paradox when he says : ' Rome for nearly 300 years remained the one free spot in southern Europe, as Holland became the free meeting-place of the protestant north.'

he still remaining prestige of the empire; but he was only following the example set by the popes after Pius II.

New Ideals in Charles VIII., Savonarola, Cæsar Borgia.—The close of the century is notable for two political experiments, the willing submission of Italy to a foreign king (a dominion which however crumbled at his first defeat *1495*) and a striking attempt at practical theocracy. The Florentines gave a ready welcome to Charles VIII of France, and Savonarola was among the deputies who invited him to enter; italian cities always preferred a supreme administrator who had nothing to do with the place and recognized no party ties.[1] A free people received as their patron a foreign king, just as the papacy rose to power by investing a frankish foreigner with the patriciate (*800*). The 'summer-king's' reign passed in a night, and Florence made trial of a theocracy under a friar preaching a stern morality in a wanton and sceptical age,—a forerunner of Calvin, Knox and the scottish presbyters: he too fell a victim like Rienzi (*1498*) and the pope Alexander VI had won a double victory over national unity achieved it is true by a foreign dominion) and the cause of reform. This strange pontiff gave the next four years of his life to the revival of Theophylact's old feudal policy (*c. 900*): Cæsar Borgia's conquest of Romagna was to found a family to which the popedom might be attached.[2] For a moment it seemed even possible that Cæsar might unite Italy under a single king; the title or antecedents of a papal bastard made no difference in an unprejudiced age which paid homage only to beauty, cleverness, and success. The deaths of father and son put an end to a scheme which in part depended on the backing of papal prestige. Julius II also desired to see the french or franks turn their backs on Italy and held that Italy's hope lay in a strong secular papacy.[3] But on his death once again a frankish policy prevailed and the concordat was signed with Francis I (*1516*).

Luther and the New Hierocracy: Subjectivity only Begets Authority in a Fresh Form.—The recent papal recovery as a secular power reinforcing spiritual claims, without doubt helped to hurry Luther into rebellion: the objects attacked were italian supremacy and financial pressure.[4]

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[1] It is hardly needful to point out the *foreign* origin of most historic dynasties, which are rarely 'prophets in their own country'; also the *patronal* basis of most royal claimants, who appear as a welcome relief from internal feud and oscillating factions: hence *cum domino pax ista venit* and, again and again, the 'people love to have it so'.

[2] Who can wonder if somewhere about this time Maximilian dreamt of annexing the *papacy* to the *empire*?

[3] That italian unity was not then achieved has been by some charged to the discredit of Venice; which steadily and stealthily opposed his policy, to her own hurt and the further disunion of Italy.

[4] Like Nestorius, Luther was only slowly and reluctantly impelled to the extreme position: he had conciliar warranty for holding that by *itself* papal decree was not security enough; in 1517 he did not deny that indulgences might be good in themselves; in 1520 he burnt Leo's Bull in

The final breach (*1520*) opened the way for new theories of church and o government. In place of a priesthood conferring (or withholding) sacra mental *grace*, *faith* in the Saviour became the chief Christian dogma and origin of salvation. Ordinances and outward forms became superfluous as long ago in the Paulicians' eyes : and though the motive was personal *mystical* and (in theory) democratic, yet the reformed system when applied to a large and ignorant mass involved the supremacy of preachers who like Savonarola or Knox, ' dictated laws from the pulpit'. At last the mystical subjectivity, which hitherto the church had known so well how to control and utilize in legitimate channels, united with a purely secular movement ' of the purse ', and in a large part of Europe won the day. Catholic ' realism ' was wholly set aside when the old donatist tenet was revived that the individual believers, added together one by one, made the church, and not the church the individual believers. If the Christian makes the church, the church does not make the Christian ; it is a later result or merely a convenient collective name, which must never deceive us into giving vitality to a mere abstraction. This was Nominalism *in excelsis*, long heralded by the new induction of individualism, which in worlds of *thought* and *nature* alike had been introduced in cent. xiii and xiv. Individual or atomic *freedom*, without necessary corporate union, cannot fail to produce *Authority* in another and intenser form.

Catastrophe of the Secularized Papacy : Henry VIII and the New Democratic Absolutism.—The last scene in the Drama of the Renaissance Papacy shows the pope Clement VII (Medici) allied once more with France against Charles V, a parody of the old captivity at Avignon. When his ally was captured by the emperor it is said that the pope absolved him from the oath to keep the treaty (which restored the king's freedom), and

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public ; five years later he declared against the conventual and cœnobitic system ; and by that time he had (no doubt with some unwillingness) allowed his eager followers to deny certain aspects and efficacies of the Mass.

[1] All the genuine and basic tenets of the Reformation may be found in the *Ship of Fools* by Sebastian Brant, chancellor of Strasburg (Basel 1494). Though he satirizes the clergy he is earnest in tone and exhorts man never to forget eternity and salvation : he does not refer to the church as granting pardon or imparting grace ; reference to confession is scanty ; virgins and saints are not named as intercessors ; there is no emphasis on the need of sacraments. The lesson is plainly taught that man *deals with God directly* without mediation of priest or ordinance : to Him alone he is responsible, ' to his own master he standeth or falleth '. Classical history supplies instances of the good and noble life, of wisdom consisting in obedience (to natural law) and upright conduct : instead of apostles and saints, we are asked to look at the examples of Hercules and Penelope, Pythagoras and Socrates, Plato and Virgil. A *german* scholar of the Renaissance thus leads the way in formulating some of the chief tenets of the new faith : but, no doubt, not the most important of all, salvation by *faith*, rather than by *works* or (pagan or pelagian) virtue.

renewed the alliance. Clement also tried to bribe Charles' general, Pescara, to desert. Fighting partly like the Borgia for family ends, partly also in the interest of italian freedom, Clement exasperated Charles and led events onward to the irretrievable catastrophe of the Sack of Rome. In the humiliation of the pope, in sacrilegious outrages in Rome, Lutherans were invited to join by the emperor's captains ; and they did so wth hearty good will. Both in *1526* and *1527* the capital of Christendom was assaulted, taken by storm and plundered. A medici pope and a catholic emperor gave Rome over to lutheran pillage. The spirit of the Holy See, not merely of the pope, was broken. He consented to crown his enemy in *1530*, and promised to call a Council. Charles made gracious concessions to the Lutherans at Nuremberg (*1532*) ; and on Clement's death, in *1534*, nearly half Christendom was in rebellion against the papal system. Just six months before his death (that is, on March 24), the pope confirmed the Rota Tribunal's decree that Henry VIII's marriage with Katharine was valid and indissoluble. The answer came in the denial of papal supremacy, the final rupture of England with Rome, and the elevation of a secular king to be the ruler of a national church. Cranmer as Primate had given leave for the divorce in May, *1533* ; and it was now openly claimed that the king had final jurisdiction in spiritual matters. Convocation and Parliament hastened to heap new titles and prerogatives on the King, and in England the ideal of Machiavelli had been realized.

Reformers Aggrandise the New Tyranny : Cruel Penalties for Treason and Heresy.—This wholesale transfer, not entirely under compulsion, of power to the state-sovereign—not by a timid mob but by men of prudence and intellect—is the salient feature of cent. xvi. Everywhere submission to authority was preached, not merely by rulers but by able spokesmen from the subject class. It was therefore clear that religious freedom and tolerance was not the aim for which Reformers strove, but religious supremacy for a new and better system (it was hoped) of dogma and discipline. Whatever promises to other dissenters may be made (or broken), every formal confession or decree of the reformed churches makes for absolute control of religion by the State. In England a king (of the italian type) is supreme head of the church : Luther is asking fresh powers for the territorial prince ; Calvin will write his *Institutes* and dedicate a notable work of learning and logic to a french catholic despot ; Ignatius composes for the new militant Order of Jesuits his *Spiritual Exercises* ; the Council of Trent will soon close up by formal and vigorous definition every avenue still left open to private judgment ; the protestant churches will retaliate by Prayer-books often recast by civil authority, by Augsburg Confessions, or Thirty-nine Articles, or Westminster Catechisms. Everywhere the old polity of tradition gives way before a feverish desire for paper constitutions, and for a strong executive—two things clearly irreconcilable. The fervour of a faith, no doubt often vague and uncertain of aim, has surrendered to fixity and formula. The Jesuits form a new order on the lines of a strict military obedience to an autocrat ; the model was no longer a secluded order of monks or even a brotherhood of preaching friars but the ' free company ' of *condottieri* under an absolute captain. Every sect (except

the socinian) accepted the duty of persecution : to be of a different faith from the ruler's was to be a traitor amenable to laws of treason, growing daily more and more cruel. Catholics sincerely maintain the need of defending the social order against the infection of anarchy, the moral law (inseparable to them from conformity and right belief) against antinomian licence. Protestants of all phases of thought demanded that the civil magistrates should abolish false doctrine and the ' idolatry of the Mass '.

Passive Obedience—(not a Legacy from Medieval Catholicism).—All early Reformers inculcated *passive obedience* to rulers ; and everywhere by a natural process, these civil rulers were being invested with spiritual or at least with clerical, powers. Some proposed to submit the prince to the ruling of the state-clergy and most refused him any competence in defining dogma ; but in the end the church-establishment was in a real degree a subsidiary department of the new absolute State ; not, as in the Middle Age, its superior, or at least its counterpoise. Thus by a curious irony the movement toward a purely spiritual and invisible church of personal belief and assurance degraded religion into a province of the State the essential element was outward conformity and obedience to a visible and no less autocratic official body. But Luther discarded the idea of a coercive Establishment, and the new hierarchic claims are best seen in Calvin's writings.

Anti-Monarchic Reaction : Revival of Republic and Parliamentarism.—Reform was a movement of the middle class, of the industrial townsfolk it was utilized by kings and nobles for their own ends ; but it distrusted these allies. Underneath professions of obedience and appeals to Holy Writ, it tended to undermine government and to claim a democratic equality of urban burgesses who might elect their ministers but were then to be governed by them. It is idle to deny that in the end reform on these lines became *anti-monarchic*. Stuarts both in Scotland and England might be pardoned for holding firmly to a belief in this anarchic tendency. The Huguenots with their exempt citadels and strongholds, were a menace to any notion of a united and centralized France ; the Beggars in the Netherlands, the Presbytery in Scotland, Calvin's imitation of Savonarola in Geneva—may be cited in support. Neither Calvin nor his fellow-townsman Rousseau in later times would allow much scope to a regal executive ; both believed in lodging absolute power in an assembly representing (or claiming to represent) the entire community.

Council of Trent Reverts to the Monarchical Principle.—The Council of Trent (sitting for 6 years in the period *1545–1564*) learnt much from the systems and policies of its enemies : *fas est et ab hoste doceri*. It organized

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[1] Even Melancthon joins Luther, Calvin and Knox, recording his vote for civil interference against popery ' *non enim plectitur fides sed* hæresis ', and what was heresy is determined by the State ; he held that stubborn Anabaptists should be put to death. Beza thinks the death penalty should be exacted from all who denied the Trinity. Calvin acted on this principle in the notable case of Servetus (1553) and himself wrote a *Defence of the Orthodox Faith showing that heretics ought to be punished by the sword.*

anew the services of defence or aggression, and (once more) submitted the church wholly to a papal autocracy like an army under a general: there was no more talk of conciliar government. But this does not in the least imply an arbitrary or purely personal power, to be lodged in the pope: quite the reverse. It is indeed the first aim of a formal Absolutism to safeguard itself against such an exercise or misuse of authority. The church had seen enough of a genuine personal autocracy, in the italian princelings or ambitious spaniards who somehow became possessed of the tiara and used it for selfish or dynastic aims. The real power was to reside (as in democratic cabinets to-day) in a small central committee, receiving news by the new 'secret service' of the Jesuit Order. Neither France nor Spain for all their professed devotion to the Holy See, regarded this development with favour. Although the pope was in theory absolute, a State could no longer treat with him personally as an autocrat, nor had he any longer a personal policy or (with rare exceptions) a will of his own. The great catholic powers were as anxious as the protestant that there should be no real revival of Theocracy.[1]

Civil State ceases to Recognize Religion or Morality.—In all this confusion of sentiment, policies and ideals, amid the belated survivals of medieval conceptions in most unsuspected quarters, passed away the period of the Wars of Religion. Westphalia (*1648*) put an end finally to many of the old pretexts and decent disguises. Hobbes at the same moment taught that, though the modern State must be absolute at the centre and religion a subordinate province, the State had in truth nothing to do with belief or personal religion at all. To-day we wonder if it has been able to retain any connexion with morality.

[1] Just as it is strange to find Voltaire writing in earnest defence of the Jesuits, so we wonder at the threat of Paul IV (a Caraffa from Naples *1555–1559*) to depose Philip II of Spain and deprive him of both his crowns! Philip, like his father, did not scruple to send troops under the duke of Alva against Rome.

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Margoliouth (prof) 866
Marsilius of Padua 859 sq.
Maternus (Firmicus) 701
Matthew Paris 798
Michelet 804

Noack 679

Œcolampadius 734
Oresme (bp.) 824
Ostiensis 789

Paul (apostle) 660 sq. 682
Pirenne (prof) 817
Poole 679
Preger 782. 796
Prutz 803

Recared (span. king) 765
Reinach (S), 751
Ricci 838
Robertson (E) 859
Royce 808

Schmidt 790
Seligman 808

Taylor, 715. 728

Villani 799. 804
Vinogradoff (prof) 825. 831

Webb (C J) 697
Wells (H G) 849
Westermarck 800
Wilcke 803
Wulf (de) 696. 720

3989

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